FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1937, THE FAR EAST, VOLUME III Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937 Volume III The Far East United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. The Far East (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, Volume III) Contents Undeclared War Between Japan and China: Political and military developments: Chapter I: January 1–July 7, 1937 (Documents 1-106) Chapter II: July 8–25, 1937 (Documents 107-266) Chapter III: July 26–August 13, 1937 (Documents 267-444) Chapter IV: August 13–31, 1937 (Documents 445-563) Chapter V: September 1–October 11, 1937 (Documents 564-657) Chapter VI: October 12–November 22, 1937 (Documents 658-777) Chapter VII: November 23–December 12, 1937 (Documents 778-888) Chapter VIII: December 13–31, 1937 (Documents 889-952) Representations to the Japanese Government with respect to the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and Salt Revenue Administrations (Documents 953-1042) Developments with respect to “Manchoukuo”; reservation by the United States of American rights threatened by consolidation of Japanese Army control (Documents 1043-1096) Consideration of neutralization of islands of the Pacific Ocean or a general Pacific pact of nonaggression (Documents 1097-1112) Index Undeclared War Between Japan and China: Undeclared War Between Japan and China: 1 1 For previous correspondence on the Far Eastern crisis, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. For other correspondence on 1937, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 313 – 428 , 487 – 553 , 729 – 735 , 757 – 760 . Contents Chapter I: January 1–July 7, 1937 (Documents 1-106) Chapter II: July 8–25, 1937 (Documents 107-266) Chapter III: July 26–August 13, 1937 (Documents 267-444) Chapter IV: August 13–31, 1937 (Documents 445-563) Chapter V: September 1–October 11, 1937 (Documents 564-657) Chapter VI: October 12–November 22, 1937 (Documents 658-777) Chapter VII: November 23–December 12, 1937 (Documents 778-888) Chapter VIII: December 13–31, 1937 (Documents 889-952) Chapter I: January 1–July 7, 1937 Chapter I: January 1–July 7, 1937 Deterioration of Japan’s foreign relations as result of developments in 1936; aftermath of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s release from kidnaping at Sian; restatement of policy by new Foreign Ministers at Tokyo and Nanking; review of American interest in China, March 13; Nanking-Moscow understanding (reported March 26); negotiations between Nanking Government and Chinese Communist leaders; Japanese Foreign Office effort to secure understanding with United Kingdom as to China; continuing deadlock in Chinese-Japanese relations [1] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 1, 1937. [Received February 19.] 894.00/696 [2] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, January 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received January 4—10:15 a.m.] 893.00/13853: Telegram [3] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, January 7, 1937—noon. [Received January 7—7 a.m.] 893.00/13877: Telegram [4] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, January 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received January 7—2:45 p.m.] 893.00/13879: Telegram [5] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, January 9, 1937—11 a.m. [Received January 9—6:36 a.m.] 893.00/13882: Telegram [6] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, January 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 4:10 p.m.] 893.00/13895: Telegram [7] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, January 13, 1937—8 p.m. [Received 9:48 p.m.] 893.00/13897: Telegram [8] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, January 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received January 22—7:10 a.m.] 893.00/13940: Telegram [9] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, January 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received at midnight.] 893.00/13951: Telegram [10] Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Nanking, January 26, 1937. 893.00/14035 [11] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, January 27, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 5:19 p.m.] 893.00/13953: Telegram [12] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Shanghai, January 28, 1937. 893.00/14042 [13] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 4, 1937—2 p.m. [Received February 5—8:18 p.m.] 893.00/13964: Telegram [14] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, February 4, 1937—4 p.m. [Received February 4—7:30 a.m.] 893.00/13963: Telegram [15] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, February 4, 1937. [Received February 23.] 761.93/1583 [16] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 6, 1937—11 a.m. [Received February 6—10:10 a.m.] 893.00/13965: Telegram [17] The First Secretary of Embassy in China (Merrill) to the Secretary of State Peiping, February 8, 1937—5 p.m. [Received February 8—2:10 p.m.] 793.94/8509: Telegram [18] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 10, 1937—9 a.m. [Received February 10—6:30 a.m.] 893.00/13967: Telegram [19] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) at Nanking Washington, February 10, 1937—2 p.m. 893.00/13964: Telegram [20] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 15, 1937—noon. [Received 8:05 p.m.] 893.00/13974: Telegram [21] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, February 15, 1937—6 p.m. [Received February 15—8:55 a.m.] 894.00/695: Telegram [22] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, February 15, 1937—6 p.m. [Received February 15—5:02 p.m.] 893.00/13973: Telegram [23] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 18, 1937—noon. [Received February 18—10:20 a.m.] 893.00/13976: Telegram [24] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, February 20, 1937—1 p.m. [Received February 20—7:10 a.m.] 793.94/8511: Telegram [25] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 23, 1937—2 p.m. [Received February 24—1:45 p.m.] 893.00/14016: Telegram [26] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, February 25, 1937. [Received March 18.] 793.94/8546 [27] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, February 26, 1937—2 p.m. [Received February 26—7:25 a.m.] 893.00/14022: Telegram [28] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received February 27—8 a.m.] 893.00/14023: Telegram [29] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, March 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received March 3—2:30 p.m.] 893.00/14025: Telegram [30] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 3, 1937. [Received April 6.] 793.94/8566 [31] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 4, 1937—2 p.m. [Received March 4—7:15 a.m.] 894.00/700: Telegram [32] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 5, 1937—6 p.m. [Received March 5—9:48 a.m.] 894.00/706: Telegram [33] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, March 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 8—3:04 p.m.] 893.00/14050: Telegram [34] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, March 9, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:55 a.m.] 711.93/350: Telegram [35] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, March 11, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 11—9:50 a.m.] 793.94/8533: Telegram [36] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, March 11, 1937—5 p.m. [Received March 11—6:55 a.m.] 793.94/8532: Telegram [37] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 11, 1937—6 p.m. [Received March 11—11:05 a.m.] 794.00/109: Telegram [38] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received March 12—9:40 a.m.] 794.00/110: Telegram [39] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, March 13, 1937—noon. [Received March 13—9:12 a.m.] 701.4194/26: Telegram [40] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received March 13—9:47 a.m.] 794.00/111: Telegram [41] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, March 13, 1937. 711.93/350 [42] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, March 16, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 3:45 p.m.] 793.94/8542: Telegram [43] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, March 16, 1937—5 p.m. [Received March 16—3 p.m.] 793.94/8541: Telegram [44] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 17, 1937. [Received April 6.] 794.00/116 [45] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, March 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 18—7 a.m.] 793.94/8544: Telegram [46] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, March 22, 1937. [Received April 19.] 893.00/14085 [47] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, March 23, 1937—4 p.m [Received March 23—8:30 a.m.] 793.94/8552: Telegram [48] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, March 24, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 12:50 p.m.] 794.00/315: Telegram [49] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 24, 1937—2 p.m. [Received March 24—7:40 a.m.] 794.00/114: Telegram [50] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, March 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 24—9:55 a.m.] 793.94/8554: Telegram [51] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, March 26, 1937—7 p.m. [Received March 26—2:30 p.m.] 761.93/1586: Telegram [52] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, March 26, 1937. [Received April 8.] 761.94/958 [53] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, March 26, 1937. [Received April 8.] 794.00/117 [54] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received April 1—1:40 p.m.] 893.00/14065: Telegram [55] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 5, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:30 a.m.] 893.00/14067: Telegram [56] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 5, 1937—5 p.m. [Received April 6—7 a.m.] 761.93/1587: Telegram [57] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, April 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received April 13—8:40 a.m.] 793.94/8583: Telegram [58] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, April 16, 1937. [Received May 3.] 741.94/92 [59] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 19, 1937—noon. [Received 12:10 p.m.] 793.94/8587: Telegram [60] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 11:25 a.m.] 793.94/8591: Telegram [61] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Shanghai, April 21, 1937. 761.93/1591 [62] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, April 22, 1937. [Received May 17.] 793.94/8629 [63] Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis London, April 23, 1937. 890.00/47 [64] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 24, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 11:45 a.m.] 793.94/8597: Telegram [65] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 893.00/14095: Telegram [66] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received April 29—8:55 a.m.] 793.94/8603: Telegram [67] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 30, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 10:50 a.m.] 893.00/14096: Telegram [68] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, May 8, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 1:40 p.m.] 793.94/8618: Telegram [69] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 10, 1937. [Received June 1.] 793.94/8643: Telegram [70] The Department of State to the Chinese Embassy undated 741.94/114a [71] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 11, 1937. [Received June 1.] 794.00/122 [72] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, May 11, 1937. [Received June 15.] 893.00/14126 [73] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, May 12, 1937. [Received May 25.] 761.93/1593 [74] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, May 12, 1937. [Received June 15.] 793.94/8662 [75] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, May 14, 1937—7 p.m. 741.94/97a: Telegram [76] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 14, 1937. [Received June 1.] 793.94/8644 [77] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 17, 1937—8 p.m. [Received May 17—11:40 a.m.] 894.00/734: Telegram [78] Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Lyon) Peiping, May 18, 1937. 893.00/14128 [79] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received May 18—2:35 p.m.] 741.94/98: Telegram [80] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, May 24, 1937. 741.94/101a [81] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 26, 1937—1 p.m. [Received May 26—6:45 a.m.] 793.94/8636: Telegram [82] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, May 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 11:10 a.m.] 793.94/8637: Telegram [83] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, May 29, 1937—noon. [Received May 29—10:25 a.m.] 793.94/8639: Telegram [84] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 31, 1937—noon. [Received May 31—7:12 a.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/7: Telegram [85] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 2, 1937—1 p.m. [Received June 2—11:45 a.m.] 893.00/14123: Telegram [86] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 7, 1937—9 a.m. [Received June 7—8:20 a.m.] 793.94/8647: Telegram [87] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 7, 1937—11 a.m. [Received June 7—7 a.m.] 793.94/8648: Telegram [88] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 7, 1937—2 p.m. [Received June 7—6:08 a.m.] 711.94/1136: Telegram [89] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, June 10, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 10—10 a.m.] 793.94/8654: Telegram [90] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 10, 1937. [Received July 13.] 893.00/14145 [91] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, June 16, 1937—4 p.m. [Received June 16—12:50 p.m.] 793.94/8663: Telegram [92] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received June 20—7 a.m.] 893.79694/24: Telegram [93] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, June 22, 1937—3 p.m. [Received June 22—11 a.m.] 793.94/8665: Telegram [94] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 23—9:25 a.m.] 741.94/111: Telegram [95] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, June 23, 1937—7 p.m. [Received June 23—1:15 p.m.] 793.94/8666: Telegram [96] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Shanghai, June 23, 1937. 893.00/14150 [97] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, June 24, 1937—5 p.m. 741.94/111: Telegram [98] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 24, 1937. [Received July 12.] 793.94/8725 [99] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Shanghai, June 25, 1937. 893.00/14148 [100] Memorandum by the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) of a Conversation With the British Secretary of the Consular Body at Shanghai (Long) [Shanghai,] June 29, 1937. 793.94/8995 [101] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 30, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:25 a.m.] 793.94/8675: Telegram [102] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Peiping, June 30, 1937. 793.94/8982 [103] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 1, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 1—9:35 a.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/19: Telegram [104] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, July 1, 1937—5 p.m. 741.94/111: Telegram [105] Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Peiping, July 1, 1937. 793.94/8982 [106] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 2, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 2—10 a.m.] 793.94/8679: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 894.00/696 [Document 1] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2209 Tokyo , January 1, 1937. [Received February 19.] Sir : Reverting to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1630 of January 7, 1936, 2 I have the honor to submit to the Department the following survey of the situation confronting Japan at the opening of the year 1937. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States General Araki observed to the British Ambassador a year or two ago that if it were not for the exclusion clause of the Immigration Act of 1924, 3 the relations between Japan and the United States might be considered as thoroughly satisfactory. While it is true that no current controversies of prime importance are at present sufficiently acute seriously to disturb those relations, nevertheless we should not close our eyes to the fact that several current issues may in due course become acute and are potentially hazardous. First and foremost is the naval issue which has automatically arisen with the termination of the Washington Naval Treaty. 4 How the future will shape up in this respect we cannot yet foresee, but it is safe to say that if a race in naval building and in the construction of fortifications results, the suspicion and uneasiness engendered will inevitably make for tenseness in those relations. Other issues which appear to be potentially disturbing are Japan’s aggressive policy in China with the possibility of that policy eventually interfering with American interests, and the flooding of American markets with Japanese low-priced goods against which we may ultimately be obliged to protect ourselves with resultant international friction and irritation. It appears unnecessary, however, to cross these bridges until we come to them. The forthcoming unofficial visit of representatives of American cotton textile manufacturers, who will endeavor to arrange a gentlemen’s agreement for the voluntary restriction by the Japanese of their textile exports to the United States 5 is a step in the right direction to avoid the necessity of crossing that particular bridge at all. The Philippine Islands also remain as a potential, although not an immediate, source of danger to the relations between Japan and the United States. The Davao land question, quiescent for the moment, may arise again and necessitate intervention by the American Government. The strengthening of American naval and army bases in the Philippines, and the further development of American air services to and within the islands (thus tending to check Japan’s “southward advance”) would certainly act as an irritant to the relations between the two countries. However, this again is a bridge which need not be crossed at present. Other current controversies such as the petroleum problem, fisheries, et cetera, are susceptible of adjustment by negotiation and in any case are not, at present at least, of sufficient seriousness to disturb the even tenor of our general relations. There is no good reason to believe that these general relations may not maintain their present satisfactory status for some time to come. On the contrary there is very good reason to feel that the Japanese Government values American friendship, especially in view of Japan’s increasing difficulties with other nations, and will not purposely alienate the United States unless situations arise where Japan considers her own national interests to be acutely involved. The outlook for 1937, so far as Japanese-American relations are concerned, therefore, would not at present appear to justify pessimism. China A recent series of articles in the Osaka Mainichi by Kumataro Honda, ex-Ambassador to Germany, castigates the Government for what he calls “diplomacy by slogans”, and so far as China is concerned the term is apt. In 1931 and 1932 the current slogan was “Manchuria the Life-Line of Japan”. Once the Manchurian situation had been dealt with, a new slogan shortly was heard: “Japan the Stabilizing Factor in East Asia”. This latter slogan soon developed into Hirota’s three points for settling Japan’s relations with China, namely, the checking by the Chinese Government of anti-Japanese activities and propaganda, Sino-Japanese cooperation against communism and the stabilizing of China’s factual relations with “Manchukuo”. * Obviously these points were susceptible of a very broad interpretation. Later, as various anti-Japanese incidents took place in China, one series of “demands” after another were formulated and publicly announced in a truculent and aggressive tone. The failure of Japan’s diplomacy and consequent loss of face in China arise from the fact that save in a few instances where local incidents have been settled through minor concessions, few if any of these general demands have been met. Protracted conferences have taken place in Nanking and official announcements have frequently been made in Tokyo to the effect that the negotiations were proceeding, but so far as the Embassy is aware they have led nowhere. Their failure has been ascribed to China’s “insincerity”, a somewhat overworked expression habitually and indiscriminately used by the Japanese to characterize those foreign governments which fail to concede Japan’s desiderata by signing on the dotted line. While this Embassy is not informed of the specific results of the Nanking conversations, it would seem that the astuteness rather than the insincerity of the Chinese Government has succeeded in playing the Japanese negotiators along without surrendering Chinese sovereign rights. Moreover serious military involvement in China has been avoided by the Japanese Army because of the remarkably improved morale and military forces of China and of the changed situation in Siberia—a very different Eastern Asia from 1932. It does not appear necessary, for the purpose of this report, to deal extensively or in detail with Japan’s diplomacy and activities in China during the past year. Suffice it to say that the overt intention and efforts of the Japanese military to detach the five northern provinces from the jurisdiction of Nanking largely miscarried; that the support of the Japanese military of the widespread smuggling operations not only became an international scandal but went far to bring down on Japan the censure of foreign countries including the United States and Great Britain; and that, far from cooperating with Nanking in an effort to control the anti-Japanese sentiment rapidly developing throughout China, the Japanese have constantly intensified that sentiment by their truculent and aggressive attitude and tactics. Thus the Chengtu incident, wherein Japanese lives were lost, was caused by their shortsighted attempt to force the opening of their consulate in that place which had been closed for some 5 years, in the face of Chinese opposition, and this incident, whether directly or indirectly, led to similar incidents at Pakhoi, Hankow, Shanghai, Changsha and Tsingtao. 6 Each of these several incidents, involving the death or injury of Japanese subjects, led to violent demands for satisfaction which in the majority of the cases have not been fully met. Thus Japan has lost face, further anti-Japanese sentiment has been evoked and a thoroughly vicious circle established. Japanese support of the invasion of Suiyuan by Mongol troops appears similarly to have miscarried and to have served only to increase anti-Japanese feeling throughout the country. As Mr. Takao Saito, a leading member of the Minseito Party, recently wrote in the Asahi: “What is to be Japan’s relation to China? It is said ad nauseam that Japan’s policy is to be China’s friend, that Japan’s policy is to cooperate with China for the sake of peace in the Far East, and so forth. These phrases have been preached for years, but I have yet to see any manifestations of actual friendliness in Sino-Japanese relations. “Had there been such manifestations there could hardly have occurred the anti-Japanese incidents which have taken place all over China. Probably the real cause of animosity between the two countries is that Japan, while asserting a policy of friendship and understanding, takes the attitude of continual readiness to knock her neighbor down. Whether or not this is a true characterization of Japan’s policy is beside the point; the fact is that real cooperation requires abandoning the attitude. I believe it is time for us to look into our continental policy fundamentally.” Now, at the opening of the new year, the Japanese program in China, whatever it may be, appears to have come to a temporary halt owing to the new developments arising out of the capture and subsequent release of Chiang Kai-shek 7 by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. 8 The Japanese are clearly marking time. Whether these developments will lead to an intensification of the anti-Japanese movement in China and whether, and to what extent, they will induce a stiffening of the future policy of Nanking remains to be seen. Similarly, there is as yet no indication as to how they may affect the immediate development of Japan’s policy and tactics in China. Japan has seriously lost face through the failure of her negotiations with Nanking. The Japanese Cabinet will be taxed with that failure in the coming session of the Diet and while Japanese Cabinets have a way of carrying on in spite of censure and lost confidence, it is not inconceivable that the Cabinet may fall. If it does fall there will be every probability of the appointment of a more reactionary cabinet, but whether the present Cabinet falls or not, no one can yet predict with any assurance if the trend of policy during the present year will aim to develop friendship with China on a more stable basis or will move in the direction of more positive aggressiveness. The outlook in that respect is still quite nebulous. The Japanese nation seems to be somewhat thunderstruck by the sudden and unexpected determination of China to yield no more to Japanese pressure. The nation is, figuratively, scratching its head and wondering what it should do next. There has been some discussion in the newspapers of a reorientation of policy toward China, but there has been no indication as yet of the direction which that reorientation will take. It is strange but true that Japan appears to have been the last to appreciate the changed conditions in China. Now that Japan realizes that its bluff of military pressure no longer works, some other aggressive method of dominating North China may be tried. Economic cooperation, with emphasis on its aim being, “improvement of the condition of the people”, is an old army plan that is being advocated increasingly by army spokesmen which might be an outlet for Japanese expansionist activities, not too objectionable to the Nanking Government. For the present it appears that Japan is not attracted by the thought of a frontal attack, on her own volition, against Nanking. More probable is the method of peripheral penetration and digging in in North China and along the Mongolian frontier. There can be no doubt as to the soundness of the statements contained in the final paragraph of our despatch No. 1630 of January 7, 1936, 9 surveying the general situation facing Japan at the commencement of the last year, which said, in relation to Japan’s policy with China: “The procedure to be followed and the methods to be pursued are open to influence by some or all of the factors suggested in this despatch, but the expansionist urge is fundamental, and I think there is no doubt that whether quietly and gradually or openly and aggressively Japanese energies will be found, from now on, steadily directed towards consolidating Japan’s control in North China and Mongolia as a primary axiom of her future strategic safety and economic welfare.” Soviet Russia Good relations between Japan and Soviet Russia in the present political era are an anachronism. Apart from frontier incidents and other minor troubles it is perfectly obvious that Russia’s well justified fears of eventual Japanese expansion into Mongolia and Siberia on the one hand, coupled with Japan’s fear of the spread of communism in neighboring territory on the other hand, are in themselves sufficient to prevent the development of any basis of mutual confidence. Nevertheless, up to the month of last November, diplomatic efforts had succeeded in elaborating a fair modus vivendi under which Soviet-Japanese relations might be carried along for the time being without too great risk of critical developments. The appointment of a mixed commission to consider frontier questions had been accepted in principle and a fisheries treaty, distinctly favorable to Japan, had been initialled and was ready to be signed on November 20. The Soviet defenses in Siberia and Vladivostok, coupled with the double-tracking of the Siberian Railway, had been brought to a point of effectiveness where Moscow could afford to regard the bluster and sabre-rattling of the Kwantung Army with a degree of cynical tolerance, while the Japanese on the other hand were too busy modernizing their army and aiming to strengthen their forces in Manchuria to a point of reasonable balance with the Soviet forces to the north to seek further grounds for early conflict. This temporary amelioration in Soviet-Japanese relations, however, was rudely shattered by the conclusion of the Japanese pact with Germany. 10 While ostensibly the pact aims only at cooperation in combating the activities of the Comintern in spreading communistic propaganda and practice abroad and is therefore not openly directed against the Soviet Government, nevertheless the existence of a secret understanding or agreement between the General Staffs of the two countries is generally accepted as fact and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo asserts that Moscow is in possession of precise evidence to that effect. Political opponents of the Cabinet in Japan maintain that if the news of this pact had not been permitted to leak before November 20, the Soviet-Japanese fisheries treaty would have been signed and all would have been well and they therefore charge the Foreign Minister 11 with a grave blunder in allowing this leakage. But it is inconceivable that Moscow was not well aware, long before that date, of what was going on in Berlin, and the blunder, if such it was, would seem to lie not with the leakage before a certain date but in entering into any such pact at all. The explanation is simple. The pact and whatever secret agreement may be attached to it were concluded by the Japanese military, the negotiations with Germany having been largely carried on by Major General Oshima, the Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin. We do not know whether these negotiations were conducted with the blessing of the Japanese Foreign Office, but since the Foreign Office has long been assiduously working to improve and stabilize Japan’s relations with the USSR as a matter of major policy, it is reasonable to question whether the shattering effect on those relations of a pact with Germany would not have been abundantly clear in advance and whether the civil Government in Tokyo could have been in sympathy with so sharp a divergence in the political orientation of Japan’s diplomacy. Certainly the pact has called forth widespread criticism throughout Japan. Here again the dual system of policy control in Japan would seem to have manifested itself. At any rate, the die is now cast and it is obvious that Japan’s relations with Soviet Russia have suffered a rude setback which is not likely to be overcome in the near future. Moreover we may be sure that the Soviet Government will continue to act on the principle that the only language understood by the Japanese is force, and that when struck, whether by a minor frontier incursion or by some broader form of aggression, the wisest policy to follow is promptly to strike back with double the force. Germany That the treaty between Japan and Germany envisages anything in the nature of a pact of military mutual assistance in case of war seems highly unlikely. It is said that Japan did her best to get Poland to participate in the arrangement with Germany but without success, and with Poland independent of commitments, and with France at Germany’s back, it is hardly likely that Germany would undertake to attack Russia in case of a Soviet war with Japan. Nevertheless the existence of an agreement for an exchange of military information and for the supply of arms and ammunition and technical aid to Japan in return for commercial commodities from Manchuria is a reasonable hypothesis. Whatever the precise nature of the agreement concluded, it is evident that a new orientation has arisen in Japan’s policy, that her relations with Germany are likely to be strengthened as time goes on and that this new orientation is bound, whether intentionally or otherwise, to react unfavorably on any improvement of Japan’s relations not only with Soviet Russia but with Great Britain and other democracies as well. Italy While there is no good reason to believe that Japan is purposely aligning herself with a Fascist bloc, nevertheless her recent almost simultaneous pacts with both Germany and Italy have naturally given rise to such a theory. In actual fact, the agreements by which Japan will withdraw her Legation from Addis Ababa and substitute therefore a Consulate, while Italy opens a Consulate General in Mukden, thereby implying de facto recognition respectively of the Italian acquisition of Ethiopia and of the “independence” of “Manchukuo”, would appear to envisage reciprocally privileged trade relations rather than to have any important political bearing. Great Britain Japan would like good relations with Great Britain but, as the British Ambassador recently said to me, she would like them on the basis of “all take and no give”. Sir Robert Clive says that his Military Attaché is constantly telling him how very friendly and cordial the Japanese army officers are to him, to which the Ambassador replies that this cordiality is but skin-deep and is induced solely by the consideration that the Japanese Army has at last awakened to the fact that in the event of a Japanese war with Soviet Russia Great Britain might not preserve even a benevolent neutrality. This fact gives them pause. A large element of the British people today are anti-Japanese in sentiment as a result of the Manchurian episode, Japan’s aggressiveness in China, trade questions, the Keelung incident 12 and other controversies. In the meantime no serious setbacks in Great Britain’s relations with Soviet Russia have occurred during the past three years. These relations are not cordial but they are at least satisfactory. The Soviets know that communistic propaganda in Great Britain will not be tolerated. Naval and trade agreements have been concluded. Thus the former enmity of the two countries is largely evaporating while Britain’s relations with Japan have steadily grown worse, and the Japanese Army has at last grasped the possible future implications of these developments which are beginning to cause anxiety. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Japanese army officers should go out of their way to be cordial to their British confreres. Potentially serious is the Japanese program of control in various parts of China because such control is certain, sooner or later, to interfere with British interests in that country. The notorious Amau Statement 13 and other pronouncements of Japanese policy relating to China have not served to render any less determined Great Britain’s intention to support and develop those interests, and it is reasonable to surmise that, if carried to their logical conclusion, the respective policies of Great Britain and Japan in China are bound to clash. In the meantime Anglo-Japanese relations have been rendered difficult by trade controversies in India, Australia, and elsewhere, and by the oil question, while the Keelung incident, wherein British naval seamen are alleged to have been assaulted and injured by Japanese police in Formosa, has further embittered these relations. As the Japanese Government has, up to the present, refused to make adequate amends for this incident, the situation has come to an impasse. The Commander in Chief of the British East Asiatic Fleet has postponed his official scheduled visit to Japan while embarrassing questions have been asked and resolutions introduced in the British Parliament. Although Prince Chichibu, the Emperor’s brother, is to represent the Emperor at the forthcoming Coronation in London in May, it would appear, under present circumstances, that he may not receive so warm a welcome as would have been the case a few years ago. In Japan itself, much outspoken criticism is heard by those who dislike the agreement with Germany and who would prefer to strengthen the old Anglo-Japanese friendship, a friendship which at present is distinctly on the decline. Netherlands Relations with the Netherlands have improved measurably during the past year due to the ironing out of the trade and economic difficulties with the Dutch East Indies. The first obstacle to good relations was removed by the final settlement of the protracted shipping dispute and with that out of the way satisfactory progress is now being made in connection with the much desired commercial treaty. It will be recalled that in 1934 the Japanese sent a commercial mission to The Hague, headed by a man of ambassadorial rank, for the purpose of inaugurating negotiations for a commercial treaty. This commission so antagonized the Netherlands Government by its inept use of publicity and its attempt to address the people directly, with promises of cheap goods, that although 6 months were spent in Holland they were at length forced to return with no result. When the shipping dispute arose the Japanese attempted to use the negotiations on this question as a lever to force the matter of the commercial treaty negotiations but the Dutch stood firm and refused flatly to take up the question of the commercial treaty until after the shipping matter was out of the way. They eventually won their point and the Japanese ceased their dilatory and obstructionist tactics with the result that last year the shipping question was settled to the satisfaction of both parties. Negotiations were then resumed on the question of the commercial treaty and are now in progress between the Japanese Consul General at Batavia and a member of the East Indies Government appointed for that purpose. It was agreed that publicity should be confined to the issuance of a simple communiqué stating that conversations were under way and that nothing further should be given out until the negotiations had reached a conclusion one way or another. I am informed that they have now reached a stage where a draft has been submitted to the home government at The Hague for approval. In this connection the question of sugar is a most important one, and it is the object of the East Indies Government to arrange that Japan shall continue to purchase 90 per cent of their total sugar imports from Java; at the same time they hoped to obtain a guarantee that Japan will not increase the production of sugar in Formosa, although it is doubtful whether they will be succesful in this direction. Much of the sugar imported by Japan from the East Indies is re-exported to China. At first the Dutch objected to this but recently they have been willing to give way on this point and have come to the conclusion that it is just as profitable to sell sugar to Japan for re-export as to attempt to increase their Chinese market at the expense of the Japanese. It will therefore be seen that considerable progress has been made during the past year and that relations have improved between the Netherlands and Japan and while, of course, a wary and watchful eye is being kept upon Japan’s new policy of “Southward Advance”, there is nothing on the immediate horizon which should interfere with continued improvement of relations between these two countries. A tentative invitation from the Japanese Government to the Netherlands to send its fleet on an official visit has been tacitly left in abeyance for the present owing to the desire of the Netherlands Government to afford at least moral support to the British Government in its attitude towards the Keelung incident, mentioned elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 2 Not printed. 3 Approved May 26, 1924; 43 Stat. 153. See section 13 ( c ). For correspondence regarding the restriction of Japanese immigration, see Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. ii , pp. 333 ff. 4 The Japanese denunciation was announced by note on December 29, 1934; for text, see note No. 250, December 29, from the Japanese Ambassador, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 274 ; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 405 ff. 5 See vol. iv , pp. 780 ff. * These points have been variously reported and variously interpreted. They are set down here as described to me by Mr. Hirota himself. J. C. G[rew]. [Footnote in the original.] 6 For details, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , pp. 414 – 458 , passim . 7 Generalissimo and President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier). 8 Vice Commander in Chief, Bandit Suppression Forces for the Northwest until December 25, 1936; under arrest thereafter. 9 Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 706 . 10 Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 153 ; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. i , pp. 390 ff. 11 Hachiro Arita. 12 This took place October 7, 1936, and involved the arrest and mistreatment of British sailors by Japanese police at Keelung, Taiwan (Formosa). 13 Statement by spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, April 17, 1934, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 224 ; for correspondence, see ibid ., pp. 223 ff. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13853: Telegram [Document 2] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , January 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received January 4—10:15 a.m.] 3. Rumors have persisted in Nanking since before the detention of Chiang Kai-shek in Sian that while there he held interviews with one or more important leaders of the Chinese Communist forces probably at the instance of Chang Hsueh-liang and that some sort of understanding was reached (1) that active hostilities against those forces would cease, (2) that the Communist forces would at some time be given financial support by the National Government and, (3) that very gradually officials sympathetic with the Soviet Government would be introduced into the National Government. The Embassy feels that although it has not been possible to confirm these rumors their persistence warrants this report to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo, code text by mail to Peiping and Shanghai. For the Ambassador. 14 Peck 14 Nelson Truster Johnson, at Nanking. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13877: Telegram [Document 3] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , January 7, 1937—noon. [Received January 7—7 a.m.] 10. 1. The following information has been received from Edward Wingerter, American citizen attached to Chinese Government as aviation specialist who was in Sian during coup and who last departed Sian by airplane on January 4th: That the situation in Sian is worse now than at any time during the detention of Generalissimo; that General Yang Hu Cheng 15 who is in control at Sian has turned Red and his troops are continuing to loot; that red flags and Communist literature are prominent there and Agnes Smedley, an American citizen, broadcasts nightly in pro-Communist and anti-religious vein; that a number of Russian advisers have arrived at Sian from Sin-kiang; that foreigners in Sian remain unharmed but are unable to leave by train or motor-car and it is doubtful if they could be evacuated by airplane which in any event would have to be arranged by Yang Hu Cheng; that he considers a military clash between central troops and Sian forces as inevitable in view of heavy movement westward of central troops and military supplies on Lunghai Railway; and that he believes it would be desirable, if possible, to evacuate foreigners from Sian since a clash there would expose them to great danger, especially from airplane bombing. 2. Substance of above communicated orally to Ambassador evening of January 6th. Repeated to Peiping, copies by mail to Nanking and air mail to Hankow. Gauss 15 Pacification Commissioner for Shensi and Kansu until the coup against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13879: Telegram [Document 4] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , January 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received January 7—2:45 p.m.] 7. Under date of January 5 the National Government issued Mandates making changes in important administrative and military posts in Shensi and Kansu. Yang Hu Cheng although temporarily left at his post was cashiered. The Embassy learns from official sources that Yang is not disposed to accept the new situation and the National Government is moving troops and artillery along the railway toward Sian to enforce its orders. The Embassy has learned also from various Chinese official sources and indirectly from a foreign observer that Communist influence is very strong in Sian. Exact information regarding present conditions there is impossible to obtain and I have today telegraphed to Swenson, Scandinavian Alliance Mission, Sian, asking for a report. It is doubtful, however, whether this effort will be successful. The Embassy is endeavoring to discover means of evacuating American citizens from Sian in view of probable hostilities but this seems impossible at the present time. 16 Sent to the Department, Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai. Johnson 16 See also vol. iv , pp. 236 ff. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13882: Telegram [Document 5] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , January 9, 1937—11 a.m. [Received January 9—6:36 a.m.] 9. Department’s telegram No. 84, of December 18, 7 p.m. 17 On the afternoon of December 24 the Counselor of the British Embassy, the French Ambassador, and I separately and individually communicated to Kung 18 our readiness to cooperate in carrying out the proposal outlined in my number 365 of December 19, 11 p.m., to the Department. 19 The Italian Ambassador had communicated his readiness to cooperate a day or two previously. The Japanese Embassy was still without instructions. As Chiang was unconditionally released on December 25 and arrived in Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsueh-liang on December 26, the latter submitting himself to trial and punishment by the Government, it seems probable that the Chinese Government will not avail itself of the British suggestion. Full report by mail. 20 Johnson 17 Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 434 . 18 H. H. Kung, acting President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier). 19 Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 438 . 20 Not printed. The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13895: Telegram [Document 6] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , January 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 4:10 p.m.] In a conversation with me this morning a high military officer expressed the greatest pessimism regarding the situation both in Shensi and Kansu; he states there is no chance now of settling the situation except by military means; that Yang Hu Cheng has allied himself with the Communists and both Lin Piao and Peng Teh Huai, prominent leaders, are in or near Sian. He believes that hostilities will commence shortly and that although Sian can be taken within a short time the rebellious troops will scatter over the two provinces and be extremely difficult to suppress. He states that Lanchow, Kansu, is not safe for Americans, that Yu Hsueh Chung 21 has raided all Central Government offices in Lanchow and killed about half of the Central Government officers. He states that Pingliang, Kansu, has been occupied by Communists. He advises that Americans should withdraw from Kansu if possible via Tienshui, Kansu; Hanchung, Shensi, and the Han River. My informant is the best informed official in Wuhan 22 in military matters. He requested that his name be not divulged. Sent to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai. Josselyn 21 Chairman of the Kansu Provincial Government. 22 The cities of Wuchang, Hankow, Hanyang. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13897: Telegram [Document 7] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , January 13, 1937—8 p.m. [Received 9:48 p.m.] 25. The broadcast from Sian last night in English was made not by woman announcer but by a man who spoke English with a Russian accent. He announced inaugural meeting of new “National Salvation Association” on January 11, with 200 delegates, at which time pleas were made for a “war against traitors” and a united front against Japan. The work of various propaganda agencies was described. It was announced that “peaceful conditions” prevailed in Shensi and Chiang Kai-shek was charged with “insincerity”. Captain Barrett 23 reports today from Loyang that the military authorities at Loyang believe that the present difficulty will be settled without resort to military force. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 23 David D. Barrett. U.S.A., Assistant. Military Attaché in China. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13940: Telegram [Document 8] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , January 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received January 22—7:10 a.m.] 34. According to today’s North China Star , General Sung Che Yuan 24 issued an order at Tientsin yesterday to various military and administrative offices in Hopei and Chahar directing that they (1) refrain from internal warfare, (2) resist all foreign aggression, and (3) annihilate all Communists and bandits. Report states Sung informed subordinates that suppression of bandits and Communists is not to be regarded as internal warfare. In a separate manifesto to soldiers of the 29th Army General Sung admonishes them to (1) support the unification of the country and carry out the orders of the Central Government, (2) safeguard the three important attributes of a sovereign state, namely, sovereignty, land and the people, (3) exterminate Communism. 2. No broadcasts from Sian have been heard for 4 or 5 nights. Information of value concerning the exact military position in Sian, Kansu, and the exact relationship between Yang Hu Cheng and Yu Hsueh Chung on the one side and the Communist armies on the other is extremely hard to obtain in Peiping. Many hold to the belief that the situation may yet be settled by negotiation and that no major military operations will occur. The trend in China definitely is in the direction of doing away with internal warfare as far as possible. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 24 Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Affairs Council. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13951: Telegram [Document 9] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , January 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received at midnight.] 44. My 7, January 7, 4 p.m. The developments of the last two weeks may be briefly described as consisting in efforts of the National Government to counteract the rapidly growing influence of the Chinese Communist forces in the northwest especially in and around Sian and to induce the leaders and forces under Yang Hu Cheng and those comprising the “Northeast army” formerly under Chang Hsueh Liang to break off their alliance with the Red forces, to accept the policies of the National Government in Sino-Japanese relations and to obey the Government’s mandates in appointment to official posts. The situation is still extremely obscure with the negotiations mainly in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek who remains at his home in Fenghua and receives representatives. It is generally believed that Yang Hu Cheng and the Northeastern army are both unwilling and so far unable to withdraw from their close association with the Communist forces under the banner of armed resistance to Japanese encroachments. It is reported that in an effort to make easier the acceptance by the Government of the submission of the three allies on the basis of resistance to Japan the Communist forces have renounced their most radical doctrines and that all three insist they do not demand immediate war but only formal adoption of armed resistance as a policy. It is commonly reported that the Government some months ago sent to Sian a large quantity of silver possibly as much as 18 million dollars and large quantities of war munitions in preparation for possible retirement of the Government to Sian in the event of hostilities with Japan and that it is his physical possession of the silver and munitions which enables Yang Hu Cheng to protract the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Peck was informed by military officers in Sian on January 15 that the allied forces there had plentiful supplies of money and arms sent by the Government for so-called bandit suppression. It is impossible on the basis of conflicting reports to anticipate when the Government’s authority over Shensi and portions of Kansu will be firmly re-established or the way in which the Government will dispose of the Communist forces there. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai. Johnson Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.00/14035 [Document 10] Memorandum by the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 25 Nanking , January 26, 1937. Conversation: General Chang Chun, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nelson Trusler Johnson. 26 I called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs today to express to him my appreciation for the assistance which the Foreign Office had given to the Embassy in its efforts to evacuate American citizens from Sian. I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether there was anything that he could tell me in regard to that situation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that negotiations and discussions were still going on, and that he thought there was some likelihood of success; that the Government was insisting upon obedience by General Yang Hu-cheng to its original decree; and that he thought, from information which had been coming through recently, that General Yang Hu-cheng was more inclined to listen to reason in regard to this matter, and perhaps to show a desire to abide by instructions of the Central Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs did not seem to think that the force commanded by the so-called Communists in Shensi amounted to as much of a threat as the papers indicated. He said that if the Sian incident had not occurred it had been estimated that the Communists would have been completely liquidated in another two weeks. He expressed himself as not believing that either Yang Hu-cheng’s forces or Chang Hsueh-liang’s had completely taken up with the Communist cause; otherwise they would constitute a very serious threat indeed. Nelson Trusler Johnson 25 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 341, February 6; received March 4. 26 Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Embassy, was also present. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13953: Telegram [Document 11] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , January 27, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 5:19 p.m.] 46. My 44, January 26, 3 p.m. In a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs January 26, 5 p.m., the latter confirmed that the efforts of the Chinese Government to consolidate its authority in Shensi Province centered mainly on an attempt to separate the forces of Yang Hu Cheng and the Northeast Army from association with the Communist forces. He said that the trend of the discussions warranted optimism. He denied that the Red forces exceeded 50,000 in number and insisted that their suppression would have been accomplished by now if they had not obtained support from the two rebel forces. In spite of the vague optimism expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Embassy has not been able to learn of any concrete advance in the reestablishment of the Government’s authority in Sian. Sent to Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.00/14042 [Document 12] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 27 No. 620 Shanghai , January 28, 1937. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith as of possible interest to the Embassy the substance of an address 28 delivered by General Wu Te-chen, Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, to a large audience of Chinese at the Civic Center on January 5, 1937. It will be observed that the Mayor, who is noted for his antipathy for Communism, endeavored in strong and clear terms to expose what he considered the specious arguments and fallacies behind the Sian crisis and to remove any misconceptions that might be harbored by the public. It will be noted that the Mayor termed the “popular front” an invention of the Comintern to be used to attain power for that group, and that its succession to power would be the signal for dissension and the commencement of a class struggle in China similar to that waged in Spain. He strongly advocated the continued suppression of the Communists and urged that the people unite in their support of the present Government and not to seek salvation in foreign panaceas and foreign saviors. In the light of the above address it will be recalled that the Mayor has been a relentless enemy of radical and even of what might be termed “liberal” activities at Shanghai. A strong campaign has been waged against Communism; the patriotic movement of the students has been curbed, particularly in late 1935; the suppression of reactionary publications and confiscation of such literature has been adhered to; and the activities of the national salvation associations have been closely curbed, culminating in the detention of seven prominent national salvation leaders in late November 1936. Lending significance to Mayor Wu’s utterances are the public statements made by Mr. Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of the Central Political Council, since his return from Europe on January 14th. In a speech at the Central Party Headquarters at Nanking on January 18th Mr. Wang delivered a telling indictment against Communism and against the policy that resistance to outside aggression should have precedence over stabilization of internal peace and order. He questioned the sincerity of the Communist Party and, after citing the broken pledges of the latter since 1924, declared that “it was not the Kuomintang which had misplaced its trust but it was the Communist Party which had broken faith.” On the evening of January 22nd Mr. Wang reiterated his attack against Communism in a broadcast speech and declared that “only the Kuomintang is capable of uniting the masses.” With aggression pressing from the outside and with the Communists pressing from within, Mr. Wang believes that the only way out for China is to support the original policy of the Government and to work together for its realization. If that support could be achieved no reactionists or militarists would be able to undermine the program for the salvation of China. Subsequently, in what was purported to be an interview with the Shanghai Times (British), Mr. Wang stated it to be his belief that conciliation and economic reconstruction are the best methods of securing internal peace, but that if conciliation failed then force must be used, and that China could not tolerate a Communist dominated “popular front.” A review of the statements of these two leaders would seem to indicate that the Chinese Government is still committed to its policy of eradicating Communism in China and that that policy has precedence over resistance to outside aggression, which, however, would be undertaken in the event it became necessary to make what is termed the “final sacrifice.” While compromise with the Sian rebels is desired, no quarter can be given to the tenets of Communism. This is also believed generally to represent the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, although it may be taken as significant that he has made no public pronouncement of his views since his return from Sian, where it is possible that his views were subject to modification. In any event, it is generally conceded in local quarters that he has worked unceasingly for a peaceful settlement of the Sian imbroglio, and that it is barely possible he would be amenable to an agreement with the Chinese Communists in Shensi and Kansu to maintain the status quo so that the energy of the Government could be devoted to internal reconstruction and defense in anticipation of outside aggression. It is commonly believed that these momentous issues are now receiving the undivided attention of the Generalissimo as he ponders at his native place near Fenghua, and that an indication of his views and decisions will be afforded at the third plenary session of the Central Executive Committee to be held in Nanking on February 15th, when it is generally conceded that the National Government will be reorganized to make place for leaders sympathetic with the policies finally decided upon. Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss 27 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his covering despatch No. 587, January 28; received March 4. 28 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13964: Telegram [Document 13] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 4, 1937—2 p.m. [Received February 5—8:18 p.m.] 59. My 46, January 27, 11 a.m. 1. There are no indications of early success in the Government’s attempt to reestablish authority over Sian. Semiofficial Central News reports that fighting has occurred in Sian between a faction of the northeastern army wishing to accept the Government’s terms of submission and a “radical” faction meaning presumably a faction which insists upon adhering to the policy of accepting the Communist forces as allies in open armed resistance to Japanese encroachments. Reuter publishes report that Yang Hu Cheng refuses to carry out agreement reached for withdrawal of his troops until after the Central Executive [Committee] meeting on February 15 and that he has seized funds in Sian belonging to the National Government. (See end of my 44, January 26, 3 p.m.) 2. Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have obtained extension of leave of absence until February 15. The following reports current in Nanking portending possibility of grave developments seem to me not inherently improbable: Chiang Kai-shek, ever since his release December 25, has been struggling to find solution of the problem created by promises given to the Sian leaders by himself and by his wife and T. V. Soong 29 on his behalf to induce the leaders to release him and the international complications which would follow execution of these pledges. This report states that he definitely promised to announce and commence armed resistance to Japanese encroachments, to cease attacks on Chinese Communist forces and accept their aid, and to remove alleged pro-Japanese officials from the National Government. The report adds that Chiang at one time almost decided to continue immediately suppression of the Communists and other rebels at Sian by force and to execute Chang Hsueh-liang as the rebel leader when he was visited at Fenghua by Soong who bitterly criticised him for violating the pledges already mentioned and threatened to leave China and publicly announce Chiang’s perfidy. Madame Chiang is credited with persuading Chiang to resist Soong’s advice. It seems probable that Chiang’s release was granted as the result of some undertaking and that this undertaking and the seizure by Yang Hu Cheng of large money and munitions supplies are serious factors in the problem. 3. An official of the Italian Embassy professes to believe a report received by him that Chiang has finally decided to accept Chinese Communist forces as allies in resistance to Japan which decision informant believes will inevitably result in an alliance with Russia against Japan and the dismissal of many prominent officials now in the capital. Informant believes that the Sian problem imposes on China the necessity of choice between alliance with Russia or with Japan. Informant’s source said that the British and American Governments had secretly indicated to China no objection to China’s siding with Russia. 4. Although the views set forth in the preceding paragraph are probably colored by the Italian conception of a world divided into Communist and Fascist blocs, it is hard to believe that the Chinese Communist forces which have successfully resisted the Government’s attempt at suppression for 10 years will abandon either their strategic position in the Northwest or their course of action to force an issue with the Government. With Russia and Japan closely watching the solution of this problem there seems to be no way for Chiang to escape deciding whether to accept the aid of Chinese Communist forces against Japan or to [adopt?] military measures against them. Either course will support the Japanese contention that the Communist forces in the Northwest are a threat to peace. Negotiations with the rebels at Sian might be expected to proceed to peace by the Chinese compromise if they were not obstructed by this factor. 5. Some decision must be ratified by the Central Executive Committee on February 15 and the nature of the decision should indicate the amount of truth there is in the reforms discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 6. Sent to the Department; by courier to Peiping. Johnson 29 Chairman of Board of Directors, Bank of China, and brother of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13963: Telegram [Document 14] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , February 4, 1937—4 p.m. [Received February 4—7:30 a.m.] 49. Reference paragraph 2 of Embassy’s telegram 34, January 22, 7 p.m. 1. According to reports published today in Peiping, disturbances occurred February 2 at Sian as the result of dissatisfaction on the part of subordinate military with the policies of Yang Hu Cheng and northeastern generals, especially with regard to withdrawal of troops northwards in compliance with desires of the National Government. It is said that Wang I Che, a northeastern general allegedly loyal to the Nanking Government, was killed, that other generals were put under surveillance, and that some clashes between opposing elements took place. According to the latest report, the situation has returned toward normal but continues tense. 2. Discord among the semiautonomous forces in Shensi might be expected to weaken them vis-à-vis the National Government and to render more likely an eventual solution of the Shensi situation favorable to the Government. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.93/1583 [Document 15] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State No. 22 Moscow , February 4, 1937. [Received February 23.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum outlining such information as has recently become available in Moscow concerning the relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Far Eastern countries on the other. It is hoped the Department will have no objection to the scope of these reports being extended to include Soviet relations with China as well as those with Japan and “Manchukuo.” All of these questions are so intimately bound up with one another that it is difficult to separate them. In view of Soviet penetration into Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia and the Soviet influence on the Chinese communist armies on the one hand, and Japanese domination of Manchuria and penetration into North China and Inner Mongolia on the other, Soviet-Chinese relations affect Soviet-Japanese relations at almost every turn. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Davies [Enclosure-Extract] Memorandum Prepared by the Embassy in the Soviet Union There has been little change during the last few weeks in the character of the Soviet attitude toward Japan or in the relations between the two countries. Nothing has occurred to diminish in any degree the disillusionment and bitterness occasioned in Moscow by the conclusion of the German-Japanese pact, and for the moment there are no immediate prospects of improvement in relations between the two countries. Moscow’s policy with regard to Japan and “Manchukuo” continues to be one of firm restraint in matters of diplomacy, and of continued preparation for war. The Soviet leaders have no desire to provoke a conflict at the present time and appear to be determined not to allow themselves to be provoked into a rash action. In accordance with this policy, the Moscow leaders, after the publication of the German-Japanese pact, refused to proceed with the signing of the new long-term fisheries convention which had been negotiated before the German-Japanese agreement became known. On the other hand, when the Japanese threatened to carry on their fishing activities without any agreement at all and to employ the Japanese Navy for the protection of their fishermen, the Soviet Government refused to allow this threat to become a question of prestige and prudently agreed to prolong the old agreement for another year. Meanwhile the situation along the borders of Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Far Eastern provinces has again become delicate and there has been a revival of that extensive border friction which had shown a welcome tendency to decline during the autumn of 1936. With the suspension of through traffic (at the border point of Pogranichnaya) between Harbin and Vladivostok, the entire border between Japanese-controlled areas and the Soviet Union, from the Pacific Ocean to Outer Mongolia, would seem to be closed to international traffic, except at Manchuli and Khabarovsk. Conditions along the rest of the border, if the reports from the Soviet side may be believed, continue to resemble those of suspended hostility between two belligerent countries, rather than of normal peacetime frontier relations. Relations between the Soviet Union and China are less susceptible to ready description than are those between Moscow and Tokyo. As has been indicated in previous reports, Moscow has deprecated the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, but has continued to use its influence in Nanking in favor of compromise with the Shensi military leaders. For the time being, the chief concern of Soviet diplomatists in regard to China is that a sufficiently stiff opposition should be presented to Japan in China proper to detract Japanese attention from the Manchurian border and to make it impossible for the Kwantung Army to leave its southern flank unguarded. Considerations for the well-being of China play a very minor part—if any—in the determination of Soviet policy. Moscow will continue to work for a general anti-Japanese front, including the Chinese communists, and its attitude toward Nanking will continue to be determined by the extent to which the Kuomintang is ready to cooperate in the realization of this aim. There is no doubt that the Kremlin is doing whatever it can to utilize the communist armies in China as a weapon for the furtherance of its policy. Insofar as this is true, Moscow may be said to share responsibility for the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek and the subsequent events in Shensi. It may very well be that the subsequent development of events in that province turned out to be quite different than that which the Kremlin had anticipated. But there seems to be no doubt that the Chinese communists who were so closely connected with these events were following what they considered to be good Comintern policy. Their actions represented at best a misguided interpretation of ideas which they had received from Sinkiang and points west. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13965: Telegram [Document 16] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 6, 1937—11 a.m. [Received February 6—10:10 a.m.] 63. It is learned from a reliable source that factional fighting persists in Sian. A circular telegram sent out by the leading generals in Sian including Yang Hu Cheng and Yu Hsueh Chung on February 5 said that Northeastern and Shensi troops would be partially withdrawn from the Sian region in conformity with the Government’s orders but insisted General Chang Hsueh-liang should return to address and reassure the troops. Informant thought Yu Hsueh Chung was still prevented from returning to Kansu. The trend of informant’s statements implied that the two generals named above were prevented from coming to an agreement with the Government by the sentiment prevailing among the military forces in Sian. Sent to the Department, Peiping, and Hankow. Johnson The First Secretary of Embassy in China (Merrill) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8509: Telegram [Document 17] The First Secretary of Embassy in China ( Merrill ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Peiping , February 8, 1937—5 p.m. [Received February 8—2:10 p.m.] 54. 1. Sung Che Yuan and the commander of the Japanese North China garrison are conversing periodically at Tientsin. Chinese and Japanese officials state that the conversations are probably confined to economic cooperation. It is understood that the Japanese are primarily interested at present in the questions of ( a ) developing the Lungyen iron mines in Chahar and the Chingying coal mines in Western Hopei and ( b ) constructing the Shihkiachwang Railway. 2. Apparently no progress is being made toward an increase of autonomy in North China. Sung Che Yuan is said by Japanese to have become more conciliatory toward them during the detention of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian but to have reverted to his previous attitude after Chiang’s release. 3. Fresh and significant developments in North China presumably await ( a ) clarification of the situation created in China by the trouble in Sian and ( b ) clarification of the political situation at Tokyo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Merrill The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13967: Telegram [Document 18] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 10, 1937—9 a.m. [Received February 10—6:30 a.m.] 69. My 63, February 6, 11 a.m. A responsible official of the Government has informed the Embassy that “a preliminary settlement” of the Sian situation has been reached and General Ku Chu Tung, Chief of the Provisional Headquarters of the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee in Sian, arrived in Sian February 9, 10 a.m. General Yang Hu Cheng, February 8, informed the Government that he expected to be on hand to welcome General Ku. General Yu Hsueh Chung is said to be in Sian but is free to return to Kansu when his services as mediator are no longer needed. Government forces have been so far stationed to safeguard communications between Sian and Lanchow (Kaolan). The indications are that the Red troops do not wish to contest Government reoccupation of the Sian area. The informant would not admit that this surprisingly peaceful settlement of the Sian difficulty resulted from carrying out by the government of any promises made by General Chiang Kai-shek when in the hands of the Sian rebels and said that the only promise given by Chiang was that he would submit their “demands” relating to resistance to Japan, et cetera, to the National Government. He said these subjects would be dealt with February 15 at Central Executive Committee meeting and that a fair attendance of members was assured. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Hankow. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) at Nanking 893.00/13964: Telegram [Document 19] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) at Nanking Washington , February 10, 1937—2 p.m. 35. Your 59, February 4, 2 p.m., paragraph 3, last sentence. Department assumes that the officer of the Embassy with whom the informant presumably talked told the informant that of course a report in regard to the American Government’s having taken action of this sort would have no basis in fact. When conveying to the Department items of information of this nature, it would be helpful to the Department if the Embassy would add some account of the rejoinders made by the officers of the Embassy to whom the information is communicated. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13974: Telegram [Document 20] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 15, 1937—noon. [Received 8:05 p.m.] 77. Reference my 69, February 10, 9 a.m. M. S. Baldwin, an American teacher at the University of Nanking, states that he has received reliable reports that the peaceful entry of Government forces into Sian was due to an agreement to incorporate Communist troops in the army, which was negotiated by Chiang Kai-shek with Red leaders before, during and after his captivity. He is said to have had conferences with the Communist leader Chou En Lai both before his confinement at Sian and recently, the latter having spent some 10 days in Fenghua during which time the Generalissimo has given him several interviews. Informant states that Chiang Kai-shek compelled the Red leaders to make the first move with an offer to cease attacks on the Government before he suggested any proceedings, thus preserving his own and the Government’s dignity. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 894.00/695: Telegram [Document 21] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , February 15, 1937—6 p.m. [Received February 15—8:55 a.m.] 57. Embassy’s 49, February 8, 7 p.m. 30 1. General Hayashi’s 31 speech before the House of Peers this morning was placatory in tone indicating the Cabinet’s wish to cooperate with and not to dissolve the Diet. He reiterated his policies without further elucidation and very briefly discussed the revised and reduced budget and the necessity for the proposed increase of taxes. 2. In the part of his speech devoted to foreign policies he stressed the necessity for China’s understanding of Japan’s attitude toward that country and urged the development of “mutual appreciation” and “closer contacts” between the two governments and peoples as well as “concrete cooperation” and “mutual assistance” indicating a trend toward a more friendly and less aggressive attitude toward China. The tone of the reference to the Soviet Union was firm, urging the Soviets to “take a broad view and cooperate with us” in the settlements of pending questions. Following the reference to Soviet-Japanese relations moreover he strongly affirmed the timeliness and necessity of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement. In regard to relations with the United States, he said “Japan’s policy of promoting friendship with Great Britain and the United States is immutable. Between the former country and ours there exist questions of various sorts requiring adjustment”. He said nothing of questions pending between the United States and Japan. Amau 32 intimated to me on the 11th that this omission would be made intentionally as Hayashi wished to convey the impression that relations with the United States are satisfactory. Repeated [Peiping?] by mail to Nanking. Grew 30 Not printed. 31 Gen. Senjuro Hayashi, Japanese Prime Minister since February 2, and concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs. 32 Eiji Amau, Director of the Information Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13973: Telegram [Document 22] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , February 15, 1937—6 p.m. [Received February 15—5:02 p.m.] 61. Reference Embassy’s 54, February 8, 5 p.m. 1. Local Japanese news agencies publish reports expressing apprehension that the third plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, which opened today at Nanking, will discuss three questions concerning North China; namely, ( a ) abolition of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, ( b ) return to Chinese control of the autonomous area of East Hopei, and ( c ) return to Chinese control of North Chahar, the purpose being the extension of power in North China of the National Government. 2. Some local Chinese believe that these questions will be discussed at the session. They think that it will discuss also the question of appointing Sung Che Yuan to a post at Nanking in order to indicate Chinese unity and of giving control of Hopei and Chahar to Sung’s subordinates, Chin Teh Chun and Chang Tzu Chung, the mayors of Peiping and Tientsin respectively. 3. It seems unlikely that the National Government will take definite action on these matters without first obtaining the consent of the Japanese, which would be given, if at such time, only in return for significant concessions. 4. Chin Teh Chun, who is representing Sung Che Yuan at the plenary session, is said to have taken with him a proposal from Sung that communism be fundamentally suppressed. This proposal may be due to Sung’s feeling that he ought to propose something rather than nothing; or it may be due to a desire to evade Japanese pressure for a local agreement with regard to suppression of communism. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/13976: Telegram [Document 23] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 18, 1937—noon. [Received February 18—10:20 a.m.] 81. My 77, February 15, noon. National Government in a mandate issued February 17 restored to Chang Hsueh Liang his civic rights of which he had been deprived for 5 years by judgment of high court martial of the Military Affairs Commission on December 31, 1936. Question of restoration of former rank still unsettled. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8511: Telegram [Document 24] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , February 20, 1937—1 p.m. [Received February 20—7:10 a.m.] 95. About 1000 Chinese mill workers rioted at Japanese Toyoda cotton mill outside western district of International Settlement this morning but were checked by police. Subsequently 300 blue jackets from Japanese landing force occupied mill property and remain there at present. Shanghai Municipal police report order has been restored and do not expect further disturbances of serious nature to arise over week end. Repeated to Peiping and Nanking. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14016: Telegram [Document 25] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 23, 1937—2 p.m. [Received February 24—1:45 p.m.] 87. 1. The third plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, the Kuomintang, convened on February 15 and terminated February 22. A manifesto summarizing the measures and policies adopted was published this morning. 2. Official reports state that 130 members were present and constituted gratifyingly large attendance. In every particular there is reliable evidence that the responsible authorities were disappointed at the failure to attend of several important provincial leaders including the Kwangsi leaders and Liu Hsiang, Provincial Chairman of Szechwan and others. 3. It remains, as always, doubtful whether the deliberations and resolutions passed will influence public opinion throughout China but the published manifesto shows at least that some of China’s leaders have a grasp of the country’s political and economic problems both internal and international. 4. The first section of the manifesto deals with policy toward Japan which is mentioned by name. This section reiterates the determination formed at the second plenary session last July to follow the path of peaceful means of negotiation as long as possible but without tolerating infringement of territorial sovereignty or signing any agreement detrimental thereto. It recalls that “when bandits and irregular troops invaded Suiyuan the Government rallied the strength of the whole nation to defend the province and repulse the invaders”. The manifesto announces the willingness of the Government to continue working for a preliminary adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations “on the basis of equality, reciprocity and a respect of each other’s territorial integrity” in order to deprive the “bandits and puppets of their present preponderance on external forces and to restore administrative and territorial integrity to China”. 5. Regarding relations with other nations the manifesto announces that China, in matters of political accord and economic cooperation, will work on the principle of reciprocity. 6. The next section deals with domestic policies and economic reconstruction. It declares that China’s guiding principle is that of democracy but significant emphasis is given the assertion that “the interests of the nation as a whole must remain over and above those of individuals and organizations”. Apparently for the benefit of those provincial leaders who did not attend the session, the manifesto emphasizes that the policy of the Government to unify the country through peaceful means does not mean that “any attempt to split the the state” will be nullified. 7. As was anticipated (see my 59, February 4, 2 p.m.), the session devoted considerable time to the settlement of the Communist problem. The manifesto blames the Communist forces for terroristic activities since 1927 “thus undermining the strength of the nation which otherwise they would have employed in resisting alien invasion” and announces that the cardinal policy of the Kuomintang is to eradicate the Communist scourge and insists that it is the duty of the Kuomintang alone to organize and train the masses for the task of national reconstruction. This subject was dealt with at great length in a resolution passed in [February] 21 which reviewed the original leniency of Sun Yat Sen, properly admitting Communists to the Kuomintang in 1924 and their subsequent abusing this through treasonable and rebellious activities up to recent days when the “Communist bandits” having been reduced to straits in the Northwest have begun to announce their alleged willingness to surrender. The resolution states that the Kuomintang is willing to give them a chance to reform but only on four major conditions which in brief require the complete cessation of all Communist activities and propaganda and of “class struggle”. 8. The manifesto next recalls the postponement of the National People’s Assembly and announces its convocation on November 12, this year, for the purpose of adopting a constitution. 9. From the standpoint of the future lying before foreign economic enterprises in China, the last section of the manifesto is the most interesting. This is devoted to economic reconstruction and the policy outlined is one of modified state capitalism. The theories of Marx and of class struggle are repudiated because there is actually no rich class in China. A happy medium is found in the resolution “to increase the productivity of the people China should seek to develop state capital and at the same time to give due protection to private capital”. The manifesto states “China has become poor under the double impact of foreign encroachments and the backwardness of her productivity”. It announces a policy of fostering Chinese private enterprises where they are feasible and of converting into state enterprises large scale industries which by their nature can best be conducted by the Government. 10. See paragraph 7 above. In spite of the stern conditions imposed by the manifesto for reconciliation with the Communist forces there are reliable indications that this reconciliation is proceeding along lines privately agreed upon. An official of the Executive Yuan states that the Communist forces agreed to abandon their Communist principles and ideals provided they were peacefully amalgamated with the Government forces. Another point pointing to settlement of the controversy by negotiations is found in the report that the Government stores of ammunition and money in Sian were returned intact. It is reported that no Communist leaders will be given positions in the government but it is an interesting coincidence if nothing more that (as I have been informed by the Reuter agent) the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Administrative Vice Minister, his personal adherent, have tendered their resignations since both these officials speak Japanese and admit [being?] nominally of the pro-Japanese faction and their replacement we suggest the appearance of a concession to the demand of the Communists for a stronger attitude toward Japan. It is publicly rumored that their places will be taken by Wang Chung Hui 33 and a man of his choice. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping. Johnson 33 Formerly Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8546 [Document 26] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2281 Tokyo , February 25, 1937. [Received March 18.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 2266 of February 16, 1937, 34 and to report that the proposed alteration of the aggressive policy hitherto pursued by Japan toward China and a reorientation of diplomacy based on economic lines now seem to be taking concrete shape. The conciliatory remarks regarding China in the speech delivered in the Diet by Premier Hayashi as Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 15 * were given added significance by subsequent replies to interpellations in the Diet. Answering a rather chauvinistic interpellation in the House of Representatives on February 19 by Mr. Seigo Nakano, leader of the Tohokai (Eastern Association), regarding Japan’s policy toward China, Great Britain, and the western Powers, Premier Hayashi stated: “I have no faith in a pugnacious foreign policy”. In reply to an interpellation in the Lower House on February 20 by Mr. Hyogoro Sakurai, of the Minseito, as to the Government’s attitude toward the Hirota Cabinet’s three-point policy toward China, Premier Hayashi stated that the Government considered the three points proper but had different views from those held by the Hirota Government with regard to their application. He added significantly: “It is greatly to be regretted if China makes the mistake of thinking Japan is wedded to a policy of aggression. I quite agree with Mr. Sakurai on the question of promoting Sino-Japanese friendship.” There are indications that Premier Hayashi is considering a complete abandonment of the Hirota three-point policy, which aimed at the eradication of anti-Japanese agitation in China, factual cooperation between Japan, “Manchukuo” and China, and cooperation between Japan and China for the removal of the Communist menace in China. It will be recalled that a number of specific demands based on this policy were the subject of the Sino-Japanese negotiations that failed in December 1936. According to the Japanese press, all of the political demands will be relinquished and the only two points in the former program that will be retained by the present Government are economic in character: the reduction of the Chinese tariff and the establishment of an air service between Japan and China. In the negotiations conducted at Nanking the Chinese were reported to have tentatively agreed to lower China’s import duties on rayon and cotton textiles, sugar, marine products, and sundries for the improvement of trade relations between the two countries. A proposal for the establishment of a Sino-Japanese air service would probably be acceptable to the Chinese under certain conditions. With regard to the proposed “reorientation” of Japan’s China policy based on economic desiderata, it has recently been reported that the Government has officially decided to send an economic mission to China on March 12 under the chairmanship of Mr. Kenji Kodama, former President of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Mr. Kodama is reputed to be an authority on Chinese affairs and also to be popular in China. At the same time it is reported that the Premier holds the belief that a renewal of diplomatic negotiations with China would serve no useful purpose. As a result of the lessening of tension over the internal political situation and the Premier’s conciliatory statements in the Diet regarding China there has been a renewal of public interest in Sino-Japanese affairs. There has been an insistent demand on the part of the liberal elements in the Diet for the adoption of a more sympathetic attitude toward China and for a clarification by the Government of its concrete aims with regard to that country. Furthermore, the Japanese newspapers are unanimous in approving the change of policy now being considered by the Government. Most of the newspapers take the position that Japan can now deal with China as an equal because that country is a united nation and not, as formerly, an entity composed of warring factions. In many of the recent editorials concerning China it has been stated that Japan has no wish to infringe on the territorial integrity of that country as an independent State. Thus the contrast between the present tone of the press and its former tone is patent. It may be of interest to note that The Japan Times of February 22 compared Japan’s reported decision to alter its China policy with President Roosevelt’s alleged decision to abandon the “Stimson policy of sending nagging notes to Tokyo”. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 34 Not printed. * Embassy’s telegram No. 57, dated February 15, 1937, and despatch No. 2266 of February 16, 1937. [Footnote in the original.] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14022: Telegram [Document 27] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , February 26, 1937—2 p.m. [Received February 26—7:25 a.m.] 70. Reference Embassy’s telegram No. 61, February 15, 6 p.m. 1. No change has taken place in the North China situation. An official of the local Japanese authorities expresses doubt that the Third Plenary Session at Nanking made any decision with regard to North China questions. 2. Although it appears that the Japanese military are dissatisfied with the situation for such reasons as the apparent lack of progress in Sino-Japanese economic cooperation in regard to China and because of General Chin Teh Chun’s attendance at the Third Plenary Session as Sung Che Yuan’s representative, there is no indication that the quiet situation here will be altered in the near future. Small incidents involving the Japanese which occur periodically are not now magnified as they were a short time ago. Local Chinese appear to be easier in their minds than previously. For example, announcement of impending routine replacement of Japanese troops has aroused no uneasiness, unlike previous replacements. 3. The transfer of Itagaki, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to command a division in Japan, to be effective March 1, may be an effort of the military authorities at Tokyo to gain a more effective control over the Kwantung Army. Itagaki’s successor is to be Lieutenant General Tojo, at present commander of the Japanese gendarmerie in Manchuria. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14023: Telegram [Document 28] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received February 27—8 a.m.] 96. My 87 of February 23, 2 p.m., paragraph 10 and 88 of February 24, 11 a.m. 35 The director of the Department of Publicity of the Foreign Office has stated that it has practically been decided that C. T. Wang 36 will be the next Minister for Foreign Affairs. In this connection it is interesting to note that General Lepin, Soviet Military Attaché, during a recent call on me expressed the opinion that the Chinese Government has reorientated its foreign policy which will henceforth be characterized by stronger resistance to Japanese encroachment and an endeavor to create closer relations with Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It seems too early however to form a definite opinion in regard to this theory. Sent to the Department, to Peiping by courier. Johnson 35 Latter not printed. 36 A former Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14025: Telegram [Document 29] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , March 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received March 3—2:30 p.m.] 103. My 96, February 27, 10 a.m. 1. The Central Political Committee this morning accepted resignation of Foreign Minister Chang Chun and Minister of Communications Ku Meng Yu and made following appointments: Wang Chung Hui to be Minister for Foreign Affairs; Chang Chun to be Secretary General of the Central Political Committee and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Political Committee; Tsing Chung King, former Vice Minister of Railways under Wang Ching Wei, to be Deputy Secretary General of the Central Political Committee; Yu Fei Peng, Vice Minister of Communications, to be Minister of Communications. 2. To Department and Peiping. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8566 [Document 30] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2299 Tokyo , March 3, 1937. [Received April 6.] Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a translation of a recent magazine article 37 by Lieutenant General Kenji Doihara, the Japanese officer who was so conspicuous in Manchuria in 1931 and 1932. Doihara is one of the Itagaki group, which has great weight in the army, and his views on the usefulness of increased Japanese armaments are worthy of attention, whatever may be the official policy of the Hayashi Cabinet. The underlying chain of reasoning in the author’s mind seems to be something like this: In Japan-Soviet rivalry, China is the vital field. Communism in China must be stopped at any cost. An obstacle to Japan is the anti-Japanese agitation; Chiang Kai-shek made use of the movement for his own particular purposes, but it got out of hand until now its demands could be met only by Japan’s abandoning the fight against communism, terminating activities in North China, and returning Manchuria. Japan’s policy must be neither to support Chiang (which would be to accept his compromise with the communists) nor to overthrow him (which would inflame anti-Japanese sentiment), but to go to the Chinese people with a propaganda campaign which may have some small effect in spite of great difficulties; and more important, Japan’s policy must be to strengthen national unity by internal reform, to increase Chinese respect for Japanese power by expanding the national armament of Japan. The necessary prelude to China’s understanding Japan’s disinterestedness is the building up of Japan’s military power. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 37 Not reprinted. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 894.00/700: Telegram [Document 31] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , March 4, 1937—2 p.m. [Received March 4—7:15 a.m.] 69. 1. Naotake Sato, until now Japanese Ambassador to France, was installed as Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening. Sato has spent over 30 years in the Japanese Foreign Service, all in Europe except for 5 years as Consul General at Harbin. He has had no service in China proper or the Americas. 2. Domei states that Sato is honest and genial but at the same time has a stern character and a “samurai-like solidity”. 3. In an interview with Japanese newspapermen last night Sato expressed the opinion that the foreign policy of a state should possess continuity and that therefore it would probably be necessary for him to adapt his preconceived views on foreign policy to the need for continuity (in other words, he is not planning radical changes in policy). He admitted that he anticipated some difficulty in reconciling his views with those of other members of the Cabinet (presumably those of the army and navy ministers) and regretted that his task would be much the more difficult by the fact that his long residence abroad had prevented him from becoming familiar with domestic political conditions. 4. Sato’s appointment was generally well received this morning by the vernacular press. The Asahi anticipated that Sato will establish a strong unified diplomacy, based on agreement of views between the Foreign Office, the army and the navy and centered on policies vis-à-vis China and the Soviets. The Hochi believed that Sato will defend liberalism in diplomacy. The Nichi Nichi stated that Sato is the most suitable choice from among the career diplomats and stressed the need for unified diplomacy. The Yomiuri expressed the opinion that Sato’s lack of intimate knowledge of China and full knowledge of Europe may be an asset because half of the difficulty in dealing with China arises from European and American influence in that country. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 894.00/706: Telegram [Document 32] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , March 5, 1937—6 p.m. [Received March 5—9:48 a.m.] 77. 1. In my initial talk with the new Foreign Minister today, Mr. Sato expressed regret that he had had no direct experience in Japanese-American affairs but he feels that our mutual relations must be largely influenced as in the case of other countries by Japan’s relations with China. The Minister therefore proposes first of all to study the Sino-Japanese situation with a view to bringing about a marked improvement in those relations and having especially in mind the effect of such an improvement on Japan’s relations with the rest of the world. 2. The Minister is perhaps unduly optimistic with regard to the possibility of achieving so desirable a purpose without eventually embroiling himself with certain elements of the military, yet on the other hand the policy which he envisages would appear to coincide with the general aim of the Hayashi Government already enunciated and almost certainly must reflect the talks which he has already had with his colleagues in the Cabinet. 3. Judging by articles in the Japanese press analyzing the Sian incident thoughtful Japanese recognize that any realignment in China which might now succeed the present Nanking Government must be more hostile to Japan and an unprovocative attitude toward Nanking is therefore wise. Furthermore, the aggressive policy and tactics recently pursued by Japan in China have signally and ignominiously failed to produce desired results. Sato’s remarks to me would appear to substantiate our belief that the Cabinet recognizes the present need for a more moderate course of procedure. 4. I know Sato fairly well personally and believe that our relations will be of the best. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14050: Telegram [Document 33] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , March 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 8—3:04 p.m.] 107. My 103, March 3, 3 p.m. 1. Wang Chung Hui this morning took office as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Both Hsu Mo and (contrary to press predictions) Chen Chieh are remaining as political and administrative Vice Ministers respectively and there are no changes in departmental heads except that the vacant Directorship of the General Affairs Department of Labor [not yet?] filled. 2. The new Foreign Minister will issue a statement on foreign policy this afternoon at 5 o’clock, the following being the text as obtained confidentially in advance from the Foreign Office. 3. “With their interests closely intertwined, nations in this modern world are living in far greater interdependence than ever before. It is only through mutual cooperation that world prosperity could be attained and international peace assured. “Since international cooperation, in the last analysis, depends on friendly feelings between peoples, it is of the greatest importance that anything which may militate against such friendly feelings should be removed or prevented. For all forms of international cooperation presumptive [ presuppose ] a desire on the part of the peoples concerned to work together for mutual benefit, and such desire is born when a spirit of goodwill and cordiality exists between them. Only in this way will any effort for international cooperation be crowned with success. “The foreign policy of China has, on various occasions, been clearly stated by the Government and by the President of the Executive Yuan, General Chiang Kai-shek. Its fundamental principles are the maintenance of the integrity of China’s territory and sovereign rights and the conduct of international relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Under the guidance of these principles, all possible efforts will be made in an atmosphere of peace to further international comity and friendship. Political understandings and economic cooperation, if they are to serve as means of consolidating regulations [ relations ] between nations, must be based on the principles of mutual benefit. Such has been the fixed policy of the Chinese Government, which is in harmony with national diplomacy. “In accepting the portfolio of foreign affairs, I am fully conscious of the heavy responsibility that is attached to it. Guided by the fixed policy of the government and the principles of international justice, I shall endeavor, in strict accordance with diplomatic usage, to secure the realization of the aspirations of the Chinese Government and the development through international cooperation of the relations between China and foreign powers to the benefit of all concerned.” 4. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping and Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 711.93/350: Telegram [Document 34] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , March 9, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:55 a.m.] 108. I called on Generalissimo Chiang on March 5th to pay my respects. The Generalissimo surprised me, after referring to a widespread impression among Chinese to the effect that the United States seemed to be less ardently interested in the Far East while the British Government was showing a growing interest, by stating that he hoped the United States would again indicate its interest in the Pacific area and in China. While the Generalissimo’s statement was couched in the most general terms, I distinctly inferred that he was anxious that the United States exert itself to occupy a position equaling that which he felt Great Britain had recently assumed. I told the Generalissimo that I would be glad to communicate his suggestions to you. I said that I felt the American Government need say very little as to its attitude in regard to the Far East, as it had made that attitude very plain on numerous occasions in the past and I knew of no change. I said that in American opinion it was now a time for action rather than words, and pointed out that among other concrete evidences of a continued American interest in the Pacific area were to be found the fact that the Government was at great expense to subsidize an air route from the United States to Hong Kong; that we were keeping our fleet in the Pacific and spending large sums for its accommodation; that, at a cost of two or three Panama Canals, we were building a large irrigation and hydroelectric plant on the Columbia River. The Generalissimo acknowledged all this but repeated his hope that the United States would keep pace with current British interest in the Pacific and the Far East, stating that the stability of the Pacific area depended upon this. The Generalissimo also stated that he felt the time was not far off when an international conference of the powers interested in the Far East should be held. I inferred from the way he talked that he perhaps was contemplating calling such a conference. He expressed the hope that the United States would bear the possibility of such a conference in mind and be prepared to participate, as American cooperation was necessary to the success of any effort to bring about peace in the Pacific area. I am not sure as to the reason for the Generalissimo’s ideas concerning the cooling of American interest in the Far East. He may have been inspired in this statement to me by his belief that the British made representations in Tokyo last fall, or it may be that he has been impressed by recent British efforts, first through Leith-Ross 38 and now through Kirkpatrick, 39 to increase the British investments in China through better credit facilities. Johnson 38 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government. 39 W. M. Kirkpatrick, representing the British Board of Trade Export Credits Guarantee Department. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8533: Telegram [Document 35] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , March 11, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 11—9:50 a.m.] 88. Reference Embassy’s despatch 1067, February 19. 40 1. Several reports have reached Peiping during the past few days that the Japanese are withdrawing their military supplies in Chahar to Dolonor in extreme eastern Chahar, indicating that no attack on Suiyuan is intended in the near future. The local correspondent of the Associated Press has just returned from Kalgan and Kueihwa and states that these reports seem to be correct. 2. The alleged withdrawal may be due to (1) orders received by the Japanese military responsible for the unsuccessful attack on Suiyuan of last November for which they were severely criticized, (2) the desertion of all or almost all of the Chinese “irregular[s]” to the Suiyuan side since the November defeat, leaving only Prince Teh’s 41 troops, numbering not more than 3,000, under Japanese direction, to evacuate, (3) effective military preparations in Suiyuan by the Chinese. 3. According to the correspondent, Fu Tso Yi 42 now controls Suiyuan practically to the Chahar border, and there are in Suiyuan 20,000 of his troops, 20,000 Shansi troops, 20,000 troops of Wang Ching Kuo, Yen Hsi Shan’s 43 subordinate in west Suiyuan, and 40,000 National Government troops. According to this informant, extensive strong defense preparations have been made in Suiyuan during the past few months. 4. There is a possibility, perhaps somewhat remote at present, that the Chinese will assume an aggressive attitude as a result of Japanese reduction of strength in Chahar and may attempt to recover Chahar territory from Japanese control. 5. Chinese in Kalgan are reported as saying that the Japanese may voluntarily give back the four western districts of the six which they control in Chahar north of the Great Wall, retaining the eastern two districts which give them control of the Kalgan–Dolonor Road but not of the Kalgan–Urga Road. It seems to the Embassy an improbable development under existing conditions. 6. The Embassy’s informant states that some missionaries have already returned to their stations in that part of Chahar under Japanese control without interference from the Japanese and that others intend to return shortly. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 40 Not printed. 41 Commanding Mongol banner forces in Chahar, and Chairman of Autonomous Political Council. 42 Chairman of Suiyuan Provincial Government. 43 Pacification Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8532: Telegram [Document 36] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , March 11, 1937—5 p.m. [Received March 11—6:55 a.m.] 89. Reference paragraph 1 Embassy’s 54, February 8, 5 p.m. and subsequent telegrams. 1. Sung Che Yuan returned March 9 to Peiping from Tientsin. The subject of his conversations with Japanese while there is still a matter of speculation. 2. Sung is reported to have said in an interview granted March 10 to Chinese pressmen that he would continue to follow his policy of supporting the National Government, that the development of economic resources would be guided by the principles of environments, reciprocity, and mutual prosperity, that mines would be developed first and then railways, and that he would continue to oppose communism. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/109: Telegram [Document 37] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , March 11, 1937—6 p.m. [Received March 11—11:05 a.m.] 85. Department’s 44, March 10, 6 p.m. 44 1. No official English version of Sato’s speech was issued by the Foreign Office. The Embassy understood that unofficial translations of practically the entire speech had been transmitted to the United States by press correspondents. The Embassy had proposed to comment by mail. 2. The first part of the speech dealt with the advisability of continuity of diplomatic policy (paragraph 3 of Embassy’s 69, March 4, 2 p.m.) but also stated that it was necessary at times to revise foreign policies to meet changed conditions. 3. Soviet-Japanese relations. Sato admitted that conditions at present are undesirable and placed the blame for such conditions primarily upon the existence within the Soviet Union of the Comintern. He suggested that if the Soviets should refuse longer to recognize the existence of the Comintern within its territory or if the organization should be transferred outside the country Soviet relations with Japan as well as with other countries would be brighter. 4. Anglo-Japanese relations. Sato emphasized the intention of the entire Japanese nation to promote harmony between the two nations and mentioned points of friction. He intimated that the chief point of friction lay in Sino-Japanese relations (paragraph 1 of Embassy’s 77, March 5, 6 p.m.) because of British fear that their interests in China are menaced by the Japanese advance. He said that Japan does not wish to cause anxiety to Britain or other countries and that Japan should ascertain the causes of such anxiety, should consider such causes and should endeavor to respect the rights of other countries in China. He added that if Japan develops peacefully her interests in China it will win the full understanding of other countries. 5. Sino-Japanese relations. Sato admitted the present impasse which he characterized as inevitable. He stated that an ideal solution could not be found at once and that it would be necessary to start with a new point of view. He said that diplomatic negotiations are normally conducted on a basis of equality between nations and intimated that the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations have been due to Japan’s sense of superiority over China. He proposed to give consideration to China’s demands and vital interests and to negotiate with China on a basis of equality and in a conciliatory spirit while maintaining Japanese interests intact. 6. Sato did not mention the United States in the speech, a favorable indication. 7. The speech was generally well received in Japan but only two vernacular newspapers commented on it editorially. The Asahi praised its outspoken tone and characterized it as highly creditable but criticised as impossible of achievement Sato’s suggestion that Soviet Russia separate itself from the Comintern. The Yomiuri praised Sato’s determination to break the deadlock in Japan’s foreign relations but also adversely criticised the suggestion regarding Soviet Russia. The Advertiser, Times , and Chronicle also published editorials commenting favorably on the speech. 8. The Embassy has been informed that Japanese financial and business circles warmly approve of Sato’s declaration of policy. [9.] To the Embassy it appears that the significant points in Sato’s speech are ( a ) the emphasis upon the fact that improvement of relations with China will react favorably upon relations with other countries, and ( b ) the intimation revealed by the tone of friendliness and peaceful cooperation on the basis of equality in the speech that Sato diplomacy will assume a more conciliatory tone than previous diplomacy especially in regard to China. Observers point out, however, that the Kwantung army may upset Sato’s plans. 10. As of significance in this connection one of my colleagues has informed me that Sato told him that before returning to Japan he did not think he could accept the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs owing to the difficulty of reconciling his views with those of other members of the Cabinet, especially those of the War Minister. 45 To his surprise upon consulting with the Cabinet he found that their views and his practically coincided resulting in his acceptance of the position. This indicates a change of policy on the part of the military probably resulting from their past mistakes and failures. It has also been suggested by observers that increasing difficulties between Japan and Soviet Russia with renewed risk of eventual war has dictated the wisdom of improving Sino-Japanese relations. 11. Sato is being interpellated again in the Diet this afternoon. The Embassy will report any significant developments arising from the interpellations. Repeated by mail to Peiping. Grew 44 Not printed. 45 Gen. Hajime (Gen) Sugiyama. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/110: Telegram [Document 38] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , March 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received March 12—9:40 a.m.] 86. Embassy’s 85, March 11, 6 p.m., paragraph 11. 1. In reply to an interpellation in the Lower House in regard to American-Japanese relations, Sato yesterday reiterated the opinion expressed to me that American-Japanese relations depend largely upon Sino-Japanese relations (Embassy’s 77, March 5, 6 p.m.). He said that if Japan’s policy toward China is fair and is one of which Japan need not be ashamed or afraid to reveal to the world, the United States will feel no anxiety concerning Sino-Japanese relations with resultant benefit to American-Japanese relations. In this connection he asserted Japan’s intention of maintaining the principle of the Open Door in Central and South China ( sic ). 2. In regard to the German-Japanese agreement, Sato said that Japan had no intention of joining the Fascist camp; that the agreement therefore should not impair Japan’s relations with other nations; and that there is no possibility that Japan through the agreement will be dragged into an European war. 3. Sino-Japanese relations. Sato said that he has no intention of including the question of Manchukuo in any future negotiations with China; also that the Japanese Government has full sympathy with the Chinese in their efforts at national unity. He denied in reply to a specific interpellation any fundamental divergence of views regarding China questions between himself and the Premier and War Minister. 4. In regard to the suggestion in his speech of the 8th concerning the Soviets and the Comintern (paragraph 3 of Embassy’s 85, March 11, 6 p.m.), Sato said that he did not contemplate the elimination of the Comintern from Russia but only intended to indicate that the existence of the Comintern in Russia made necessary the German-Japanese agreement. 5. In the concluding portion of his speech Sato said that the crisis, if by crisis is meant strained foreign relations, is not peculiar to Japan and that whether or not the crisis is to be translated into war depends entirely upon the way in which the Japanese nation thinks; if Japan does not want such a crisis it can be avoided at any time. He added that Japan if it is a great nation should walk the open path in a straightforward and dignified manner. 6. Sato’s comments on the “crisis” contradict the statement of the Premier when, concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs, he said that the situation in the Far East since the Manchurian incident “might explode at a touch”. Certain circles in the army (called the “middle stratum”) according to this morning’s vernacular newspapers have taken exception to Sato’s comments holding that he has not a clear conception of Japan’s domestic and foreign circumstances. 7. Some observers in Tokyo believe that the Japanese Government with the consent of the present army leaders is abandoning the “diplomacy of desperation” and returning to the “Shidehara diplomacy”. 46 Apparently, however, the radical elements of the army are opposed to any such change. It is as yet too early to attempt any prediction as to the outcome of this conflict of opinions. Repeated by mail to Peiping. Grew 46 Conciliatory policy of Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who resigned in December 1931. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 701.4194/26: Telegram [Document 39] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , March 13, 1937—noon. [Received March 13—9:12 a.m.] 142. The appointment is officially announced this morning of Sir Robert Craigie 47 to succeed Clive as British Ambassador in Tokyo. An article in the Times this morning from its Tokyo correspondent dealing with Sato’s speech in the House of Peers on March 12th concludes: “It is officially explained that Mr. Sato’s remark about a new departure in China policy applied to methods, not policy. Whatever views the Japanese Foreign Minister may hold on China policy, these in practice are always affected by the army’s fixed conviction that Manchukuo’s security entitles Japan to regard North China as a special area. The most that can be safely assumed is that the army admits that the recent negotiations turned out badly and has agreed to a fresh start. Whether the change in method means a change of heart must be doubted till concrete proposals are reached.” This is of interest since it is not out of line with the tenor of a comprehensive discussion with Cadogan yesterday on the Far East situation in general. The memorandum goes forward by pouch. 48 Bingham 47 British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 48 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/111: Telegram [Document 40] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , March 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received March 13—9:47 a.m.] 90. Embassy’s 86, March 12, 7 p.m. 1. In view of the widespread criticism that Sato’s views do not coincide with those of the Premier, it was reportedly decided at a conference yesterday between the Premier and Foreign, War and Navy Ministers that Sato should qualify the statement of policy which he made in the Lower House of the Diet on the 11th. Accordingly yesterday at a meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Peers Sato explained ( a ) that by saying that the Japanese nation can avert a crisis at any time if so minded he meant that Japan should avoid a positive challenge to another power, not that Japan should tolerate any provocation; ( b ) that in advocating a policy of conciliation and patience toward China he did not mean that Japan should be submissive if China trampled upon international justice or damaged the prestige of Japan; ( c ) that in stating that economic blocs in the Far East were premature he did not mean to deny the “inseparable relations” between Japan and Manchukuo; and ( d ) that by asking why Japan did not walk the open path straightforwardly he did not mean to criticize past actions of Japan. 2. Later both the Premier and the War Minister stated at Diet committee meetings that there is no material discrepancy between their views and those of Sato. 3. The general opinion among political observers is that Sato has talked too much without sufficient knowledge of domestic political conditions and trends; that his phraseology was poorly selected; and that he was not fully or well advised by his subordinates in the Foreign Office. The Nichi Nichi this morning reports that this last circumstance may lead to extensive changes in the personnel of the Foreign Office, probably including the transfer to the field of the Vice Minister. 4. Two of the minority groups in the Lower House are taking the lead in opposing Sato’s policies and the newspapers this morning report that one of the groups will introduce a motion of non-confidence in the Minister for Foreign Affairs if sufficient support seems to be forthcoming. Repeated by mail to Peiping. Grew The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 711.93/350 [Document 41] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , March 13, 1937. Dear Nelson : The Secretary and all of us in FE 49 have been very much interested in your confidential telegram No. 108, March 9, 9 a.m., reporting a conversation on March 5 with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo’s statement indicating his hope that the United States would manifest its interest in the Pacific area and in China and would bring its attitude toward that area abreast of the attitude which Great Britain had recently assumed constitutes, it seems to us, further evidence of an inclination in high Chinese circles to intimate that the United States has lost interest in China and the Far East and that the United States is not paying as much attention to that area as is Great Britain. We agree with your statement that the situation in the Far East cannot be dealt with adequately by mere words. We feel that action and facts are the proper criteria with regard to the attitude and position of the United States in reference to China and the Far East. And it is our estimate that an examination of the record shows that the action and attitude of the United States in and with reference to China during recent years have moved along lines parallel with and abreast of the attitude and action of Great Britain in reference to China. In the field of diplomatic action, the United States has not, as you realize, lagged behind Great Britain. During the last year or two the tactics which the American Government has employed have perhaps not resulted in as much publicity to diplomatic démarches on the part of the American Government as to similar démarches on the part of the British Government; but it seems to us that the efforts of the American Government have been as fruitful of beneficial results as have the efforts of the British Government. Turning to other fields of activity, it is probably true that at the present time American financiers and businessmen do not have as keen an interest in China as a field for present investment and trade expansion as have British financiers and businessmen. But, we think a very good case can be made out demonstrating the continued interest of the United States in China from point of view of finances and trade. To be more specific: (1) the British Government sent Leith-Ross to China where he conducted investigations into China’s monetary and financial situation and made helpful suggestions. Did not the American Government somewhat parallel Leith-Ross’ helpfulness by purchasing in November, 1935, from the Chinese Government 50 million ounces of silver at the then prevailing world price? The resulting United States dollar credit was of material assistance to the Chinese Government in maintaining the stability of its new currency and in gaining the confidence of the Chinese public. Moreover, in May, 1936, the United States Treasury arranged to purchase from China further substantial amounts of silver and to make available dollar exchange for Chinese currency stabilization purposes. (2) Several months ago the British Government sent a representative of its Export Credits Guarantee Department to China to investigate there projects involving the extension of British credit for purchases by China of British commodities. But, has not the American Government maintained in China a commercial attaché’s office 50 the personnel of which is and has been larger than that maintained by any other government? (3) Notwithstanding the special interest accorded Chinese trade and economic possibilities by Great Britain, the United States has continued to hold the leading position in the foreign trade of China—which it attained in 1932. (4) In the spring of 1935, an unofficial American economic mission visited the Far East. Since its return to this country the members of that mission have been active in stimulating interest in the United States in the possibilities of increasing the trade of the United States with China to the mutual advantage of both countries. Moreover, the United States has maintained a steady interest in reconstructive efforts in China and has consistently endeavored to be helpful. In this connection it is pertinent to keep in mind the fact that whereas the British Government in providing for the remission to China of the balance of the British Boxer Indemnity Fund stipulated that the funds should be used in first instance and in large part as a revolving fund for the purchase of British materials for use in China, the American Government remitted the balance of China’s Boxer Indemnity for educational and scientific use. The funds remitted by the American Government serve toward training China’s future leaders. Does not such use contribute as much toward assisting China in its efforts at reconstruction as the purchase of commodities? The manner in which the funds remitted by the American Government are used would certainly seem to fit in with the aims of General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek toward building up a higher type of personnel and to be in line with their New Life Movement. This is of course not a complete statement of the case, but is illustrative of the thoughts which occurred to us in reading your telegram under reference. In this general connection we have re-read the statements made in the Department’s telegram to Peiping No. 215, July 17, 1932, 11 p.m.; 51 the Department’s telegrams to Nanking No. 56, July 5, 1935, 6 p.m.; 52 and No. 65, October 7, 1936, 7 p.m.; 53 and in my letter of December 1, 1936, to Willys Peck (copy of which I think you have seen). 53a We realize, as stated in my letter of December 1, that the problem which confronts American officialdom with regard to interpreting in contacts with Chinese officialdom the attitude and policy of this country is full of difficult angles. Just as Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders have foremost in their minds the interests of China, so we have foremost in our minds the interests of the United States. We are fortunately situated in that our interests and those of China usually run along parallel lines; at least they do not conflict. We shall continue to give serious thought to the statements made to you by General Chiang Kai-shek as reported in your telegram. With all best wishes [etc.] Stanley K. Hornbeck 49 Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 50 Julean Arnold, Commercial Attaché since 1914. 51 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. iv , p. 165 . 52 Ibid ., 1935, vol. iii , p. 295 . 53 Ibid ., 1936, vol. iv , p. 343 . 53a Not found in Department files. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8542: Telegram [Document 42] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , March 16, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 3:45 p.m.] 119. 1. A Japanese Economic Mission arrived in Shanghai from Japan March 14 and in Nanking March 15 its purpose as reportedly stated in January by Japanese Minister of Finance being to (1) return the call in October 1935 of a Chinese Economic Mission to Japan, (2) “impress upon Chinese official and private circles Japanese side of the argument for joint development of China’s economic sources”. Kenji Kodama, head of the group, was recently reported as denying that the group was entrusted with any special mission but would “doubtless prepare the ground of economic cooperation between China and Japan”. 2. The group’s personnel has caused press to attach considerable significance to the visit and includes the presidents or other high officials of such concerns as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Nippon Yusen, Dai Nippon sugar, Toyo and Dai Nippon cotton spinning; Chosen and Sumitommo Banks; Japanese cotton mill owners in China and Sino-Japanese Trade Associations. The group was accompanied to Nanking by the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, several Shanghai Chinese businessmen and the Japanese Military Attaché and was greeted by a delegation headed by the Chinese Minister of Industries. The day was spent in calls and entertainments at which Ministers of Communications, Railways and Industries were hosts. 3. Characteristic Chinese press comment: the Mission’s intention of cooperation should not be lightly regarded since members represent the captains of Japanese industry and can exert great influence over whatever policy their Government may adopt vis-à-vis China; while the Chinese do not expect much, they hope the members will be observant and on returning to Japan will advise their fellow countrymen and Government whether or not certain Japanese actions and policies in China should not be rectified; they should notice that “certain people” have been monopolizing the illicit drug traffic not only for pecuniary purposes but to make their victims unfit for manly duties; they will observe the “special trade” in North and South China and discover that this is not only injuring ordinary trade conducted by Japanese and others but was disrupting Chinese public finance and revenue; economic or other cooperation must be built on principles of reciprocity and equality. 4. Director of Department of Intelligence and Publicity of Foreign Office has made the informal comment to me that since mission has no official character whatever and that it can accomplish little unless the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs takes steps to abate the smug-ling in North China and to induce Japanese banks to hand to the Chinese Government silver stocks of about 9,000,000 Chinese dollars in conformity with the currency regulations following the example of all other foreign banks. 5. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8541: Telegram [Document 43] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , March 16, 1937—5 p.m. [Received March 16—3 p.m.] 92. Embassy’s 88, March 11, 4 p.m. 1. The informant mentioned in paragraph 1 of that telegram states that he has just been reliably informed that a Monkokuo (Mongolian state) has been definitely established, that it includes all of Chahar Province north of the Great Wall, that Chapsur is its capital, that the “Government” has a president (presumably Prince Teh), a vice president, a prime minister and 100 other Mongols, participating in that capacity, together with Japanese advisers, and that a tariff schedule has been published. 2. This information, which has not been confirmed, is believed to have come originally from the foreigner 54 mentioned on page 3 of the Embassy’s despatch 618 July 31, 1936, 55 who has recently been at his residence mentioned on that page. 3. Reports of such a régime has been rumored from time to time. If it proves to be true it would seem to render less likely the return of this area to Chinese control through negotiations at some future time. 4. Similarly the reputed circulation in Yin Ju Keng’s area in east Hopei 56 during this month of money issued by that régime’s bank, for the purpose of replacing the Chinese money now circulating there, will apparently create still another barrier to a rendition through negotiation of this Japanese-controlled area to Chinese control. 5. There is at present a 3-day celebration in progress at Kueihwa, consisting of a memorial service March 15 for those Chinese who fell in the fighting of last November and December with Japanese-directed forces, a review March 16 and the opening March 17 of the 1937 session of the Suiyuan Mongol Council. These ceremonies are attended by Wang Ching Wei, Yen Hsi Shan, and other officials from outside Suiyuan and are evidence of Chinese intention to resist Japanese expansion westward from Chahar. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 54 The Swedish dealer, known as “Duke” Larson, who lived north of Chapsur. 55 Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 255 . 56 Yin styled himself Governor of East Hopei (“Communist-prevention Autonomous Council”). The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/116 [Document 44] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2312 Tokyo , March 17, 1937. [Received April 6.] Sir : With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams Nos. 69, March 4, 2 p.m., 85, March 11, 6 p.m., 86, March 12, 7 p.m. and 90, March 13, 2 p.m., in regard to the recent appointment of Mr. Naotake Sato as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi Cabinet and his policies as expressed in his public utterances, I have the honor to submit the following report on the subject. Mr. Naotake Sato, who was until his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin [ Paris ], was proceeding to Japan on home leave when the Hayashi Cabinet was formed. It was rumored in Tokyo that he would be appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs on his arrival in Tokyo, but in interviews with newspaper correspondents en route he denied having been approached on the subject. On his arrival in Tokyo he was consulted by Mr. Obata, a retired diplomat who had himself refused to accept the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi Cabinet on the grounds of ill health. Mr. Sato refused to give an immediate answer and asked for interviews with General Hayashi, the Premier, and General Sugiyama, the War Minister. The interviews with these officials apparently having been satisfactory, Mr. Sato accepted the appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 3 and was installed in office that evening. In this connection I am enclosing a memorandum 57 of a conversation which I had with the Belgian Ambassador in Tokyo, which explains the circumstances under which Mr. Sato agreed to accept the post. According to the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Sato, while en route home, believed that he would be unable to accept the post even, if it were offered him, as he did not think that his views could be reconciled with those of the Minister of War. After interviewing some of the members of the Cabinet (evidently the Premier and the War Minister), however, he found to his surprise that their views could be reconciled, and consequently he accepted the post. [Here follows report on Mr. Sato’s policies.] Analysis and Comment . The experience of Mr. Sato as the newly-appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan well illustrates the constant conflict taking place in Japan between the old-line, liberal diplomacy and the blustering, sabre-rattling diplomacy of the days since the Manchurian incident of 1931. It is evident, from information which has reached the Embassy, that Mr. Sato accepted the post as Minister for Foreign Affairs with the understanding that he be given a fairly free hand in diplomatic affairs. The military and chauvinistic elements in the Government, which had been foisting on the nation the aggressive diplomacy of recent years, had apparently become convinced, as a result of the dismal failures of that diplomacy during the past year, that they had best step out of the picture for a time and leave diplomacy in the hands of the group trained in international intercourse. It is also apparent, however, that they had not expected Mr. Sato to go as far as he did in re-orienting Japan’s foreign policies. Mr. Sato, in the first place, very evidently intended to discard the aggressive, sabre-rattling diplomacy and to adopt a much more conciliatory tone than has been used for some years past. As a perusal of his speeches will show, he several times emphasized the advisability of treating other nations (China in particular) on a basis of equality and of giving due consideration to the other parties’ points of view. It has often been said that in dealing with the Japanese, as a nation or as individuals, the principal difficulty arises from the fact that the Japanese are never able to see the other party’s point of view. Mr. Sato, with his long experience in European diplomacy and in international conferences, understood this defect in Japanese diplomacy and proposed to correct it. In the second place, Mr. Sato apparently desired to drop all aggressive designs on China, to fix definitely the minimum demands which Japan should make on China to protect Japanese rights and interests in that country, to proclaim these demands to the world, thereby relieving the international uneasiness in regard to Japan’s intentions in China, and to negotiate patiently with China for the acceptance of these minimum demands. It is a question, however, if the Army permitted him to include North China in the area to be covered in the negotiations. The specific mention of Central and South China and the omission of any mention of North China in Mr. Sato’s remarks about the maintenance of the principle of the Open Door in China, would appear to indicate (unless the omission was inadvertent) that the Army might have reserved North China as its sphere of operations, not to be included in diplomatic negotiations. In the third place, Mr. Sato proposed to formulate fair and equitable foreign policies, to conduct his diplomacy on a frank and just basis and to avoid trickery and chicanery in his dealings with other countries—in other words, to “tread the righteous road steadfastly and courageously”. Although he was forced to deny it the next day, Mr. Sato in this was apparently tacitly disavowing previous Japanese acts, such as the subterfuges employed in the conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of “Manchukuo”, the setting up of the East Hopei Autonomous Government, the incitement of the Mongols in Suiyuan, and the secret conclusion of the German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement, which had unexpected repercussions throughout the world and especially in the Soviet Union. In the fourth place, Mr. Sato was apparently endeavoring to discredit the militaristic and chauvinistic elements in the nation and thereby to build up more support for his own policies and plans, when he denied the existence of a “crisis” except in the minds of the people, and proclaimed Japan’s ability to avoid a serious crisis (meaning war) at any time if Japan so desired. Mr. Sato, however, not being entirely familiar with political conditions in Japan, does not seem to have realized, when he denied the famous “crisis”, that he was thereby striking at the keystone of the structure of military power and prestige in Japan. What right would the Army have to demand immense appropriations for repletion of armaments, to demand a “semi-wartime” economic system, and to dictate the composition of the administration in Japan, if no “crisis” loomed on the horizon? Mr. Sato’s policies, which seem reasonable and just to other nations and which Mr. Sato had undoubtedly formulated as a result of his long diplomatic experience abroad, were somewhat too liberal for the more chauvinistic elements of the Japanese nation. As the Yomiuri pointed out, the so-called “middle stratum” of the Army objected strongly to Mr. Sato’s policies as smelling of a revival of the Shidehara diplomacy, which was much too liberal for the Army. However, the chauvinists might have swallowed the Sato diplomatic policies, at least for a time, but the denial of the existence of a “crisis” was too much. Pressure was immediately brought to bear on Mr. Sato (exactly what form the pressure took is not known) and Mr. Sato was compelled to eat humble pie by qualifying his statements in the Diet, thereby again demonstrating the dominant influence of the military over the domestic and foreign policies of Japan. The general opinion in diplomatic and other circles in Tokyo is that Mr. Sato should not have attempted to express his views so fully and frankly without having first ascertained definitely the reaction of the military to his policies. Mr. Sato has resided abroad for over 30 years, and while he undoubtedly was aware of the powerful influence wielded in Japan by the military and chauvinists, he appears to have underestimated that influence. He made a very bold and courageous attempt to persuade Japan to adopt more liberal and conciliatory foreign policies, but he seems to have failed to realize that, under present conditions in Japan, his attempt would be practically hopeless. Any change in Japanese foreign policies, if such change occurs, will have to take place slowly and gradually in accordance with gradually changing conditions. Most observers believe that Mr. Sato would have been well advised to have stopped with his first speech, and that his second, or explanatory speech, was a tactical blunder, as it opened the doors to severe criticism from the chauvinistic elements. The tendency, both in the Japanese Foreign Office and in diplomatic circles, is to blame the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi, either for badly advising Mr. Sato, or for failing to advise him of the probable results of the second speech. One newspaper stated that the younger element in the Foreign Office was taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by Mr. Sato’s errors in tactics to press for the retirement or transfer to the field of many of the heads of bureaux. Mr. Horinouchi was mentioned as one of those who would be replaced. Although practically everyone agrees that Mr. Sato suffered a defeat and considerable humiliation when he was obliged to go before the Diet and qualify the statements which he made in his second speech, the more observant among the diplomats and newspaper correspondents take the stand that he did not, in his qualifying explanations, to any considerable extent weaken his original policies. It will be observed that the qualifying statements endeavored to reconcile Mr. Sato’s policies with those of the Premier and did not change the policies themselves. It was rather an attempt to save the face of the Premier than an about-face on the part of Mr. Sato. [Here follows brief report on press comment.] After all, Mr. Sato has so far survived the storm which he aroused by his speeches and, it is believed, has impressed several of his points upon the nation. It is impossible to predict what will happen in the future, especially when the “middle stratum” of the Army at home and the Kwantung Army are taken into consideration, but the general opinion seems to be that he has made a good impression upon the great mass of the Japanese people and that, barring unforeseen contingencies, he should be able to continue in office during the life of the Hayashi Cabinet. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 57 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8544: Telegram [Document 45] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , March 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 18—7 a.m.] 93. Embassy’s 92, March 16, 5 p.m. 1. The informant mentioned in paragraph 1 of these telegrams returned last night from Kalgan where he talked with several foreigners who have recently been in the vicinity of Chapsur and who confirm that the Mongol régime under Prince Teh has been established. They stated that it was established some time ago but that information with regard to it has been slow in getting out. 2. The Embassy’s informant learned that all or most of the Japanese officers who have been running the régime have recently left and have been replaced by other Japanese (presumably of the Japanese Army) who are apparently under orders to accord better treatment than their predecessors to Mongols and other non-Japanese people. 3. From the same source it is learned that Prince Teh has only three to four thousand troops. These are mostly Jehol Mongols under the leadership of the Manchukuo-Jehol Mongol, Li Shou-hsin. They are at present occupied in trying to clear up banditry in North Chahar, the bandits being some of those irregulars who were under Japanese direction at the time of their defeat of last November in Suiyuan. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14085 [Document 46] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 392 Nanking , March 22, 1937. [Received April 19.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram from Nanking No. 107, March 8, 4 p.m., concerning the statement of foreign policy issued that day by Dr. Wang Chung-hui, newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to enclose for purposes of record the text of Dr. Wang’s statement 58 as handed to an officer of the Embassy by the Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Foreign Office and subsequently released to the press. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. The Chinese attitude can not be dismissed as one merely of scepticism or cynicism. It is based in part upon a comparatively recent sense of security and self-reliance. The Chinese have grown to feel somewhat secure from overt military action by the Japanese because they have come to realize that the Japanese desire to avoid becoming involved in any major military operations in China or on the Siberian border. This realization seemed to strike the Chinese Government in September 1936 and grew out of the approaches which Mr. Kawagoe 59 made to the Chinese Foreign Office in regard to the settlement of outstanding issues, including the Chengtu, Pakhoi and Shanghai incidents. Leaders of the Chinese Government appeared then to have become receptive to the idea that the number of such incidents had imbued the Japanese with a sincere anxiety lest there occur a recrudescence of anti-Japanese sentiment which would sweep over China and jeopardize the general safety of Japanese lives and property in this country. The failure of the Japanese Navy to take action at Pakhoi when the 19th Route Army (whose startlingly successful resistance of the Japanese Navy in Shanghai in 1932 has never been avenged) refused to permit the landing of either Chinese or Japanese investigators, gave the Chinese a most impressive cue as to Japan’s reluctance to embark upon a major military adventure. Chinese officials stated, during the Kawagoe-Chang Chun conversations, that both the Chinese [and] Japanese were “playing poker”; the Chinese Foreign Office hoped to bluff the Japanese Embassy, and it succeeded in doing so, for the incidents were settled individually and not in connection with the Japanese demands for a settlement of “fundamental issues”. The Japanese swallowed their demands rather than press the issue to a dangerous point or to what they feared might be a dangerous point. To this Chinese sense of partial security, the successful repulsion in November 1936 of Japanese-directed “irregulars and bandits” who invaded Suiyuan added a new feeling of self-reliance concerning the handling of matters arising in North China and, until there occurs some incident to undermine their confidence, the Chinese are not to be stampeded into meeting Japanese desires. Since they realize, too, the nature and purpose of Japanese aims in China, they may be expected to regard cynically any new and professedly friendly approach by the Japanese which is not supported by concrete evidence of good faith. For the moment such evidence would consist in no less than the abolition of the East Hopei régime and the suppression of the smuggling of Japanese goods into North China. 60 6. Neither the abolition of the East Hopei régime nor the suppression of smuggling, however, would necessarily constitute more than a temporary move by the Japanese toward a fundamental readjustment of the North China situation. Laying aside the question of the so-called Ho–Uyemetsu agreement, 61 which is a matter of dispute, no actual readjustment is possible so long as the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, 62 continues in operation. The existence of the East Hopei régime and the circumstances which make successful smuggling possible are due fundamentally and primarily to the Tangku Truce. It is doubtful whether at the time of the formulation of this agreement, either the Japanese or Chinese realized the full significance of its terms. It will be recalled that the Truce provided that: (1) Chinese troops would completely withdraw to the west and south of an irregular line connecting Lutai, Hopei, and Yenching, Chahar, and would undertake not to advance beyond that line; (2) Japanese troops might at any time make observations to confirm the execution of this provision; (3) Chinese police would maintain peace and order north and east of the line. In other words, by this agreement the Chinese relinquished military jurisdiction (which is tantamount to relinquishing effective civil jurisdiction) over some 5,000 square miles of intramural territory in Hopei Province and, since Yenching is in the southeastern corner of Chahar, over most of that province. It could be argued that the agreement gave de facto recognition to Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria and Mongolia. In any case, as subsequent developments proved, the agreement, by removing active military opposition to Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria, enabled the Japanese to suppress rebels, “volunteers” and bandits in Manchuria and consolidate their position there. Since the “volunteers” fighting the Japanese in Manchuria had been directed to some extent from this intramural area and had received much of their supplies therefrom, the creation of a buffer region was of paramount importance to the Japanese military and will continue to be so. It is accordingly unlikely that the Japanese will be willing to abandon the benefits accruing to them from the Truce. The converse rather will be true for by a logical process the creation of a buffer region for the protection of “Manchukuo” creates another more distant boundary requiring protection and demands the creation of a second special area for the protection of the first. Japanese hopes for the establishment of an autonomous or semi-autonomous five province régime in North China have developed naturally out of these circumstances and it is difficult to imagine that any reorientation of Japanese policy toward China, sincere or otherwise, unified or dual, will include a rectification of this situation. 7. The conclusion to be drawn is that there is no reason to assume that Japan has actually embarked upon a revolutionary change in policy toward China, or upon any new orientation of policy which will be more than temporarily beneficial to this country, except insofar as a temporary lessening of Japanese pressure may be considered beneficial. On the contrary, it seems likely that the mooted change in policy, such as it is, will pretend to place emphasis upon so-called economic cooperation and only ostensibly leave political questions in the background. Some indication of this appears in today’s press despatches from Tokyo * which state that the Japanese Economic Mission has been a failure because Chinese officials and businessmen insist upon discussing political questions before considering economic questions, and Japan therefore has no alternative but to go on with the “economic development” of North China as already planned. Respectfully yours, Nelson Trusler Johnson 58 The text of statement transmitted to the Embassy was substantially the same as that contained in telegram No. 107, March 8, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] . 59 Shigeru Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador in China. 60 See also pp. 848–859 [ Pgs. 848–859 include portions of Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , and Doc. 971 ] , passim . 61 Alleged secret agreement between the Chinese War Minister and the Japanese Army Commander in North China, May–July, 1935; see despatch No. 332, March 27, 1936, from the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 89 . 62 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 120 . * Domei, quoting the Tokyo Asahi . [Footnote in the original.] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8552: Telegram [Document 47] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , March 23, 1937—4 p.m [Received March 23—8:30 a.m.] 97. Reference Embassy’s 86, March 9, noon; 63 paragraph 5 Embassy’s 88, March 11, 4 p.m.; and paragraphs 3 and 4 Embassy’s 92, March 16, 5 p.m. 1. A well informed civilian Japanese official has stated in private conversation that he sees no probability of a change in the status of Yin Ju Keng’s régime in East Hopei nor of a return of Chahar north of the Great Wall to Chinese control. 2. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army told the local representative of the Chicago Daily News a few days ago that he did not believe it likely that the status of Yin Ju Keng’s régime would be changed for the present. He also said that the Japanese military have advised the Mongols in Chahar not to try to win Suiyuan by fighting but by peaceful negotiation and that there will be no fighting of any sort against the Chinese forces in Suiyuan. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 63 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 794.00/315: Telegram [Document 48] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , March 24, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 12:50 p.m.] 98. 1. The optimism created in North China by press reports of earlier statements of the new Japanese Foreign Minister, which indicated that Japan’s future policy with regard to China might henceforth be more moderate and conciliatory, seems to have diminished. This optimism has decreased in part because subsequent reports of statements of the Foreign Minister indicate that something (presumably the displeasure of the military) has caused him to be less reassuring, implying that the future policy may not be as conciliatory or moderate as seemed at first probable. Lesser causes of the decrease in optimism have been ( a ) press reports of the failure of the Kodama Economic Mission to accomplish anything concrete and ( b ) recent conferences of Japanese military officers held at Shanghai and Tientsin, which were perhaps routine in character but which nevertheless created uneasiness among Chinese observers. 2. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army recently said to the Far Eastern correspondent of the Chicago Daily News that the Foreign Minister having amended his original statement on policy, the Kwantung Army was not now in disagreement with his “later statement”. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/114: Telegram [Document 49] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , March 24, 1937—2 p.m. [Received March 24—7:40 a.m.] 95. Embassy’s 90, March 13, 2 p.m., and previous on Sato’s policies. 1. Yesterday in reply to numerous interpellations at a meeting of the Budget Committee of the Lower House Sato defined more specifically some of his foreign policies. 2. Anglo-Japanese relations. Sato said that although the restoration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 64 is being given serious consideration in Japan and in Great Britain, such restoration is difficult because Great Britain is a member of the League of Nations. He refused to state his opinion as to the attitude which Japan should take on the question. 3. American-Japanese relations. Sato said that the question of exclusion of Japanese immigrants is again being discussed in the United States and that the Japanese Government will endeavor to obtain an advantageous settlement. 4. Soviet-Japanese relations. Sato said that the border problem is the most urgent issue and that negotiations are proceeding on that question. He said that the Foreign Office has no immediate intention of concluding a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. 5. Sino-Japanese relations. Sato said that economic and cultural cooperation between Japan and China should take priority over political negotiations and that patience must be exercised in dealing with China in the normal course of international relations. He said that as there are special and peculiar conditions [in?] China, different measures than are used in dealing with Central and South China are required in dealing with North China (see paragraph 1 of Embassy’s 86, March 12, 7 p.m.). In reply to an interpellation regarding the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar administrations, he said that those administrations came into existence under special circumstances obtaining in North China and were not a matter for discussion with Japan, although later they might be discussed in negotiations with China. The interpellator then expressed the opinion that cooperation with China in suppressing the “special trade” (smuggling) in North China is a prerequisite to Sino-Japanese understanding. Sato said that the “special trade” is a matter that concerns the East Hopei régime and is not one that should be discussed with Japan, although Japan will consider it in connection with the problem of Chinese tariffs, as the “special trade” has an important bearing on Japanese trade with China. 6. Reference paragraph 4 of Embassy’s 90, March 13, 2 p.m. The opposition to Sato appears to be decreasing. Both the Premier and the War Minister yesterday stated in replies to interpellations that although there were points in Sato’s speech of March 11 (Embassy’s 86, March 12, 7 p.m.) which they did not understand or to the phraseology of which they objected, Sato had explained the points and they now accepted the speech as given by Sato. The minor parties have apparently abandoned their resolution of nonconfidence in Sato because of lack of sufficient support and consequently there is now no reason to believe that Sato will not remain as Minister for Foreign Affairs during the life of the Hayashi Cabinet. Copy to Peiping by mail. Grew 64 1902–21. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8554: Telegram [Document 50] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , March 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received March 24—9:55 a.m.] 134. My [ our ] 119, March 16, 1 [ 3 ] p.m., and [my] 121, March 18, 9 a.m. 65 1. Japanese Economic Mission left Shanghai for Japan yesterday although, according to press reports, three members are remaining for the time being in order to visit North China. According to the informant mentioned, 133, March 24, 3 p.m., 66 the mission accomplished nothing because the Chinese do not want Japanese “economic cooperation” which they understand to mean Japanese “domination”. 2. In the conversations between members and Chinese officials and businessmen in Shanghai, the Chinese appear to have insisted that a readjustment of the political relations of the two countries is necessary before any concrete program of “economic cooperation” can be agreed upon and this insistence is blamed by Japanese press reports widely circulating in China (notably Domei from Tokyo, March 22, quoting the Tokyo Asahi ) as responsible for what is termed the mission’s failure. These reported comments state that the mission’s visit was employed chiefly as excuse for “exchange of complaints”, there is no hope of Japanese economic cooperation with China in any part of that country but the north, hopes of a political readjustment are to be despaired of because of the Chinese attitude mentioned above, and there is accordingly nothing left for Japan to do but push her economic program in North China. 3. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 65 For latter, see vol. iv , p. 578 . 66 Not printed. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.93/1586: Telegram [Document 51] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , March 26, 1937—7 p.m. [Received March 26—2:30 p.m.] 58. Am advised by Chinese Ambassador at Moscow that his Government and U. S. S. R. have arrived at a definite agreement providing that the U. S. S. R. will not support or encourage communistic groups or communistic armies or independent states against present Chinese Government and that Chinese Government continue support such groups through absorption in or through government activities. Repeated to Peiping by mail. Davies The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.94/958 [Document 52] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State No. 152 Moscow , March 26, 1937. [Received April 8.] Sir : I have the honor to report in connection with a recent conference which I had with the Japanese Ambassador, arranged at his request, concerning the Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union. The Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, is a regular officer of the Japanese Army, a fine type of man, and of rather a liberal outlook. We had quite an extended discussion. He stated that he wanted me to know that he and his Government had been making every effort to compose their differences with the Soviet Union; that he had encountered very great difficulty in persuading the Foreign Office here of the non-aggressive attitude of his Government; that they were exceedingly skeptical and suspicious; that apparently they were most confident of their military strength and power and were not disposed to meet his approaches, but that he had hopes that the situation might be bettered. In that connection he stated that the Japanese budget, including military appropriations, would be passed within the next two weeks, and that provision therein would be made for additional armed forces; that this was in fact made necessary, in part, by the Russian attitude; that the Japanese forces in “Manchukuo” consisted of five divisions which, with technical auxiliaries, did not exceed 100,000 men; that the Russian forces on the east consisted of 17 divisions; that accordingly it was necessary for them to increase their forces from five to seven divisions which the budget plan had made provision for; that his country did not require more than this in “Manchukuo” because of its proximity to the Japanese base. The impression which I gathered was that he was quite concerned about the aggressive attitude of the Soviet Union. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Davies The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 794.00/117 [Document 53] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State No. 155 Moscow , March 26, 1937. [Received April 8.] Sir : I have the honor to report that upon the same occasion as is described in my despatch No. 152 of March 26, 1937, the Japanese Ambassador stated to me the following: He wished to assure me that his Government had no imperialistic ideas of territorial aggressive expansion through the Philippines or through Singapore or the south; that notwithstanding statements to the contrary of jingoes in his own country, which he deplored, he was positive that the attitude of his Government was as above stated; that “Manchukuo” provided them with an outlet for their surplus population and with a source of raw materials sufficient for their existence; that they were content to consolidate their gains and develop their national existence through such a policy. I then asked him “What about China?” He stated that Japan had made a great mistake in China; that he had been stationed in China and was for a time the recognized expert in Chinese affairs; that he had resigned in protest against the policy of Japan toward China; that his attitude was well known, and that his return to the Service was an indication of an acceptance of his views; that Japan had no policy or intention of territorial acquisition of Chinese territory; but that the Chinese situation was difficult as they were so close together and there were constant matters of difference which amounted to irritations as between the two peoples. I gathered from this conversation, and other information which I have generally picked up here, that the economic and financial condition of Japan is pressing heavily upon the Government and that Japan, like Germany, and Italy, are much concerned over the rearmament of Great Britain and other democracies, and their own economic inability to continue armament expansion. The Japanese Ambassador deplored with me the conditions in the world which seemed to indicate a lack of statesmanship among the leaders of the nations of the world in failing to provide for some means for the settlement of world conditions through equitable, peaceable arrangements, instead of through the imposition of these enormous war armament costs with their burden on the civilian populations and the threat of catastrophic war. In that connection he stated very strongly his belief that the voice of the United States, and particularly that of President Roosevelt, would have great moral effect upon world public opinion and perhaps be the most influential single factor alleviating these conditions. He also spoke enthusiastically of the great practical contributions which were being made through the trade agreements of Secretary Hull. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Davies The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14065: Telegram [Document 54] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received April 1—1:40 p.m.] 144. 1. Wang Chung Hui was this morning appointed currently Acting President of the Executive Yuan during the absence of Chiang Kai-shek who has been granted 2 months’ additional leave. 2. Chiang is at present at Hangchow engaged in conferences with Yang Hu Cheng, Yu Hsueh Chung, T. V. Soong and others which are believed to be chiefly concerned with the liquidation of the Sian revolt; it is reported that for a considerable period of time he has been inactive in routine Government matters and that Government papers have been accumulating waiting for his attention. This has caused some disquiet but the Embassy believes that he is anxious for a short but fairly complete rest from his duties (it is understood that he has not completely recovered from the injury to his back received near Sian) and that this explains his inactivity. 3. Today’s appointment would seem logical, especially in the absence of Vice President Kung, because Wang was formerly President of the Judicial Yuan and that fact was believed to have militated for a time against his acceptance of the foreign ministry portfolio because of the relatively subordinate rank of a cabinet post. 4. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14067: Telegram [Document 55] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 5, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:30 a.m.] 149. Paragraph 2 of our 144, April 1, 3 p.m. 1. Yang Hu Cheng returned to Sian April 2 and issued statement pledging loyalty to National Government. This is considered indication that, when movement of Northeastern troops into Honan and Anhwei is completed, the Sian revolt except for Communist question will have been settled. Yang’s pledge of loyalty is reported to have been contingent upon a promise of security in his position as Shensi Pacification Commissioner in return for his agreement to reorganization of his troops. Yu Hsueh Chung will reportedly be given post such as Honan-Anhwei Pacification Commissioner. 2. Opinions conflict as to whether Chang Hsueh Liang will be given new military post. Indication to the contrary is that he recently presented his private Boeing plane to Chiang Kai-shek to be included in national air service equipment. Opinions also conflict as to whether he is virtually a prisoner at Chikow and will remain so until disposition of his troops is completed or whether he is being guarded there for his personal safety against patriots who consider him a traitor deserving assassination. 3. According to Japanese news sources, the Hangchow conversations March 29 to April 1 included questions of (1) reorganization of Chinese Red Army; (2) convocation of National Defense Conference to formulate positive Japan policy as suggested by Szechwan militarists and others. Whether these questions were actually discussed is unknown. 4. Han Fu Chu 67 also visited Hangchow causing considerable speculation. One plausible reason advanced for his presence there was to discuss cooperation between Shantung troops and Northeast troops in latter’s new positions looking to reformation of the “defense line” against “influences” in North China. 5. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 67 Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 761.93/1587: Telegram [Document 56] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 5, 1937—5 p.m. [Received April 6—7 a.m.] 154. 1. Soviet Ambassador, 68 absent in Russia since November 10, reached Shanghai April 1 but has not yet come to Nanking. Some observers consider that his departure from Moscow was partly responsible for unconfirmed Japanese news story March 25 that following “political understanding” had been reached with China: (1) Soviet to accord no assistance to Chinese Communists; (2) China to regard communism as domestic issue requiring no agreement with third party; (3) Soviet to recognize Chinese sovereignty in Sinkiang and aid Nanking in extending Chinese authority in that province; [(4)?] ( status quo ) in Outer Mongolia to be maintained and Soviet to issue statement confirming Chinese sovereignty there in view of existence of Manchukuo and Japanese activities in Outer [ Inner? ] Mongolia; (5) circumstances permitting, the two governments to propose creation of machinery to guarantee security of the Pacific. Both Soviet and Chinese authorities in Nanking have denied truth of this report and it is generally discredited. 2. Correction of the report with Bogomoloff’s return is regarded in some quarters as conceivably due to (1) his having returned to Moscow at the time the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Pact was announced, (2) possibility that he is returning to negotiate an understanding with the Chinese such as that described above which would be a logical move by the Soviet Union to counteract the Japanese-German agreement. According to a confidential Chinese official source, some sections of Chinese officialdom would welcome such an agreement. According to this source, conversations concerning a Sino-Soviet commercial treaty (which may or may not include political matters) have continued from time to time but the Soviet representatives are extremely difficult to deal with because they demand acceptance of hard and fast prior conditions. 3. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo, Moscow. Johnson 68 Dimitri Bogomolov. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8583: Telegram [Document 57] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , April 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received April 13—8:40 a.m.] 119. Reference Embassy’s 73, March 2, 3 p.m. 69 1. The informant 70 mentioned in that telegram returned a few days ago from a 3 weeks’ visit to Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai where he conversed with Chinese leaders. His views, expressed in confidence last evening, presumably reflect those of an important element in the Government. His statements are given in paragraphs 2 to 4 inclusive. 2. There is little or no hope that Japan will adopt a reasonable or sane attitude toward China. China will continue to prepare for eventual and almost inevitable conflict with Japan. China will take no aggressive step, will not, for example, attempt to recover East Hopei. China expects material assistance from Great Britain and Russia. Meanwhile China will try to improve the economic conditions of the people, which is China’s most important problem. 3. The friendship of Russia was shown by the order of the Third Internationale to Chinese Communist forces, when Chiang Kai-shek was detained at Sian, to take no action against the National Government. The Chinese Communist forces are being or have already been incorporated as a separate army under the National Government; so they are no longer a threat. They will presumably concern themselves with anti-Japanese propaganda. Important Communist position and attitude of the present leaders in Kwangsi, Shantung and Hopei. Important Communist leaders are to travel abroad. 4. No change is expected with regard to position and attitude, etc. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 69 Not printed. 70 Chancellor Chiang Monlin, of Peiping National University, then in South China. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 741.94/92 [Document 58] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2371 Tokyo , April 16, 1937. [Received May 3.] Sir : I have the honor to report that the settlement of the Keelung Incident, 71 reported in recent telegrams, * is possibly more indicative of the present trend in Anglo-Japanese relations than the liquidation of a minor difference would ordinarily be. It will be recalled that this dispute had dragged on since last October and that little progress was made toward a settlement although the British Government had made it amply clear, both through representations in Tokyo and in replies to questions in Parliament, that it considered the affair a most serious impediment to the progress of Anglo-Japanese relations. The matter had settled down to a stubborn battle with few signs of a disposition on either side to make concessions. Suddenly, however, on the eve of Prince Chichibu’s 72 scheduled arrival at Southampton the Foreign Office announced an exchange of letters between the Director General of the Formosan Government and the British Consul at Tamsui in which the Japanese Government expressed both regret for the incident and included the admission of improper conduct on the part of the Japanese policeman involved. Those familiar with the practice of the Japanese authorities in such affairs will realize that the admission of improper conduct on the part of Japanese officials is extremely rare and thus the settlement indicates a serious effort on the part of the Japanese to conciliate the British Government and public opinion. While there is no doubt a connection between the fact of Prince Chichibu’s impending arrival in England and the settlement of the Keelung Incident, implying the fear that the warmth of the Prince’s reception might have been affected, nevertheless the thought suggests itself that Mr. Sato, whose intelligent grasp of European affairs and of the foreign point of view is perhaps greater because of his long service in Europe, may have decided to seize the opportunity to inaugurate a new era in Anglo-Japanese relations, especially at a moment when the dramatic flight to London of the Asahi airplane presumably had impressed British public feeling. Relations between Japan and Great Britain have noticeably become less favorable since the Leith-Ross mission to China in the fall of 1935. On his visit to Japan Sir Frederick Leith-Ross reportedly attempted to gain Japan’s cooperation in consenting to joint investment in China, but his advice in this matter was rejected. Great Britain’s progress in China has markedly increased and her prestige there has certainly gained at the expense of Japan following Britain’s reported part in the settlement of the Sian incident and the collapse of the Sino-Japanese negotiations at Nanking in the fall of 1936. In addition to this the German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement was not only badly received in London but its effect has been to throw Great Britain into even closer relations with China, and even to cause the British to lean a little more toward Soviet Russia (with consequent detriment to Anglo-Japanese relations) due to the fact that the anti-Comintern pact is regarded by the British as tending to upset the balance of power. Eden 73 is reported to feel that so long as Soviet Russia is powerful enough to hold off either Germany or Japan singly the equilibrium will not be disturbed, but if the two combine it will upset the balance and precipitate war. Mr. Sato has given every indication that he is fully aware that Japanese relations with England must undergo a thorough overhauling. On March 23, previous to the dissolution of the last Diet, he was interpellated on the question of whether the Government intended to revive the former Anglo-Japanese alliance, an action which was advocated by a member of the Seiyukai, Mr. Kaju Nakamura. While the Foreign Minister’s replies indicated that Japan has no intention of attempting to restore the former alliance, nevertheless they made it perfectly clear that the Government will exert every effort to improve Anglo-Japanese relations by the best methods available. The Embassy has examined the proceedings of the Diet on the date of the interpellation under reference and finds that Mr. Sato closed his reply with the following words: “I am of the opinion that some sort of treaty (with Great Britain), based on thorough understanding similar in purpose or in spirit to the former (Anglo-Japanese) alliance, would be highly fortunate and beneficial to both powers. But the question is very delicate—so delicate that I would refrain from expressing my own views at the present moment as to what methods might or might not be efficacious”. We may also read into Mr. Sato’s declaration of policy regarding China † , in which he proposed to negotiate with that country on a basis of equality and in a conciliatory spirit—a bid for British, as well as American, approval. Certainly little progress can be made toward a substantial improvement of relations with Great Britain without an adjustment of the China issues. The British economic advance in Central and South China during the past year has been marked and there has been during the same period a definite setback in Japan’s economic progress in North China. It is quite possible that the Japanese Government now feels that the time may be favorable to approach Great Britain with a proposal of an agreement on the basis of the latter’s advantageous condition for some sort of division of economic spheres of influence in China, possibly in return for a solution of the disarmament issues. At any rate the signs are not lacking that definite gestures designed to improve relations are being made in the direction of Great Britain. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 71 The incident involved alleged brutal treatment of British sailors by Japanese police at Keelung, Taiwan (Formosa), October 7, 1936. * Embassy’s telegrams No. 108, April 12, 4 p.m., and No. 109, April 15, 5 p.m., 1937. [Footnote in the original; telegrams not printed.] 72 Younger brother of the Japanese Emperor. 73 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. † Embassy’s telegram No. 85, March 11, 6 p.m. [Footnote in the original.] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8587: Telegram [Document 59] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 19, 1937—noon. [Received 12:10 p.m.] 167. 1. According to the press, Kawagoe will proceed May 2 to Tokyo to “report on Sino-Japanese negotiations of the past year.” He gave an interview to the semi-official Central News Agency, Nanking, April 15, which has caused some comment in vernacular papers and this, together with his forthcoming departure, is apparently responsible for Japanese press despatches from Nanking outlining a “six-point program” which he reputedly will place before the Japanese Foreign Office. The Embassy believes that these reports give a fairly accurate picture of the present state of Sino-Japanese negotiations and relations. 2. In the interview Kawagoe reputedly stated (1) while there is some ground for the Chinese stand that removal of political obstacles must precede discussion of Sino-Japanese economic rapprochement , economic cooperation may also lead to settlement of political differences; (2) there is no truth in the belief that Japan expects through an economic rapprochement to unfold her political program by acquiring necessary raw materials from China; (3) economic cooperation will benefit both countries and help maintain the people’s livelihood in China and Japan; (4) he had only newspaper information concerning possibility that Kodama (head of recent Japanese Economic Mission) might be appointed Ambassador to China but there were certain groups in Japan favoring the appointment of economic leaders to diplomatic posts and if this proposal is adopted Kodama would be an ideal choice for China; (5) outward smuggling of copper coins by Japanese subjects is a problem which can be settled if Chinese authorities in various localities approach Japanese officials for necessary assistance, but smuggling in North China is due to special conditions and cannot be regarded in this light; (6) the East Hopei régime is theoretically a domestic issue for China but personally he hoped that by the time general Sino-Japanese relations are amicably readjusted, Japan would be able to hold negotiations on the matter with China and give a certain degree of help. 3. The “six points”: (1) Following liquidation of the Liangkuang 74 crisis and the Sian revolt the Chinese Government is driving with full force toward national unification; (2) While there is no warrant for Chinese hopes of a complete removal of the existing deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, Japan should concur in Chinese hopes to a certain extent while insisting on seeking practical benefits; (3) Sino-British economic collaboration, proceeding with extraordinary tempo and magnitude, is an expression of British policy towards the Far East in general and China in particular, and hence should receive Japan’s full attention; (4) Japan should not look upon China’s 5–year economic reconstruction plan with indifference; (5) It is necessary to readjust and replenish the front of Japanese economic activities in the same manner, systematize the various organs established in China by different Japanese ministries and organize a sort of “economic embassy” as their controlling organ; (6) Japan should negotiate sympathetically with China in connection with China’s expected demand for abolition of extraterritoriality. 75 4. The vernacular press criticizes Kawagoe’s statements on grounds that (1) Japanese desire for national economic cooperation has as motive the avoidance of a wholesale settlement of political questions; (2) an “American policy form” of economic penetration has already been fitted to Peiping, Tientsin, Shensi and Shantung and settlement of economic questions favorable to Japan (construction of the Tsangchow-Shihchiachuang Railway, exploitation of the Lungyen iron mines, establishment of air traffic between China and Japan, purchase of cotton mills, cultivation of cotton, development of harbors, purchase of Changlu salt at reduced prices, reduction of import tariff, et cetera) will give Japan a firm grip on China; (3) the statement that smuggling in North China is a domestic problem is irresponsible since the motive behind organized smuggling is to force reduction of Chinese tariffs; (4) similarly Japan is attempting to use the East Hopei régime as a lever to force settlement of Sino-Japanese relations “as a whole”; (5) the statement that “special conditions” obtain in North China is untenable since North China is an integral part of China. 5. By mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 74 The two Kwang provinces (Kwangtung, Kwangsi). 75 See also vol. iv , pp. 634 ff. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8591: Telegram [Document 60] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 11:25 a.m.] 170. China press today carries following Domei article: Domei, Tokyo, April 19. “Formulation of a ‘stable’ China policy was urged upon the Government today by Mr. Tatsuo Kawai, the newly appointed director of the Gaimusho’s 76 Information Bureau on his arrival here from Shanghai where he served as Consul General. ‘Retarded in her economic development, China is financially becoming a modern state’, declared Mr. Kawai. ‘An important feature of this process is the Nanking Government success in bringing under its sway, direct or indirect, the nation’s economic structure. ‘Nanking today directly controls the financial and the more important industrial activities. It is also gradually extending its control over trade and other fields of economic endeavor. ‘Therefore’, Mr. Kawai asserted, ‘if we desire to achieve Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, we must deal directly with the Central Government. ‘It follows’, he added, ‘that positive efforts must be made to readjust the political relations between the two countries at the earliest possible opportunity’”. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping. Peck 76 Japanese Foreign Office. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 761.93/1591 [Document 61] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 77 No. 770 Shanghai , April 21, 1937. Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 128 of April 17, 1936, 78 concerning the rumored conclusion of a Sino-Soviet pact and to many subsequent rumors, mainly inspired by the Japanese, regarding this matter. Mr. Billingham, New York Times correspondent, has just given this office, in strict confidence, some very interesting information on this subject, obtained from the Soviet Ambassador, who confirmed the fact that conversations are at present being carried on with the Chinese authorities looking toward the conclusion of a new Sino-Soviet agreement. Mr. Billingham has apparently been closely following all reports and rumors regarding this subject and has on several occasions asked Mr. Spilwanek, the local Soviet Consul General, whether there was any basis for such reports. Finding Mr. Spilwanek noncommittal he decided to sound out the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Bogomoloff, and took occasion to do so upon the latter’s recent visit to Shanghai. Mr. Billingham found Mr. Bogomoloff equally uncommunicative at first but upon his mentioning that he understood many of the foreign embassies and consulates were reporting on the rumored commencement of Sino-Soviet negotiations he apparently decided to give Mr. Billingham certain information on the understanding that it was not for publication but presumably for repetition to interested American officials. In any event the Soviet Ambassador asked Mr. Billingham to lunch on April seventeenth and talked to him for about two hours with considerable frankness. The conversation ranged over the entire Chinese political situation, concerning which Mr. Bogomoloff was apparently exceedingly well informed. In brief, he informed Mr. Billingham that he and other Soviet representatives in China had been increasingly impressed during the past few years by the growing solidarity and unity of the Chinese Government and people and the diminution of what he termed the spirit of “isolated provincialism” which had been so marked a characteristic of the earlier years of the Republic. In this connection Mr. Bogomoloff expressed the opinion that the province of Kwangsi is at the present time the only example of “isolated provincialism”. He continued, that in consequence of this definite cohesive trend it was felt by him and his Government that Soviet policy in China should be reoriented and that the Government at Nanking should be supported rather than opposed. He intimated that in pursuance of this change in policy a series of conferences had been convened while he was home on leave recently and that it was the consensus of opinion among the Soviet officials who participated that cognizance must be taken of the growing trend toward unity in China and that the Soviet Government would do well to support the Nanking Government as the stabilizing and paramount force in this country. Mr. Billingham remarked it was obvious from the Soviet Ambassador’s statements that relations between Soviet Russia and Japan and the maintenance of peace in the Far East had also received much careful consideration, for Mr. Bogomoloff intimated it was felt that a strongly united China friendly to the Soviet Union would tend to preserve the balance of power in the Far East and maintain peace in this area. In discussing this change in Soviet policy Mr. Bogomoloff made the interesting statement that “even before the Sian coup we had changed our policy.” From this it is perhaps not illogical to infer that the Soviet Government’s change of policy and the reported change in policy of the Chinese Communist Party, whose leaders announced months ago that the Communists were no longer opposing the Nanking Government, were more than coincidental. In fact it is very probable that the changes were carefully planned and timed in Moscow. Mr. Billingham inquired whether this change in policy had resulted in the commencement of negotiations between the two Governments. Mr. Bogomoloff answered in the affirmative and stated that talks were proceeding, but Mr. Billingham gathered not with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at least for the present. It is possible that these conversations are being carried on either directly with General Chiang or through the medium of the Communist leader, Chow En-lai, who is reported to have been in Fenghua recently. Mr. Billingham endeavored to elicit definite information concerning the nature and scope of these negotiations but was not able to extract more than a smiling affirmative nod to his query as to whether the talks are of a politico-economic military nature. However, in discussing Soviet influence in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia Mr. Billingham said he gained the distinct impression that the relaxing of Soviet control over those areas was one of the subjects being discussed. Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss 77 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Shanghai in his covering despatch No. 732, April 21; received May 17. 78 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8629 [Document 62] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State No. 1198 Peiping , April 22, 1937. [Received May 17.] Sir : I have the honor to discuss the Japanese North China Garrison, with especial reference to its numerical strength and to the views of its officers with regard to Sino-Japanese relations. It is impossible to obtain authentic information with regard to the numerical strength of the North China Garrison. At the time of the principal increase in its strength (May 1936), Japanese military officers indicated that the new total approximated 4,000. Since that time, Japanese officers have refused to make any statement in this regard, thereby strengthening the widespread opinion that the actual number is considerably in excess of 4,000. As reported by the Embassy in its monthly report for May, 1936, 79 two non-official and unrelated Japanese sources put the number at slightly more than 8,000. Other observers, including the American Naval Attaché 80 and a Chinese Government official connected with intelligence affairs, subsequently gave similar estimates. Following the most recent replacement movement of the troops of the Japanese North China Garrison (March–April 1937), the American Naval Attaché arrived at the conclusion, after investigation, that the numerical strength of the North China Garrison had been increased to 9,200. Independently of his investigations, the above-mentioned Chinese official, who has association with a Chinese intelligence officer charged with discovering the strength of the Japanese Garrison, arrived at the conclusion that the numerical strength had reached slightly more than 9,000. A Japanese national, closely associated with the Japanese military, expressed the opinion a few days ago in private conversation that the number was probably at present above 8,000. The American Assistant Military Attaché, 81 while stating that he had been unable to obtain satisfactory information on the subject, said that he thought the number might be somewhere between 8,000 and 9,000. It would seem not improbable, therefore, that the actual numerical strength is considerably greater than that admitted by Japanese officers. It may be added that a secretary of the local Japanese Embassy stated in private conversation recently that the numerical strength was 5,000, a larger estimate than that given last May by the Japanese military. This secretary spoke, however, with such emphasis that it seemed to his listener that he was making an understatement with intent. The Chinese official above-mentioned has recently informed a member of the Embassy that an increase in the numerical strength of the Japanese Garrison is expected before summer and that the Garrison will then consist of a full division of 12,000 men. This report appeared subsequently in a Chinese newspaper published at Shanghai. It will be impossible, however, to establish the authenticity of this report until the increase is made, if it can be established then. The alleged impending increase of the North China Garrison may have some relation to the growing nationalism of General Sung Che-yuan’s 29th Army and to its alleged advance in equipment and in numerical strength. It seems possible that the 29th Army might not today be so easily intimidated by a show of Japanese strength into disspirited submission to unreasonable Japanese demands as it might have been by a lesser display of Japanese strength a year or more ago. Parenthetically it may be stated that the numerical strength of the 29th Army cannot be definitely learned. The American Military Attaché 82 estimated that it numbered in January of this year 51,800 men (36,800 in Hopei Province and 15,000 in Chahar Province), an increase of 9,800 over his estimate of its strength in September, 1935, when General Sung was assuming control of Hopei Province. This may be, however, an underestimate as in September 1935, the British and Japanese Military Attachés believed that General Sung had 60,000 men, and practically all observers are convinced that General Sung has done considerable recruiting since that time. Some Chinese officials claim that General Sung has at present 100,000 men. Observers also agree that the equipment of the 29th Army is much better today than it was in 1935 and that the anti-Japanese feeling of the troops has not lessened during this time, if, in fact, it has not increased. There is another factor which might be of importance in deciding the 29th Army to ignore or accept the challenge of an aggressive display of Japanese military strength. There is more reason to believe that actual military conflict in Hopei Province would now bring military assistance from the National Government. It sent troops to Suiyuan Province last autumn to assist the Suiyuan provincial forces against Japanese aggression there; and the temper of China has so changed during recent months that even some conservative intelligent Chinese believe that the National Government would fall if it did not dispatch military support in case of a conflict in Hopei. Presumably the 29th Army counts more today on support from the National Government than it did formerly. It is not intended to give the impression in this despatch that a military conflict in Hopei Province is imminent. The possibility does, however, exist; and it seems increasingly probable that a serious incident in Hopei might bring on a major conflict. Such an incident might be precipitated by Japanese military discontented with the lack of progress in Sino-Japanese economic and/or political cooperation in North China or by Chinese military imbued with a growing belief in their own prowess. It is difficult to state the exact intention of the Japanese military in increasing the strength of the North China Garrison. It cannot be known whether it is intended merely as a display of strength or as preparation for eventualities or as a part of an accepted plan in extension of Japanese influence. Perhaps, in connection with this last mentioned possibility, the increase is due in part to an intention to station some of the troops along the line of the proposed Shihkiach-wang-Tientsin railway when construction of that line eventually begins. The stationing of Japanese troops along that line would presumably assist in separating from the National Government that part of Hopei lying north of the proposed line. It is not improbable that the intention of some of the officers of the Japanese North China Garrison differs from the intention of others. As in other units of the Japanese army, so in the North China Garrison the Japanese officers apparently hold differing views with regard to policy toward China. Information received by the Embassy indicates that the older officers of the Garrison are inclined to be less immoderate in their views with respect to China policy than are the younger officers. Some Japanese nationals resident in Peiping describe the younger officers as “rabid”, saying that they presumably want political control of the five northern provinces and are strongly opposed to the return to Chinese control of Yin Ju-keng’s bogus regime, the East Hopei Anti-communist Autonomous Government. Some of the older officers are understood to be content if they can achieve effective economic cooperation in North China and adequate protection of Japanese interests, a phrase which is not clearly understood by the Embassy. An evidence of the more reasonable attitude of the older officers was the recent admission in conversation by Lieutenant Colonel Gennosuke Matsui, head of the Special Military Organ at Peiping of the North China Garrison, to the effect that the formation of Yin Ju-keng’s bogus regime had proved to be a mistake. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Frank P. Lockhart Counselor of Embassy 79 Not printed. 80 Commander Harvey B. Overesch. 81 Capt. David D. Barrett. 82 Col. Joseph W. Stilwell. Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis 890.00/47 [Document 63] Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis 83 London , April 23, 1937. Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador, who had asked to see me, came by appointment at 10 o’clock this morning. He began by referring to a conversation which he had had with me in New York last year on his way to London. He said that while he had not made the headway in arriving at some tentative understanding with the British with regard to economic cooperation which he had hoped for, he wanted to tell me just what the situation is. 84 In substance he said that he was working for the demilitarization of Japan and for a closer economic cooperation and friendship between Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. Although he had been away from Japan for some time, he felt certain that the militarists are losing ground primarily because of the increase in taxes and of the fact that they had only caused trouble and suspicion with other countries, from which no benefits had been derived. As a result of the Japanese policy in China, they had destroyed their trade and friendship with China and had been infringing on British interests there, which had caused tension with Great Britain. In order to seek an outlet for trade which they had lost with China, they had been taking trade away from England in India and other places and embargoes had been established against them. Yoshida said that while it was vitally necessary for Japan to increase her trade, the only practicable way to do so was through economic international collaboration, particularly with Great Britain and the United States and China. He believed that the militarists were beginning to realize the only practicable way to achieve this would be through a reversal of their policy in China and the development of a program of collaboration for the economic rehabilitation of China and the consequent development of that great potential market, which must be done for the benefit of China and in a way to increase the friendship and confidence of China in regard to Japan. Yoshida said it was necessary to demilitarize Japan through industrialization and commercialization, and now that militarism is losing ground because of taxes, etc., is the time to bring this about. He expressed the hope, therefore, that the United States might call an economic conference and thus help to free the economic forces which, in turn, would help to demilitarize Japan and lighten the burden of armaments and reduce the tension between nations. He said he had finally induced the British to allow him to invite his Government to make suggestions as to possible economic collaboration in China and that if anything definite should result from this, they would naturally take it up with the United States because he was satisfied that Great Britain would not make any kind of an agreement which is not acceptable or agreeable to the United States, and also that it is most important that the three countries should cooperate in efforts to achieve economic recovery. I told him that while I was sure the United States would be sympathetic with any practicable efforts at economic recovery in China and elsewhere, it would not be possible to express any definite opinion until the plans which he has in view become more crystallized. I told him we were most desirous of collaborating economically in every practicable way and that it would, in my opinion, be futile to call a world economic conference at least without considerable advance preparation. I told him we were having discussions with the British as to a possible commercial agreement, the principal purpose of which would be to improve the whole world situation and not just to negotiate an agreement that merely improved trade between Great Britain and the United States. 84a Yoshida then referred to the internal and external situation of Japan. He repeated that it was necessary to demilitarize Japan in order to reduce taxes and the burden of armaments and to abate social unrest, and it was also necessary to do so in order to foster the confidence and friendship of other nations, particularly Great Britain and the United States. I told him that while I could understand that the Japanese Government might have deemed it politically unwise at the time, to become a party to the naval treaty, I was surprised that even the militarists had refused to agree to accept the fourteen-inch guns for battleships, 85 particularly since they have always advocated a reduction in the caliber of guns. Also, since his Government had repeatedly expressed a desire to avoid a naval race, from which it was evident it could gain nothing whatever, I wondered if they realized that the only practicable way to avoid a naval race is to avoid suspicion and to adhere to accepted types of naval armament. He said he fully realized this and had done all he could to get his Government to accept at least the fourteen-inch gun; that while he had not so far succeeded, he was hopeful that when the new Diet meets after the elections, it would be possible to get somewhere on this. He said that after the new Diet and Government is formed, he thought it would be advisable for Great Britain and the United States to take this matter up again, but that it would be better to wait until then because the present Government, which is only a temporary one, wishes to postpone all possible decisions. He felt that although Mr. Sato might not continue in the new Government, he had already been able to exercise a good influence, and the mere fact that he had been invited to be Foreign Secretary was a hopeful indication of a definite, liberal trend. In concluding, he said he wished to express the hope that Great Britain and the United States would be patient and through economic cooperation would help Japan to attempt a policy of friendly cooperation. 83 Copy transmitted to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs by Mr. Davis from London, April 27. Mr. Davis was Chairman of the American delegation to the International Sugar Conference. 84 For Mr. Yoshida’s conversations with the British, see memorandum of April 22 by Mr. Davis, p. 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] . 84a See vol. ii , pp. 1 ff. 85 See telegram No. 178, March 30, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador In the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 299 ; see also Foreign Relations , 1937, vol. i , pp. 618 ff. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8597: Telegram [Document 64] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 24, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 11:45 a.m.] 179. Our 167, April 19, noon. 1. Domei, Shanghai, reports today that Kawagoe, now in that city pending departure for Japan April 28, stated in an interview yesterday: (1) through mutual concessions alone can China and Japan hope to adjust their relations and there can be no readjustment if one party seeks to realize its own program and that alone; (2) he had repeatedly told Wang Chung Hui that what China needs most is a clear realization of the factors involved in Japan’s national existence and growth; (3) Japan on her part must ( a ) fully understand China’s unification movement and the Central Government’s growing strength, ( b ) make a thorough study of the real nature of the National Government and the development of its various branches, ( c ) keep constantly in mind the nature of China’s national unification; otherwise there will be no hope of readjusting Sino-Japanese relations; (4) China is as much interested as Japan in readjusting mutual relations and there is no divergence in views between Nanking and Tokyo on the necessity of breaking down the current deadlock; (5) economic cooperation will naturally follow readjustment of relations. 2. He said he had noted China’s wishes for abolition of the East Hopei régime and suppression of smuggling and “intimated that the Chinese authorities appeared to be ready to make certain concessions” in regard to the import tariff. 3. He gave noncommittal comment on “rumors of China’s rapprochement with Russia and economic cooperation with Great Britain”. In regard to “reports of projected Anglo-Japanese cooperation in China” he said “he had not observed any leanings in that direction in British circles in Nanking”. 4. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14095: Telegram [Document 65] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 183. Our 174, April 20, 3 p.m. 86 1. Executive Yuan yesterday appointed (1) Yu Hsueh Chung to be Pacification Commissioner for Kiangsu; (2) Wang Shu Chang (Vice President of Military Operation Advisory Committee, former northeastern commander who in 1931–32 was Hopei chairman and in 1933–35 was Peiping-Tientsin garrison commander) to be the Pacification Commissioner for Honan and Anhwei; (3) Ho Chu Kuo to be Deputy Director of the Generalissimo’s Sian provisional headquarters; (4) Ho Yao Tsu (Commander of Third Army at time of 1928 Tsinanfu incident, late Vice Chief of Staff, recently Minister to Turkey) to be acting Kansu chairman. The Yuan also created a new military organ called the Military Rehabilitation Committee for Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsu to be headed by Liu Shih, Pacification Commissioner for Honan and Anhwei and including Yu Hsueh Chung and Wang Shu Chang as members. 2. Except for disposition of Chang Hsueh Liang these actions would appear to constitute final moves in settlement of the December 1936 Sian revolt. With a former northeastern official as new Anhwei chairman and most of the Young Marshal’s former troops transferred from Shensi and Kansu to Honan and Anhwei, provision has now been made both for the support and employment of the main body of those troops under the control of the National Government with northeastern representation on the supervising organ. Effective Government control, which will probably provide for ultimate absorption of the northeastern troops, would have to have been provided for by, (1) separation of Yu Hsueh Chung from personal command of his troops, (2) separation from the main body of Ho Chu Kuo’s cavalry with Ho directly under Ku Chu Tung in the Sian headquarters, (3) appointment of a trusted adherent of Chiang Kai-shek as chairman of the new military organ to reorganize the northeastern troops transferred to Anhwei and Honan. In Shensi and Kansu Government control would also be well assured by developments previously reported together with yesterday’s appointment of Ho Yao Tsu. In this connection it is reported but not confirmed that Yang Hu Cheng whose troops have been moved to south central Shensi is contemplating a trip abroad. 3. Additional reliable information we have received tends to confirm report that Chang Hsueh Liang is a prisoner at Chikow in the province of Fenghua [ Chekiang ]. 4. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 86 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8603: Telegram [Document 66] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received April 29—8:55 a.m.] 184. Our 179, April 24, 10 a.m. 1. Kawagoe sailed this morning from Shanghai for Japan. 2. A responsible official of the Foreign Office stated today to an officer of the Embassy that the Foreign Office had for a long time been “negotiating” for abrogation of the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, but without success and before Kawagoe’s departure from Nanking had intimated to him “not in so many words but in a general way” that future Sino-Japanese discussions would be conditioned upon at least abolition of the East Hopei and North Chahar régimes and suppression of smuggling in North China (their existence being possible because of the Tangku Truce). He said that recently both Japanese and Chinese officers had been very cautious in approaching the question of the resumption of Sino-Japanese discussions looking to settlement of so-called fundamental issues and neither side wanted to take the initiative. The Foreign Office expected that developments arising out of the forthcoming April 30 elections and returns would occupy the Japanese Government for at least a month and Sino-Japanese discussions would not be reopened until after that period. He anticipated that when they were resumed they would consist in little more than informal talks looking to the discovery of a basis on which formal discussions might proceed. The Foreign Office believed that Sato was sincere in desiring to reorient Japan’s China policy along more moderate lines; claims that Japanese officials in China had come to be moderate in their views including Kodama (head of the recent Japanese Economic Mission), Kawagoe and Suma; 87 all the opinions of these men could not prevail with Japan’s military reactionaries; he, accordingly, did not believe that there would be any real change in Japanese policy because the Japanese military would be unwilling ever to annul the Tangku Truce which gives them a buffer between Manchukuo and China Proper, a corridor to Mongolia, a base for activities such as the illicit narcotics traffic and the smuggling which menaces the Chinese Government’s fiscal security. 3. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson 87 Yakichiro Suma, Counselor of Embassy in China. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14096: Telegram [Document 67] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , April 30, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 10:50 a.m.] 186. Our 87, February 23, 2 p.m., paragraphs 7 and 10; monthly review for March 88 page 19. 1. It has been generally believed here that negotiations have been proceeding between the National Government and the Communists in the northwest looking to a reconciliation along the lines of a compromise between the Communists’ “demands” (see our despatch 378, March 15 89 ) discussed at February plenary session of the Central Executive Committee and the Government’s (or party’s) “conditions” laid down by the session. One current view is that the Government (i. e. Chiang Kai-shek) has strongly favored a reconciliation even on milder conditions but that party officials while connected with the Government and opposed to Chiang have been the chief objectors. According to some reports, negotiations actually started in face to face conversations between Chiang and Chou En Lai, Secretary General of the Chinese Communists, even before Chiang’s detention in Sian December 1936, and recently an official of the Foreign Office who has had long personal acquaintance with Chou stated to an officer of the Embassy that these reports were true. During the past week the Tientsin United Press correspondent (American) who has been visiting the Communist “capital” at Yenan, Shensi, has reported that Mao Tze Tung 90 told him that negotiations with the Government were continuing and that the Communist representative was making frequent flights to Sian in a plane furnished by the Government in order to negotiate at Sian with a representative [sent?] from there by the Government. 2. Last evening a National Government Vice Minister stated to an officer of the Embassy that (1) negotiations between the Government [and] Communists were in fact continuing at Sian and were meeting with success; (2) the Communists had accepted the Government’s conditions that they ( a ) cease to style themselves “communists” and ( b ) relinquish the class struggle both in practice and theory; (3) the points remaining at issue concern reorganization of the Communist troops into government units; (4) the Government hopes to persuade the Communists to agree to the placing of their troops with their own officers under supervision of Government officers, thus effecting their technical incorporation into the national forces but leaving them for the time being together and in their present station; (5) if such agreement is reached further absorption will be postponed and later will proceed gradually by occasional transfer of small attachments to other areas for incorporation into large regular government military units. 3. He did not believe that active assistance was any longer being given to the Chinese Communists by the Comintern, it being the present policy of the Soviet Russian régime not to exploit revolution but to influence existing Communist organizations abroad to align themselves with such movement as that represented by the anti-Japanese program of the Chinese Communist troops and organizations. He said that without material assistance from Russia, the Communists in the northwest would have to meet the Government’s wishes because they were in territory so poor that it could not long support them and they lacked necessities such as salt and were even short of water. 4. By pouch to Peiping, Tokyo, Moscow. Johnson 88 Review not printed. 89 Not printed. 90 Founder of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, and head of its “Government”. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8618: Telegram [Document 68] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , May 8, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 1:40 p.m.] 194. 1. In interview granted yesterday to local Associated Press correspondent (American) by Wang Chung Hui, 2. Questions submitted were to effect: (1) Does Chinese Government perceive any useful purpose in sponsoring or participating in a Far Eastern regional pact and are existing accords to which China is party or which have to do with stability in Eastern Asia sufficiently up to date to serve as guarantees for mutual well-being of Far Eastern nations and of powers vitally interested in the Orient; (2) Does China expect to take initiative in securing revision of expired treaties with Great Britain [and America?] or wait for London or Washington or both to make first move; (3) What are China’s minimum requirements for resumption of Sino-Japanese negotiations. 3. Following written answers were given in English: “(1) International developments during the last few years, and more particularly in this part of the world, have forced attention to the inadequacy of the existing peace treaties as guarantees for national security and international peace. This has led to a great piling up of armaments on the one hand and to a quest for regional security on the other. Though China has suffered severely from foreign aggression, she still believes that the ideals represented by the League Covenant 91 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 91a afford the best means of securing universal lasting peace. The Chinese Government has given wholehearted support to efforts to strengthen instruments of peace in order to establish firmly a universal system of collective security. It is our hope that the present state of affairs in which the violation of the independence and territorial integrity of national sovereign states has been allowed to pass with impunity, will soon be remedied. As regards the question of a Far Eastern regional pact, the participation and support of the powers interested in the Far East is necessary in order to make it effective. The primary objects of such a pact would be, of course, to reaffirm the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereign rights and to provide a more effectual machinery than that now existing for the prevention or removal of any state of affairs that might gravely endanger peace and stability in this part of the earth. “(2) Such initiative was taken by the Chinese Government when the treaties referred to expired a few years ago. It is unfortunately the fact that not much progress has been made in the intervening period. Since these treaties were concluded in circumstances entirely different from those existing today they are both antiquated and out of harmony with the national consciousness of the Chinese people. The Chinese Government sincerely hope that the task of revising these obsolete treaties will soon be accomplished for the benefit of all concerned. “(3) China is always prepared to discuss outstanding issues with Japan in a frank and open manner with a view to finding common points of agreement. The usefulness of such parleys depends on at least two factors. First, the present situation should not be further aggravated by any acts of aggression or infringement upon China’s sovereign rights. Secondly, the negotiations should not at any stage be prejudiced by actions tending to incite the public feeling in either country. I am of the opinion that many questions in North China, for example the bogus régime in East Hopei and North Chahar and the smuggling question, can be speedily remedied if friendly words are supplemented by deeds. With a clarification of Sino-Japanese relations in North China, the present situation would undoubtedly be improved, thus facilitating negotiations looking toward a solution of the fundamental issues as well as closer economic ties between the two countries.” 4. Sent to the Department. By mail to Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson 91 Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 69 . 91a Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. i , p. 153 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8643: Telegram [Document 69] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2407 Tokyo , May 10, 1937. [Received June 1.] Sir : With reference to this Embassy’s despatch No. 2388, dated April 30, 1937, 92 introducing the question of whether or not Japan is endeavoring to revive the system of “spheres of influence” in China, I now have the honor to report that any such intention in the present Anglo-Japanese conversations has recently been denied in both Tokyo and London. In an interview which Mr. Sato, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, granted to the foreign newspaper correspondents in Tokyo on May 6, 1937, one of the correspondents asked Mr. Sato if the references in official statements to Japan’s “special interests” in North China meant that Japan claimed a “sphere of influence” in that region. According to the Advertiser account of the interview, Mr. Sato denied any such meaning in the phrase “special interests”. He admitted that the expression is used in Japan but stated that it does not mean anything exclusive. Japan does not want to monopolize North China, and moreover China will not be so generous as to grant any monopoly in that region. At any rate, Japan does not demand exclusive rights and believes that it can live peacefully side by side in the economic world. In reply to another question regarding the Anglo-Japanese conversations, Mr. Sato denied that anything like “spheres of influence” in China is being discussed between the two countries. Under London date of May 5, 1937, Domei telegraphed the following message to the Japanese press: “The British Government has no intention of suggesting a revival of spheres of influence in China in any negotiations with other Powers interested in the Far East, Foreign Secretary R. Anthony Eden declared in reply to questions in the House of (Commons today. Foreign Secretary Eden made his statement after Mr. Robert Morgan, Conservative, asked whether the Government had decided to broach the question in connection with efforts to reach a better international understanding regarding trade with China.” While, therefore, any definite intention of reviving the system of “spheres of influence” is denied by both Japan and Great Britain, the fact remains that the tendency in Japan to regard North China as a special sphere for Japanese exploitation is not only strong but appears to be growing, and Mr. Sato, as was mentioned in despatch No. 2388, has twice indicated that Japan regards North China as a region which Japan should treat separately from the rest of China. The Japanese apparently are not asking for and do not expect to receive monopolistic economic rights in that region, but are working toward establishing special interests there much as they established special interests in Manchuria prior to 1931. If they are successful in their efforts, the eventual net result, if one can judge by the result in Manchuria, will be much the same as the establishment of an exclusive “sphere of interest”. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 92 Not printed. The Department of State to the Chinese Embassy 741.94/114a [Document 70] The Department of State to the Chinese Embassy 93 undated The Department understands and sympathizes with the desire of the Chinese Government to know what possibilities, if any, may be under discussion between British and Japanese officials in regard to Far Eastern matters. However, the Department has no reason to believe that any projects which would be injurious to China’s interests or in impairment of China’s rights are being given any serious consideration in such conversations. It seems obvious that the British Government and British interests are at this time cultivating the good will of the Chinese Government and people. It would also seem obvious that any project on the part of any power or powers looking toward any partitioning of China either political or economic would be stultifying to the interests of such power or powers as committed themselves in favor thereof. The Department will of course endeavor to keep informed of any concrete developments such as negotiations which may arise out of conversations held between British and Japanese officials. However, to the Department it seems that it would not be the part of wisdom for this Government to intrude by making an express request at this time that the British Government inform it with regard to something which the Department does not believe to be under discussion. The Department believes it desirable and requests that no publicity be given to this exchange of views. 93 Notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) on May 11: “Mr. Hornbeck handed a copy of the attached statement to the Chinese Ambassador as record of an informal oral reply to an oral question put by the Chinese Ambassador.” The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/122 [Document 71] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2410 Tokyo , May 11, 1937. [Received June 1.] Sir : With reference to the Embassy’s telegram No. 126, May 7, noon, 94 and to previous correspondence both written and telegraphic, in regard to the foreign policies of Mr. Sato, recently appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to enclose herewith a clipping from the Japan Advertiser of May 7, 1937, 94a containing the text of the prepared statement which Mr. Sato read to the foreign correspondents on the afternoon of May 6, and the most complete account available to the Embassy of the questions asked by the foreign correspondents and the replies of Mr. Sato. The prepared statement, which was decidedly optimistic in tone, dealt with various phases of Japan’s foreign relations. It is significant that Mr. Sato undertook to discuss Anglo-Japanese relations first, indicating that the Japanese Foreign Office now places those relations in the forefront of Japan’s foreign policies. Mr. Sato said that Anglo-Japanese relations have taken a turn for the better owing to the recent settlement of some vexing questions, and that he hoped to strengthen the traditional Anglo-Japanese friendship. Turning to the subject of Sino-Japanese relations, Mr. Sato said that no new developments have taken place in those relations since the Nanking negotiations of last year, but that both sides are endeavoring to create a basis for better mutual understanding. In regard to Soviet-Japanese relations, Mr. Sato said that it is urgently necessary to adjust those relations and such adjustment is not impossible as both governments are anxious to improve relations between the two countries. Mr. Sato then defended the German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement by saying that that agreement is rooted in the cordial friendship between the two countries and that it has no aims other than those stated by the two Governments at the time of the conclusion of the agreement. Turning to American-Japanese relations, Mr. Sato stated that “there is no vexing issue, political or otherwise”, between the United States and Japan, and that the friendship between the two nations is destined to grow with the years. Mr. Sato then discussed briefly Japan’s trade and economic relations. He said that trade agreements had been reached with several countries and that others are in progress of negotiation, and that he hoped that through an international economic conference freedom of trade would eventually be restored. After Mr. Sato had read his prepared statement, the correspondents were asked if they would like to put any questions. Mr. Sato’s replies to the resulting questions are of considerably more interest, in that they are more specific, than his statement. As was to be expected, the questions had to do primarily with Anglo-Japanese, Sino-Japanese and American-Japanese relations. In reply to a question in regard to the Anglo-Japanese conversations now proceeding, Mr. Sato said that so far they had consisted only of a very general exchange of views and that it is premature to believe that anything like an agreement has been reached. He also denied that “spheres of influence” in China were being discussed, but admitted that the relations of Great Britain and Japan with China formed a part of the subject of the conversations. A Chinese correspondent asked several questions in regard to Sino-Japanese relations. Mr. Sato in reply made several non-committal remarks on the expressed Japanese desire to formulate an economic rapprochement with China, and emphasized the theory that it is more important to promote good relations between the two countries than to attempt to settle complicated outstanding questions, such as the North China issues. He advocated the promotion of good feeling by liquidating certain pending questions of minor importance. (This indicates a distinct change in Japan’s method of approach to China. Only a few months ago Japan was insisting upon a general settlement of all outstanding questions in connection with the settlement of minor matters, such as the Chengtu affair. It now appears that Japan will try to lessen Chinese animosity by removing small causes of friction before endeavoring to reach an agreement on larger issues.) Mr. Sato, however, refused to discuss the reasons preventing a settlement of the North China questions. In regard to a question as to whether “special interests” in North China meant “spheres of influence” there, Mr. Sato said that it did not and that Japan was not seeking exclusive rights in that region. In reply to a question in regard to the rumor that he was planning a non-aggression pact with the United States, 95 Mr. Sato said that he had mentioned the idea casually to a reporter of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi ) but that the reporter had made too much of the matter. He said that the idea of such a non-aggression pact interested him, but that he had no concrete plan as yet and no approach had been made to the United States. He added that he was only “a little Foreign Minister whose life may not be long”, and that the question was too important for him. Later, in reply to another question, he said that there was no connection between the idea of a non-aggression pact with the United States and the idea of an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement . He added that his idea of a non-aggression pact with the United States was in no way definite and that he “did not mean to put it forward”. The conversation also included economic questions. A correspondent pointed out the inconsistency between Japan’s asserted desire for freedom of trade and the increasing control of Japan’s foreign trade by the Government. Mr. Sato replied that the control of trade was caused only by the necessity of maintenance of the exchange value of the yen. Asked for his opinion in regard to redistribution of colonies and raw materials, Mr. Sato said that he had no idea of asking for redistribution of colonies, but that Japan wanted fair distribution of raw materials and fair treatment for Japanese goods. It wants free access to sources of raw materials—sources now impeded by economic causes. A correspondent pointed out that the British Empire places no obstacles to the purchase by Japan of any raw materials available in the Empire. Mr. Sato admitted this, but stated that Japan must sell in order to buy, and that obstacles to the importation of Japanese goods in various countries impeded Japan’s ability to purchase raw materials in those countries. In reply to a question as to whether or not Japan is giving thought to the return of Germany’s former colonies (referring undoubtedly to the former German islands north of the Equator now being administered by Japan under mandate) in connection with the question of redistribution of raw materials, Mr. Sato said that Japan is considering the raw material question from the economic point of view. In regard to Japan’s “southward advance” policy, Mr. Sato stated that Japan has no territorial ambitions to the south and has made no demand for rights of colonization, but does want extension of its trade with the south. On the whole, Mr. Sato’s remarks were well received by the local correspondents who appreciated his courage in attempting to reply in a not-too-familiar language (English) to the questions put by men who had spent much more time in studying the political relations of the Far East than had Mr. Sato. The correspondents were able easily to disconcert Mr. Sato by their leading questions, especially in regard to economic matters, but Mr. Sato maintained throughout a dignified, diplomatic manner, although his replies often were vague and obviously evasive. The statement and later remarks of Mr. Sato received no attention in the Japanese press, undoubtedly due to the fact that no reporters of Japanese newspapers were invited to the interview. The English language press of Japan has commented favorably upon Mr. Sato’s policies, as clarified by the interview. The opinion seems to be that Mr. Sato is introducing an air of optimism and of faith in the future of Japan’s foreign relations, and that this air should do much toward clarifying to the world the principles actuating the policies of the present Government. The Japan Times & Mail pointed out that the policies of the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, consisting principally of a desire for peace and friendly cooperation, are quite different from the policies of Japan of only a few years ago, when Japan clung to the theory that it could exist in “glorious isolation” and defy the rest of the world. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 94 Not printed. 94a Not reprinted. 95 For further correspondence, see pp. 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 1097 ] ff. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14126 [Document 72] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State No. 461 Nanking , May 11, 1937. [Received June 15.] Sir : Telegram 188, May 3, 2 p.m. 96 reported that General Chiang Kai-shek had not recovered from injuries received at Sian in December 1936; on the contrary his injuries are far more serious than was at first generally known; there are alarming reports as to his present condition which add to the disquiet already felt at his continuing absence from regular duty. The seriousness of his condition raises the question as to possible consequences in China and the Far East if, as there seems some reason to fear, he should be permanently incapacitated. 1. [Here follows report regarding Chiang’s injuries.] 2. For the past several years there has been growing among Chinese, irrespective of their political and personal inclinations, a feeling that the continuance of Chiang Kai-shek in power is essential to the salvation of the Chinese nation. This feeling has been intensified and its growth promoted by aggressive Japanese activities in and with reference to China, particularly the Japanese military démarche in North China which began in May 1935 and subsequent developments. The Japanese genius for making enemies has had an ironic turn here. Japanese pressure exerted to partition China by alienating five northern provinces has done more than anything else to create in the Chinese people a desire for national unity; under continuing Japanese pressure this desire has grown so strong that it is rapidly becoming a part of the Chinese racial consciousness. By seeking to take advantage of the individualism of the Chinese, which has been a great obstacle to Chinese national unity, Japanese methods have turned that individualism to something like its opposite. The Japanese have made the Chinese ashamed of disunity. The Japanese definition of China as not a nation but merely a geographical area has humiliated the Chinese. It has created an ideal of unity in the Chinese mind against which no Chinese leader can now dare to be frankly false. Because of his personal military and political power and his statesmanlike adaptability to changing times, the execution of measures to make China a unified nation has devolved upon Chiang Kai-shek. The direction of the national destiny in China’s emergence from the vestiges of the feudal period, so called, has been his. Opportunist or statesman, he has continued to rise on the spirit of nationalism which is bringing the country into a solid front against the Japanese enemy. He is the only figure in Chinese political life who thus far has commanded sufficient power to push the work of unification and he has become psychologically necessary to the nation both in the minds of his adherents and in the minds of many of his personal enemies. Because of the peculiar place he has assumed in the nation’s life, his elimination by any circumstances other than the rise of a figure strong enough to usurp this place—and there appears to be no such figure today—could conceivably have one of two seemingly possible results: (1) the complicated structure he has set up to maintain himself in power and extend his own and the Government’s authority would fall apart when his hands cease to hold it together, or (2) it would continue of itself to stand after a fashion, ( a ) possibly through inertia and dependence of one part upon the other, ( b ) possibly because the ideal of unity of which Chiang has become the symbol would continue to live in memory of him with sufficient vigor to make it impossible for any other leader to tear down the structure by actions which would be considered traitorous to this ideal and therefore traitorous to the Chinese nation. 3. It is easy to conceive of the structure falling apart. While Chiang Kai-shek has enjoyed success in nominally unifying China and in bringing diverging powerful sectional and national leaders into collaboration with and lip-service to the Government, the transitional period from so called feudalism and individualism has not completely passed. Hu Han-min, who led the southwestern faction in continuing opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, died in 1936; Chen Chi-tang was eliminated in the liquidation of the Southwestern rebellion of June 1936. But Yu Han-mou, who was Chen’s righthand man and who went over to the Government, remains the commander of Kwangtung’s troops and while Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi are rendering lip-service to the Government, their control of Kwangsi remains little impaired and Kwangsi is virtually an autonomous province. Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang have accepted office in the Government but their past relationships have not been, probably can not be during their lifetime, completely obliterated; and their henchman Han Fu-chu, whose province of Shantung is in a key position between the area of the capital and North China, sometimes assumes an ambiguous character. Ho Chien of Hunan whose provincial borders are not far from the capital is untrustworthy. Disaffection in Szechwan continues. The Northwestern (Sian) revolt of December 1936 has been liquidated except for the Communists and the disposition of Chang Hsueh-liang. But, while Chang’s reputation has so fallen as a result of his seizure of the Generalissimo at Sian that at the moment he does not seem a figure of importance, his troops have been moved into Honan and into Anhwei, a province which borders that of the capital, and could conceivably become a troublesome factor if Chiang Kai-shek should die and Chang resume command of them. With a leaderless Government the Communist problem might easily cause a schism that would tear the country apart. For the chief obstacle in the way of effecting a satisfactory reconciliation between the Communists and the Government (or the Party) appears presently to lie, although this seems an incongruous statement because the Party controls and directs the Government, in differences of opinion between the Government (as personally represented by Chiang Kai-shek and his followers) and the Party (as represented by Kuomintang die-hards and such Party leaders as Wang Ching-wei who at present holds no Government post). In addition, there are various factions within the Party and Government who would attempt to assume control and would meet with obstinate resistance from opposing factions; two examples may be cited here. For one, the opinion has been advanced that the “Blue Shirts” might attempt such a coup. * For another, the so-called Soong dynasty (Madame Chiang Kai-shek, her sister’s husband H. H. Kung, her brother T. V. Soong) would undoubtedly wish to perpetuate itself and undoubtedly its elimination would be strenuously sought by numerous opponents. That the Japanese military would quickly complete the alienation of north China if Chiang Kai-shek were eliminated is a logical expectation; freed from danger of a united Chinese front, the way for war with Soviet Russia would be greatly cleared. 4. Against these possibilities, which appear almost overwhelming, there is the measure of unification which Chiang Kai-shek has already achieved, widespread realization that unity is essential for the survival of China as a nation, the emergence of Chiang out of a chaotic scramble for power to become the living symbol of Chinese unity. If the destiny of a nation depends chiefly upon its spirit, the establishment of this ideal, which can be translated into a determination on the part of the heterogeneous people of China that they shall survive collectively, will have far reaching effects not only in the country itself but in the Far East generally, because it is one mark of the change from defeatism to a will to win through which the Chinese are now progressing. Although it is not analogous to the Chinese desire for unity, there comes to mind the example of the British Crown as the symbol of the unity of the British Empire which loyal Britishers revere more than the substance. More analogous to Chiang’s relationship to the Chinese ideal is the example of Sun Yat-sen whose virtual deification has been elsewhere discussed; † from assuming a Washingtonian place in the Chinese mind as father of the revolution Sun has become a spiritual symbol of the aims of the revolution; his San Min Chu I 97 has acquired some of the character of a Bible and now as long as 12 years after his death, the Government is proceeding to bring into being his precepts in regard to economic and industrial development; national unity was, of course, one of the aims of the Revolution; Japanese aggression has made it of paramount importance at the present time; its immediate, effective and living symbol is Chiang Kai-shek. It would be interesting to trace the growth of Chiang’s appeal to republican China as the personification of leadership, to speculate upon the part played by Madame Chiang in the identification of her husband with China’s destiny and his enshrinement as China’s indispensable leader toward unified nationhood and national salvation. Conceivably Mr. W. H. Donald, her adviser and Chiang’s adviser, has assisted. That she has this feeling toward him, or purports to have it, and seeks to imbue others with it, was apparent in the Generalissimo’s Good Friday message to a Methodist conference at Nanking which was presumably written by her. Recounting his experiences in Sian, Chiang described his detention as 40 days and nights in the wilderness; the demands of the rebels were the temptations of the devil; faced with the threat and possibility of being executed he compared himself in so many words to Christ at Gethsemane. Perhaps it is natural for a man in whose actions lie something of the fate of a people to fall into a religious attitude of mind concerning what he conceives his mission; it is inevitable that those who follow him will come to believe in part at least as he does. Chiang has not yet assumed the heroic place with the god-like which Madame Chiang would have for him; but he has become in Chinese minds something of a man of destiny; his place here is comparable to that of Hitler and Mussolini in their countries. And however the idea has been fostered that Chiang’s leadership is necessary to the nation’s survival, his identification with that idea has been achieved concretely by action. This is particularly true of recent events. In 1936 he was confronted with two serious rebellions—the Southwestern revolt of June and the Sian revolt of December. Both were cloaked with an anti-Japanese character and excused themselves on the ground that the Government had failed the country in failing to give armed resistance to Japanese aggression. But the anti-Japanese character of both, while utilized for purposes of rebellion were also sincere. Chiang possessed the military power to crush the Southwestern revolt; according to observers, the Government’s air force could have without difficulty destroyed the Kwangsi “anti-Japanese northern expedition”. Nevertheless he accepted the sincerity of the rebels’ sentiments against Japan; the revolt was liquidated without bloodshed and while the Kwangsi leaders won practically all their demands of the Government, they are now nominally serving the Government and in time will doubtless come under greater Government control as other powerful sectional leaders have in the past. Certainly one of the chief reasons why it was possible to settle the Southwestern revolt peacefully was that the rebels, in spite of their avowedly anti-Japanese purpose, did not obtain the support against the Government from other dissatisfied leaders which they expected. Similarly the Sian revolt collapsed because expected support in other parts of China was lacking. The country was horrified; denunciation of the rebels was practically universal. Even the Communists, who should be counted Chiang Kai-shek’s bitterest enemies, did not rally to the side of Yang Hu-cheng and Chang Hsueh-liang when the person of the Generalissimo was seized. To the contrary Chou En-lai, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party and Vice Commander of the Chinese Soviet Military Council, insisted upon Chiang’s liberation “because he was necessary to the nation”. By this example alone, we are impelled to the belief that Chiang’s elimination through illness or death would not necessarily cause a disintegration of the National Government and its authority in China. The majority of Chinese leaders have come to realize that China must become unified and show a united front against the common enemy. Chiang Kai-shek has demonstrated the possibility of unification despite old hatreds and old feuds. He has become the symbol of this ideal of unity whose accomplishment is necessary if Japan is to be held off. We are of the opinion that, living or dead, he will for a long time continue to be so. Respectfully yours, Nelson Trusler Johnson 96 Not printed. * Embassy’s (Nanking) despatch 458, May 8. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] † Embassy’s (Nanking) despatch 441, April 24, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] 97 “Three People’s Principles”. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 761.93/1593 [Document 73] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State No. 284 Moscow , May 12, 1937. [Received May 25.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith, in translation, 98 the text of an article which appeared in the Moscow magazine Bolshevik , No. 8, for April 15, 1937, dealing with the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. The article is from the pen of Wang Ming, the leading Chinese in the central Moscow apparatus of the Communist International. * The magazine Bolshevik is the organ of the Central Committee of the Ail-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). The same article appeared, with a few minor alterations, in the Moscow magazine Kommunisticheski Internatsional ( Communist International ), No. 3, for March 1937. This magazine is the organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The appearance of an article of this sort in the Communist International alone would be ample indication that it bore the stamp of complete approval of the Kremlin. Its appearance in the Bolshevik as well leaves not the faintest shred of doubt on this point. Thus the article is in reality an expression of Moscow’s policy toward the political situation in China, and the first of this sort that has appeared for a long time. For this reason it was thought that the Department might be interested in receiving the full text of the document, in translation, despite the redundancy of phraseology which it shares with most expressions of Russian communist thought. The Embassy considers the following points in this article to be of particular interest: (1) the demonstration of the intimate connections of the Communist International (i. e., the leaders of the Soviet Government) with the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Ked Army, and the Chinese Soviets, and the expression of Moscow’s approval of the policy now being carried out by the Chinese communists; (2) the obvious desire for an open alliance between China and the Soviet Union directed against Japan (pages 11, 21, and 22); (3) the willingness of Moscow to have the Chinese communists negotiate with Nanking on the basis of the four conditions laid down by the Third Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (page 22); (4) the simultaneous warning that “there is a certain limit to the willingness of the communists to compromise on political matters” (page 23); (5) the reproaches levied against Nanking for concentrating large military forces in northwestern China instead of the evacuation of all Nanking troops from Shansi [ Shensi? ] and Kansu, for allowing Ma Bu-fan to continue his action against the Red Army units in western Kansu, for transferring the Northeastern Red Army to Honan and Anhwei, for not giving Chang Hsueh-liang full personal freedom and restoring him to his military and political posts, for the murder of General Wang I-cheh, and for “the deliberate stalling for time in the negotiations with the Communist Party” and for excessive demands with respect to the Red Army and the Communist Party (page 29); (6) the interesting reply to Japanese accusations that the United Front is only a temporary maneuver of the communists and that the latter will eventually turn against the Kuomintang (page 36); (7) the reply to the charge that the United Front movement “benefits only the U.S.S.R.” (page 37); (8) the indication that the Communist Party of China has received instructions to take the initiative in making certain concessions, as a gesture, even before the conclusion of negotiations with the Nanking Government; and (9) the use of the phrase “the cause of all advanced mankind” in relation to the battle of the Chinese people “against Japanese imperialism” (page 38). This phrase was coined by Stalin to apply to the cause of the republican forces in Spain. Phrases coined by Stalin are not bandied about loosely and the appearance of this one with relation to China is equivalent to an expression of policy. The significance of this article has already been discussed in the last report of this Mission on developments of Soviet relations with Far Eastern countries (despatch No. 256, April 30, 1937). 99 Respectfully yours, Loy W. Henderson 98 Not printed. * Wang Ming is a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and of its Presidium. He is also an alternate member of the Secretariat [Footnote in the original.] 99 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8662 [Document 74] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State No. 463 Nanking , May 12, 1937. [Received June 15.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a Japanese Domei news telegram dated Tokyo, May 4, 1937, 99 quoting a remarkable statement attributed to Mr. Sato, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Department will note that Minister Sato made the rather startling revelation that “about a decade ago, when anti-British sentiment prevailed in that country (i. e. China), Great Britain asked Japan to send a joint expedition to China. Japan at that time, he said, declined to comply with this request. “Similarly,” he added. “I fear that Great Britain would possibly hesitate to accept Japan’s offer of co-operation in China, if such an offer were made now, especially since China would naturally look with disfavor upon Anglo-Japanese co-operation in China”. The news despatch does not so state, but obviously Mr. Sato’s remarks were elicited by queries concerning the reliability of numerous reports now current to the effect that conversations are in progress in London between Japanese and British statesmen having in view “Anglo-Japanese co-operation” in China. To indicate the nature of press reports current here regarding the conversations now being conducted in London concerning Anglo-Japanese co-operation in China I enclose a copy of a Reuter despatch dated London, May 6 1 which reports a reply made by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to a Parliamentary interpellation, in which he said that a number of informal conversations had occurred in recent months with the Japanese Ambassador with the object of improving Anglo-Japanese relations generally, but no concrete suggestions had hitherto been made by either side on their interests in China, or on any other matter; the desirability of keeping other interested governments informed had not been overlooked. On May 7 a Chinese official of some rank in the Foreign Office stated to the Counselor of the Embassy at a social affair that he regarded the statement of Minister Sato quoted in the second paragraph of this despatch as extremely stupid, and most surprising as coming from a seasoned diplomat like Mr. Sato. He said that it was quite evident that in asserting that there had been a British proposal for a joint Anglo-Japanese military expedition into China in 1927, or thereabouts, Mr. Sato had wished to drive a wedge between Great Britain and China just when their relations showed signs of becoming very intimate and friendly and that, obviously, such an attempt could end only in failure. The point of the informant’s remarks was, however, that such an ill-considered attack on Sino-British relations by the Japanese Foreign Minister could proceed only from a feeling of desperation on his part over the hopelessness of the relations between Japan and China and he feared that if Japanese civilian officials took such desperate measures to relieve a hopeless situation, Japanese military officers might be in a frame of mind to adopt even more desperate expedients, in complete disregard of the possibly fatal effect on the future of Japan and on the peace of the world. The informant had in mind, quite evidently, a large-scale Japanese military invasion of North China. He expressed the opinion that Japan would ruin itself if it attempted to conquer China by military force, partly because of the intrinsic difficulty of the undertaking, and partly because the Japanese people, after the first burst of patriotic enthusiasm, would revolt against the sacrifices entailed, but he did not think the possible peril to Japan would deter Japanese militarists. On the evening of May 7, at another social affair, I chanced to be in conversation with the Minister of Railways and he expressed somewhat similar forebodings over the probability of imminent Japanese pressure on China, but what he feared was an attempt to dominate China in economic, not military, ways. He did not believe Japan would try to conquer China by force of arms. Both to me and to a member of my staff on the same evening he said that he anticipated that the Japanese military authorities in North China would try to compel General Sung Che-yuan to sign a contract for construction by the Japanese of the Tientsin-Shihchiachwang Railway, a line which, masquerading as an economic enterprise, is really desired by the Japanese for its strategic and military usefulness. The Chinese reading public seems to be following with close attention the three-cornered struggle now in progress in Japan between the major political parties and the Cabinet and between the Cabinet and the military faction. While some Chinese take consolation in the theory that these internal perplexities will divert Japanese attention from the China adventure, others find in them reason for increased anxiety, on the ground that the internal dissensions may goad the Japanese militarists to such a state of exasperation that they will take the reins into their own hands, abruptly break off all attempts to settle Sino-Japanese problems through negotiation and take steps to carry out their “continental policy” by the Use of armed force. In this relation, the Embassy has received reliable information to the effect that the German chief military adviser to the National Military Affairs Committee has confidentially informed the Committee that the Chinese army has now reached a state of high efficiency and that it need not seriously fear the outcome of a test of strength with Japanese troops. Respectfully yours, Nelson Trusler Johnson 99 Not printed. 1 Not reprinted. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 741.94/97a: Telegram [Document 75] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , May 14, 1937—7 p.m. 177. 1. There have appeared in the press recently stories, dated London and Shanghai, alleging that discussions are being carried on in London between representatives of the British and the Japanese Governments involving possibly consideration of a plan for an understanding between Great Britain and Japan “to divide China into spheres of economic influence.” The Shanghai stories allege that Chiang Kai-shek has talked with the British Ambassador and given warning against action which might adversely affect China without China’s being consulted. 2. The Chinese Ambassador here has approached the Department informally stating that he is instructed from Nanking to inquire whether the American Government could see its way clear to approach the British Government with a request that in regard to any Anglo-Japanese discussions which may be in progress concerning the Far East the American and the Chinese Governments be kept adequately informed. The Department has replied 3 that it has no reason to believe that any projects which would be injurious to China’s interests or in impairment of China’s rights are being given any serious consideration in conversations such as those under reference; and we have stated that it seems to us that it would not be the part of wisdom for this Government to intrude by making at this time an express request that information be given us with regard to something which we do not believe to be under discussion. 3. The Department recalls the statements made to Atherton 4 by Cadogan 5 (see Embassy’s despatch No. 2936 of March 16 6 ) to the effect that the British Government would not be prepared to set up any series of Far Eastern agreements which would tend to exclude China from them, nor would England become a party to an agreement for the dissection of China; that it was not the idea of the British Government to confine its policy to southern China; and that no policy would emanate from Great Britain without consultation. The Department refers also to statements made by Cadogan to Mr. Norman Davis on April 22 7 to the effect that the British would not consider any agreement that was not entirely acceptable to China and that the American Government would be kept fully informed of any developments in connection with the conversations which the Japanese Ambassador at London was having with the British Government. 4. In the light of the above, and toward ensuring against any inadvertence or misapprehension on our part, the Department desires that unless you perceive objection (in which event please cable Department a statement of your reasons) you seek an early opportunity to approach Cadogan or some other appropriate high official of the British Foreign Office and make oral inquiry, referring appropriately to the matters mentioned in paragraphs above, whether any developments which would be of interest to the United States have occurred in British-Japanese conversations at London since Cadogan’s conversations with Atherton and with Norman Davis. You should endeavor tactfully to elicit comments in regard to the press reports and any bearing that they may have on the subjects indicated. 5. Please cable the Department promptly a report of your approach to the Foreign Office. Hull 3 See memorandum to the Chinese Embassy, p. 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] . 4 Ray Atherton, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom. 5 Sir Alexander M. G. Cadogan, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 6 Not printed. 7 See memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis, p. 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8644 [Document 76] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2419 Tokyo , May 14, 1937. [Received June 1.] Sir : It cannot be denied that Japan’s policy toward China has undergone a marked change during the past few months, but many observers doubt that there has been any real change in Japan’s basic policy. This basic policy was, and now is, to dominate China in one way or another, thereby dominating the whole of the Far East south of Siberia. Japan formerly sought to attain this end through aggressive attempts to obtain political and economic control of China, but China’s apparent determination, exhibited in various ways during the past few months, to resist such attempts at control, has caused Japan to alter its method of approach. As near as the Embassy can judge the present situation, Japan now hopes to attain and maintain a strengthened position on the Asiatic mainland through friendship and economic cooperation with China, rather than by actual political control of that country. There have been many indications in recent months of this change in Japan’s methods of attaining its ends. The reaction in Japan to China’s growing strength and unity was one of astonishment and consternation. However, the Japanese are intelligent enough to realize the changed conditions in China and to appreciate the wisdom of shaping Japan’s policy in such a way as to be able to deal with the altered situation. The demand for a policy of friendship and cooperation with China has come from many quarters of the Japanese nation. It was perhaps the Japanese diplomats and consular officers stationed in China who first realized the changed conditions and advised their Government accordingly. They were followed by businessmen engaged in trade with China, and later even a section of the Japanese military realized the fact that the blustering, aggressive tactics of the past were no longer effective. Since then, politicians in Japan, and most of the Japanese newspapers and magazines have come to appreciate the situation and are urging a changed policy toward China. It is true that some sections of the Japanese nation, who have been badly informed or who are reluctant to relinquish their former views, still cling to the idea that China can be coerced into compliance with Japanese demands, but the bulk of the nation now realizes that this course is dangerous. During recent months three men of considerable prominence in Japan have advocated a changed policy toward China. The Embassy has already reported by telegraph and despatch the views of Mr. Naotake Sato, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in regard to China. It will be remembered that he advocated treating China “on a basis of equality” and indicated that past errors in negotiations with China had been due to the fact that Japan had a sense of superiority in its dealings with that country. It is true that Mr. Sato later was compelled, presumably by the more chauvinistic elements in the Government, to modify his statement so far as to say that he did not mean that Japan should deal patiently with China if China broke the rules of international justice, but nevertheless it appears to be certain that Mr. Sato still hopes to be able to deal with China in much the same manner as he would deal with the United States or Great Britain. Mr. Sato apparently is fully aware of the realities of the situation and has shaped his course accordingly. Mr. Kenji Kodama, the chairman of a recent Japanese economic mission to China, on his return to Japan, according to the press, expressed the view that Japan should realize that China is now a strong, unified nation and must be dealt with accordingly. The press assumes that Mr. Kodama advised the Foreign Office to adopt a changed policy towards China more in keeping with changed conditions, in order to improve economic relationships between the two countries. Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe, the Japanese Ambassador to China, was recently recalled to Japan to confer with the Foreign Office on China policies. The press has been hounding Mr. Kawagoe in an attempt to discover what advice he has given in this connection, and it appears reasonably certain that his views were along the following general lines: 1. China is progressing rapidly, and national unity of that country is becoming a reality. 2. Japan should realize that the actual power in China lies with General Chiang Kai-shek and a section of the national army. 3. The actual control by the Chinese Government of China is great and extensive, “comparable to that of the Japanese Government in Japan”. These three men represent the Japanese Foreign Office, the Foreign Service in China, and Japanese industrialists and financiers. As such they speak with a certain amount of authority, and the Japanese nation appears now to be considering and adopting their views. The Japanese press is inclined to urge the Government to seek the friendship of China and to “reconsider its aggressive policies”. There seems to be little doubt that with this pressure a new policy toward China will evolve, but this is not held to mean a loss of prestige to the Japanese Government. It simply means that Japan is adapting its policies to meet changed conditions. It is true that the idea of treating China on a basis of equality and reciprocity is very different from Japan’s aggressive policy of only a few months ago, but, as the Japan Times pointed out editorially, the policy is different because China itself is now different. It was impossible previously to deal with China, according to the Japanese view, on a basis of equality, because China was not, in strength, unity, and stability of Government, on a par with other great nations. Now that China has attained a degree of unity and stability, Japan sees no disgrace in altering its policies accordingly. It is difficult to say what attitude the Army will take toward the policy of conciliation and friendship with China, as the Army spokesmen have been silent on the subject during recent months. There is no doubt that a section of the Army believes that a “weak policy” toward China will only result in the stronger determination of Nanking to resist Japan, but there also appears to be a section of the military, represented by the men in high positions at the present time, who are inclined to adopt the civilian view of treating China more or less on a basis of equality and reciprocity. However, it will undoubtedly be very difficult to persuade the military to surrender the gains they have made in North China, such as the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, the East Hopei Autonomous Régime, the Tangku Truce Agreement, 7a and the Ho–Umezu Agreement. 8 The opposition of the Japanese military to any relinquishment of such gains now appears to have caused a compromise between the liberal policies of Mr. Sato and the chauvinistic policies of the past. After the return of Mr. Kawagoe to Japan to confer on China policies, there was a meeting of the representatives of the Foreign Office and the War and Navy Ministries to discuss the proposed “new deal for China”. The results of the discussion have not been officially announced and the versions of the proposed “new deal” published in the press vary somewhat in detail, although all express the same general theme. The Kokumin outlines the new China policy as follows: “1. Japan will not selfishly fail to appreciate that the Nanking Government’s power is gradually expanding as long as the special position of Japan in North China is not infringed on. 2. It will guard closely, however, against the growing tendency for peace and order in North China to be disturbed as a result of the compromise between Nanking and the Chinese Communists. 3. Negotiations for adjustment of relations shall be started as soon as possible. The first matters to be negotiated on shall be exclusively economic, and political questions shall be avoided for the time being. 4. For smooth trade and economic co-operation in North China, the lowering of high tariffs against Japanese goods shall be made an urgent question for negotiation. 5. Abolition of the East Hopei régime and acquisition of the political power in North China, which Nanking reportedly means to demand of Japan, if brought up by the Chinese at this time would tend to aggravate relations further. Thus the prudence of the Chinese regarding these matters is fully anticipated. 6. Japan will co-operate with China against any nation attempting to sacrifice the latter and will reject any negotiations that would bring China under international control. At the same time, it will avoid friction with the other countries interested in China.” It will be observed that these policies provide for Japan’s recognition of China’s increasing strength and unity, but nevertheless do not contemplate the relinquishment by Japan of its “special position” in North China. The policies also do not contemplate the immediate abolition of the East Hopei Autonomous Régime or the further consolidation of Nanking’s influence in North China. As the abolition of the East Hopei Autonomous Régime and the extension of Nanking’s control over North China appear to be the principal demands made by China as a preliminary to further negotiations, it does not appear likely that the proposed “new deal for China” will be acceptable to China as a basis for negotiations. Japan apparently proposes to inaugurate negotiations with China with a “clean slate” and on a basis of equality, but does not propose to abolish the results of past aggression. It is difficult to see how this compromise policy can be effective in promoting friendship between the two countries. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 7a Agreement between the Chinese and Japanese military authorities, May 31, 1933; for text, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 120 . 8 Alleged secret agreement between the Chinese War Minister and the Japanese Commander in North China, May–July, 1935; see despatch No. 332, March 27, 1936, from the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 89 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 894.00/734: Telegram [Document 77] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , May 17, 1937—8 p.m. [Received May 17—11:40 a.m.] 131. Addressing the Conference of Prefectural Governors today the Premier expressed the political generalities previously reported in his statements of policy, and said that the Government expects the cooperation of the newly elected House of Representatives in the public interest. The Foreign Minister delivered a long and important speech the substance of which follows: 1. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is widespread. The Nanking Government itself uses the growing spirit of nationalism by urging cessation of internal hostilities in order to resist foreign aggression. China is progressing in unification. Japan harbors no aggressive designs. The Japanese Government hopes to create a more harmonious atmosphere by fresh personal contact, cultural cooperation, interdependent economic relationship founded upon common interests. 2. Military construction and war industries in the Soviet Far East are being pushed with vigor and speed. The trials of January and August in Russia show that the country’s internal condition is complicated. Japan is trying to eliminate unnecessary friction. Unnecessary friction has arisen through treatment of Japanese officials and subjects by Soviet officials and through complaints against Japanese treatment of Soviet officials. It is desirable that Japanese prefectural governors exercise care in this regard. 3. It is highly desirable to secure firmly Great Britain’s friendship. Not a few questions with regard to China and trade require solution between Japan and Great Britain. The Japanese Government is exerting its [influence?] to solve them. 4. Relations with the United States are satisfactory on the whole. Japanese expanding export trade has caused difficulties which have been gradually resolved by mutual understanding. The Economic Mission now touring the United States is expecting to enhance this friendly atmosphere. The Murchison Mission resulted in a satisfactory agreement. 8a I hope that Japan and the United States, whose economic relations are complementary, will continue to collaborate in the task of preserving peace in the Pacific. 5. The agreement of last November with Germany against the Communist International is simply a continuation of Japan’s invariable policies against all Communist movements. This agreement is of the greatest value and significance. 6. International trade is essential to a densely populated country like Japan. The restoration of freedom of trade and the opening of sources of raw materials which the Japanese Government has on all occasions advocated is an assertion of our right of national existence. Japanese representatives abroad must be constantly vigilant against obstruction of Japanese exports. 7. Treatment of Japanese abroad depends in part on treatment of foreigners in Japan. Prefectural governors are requested not to treat foreigners with too great rigor simply because they are foreigners. To Peiping by mail. Grew 8a For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv , pp. 780 ff. Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Lyon) 893.00/14128 [Document 78] Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China ( Lyon ) 9 Peiping , May 18, 1937. In a conversation last evening with Dr. S. T. Wang, 10 who has recently returned from Nanking, he informed me that while there he was told by a Chinese official (whose name he did not disclose but who, he said, was one who knew what he was talking about) that Chiang Kai-shek’s escape from Sian was the result of Soviet intervention. I asked Dr. Wang if he could tell me how this intervention was actually effected: whether it came through Russian advisers to the Chinese Communists or through the Soviet Ambassador at Nanking. Dr. Wang said that he did not know but that the theory was that the word came, by whatever means, direct from Moscow, for the Russians realized that if anything happened to Chiang Kai-shek a chaos would result in China, of which the Japanese would take immediate advantage. On the other hand, they appreciated the fact that if Chiang Kai-shek were released as the result of Communist intervention he would be somewhat indebted to the Chinese Communists and would be forced to yield to some of their demands. This, in turn, would result in Sino-Soviet cooperation against Japan. 9 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Embassy in China in its despatch No. 1246, May 21; received June 15. 10 Superintendent of the Peking Union Medical College, Peiping. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 741.94/98: Telegram [Document 79] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , May 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received May 18—2:35 p.m.] 292. I discussed Department’s 177, May 14, 7 p.m. with Cadogan today. He told me that far more appeared in the press than had ever transpired and that the British Goverment was still waiting for the proposals from the Japanese Government referred to in my 3051 of May 4 11 and previous. However, Yoshida had informed him recently that these proposals had been under discussion between himself and Tokyo and he hoped to lay them before the Foreign Office in the near future. I asked Cadogan what he thought these might include and he said he thought in response to the British memorandum of last winter as to discussions “upon the basis of existing treaties” it would deal with trade, quotas (more especially dominion quotas which the Japanese still professed to think were under London’s dictatorship), the situation in regard to China and possibly monetary subjects including references to a loan; but Cadogan emphasized he was not in any way definite about either the form or the content. Incidentally I gather he had explained the present situation to the Chinese Ambassador here. In the course of the conversation he added that he was quite surprised at Lyons’ 12 proposal in the Imperial Conference regarding a pact of nonaggression in the Pacific. I said in my opinion a pact of nonaggression was generally interpreted to include a guarantee against violation which he said was exactly the reason that led him to think nothing very much could come of Lyons’ proposal. He told me that Kung 13 came here with very big ideas as to a loan of from 20 to 50 million pounds for internal purposes but that Leith-Ross “had watered him down heavily” and intimated that the most he could hope for would be from 10 to 12 million pounds which Kung said he could not contemplate without loss of face. Cadogan said that he knew technical advisers of Kung were still talking finance in the city but without any results or he would have been advised. 14 In conclusion he referred to the contents of the Department’s 107, March 27, noon 15 and handed me a note which reads as follows: “I must apologize for the delay in replying to the aide-mémoire of the 30th March which you left with the Foreign Office on the 1st April last. As I am not yet in a position to give you the considered views of His Majesty’s Government on the subject of extraterritoriality in China I thought it would be best to send you an interim reply on the point as regards a foreign government or foreign governments taking the initiative in approaching the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government might we think be actually embarrassed by such an initiative; and if as seems possible it had the effect of encouraging an agitation among the more irresponsible elements in commercial political circles it might make it more difficult for them to pursue a reasonable course if negotiations on the subject are begun. We agree therefore with your Embassy in China in thinking that it would be a mistake for any foreign government to take the initiative and we should prefer to await proposals from the Chinese Government. In the meantime the important questions of policy involved will receive our most careful consideration and the conclusions we may reach will in due course be communicated to you. I need hardly say of course that we fully reciprocate the desire expressed in the aide-mémoire for close collaboration between our two governments.” Bingham 11 Not printed. 12 Joseph A. Lyons, Australian Prime Minister. 13 H. H. Kung was Chinese representative at the coronation in London. 14 See also vol. iv , pp. 568 ff. 15 Ibid. , p. 639 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 741.94/101a [Document 80] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) No. 1757 Washington , May 24, 1937. Sir : Reference is made to the Department’s telegram No. 177, May 14, 7 p.m., and to the Embassy’s telegram No. 292, May 18, 1937, 6 p.m. In several stories which have appeared in the press recently, news correspondents have affirmed in varying phraseologies that the British Government would of course have no objection to “recognizing” that Japan has “special interests” in China or a “special position” in the Far East. If in such connection those who talk about “recognizing” are envisaging entry by the British Government into a formal commitment affirming for and attributing to Japan “special interests” or a “special position,” we doubt whether the stories rest on any foundation of real fact. But, if by any chance such a proposal has been or should be evolved, we feel that the British Government would be well advised were it to study carefully the whole history of the Lansing–Ishii exchange of notes 16 before coming to any conclusion favorable to the making by it of such a commitment. Please be on the alert for any evidence that any such proposal is under consideration. In case you discover any such evidence, please take occasion immediately and invariably to point out that your Government regards as most unfortunate and unsatisfactory its experience with such a commitment; point out that the Lansing-Ishii agreement had most unfortunate repercussions and consequences; and intimate that any project for the conclusion between any governments of any agreement in recognition of any “special interests” or “special position” of any power in the Far East would be a matter of concern to your Government. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull 16 See Foreign Relations , 1917, pp. 258 ff.; ibid. , 1922, vol. ii , pp. 591 ff.; Foreign Relations , The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, vol. ii , pp. 432 ff. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8636: Telegram [Document 81] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , May 26, 1937—1 p.m. [Received May 26—6:45 a.m.] 137. 1. I called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to present Dooman. 17 The Minister stated that Kawagoe would leave on or about June 10 for Nanking and that he is to be directed as soon as practicable after his arrival there to begin conversations with the Chinese Government looking toward the adjustment of important questions pending between Japan and China. 2. He observed that one of the greatest impediments in the way of doing anything to improve relations between the two countries is the divergence of views among various influential Japanese elements and he especially mentioned the military at Hsinking and Tientsin. He expressed regret that there should have occurred at this time any incident such as that which occurred recently at Swatow 18 for the reason that there is possibility that a grave view would have to be taken of it. 3. He said that Kawagoe had requested to be relieved as Ambassador to China but that Kawagoe could not be satisfactorily replaced at this time. Sato admitted that the previous conversations carried on by Kawagoe with the Chinese Government had been unsuccessful. He felt, however, that Kawagoe had profited by his past experiences in China and that he would exploit such experience to advantage in the forthcoming negotiations. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 17 Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan. 18 See telegram No. 220, May 27, 10 a.m., infra. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8637: Telegram [Document 82] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Nanking , May 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 11:10 a.m.] 220. Our 218, May 26, 10 a.m. 19 1. According to an official of the Foreign Office, the following statement published last night by Central News Agency Nanking is a statement prepared by the Foreign Office. 2. “The latest Sino-Japanese incident in Swatow was started when a Japanese subject attempted to move into a house in another district of the city without first reporting to the local police and receiving a permit from them as was required by police regulations, declared a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to reports hitherto received at Foreign Office, continued the spokesman, the Japanese subject involved in the affair, Kiyoshi Aoyama, committed bodily assault upon the Chinese police who attempted to persuade him to fulfill the requirements of the police regulations before moving into a new district. One officer and one policeman were said to have been injured. The Japanese was placed under arrest but was handed over to his Consul on the night of the incident. His punishment has been demanded by the local Chinese authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has instructed Dr. Philip Tyau, Special Foreign Commissioner in Canton, to proceed to Swatow immediately to make a full inquiry into the matter. It is hoped that the incident will soon be settled amicably on the basis of impartial findings.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peck 19 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8639: Telegram [Document 83] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , May 29, 1937—noon. [Received May 29—10:25 a.m.] 224. My 220, May 27, 10 a.m. The Japanese Chargé d’Affaires called on me yesterday in regard to another matter and I inquired about the Swatow incident of May 22. He said that Aoyama, the Japanese consular police official concerned, had sent a colleague to the Swatow police to inform them of his removal to new quarters before the removal occurred and that the subsequent rough handling of Aoyama was doubly unjustified. He said that Japanese nationals had found by experience that prior notice to the Chinese police of removal to new residence quarters often resulted in intimidation of the new landlord by the police; the Japanese authorities do not recognize prior notification as mandatory on Japanese nationals because they have extraterritorial status; in forcibly entering the new quarters of Aoyama the Chinese police were acting beyond their rights because those quarters were in a building already rented by a Japanese shopkeeper; injuries received by the Chinese police resulted unavoidably from the fracas precipitated by the attempt to seize Aoyama; the Japanese consular police sent to take over custody of Aoyama were not armed as asserted by Chinese reports and were acting strictly in accord with precedent which requires that Japanese if arrested shall be handed to the Japanese authorities immediately, whereas in this instance the victim was detained unnecessarily for several hours. The informant deplored premature news release by the Chinese Foreign Office prior to receiving official reports and the folly of the local Chinese authorities in South China in using trivial routine regulations as a pretext for rough treatment of Japanese subjects. He said that the local authorities apparently did not realize that these affronts to Japan might result in consequences entirely disproportionate in gravity to the importance of the regulations. He said the Japanese Consul at Swatow has successfully handled incidents like this in Kalgan and other places and is very peaceable and self-restrained. The informant himself showed no rancor and seemed to be sincerely animated by the widely publicized friendly attitude of the Japanese Foreign Office toward China. I inferred that in his conversations at the Chinese Foreign Office the informant had talked along lines similar to the observations made to me. Sent to the Department; by courier to Peiping and Tokyo. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/7: Telegram [Document 84] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , May 31, 1937—noon. [Received May 31—7:12 a.m.] 140. Byas’ 20 forthcoming despatch to the New York Times concerning a bilateral nonaggression pact between Japan and the United States is based on two recent interviews with Sato. Sato feels as I have previously reported that the first essential requirement for the betterment of Japan’s foreign relations is improved relations with China but he visualizes a nonaggression pact with the United States as an important desideration for some time in the future. Other comments on Japan’s attitude towards China and Mongolia are based on a confidential interview which Byas has had with the Minister of War. Grew 20 Hugh Byas, British correspondent in Japan of the Times (London) and the New York Times. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14123: Telegram [Document 85] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , June 2, 1937—1 p.m. [Received June 2—11:45 a.m.] 229. Our 186, April 30, 9 a.m. 1. There are reports current that progress in the negotiations between the National Government and the Communists in the northwest have progressed to a point where reorganization of the Red troops into the national forces has commenced and that they have been placed under the superior or supervising command of Ku Chu Tung, director of the Generalissimo’s Sian Field headquarters, with their own officers continuing in immediate command. Commenting on one point of the National Government, Vice Minister cited in the telegram under reference stated last evening to an officer of the Embassy that while the Government hoped to accomplish this step such hope had not yet been realized. 2. The Tientsin North China Star published May 27 a news story dated at Yenan, Shensi, the Red “capital”, which quoted a message said to have been sent by Chu Teh, “commander-in-chief of the Chinese People’s anti-Japanese Red Army” to the Spanish people, which is of interest in connection with the northwestern Communists’ reputed agreement with the Government that they will cease styling themselves Communists and will forego the class struggle and as an indication of a general reformation of Communist policy to submerge their communistic air in supporting democractic bourgeoisie movements opposing fascism. Paid tribute to the struggle of the Spanish “comrades” against “German and Italian fascists and Spanish insurgents”; (2) stated that ( a ) the Red army had grown up from workers and peasants “under the leadership” of the Chinese Communist Party, ( b ) after a 10-year struggle against “international imperialism and international counter revolutionary forces” had proposed to all parties and groups in China a new policy of a national united front against Japan, thus bringing about the end of China’s “20-year civil war”; (3) concluded rhetorically that “your front and our front is one, we have the same enemy, fight German and Italian fascism in the West and we fight Japanese fascism and militarism in the East”. 3. The source of this news report is unknown but is presumed to be Earl Leaf, American correspondent at Tientsin of the United Press who recently visited Yenan and published through the United Press a series of articles concerning the Communist régime in North China and the negotiations with the Government looking to a reconciliation. Japanese press dispatch May 16 accused Tass of utilizing the United Press in this connection for anti-Japanese propaganda, stated that the correspondent’s sojourn in Yenan could not have been possible without the assistance of the Soviet Union and went on to say that it is an open secret that when Chiang Kai-shek was detained at Sian a certain Communist leader (Chou En Lai) suddenly appeared and saved Chiang “from the Judas grip of the Sian rebels,” pleading with the latter that this was not the time for internal quarrels in China but now for a united front against Japan. The Japanese press despatch in question has been rendering conclusions from the circumstances which it cited. 4. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping, Tokyo, Moscow. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8647: Telegram [Document 86] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , June 7, 1937—9 a.m. [Received June 7—8:20 a.m.] 230. On June 4, the Embassy obtained from William R. Mathews, editor and publisher of the Arizona Daily Star , the text of an Associated Press telegram sent to the United States reporting his interview with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that day. The text was as follows: “As a first step in settling the only question of concern between the United States and China, that of extraterritoriality, 21 Dr. Wang Chung Hui, Chinese Foreign Minister, asks that existing treaties be interpreted to permit the taxing of all foreign residents on the same basis that the Chinese Government taxes its own nationals. As Dr. Wang explained, China at present has this right but cannot enforce it because its courts lack jurisdiction. Dr. Wang declared that China is anxious and willing to settle all vital issues between China and Japan by peaceful means. But China can give in no more. An attitude of conciliation on the part of China based upon the principle of environments would be reciprocated by the British. The Chinese Government, stated Dr. Wang, is doing everything it can and doing it successfully to suppress unlawful anti-Japanese propaganda but ‘we cannot control or suppress the feelings in the heart of every Chinese, feelings which have been aroused by acts of Japan’; nevertheless, the Chinese Government is doing everything possible to localize any undue incident that might occur. Replying to recently circulated rumors that China and Soviet Russia were working hand in hand, Wang declared that ‘We have not yet been able to conclude a commercial treaty with the Soviet Union because the views of Nanking and Moscow are not in agreement on several points’”. Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping. Peck 21 For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv , pp. 634 ff. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8648: Telegram [Document 87] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , June 7, 1937—11 a.m. [Received June 7—7 a.m.] 231. My 230, June 7, 9 a.m. Informant stated that the Director of the Publicity Department of the Chinese Foreign Office stated positively that war between China and Japan would take place within 5 years. Informant said that statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs indicate beyond reasonable doubt that either an oral or a written understanding has been reached between China and Russia providing for joint military resistance to Japan in certain circumstances. Among deletions made by the Foreign Office in the draft of the proposed telegraphic report of the interview was a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning relations between the Soviet Union, Japan and China that the desire of China was to maintain peaceful balance in the Orient; that there was naturally a joint interest between the Soviet Union and China to resist continental aggression by Japan since China could not afford to see an increase in Japan’s strength in Northern China following a defeat of Russia nor an increase in Russian strength following a defeat of Japan. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 711.94/1136: Telegram [Document 88] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , June 7, 1937—2 p.m. [Received June 7—6:08 a.m.] 151. 1. In my initial interview today with the new Foreign Minister, 22 Hirota asked me to tell the President and yourself that his guiding policy in conducting Japan’s relations with the United States would be based on the exchange of messages with you in 1934. 23 2. With regard to the Sino-Japanese affairs he said that his former “three points” were too abstract for present circumstances. He therefore proposed to find concrete solutions of the various outstanding problems between Japan and China. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 22 Koki Hirota returned to this post in the Cabinet of Prince Fumimaro Konoye on June 4. 23 Exchanged on February 21 and March 3, 1934, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 127 – 129 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8654: Telegram [Document 89] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , June 10, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 10—10 a.m.] 164. Embassy’s 134, May 12, 7 p.m. and 145, May 24, 1 p.m. 24 1. Sung Che Yuan continues in retirement in Western Shantung. 2. Japanese in North China regard his lengthening absence as due to Sung’s desire ( a ) to avoid Japanese representations for economic collaboration and perhaps, ( b ) to avoid pressure by the National Government for increase of its influence in this area. Japanese opinion is that pro-National Government elements are taking advantage of Sung’s absence to increase the Government’s influence. 3. Some Chinese also express the above views. Others think that Sung is agreeable to increased influence of the National Government because he realizes that he cannot go against the general trend in China toward unity. 4. Sung is probably staying in retirement in the hope that time will solve some of very material difficulties before he resumes his duties. Sung is meeting with Chinese leaders who visit his place of retirement from time to time. 5. Japanese and Chinese are agreed that the National Government is making efforts to increase its influence in Hopei. Recent evidence is as follows: ( a ) Physical (military) summer training for Peiping students, which was suspended last summer because of Japanese displeasure, is allegedly being reinstituted. ( b ) Peiping students have been forbidden to parade or lecture, the purpose being apparently to avoid students’ activities directed against Japan and the National Government. ( c ) Chinese are attempting to prevent Japanese from obtaining leases of land in Hopei, even when done through the names of complacent Chinese. ( d ) Allegedly the local authorities intend to prepare for elections of delegates for the approaching Peoples’ National Assembly. ( e ) Sung is avoiding discussion with Japanese of construction of the Shihkiachwang–Tientsin Railway. ( f ) Evidently the Hopei authorities have decided not to cooperate economically with the Japanese unless East Hopei is returned. 6. It is apparent that Sino-Japanese relations are deadlocked. Chinese and Japanese informants agree that the Hopei authorities there offered to cooperate, including the building of the Shihkiachwang-Tientsin Railway, if East Hopei is returned. There is little or no prospect of its being returned, partly because Japanese in Manchuria feel that the existence of this buffer régime has played an important part in the recent developments of subversive activities in Manchuria. From statement of Japanese, it is evident that the Japanese desire the situation to continue to be quiet but that they fear the deadlock will evidently be broken by some too forward movement on the part of the Chinese which will precipitate serious trouble. By mail to Tokyo. Johnson 24 Neither printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14145 [Document 90] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 498 Nanking , June 10, 1937. [Received July 13.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose a memorandum 25 of a conversation of June 9, 1937, between an officer of this Embassy and an official of the National Government concerning various aspects of important current political developments in and with respect to China. The official in question has frequently been a reliable source of information and is in a position to have an intimate knowledge of developments which concern the National Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Conclusion. Considered together, the informant’s remarks bring out in fairly clear outline what is taking place in and with respect to China today. That is to say: the Chinese Government, while waiting for Japan to make the next move in regard to fundamental Sino-Japanese issues, is taking advantage of the temporary relaxation of acute Japanese pressure to proceed with the unification of the country, the consolidation of the Government’s authority, and with construction and strategic projects; meanwhile the jealousies and competitive maneuvers of western nations are concerned in some of these matters, particularly in the construction projects and also, in a broader sense, in the relations of China and Japan, because participation by western nations in Chinese railway construction and other enterprises constitutes a challenge to Japan’s program for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. The French saying “ Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” comes to mind in this connection, because it is apparent that China continues to be swept by the cross-currents of many years standing and China’s problems and the problems of the world with respect to China have not essentially altered in recent years. These are: Japanese aggression, the problem of internal peace and order, the problem of industrialization with its political implications involving conflicts of primarily selfish European interests. There is, however, one far-reaching difference and that is the change in the Chinese themselves. The unification of China no longer depends entirely upon what military force the Government, or the principal leader of the Government, can command. The ideal of national unity is rapidly becoming a part of China’s national consciousness. An example of the tremendous growth of this ideal in the minds of the people was the widespread horror, even among the discontents and the enemies of Chiang Kai-shek, at the Generalissimo’s detention at Sian. Recent examples of the growth of this ideal among the country’s leaders were the peaceful liquidation of the June, 1936 Southwestern revolt, the peaceful liquidation of the December, 1936 Sian revolt, and the current negotiations looking to a complete reconciliation between the Government and the Chinese Communists in the Northwest. The attempt to find a modus vivendi between a government which operates under the framework of a democracy and the Communists is an experiment which does not seem to have been attempted before in modern times. The fact that progress is being made, with the probability of some compromise that will provide a working arrangement, is certain indication of the extent to which the Chinese, heterogeneous as they are in spoken language, physique, temperament and political beliefs, have come to realize the necessity, for their own salvation, of joining together in forming a real nation under effective government. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Willys R. Peck Counselor of Embassy 25 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8663: Telegram [Document 91] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , June 16, 1937—4 p.m. [Received June 16—12:50 p.m.] 172. Embassy’s telegram 135, May 12, 10 p.m., despatch 1273, June 5, 26 and telegram 170 [ 164 ] June 10, 5 p.m. 1. Chinese press reports have been appearing since June 1 to the effect that uprisings against Japanese control in Chahar north of the Great Wall have been taking place. 2. Although the reports appear to be exaggerated, it seems that there have been activities aimed against Japanese control. The Tokyo Foreign Office spokesman was reported in yesterday’s press as having said on June 9 that it was feared that a quite unexpected incident might occur in Northern Chahar as a result of activities of irregulars and bandits, allegedly instigated by Chinese authorities. The First Secretary of the local Japanese Embassy stated this morning that agents of the National Government have instigated trouble in Northern Chahar which is being adequately dealt with by the authorities of that area and that the despatch of Japanese troops from Jehol is unnecessary. 3. A fairly reliable Chinese source states that a Chinese, Li Ying, with 3 or 4,000 men, recently seized territory near Kuyuan in Eastern Chahar and is attempting to obtain confirmation of his action from Suiyuan and Chahar authorities. 4. If the so-called uprisings are sporadic and undirected, then they may be expected not to assume importance. If, however, they are directed by agents of the central or provincial authorities, they may lead to a serious situation in view of ( a ) the overconfidence of Chinese and ( b ) the impatience of elements of the Japanese military with the present deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations and their dissatisfaction with the Chinese attitude. 5. It seems unlikely at present that ( a ) the Chinese will attempt to recover control of Northern Chahar or ( b ) the Japanese military will attempt further westward expansion. By mail to Tokyo. Johnson 26 Neither printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 893.79694/24: Telegram [Document 92] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , June 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received June 20—7 a.m.] 240. 1. The press reports that Huitung Aviation Corporation, said to be a Sino-Japanese enterprise including the Tientsin mayor among its directors but understood to be chiefly Japanese, on June 1, opened commercial passenger air service between Tientsin and Tokyo via Manchukuo or Dairen. According to a responsible official of the Foreign Office, the Executive Yuan early this month issued an order prohibiting the operations of the line on the ground that it had not received the National Government’s approval. This order was ineffective and the line shortly began carrying mail as well as passengers. On June 15 the Foreign Office handed an aide-mémoire to the Japanese Embassy embodying its protest but has not received a reply. Telegraphic requests for information sent by the National Government to Chinese authorities in the north have also been ignored. 2. To the Department. By mail to Peiping, Tientsin, Tokyo. Peck The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8665: Telegram [Document 93] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , June 22, 1937—3 p.m. [Received June 22—11 a.m.] 300. At the request of the Japanese Consul General, the Chairman of the Joint Commission established by the 1932 agreement 27 for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai has called a meeting of the Commission for tomorrow afternoon. The Japanese Consul General informed me this morning that he intends at this meeting to bring forward a rumor or report that the Chinese have fortified Woosung; also that they have greatly increased the number of the Peace Preservation Corps and supplied them with tanks and other equipment beyond ordinary rifles, pistols and machine guns and that they have dug trenches and constructed concrete dugouts in the evacuated area. Upon being questioned by me as to whether the Japanese have made any representations to the Chinese authorities, the Japanese Consul General admitted that last November his predecessor saw the Mayor concerning the reported fortifying of Woosung and asked for facilities for an inspection. The Mayor is stated to have indicated his inability to give the permission desired. The Japanese Consul General says that the Japanese Navy has been pressing him for action to bring the situation before the Joint Commission and he feels that whatever may be Chinese attitude the representations should be made to the Commission and stand of record. He will probably ask for an investigation by the Joint Commission or its representatives including neutral observers. He declares that the Chinese members of the Commission, if they attend the meeting, will likely withhold consent to an inspection. I will report [course?] of the meeting at which I take no active part and reserve the American opinion if necessary. Telegraphed to the Department and Peiping, to Nanking by mail. Gauss 27 Signed at Shanghai, May 5, 1982, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 217 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 741.94/111: Telegram [Document 94] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , June 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 23—9:25 a.m.] 165. 1. In a conversation this morning with Dooman, Yoshizawa 28 confirmed the accuracy of a statement contained in the Domei despatch from London published in the papers yesterday to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador at London has been authorized to open negotiations with the British Government looking toward the conclusion of a political agreement. 2. Yoshizawa stated that Yoshida, following informal conversations with Cadogan and later with Eden, had submitted to Tokyo an outline of an agreement which in Yoshida’s opinion might be acceptable to the two Governments concerned, and that the Japanese Government had authorized Yoshida to lay the outline before the British Government as a basis for negotiations. He emphasized that the difference between Yoshida’s previous conversations and the forthcoming conversations is that the latter will be conducted with the “official cognizance of the Japanese Government”. 3. As Yoshizawa stated that the Domei report could be accepted as “a substantially accurate estimate” of the scope of the forthcoming negotiations at London, it is briefly summarized as follows: ( a ) The Japanese Government will emphasize the adjustment of trade relations (presumably this refers to desire of Japanese for removal of quotas on Japanese imports into British Colonies and assurance that special restrictions will not be imposed upon Japanese goods entering British markets); ( b ) Possibility of declaration by Japan that “it has no territorial ambitions in China and is ready to respect British vested interests in that country”. 4. Assuming that the press report is substantially accurate it would seem that declarations contemplated by the Japanese Government is an exchange of a Japanese declaration to refrain from molesting British interests in China for a British assurance to refrain from discriminating against Japanese goods in British markets including probably Dominion markets. It seems to me that it would be a hard and probably technically difficult bargain for the British to accept notwithstanding the importance to them of their interests in China. 5. Another press despatch on the same subject refers to the possibility that the British Government without recognizing Manchukuo would deal with it as a fait accompli and would recognize the Japanese position in North China. I do not give credence to that report. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 28 Seijiro Yoshizawa, Director of the American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8666: Telegram [Document 95] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , June 23, 1937—7 p.m. [Received June 23—1:15 p.m.] 304. Reference my No. 300, June 22, 3 p.m. At meeting of Joint Commission this afternoon the Japanese Consul General stated he had information that Chinese had fortified or were about to fortify Woosung forts, also that Peace Preservation Corps in “demilitarized zone” had been increased from 2,000 men to about 6,500 armed with tanks and other weapons approximating to regular troops. He considered these acts, if true, are to invoke 1932 truce agreement. Requested information from Chinese side and asked that Japanese be allowed to investigate, accompanied by neutral members. Chinese delegate maintained that questions raised by Japanese do not come within provisions of 1932 agreement, objected to use of term “demilitarized zone” and declared fortification of Woosung whether true or not would not constitute violation of agreement or be matter for joint action. Neutral members stated they were not in a position to express an opinion on the conflicting interpretations of 1932 agreement but inquired whether the Chinese delegate without prejudice to his stand and as a gesture of conciliation and good will was prepared to make any voluntary statement regarding Peace Preservation Corps and/or fortifications at Woosung. Chinese delegate replied that his authority as member of Joint Commission is limited and, therefore, he was unable to make even a voluntary statement without permission. Meeting then adjourned. Full report follows by mail. 29 Sent to the Department and Peiping. [ Gauss ] 29 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.00/14150 [Document 96] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 30 No. 858 Shanghai , June 23, 1937. Sir : I have the honor to enclose a newspaper clipping 31 which contains the observations of Mr. J. B. Powell, an American journalist residing in China, on his return from a recent trip to North China. It will be noted from a perusal of the article that Mr. Powell is pessimistic in regard to the future of North China as a part of China proper, and that he feels that the situation is in some respects parallel to that existing about Mukden prior to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1931. While one hears comparatively little in Shanghai concerning the North China situation, I believe that there are some local Chinese who share his views and who feel that while the status quo is satisfactory for the time being, military aggression on the part of Japan will force the present administration of China into hostilities if it wishes to retain control of the Government. Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss 30 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Shanghai in his covering despatch No. 842, June 23; received July 27. 31 Not reprinted. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 741.94/111: Telegram [Document 97] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) 32 Washington , June 24, 1937—5 p.m. 94. Your 165, June 23, 5 p.m. Under date June 21, the Embassy at London telegraphed 33 that Cadogan on June 21 informed Ambassador Bingham that Cadogan had had several talks with Ambassador Yoshida in the course of which Yoshida had proposed a pact for protecting China’s independence and territorial integrity. Cadogan said that the British Government would cooperate in this sense with the Japanese or any other government and that the Japanese Ambassador had then suggested that there be discussed an agreement for China’s rehabilitation and protection; that Cadogan had informed Yoshida that in no circumstances would Great Britain enter into such a pact, that while his Government would support cooperation with China, Japan and the United States for the stability and peace of the Far East, consideration could not be given to a special agreement in any form; and that Yoshida was to furnish Cadogan with a memorandum on the points which Japan would propose to discuss but that the changes of government in Japan has involved a delay in the presentation of the memorandum. Cadogan stated that he expected that the memorandum would be forthcoming shortly; that he had promised to keep the Chinese Ambassador informed of any negotiations with Japan; and that he would keep the American Embassy informed. Hull 32 Sent as No. 97, June 25, 4 p.m., to the Embassy in China. 33 Vol. iv , p. 605 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8725 [Document 98] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2484 Tokyo , June 24, 1937. [Received July 12.] Sir : There has been much speculation in Japan as to what definite policy, if any, the new Konoye Cabinet will adopt toward China. Thus far, judging from the public statements made by the Premier and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would appear that only the general outlines of the policy to be pursued with respect to China have been considered. While Japan’s China program remains in a nebulous state, an appraisal of the lines which any future policy will be most likely to follow may perhaps be reached through an analysis of the former Hirota and Sato policies and of the divergent points of view held by the Japanese and the Chinese. It will be remembered that the Hirota three-point policy called for the checking by the Chinese Government of anti-Japanese activities and propaganda, Sino-Japanese cooperation against communism, and the stabilizing of China’s factual relations with “Manchukuo”. * On the basis of these Japanese aims negotiations were opened between the Chinese and Japanese Governments in March 1936. Conscious of its increased strength the Nanking Government was able to reject these demands, labelled “requests” by the Japanese, and the negotiations came to a close in December 1936. Thus the futility of pressing these demands without the use of armed force was fully realized before the resignation of the Hirota Government on January 23 and the formation of the Hayashi Cabinet on February 2, 1937. Hence, in the early part of the present year the Japanese began to see the necessity of adopting a more conciliatory and equitable policy toward China from the point of view of expediency if Japan’s economic aims in China were to be attained. † There was nothing surprising in the remarks made before the Diet by Mr. Sato, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi Cabinet, who urged that negotiations with China be taken up on the basis of equality and that Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations be based on a harmony of feeling between the two nations. ‡ It is well to remember that although Mr. Sato amplified these remarks on several occasions, his statements regarding the proposed new China policy were always vague and that not once did he intimate that Japan’s political and economic gains in North China would be relinquished in line with the new policy of “equality and equity.” In fact, under pressure from the Japanese military in the latter part of March, Mr. Sato asserted publicly in the Diet that the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar administrations had been established because of special conditions existing in North China and hence were not a matter for discussion with Japan, and that the question of Japan’s “special trade” (smuggling) in the East Hopei region was a concern of East Hopei and should not be discussed with Japan, but that Japan would consider it in connection with Chinese tariffs. § It is easy to understand, therefore, why Mr. Sato’s “new policy of conciliation” was received with skepticism by the Chinese, since it offered nothing to them in the way of concession. To recapitulate, the old three-point program advocated by Hirota failed because the Chinese refused to accept it. The Sato policy gave little promise of success owing to the vagueness of its terms and its failure to pay attention to the concrete desires of the Chinese. Since the advent of the Konoye Cabinet and the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Minister for Foreign Affairs, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning Japan’s future China policy. Will the new Government attempt to open negotiations with the Nanking Government on the basis of the Hirota “three-point policy”, will it carry over the Sato policy of conciliation, or will it adopt an entirely new policy? In my first interview with the new Minister for Foreign Affairs on June 7, Mr. Hirota stated with regard to Sino-Japanese affairs that conditions had changed since he was last in office: that his former three points were too abstract for present circumstances, and that he therefore proposed to find concrete solutions of the various problems outstanding between Japan and China. ║ The Minister for Foreign Affairs has made no statement as to whether he intends to follow Mr. Sato’s policy of equality and reciprocity, but there are indications that some sort of new departure is contemplated. On June 4 Mr. Hirota stated in a press interview, according to The Japan Times of June 5, that the diplomatic situation between Japan and China had now reached such a state that it would not permit of mere theoretical discussion but called for approaching concrete questions along practical lines. Mr. Hirota’s reference to “concrete questions” and “practical lines” may have been intended as a veiled criticism of Mr. Sato’s relatively vague policy. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of June 22 reported that Mr. Hirota in his new orders to Ambassador Kawagoe would lay special stress on the “positive and self-initialing” nature of his China policy in view of the fact that the Sato diplomacy had given the impression among the Chinese that Tokyo was adopting a defeatist policy in China. It was reported by the Yomiuri of June 18 that Mr. Hirota would endeavor to resolve the differences between the various elements in Japan and to enlist the united support of the nation for his policy before proceeding to put it into execution. This report, if true, would indicate that some time will be required for the formulation of a definite China policy. Taking into account Mr. Hirota’s emphasis on the necessity of solving concrete problems one by one, it would seem only natural that the first questions to be dealt with will be those most easily susceptible of solution, such as the desire of the Japanese to establish an air service between Peiping and Tokyo legally recognized by the Nanking Government, and not only by the East Hopei-Chahar Political Council, and the ownership of land in North China by Japanese subjects. A member of the Chinese Embassy Staff in Tokyo admits that these two relatively minor questions should not be difficult of solution. Next would logically follow a discussion of Japan’s desire for economic concessions in North China, namely, for coal and iron mining, cotton development, and railway construction. The Chinese appear to be less amenable in these matters, having recently refused the Japanese permission to construct a railway between Tientsin and Shihchiachwang. Besides, the Nanking Government has maintained for several months that it will not consider the matter of economic concessions to Japan until political difficulties have been disposed of. Whether China will cling to this point of view in the face of possible Japanese pressure remains to be seen. Thirdly, there are the following highly contentious issues which, if they should become the subject of negotiations, would offer immense difficulties: China’s desire for a reestablishment of sovereignty over the whole of North China, including the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar régimes, and China’s insistence that Japan put a stop to smuggling by Japanese merchants in North China. Up to the present time the Japanese have given no indication whatsoever that they would be willing to relinquish their indirect but nevertheless effective control over the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar regions. At the same time, Japan has consistently affirmed that the cause beneath the smuggling in North China has been the high Chinese import tariffs and that these tariffs must be lowered before Japan can undertake to cooperate with China in the suppression of the “special trade” or smuggling. These appear to the Embassy to be the two most difficult problems that will have to be ultimately faced in any negotiations that may ensue. Believing that China will not resort to arms to reestablish sovereignty over North China, Japan feels itself in a strong position. On the other hand, China appears to be in the fortunate position of being able to refuse the granting of economic concessions which Japan urgently needs but for the attainment of which Japan is apparently not desirous of using armed force. These two factors must be included in a careful estimate of the question whether any future recession will be made by China to Japan. There is enclosed a memorandum of a conversation 34 between Dr. Mar, Second Secretary of the Chinese Embassy, and Mr. Andrews, Second Secretary of this Embassy. Dr. Mar’s assertions concerning China’s determination and ability to resist Japan in armed conflict should be taken with some reserve. It will be noted that his attitude is one of truculence and undue optimism, thus reflecting the enhanced sense of security that has been developed in a section of Chinese officialdom as a consequence of the developments of the past year. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew * Embassy’s despatch No. 2209, January 1, 1937. [Footnote in the original.] † Embassy’s despatch No. 2266, February 16, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] ‡ Embassy’s despatch No. 2317, March 18, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] § Embassy’s despatch No. 2345, April 2, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] ║ Embassy’s telegram No. 151, June 7, 1937. [Footnote in the original.] 34 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.00/14148 [Document 99] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 35 No. 867 Shanghai , June 25, 1937. Sir : I have the honor to report, as of possible interest to the Embassy, that Mr. Hallett Abend, representative of the New York Times , interviewed General Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling on June 17th. He was told that he might cable home the substance of the interview without disclosing, however, the identity of the person interviewed. Accordingly, he cabled a story a few days later, a copy of which is enclosed 34 for the information of the Embassy. Attention is drawn particularly to that section which refers to the fact that China will not be cajoled or forced into discussing with Japan any problems which even remotely or indirectly concede the existence of “Manchukuo.” This, according to Mr. Abend, is based directly on statements made to him by the Generalissimo who also informed him that China would not consider even the tacit recognition of “Manchukuo” although Japan might express a willingness to make sweeping concessions in return for such recognition, including the abolition of the East Hopei régime, the withdrawal of support from the Mongols and “irregulars” in North Charhar, the suppression of smuggling into China, the abandonment of railway projects in North China and even the surrender of extraterritorial rights. The Generalissimo is said to have explained that any such quid pro quo would be rejected not only because nonrecognition of “Manchukuo” is one of the fundamental policies of the Nanking Government but also because Chinese Government leaders are convinced that national consciousness has now developed to such a point that no government could continue to exist which even contemplated such a compromise. Mr. Abend informs me that he found the Generalissimo cheerful but in none too good health; that he continues to wear braces and is in constant pain; that doctors both foreign and Chinese who have examined him state there is nothing that can be done for him except a major and very risky operation and that pains and pressure on his nervous system will probably increase. Mr. Abend says, however, that the Generalissimo’s mind is active and clear and concerned with a thousand different problems. Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss 35 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Shanghai in his covering despatch No. 854, June 25; received July 27. 34 Not printed. Memorandum by the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) of a Conversation With the British Secretary of the Consular Body at Shanghai (Long) 793.94/8995 [Document 100] Memorandum by the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) of a Conversation With the British Secretary of the Consular Body at Shanghai ( Long ) 37 [ Shanghai ,] June 29, 1937. Mr. Long 38 told me yesterday that after the meeting of the Joint Commission he had heard that when the Chinese and Japanese delegates had withdrawn temporarily to permit the representatives of the participating friendly Powers to discuss the situation, Mr. O. K. Yui, the Chinese Delegate, had told Mr. Okamoto, the Japanese delegate, that while he could say nothing officially, privately he could assure him that the report of the fortifying of Woosung was without truth. Mr. Long told me that he approached the Japanese Consul General and delegate on the Joint Commission (Mr. Okamoto) who confirmed that Mr. Yui had made this private statement. Mr. Long then asked whether the statement satisfied the Japanese. Mr. Okamoto replied that his Navy authorities were still not satisfied and would like an inspection of the area; but he did not know whether any further action would be taken. Mr. Okamoto expressed himself to Long as pleased with the result of the meeting of the Joint Commission since it had brought out and made of record the facts (1) that the Chinese considered the Agreement of 1932 to be still in effect, and (2) that the Chinese recognized that the movement of Chinese troops into the prohibited area would constitute a violation of the agreement. C. E. G[ auss ] 37 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Shanghai in his covering despatch No. 859, June 30; received July 27. 38 E. A. Long was also secretary of the Joint (Sino-Japanese) Commission established under the Shanghai Truce Agreement of 1932. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8675: Telegram [Document 101] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , June 30, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:25 a.m.] 250. 1. Kawagoe arrived yesterday afternoon at Shanghai where reportedly he will remain for several days. 2. An officer of the Embassy has been informed by a responsible official of the Foreign Office that (1) recent conversations between the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires and the Foreign Office, reported in the press, did not concern fundamental Sino-Japanese issues; (2) it was not anticipated that formal negotiations with the returning Japanese Ambassador would be opened for at least 2 months because ( a ) the Foreign Minister had hinted to Kawagoe through the Japanese Embassy that if the latter wished to see him he must come to Nanking before July 2, the day on which Wang plans to depart for Kuling, ( b ) the present atmosphere was not suitable for the reopening of negotiations and had been considerably darkened by Kawagoe’s statements to the press in Tokyo June 25 that China must be brought to full recognition of Japan’s right to expansion and of the inevitable relations between Manchukuo and North China, that the Tangku Truce and Ho–Umetsu Agreement could not be abrogated, and that Japanese would continue to deal with regional authorities in the north. In regard to economic developments there the informant did not think that the renting of a house at Kuling for the Japanese Ambassador (as reported in our 228, June 2, noon 39 ) would hasten the opening of negotiations. 3. He intimated that if Japanese policy was along the lines indicated by Kawagoe in the press reports above-mentioned there seemed no possibility of a break in the deadlock and he looked with pessimism to the future. 4. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping, Tokyo. Peck 39 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/8982 [Document 102] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) 40 Peiping , June 30, 1937. Subject: Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai. Sir : I have your despatch No. 864 of June 24, 1937, 39 in reference to the above subject, with which you enclose a transcript of shorthand record of proceedings at meeting of Joint Commission held on June 23, 1937. 44 I approve of the action taken by you at this meeting. There were no official minutes of the meetings held by the representatives of China and Japan and the neutral Ministers and the Military Attachés before the agreement of May 5, 1932, was signed; but I did on my own account keep notes from day to day, and have here in the Embassy a copy of the record which I made. I may say for your confidential information that Article II of that agreement was the subject of a great deal of discussion, and that the Chinese refused point-blank to accept the text as it now stands without it being understood that it was not intended to restrict the right of the Chinese to move troops in Chinese territory as they wished. I quote the following from my longhand record of the proceedings on the morning of Thursday, March 31, 1932; we spent that morning on Article II, and after some discussion the following colloquy occurred: Mr. Quo Tai-chi: “I want to make an official declaration along the lines of my original text quoted in Draft B.” Mr. Shigemitsu: “How will it then stand?” Sir Miles Lampson: “It will stand as drafted: paragraph I with the suggested addition; the second paragraph will then become an official declaration to the Conference. Thus: ‘Article II. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by the agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this agreement. ‘Official declaration to Conference by Mr. Quo. It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction of the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory.’” Mr. Shigemitsu. “This is acceptable to Japan.” Thus you will see that Mr. Yui was technically correct in the statement which he makes at the top of page 4 of your transcript of the proceedings of January [ June ] 23, 1937. The effect of the proceedings in March and April of 1932 may have been to demilitarize the area between the International Settlement and Woosung; certainly the Japanese intend to insist that this is the effect; and I suppose there is no way in which their contention can be successfully combated as long as they appear to be prepared to back up their contention by force of arms. The Chinese will, I think, be well advised to refrain from attempting to militarize that area in the face of Japanese opposition. But it seems to me that it is no part of ours to compel the Chinese to yield to the Japanese contention. I gather from the statements made by Mr. Yui that, generally speaking, the Chinese have no intention of militarizing this area. Very truly yours, Nelson Trusler Johnson 40 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 1313, July 1; received July 26. 39 Not printed. 44 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/19: Telegram [Document 103] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 1, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 1—9:35 a.m.] 252. 1. At a farewell call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs prior to his departure for the summer capital July 2 Dr. Wang informed me confidentially in reply to questions that his discussions with the Soviet Ambassador for a trade treaty have resulted in deadlock on two points. He informed me of only one which relates to the amount of reciprocal purchases to be guaranteed. The Chinese Government definitely expects to achieve a degree of control of foreign trade which will enable it to guarantee such trade balances. In order to elicit a statement I said that information had come to hand indicating that a military agreement had been reached between the Chinese and Soviet Governments. Wang did not deny this but asked laughingly whether this information had come from Japan. 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs inquired what attitude the American Government had taken toward the proposal made by Lyons 45 for a Pacific non-aggression pact. 46 I replied that I had no definite information on this subject and he did not indicate any desire that I obtain it for [him?]. He said that long before Lyons made the proposal at the Imperial Conference in London the Soviet Ambassador had urged on him the concluding of such a pact. I inquired whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs personally felt that Japan could be induced to enter a non-aggression pact and he replied that he did not think so but he felt that it would be advantageous for the other powers in the Pacific area to conclude a non-aggression pact between themselves and leave it open to Japan to join whenever so inclined. 3. Wang said that the Chinese Government was anxious to bring about the termination of the East Hopei régime as soon as possible and to adjust other outstanding questions with Japan but was determined to adhere to its policy of avoiding any precipitation of actual conflict while equally avoiding any surrender of rights. He did not think that the Japanese Government would make any further aggressive move for the time being. During this lull the Chinese Government will strain every effort to strengthen its powers of self-defense in anticipation of a resort to force in defense of its rights. It is especially anxious to defer hostilities until after the National Congress on November 12 (I inferred that the Government desires through the delegates to the Congress either to test or to solidify public opinion on the matter of armed resistance). In the meantime the Government will keep alive popular realization that China is faced with a crisis and is straining every nerve in preparing. 4. Wang expressed satisfaction with the nationwide progress of unification and strengthening of authority. Prospects are good that the military forces in Szechuan will soon be completely nationalized and a portion of the Communist forces in Northern Shensi have already accepted the Government’s terms. Wang confirmed the supposition that the Government is favorably disposed toward keeping the Communist forces intact as a useful weapon in an emergency. (American businessmen confidentially informed the Embassy yesterday that they had sold some trucks to these Communist forces and believed that the money must have come from the Central Government.) Peck 45 Joseph A. Lyons, Australian Prime Minister, who spoke on May 14. 46 See pp. 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 1097 ] ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 741.94/111: Telegram [Document 104] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) 47 Washington , July 1, 1937—5 p.m. 102. Department’s No. 94, June 24, 5 p.m. Under date June 30 the Embassy at London telegraphs as follows: “Cadogan informed me that Yoshida had as yet made no request for appointment to present any memorandum in spite of press reports from Tokyo. Cadogan said he felt Japanese position has stiffened since Hirota had taken office and if there were any truth in rumors coming from Tokyo that in negotiations with His Majesty’s Government Japan would be disposed to merely redefine her position as to ‘special régimes’ in North China and ‘special trade’ in that area, he was not hopeful of the outcome.” Hull 47 Repeated as No. 104 to the Embassy in China. Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/8982 [Document 105] Memorandum by the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 48 Peiping , July 1, 1937. Conversation: Mr. A. D. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor of the British Embassy, and Mr. Johnson Present: Mr. Lockhart Mr. Blackburn came, at the request of his Ambassador who has left for Peitaiho, to inquire as to our attitude in regard to the question of the Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai, and the meeting on June 23rd to consider the complaint of the Japanese regarding the rumored rebuilding of the forts at Woosung by the Chinese. Mr. Blackburn stated that when this matter came before their Embassy in 1935 last their opinion was that the Commission served a useful purpose as a means of permitting Chinese and Japanese to discuss in the presence of mutual witnesses any differences of opinion which they might have regarding their problems in the area between the International Settlement and Woosung. He said that they now saw in the present meeting and the way the Commission handled the matter no reason for reconsidering the stand which they then took. In other words, the British Embassy favored the continuance of the Commission, it being understood that the Commission would take no action in these matters other than that of neutral observers, and offer the Chinese and Japanese an opportunity to discuss their differences of opinion. He stated that it was the British Embassy’s feeling that the Commission had acted properly in the present instance. I told Mr. Blackburn that it was our opinion that the Commission served a useful purpose, and that as long as they kept free of the disputes and merely acted as neutral observers I saw no reason why they should not continue. I read to Mr. Blackburn the text of the letter which I am sending to the Consul General at Shanghai approving of his action at the time, and quoting from longhand minutes which I kept of the negotiations in March and April, 1932, in which I recorded the declaration of the Chinese to the effect that nothing in the agreement should be interpreted as implying any permanent restriction of the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory, a declaration which was accepted by the Japanese. Mr. Blackburn stated that the Japanese position apparently was that the Commission should continue to function until the “later arrangements” mentioned in Article II of the agreement of May 5, 1932, had been effected through the means of a round-table conference,—a conference which they had suggested at the time of the negotiations and which they apparently still hoped could be held. It was his opinion that at such a conference the Japanese would insist upon the demilitarization of Shanghai. I agreed with Mr. Blackburn and stated that at the time of the negotiations we were not interested in a round-table conference, nor were we now interested in one. Nelson Trusler Johnson 48 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 1313, July 1; received July 26. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8679: Telegram [Document 106] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 2, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 2—10 a.m.] 200. Embassy’s 164, June 16 [ 10 ], 5 p.m. 1. The deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations in regard to Hopei Province continues much as it was described in the above-mentioned telegram. Sung Che Yuan remains in western Shantung, with the date of his return to Peiping still undetermined so far as known. The National Government continues, with some success, to increase its influence in this area, with the Japanese allegedly being especially displeased at the preparations for selection of delegates to the People’s National Assembly. The Japanese apparently prefer [situation?] to continue for the time being rather than risk steps for its improvement which might have disadvantageous results. 2. According to an officer of the local Japanese Embassy, the Japanese Ambassador will arrive in Peiping in the near future not for the purpose of conferring with Sung but for personal reasons. 3. Rumors have been current in Peiping during the past week of possible disorders being created by disgruntled Chinese or Japanese Nationals, and it is stated by local officials that special precautions have been taken for dealing with such an eventuality. Insofar as can be discovered, the rumors seem to be primarily due to the uneasiness which has developed among local Chinese as a result of Sung’s lengthening absence. 4. It seems likely that any fresh developments of importance await Sung’s return and his action with regard to the various problems as requested by him. By mail to Tokyo. Johnson Chapter II: July 8–25, 1937 Chapter II: July 8–25, 1937 Outbreak of hostilities between Japanese and Chinese forces at Marco Polo bridge near Peiping July 7–8; American warning to Japan and China against spread of hostilities; Japanese insistence on local arrangements to end hostilities; China’s expressed willingness to resolve differences with Japan by peaceful methods; Japan’s warning to China against dispatch of troops to North China, July 17; Chinese protest against Japanese air attack on troop train, July 18; Generalissimo Chiang’s minimum conditions for peace between China and Japan, July 20; renewal of American plea on behalf of peace, July 21; China’s consent to local truce at Marco Polo bridge, July 25 [Additional correspondence regarding Japan’s undeclared war in China beginning with the fighting at Marco Polo Bridge the night of July 7, 1937, is printed in Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, volume I, pages 313 ff. Numerous telegrams reporting details of military movements and clashes between the Chinese and Japanese forces were received by the Department of State. For the most part, these are not printed. A summary of the evidence regarding the outbreak of hostilities is given in the First Report Adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on October 6, 1937, reprinted ibid. , page 384 .] [107] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 9, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 9—9:10 a.m.] 793.94/8687: Telegram [108] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 9, 1937—noon. [Received July 9—7:23 a.m.] 793.94/8691: Telegram [109] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 10, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 10—8 a.m.] 793.94/8697: Telegram [110] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, July 10, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 11: 50 a.m.] 793.94/8696: Telegram [111] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 10, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 4:25 p.m.] 793.94/8702: Telegram [112] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] July 10, 1937. 893.0146/549 [113] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 10, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 6:06 p.m.] 793.94/8700: Telegram [114] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 11, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 11—11:20 a.m.] 793.94/8698: Telegram [115] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 11, 1937—[10 p.m.] [Received July 11—11:20 a.m.] 793.94/8703: Telegram [116] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 12, 1937—1 a.m. [Received July 11—6 p.m.] 793.94/8706: Telegram [117] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—9 a.m. [Received July 12—6:43 a.m.] 793.94/8710: Telegram [118] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:20 a.m.] 793.94/8715: Telegram [119] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 12, 1937—noon. [Received July 12—3:43 a.m.] 793.94/8704: Telegram [120] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, July 12, 1937—noon. [Received July 12—9:50 a.m.] 793.94/8714: Telegram [121] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 12, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 12—8:15 a.m.] 793.94/8711: Telegram [122] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 12—10:30 a.m.] 793.94/8716: Telegram [123] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 12, 1937—4. p.m. [Received July 12—9:35 a.m.] 793.94/8707: Telegram [124] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy (Ing) [Washington,] July 12, 1937. 793.94/8738 [125] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] July 12, 1937. 793.94/8736 [126] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 12, 1937. 793.94/8737 [127] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 12—1:43 p.m.] 793.94/8719: Telegram [128] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 12, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 12—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/8712: Telegram [129] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 12—4:14 p.m.] 793.94/8726: Telegram [130] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 12—3:15 p.m.] 793.94/8727: Telegram [131] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 12, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/8749: Telegram [132] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 12—1:25 p.m.] 793.94/8718: Telegram [133] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 12, 1937—midnight. [Received July 12—3:40 p.m.] 793.94/8728: Telegram [134] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 13, 1937—9 a.m. [Received July 13—5:02 a.m.] 793.94/8730: Telegram [135] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 13, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 13—11:35 a.m.] 793.94/8744: Telegram [136] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the French Embassy (Gaucheron) [Washington,] July 13, 1937. 793.94/8780 [137] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 6:15 p.m.] 793.94/8748: Telegram [138] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 13, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 13—11:58 a.m.] 793.94/8740: Telegram [139] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 13, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 13—2:30 p.m.] 793.94/8750: Telegram [140] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 13, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 13—2:20 p.m.] 793.94/8746: Telegram [141] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, July 13, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/8744: Telegram [142] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 13, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 13—2:40 p.m.] 793.94/8747: Telegram [143] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 13, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 13—1:45 p.m.] 793.94/8742: Telegram [144] Professor John Lossing Buck to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) Shanghai, July 13, 1937 793.94/8954 [145] The British Embassy to the Department of State undated 793.94/8777 [146] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 13, 1937. 793.94/8777 [147] The Department of State to the British Embassy undated 793.94/8785 [148] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 14, 1937. 793.94/8786 [149] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 14, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 14—9:10 a.m.] 793.94/8757: Telegram [150] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the French Embassy (Gaucheron) [Washington,] July 14, 1937. 793.94/8784 [151] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Broadmead) [Washington,] July 14, 1937. 793.94/8872 [152] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 14—1:05 p.m.] 793.94/8766: Telegram [153] The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State Canton, [July 14, 1937—5 p.m.] [Received July 14—8:38 p.m.] 793.94/8767: Telegram [154] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 14, 1937. 793.94/8951 [155] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 14, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 15—1:40 a.m.] 793.94/8773: Telegram [156] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 15, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 2:02 p.m.] 793.94/8782: Telegram [157] Memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [Washington,] July 15, 1937. 793.94/9010 [158] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 15, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 15—6:40 a.m.] 793.94/8771: Telegram [159] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 15, 1937. 793.94/9010 [160] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 15, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 10:05 p.m.] 852.00/6003: Telegram [161] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, July 15, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/8748: Telegram [162] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 15, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 15—5:37 p.m.] 793.94/8788: Telegram [163] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 15, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 15—12:15 p.m.] 793.94/8774: Telegram [164] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 15, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 15—10:15 a.m.] 793.94/8770: Telegram [165] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 15, 1937—11 p.m. [Received July 15—2:35 p.m.] 793.94/8781: Telegram [166] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 16, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 16—10:50 a.m.] 793.94/8791: Telegram [167] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 16, 1937—noon. [Received July 16—12:58 a.m.] 793.94/8783: Telegram [168] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 16, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 16—10:20 a.m.] 793.94/8790: Telegram [169] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 16, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 16—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/8787: Telegram [170] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 16, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 16—1:20 p.m.] 793.94/8800: Telegram [171] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 16, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 16—11:45 a.m.] 793.94/8794: Telegram [172] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 16—11:05 a.m.] 793.94/8789: Telegram [173] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 16—12:45 p.m.] 793.94/8793: Telegram [174] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 16—1:10 p.m.] 793.94/8797: Telegram [175] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 16—11:30 a.m.] 793.94/8792: Telegram [176] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 16—1 p.m.] 793.94/8798: Telegram [177] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 16, 1937. 793.94/8874 [178] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State [ Washington ,] July 15, 1937. 793.94/8874 [179] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 17, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 11:15 a.m.] 793.94/8811: Telegram [180] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 17, 1937—noon. [Received July 17—4:23 a.m.] 793.94/8809: Telegram [181] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 17, 1937—noon. [Received July 17—9:50 a.m.] 793.94/8812: Telegram [182] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 17, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 17—10:30 a.m.] 793.94/8813: Telegram [183] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 17, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 17—6:23 a.m.] 793.94/8801: Telegram [184] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, July 17, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 17—2 p.m.] 793.94/8822: Telegram [185] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 17—7:54 a.m.] 793.94/8802: Telegram [186] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 8:50 p.m.] 793.94/8814: Telegram [187] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 17, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 17—11:55 a.m.] 793.94/8815: Telegram [188] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 17, 1937. 793.94/9065 [189] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 18, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 18—5:50 a.m.] 793.94/8823: Telegram [190] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 18, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 18—6:25 a.m.] 793.94/8821: Telegram [191] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 18, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 18—10:20 a.m.] 793.94/8827: Telegram [192] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 18—9:38 a.m.] 793.94/8824: Telegram [193] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 18—9:54 a.m.] 793.94/8816: Telegram [194] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 18, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 18—11:22 a.m.] 793.94/8817: Telegram [195] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 18, 1937—midnight. [Received July 18—9:13 p.m.] 793.94/8828: Telegram [196] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 19, 1937. 793.94/9067 [197] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the French Chargé (Henry) [Washington,] July 19, 1937. 793.94/9066 [198] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 19, 1937—noon. [Received July 19—6:30 a.m.] 793.94/8829: Telegram [199] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 19, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 19—10:25 a.m.] 793.94/8844: Telegram [200] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 19—11:14 a.m.] 793.94/8842: Telegram [201] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 19, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 19—10:55 a.m.] 793.94/8843: Telegram [202] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 19, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 19—8:55 a.m.] 793.94/8839: Telegram [203] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 19, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 19—11 a.m.] 793.94/8837: Telegram [204] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 19, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 19—10:20 a.m.] 793.94/8836: Telegram [205] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 19, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 19—5:35 p.m.] 793.94/8847: Telegram [206] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, July 19, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/8958: Telegram [207] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 19, 1937. 793.94/8958 [208] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 19, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 19—6 p.m.] 793.94/8848: Telegram [209] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 20, 1937—2 a.m. [Received 6:40 a.m.] 793.94/8865: Telegram [210] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 20, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 12:05 p.m.] 793.94/8867: Telegram [211] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 20—7:35 a.m.] 793.94/8860: Telegram [212] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 21—6:40 a.m.] 793.94/8882: Telegram [213] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 20, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 20—5:50 a.m.] 793.94/8861: Telegram [214] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 20, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 20—5:50 a.m.] 793.94/8862: Telegram [215] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 20, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 20—2:35 p.m.] 793.94/8876: Telegram [216] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 20, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 20—9:50 a.m.] 793.94/8863: Telegram [217] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, July 20, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94/8824: Telegram [218] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) Washington, July 20, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94/8883: Telegram [219] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 20—8:40 a.m.] 793.94/8853: Telegram [220] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 20—3:25 p.m.] 793.94/8875: Telegram [221] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, July 20, 1947—6 p.m. 793.94/8827: Telegram [222] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 20, 1937—midnight. [Received July 20—2:10 p.m.] 793.94/8869: Telegram [223] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 20, 1937. 793.94/8920 [224] The Department of State to the British Embassy undated 793.94/9068 [225] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 21, 1937. 793.94/9068 [226] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, July 21, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 21—7:23 a.m.] 793.94/8880: Telegram [227] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 21, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 21—4:36 a.m.] 793.94/8899: Telegram [228] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 21, 1937—noon. [Received July 21—7:15 a.m.] 793.94/8877: Telegram [229] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 21, 1937—noon. [Received July 21—10:10 a.m.] 793.94/8900: Telegram [230] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 21, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 21—9:40 a.m.] 793.94/8902: Telegram [231] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 21, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 21—9:55 a.m.] 793.94/8888: Telegram [232] The French Embassy to the Department of State Washington, July 21, 1937. 793.94/8945 [233] The Department of State to the French Embassy Washington, July 21, 1937. 793.94/8945 [234] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 21, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 21—10:30 a.m.] 793.94/8889: Telegram [235] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 21, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 21—11:15 a.m.] 793.94/8897: Telegram [236] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , July 21, 1937. 793.94/8920 [237] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, July 21, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/8912a: Telegram [238] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) at Nanking Washington, July 21, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/8800: Telegram [239] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) at Nanking Washington, July 21, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/8897a: Telegram [240] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, July 21, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 21—11:35 a.m.] 793.94/8894: Telegram [241] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 21, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 21—3 p.m.] 793.94/8908: Telegram [242] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 21, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 21—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/8896: Telegram [243] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 21, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 21—11:30 a.m.] 793.94/8898: Telegram [244] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 22—5:46 a.m.] 793.94/8919: Telegram [245] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 22, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 22—5 a.m.] 811.3394/265: Telegram [246] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 22, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 793.94/8927: Telegram [247] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 22—9 a.m.] 793.94/8913: Telegram [248] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, July 22, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 22—10:55 a.m.] 793.94/8921: Telegram [249] The Military Attaché in Japan (Crane) to the Adjutcmt General, War Department (Conley) Tokyo, July 22, 1937. 793.94/8910 [250] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 23, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 23—12:24 a.m.] 793.94/8933: Telegram [251] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 23, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 23—9:40 a.m.] 793.94/8934: Telegram [252] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 23, 1937—noon. [Received July 23—11:25 a.m.] 793.94/8939: Telegram [253] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 23, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 6:23 p.m.] 793.94/8936: Telegram [254] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, July 23, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 23—9:50 a.m.] 793.94/8935: Telegram [255] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 23—3:16 p.m.] 793.94/8943: Telegram [256] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 23, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 23—9:30 a.m.] 793.94/8938: Telegram [257] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 23, 1937. [Received August 9.] 793.94/9259 [258] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, July 24, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 24—10 a.m.] 793.94/8956: Telegram [259] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 24, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 24—11:25 a.m.] 793.94/8960: Telegram [260] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 24—11:35 a.m.] 793.94/8965: Telegram [261] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, July 24, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 24—11:41 a.m.] 793.94/8962: Telegram [262] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 24, 1937. [Received August 9.] 793.94/9260 [263] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 25, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 25—6:10 a.m.] 793.94/8966: Telegram [264] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 25, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 25—7:35 p.m.] 793.94/8980: Telegram [265] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) Nanking, July 25, 1937. 793.94/9612 [266] Memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [Washington,] July 26, 1937. 793.94/9012 The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8687: Telegram [Document 107] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 9, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 9—9:10 a.m.] 256. Peiping’s 206, July 8, 11 a.m., 49 and 207, July 8, 3 p.m. 50 1. An officer of the Embassy has just been informed by a responsible official of the Foreign Office that another clash occurred last night and that the Foreign Minister, who left July 2 for the Kuling summer capital, is returning here this afternoon by plane. 2. The Foreign Office official stated that (1) the Foreign Office last evening lodged with the Japanese Embassy here an oral protest against “attack by Japanese troops upon Chinese troops” and requested immediate cessation of hostilities, and (2) the Japanese Embassy replied that it would telegraph the request to the Japanese military authorities in North China. 3. The informant stated that the incident was clearly premeditated by the Japanese and has the following background: (1) It has been known for some time that Konoye 51 has been planning to make extensive changes among commissioned personnel of Japanese forces in North China with a view to eliminating junior leaguers; (2) the “increasing influence” of the National Government in North China, as evidenced by preparations there for selection of delegates for forthcoming National People’s Assembly and Government opposition to the Tientsin–Tokyo air line, has greatly displeased Japanese military in North China; (3) the Japanese military have for some time made known their desires that Chinese troops withdraw from Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) and Wanping to sector west of the Yungting River, Lukouchiao being important to the Japanese as a military station because it is junction of three rail lines; (4) Japanese military have been displeased at Sung Che Yuan’s 52 lengthy absence from his post which has been presumably in part due to his desire to avoid discussion with them concerning Japanese economic and other aims. 4. He says that Wanping was still being besieged; the Japanese had demanded permission to enter that town and search for an allegedly missing Japanese soldier whose absence had been discovered during the night maneuvers of July 7 following the sound of rifle shots in the distance. The Chinese troops, who had not emerged from Wanping during July 7, refused the Japanese permission to enter, and latter surrounded the town although the missing soldier had subsequently been found. 5. Among the speculated [ speculative? ] reports from unofficial Chinese sources is one that the Japanese, displeased at Sung’s continuous absence, are taking this means toward eliminating him as Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Council and causing the transfer of Sung’s unfriendly 29th Army. 6. Kawagoe 54 sailed yesterday from Shanghai for Tsingtau and North China. 7. Sent to Peiping and Tokyo, by courier to Shanghai. Peck 49 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 313 . 50 Ibid. , p. 314 . 51 Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Japanese Prime Minister. 52 Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. 54 Japanese Ambassador in China. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8691: Telegram [Document 108] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 9, 1937—noon. [Received July 9—7:23 a.m.] 257. Embassy’s July 9, 11 a.m. 1. Japanese Embassy spokesman here has told foreign newspaper correspondents here that (1) a truce was arranged at 5 o’clock this morning providing, as a preliminary measure, for the withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese forces; (2) withdrawal by both sides began but later Chinese reopened fire upon the retiring Japanese troops; (3) fighting ceased again at 7 a.m.; (4) the Japanese Embassy is still optimistic that some machinery for a settlement can be set up in the course of today. 2. The Foreign Office official cited in our telegram under reference just telephoned that the Japanese have not occupied Lukouchiao which he states is still occupied by Chinese troops, and that upon the appearance of Chinese reenforcements in the vicinity this morning the Japanese troops withdrew several kilometres. 3. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, by courier to Shanghai. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8697: Telegram [Document 109] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 10, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 10—8 a.m.] 258. Our 257, July 9, noon. 1. A responsible official of the Foreign Office states that the following is the official version of a call by the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy here yesterday afternoon upon the Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs as published last evening by the semiofficial Central News Agency. “Nanking, July 9: Calling at the Foreign Office this afternoon, Mr. S. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, declared that Japan wished to reserve to herself the right of making whatever legitimate demands she may think fit in connection with the clash between Chinese and Japanese troops at Marco Polo Bridge early yesterday morning. However, this reservation was rejected by Minister Chen Chieh, Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who pointed out to the Japanese diplomat that the Chinese side was not responsible for the incident. The Japanese reservation was a retort to the verbal Chinese protest over the incident conveyed by an official from the Waichiaopu 55 to Mr. Hidaka yesterday afternoon. In that protest China reserved to herself the right of making legitimate demands relating to the conflict afterward”. 2. Wang Chung Hui returned from Kuling yesterday afternoon by plane following a conference there with Chiang Kai-shek concerning the incident. Political Vice Minister Hsu Mo is remaining in Kuling for the time being. According to press reports, the Japanese Ambassador yesterday while at Tsingtau received instructions from Tokyo to proceed to Nanking. 3. The informant states that Hidaka will see Wang today. 4. Sent to the Department and Peiping. By mail to Shanghai, Tokyo. Peck 55 Chinese Foreign Office. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8696: Telegram [Document 110] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , July 10, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 11: 50 a.m.] Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe arrived in Tsingtao yesterday. Local Japanese newspaper states that Ambassador stated that “With reference to North China clash it is highly desirable that this unfortunate affair should be settled on the spot in an amicable manner as soon as convenient; it is unfortunate that such a clash should occur in North China, a region where attempts are being made to attain Sino-Japanese cooperation”. As to a readjustment of Sino-Japanese political relations the Ambassador is quoted as having stated “No atmosphere for a thoroughgoing readjustment exists. The creation of an atmosphere in which a genuinely thorough readjustment is capable of achievement is a preliminary to negotiations for readjustment”. Sokobin The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8702: Telegram [Document 111] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 10, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 4:25 p.m.] 259. Our 258, July 10, 10 a.m. 1. Hidaka last night told an American news correspondent that the Central News Agency account of his yesterday afternoon’s interview with Chen Chieh was not strictly accurate. He said that, (1) the Foreign Office had not actually lodged a protest with the Embassy July 8 but merely requested that steps be taken to cause cessation of hostilities; (2) yesterday he himself made no protest and told Chen that he did not wish to and would not do so unless the Chinese protested; (3) if the War Office protests were not filed the incident could be localized and not become an issue between the two Governments; and, (4) it was the desire of the Japanese Government that it be settled amicably by officials in the North as a local matter. 2. To the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai. Peck Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 893.0146/549 [Document 112] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] July 10, 1937. Conversation: Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance; Dr. C. T. Wang, Chinese Ambassador; Mr. Hornbeck; Mr. Hamilton. Present: Mr. P. W. Kuo and Dr. Clarence K. Young. 56 During the course of and following a luncheon given by the Chinese Ambassador at his residence at Twin Oaks, the Chinese Minister of Finance, Dr. H. H. Kung, referred to the fighting which had occurred at Wanpinghsien and asked what information the Department had received in regard thereto. In reply Mr. Hornbeck gave a brief outline of the information which we had received. Dr. Kung then said that the fighting was due to aggression on the part of the Japanese and that Japanese troops had no right to be in the place where the fighting occurred, even under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901. 57 Dr. Kung then proceeded to say that in 1901 the Chinese Government had agreed to the terms of the Boxer Protocol which provided that foreign governments might maintain at Peiping and at certain other points foreign armed forces for the purpose of protecting their legations at Peiping and to maintain open communication between Peiping and the sea; that the foreign governments had now moved their diplomatic establishments from Peiping to Nanking; and that therefore there was no longer warrant for the maintenance by foreign governments of their foreign armed forces at Peiping. The Chinese Ambassador intimated that in his opinion the Chinese Government should endeavor to cause foreign governments to withdraw their armed forces which were stationed in North China by virtue of the provisions of the Boxer Protocol. Mr. Hornbeck said that if the Chinese Government wished to raise the question with the American Government, the Chinese Government could probably cause the American Government to withdraw its armed forces from Peiping. He said that the Chinese Government might perhaps also cause the British Government and possibly one or two other governments to do likewise. He then asked the question: would Dr. Kung wish to have the American armed forces withdrawn. Dr. Kung immediately and emphatically replied that he did not, unless such withdrawal would be concurrent with withdrawal by all the other governments of their armed forces. He stated that the President had asked him that question and that he had made to the President the same reply. The Chinese Ambassador said that he believed that where there was a question of principle involved the Chinese Government should press for the carrying out of that principle; and he intimated, although he did not expressly so state, that, even should Japan not be willing to withdraw its armed forces, a useful purpose might be served if all the other governments were to withdraw their armed forces. Mr. Hornbeck then raised the question: what would be the situation should all governments, including the Japanese, withdraw their armed forces from Peiping (and Tientsin). Dr. Kung and Dr. Wang made no express reply to this question but Dr. Kung reiterated that he was of the opinion that withdrawal by the American Government of its armed forces should be contingent upon concurrent action by all the other interested governments. In reply to a further express question, both Dr. Kung and Dr. Wang said that the Chinese were not bothered by the presence of American armed forces in North China. Mr. Hornbeck then commented at considerable length to the effect that during the last few years the Chinese Government had made substantial progress in many fields; that people who returned from China today were almost unanimous in giving glowing accounts of the constructive activities of the Chinese Government and people; that progress was being made toward unifying China, in finance, in road building, in railway construction, etc.; and that, in general, things in China seemed to be going along extraordinarily well. He said that of course, as Dr. Kung and Dr. Wang both realized, the task of reconstruction in China was not yet completed and there were still many difficulties to overcome. He said that in view of the situation wherein China was making measurable progress in so many lines and wherein things were getting along so well, would it not be advisable for China to continue along this course of concentrating its attention and energies upon reconstructive effort rather than for China to start arguments with foreign governments; was not it advisable that China pursue its program of reconstruction to such a point that when China chose to raise any question with foreign governments, China would have attained such progress and be in such a strong position that the foreign governments so approached would readily listen to the Chinese Government’s proposals. Dr. Kung said that he realized the force of Mr. Hornbeck’s remarks but that although China itself was preparing for what he felt was an inevitable war with Japan, Japan was also preparing militarily, and he felt that with the passage of each year Japan would become as compared with China comparatively stronger. Mr. Hamilton said that his view differed somewhat from this: that in his opinion what China was doing in the way of effort toward internal construction and building up the strength of the nation and the government was in general on the constructive side, whereas he felt that many of the lines along which the Japanese Government and the Japanese nation were expending their energies were not constructive but were placing additional strains—and weakening strains—upon the government and people of Japan. Mr. Hornbeck said that he concurred in this view. (Mr. Kuo indicated his concurrence.) Dr. Wang and Dr. Kung both suggested that because of Japan’s imperialistic and aggressive characteristics, it was important that the United States help China. They said that some day the United States would have to face Japanese aggression, unless that aggression should be checked by China. Mr. Hornbeck said that the United States had always been in favor of a strong, unified China. He pointed out, however, that the United States did not adopt certain policies or pursue certain courses toward China just for the sake of helping China. He said that our policies and our attitude were based upon our conception of the interests of the United States, just as China’s policies and China’s attitude and the policies and attitude of any other country were based upon national conceptions of national interests. He said that it was fortunate for us and for China that our policies and our attitude in regard to China coincided with China’s own desire to build up a stable and a strong nation. At several points during the conversation the Chinese Ambassador gave evidence of his continued belief in the adoption of the tactics of a revolutionary. He cited his own experience in connection with the 1911 revolution in China and stated that had a small group of revolutionaries not then taken the action they did, the Republic of China would not have been established, at least not at that time. Mr. Hamilton commented that it seemed to him there was a definite distinction between the adoption by an individual of a revolutionary attitude toward a question internal to his own country and the adoption by a government of revolutionary tactics which might lead to war; that a person engaging in revolutionary activity in his own country could, if the revolution proved unsuccessful, either flee or at most lose his life. On the other hand, if persons in responsible control of governmental affairs engaged in revolutionary tactics which brought on war, there could be no running away by a country from that war and the whole country would have to stand the consequences of the war. Mr. Hamilton said that to him it therefore seemed highly advisable that persons in responsible government positions proceed with greater circumspection than need be observed by persons not so placed. Mr. Hornbeck said that it seemed to him incumbent upon persons in authority to endeavor to take the long view and to estimate carefully every possible important contingency and consequence which might result from any contemplated course. Dr. Kung mentioned again that when he saw the President the President had asked him whether he would like to have American forces withdrawn from Peiping, and Dr. Kung stated again that he had informed the President that he was not in favor of the withdrawal of the American forces alone but that he was in favor only of a concurrent withdrawal of all foreign armed forces. Mr. Hornbeck complimented Dr. Kung upon his realistic approach to the questions under discussion affecting China. 56 Advisers of Dr. Kung. 57 Signed at Peking, September 7, 1901, Foreign Relations , 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8700: Telegram [Document 113] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 10, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 6:06 p.m.] 260. Our July 10, 10 [ 11 ] a.m. and third paragraph, 58 July 10, 11 [ 10 ] a.m. 1. Hidaka called on Wang before noon. We are informed by a reported to be reliable source [that] (1) Hidaka (under instructions from his Government) and Wang expressed to each other the hope that the incident would be brought speedily to an amicable settlement, and (2) Hidaka expressed on behalf of his Government the further hope that the Chinese Government would take whatever steps might be required to prevent any recrudescence of anti-Japanese feeling as a result of the incident. 2. To the Department, Peiping and Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai. Peck 58 Paragraph 3 refers to telegram No. 258, July 10 10 a.m., p. 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8698: Telegram [Document 114] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 11, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 11—11:20 a.m.] 218. Following from Mukden: “July 11, 4 p.m. I have just learned from Japanese military here that traffic between Mukden-Tientsin has been suspended, I assume in order to clear line for military use. Repeated to Tokyo.” Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8703: Telegram [Document 115] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 11, 1937—[10 p.m.] [Received July 11—11:20 a.m.] 219. Embassy’s 217, July 11, 3 p.m. 59 1. Reuter publishes late this afternoon despatch under Tientsin date line that “Japanese military headquarters at Tientsin state that the total Japanese casualties in the Wanping area since fighting began on Wednesday–Thursday 60 night are 18 killed and 40 wounded”. 2. The same release states that “four demands are being presented to the Chinese authorities by the Japanese in consequence of the incidents in the Wanping area. They are: (1) the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge; (2) punishment of those responsible for the incidents; (3) adequate control of anti-Japanese activities in North China; (4) enforcement of anti-Communist measures. 3. An official of the local Japanese Embassy stated to this Embassy that he believes an agreement is near. Johnson 59 Not printed. 60 July 7–8. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8706: Telegram [Document 116] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 12, 1937—1 a.m. [Received July 11—6 p.m.] 221. Embassy’s 219, July 11, 10 p.m. 1. An official of the Japanese Embassy states that an agreement was signed at 8 p.m., today [July 11] between responsible military officials providing that: (1) apology by high officers of the 29[th] Army; (2) punishment of the officers of that army responsible; and (3) guarantee of non-recurrence. The Peiping Mayor is reported to have announced for publication, between 8 and 8:30 p.m., that a peaceful settlement had been reached, it being agreed that: (1) the troops of both sides should withdraw to their original lines; (2) both sides should express regrets for the lives lost; (3) steps would be taken to prevent a recurrence of such incidents in future. According to the announcement, the major part of the Japanese forces had already been withdrawn. 2. The mayor’s announcement is reported to have been withdrawn about 11 p.m., “because of difficulties”. 3. Firing was audible in Peiping between 10 and 10:30 p.m. A Japanese official claimed that this firing was done by Chinese troops several miles to the north of Marco Polo Bridge, not in contact with Japanese troops, who allegedly are not involved in this new development. The agreement, he held, was still valid. A Chinese official source alleged that the Japanese had broken the reported agreement, which had required their withdrawal, and had renewed attack about 10:15 p.m. He stated that four trains of troops were headed for Fengtai from Mukden and that one of these, with 77 cases of ammunitions had already arrived. Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking and Shanghai. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8710: Telegram [Document 117] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—9 a.m. [Received July 12—6:43 a.m.] 262. Our 261 [ 260 ?], July 10, 2 p.m. I asked the Chinese Minister of War 61 July 11, 6 p.m., whether he thought recent events would develop into a war and he replied that this decision rested entirely with the Japanese; confronted with their “bandit methods” the Chinese could only resist. I inquired whether if war could not be avoided the Chinese Government would not prefer even at a sacrifice to postpone it for 1 or 2 years in order to complete preparations. He replied that it would be difficult ever to say that preparations were complete and that although China was very unwilling to fight, it would do so at once if Japan decided on war. He said that neither Wanpinghsien nor the Bridge would be surrendered. He expressed a firm belief that the Japanese planned in advance occupation of these points and suggested that perhaps the Kwantung army, and especially Itagaki, Chief of Staff, in precipitating the incidents beginning July 7, midnight, had acted without sanction of the Japanese Government. Questioned regarding Chinese military measures and strategy he was evasive but he did deny emphatically that in the event of war there would be preliminary withdrawal to a line near the Yellow River. He disbelieved theory that Japan felt emboldened to provoke hostilities with China at this moment because of supposed disloyalty of Soviet forces in Siberia and insisted that the Soviet Army is dependable in morale. The Minister of War returned by plane July 10 from Szechwan where he had been nationalizing the different armies. He said satisfactory results achieved. He complained of brain fatigue and I ascribed this to the exhausting heat and to prescribed complex and heavy responsibilities. Sent to Peiping, Tokyo. Peck 61 Gen. Ho Ying-chin. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8715: Telegram [Document 118] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:20 a.m.] 263. Our 262, July 12, 9 a.m. 1. We learn on reliable authority that Chiang Kai-shek, July 9, told a large gathering of officials at Killing that he was despatching six divisions of troops to North China; according to another source, he also stated that China would fight. This latter source states that several divisions will move up from Hankow on the Peiping–Hankow Railway and others on the Tientsin–Pukow Railways. The press reports troop movements north from Hankow. 2. Competent observers here consider the situation one moving toward war; they point out that if the National Government should hold to the former plan of surrendering North China rather than resist Japanese aggression there the National Government’s existence would be seriously jeopardized because (1) it is believed to have pledged resistance to Japan as part of the settlement of the Sian revolt and nonresistance would cause the alienation of the Communist forces in the northwest who are about to be incorporated into the Government’s armies; (2) the southwestern irreconcilables, Pai Chung Hsi and Li Tsung Jen who render little more than lip service to the Government would presumably demand Chinese military action or a new government; (3) the position of the Suiyuan, Shansi and Shantung authorities would be endangered by extensive Japanese control in Hopei and Chahar and they would also be expected to bring pressure upon the Government to make a stand. 3. The general impression here is that the Japanese actions constitute a challenge which the National Government must take up energetically if it is to survive as the Government of a unified China; whether or not resistance will be effective would seem to depend in part for the time being upon the 29th Army of Sung Che Yuan who has reportedly reached Tientsin from Loling. 4. To the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8704: Telegram [Document 119] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 12, 1937—noon. [Received July 12—3:43 a.m.] 189. The Embassy was informed this morning by an official of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office that prospects are favorable for local settlement of the tense situation which arose from the clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops at Lungwangmiao on the night of July 10 and in the early morning of July 11. While the Foreign Office has received no official confirmation that an agreement has been reached between the Chinese and Japanese authorities on the spot it has reason to believe that a satisfactory agreement for the withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops from the scene of action will be reached shortly as the Foreign Office received reports last night that the negotiations were progressing favorably and as no serious clashes have occurred since the early morning of July 11. The Foreign Office official described matters as follows: The situation resulting from the original Lukouchiao clash appeared to be clearly settled on the evening of July 9; hence the attacks by the Chinese at Lungwangmiao came as a complete surprise to the Japanese troops, who were in the act of withdrawing from the river, and to the authorities in Japan; the situation today seems more hopeful than yesterday when the Japanese Government was considerably concerned; the War Office has decided “in principle” to despatch reenforcements to the Peiping area from Manchuria, Korea and Japan proper; however, these reenforcements will not be sent unless further clashes occur. The Foreign Office informant states that everything now will depend on whether a local agreement is reached by the negotiators and respected by the Chinese troops and whether the Chinese military authorities will be able to restrain those elements of the 29th Army in which anti-Japanese feeling has been engendered by the Blue Shirts. The informant stated further that the development which had caused most concern to his Government was the report that four divisions of the Chinese Army had been ordered by the Nanking Government to mobilize and to move northward; that the movement of these divisions and the flight of Chinese airplanes northward had been confirmed; that in the Foreign Office’s belief the Chinese reenforcements from the South would not be moved into Hopei Province as long as any hope remained for local settlement of the recent clashes. The Embassy has checked Domei’s translation of the statement issued by the Cabinet on the North China situation last night and found it to be substantially correct. 62 Repeated to Peiping. Grew 62 See also statement by the Japanese Embassy on July 12, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 318 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8714: Telegram [Document 120] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , July 12, 1937—noon. [Received July 12—9:50 a.m.] 352. Reference Embassy’s July 11, noon. 63 Shanghai reaction to the situation in the north has been surprisingly mild. The Chinese press places responsibility squarely upon the Japanese but has not indulged in any violent outburst. Chinese officials and merchants as well as Japanese officials appear hopeful that the situation in the north may be localized and settled. I am informed that the Acting Minister of War and garrison commander have received telegraphic instructions from Generalissimo Chiang to make every effort to prevent any incident at Shanghai and to do their best to maintain peace and order. This is interpreted locally as indicating that the Generalissimo is desirous of localizing the incident and preventing aggravation of the situation. 2. Chinese and Settlement authorities have taken usual precautionary measures and have slightly increased number of patrols in areas where Japanese reside. As a precautionary measure, Chinese authorities have suspended the celebrations in connection with the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Shanghai City Government. Japanese naval landing party have increased number of patrols in one district but otherwise have taken no unusual steps. There have been no anti-Japanese demonstrations thus far. To Peiping and the Department; to Nanking by mail. Gauss 63 Apparently not repeated to the Department. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8711: Telegram [Document 121] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 12, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 12—8:15 a.m.] 223. Embassy’s 219, July 11, 10 p.m. and 221, July 12, 1 a.m. 1. Confirmation of reports of Japanese demands or Chinese agreement is unobtainable. [A Japanese] who is closely associated with Japanese military states that Lieutenant Colonel Matsui, Resident Officer in Peiping of the North China garrison, handed at 8 p.m. yesterday at Peiping to the Mayor of Tientsin a memorandum [calling for] (1) expression regret by Chinese responsible for the affair, (2) punishment of Chinese responsible, (3) withdrawal of Chinese forces from the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge and (4) suppression of activities of Blue Shirts and Communists. According to this source, the Mayor of Tientsin acknowledged the receipt of the memorandum. The informant states that most of the Japanese troops have withdrawn from the area of fighting; a Japanese official states that some 200 Kash [ Japanese ] troops still remain in the area. 2. The first-mentioned source states that Sung Che Yuan and Kazuki 64 are expected to arrive in Peiping this afternoon. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Johnson 64 Lt. Gen. Kyoshi Kazuki, new commander of the Japanese North China garrison. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8716: Telegram [Document 122] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 12—10:30 a.m.] 265. My 263, July 12, 10 a.m. 1. An Australian press correspondent today telephoned Atcheson 65 asking his opinion regarding the results which would follow if the Chinese Government were to suggest to the British and American Governments the advisability of representations from them to the Japanese and Chinese Governments urging moderation in the present crisis. He observed that a favorable opportunity for such representations in the case of the British was presented by the present Anglo-Japanese conversations in London and that similar steps taken by the American Government in the past afforded a precedent. 2. The correspondent named was Timperley, representing Manchester Guardian and Christian Science Monitor . Significance is given his inquiry by his known collaboration in drafting of the Foreign Office statement yesterday (see my 261, July 12, 8 a.m. [ p.m. ] 65a and his relations with Hu Shih and other leading intellectuals influential with the Foreign Office. 3. Atcheson replied that he did not know what the reaction in Washington would be to such a suggestion and that he assumed the Chinese Ambassador in Washington knew by now how the ground lay. 4. To the Department and Peiping. Peck 65 George Atcheson, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy in China at Nanking. 65a Post , p. 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8707: Telegram [Document 123] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 12, 1937—4. p.m. [Received July 12—9:35 a.m.] 224. Embassy’s 223, July 12, 3 p.m. 1. The Consul General at Tientsin has just telephoned that large numbers of Japanese troops are arriving at intervals at East Station Tientsin and are going into barracks at Tientsin. He states that the Shanghai express from the South arrived at 1 p.m., today, stopped at West Station Tientsin, and will proceed no further. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy (Ing) 793.94/8738 [Document 124] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy ( Ing ) [ Washington ,] July 12, 1937. Mr. Ing called this morning at 11 o’clock by appointment made by the Chinese Ambassador yesterday. Mr. Ing gave me the paper here attached 66 which he said was a very brief digest of information received by the Chinese Embassy. I read this paper and inquired whether this was all that the Embassy had received. Mr. Ing replied that this was merely a digest and that they had received several messages this morning which were at the moment being decoded. I asked Mr. Ing how he viewed the situation. Mr. Ing replied: “I am afraid it means war.” I made rejoinder: “Surely you do not mean that either the Chinese Government or the Japanese Government want war.” Mr. Ing then said that the Japanese, especially the Kwantung Army, had long wanted to cut north China off from the rest of China and that the operations of the Japanese troops last week and now appear to be deliberately provocative. He said that they had made the excuse that one of their men had been found missing and had demanded that they be permitted to search the village of Wanpinghsien but that later the allegedly missing man had been found unharmed among the men of his own unit. Mr. Ing said that the Japanese were moving in troops from Manchuria and that Nanking had ordered six divisions to move northward. Mr. Ing asked what would be my advice to China. I said that I was not in position to offer advice but that I felt warranted in expressing the hope that each and both sides would exercise restraint; that I could point out that neither side could afford terrific costs which war would involve; that each and both sides must consider a great variety of interests, including both the interests of their own people and the interests of the whole world; and that no country should permit itself to be rushed into war. Mr. Ing said that he would send me as soon as possible the additional information which his Embassy had. I suggested that he keep us as fully informed as he might feel appropriate. The conversation there ended. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 66 Not printed. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.94/8736 [Document 125] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] July 12, 1937. The Counselor of the Chinese Embassy telephoned Mr. Hamilton and communicated to Mr. Hamilton the substance of a cablegram which the Chinese Embassy had just received from the Chinese Foreign Office, as follows: Situation in North China extremely grave. Tokyo has despatched 5th Division from Japan, while 10th Division is in readiness. Japanese Navy has been ordered to stand by. Japanese troops concentrated at Fengtai number over 20,000. Suggest that Embassy take up with the Department of State whether it would be possible for America to do something in a mediatory capacity. Mr. Ing stated that the last part of the telegram with reference to whether or not it would be possible for the United States to do something in a mediatory capacity was the important part of the message. Mr. Hamilton said that he would bring the message at once to the attention of Mr. Hornbeck. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/8737 [Document 126] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 12, 1937. Reference, memorandum of Mr. Hamilton’s conversation with Mr. Ing this morning and Nanking’s telegram 265, July 12, 3 p.m. It is believed that any step that might be taken by this Government toward action “in a mediatory capacity” would (at this moment) be premature and ill-advised; would be likely to aggravate rather than to ameliorate the situation. The Secretary has already expressed to the Japanese Ambassador certain views, 67 and Mr. Hornbeck has expressed to the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy certain views, the indication given in both cases being that this Government would look with great disfavor upon a development to the point of seriousness of hostilities between Japan and China. There is a step which the British Government might take which might have some effect toward restraining the Japanese: the British Government might tell the Japanese Ambassador in London that so long as there are hostilities between Japanese and Chinese armed forces the British Government cannot continue conversations with the Japanese Government on the subject of a possible agreement with regard to Far Eastern matters. For the moment, this Government should, it is believed, make no approach to either the Chinese or the Japanese authorities and make no public comment. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 67 See memorandum of July 12, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 316 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8719: Telegram [Document 127] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 12—1:43 p.m.] 267. Our 265, July 12, 3 p.m. 1. According to a spokesman of the Foreign Office, the following, which was published today by the semi-official Central News Agency, is a correct account of a conversation held yesterday between Vice Foreign Minister Chen Chieh and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy here: 2. “Nanking, July 11 (Central). Demand that he immediately cable the Japanese Government to order a cessation of Japanese military activities in North China was made today by Mr. Chen Chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, upon Mr. S. Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy here, in an interview at 4 o’clock this afternoon. Mr. Chen enumerated the facts regarding the reinforcement of Japanese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area, pointing out that such action was completely contradictory to the professed desire of the Japanese Government and its diplomatic authorities in China to prevent any aggravation of the situation. Replying, Mr. Hidaka said that the reported movement of Central Government troops northward has given rise to apprehension on the part of the Japanese troops. Mr. Chen, however, assured Mr. Hidaka, that Chinese troops have no intention of provoking a war with the Japanese Army. Nevertheless Mr. Chen warned Mr. Hidaka that China does not tolerate any alien country arbitrarily increasing its garrison in China and infringing on her territorial sovereignty. If such action continues, Mr. Chen said, China will be forced to take defensive measures. In conclusion Mr. Chen expressed the hope that the Japanese authorities will awake to the situation and take necessary steps not to aggravate the relations between the two countries”. 3. To the Department and Peiping. By mail to Tokyo. Peck The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8712: Telegram [Document 128] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 12, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 12—11:10 a.m.] 225. Embassy’s 224, July 12, 4 p.m. 1. A Chinese official with good sources of information states that the Japanese demands are the same as outlined in the Embassy’s 223, July 12, 3 p.m.; that as far as he is aware there are no others; that they have not been accepted; that the Chinese have demanded from the Japanese an apology, punishment, indemnity for destroyed property, and promise of non-recurrence; that these demands are, of course, unacceptable to the Japanese. The Embassy has been unable to obtain confirmation that an agreement had been made by the Chinese with the Japanese. Presumably negotiations are still in progress. 2. There are reports of uneasiness in Tungchow and the above official, who has good connections with that régime, claims that Yin Ju Keng and a few of his subordinates have fled to Shanhaikwan. 3. Koreans in Peiping are frightened and are taking refuge in the places mentioned in the Japanese notice of measures to take in case of danger. (Reference paragraph 5 of Embassy’s 222, July 12, 2 p.m. 68 ) 4. The above-mentioned official adds that the Kwantung Army has become so angered by the failure of Sung Che Yuan to comply with Japanese desires since he assumed power as the result of Japanese influence that it intends to fight. He believes there is some hope of Kazuki checking the more rabid military. 5. Another Chinese official has just informed the Embassy that a truce has been reached to permit Sung Che Yuan to reply to the Japanese demands. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Johnson 68 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8726: Telegram [Document 129] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 12—4:14 p.m.] 268. Our 267, July 12, 5 p.m. 1. An officer of the Embassy has been informed by a responsible official of the Foreign Office that in the conversations between the Foreign Office and the Japanese Embassy of July 11th and of today the Japanese advanced the view that (1) North China is a special almost independent region; (2) whatever occurs there is no proper concern of the National Government; (3) the National Government has been acting “illegally” in attempting to augment and nationalize the 29th Army; (4) the present affair is one which can be settled only by negotiations with regional authorities in the north; (5) the National Government should not interfere in the matter. 2. The informant said the Foreign Office had intimated to Hidaka that Kawagoe should come to Nanking to arrange a settlement but Hidaka had replied that this was not necessary because it was his Government’s policy to deal locally with matters arising in North China and he himself, having recently been Chargé d’Affaires, was a sufficiently responsible official to conduct the Japanese side of any essential conversations with the Foreign Office. 3. He said (1) the Foreign Office late July 10 sent a written protest to the Japanese Embassy which recapitulated the Chinese situation as previously explained to the Japanese orally, and (2) no reply to this communication had been received. 4. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8727: Telegram [Document 130] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 12—3:15 p.m.] 269. Our No. 268, July 12, 6 p.m. 1. The informant cited in my telegram under reference stated further that he had just received information by telephone from Peiping that (1) fighting at Papaoshan ceased about 3 this morning; (2) 20,000 Japanese troops around Fengtai, most of whom had come from Manchuria via Tientsin. 2. He added that (1) one division Japanese troops was now en route China from Japan, (2) another was being prepared for embarkation, (3) all military leaves in Japan had been canceled, and (4) the belligerent spirit of the Japanese made it seem unlikely that a major clash could be avoided. 3. To Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/8749: Telegram [Document 131] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 12, 1937—7 p.m. 291. Your 461, July 12, 5 p.m. 69 1. The Japanese Ambassador called this morning by his own request and read to me and later left with me a statement in regard to Chinese-Japanese hostilities near Peiping. 70 During the reading of each paragraph I expressed deep regret at the incident and at the conclusion of the reading I specially emphasized with approval the statements made in regard to the efforts of the Japanese Government to work out a friendly settlement of the incident. I pointed out the desirability of the exercise by Japan of general self-restraint. I stated that this country is greatly interested and concerned in the preservation of peace in every part of the world and I expressed the earnest hope that the opportunity which Japan has to make a material contribution in the direction of restoring world stability and peace would not be lost through the getting under way of serious military operations. 2. Shortly before the Japanese Ambassador called on me, the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy called on the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and handed him a paper summarizing information received by the Chinese Embassy. The Counselor asked what would be Mr. Hornbeck’s advice to China. Mr. Hornbeck replied that he was not in position to offer advice but that he felt warranted in expressing the hope that each and both sides would exercise effective restraint. 3. The Department has this afternoon made a release to the press as follows: “The Japanese Ambassador and the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy each called at the Department this morning and communicated information in regard to events in North China. In the course of the conversations which ensued both were given expression of the view that an armed conflict between Japan and China would be a great blow to the cause of peace and world progress.” 71 4. Thus, it is evident that both the British and the American Governments have acted, independently but simultaneously, toward discouraging prolongation and extension of the hostilities. We have not in mind at this moment any further step which we might deem likely, if taken, to serve a useful purpose; but we would welcome continuous and frank exchange of information and of views as they may develop. 5. You may inform the Foreign Office of the above. 6. Publicity should be confined to text of press release quoted above. Hull 69 Not printed. 70 See Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 316 – 319 . 71 This information and the additional account of exchanges with the British and French were telegraphed, July 13, 2 p.m., to the Embassies in China and Japan as Nos. 115 and 112, respectively. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8718: Telegram [Document 132] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 12—1:25 p.m.] 261. 1. Foreign Office spokesman last evening made following statement to the press: “According to the reports received, the Japanese military have, in violation of the arrangement reached for the suspension of hostilities at Lukouchiao, refused to carry out the complete withdrawal of their troops to the designated points. They have maintained more than 200 troops at Wulitien and have further effected a concentration of over 1,000 men at Tawayao, both points being a little to the northeast of Lukouchiao. Beginning from 6 o’clock p.m., yesterday (July 10) the Japanese troops have launched a series of fierce attacks on the Chinese soldiers at Lukouchiao. In the meantime large numbers of Japanese troops have been ordered to the Peiping-Tientsin area from their stations both at home and in Manchuria, such military activities, indicating as they do that a large scale military campaign was contemplated, have further increased the tension brought about by the Lukouchiao incident. For this the responsibility rests solidly with the Japanese. The Lukouchiao affair, it may be recalled, broke out late in the night of July 7, when a number of Japanese troops were engaged in illegal maneuvers at Lukouchiao. In the course of their war exercises the Japanese demanded to enter the walled city of Wanping for a search on the pretext that one of their men has been missing. How this could have happened is beyond comprehension. Upon the demand being refused by the Chinese authorities, the Japanese immediately launched an artillery attack upon the city, thus giving rise to the outbreak of hostilities. It appears quite obvious that the Japanese troops acted in accordance with a preconceived plan. It is to be pointed out here that the presence of foreign troops at Lukouchiao is without treaty sanction, and still less the holding of maneuvers there. The acting on the part of the Japanese troops is undoubtedly illegal. Acting in self-defense, the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao have put up a stern resistance. At the same time the Foreign Ministry lodged a vigorous protest with the Japanese Embassy demanding the immediate cessation of military activities on the front of the Japanese troops and reserving for China the right to make legitimate demands. Meanwhile, the Chinese local authorities have been engaged in patient negotiations with the Japanese with a view to an early amicable settlement of the affair. Our firm determination and painstaking efforts to preserve the peace must be obvious to all impartial observers. On the evening of July 8 an understanding was reached by the two parties on the following: (1) cessation of military activities on both sides; (2) withdrawal of troops on both sides to their original positions; and (3) Lukouchiao (bridge) to be guarded, as heretofore, by Chinese soldiers. But unfortunately the tranquility thus restored was short-lived. As indicated by subsequent developments, the Japanese military, instead of showing the least sincere efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement, appear to have entered into the understanding with no other object than that of gaining time to call up reinforcements from [ for? ] a fresh offensive. The policy of China is, internally, economic reconstruction and, externally, the maintenance of peace. So far as our relations with Japanese are concerned our policy is to seek a peaceful settlement, through diplomatic channels, of all outstanding issues on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Such being the case, the Chinese Government earnestly desires that the Japanese will immediately cease all military activities and, in accordance with the understanding previously reached, withdraw their troops from the scene of the conflict. Furthermore, with a view to avoiding the possibility of future conflict, it is also to be desired that the Japanese will refrain from staging troops or holding military maneuvers in those parts of China where no foreign troops are allowed. The carrying out of the above measures may be confidentially expected to bring about an improvement in the situation and facilitate the liquidation of the unfortunate affair. On the other hand, failure to take such action is likely to further aggravate the situation and increase the danger to the peace of Eastern Asia, in which everything [ case? ] the heavy responsibility will rest with Japan.” 2. Sent to the Department. By mail to Shanghai, Tokyo. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8728: Telegram [Document 133] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 12, 1937—midnight. [Received July 12—3:40 p.m.] 270. Our 269, July 12, 7 p.m. 1. Timperley telephoned to an officer of the Embassy at 11 p.m. to say that he had just completed a conversation with the Foreign Minister and the Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Foreign Office in which the Foreign Minister had asked him to convey to the American and British Ambassadors the hope of the Chinese Government that the American and British Ambassadors come at once to Nanking. Our first reaction to this information is that if the Chinese Government desires the presence in the capital at this time of the American Ambassador, the Foreign Office should employ the usual channels of communication to make that desire known to the Ambassador. However, I pass on this information for whatever consideration it may merit. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8730: Telegram [Document 134] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 13, 1937—9 a.m. [Received July 13—5:02 a.m.] 272. Our 270, July 12, midnight. 1. The First Secretary of the British Embassy received last night the same message from Timperley and subsequently made inquiry of the Foreign Office whether the message represented the Foreign Office’s views. Dr. T. T. Li, Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Ministry, informed him that such was the case and that “it was the wish of the Chinese Government” that the British and American Ambassadors come to Nanking. The British Secretary has telegraphed this information to Peiping and to his Ambassador at Peitaiho. 2. Sent to the Department, Peiping. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8744: Telegram [Document 135] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 13, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 13—11:35 a.m.] 275. Our 270, July 12, midnight, and 272, July 13, 9 a.m. 1. Dr. T. T. Li, director of the Department of Publicity and Intelligence of the Foreign Office, just inquired of Atcheson over the telephone concerning the present movements of the Ambassador and stated that while the Foreign Office did not wish to make an official request for the Ambassador’s presence in Nanking, it considered it “highly desirable” that he come here. Li asked that this statement be telegraphed to the Ambassador. 2. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the French Embassy (Gaucheron) 793.94/8780 [Document 136] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the French Embassy ( Gaucheron ) [ Washington ,] July 13, 1937. Mr. Gaucheron called by appointment to see Mr. Hornbeck. Inasmuch as Mr. Hornbeck was in conference in the Secretary’s office, Mr. Gaucheron asked to see Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Gaucheron told Mr. Hamilton that he had called to give the Department more precise information in regard to the substance of a telegram which the French Embassy had received from the French Foreign Office in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation. (Presumably Mr. Gaucheron had in mind information communicated by Mr. Henry 72 by telephone to Mr. Hornbeck early in the morning, which information was to the effect that the French Government had instructed its Ambassadors in China and in Japan to express to the appropriate Chinese and Japanese authorities concern in regard to the situation.) Mr. Gaucheron said that the telegraphic information which the French Embassy had received from the French Foreign Office was to the effect that the French Ambassador in China had communicated to the French Foreign Office a suggestion that it might be helpful should the French, British, and American representatives at Tokyo and at Nanking approach the appropriate Japanese and Chinese authorities and counsel moderation; that the French Foreign Office was very favorable in principle to such a step and had authorized the French Ambassadors in China and in Japan to be prepared to make such an approach along with the British and American representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo. Mr. Gaucheron stated also that the French Foreign Office’s cable to the French Embassy here set forth the substance of statements made by the Japanese Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Secretary. Mr. Gaucheron then outlined this information, which is substantially the same as that given in the first paragraph of London’s telegram No. 466, July 13, 7 p.m. 73 Mr. Gaucheron inquired whether the information given us by the Japanese Ambassador was in general along these lines. Mr. Hamilton replied that the Japanese Ambassador had informed us of the Japanese Government’s version of the fighting which had occurred near Peiping but that the Japanese Ambassador had not made any statement to us in regard to Japan abandoning its position in South China and concentrating in the North. 72 Jules Henry, French Chargé d’Affaires. 73 Post , p. 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] . The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8748: Telegram [Document 137] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 6:15 p.m.] 973. I discussed this afternoon with Leger 74 and the Chinese Ambassador 75 the situation in the Far East. Leger stated that the note which the Japanese Government had presented to the French Government yesterday together with the accompanying explanations convinced him that the Japanese military authorities had decided definitely to turn North China as far south as the Yellow River into another Manchukuo. He believed that Japanese military authorities were taking advantage of the strained situation in Europe and the present weakness of the Soviet Union to impose their will upon China. He believed that the Japanese Army had been much disturbed by the pacific policy which Sato had attempted to inaugurate when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and had felt that there was little time to be lost if North China was to be brought under Japanese domination. The Chinese Ambassador yesterday had on instructions from his Government asked the French Foreign Office whether the French Government would consider it desirable at this moment to invoke Article 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 76 The French Government in reply had asked for time to consider the question. Leger expressed to me the opinion that to call on the League of Nations to attempt to settle this dispute would be extremely damaging to the League which once again would prove to be impotent and would be equally damaging to China for the Chinese would be apt to believe that they could count on real support from the League when in reality they could count on no support from the League. He thought that the matter might perhaps be handled more effectively by invoking Article 7 of the Washington Treaty. 77 The Chinese Ambassador (Wellington) Koo stated to me that in the discussion which had followed his inquiry as to the attitude of the French Government toward invoking Article 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations it had been brought out that if Japan should refuse to accept any intervention by the League there would be little that could be done. He, Koo, had suggested therefore that Article 11 of the Covenant of the League should be invoked. The French Foreign Office had then suggested that Article 7 of the Washington Treaty might be more effective in the circumstances and both Delbos 78 and Leger had said to him that it would be absolutely essential to get the United States into the discussion and had pointed out that the United States was not a member of the League. I gathered the impression from my conversation with Leger that the French Government faced by its troubles in Europe is somewhat loath to take any active part with regard to matters in the Far East. Incidentally, Leger expressed the opinion that there was not the slightest doubt that the Japanese after the butchery of various Chinese armies would be able to take over China as far south as Yellow River and set up another Manchukuo. The Chinese Ambassador said that he had information which indicated that General Chiang Kai-shek was bringing up all the best divisions of the Chinese Army. He had also been informed from Nanking that the Japanese in addition to divisions which were being sent from “Manchukuo” had embarked the 6th Division for China yesterday and would embark the 10th Division today. I assume that the Japanese Government presented to our Government and the British Government yesterday the same note which was given to the French Foreign Office last Friday, if not and if the Department should desire, I believe that I can obtain the text. I should be glad to receive any instructions that the Department may care to give me in the premises. Bullitt 74 Secretary General of the French Foreign Office. 75 V. K. Wellington Koo. 76 Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 69 , 91 . 77 The Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 relating to China, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . 78 Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8740: Telegram [Document 138] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 13, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 13—11:58 a.m.] 228. Nanking’s 270, July 12, midnight and 272, July 13, 9 a.m. I have been informed that British Ambassador, who is now at summer home in Peitaiho, will probably go to Nanking. In view of the fact this request comes indirectly through a newspaper correspondent and not directly to me or through Peck, I am not planning to leave Peiping where I consider situation so delicate that I think my presence here for the time being necessary. My decision in this matter of course is subject to the Department’s wishes. I would feel differently about it if the [Minister for Foreign Affairs] were to make the request direct. Repeated to Nanking. Johnson The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8750: Telegram [Document 139] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 13, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 13—2:30 p.m.] 465. I saw Cadogan 79 this afternoon and conveyed to him the information contained in your 291 of July 12, 7 p.m. He expressed his appreciation for so prompt a response to the Foreign Secretary’s 80 inquiry of yesterday and said that he regretted to say he had no new information. He told me that Eden saw the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors yesterday. Both gave the Foreign Secretary their versions of what has taken place, which Cadogan surmises is similar to the accounts given you by the Japanese and Chinese representatives in Washington. The Japanese Ambassador, as was indicated in my 461, July 12, 5 p.m., 81 was warned of the serious effect which events in North China might have on any Anglo-Japanese discussions. Cadogan also talked with the Chinese Ambassador who suggested that his Government would welcome joint “mediation” by the United States and Great Britain. Cadogan said that he had made it quite clear to the Chinese Ambassador there could be no question of mediation in any case unless both parties desired it and that there was no indication that such was the wish of the Japanese. Cadogan said that he would be glad to continue to cooperate in the frank exchange of views and information. Bingham 79 Sir Alexander M. G. Cadogan, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 80 Anthony Eden. 81 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8746: Telegram [Document 140] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 13, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 13—2:20 p.m.] 466. Cadogan told Johnson 82 late this afternoon that he had just been informed by the French Ambassador that the Japanese Ambassador in Paris had called on the French Foreign Secretary and stated that “recent incidents in North China were not of a local character but are the result of anti-Japanese feeling stirred up in North China by the Nanking Government; that the Japanese, having a special interest in Manchukuo, would have to take the necessary measures to safeguard their interests; that Japan has decided to put an end to this agitation and if circumstances require it she would abandon her positions in South China and concentrate in the North; that all Japan was united in this matter and that the illusions created by certain statements of Sato were being rapidly dissipated”. Cadogan said that this information looked very serious to him. The Japanese Ambassador in London has not yet made a similar communication to the Foreign Office. Cadogan said that he did not understand what was meant by Japan abandoning her positions in South China. Cadogan said that the French Ambassador had also informed him that the French Ambassadors in Tokyo and Nanking have been instructed to cooperate with the British in any attempts at conciliation the British Government may decide to make. A telegraphic instruction has been sent this afternoon to Sir Ronald Lindsay 83 containing suggestions for possible action at Tokyo and Nanking to alleviate the situation, which Cadogan expects you will receive tomorrow morning. Bingham 82 Hershel V. Johnson, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom. 83 British Ambassador in the United States. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/8744: Telegram [Document 141] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , July 13, 1937—7 p.m. 116. Your 228, July 13, 6 p.m. and Nanking’s 275, July 13, 3 p.m. Department feels it desirable that you remain where you are pending further developments. If developments cause you to feel that you should proceed to Nanking, please consult Department. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8747: Telegram [Document 142] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 13, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 13—2:40 p.m.] 230. Embassy’s 221, July 12, 1 p.m. [ a.m. ] 1. The Secretary of the local Japanese Embassy mentioned in the first paragraph of the above-mentioned telegram insisted this afternoon emphatically in conversation with a member of my staff that Chang Tzu Chung, Mayor of Tientsin, and Colonel Chang Yun Jung, an officer under General Sung Che Yuan, signed on July 11 the Japanese demands which he had outlined to the same member of my staff; that is (1) apology, (2) punishment and (3) promise of non-recurrence; that there was a fourth provision; namely, putting down of anti-Japanese activities including Blue Shirts and communism; that Chang Tzu Chung requested that the signing of these demands be kept secret; and that the foregoing information was telegraphed by the local Embassy to the Foreign Office at Tokyo. 2. There seemed to be no doubt that the speaker was sincere in what he said. 3. Chinese in the meantime have signed agreement and requested secrecy so that the fact of signing has not been definitely established until long afterwards. 4. When the informant was told that local Chinese officials claim that the signing of an agreement, which included suppression of communism and Blue Shirts, would mean separation of this province from Nanking and its practical control by the Japanese military he replied that Major General Hashimoto, who was the ranking Japanese in the negotiations, had definitely informed the Embassy that the Japanese military intended to obtain no political concession from the Marco Polo incident. The informant added that the entry of the Kwantung army into the situation may have altered this aspect of it. 5. The informant stated that the future depends upon three things: (1) The carrying out of the agreement by the Chinese; (2) the [non-] advance upon Japanese troops of Chinese troops west of Peiping, and; (3) the northward advance of Chinese troops from Honan and Southern Hopei. He said that Chinese troops from Southern Hopei had definitely arrived at Changhsintien just south of Marco Polo Bridge. 6. He described the Japanese line as extending from Fengtai to Wanpinghsien with some Japanese forces along part of the road from Wanpinghsien to Peiping. He described the Chinese forces as being west of the Yungting River and also in the area of the summer palace. 7. He stated that as far as he knows negotiations are not going on at Tientsin as Sung Che Yuan claims he is ill and refuses to admit visitors. 8. He stated that the troops which arrived at the northeast gate of Peiping last night (reference paragraph 6 of Embassy’s 226, July 13, 4 p.m. 84 ) were troops of the Embassy guard returning from Tung-chow and not troops from Koupeikou. He said that the firing near Peiping last night was unimportant as no Japanese participated, the firing again being due to Chinese misapprehension. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Johnson 84 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8742: Telegram [Document 143] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 13, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 13—1:45 p.m.] 196. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires 85 today informed me that Eden had inquired of Bingham whether some combined Anglo-American démarche in Tokyo and Nanking would be favorably considered by the American Government. Dodds proposes to reply that any direct representations would be resented in Tokyo but that he sees no reason why the British representatives in Nanking and Tokyo might not simultaneously inquire of the Chinese and Japanese Governments whether they could in any way help at the present juncture. 2. Dodds’ feeling is that the Japanese Government might conceivably still welcome some method of avoiding general combat if they could do so without loss of face. 3. I see no reason why we should take action. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 85 James L. Dodds, Acting Counselor of Embassy in Japan. Professor John Lossing Buck to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/8954 [Document 144] Professor John Lossing Buck to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) 86 Shanghai, July 13, 1937 Timperley sends the following information to yourself and Hornbeck: “Hu Shih and other responsible Chinese think present crisis most serious since that of September, 1931. I have confidential information of military preparations of Chinese and attitude of highest officials downward from generalissimo makes me believe that finally Nanking has decided to fight. Reuters’ correspondent here learns that general offensive with 50,000 troops planned by Japan—to start July 15. Immediate vigorous intervention by Britain and America appears to be only likelihood of avoiding major war. Nanking would gladly welcome such intervention.[”] 86 Copy of paraphrased telegram to Dr. Buck from the “Sp[ecial] Agent, Shanghai, China”, July 13. Dr. Buck, authority on agriculture at the University of Nanking, was an adviser of the Treasury Department. The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/8777 [Document 145] The British Embassy to the Department of State 87 undated (1) Chinese Ambassador has again asked British Government to offer their good offices. He says that French, United States, and Soviet Governments have also been asked. (2) French Ambassador says his Government is agreed in principle to urge moderation on both sides. French representatives at Nanking and Tokyo are ready to cooperate. (3) State Department knows already that Japanese Ambassador has been told that Anglo-Japanese conversations would be inopportune during present situation. We hope Ambassador has informed his Government accordingly. (4) Mr. Eden is disturbed at news of Japanese troop movements. He feels it would be foolish to ignore altogether repeated Chinese warnings that they would have to resist further Japanese encroachments. Maybe the Japanese Government has not planned an aggression, but the situation may get out of hand and result in a clash on a large scale. (5) Mr. Eden has been considering whether it might not be advisable to express our appreciation to Japanese at reports of large reenforcements. Of course the Japanese are judges of measures necessary for their own security, though it seems to us that their forces on the spot must be sufficient to maintain the position until recent unhappy incidents can be cleared up and a satisfactory settlement reached. Mr. Eden would be inclined to say also that he was also using his influence at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to do nothing to make things worse. If in the course of any negotiations for the settlement of the whole dispute, British Government could be of any help they would gladly listen to any suggestions the Japanese Government might make. (6) Mr. Eden would simultaneously instruct his representative at Nanking to inform Chinese that we are urging restraint at Tokyo; to beg them to do nothing to make things more difficult. He would say that mediation cannot usefully be attempted unless both sides desire it, and that without further exchange of views with Japan we cannot say if there is a method of assisting towards a settlement. (7) What are Secretary of State’s reaction to above? Would he be disposed to instruct his men at Nanking and Tokyo to cooperate on these lines? 87 Handed by the British Ambassador on July 13 to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8777 [Document 146] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] July 13, 1937. Mr. Secretary : The British Ambassador called at my office at 6:15 this evening and read me the memorandum which is here attached in his own hand-writing. 88 There followed a brief discussion in which the most important point brought out was that the Ambassador and I are equally of the opinion that the time factor in relation to this matter is of very great importance. I told the Ambassador that I would see that this message got into the hands of the Secretary early this evening. The Ambassador expressed the hope that he might have a reply during the night. I told him that I had very great doubt whether that would be possible, but that I would see to it that the message was delivered probably before 8:30 this evening. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 88 Supra. The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/8785 [Document 147] The Department of State to the British Embassy 89 undated Memorandum Department informed American Ambassador London yesterday, for communication to British Foreign Office, of conversation held with Japanese and Chinese diplomatic representatives here yesterday. Secretary of State has held conversations today with Japanese 90 and Chinese representatives. In all four of these conversations Department has urged at length the importance of maintaining peace and has covered most of the points mentioned in Eden’s outline—except that we have made no reference to possibility of mediation. We are heartily in accord with the idea of there being made by British representatives in Japan and China representations such as outlined by Mr. Eden. It seems to us that this would be action parallel with though not identical with that which we have already taken here and which we intend to repeat. We are keeping our representatives in Japan and China informed of steps taken. We consider it important that our two governments cooperate closely in exchanging information and views and in working on parallel lines. 89 Handed to the British Ambassador on July 13 by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 90 For memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 320 . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/8786 [Document 148] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 14, 1937. The memorandum brought in by the British Ambassador yesterday afternoon 91 was handed to the Secretary by Mr. Hornbeck at 8:40 last evening. The Secretary, in conference with Mr. Welles, 92 Mr. Norman Davis, 93 and Mr. Hornbeck, decided upon a reply which was drafted in the form of a memorandum, a copy of which is here attached. 94 Mr. Welles read to the President the British Ambassador’s memorandum and the proposed reply. The President approved the proposed reply. Mr. Hornbeck took to the British Ambassador the handwritten original of the reply thus decided upon. The British Ambassador read the memorandum very carefully. He then remarked: “This means, I would understand, that the American Government is not prepared to join in representations at Tokyo and at Nanking.” Under instruction, Mr. Hornbeck explained to the British Ambassador that it was fully the desire of this Government to cooperate with the British Government in the effort to discourage entry by the Japanese and Chinese upon serious hostilities, that is, effort to preserve peace; that this Government had already urged upon both the Japanese and the Chinese the importance of maintaining peace; that we hoped that the British Government would do likewise; that we intended to continue our efforts; and that we felt that cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be more effective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of that desired than would joint or identical representations through our representatives in Japan and in China along with representatives of Great Britain and other powers. The Ambassador then read the memorandum again, maintained silence for some time, and then, with a smile, said that he understood. Mr. Hornbeck said that he felt that the Ambassador should know that throughout the conference at which this reply had been under consideration, there had been unanimity of view that cooperation between the British and the American Governments toward maintenance of peace was most desirable and that there had also been unanimity of opinion that the method of cooperation which we envisaged, as indicated in the memorandum, would be the most likely to produce beneficial and to avoid harmful effects in reference to the common objective. The Ambassador again read the memorandum and, with a smile, said that he greatly appreciated Mr. Hornbeck’s successful effort to effect, in response to the Ambassador’s earlier suggestion, this expedition in reply on the part of and by the American Government. Mr. Hornbeck thanked the Ambassador for his cooperation in having made possible the delivery of the reply at so late an hour in the day. The conversation there ended. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 91 Ante , p. 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] . 92 Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State. 93 Chairman of the American delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. 94 Supra. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8757: Telegram [Document 149] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 14, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 14—9:10 a.m.] 278. Peiping’s 228, July 13, 6 p.m. 1. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs returned to Nanking July 9th. I refrained from calling on him lest my call be misinterpreted by the press which minutely records visits of all foreign officials to the Foreign Office and their supposed purposes. However, almost hourly telephone and personal contact has been maintained by Atcheson with Li, Director of Intelligence [and] Publicity, who appears to be playing an influential role. 2. Fearing that my continued absence might also be misinterpreted I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs July 13, 6 p.m. Brief summary of his remarks follows: 3. The Minister confirmed that six Chinese divisions are proceeding northward on railway from Hankow and added that more were going. (We obtained from reliable military source information that the first division is proceeding north from Hsuchow by rail.) 4. The Minister said that the fighting near Peiping had been provoked by Japanese demand to occupy Wanping July 7, noon, on trivial pretext of a missing soldier, that the Chinese garrison rightfully refused permission and that Japanese premeditation was shown by the preparedness of the Japanese who almost immediately opened hostilities. He asked my opinion regarding Japanese objective and I evaded by saying I could only draw inferences from Japanese activities in ’31, ’33 and ’35. I inquired his opinion regarding newspaper conjectures that the Japanese intend to consolidate their military and political position in Hopei and Chahar. He said this explanation seemed to be correct and added that Shantung was possibly included in the area but that the Chinese had no definite information about this as yet. He referred to published statement by the Japanese Government that mobilization had been ordered in Manchuria, Korea and Japan and stated that three divisions rather than two were on their way to China. 5. The Minister said with great intenseness that war is “imminent” and that instructions had been telegraphed to Chinese diplomatic representatives in nations “specially interested in the Far East” to present the facts to the respective governments. He inquired concerning the plans of the American Ambassador and whether he intended to come to Nanking. I replied that I had been informed of the statement made by Li to Atcheson that afternoon (reported in my July 13, 3 p.m.) and had telegraphed it immediately to the Ambassador. The Minister said he had sent a similar message to the British Ambassador who is at Peitaiho. I asked what other diplomats had been approached and he replied that only the British and American Ambassadors had been asked as a beginning because if the request were widened he would have to invite some whose presence might be “inconvenient” and he named the Italian Ambassador. I said I could not predict the reaction of the American Ambassador but I felt that both he and the British Ambassador might regard their presence in North China as desirable and their return to Nanking as open to unwarrantable inferences. Alluding to earlier years I remarked that in the North the Ambassadors were at least “neutral observers”. The Minister admitted that the Ambassadors might hold such opinions. 6. The Minister said that Japan is shrewd at selecting opportune moments for renewing activity in China. He supposed that Japan feels that the United States and Russia are preoccupied with domestic issues at present and that Europe is tied up with the Spanish problem. 7. From what precedes and other indications it would appear that the Chinese assume that political groupings elsewhere hold good in the Far East, that is, that the United States and Great Britain have democratic systems and historical reasons [to] support China; that Italy and Germany have sympathy with Japan; and that Soviet hostility to Japan requires no proof but it is believed that Russia is resolved to avoid war for the time being. 8. The Minister said that leading officials of the Executive Yuan had just returned to Nanking by plane and that [the?] other Government departments would return shortly. 9. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the French Embassy (Gaucheron) 793.94/8784 [Document 150] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the French Embassy ( Gaucheron ) [ Washington ,] July 14, 1937. Mr. Gaucheron called this morning and, referring to a conversation which he had had with Mr. Hamilton yesterday afternoon, repeated substantially what he had said to Mr. Hamilton (see Mr. Hamilton’s memorandum of conversation, July 13, 95 on subject: “The Sino-Japanese Situation”). I said that on July 12 this Government had taken action as reported in the press release of that date, of which I gave Mr. Gaucheron a copy; and that on July 13 the Secretary of State had spoken with both the Japanese 96 and the Chinese Ambassadors and had again strongly urged upon them the desirability of maintaining peace. Mr. Gaucheron inquired what was our feeling on the subject of cooperation. I said that we were all in favor of a general effort for maintenance of peace; that we had already made the effort indicated; that we hoped that other governments would make efforts. Mr. Gaucheron inquired whether we had instructed our representatives in Japan and in China to speak. I replied that we had not done so, but that the Secretary of State was speaking here at headquarters and that we hoped other governments would speak, each in whatever way seemed most practicable to it. I gave Mr. Gaucheron a penciled statement in record of conversations by the Secretary of State with the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors, yesterday (July 13). Mr. Gaucheron said that he would like to be kept informed of any steps that we take. I said that he might inform his Government that we would greatly appreciate being informed of any steps which it might take. Mr. Gaucheron said: “Yes, certainly.” The conversation there ended. 95 Ante , p. 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] . 96 See memorandum of July 13, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 320 . Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Broadmead) 793.94/8872 [Document 151] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the British Embassy ( Broadmead ) [ Washington ,] July 14, 1937. Mr. Broadmead telephoned at 3:50 p.m. and said that the British Ambassador had asked him to communicate certain information to Mr. Hornbeck and that in Mr. Hornbeck’s absence he would like to communicate the information to Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Broadmead continued that the British Embassy had received a cable from the British Foreign Minister in which Mr. Eden had expressed his thanks for the message which Mr. Hull had communicated to him last night; that the British Ambassadors in China and in Japan had been instructed to make an approach to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments along the lines indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the memorandum which the British Ambassador had left with Mr. Hornbeck on the afternoon of July 13; that the British Ambassadors in China and in Japan had been told not to make their approach as an Anglo-French joint approach; that the British representatives would make their approach independently and after making the approach would inform the French, who would then be in position to take similar but independent action if they should so desire. Mr. Hamilton thanked Mr. Broadmead for this message. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8766: Telegram [Document 152] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 14—1:05 p.m.] 199. My 196, July 13, 9 a.m. [ p.m. ] 1. A day or two ago the British Chargé d’Affaires recommended to his Government that in certain eventualities he be instructed to call on Hirota 97 and to say to him that the improved Anglo-Japanese relations so earnestly desired by the Minister could not materialize if Japan should turn North China into a Manchukuo. 2. Today Dodds has received a telegram from Eden approving the recommendation and directing him to take the action at the earliest moment. Dodds says that his Foreign Office has totally overlooked his phrase “in certain eventualities” by which he intended to convey the meaning “as a last resort”. He is so informing Eden and strongly advising against the action at this juncture as it would merely anger the Japanese Government without producing favorable results. 3. In the meantime, according to Dodds, Eden has “warned” Yoshida 98 that if further Japanese troops are sent into China the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations in London cannot be hoped for. 4. We are informed by the Associated Press correspondent that this morning he invited the Foreign Office spokesman to comment on press reports to the effect that conversations are now taking place between the American and British Governments with regard to the possibility of making to the Japanese and Chinese Governments a joint offer of mediation and that the spokesman replied that any such offer if made would be rejected by the Japanese Government which takes the view that the North China incident is a matter for settlement by Japan and China without outside intervention. On the other hand Byas, correspondent of New York Times , states that at this morning’s conference of the foreign press correspondents with the Foreign Office spokesman the question was asked whether Japan would consider an offer of mediation and that the spokesman had replied that the offer would be examined in the light of circumstances in which it was made. Byas considers the statement as merely an inept reply to a leading question and does not attach importance to it. It is his opinion that any offer of mediation would be rejected by the Japanese Government. 5. There are several reasons upon which I base my recommendation set forth in paragraph 3 of my No. 196, July 13, 9 p.m., that the American Government refrain from offering its good offices toward settlement of the North China incident and of those reasons I enumerate the following: ( a ) One of the principal objectives of Japan’s foreign policy is the elimination of the influence of western powers as a factor in Far Eastern politics, especially as a factor in relations between China and Japan. This objective has been repeatedly enunciated by Japanese leaders and it is a logical corollary of Japan’s continental policy for the reason that the effectuation of Japan’s program of expansion in China is necessarily retarded by occidental support, even though falling short of physical support, of resistance by China. Whereas there exists in the Japanese view no moral right which would warrant the western powers in participating in the regulation of political affairs in the Far East, especially of relations between Japan and China, acceptance by Japan of offer of good offices by the United States or by Great Britain would necessarily constitute an admission of such a right. We therefore find it difficult to believe that the Japanese Government would in the present circumstances respond favorably to any such offer. ( b ) So far as we can ascertain no negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Central Government looking toward settlement of the North China incident are taking place. In the event that the Department does not concur in the view set forth in preceding subparagraph we would urge that no initiative toward tender of good offices be taken until such negotiations have begun or until the Japanese Government has manifested desire for such tender (which contingency we consider remote). 6. The situation has not sufficiently developed in our opinion to permit of formulation of recommendation as to any other action which might with advantage be taken by the American Government. However, we wish to point out that the improvement in relations between the United States and Japan, which are now better than they have been for a long time past, was made possible when the American Government transferred the emphasis of the actions taken by it in matters affecting relations between Japan and China from ( a ) endeavor to restrain the use by Japan of force to ( b ) the laying down of reservations of American rights in China. It is our opinion if there should occur an outbreak of organized hostility that we should continue to follow the course which our Government has followed during the past 4 years and should resort to protests against Japanese military action only in those circumstances where such protests might be expected not to aggravate the situation or when American citizens and property are molested or when humanitarian considerations make necessary an expression of American official opinion. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 97 Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. 98 Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom. The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8767: Telegram [Document 153] The Consul General at Canton ( Linnell ) to the Secretary of State Canton , [July 14, 1937—5 p.m.] [Received July 14—8:38 p.m.] Sino-Japanese situation South China. No excitement apparent among people Canton. Kwangtung apparently satisfied to follow Chiang Kai-shek and accept his decision. Many conflicting rumors circulating. General Yu Han Mou now inspecting troops border Fukien. He was expected to proceed thence to Lursan but statement is made that he will now return to Canton. Generals Li and Pai, Kwangsi, have telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek, to Minister and Vice Minister of War, and others assuring support of Kwangsi and urging firm resistance against Japanese Army. Linnell Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/8951 [Document 154] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 14, 1937. It is true that we are receiving conflicting and confusing information with regard to the situation and events in north China. However, it is not necessary that we allow ourselves to be confused, by the contradictory aspects of the current reports, as regards the fundamental facts and the outstanding developments. Reduced to its simplest terms the situation is this: hostilities are taking place on Chinese territory between Chinese and Japanese armed forces. The area involved embraces the city of Peiping and its environs. Here we have the erstwhile capital, a point which is still the nerve center of north China. Peiping is a railway center. From it there goes to the northwest the railway which leads into Mongolia; to the, east, the railway which leads to Tientsin and from Tientsin northward along the coast into Manchuria effecting junction with the South Manchuria Railway main lines which in turn lead to the Trans-Siberia Railway on the north and the lines into Korea on the southeast (from Tientsin, railway connection is made southward to Nanking and Shanghai); to the south, the railway to Hankow (from where there branch off two lines westward) which makes, at the Yangtze River, in central China, connection with the line southward to Canton. At and around Peiping Chinese troops have always been stationed in considerable numbers and there exist extensive permanent barracks. Before 1931, all of the important treaty powers had in Peiping legation guards in about equal numbers and had at Tientsin small armed forces in about equal numbers. Since 1931, the Japanese have greatly increased the number of their armed forces theoretically based on Tientsin. During last year, the Japanese armed forces in this region have numbered approximately 10,000. These Japanese armed forces have made themselves a nuisance both to the Chinese and to nationals of other countries. They seem to have a passion for engaging in “maneuvers.” They seem to derive special pleasure from “maneuvering” during the hours between midnight and daybreak. Inside the walled city of Peiping the Japanese “guard” has frequently turned out in the middle of the night, dashed into and out of various points, carried and set up and fired off machine guns, etc., etc., on many occasions. Outside of the city and all along the railway as far as Tientsin, units of the Japanese forces are constantly engaged in marching and counter-marching, staging sham battles, passing over cultivated farm lands, requisitioning quarters, etc., etc. Foreign observers, even those most sympathetic to the Japanese, have been unanimous in the opinion that these activities of the Japanese armed forces, whether or not so intended, have been inevitably provocative. Many times have these observers expressed surprise that the Chinese have been able to exercise the amount of self-restraint required to avert armed clashes. Those who wish accurately to envisage and disinterestedly to understand this situation should realize that these Japanese activities are taking place on territory which is clearly Chinese, which is strategically and politically and economically important, and where the Japanese have no right to be except as a right may be claimed under provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901. (Note: In the Boxer Protocol it was provided that the powers might maintain armed forces at Peiping and armed forces along the railway line, for two purposes, (1) guarding their legations and (2) keeping “open” a line of communication between Peiping and the sea. The significant fact in this connection is that during recent years the Japanese have introduced and maintained in the area armed forces numbering five to ten times as many as those maintained by any of the other Treaty Powers. Admitting that this may be within the letter of the Boxer Protocol, most observers affirm that it is not within the spirit and intent of that Protocol. None but the Japanese perceive any need or justification for constant “maneuvering” such as the Japanese persistently engage in.) The outstanding political facts are as follows: some 4 years ago Japanese armies came into north China from Manchuria and Jehol and advanced to the gates of Peiping. Under Japanese aegis, there were set up in 1935 two autonomous régimes with renegade Chinese in nominal control and the Japanese Kwantung Army functioning as a “power behind the throne.” Ever since, the Kwantung Army and some Japanese leaders in Tokyo have been intent on cutting north China from the rest of China, with the line of demarkation roughly indicated by the Yellow River. High authority in Tokyo has been opposed to this project, especially so during recent months in the course of which there has been increasing evidence of a disposition on the part of the Nanking Government to resist with force, and while there have been various upsets in the internal situation in Japan. Meanwhile, it has become clear that China is making great progress in the fields of economic reconstruction, financial stabilization, military preparedness and national solidarity of opinion on the subject of resistance to Japanese pressure. Most recently, the Japanese have succeeded in setting up a Cabinet which, with Prince Konoye at its head, has a more widespread basis of articulate and popular support than have had the succession of Japanese Cabinets which have preceded it during recent years. In regard to the present hostilities, the simple facts are as follows: on the night of July 7, Japanese armed forces in the neighborhood of Marco Polo Bridge, some 10 miles southwest of Peiping, engaging in night “maneuvers,” met with some form of resistance on the part of Chinese armed forces at their proper stations in that neighborhood. Hostilities thereupon began. Since then there have been, effected by local representatives of the two nationalities, a series of truces followed in series by resumptions of hostilities. The military operations of the Japanese have been extended as shown by clashes at points many miles distant from the point of the original clash. The question arises, what objective could those operations have had other than (1) to bring on widespread hostilities and (2) to drive Chinese armed forces out of and away from the (strictly Chinese) region involved? With regard to the broader military situation, the simple facts are: the Japanese have already moved in reinforcements from Manchuria: they are estimated now to have in the area west of Tientsin perhaps as many as 20,000 men. The Japanese Government has either sent or assembled for sending, from Japan, two divisions (approximately 40,000 men). A Japanese naval squadron is standing off of Shanghai. The Nanking Government has ordered to proceed to the north six divisions of what are affirmed to be Chiang Kai-shek’s best troops. Thus, each side is bringing into or toward the affected area heavy reinforcements, and, on the Japanese side, a minatory gesture is being made at the most vital point on the China coast. It should be kept in mind that all of the stationing of military reinforcements is taking place on Chinese soil. The simple facts in regard to the diplomatic situation are: China is on the defensive: the Chinese Government has taken the position that the question involved in north China is a national and not merely a local question; the Chinese Government has declared its desire not to fight and has asked the powers to take steps on behalf of peace. The Japanese are on the offensive: they have taken the position that the situation in north China is of no rightful concern to the Nanking Government but is a local question; they have affirmed to the powers that they are entirely within their rights in their military operations in north China, and they have stated that “the presence of disorderly Chinese troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area … disturbs peace and order in north China which is of vital importance to Japan …”; they have declared that “the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations …”; 99 they have stated that they want peace but that they intend to handle this matter conclusively. (Note: Japanese demands as given in the press are: (1) Withdrawal of all Chinese troops from the fighting zone; (2) Punishment of all Chinese troops held responsible for the outbreak last week; (3) Termination of anti-Japanese activities in north China; (4) Support of Japanese anti-Communism movement.) 99 Omissions indicated in the original. The quotations are taken from the memorandum from the Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, July 12, 1937, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 318 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8773: Telegram [Document 155] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 14, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 15—1:40 a.m.] 234. 1. I do not believe that either the Japanese Government or the Japanese Army engineered the incident at Marco Polo Bridge. The question of the responsibility for this incident dwindles in importance in view of use which Japanese now apparently propose to make thereof. 2. Incident of night of July 3 [ 7 ] probably involved not more than 200 Japanese soldiers who were engaged in night maneuvers in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge which is garrisoned and patrolled by soldiers of the 29th Army. Since incident occurred Japanese forces have been slightly reinforced and perhaps number now in the neighborhood of 1000. They have remained in their positions on a line south of Peiping extending from Fengtai west of Marco Polo Bridge. There have been almost daily exchanges of shots between the Japanese on this line and Chinese soldiers. Japanese apparently intend to hold this line. 3. Chinese here with whom Embassy has contact state and appear to believe that Chinese will not accept terms which Japanese have presented, and it therefore now seems certain that Japanese must enter this area in force in order to compel acceptance or in order to eliminate from this area elements opposed to Japanese plans. 4. According to one of the principal Chinese negotiators of the first 48 hours, arrangements were several times concluded with the Japanese military advisers of the 29th Army but were ignored by those officers’ superiors in the Japanese North China garrison. This seems to be true as no adequate excuse is apparent for the Japanese attack on Wanpinghsien in the early morning of July 9. Nor is any adequate reason apparent for the return of Japanese troops to the fighting area on the afternoon of the 10th as competent foreign eye witnesses state that the 29th Army troops had prior to then retired to the west side of the Yungting River. 5. From this time, at least, it seemed apparent that the Japanese military were intent on achieving some important ends affecting Hopei Province. 6. During the time which it seems to observers an amicable settlement might be reached if the Japanese desired it and took proper measures to prevent fresh incidents, the Kwantung Army apparently began preparations to assist and the Japanese forces in the Fengtai area were reenforced by the North China garrison. These measures might easily be regarded by the Japanese (as such measures have been regarded by them in the past) as adequate to frighten the Chinese into signing an agreement by which they would achieve their ambitions with regard to Hopei. Certainly these measures appear to disinterested observers as unnecessary to settle amicably the Marco Polo affair. 7. The negotiator referred to above stated in private conversation this morning that he believes war is inevitable unless agreements for various kinds of economic cooperation and for “suppression of Communism” are signed. He stated that if an agreement was signed, as the Japanese allege, the Chinese signers lack authority to make the agreement effective. He is firmly convinced that the Chinese will fight rather than make such agreements which will mean Japanese control of Hopei. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8782: Telegram [Document 156] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 15, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 2:02 p.m.] 283. 1. Timperley states that at his suggestion the Foreign Office is beginning to disseminate news of Chinese troop movements and other military preparations and that last night he telephoned to Reuters, Shanghai, a long account of this nature from the Foreign Office, to be issued by Reuters at that place. He states that the purpose of the change is to obviate the 1935 reaction of world opinion, that China was doing nothing to help herself whereas preparations for eventualities are being strenuously undertaken. 2. Pie says that letter received by him this morning from T. V, Soong 1 states that the latter is communicating by cable with Leith-Ross 2 in London urging Leith-Ross to press the British Government to intervene, arguments being that war will destroy all the groundwork of currency stabilization and financial rehabilitation prepared by Leith-Ross. Soong added that in his opinion the Chinese Government should as a matter of policy seek foreign “mediation” because of the pressure of British, American and other foreign opinion toward peace. In this connection a responsible official of the Foreign Office last evening told an officer of the Embassy that while China was determined to uphold her rights, she was reiterating her attitude of desiring peace. 3. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck 1 Former Chinese Minister of Finance. 2 Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government. Memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 793.94/9010 [Document 157] Memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] July 15, 1937. Colonel Bratton, of M. I. D., 4 has telephoned that the War Department has just received a telegram from Colonel Stilwell, Military Attaché at Peiping, to the effect that 4,600 Japanese troops have arrived in Tientsin and that indications are that this movement is about completed; further, that on July 14, 3,500 Japanese troops and 12 guns left Tientsin for the Peiping area by highway; that it is estimated that the total north China garrison is now about 12,000 strong. It was also stated that the probable intention of the Japanese is the expulsion of the 29th Army from the Peiping area; 5 that there has definitely been no Japanese troop movement from Japan or from Korea to north China; and that General Sung Che-yuan is still in Tientsin (apparently carrying on negotiations with General Kazuki). The message stated also that there has been no confirmation of the rumored movement of Chinese troops into Hopei Province. Colonel Bratton added that the troops which were sent from Jehol comprised a reenforced battalion, which unit has joined the Japanese forces at Fengtai. Colonel Bratton stated further that it would appear that unless Chiang Kai-shek moves Chinese troops north of Paoting, capital of Hopei Province, there would appear to be little likelihood of major military operations. 4 Rufus S. Bratton, U.S.A. of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department. 5 Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs noted on the margin “Concur.” The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8771: Telegram [Document 158] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 15, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 15—6:40 a.m.] 236. French Ambassador told me yesterday that Japanese Ambassador at Paris had left with French Government a memorandum setting forth situation in North China with special reference to incident at Marco Polo Bridge and stating that Japanese Government, unanimously supported by public opinion in Japan, was determined to eliminate anti-Japanese sentiment and activities in North China and was prepared to take such steps as might be necessary to that end. He said that Japanese Ambassador made it plain that Japan intended to take no action in South China. With further reference to question of moderating action at Tokyo and Nanking, French Ambassador stated that his Foreign Office had instructed him to take such action in cooperation with and in consultation with his colleagues. He said that similar instructions had been sent to Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9010 [Document 159] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 15, 1937. Colonel Bratton’s estimate, below, 6 is in line with the views which I expressed tentatively (before receipt of Colonel Bratton’s estimate) in conference this morning. I would phrase the conditional statement with which he concludes a little differently: I would put it that “unless the Chinese press too hard, diplomatically and militarily, from Nanking, there would appear to be substantial likelihood that an adjustment will be arrived at without the matter going to the point of major military operations (meaning, that there may be some further military operations for purposes of developing the situation to a point where the stage would be set for a settlement by negotiation but good chance that a major military conflict may be avoided).” S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 6 See memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 15, p. 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] . The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 852.00/6003: Telegram [Document 160] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 15, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 10:05 p.m.] 982. Continuing my 981. 7 There was considerable discussion of the situation in China. Delbos said that a telegram from the French Ambassador in Tokyo received this morning indicated that the Japanese Government was making every effort to drum up war spirit for a large scale war. The French Ambassador in Tokyo was extremely pessimistic and believed that the Japanese were determined to take over North China as far as the Yellow River plus Shantung. Delbos went on to say that he regretted greatly that it had not been possible for the British, French, and American Governments to make a joint démarche in Tokyo. The French Government was all ready to go along with the American and British Governments in any joint undertaking. As it had not been possible to do this he had invited the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires in Paris to visit him at 4 o’clock this afternoon and the Chinese Ambassador at 5 o’clock. He would counsel moderation and express the hope of the French Government that the incident might be settled peaceably. He inquired if I had any information with regard to the future action the American Government was likely to take and I replied that I had none. He asked me to let him know as soon as I might receive any information as to our views. Both Delbos and Phipps 9 agreed that inasmuch as neither Great Britain nor the United States seemed ready to intervene actively in the Far East little result could be expected from counsels of moderation. Delbos reiterated his statement that if Great Britain and the United States should be willing to intervene actively France would cooperate to the fullest extent possible. The Chinese Ambassador stated to me this morning that Chiang Kai-shek’s troops had reached Peiping and that cooperation was perfect between the troops of the Central Government and those of General Sung’s Army. They concur further that the Japanese had attempted an attack yesterday which had been ended by the Chinese artillery which had dropped shells on two Japanese trucks loaded with ammunition demolishing them and all the Japanese soldiers nearby. Both Delbos and Phipps expressed the opinion that it would be disastrous to the League of Nations if China should call on the League to deal with this question. The League would be unable to refuse to take up the matter but the absolute impotence of the League would once more be demonstrated. Delbos added that in his conversation with the Chilean [ Chinese? ] Ambassador on this question he had remarked, “You might as well call on the moon for help as on the League of Nations.” Delbos went on to say that he hoped that the Government of the United States would act under Article 7 of the Washington Agreement and asked me for the opinion of my Government on this proposal. I replied that I had no information. I asked Delbos if he had any information from Germany which might indicate that the German Government expected to take advantage of the present situation to act against either Austria or Czechoslovakia. He said that he had talked with Francois-Poncet 10 on the telephone this morning and that Poncet had expressed the opinion that the Germans were not contemplating an immediate move against Austria or Czechoslovakia. I should be greatly obliged if the Department would inform me with regard to the line I should take in further conversations on the Far Eastern situation with the French Government. Bullitt 7 Vol. i , p. 360 . 9 Sir Eric Clare Edmund Phipps, British Ambassador in France. 10 André François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Germany. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 793.94/8748: Telegram [Document 161] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , July 15, 1937—6 p.m. 343. Your 973, July 13, 5 p.m. 1. The information contained in your telegram under reference is helpful and is appreciated. If you can conveniently obtain a copy of the text of the Japanese note to the French Government please send it by mail. 2. On July 12 and again on July 13 we urged upon the Chinese and Japanese diplomatic representatives here the importance of preserving peace. 3. The Department is exchanging information and views with the British Government through its Embassy here and through our Embassy in London. The French Embassy here has also kept in touch with the Department. During the conversations which have taken place, we have stated that we are in favor of a general effort for the preservation of peace; that we have already made efforts; and that we hope that other governments would make efforts, each in whatever way seemed most practicable to it. We have asked the French Embassy to keep us informed of steps taken by the French Government. Hull The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8788: Telegram [Document 162] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 15, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 15—5:37 p.m.] 284. 1. At his own initiative Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, called today and for more than 2 hours explained the psychological and political origin of the present northern crisis and its possible results. Brief résumé follows. 2. Regulations controlling Japanese troops everywhere [ were issued? ] for the July 7 night maneuvers. First firing positively was by the Chinese. The only ammunition carried by troops in maneuvers consists of one cartridge per soldier and these are in possession of the commanding officer. Firing began again while two Japanese officers were in Wanping and obviously was started by the Chinese because the Japanese would not willingly endanger lives of these emissaries. The whole incident was evidently not premeditated because otherwise detachments would not have gone to Tungchow and elsewhere helpless because without ammunition. 3. However, informant has urged the Chinese Government not to waste time in the origin and treaty implications of the incident because a crisis of the first magnitude in Chinese-Japanese relations is imminent. To avoid this crisis the Chinese Government must approve or at least not disapprove execution of the agreement signed July 11 and failure to execute this agreement will inevitably lead to stern military action. 4. Informant repeatedly stressed that the entire Japanese nation is now convinced that the Chinese invariably misinterpret moderation for weakness and friendship for cowardice and that moderation must be accompanied by evidence of firmness. Informant is personally convinced that Japanese military officers from the highest to the lowest are now extremely reasonable in their attitude toward China and he asserted positively that the Japanese Government has no intention to enlarge the scope of this incident either by injecting or reviving political projects like the five-province autonomy movement or expanding the geographical area involved. 5. Nevertheless the Japanese Government is unalterably determined that the Chinese local and national authorities shall show good faith with Japan by executing the plain promises made by Ho Ying Chin in 1935 11 including removal of hostile communistic agitation (suspected in the ranks of the 37th Division of the 29th Route Army); and under such economic cooperation in Hopei informant did not regard these points as enlarging the incident. 6. The Japanese Government does not insist that the Chinese Government recognize in principle the existence of Manchukuo and to save the Chinese Government embarrassment is willing to deal only with the Hopei authorities. The Japanese Government does, however, insist that the Chinese Government shall continue to recognize the indisputable fact of the economic interdependence between Manchuria and China as it has already done by permitting railway and postal communications. 7. Informant said that the patience of the Japanese Government and people is completely exhausted by continuous Chinese insults and rejection of Japanese friendship as evidenced by the accumulation of innumerable unsettled grievances and the absence of a single instance of friendly cooperation. Consequently to enforce July 11 agreement and other just and moderate expectations in Hopei the Japanese Government will, if necessary, wage war with China regardless of consequences. Peck 11 For the so-called Ho–Umetsu Agreement, see despatch No. 332, March 27, 1936, from the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 89 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8774: Telegram [Document 163] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 15, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 15—12:15 p.m.] 201. My No. 200, July 14, 6 p.m. 12 1. The Foreign Office informed us this afternoon that negotiations at Peiping and at Tientsin are in progress between the Japanese military and local Chinese authorities but that it would still be premature to anticipate the character of the outcome of such negotiations. However, it was said that the release by the Chinese of several captured Japanese policemen and gendarmes had contributed something toward relieving the tenseness of the situation. 2. In response to a question with regard to the basis of the negotiations the Foreign Office informant stated that the only basis of discussion is the agreement of settlement said to have been signed by representatives of the Chinese local authorities and delivered to the Japanese on July 11. He said further that if a settlement could be reached of the present disturbed situation it might be possible that the Japanese Government would propose negotiations looking toward a more permanent stabilization of conditions in North China on which occasion it was not unlikely that economic matters would be discussed. He emphasized that the negotiations now in progress are designed to find a settlement of the military situation only. 3. The Foreign Office informant further stated that communist agitators are active in disseminating misinformation with regard to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops, press accounts of large bodies of Chinese troops proceeding toward the north being greatly exaggerated while the reports current abroad of large Japanese troop movements are without valid foundation. He added that thus far no troops of the Chinese Central Government have proceeded north of the line laid down in the Ho-Umezu agreement. 4. Again the information furnished us by the Foreign Office is identical with that furnished the Military Attaché by the War Office. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 12 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 322 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8770: Telegram [Document 164] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 15, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 15—10:15 a.m.] 202. My 201, July 15, 9 p.m. It has just been announced that the Cabinet has decided to despatch to North China reenforcements of undisclosed number of troops. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8781: Telegram [Document 165] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 15, 1937—11 p.m. [Received July 15—2:35 p.m.] 203. Embassy’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires decided, subsequent to our talk yesterday, that his instructions required him to see the Foreign Minister and he therefore called yesterday on Hirota. Dodds confined himself to repeating Eden’s observation to Japanese Ambassador in London knowing that present moment might not be an opportune one for opening the conversations in London looking towards an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. Hirota asked Dodds if he had observed the absence of propaganda on the part of Japan. Dodds replied in the affirmative and said that he had so reported to his Government. (See last sentence, paragraph 3, Embassy’s 193, July 13, 6 p.m. 13 ) 2. Today Dodds received definite instructions directing the British diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking to counsel moderation on both sides. Dodds called on Horinouchi 14 but contented himself by stating orally that “the British Government is using such influence as it may possess at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation in North China most difficult. If in the course of any negotiations that may take place for a settlement the British Government could be of any assistance it will be glad to listen to any suggestions that the Japanese Government would care to make”. [3?] Dodds felt that he must take this action because the Chinese authorities in Nanking would in the meantime be assuring the Chinese Government that similar steps were being taken in Tokyo. He refrained, however, from “counseling moderation”. He had not yet received a reply to his telegram mentioned in paragraph 2, Embassy’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m. 4. Dodds tells me that Horinouchi, after long consideration, thanked him warmly for this act of friendship, presumably referring to the counseling of moderation in Nanking. Horinouchi furthermore expressed optimism as to a peaceful outcome and gave Dodds explicit assurances that no Japanese troops had yet been moved from Japan Proper or Chosen and that no mobilization had taken place. 5. In my conversation with Dodds today he gave me a somewhat different impression of Eden’s representations to Yoshida (paragraph 3, Embassy’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m.). Eden apparently told Yoshida that the present moment for opening the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations would not be opportune if the situation in China were allowed to become worse. It is not clear that Eden referred to reenforcements. 6. The French Ambassador has been told by his Government that he may make in Tokyo representations similar to those of his British and American colleagues. I am informed that he strongly disapproves of making representations of any kind and that he will for the present ignore the authorization given him. He is convinced that the Japanese did not premeditate or commence the incident and he believes that they are anxious to avoid war (see paragraph 4, Embassy’s 192, July 13, 5 p.m. 15 ) 7. As this telegram was about to be despatched, Department’s 115, July 14, 7 p.m., 16 was received and has just been decoded. I am sending it as drafted and without abridging it as it may be of interest to the Department to learn how events have unfolded here. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 13 Not printed. 14 Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. 15 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 319 . 16 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8791: Telegram [Document 166] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 16, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 16—10:50 a.m.] 285. My 284, July 15, 7 p.m. 1. The occasion of the informant’s presentation of Japan’s attitude toward China indicated to me hopeless divergence between their conceptions of fundamental issues. Informant described organization of society in Japan which makes the group responsible for individuals and enjoins the duty of admonishing neighbors who offend against the social code. He said it was foolish for the Chinese stubbornly to demand settlement of the political issues first of all when they have failed to demonstrate good faith with Japan by settling any practical details in dispute. He said China has repeatedly, rudely and most unwisely rebuffed Japan’s offers of friendship and of neighborly economic cooperation, as for example, when an economic mission recently visited China, so that even former advocates of the friendly policy of Shidehara 17 are convinced that the Chinese respond favorably only to force. Chinese diplomacy at best consists of empty promises never fulfilled. Informant observed that whereas in one respect China occupied the superior position because China could exist even if “Japan were submerged in the ocean” and Japan could not possibly exist without economic relations with China, nevertheless in another respect Japan holds the superior position. His remarks showed that he meant Japan has the military power to enforce its will. Almost the only reasonableness conceded by the informant to China’s dislike of Japan was in connection with China’s objection to “Manchukuo” and he urged that the existence of this country is an unalterable fact which China in its own interest would be wise to recognize. 2. During informant’s explanation I exerted every effort to grasp his point of view and opposed no arguments beyond merely suggesting that the friendly advances of Japan possibly would be received more favorably if Japan would try to dissipate China’s fear. He said this policy had failed. He seemed ignorant of, or to dismiss as unworthy of argument, the prevalent Chinese belief that every so-called offer of “friendly economic cooperation” is attempted exploitation and the fear and indignation inspired in the Chinese by the idea of Japanese hegemony in the Far East as well as the suspicion prompting China to reject Japan’s offer of friendly supervision of China’s international and economic development which offer the Chinese believe is prompted solely by self interest. The informant admitted that China is imbued with a new and sometimes extreme nationalistic feeling but he strongly depreciated this feeling on the ground, as I inferred, that China has not sufficient military strength to justify it. 3. The informant recalled that he had at the first opportunity called on the American Ambassador when the latter was in Nanking and had tried to explain to him as he had to me true inwardness of Japanese feeling toward China. Among Chinese officials he had recently directed his efforts at persuasion principally at the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Interior. In leaving he expressed a wish to revive the “intimate relations” which he and I enjoyed during his service in Nanking about 3 years ago. 4. The informant impressed me with his sincere devotion to peace if Japan’s justifiable moderate expectations were met by China and it seemed to me that he expressed his honest conviction on all points. This impression has led me to report his remarks in detail although in condensed form as exhibiting the conflict between Japanese and Chinese views on even basic questions. 5. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck 17 Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs who retired in December 1931. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8783: Telegram [Document 167] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 16, 1937—noon. [Received July 16—12:58 a.m.] 204. The Naval Attaché was requested by the Navy Department to submit his own estimate of the North China situation and yesterday he telegraphed his report setting forth consensus of opinion of the entire Embassy. 18 Grew 18 It reported that the Japanese Government, including the Army, was in apparent agreement on a decisive course of action, probably meaning actual hostilities in North China, if the Chinese did not accept the Japanese proposals for settlement of recent clashes, and that the situation was serious though not beyond amicable settlement. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8790: Telegram [Document 168] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 16, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 16—10:20 a.m.] 245. It is understood that in an interview by the New York Times correspondent at Tientsin yesterday with a spokesman of the Japanese Army Headquarters it was disclosed that Japanese Army proposes to control the situation outside the City Walls and thereby compel the reopening of the Peiping city gates so that the Japanese Embassy guard here may be largely reenforced, ostensibly for the protection of Japanese lives and property inside the Tartar Wall. This is the first intimation that has been conveyed that the Japanese might resort to these tactics to compel the opening of the city gates. It will be recalled that several attempts have been made by detachments of Japanese troops to enter Peiping through closed gates but that admittance has been refused by Chinese soldiers on guard. It is significant that every train out of Peiping for the last 3 days has carried large numbers of Japanese nationals composed largely of women and children and Koreans and on the other hand there has been an influx within the past few days of rough-looking Japanese and Korean men. It is correct that the Japanese Embassy guard is now small numerically. For more of interview please see New York Times , presumably today’s date. By mail to Nanking, repeated to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8787: Telegram [Document 169] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 16, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 16—8:45 a.m.] 246. Tokyo’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m. to Washington. I agree thoroughly with analysis set forth in paragraph 5 of Grew’s telegram. There is every indication that the Japanese Government intends to deal with this North China question without reference to Nanking. Japanese Ambassador at present in Tientsin. Rumors now reaching us of discussions at Tientsin confirm me in the belief that it is present intention of Japanese to eliminate all Nanking influence here, substituting therefor a régime amenable to Japanese control. Statement made to Abend by the Japanese military command at Tientsin and telegraphed yesterday by Abend to New York Times supports this point of view. Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8800: Telegram [Document 170] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 16, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 16—1:20 p.m.] 287. 1. I called on Vice Minister Hsu Mo and informed him that the Department deemed it advisable that the Ambassador remain in Peiping for the time being. The Vice Minister informed me in reply to questions that General Chiang is in Ruling, that he is in supreme and also active control of troop movements and that the Minister of War functions under him. No field commander-in-chief for North China has been appointed. 2. In general conversation the Vice Minister asked whether the American Government had made any representations in Tokyo relating to the present crisis with Japan. I replied I had no knowledge of any. He said that the Chinese Government is aware that the American Government favors individual rather than simultaneous or joint representations and remarked that his Government did not know the nature of the views expressed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary on July 12. I replied that they had been similar to those expressed to the Chinese representative. 3. The Vice Minister inquired at what stage the American neutrality law 19 would be made applicable to the present crisis. I have replied that the law authorized the President to apply it when hostilities threatened to involve the United States in danger. He commented that as he understood the law it would bear more disadvantageously on China as the weaker contestant since Japan did not need as China did access to financial and material resources. He observed that the Chinese people actually hope for the assistance of the United States in their trouble and if on the contrary a law is applied which in fact helps Japan there cannot but be strong popular reaction caused by disappointment. He hoped there would be no early application of the law. 4. He observed that the policy of isolation from war adopted by the American Government might seem wise but a major conflict in the Far East would certainly entail serious world repercussions involvement in which it would be difficult for the United States to avoid and he wondered whether an effort to obviate such a conflict was not really the wiser course for the United States to pursue rather than to attempt isolation. 5. The Vice Minister knew of no attempts to negotiate fresh settlement terms in the North. He said the Japanese Embassy had not, as reported, denied the right of the National Government to intervene but neither had the Japanese Embassy seriously attempted to reach a settlement with the Foreign Office. 6. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck 19 Approved August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081. As amended February 29, 1936, 49 Stat 1152, and May 1, 1937, 50 Stat 121. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8794: Telegram [Document 171] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 16, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 16—11:45 a.m.] 288. Since drafting my 287, July 16, 3 p.m., the British Ambassador has informed me (although as he said without instruction to do so) of his representations made yesterday and their result which have been telegraphed to Washington and Peiping. This information explained the Vice Minister’s remarks (see end paragraph 4) and his further observation that the British Government seemed more active during this crisis than the American Government, thus reversing the circumstances when the Manchurian incident occurred. Although I did not know then that the British Ambassador had already taken the step described in the Department’s July 14, 7 p.m., 20 paragraph 1, I replied that I was not aware that any Government had taken any step in connection with this crisis otherwise than the Secretary’s representations made on July 12. I informed the British Ambassador of the Department’s July 14, 7 p.m., paragraph 3, and we exchanged information and views and agreed to maintain contact. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck 20 Telegram No. 105, not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8789: Telegram [Document 172] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 16—11:05 a.m.] 205. Following is summary of an extended account which Yoshizawa 21 gave “personally and unofficially” to Dooman 22 this afternoon of the situation in North China. 1. The 29th Chinese Army and the Hopei-Chahar authorities have not thus far disavowed the agreement which they signed and gave to the Japanese on July 11. It will take some time to carry out the terms of that agreement but no overt act has been taken by the 29th Army which would conclusively indicate that the agreement is not to be carried out or is to be disavowed. 2. The steady development of plans of the Chinese Government to mobilize its forces and to concentrate them in North China was the principal cause for the decision taken yesterday by the Japanese Government to send reenforcements from Japan to North China and so to assure the safety of the Japanese forces in the Peiping area. 3. Out of the Marco Polo Bridge incident there have developed two virtually separate and distinct questions: (1) settlement of the incident arising out of hostilities between the 29th Army and the Japanese forces and (2) the question whether the Chinese Government will observe the terms of the Ho–Umezu Agreement. With regard to the first question in addition to the circumstances set forth in paragraph 1 above, the 29th Army is composed of various conflicting elements which can be roughly grouped into two factions: one which advocates resistance to the Japanese and the other which advocates coming to terms with the Japanese on the basis of the agreement of July 11. The indications are that the latter is in the ascendency. With regard to the second question there could be no solution satisfactory to the Japanese other than strict observance by the Chinese Government of the Ho–Umezu Agreement. 4. If the Chinese Government forces should cross the Ho-Umezu line, there are in Yoshizawa’s “personal” opinion three possible developments: ( a ) the Japanese military will move against the Central Chinese forces with the “friendly cooperation or possibly with the support” of the 29th Army; ( b ) the Japanese Army will move against the Central Chinese forces with the 29th Army maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality; ( c ) the Japanese military may have to deal with both the Central Chinese forces and the 29th Army. Of these three possible developments Yoshizawa thought that ( b ) would be the most likely. 5. An officer in the War Office in conversation this afternoon with the Military Attaché 23 expressed the opinion that there is a “50–50” chance that a peaceful settlement of the whole affair will be reached. He also stressed the importance attached to faithful observance of Ho–Umezu Agreement although no serious view is being taken of minor violations which have occurred to date. The officer affirmed as did the Foreign Office yesterday that the agreement of July 11 has no reference to economic or political questions. 6. The Military Attaché states in his report to me that he believes from various indications that part (probably a brigade of two infantry régiments with some artillery, cavalry, and engineers attached) of the 6th Division stationed in Southern Kyushu sailed from Shimonoseki last night; that a partial mobilization of some units including the requisitioning of motor vehicles is under way and that supplies of aviation gasoline are being accumulated. There are ample indications that Japan is preparing to use the force necessary to compel execution of the agreement of July 11 if that agreement is not carried out voluntarily. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 21 Director of the American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office. 22 Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan. 23 Lt. Col. William C. Crane. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8793: Telegram [Document 173] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 16—12:45 p.m.] 479. Your No. 298, July 14, 7 p.m., 24 referring to the British Ambassador’s conversations with you, Cadogan stated today that he had no additional information and that he felt his Government had done all it could at least for the moment. Bingham 24 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8797: Telegram [Document 174] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 16—1:10 p.m.] 247. Department’s 115, July 13, 2 p.m. 25 On July 14 the French Ambassador informed me that he had received a telegram from Paris stating that Japanese Ambassador had informed the French Foreign Office of the North China situation and had stated that Japan could no longer countenance the anti-Japanese situation existing in North China; that the nation was behind the Japanese Government in its determination to take such steps as might be necessary to eliminate this anti-Japanese feeling. The French Ambassador stated that the Japanese Ambassador had added that Japan had no intention of taking any action in South China. We both interpret this to mean that Japanese Government is determined now to take all steps necessary to separate this area from Nanking. Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking. Johnson 25 See footnote 71, p. 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8792: Telegram [Document 175] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 16—11:30 a.m.] 206. 1. In view of the announcement of the commencement of troops movements from Japan to China and also in view of the Vice Minister’s favorable reaction to his representations yesterday (my 203, July 15, 11 p.m., paragraph 4), the British Chargé d’Affaires again called on the Vice Minister this morning and made to him the following oral statement: “The Japanese Government must of course be the judge of what measures are necessary for the security of their troops in North China. It is hoped that the representations being made at Nanking by His Majesty’s Ambassador will succeed in persuading the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation more difficult. The Chinese Government may however be unwilling to listen to his representations if they are able to show that large reenforcements are being sent to the Japanese garrison in North China. The sole object of His Majesty’s Government is to do all they can to ensure the maintenance of peace between the two powers with whom Great Britain is always anxious to remain on the best of terms.” 2. Strictly secret as requested by informant. Thereupon and without instructions from his Government Dodds communicated orally to the Vice Minister the contents of a telegram just then received from the British Ambassador in Nanking which I paraphrase as follows: ( a ) Chiang Kai-shek, with whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nanking has now communicated, has made a most categorical statement to the effect that all movements of Chinese troops have, as a result of troop movements by Japan, [been made?] solely for self-defense. The Generalissimo states that he entertains no intentions whatever of starting hostilities. ( b ) The Chinese Government is ready to withdraw troops to their positions prior to the incident and to terminate all troop movements in the affected area if similar action is taken by the Japanese Government. The utmost importance is attached by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the avoidance of aggravating the situation and as a preliminary measure he suggests that on July 17 all troop movement on both sides shall stop. Arrangements could be made thereafter for restoration of the previous positions. The foregoing proposal would be conditional on the understanding that no attempt to occupy positions of strategic importance would in the meantime be attempted by either side or in other words a gentleman’s agreement under which there would be no attempt to take advantage of this intervening period. (End of oral communication). 3. After communicating the foregoing statement Dodds asked the Vice Minister his reaction. Dodds states that no reaction was forthcoming. Dodds pointed out the seriousness of the situation and that time is at present a vital factor in preventing hostilities. He said that this is a moment for the statesmen and not the soldiers to control. The Vice Minister still made no comment. 4. Dodds [made his?] communication in paragraph 2 to the Vice Minister without instructions from his Government and he is somewhat apprehensive lest his actions meet with disapproval in London. 5. The French Ambassador informs Dodds that he is still determined to take no step unless categorically directed by his Government to do so. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8798: Telegram [Document 176] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 16—1 p.m.] 248. Embassy’s 239, July 15, 4 p.m. 26 1. It is learned from a foreign source and from a local Chinese official that the following eight demands have been presented by the Japanese to the Chinese negotiators at Tientsin for acceptance by July 18: (1) Tientsin to be under the East Hopei régime; (2) Peiping, Fengtai and Wanpinghsien (district) to be part of the demilitarized zone; (3) Tangku to be made into a naval base for the East Hopei régime; (4) the Peiping railway from Peiping to Mukden to be administered by the Japanese; (5) the 29th Army to be removed to Paoting-Shihchla-chuang; (6) note issue of East Hopei and Manchukuo to be permitted free circulation in “North China”; (7) Japanese to be granted special concessions (powers recombined) in Tientsin; (8) every means must be taken to check Communist propaganda in “North China”. 2. The Embassy is not convinced that the Japanese demands are as stated but believes that it is probably true that considerable Japanese pressure is now being exerted on the Chinese negotiators who have gathered at Tientsin (Chin Teh Chun and Liu Ju Ming being the only important 29th Army officials who are absent). The negotiations would appear to be directed, as far as the Japanese are concerned, toward the achieving in part at least of the program they have harbored so long for increasing the degree of autonomy in North China in favor of Japanese projects in this area. Whether the Chinese negotiators will sign is generally believed by observers to depend largely on the amount of support given by the National Government to the 29th Army group at this juncture. An officer from the Military Attaché’s office reported this morning from Hsuchow (Anhwei) that no troop movements northward are to be observed on the Tientsin–Pukow Railway. An observer sent to Paoting has not yet reported. However, Japanese planes make daily reconnaissance flights over the Marco Polo Bridge area and Paoting. It is believed probable that no National Government planes are to be found in Paoting although some former Chang Hsueh Liang or Kuominchun troops may have arrived. 3. Repeated Tokyo, Nanking and Shanghai. Johnson 26 Not printed. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/8874 [Document 177] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 16, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador 26a called on the Secretary this afternoon on the Ambassador’s own initiative. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Hornbeck be present, and, the Ambassador having assented, Mr. Hornbeck was called in. The Ambassador handed to the Secretary and Mr. Hornbeck copies of a memorandum, a copy of which is here attached. 27 While the Secretary was reading this memorandum, Mr. Hornbeck inquired of the Ambassador whether the figure “200,000” with regard to Japanese troops was not perhaps a typographical error. The Ambassador said that he felt that it probably was such, but that it had so come to him. He pointed out to the Secretary that probably in place of “200,000” the memorandum should read “20,000.” The Secretary said that we regarded this whole situation as most unfortunate and that we were very desirous that peace be maintained. There followed a conversation in the course of which there came up mention of the Nine Power Treaty (which treaty is mentioned, along with the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League, in the memorandum). The Ambassador said that he hoped that the powers would take some action, it might possibly be the powers party to the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether the Ambassador would feel inclined to give for the Secretary’s benefit any statement in exposition of his, the Ambassador’s, view with regard to a specific question: Would the making of any direct representations by the powers, either individually or in a group, contribute toward maintenance of the peace or would it contribute toward just the opposite. The Ambassador made the affirmation that in his opinion it would tend to deter the Japanese from going to lengths which, if persisted in, would have to be resisted forcefully by China. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether such had been the effect of the action taken by the League and the United States in 1931. The Ambassador again said that representations by the powers would tend to restrain the Japanese. The Secretary said that we greatly appreciated the Ambassador’s having come in and having given us information and his views, that we wanted him to come in at any time, and that we were very solicitous that peace be maintained. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 26a Chengting T. Wang. 27 Infra. The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/8874 [Document 178] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 28 Memorandum Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident in the night of July 7th, when the Japanese troops in the course of their maneuvers (which were not permissible even under the terms of the Protocol of 1901), suddenly opened an attack on the city of Wanping and met with resistance from the local garrison, the Chinese authorities, anxious to reach a peaceful settlement, have used their best efforts to arrange for the cessation of hostilities by mutual withdrawal of troops. But, almost immediately after each successive arrangement was made, it was nullified by the resumption of attack by Japanese forces. In the meantime, fighting has been extended to the immediate environs of Peiping, while a large number of Japanese reinforcements are being rapidly sent into Hopei province from Manchuria, Korea and Japan. It is estimated that over 100 aeroplanes and 200,000 troops have already been concentrated in the Peiping and Tientsin area ready to precipitate a major clash at any moment. It needs scarcely to be pointed out that the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces constitute a clear violation of China’s sovereignty, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Nine Power Treaty, the Peace Pact of Paris, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The crisis thus precipitated by Japan’s aggressive action in China, if permitted to take its own course, will not only immediately disturb the peace in East Asia, but also may entail unforeseen consequences to the rest of the world. While China is obliged to employ all the means at her disposal to defend her territory, and national honor and existence, she nevertheless holds herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known in international law and treaties. [ Washington ,] July 15, 1937. [For papers concerning the statement on fundamental principles of international policy by the Secretary of State, July 16, see volume I, pages 697 ff.] 28 Handed to the Secretary of State on July 16 by the Chinese Ambassador. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8811: Telegram [Document 179] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 17, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 11:15 a.m.] 289. 1. Following information published by Central News Agency under date July 16 was issued unofficially not by Foreign Office, and is understood to be based in part on reports received from Chinese Embassy in Japan: the 5th, 6th, 10th, 12th and 16th Japanese Army Divisions with estimated total strength of not less than 100,000 have left Japan for various destinations in China and Korea. Two of them have orders to proceed direct to North China, others will wait for further orders in Korea. Japanese reservists throughout Korea have been called up for immediate service in anticipation of the standing army in Korea being despatched to China. Thirty-one merchant vessels have been chartered by the Japanese military for transport of troops and munitions from Japan. (See Tientsin’s July 16, 2 p.m. 29 ) At Tientsin four more trains of munitions, army trucks and cars and other military supplies arrived July 16th and Japanese forces along the Peiping-Tientsin section of the railway have been increased by more than 500 soldiers and some 20 field guns. Elaborate defense works have been erected around Fengtai and many mines are being planted; an airfield has already been constructed at Chaochiaotsun in the southern neighborhood of Fengtai and four Japanese planes are on reconnaissance duty there. A Japanese cruiser and several destroyers have arrived Tsingtao and the Japanese reservists there have been called together and given special instructions. 2. Press reports several days ago stated two squadrons of destroyers were leaving Formosa for South China ports including Foochow, Amoy, Swatow to “guard against anti-Japanese agitation”. 3. Sent to the Department, Peiping. By courier to Shanghai, Tokyo. Peck 29 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8809: Telegram [Document 180] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 17, 1937—noon. [Received July 17—4:23 a.m.] 252. Following telegram has been received from the Consul General [at] Tientsin. 30 “July 16, noon. Interviewed by foreign newspapermen yesterday, Japanese Ambassador stated that present situation was local affair between Chinese-Japanese military; did not directly concern him as he is accredited to the National Government, and settlement must be on military basis excluding political issues. Replying to question [he] stated that he had never contemplated possibility establishing autonomy of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council on basis similar to the existing East Hopei régime. Sung Che Yuan reported to have held a conference yesterday with senior officers of the 29th Route Army and also received General Kazuki. This is the first time he has consented to meet Japanese commander and it is reported that they considered results of conversation held for some days in Tientsin between respective subordinates, including Chen Chueh Sheng, Chang Tsu Chung, General Hashimoto, Colonel Wachi”. Johnson 30 John K. Caldwell. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8812: Telegram [Document 181] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 17, 1937—noon. [Received July 17—9:50 a.m.] 290. 1. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Hidaka yesterday saw Kao Tsung Wu, Director of the Department of Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office and stated to Kao that (1) the Japanese Government has the impression that the Chinese Government and in particular Chiang Kai-shek does not realize the gravity of the situation in North China and (2) an additional and very important element of danger has been injected into the situation by “the Communists”, (he implied that he meant the Comintern and the Soviet Government) who are attempting to aggravate the trouble between China and Japan. The Secretary said that Kao who is personally close to Chiang would fly to Kuling tomorrow and attempt to impress this view upon the Generalissimo. The Secretary asked that the information concerning Kao’s proposed visit to Chiang be treated as strictly confidential. 2. In regard to Communistic activities, the informant said (possibly for propaganda purposes) that his Embassy had been told by a high Chinese official that the Chinese Government had been intercepting telegrams from Moscow to agents in China which revealed these activities. Sent to the Department, Peiping and Tokyo. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8813: Telegram [Document 182] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 17, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 17—10:30 a.m.] 291. 1. The informant cited in our 290, July 17, noon, confirmed in general information concerning Japanese military developments set forth in our 289, July 17, 9 a.m., except that only sections of each division are being sent and not full strength divisions. 2. We are told by a foreign military adviser and other sources that (1) most of the Chinese troop movements northward (seven to eight divisions) have been along the Peiping–Hankow Railway; (2) the first division went north on the Tientsin–Pukow; (3) the first division is well equipped but the others are mediocre in equipment and personnel; (4) the “crack” 30th, 87th and 88th Divisions remain between here and Shanghai to prevent any incursion toward the capital of Japanese troops from Shanghai as was threatened by the Japanese in 1932; (5) yesterday an air contingent of 100 ground men left Nanking for the north; (6) the national military authorities are purposely refraining from despatching troops to the present area of hostilities because they ( a ) want peace if possible; and, ( b ) in case of war wish the brunt of first engagements to fall upon the 29th Army and similar forces. According to the adviser cited, this means that they are risking the loss of North China rather than risk their best divisions in battle. 3. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8801: Telegram [Document 183] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 17, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 17—6:23 a.m.] 207. 1. In replying to the telegram from the British Ambassador in Nanking referred to in paragraph 2, Embassy’s 206, July 16, 7 p.m., the British Foreign Minister informed the Ambassador that the British Government desired to abstain from offering mediation unless it should be requested by both sides. In his view the suggestion of the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs for a cessation of all troop movements on July 17 could appropriately be communicated to the Japanese Government through Chinese diplomatic channels which were still open. 2. Dodds is not yet aware whether his second communication to the Vice Minister yesterday will have been regarded in London as “mediation” or whether the British Foreign Office will have approved or disapproved his step. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8822: Telegram [Document 184] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , July 17, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 17—2 p.m.] 333. My 332, July 17, 1 p.m. 31 The British Ambassador here discussed the Sino-Japanese crisis with the Minister of Foreign Affairs here yesterday and Count Ciano told him that the Italian Government naturally viewed with concern the recent developments in the Far East and that although Italian interests there were not of great importance he fully realized that an outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan would inevitably produce consequences the magnitude and extent of which could not be foreseen and from which no country might regard itself as immune. He added that whereas Italy entertained a feeling of sympathy for Japan, especially as a result of the Japanese recognition of the Empire, the Italian Government did not wish to see Japanese aggression in China and in conclusion informed the British Ambassador that he proposed to instruct the Italian representatives in China and Japan to counsel moderation. The Japanese Ambassador here is inclined to a pessimistic view as to a peaceful solution of the crisis and points out that although the Japanese Government is understood to be confining the shipment of reinforcements to Dairen a concentration of Chinese forces in that part might give rise to incidents which would be developed into a general conflict. He added that the Japanese Government viewed with resentment the reported action of the French Government whereby Delbos in a conversation with the Japanese representative in Paris is said to have offered his “good offices” in the conflict and that this démarche was regarded in Tokyo as inspired from Moscow. Phillips 31 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8802: Telegram [Document 185] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 17—7:54 a.m.] 208. At a conference which the Prime Minister held last night with the War and Navy Ministers, continued this morning with the added presence of the Foreign and Finance Ministers, it was decided that direct negotiations should be opened with the Chinese Central Government for which purpose Ambassador Kawagoe has been directed to proceed immediately to Nanking. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8814: Telegram [Document 186] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 8:50 p.m.] 293. An American-educated official having a very important post in the Chinese Government and close relations with General Chiang described the northern crisis briefly as follows: The Japanese conquest of Manchuria, then of Jehol, and 2 years ago the forcing of the Ho-Umetsu Agreement show that the present Japanese attempt to consolidate their gains in Hopei is merely a step in a methodical program. If successful, the process will be repeated in successive advances without foreseeable limits. Consequently minor details of the occurrence and even the terms now being negotiated locally are inconsequential. The question the Chinese Government must decide is at what juncture to attempt to stem the Japanese advance. At the present stage Japan is immeasurably superior to China in military strength. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government is determined that there shall be no repetition of the Mukden incident when the mere presence of the Japanese Army magically transformed Chinese into Japanese territory. 2. The Chinese Government is without representatives in Tientsin, although some are going, and does not know what terms are being discussed by local military officers and it disavows the whole proceeding. Informant believes that at least a portion of the 29th Army especially the 37th Division at Peiping will fight rather than submit to such terms as evacuation to the south. Informant branded as propaganda to weaken the morale of the 29th Army the Tokyo press despatch published yesterday quoting a high Japanese Army officer as stating that the Chinese Government intends to utilize the Japanese to destroy the 29th Army. Informant thought the 29th Army must know that the Chinese Government will support it if fighting occurs. Informant said that the political unification of China has not been completed and his considered opinion is that the Government would be overthrown if it did not fight either to prevent actual alienation of Hopei or in support of the 29th Army in the event of hostilities. Although I indicated a desire to learn whether the Chinese Government had sent troops to the north or made other preparations for fighting the Japanese, informant refused comment. Having left General Chiang July 13 informant may not know the latter’s decision. 3. I thoroughly agree with Peiping’s July 17, 1 p.m., 32 that the future is obscure but my impression is that the Chinese Government may decide to defer armed resistance to a time of its own choosing unless its hands are forced as described above. I was informed by a former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 2 years ago that the Chinese Government would not attempt to retain by force of arms the area north of the Yellow River. The present interview was remarkable in that the informant did not question me about foreign mediation. In an interview some months ago he informed me Chinese leaders had learned that China could expect no effective assistance from other countries against Japan and that China must work out its own salvation. Sent to the Department, Peiping, and Tokyo. Peck 32 Telegram No. 253, not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8815: Telegram [Document 187] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 17, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 17—11:55 a.m.] 294. A responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy has just telephoned to an officer of this mission that the Assistant Japanese Military Attaché, Okido, at 6 o’clock this evening delivered a written memorandum to the Chinese Vice Minister of War to the effect that if the National Government, in disregard of the Ho–Umetsu Agreement, despatches troops including air contingents into North China the Japanese military will take whatever measures they consider necessary and any eventualities which may develop from those steps will be the sole responsibility of the Chinese Government. 2. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Peck Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9065 [Document 188] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 17, 1937. The French Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Jules Henry, came in this morning by appointment asked for by him. He said that since making the appointment yesterday he had seen the statement which the Secretary made yesterday evening 33 and that it amounted to an answer to the question which he had expected to ask: it indicated what is the American Government’s position and action. Mr. Hornbeck said that he was very desirous of having a clear understanding of just what had occurred on July 13: Mr. Henry had called him in the morning on the telephone and had stated that the French Government had instructed its Ambassadors in Japan and in China to make representations to the Governments to which they were accredited; Mr. Henry had asked what the American Government was doing; and Mr. Hornbeck had informed Mr. Henry of the action which the Department had taken on the previous day. Thereafter, in the afternoon, Mr. Gaucheron had come from the French Embassy and had stated to Mr. Hamilton that the information which the Embassy had given us in the morning was not complete; that the French Ambassadors in Japan and in China had been instructed to make representations, but, only subject to the making of representations likewise by the British and the American Governments. Mr. Henry said that what had happened was that they had received two telegrams, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. At that point, Mr. Hornbeck was called to the Secretary. As he and Mr. Henry walked out together, Mr. Hornbeck said that in the course of a conversation with Mr. Gaucheron on July 14 the conversation had been terminated with a request on our part that the French Embassy keep us informed of action taken by the French Government. Mr. Henry said that he had not been informed of any action taken except that of the instruction dealt with in the earlier part of the present conversation. Mr. Hornbeck said that, as we had not been informed of any action taken by the French Government, he would take the liberty of saying again what he had said to Mr. Gaucheron, namely, that we would appreciate being informed of such action as has been or may be taken by the French Government. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 33 Vol. i , p. 699 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8823: Telegram [Document 189] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 18, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 18—5:50 a.m.] 295. Our 290, July 17, noon. 1. Hidaka called last night at midnight on the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and handed him a memorandum pointing out the gravity of the situation in North China and urging that the National Government despatch no further troops northward and refrain from “further provocative acts”. Inquiry of the Foreign Office by an officer of the Embassy met with admission by a responsible official that a document along these general lines had been presented last night to Wang by Hidaka, but the Foreign Office was still studying the document and the official was, therefore, not yet in a position to discuss it. 2. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy the document was merely an aide-mémoire left by Hidaka to summarize his remarks made under instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office, that the situation in the North is very grave and that if the National Government really desires a peaceful settlement it should not send any more troops northward or continue in its “disturbing” attitude. The secretary states that Hidaka requested a definite reply and Wang told him that the gravity of the matter would require a meeting of the Executive Yuan, he would call such meeting, and a reply to the Japanese Embassy would be duly made tomorrow. 3. The Chinese Foreign Office spokesman confirmed the details of the call of the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché upon the War Ministry as described in our 294, July 17, 9 p.m., and stated that this particular démarche by the Japanese War Office had naturally been expected by the Chinese Government. 4. The Foreign Office official also stated that, as reported in the’ press, Chinese diplomatic representatives had delivered on June [ July ] 16 identic memoranda 34 to seven signatories of the Nine Power Treaty; he appeared unwilling to describe their contents and stated that the texts had not been handed to any foreign diplomatic missions in China or otherwise given out here. 5. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck 34 Presumably memorandum from the Chinese Embassy to the Department of State, July 15, p. 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8821: Telegram [Document 190] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 18, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 18—6:25 a.m.] 255. Embassy’s 253, July 17, 1 p.m. 35 1. The Chinese who is administering Peiping National University during the absence at Kuling of Chiang Monlin and Hu Shih, informed a member of my staff last evening that he and four other representatives of educators in Peiping had a conversation with Sung Che Yuan at Tientsin on the afternoon of July 16. According to the informant, Sung stated that he had not yet signed any agreement and that he was not himself negotiating with the Japanese. The informant said that Sung had apparently not yet decided what course he would pursue. On the one hand Sung expressed the views that ( a ) he could not sign excessive demands; ( b ) if he signed such demands, it would only mean that a few weeks or a few months later the Japanese would present fresh demands to him, ( c ) the 29th Army, which is united in its views about the Japanese, would not submit peacefully to an agreement including excessive concessions to the Japanese, ( d ) he was willing to agree to mutual apologies, a withdrawal (undefined) of some Chinese forces, punishment in some degree of Chinese immediately involved, and a vague promise to put down anti-Japanese activities. On the other hand he showed lack of determination by ( a ) stating that it might be advisable for him to enter into some sort of agreement in order to give China a few months more to prepare for war, ( b ) by criticizing the National Government for not putting him in command of troops approaching from the South and for not sending troops north along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and ( c ) by saying that he might be willing to agree to enforcement of the Ho–Umetsu Agreement. This last admission made the educators uneasy because no one seems definitely to know how broad the terms of that agreement may be. The educators have the opinion that Sung seemed considerably more inclined to refuse to submit to excessive demands than to accept such. 2. A Secretary of Embassy of the Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff yesterday that Major General Hashimoto, Chang Tzu Chung, and Chen Chueh Sheng are conducting negotiations in Tientsin; that details of the agreement of July 11 are under discussion; that he assumes that, following settlement of those details, negotiations for a political settlement will be begun; that the Japanese are insisting upon the withdrawal from Peiping of all troops of the 37th Division. The Japanese Embassy informed an American press correspondent later yesterday that the Embassy is pessimistic of a successful outcome because of the disinclination of the Chinese to come to a satisfactory agreement. 3. Future developments seem to be [ depend on? ] ( a ) the degree of determination [of] Sung, ( b ) the attitude of the 29th Army, ( c ) the removal of the 29th Army’s suspicion of the National Government, ( d ) the attitude and actions of the National Government, and ( e ) the degree of determination of the Japanese. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Johnson 35 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8827: Telegram [Document 191] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 18, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 18—10:20 a.m.] 256. 1. The French Ambassador informed me last evening that he had received instructions to go to Nanking to be near the Government. When I told him of Department’s instructions to me he said he would request Paris to authorize him to go if and when I do. 2. Once more he spoke of what the powers might do to ameliorate the situation. After discarding the Nine Power Treaty and the League Commission he said that he found one basis for common action to which he thought no objection could be raised by Japanese or Chinese, namely, the Boxer Protocol and specifically that provision thereof which provides that communication shall be kept open to the sea. He remarked that he believed the Chinese wanted an excuse for signing an agreement with the Japanese and expressed the belief that if the Boxer Protocol powers insisted on communication being kept open this would give them the necessary excuse. He reasoned that fighting here would close off communication. If the protocol were observed by both sides there would be no fighting. The Chinese could excuse their act on the ground that they had to sign to prevent fighting and thus prevent a violation of the protocol. I remarked that the net result might be to turn resentment from their negotiations to us as the ones who had forced them to sign away their rights. I also pointed out that the line was in the hands of one of the Protocol powers from Chinwangtao to Tientsin and that that power threatens to take over the line from Tientsin to Peiping. 3. I do not believe that the time has come when I can be of use in Nanking. If the Japanese do attempt to force their way into Peiping, I think there will be some value in my being present here to witness the act and the means. I do not believe that they will go so far as to bomb this city or main street fighting here for the purpose of ousting the 2700 soldiers of the 37th Division guarding its gates. 4. The French Ambassador told me yesterday that he told Shima of the Japanese Embassy, who came to him on another matter, that if the Japanese Army bombed the city or started street fighting inside the walls, they would stand before the world as murderers of women and children. He expressed the hope to Shima that he would communicate his views to the Japanese Ambassador now at Tientsin. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8824: Telegram [Document 192] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 18—9:38 a.m.] 257. With reference to my 256, July 18, 3 p.m. The French Ambassador has just sent to me the following draft of a letter which he proposes that the British, French, Italian and American Embassies address identically to the Japanese Ambassador and to General Sung Che Yuan. The following is a translation from the French: “Project of an identical letter to be addressed simultaneously to His Excellency Mr. Kawagoe and to General Sung Che Yuan. Mr. Ambassador or Mr. President: As you are aware, the freedom of communication between Peiping and the sea constitutes one of the principal provisions of protocol of September 7, 1901. It goes without saying that any hostilities in the region extending between Peiping and the sea and in the neighboring zones would be of a nature to destroy the freedom of communication or to place it in serious danger. In bringing these facts to Your Excellency’s benevolent attention I have no doubt that you will be good enough to intervene with the interested Japanese-Chinese authorities in order that they will abstain from taking any action which might directly or indirectly affect the freedom of communication between Peiping and the sea, which freedom is indispensable to the safety of the diplomatic corps, the occupation corps, the guards of the embassies, the foreign colonies. The same communication has been addressed to His Excellency Mr. Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador in China (or ‘to General Sung Che Yuan, President of the Political Council of Hopei and Chahar’). Accept, Excellency, etc.” It is his belief that such a letter might serve to prevent fighting and open the way to some further action in the interests of peace. It is my opinion that Japanese reply would be that their aim is within the Protocol to keep communications open. Chinese reply would be that they have no desire to interrupt but that the railway is being used by Protocol power with hostile intent and entirely outside the scope of the Protocol. I doubt whether note will accomplish purpose he has in mind. Nevertheless I promised to communicate it to you and ask for instructions as to whether I could join in such action if the other powers agreed. I may add that French Ambassador has referred this matter to Paris which replied that it was action not to be taken at the capitol but with local authorities. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8816: Telegram [Document 193] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 18—9:54 a.m.] 296. Our July 18, 11 a.m. 1. I was conversing with the British Ambassador July 18, 5 p.m., when the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned informing the Ambassador that Japanese military planes had bombed Shihchi-achwang, a junction point on the Peiping-Hankow Railway at 11:30 this morning and a place in Hopei near the Honan border called Sanhochiao (hour unspecified). 2. The British Ambassador saw the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon but the latter did not give him text of the circular communication to the powers. The British Ambassador saw the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs again this afternoon and was told that the precise nature of the reply to the Japanese memorandum delivered last night had not been framed but probably would categorically assert that the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory was a prerogative of the Chinese Government. Information believed by him to be reliable received by the British Ambassador from Kuling indicates that General Chiang knew what caused the Chinese Government to issue a statement pointing out that the forebearance hitherto shown by China toward Japan has always resulted in further injury and strongly asserting China’s rights. The British Ambassador and I agree that the two bombings today may precipitate stronger action by the Chinese Government but as yet we have no basis for predictions. 3. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8817: Telegram [Document 194] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 18, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 18—11:22 a.m.] It is reported that the Chinese and the Japanese reached an understanding here this afternoon under which Sung Che Yuan expressed regret that some of his subordinates had come into conflict with Japanese soldiers; agreed to punish a few of his subordinates; stated that he was already attending to the suppression of communism and anti-Japanese propaganda and agreed to the garrisoning of Wanping-hsien by Paoantui . 36 About 3,000 Japanese soldiers arrived here today from Shanhaikuan. Japanese have occupied all railway stations and are preparing additional quarters for their troops. Caldwell 36 Local militia. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8828: Telegram [Document 195] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 18, 1937—midnight. [Received July 18—9:13 p.m.] 297. 1. A foreign news correspondent stated that he has just been informed by the Foreign Office that: (1) Japanese military airplanes today made three attacks upon trains on the Peiping-Hankow Railway as follows: ( a ) at 11:30 a.m., a plane fired machine guns at a passing train at Changhochia, Honan, killing 2 and wounding 2 passengers; ( b ) at noon a plane fired machine guns at a southbound train from Paoting passing Kwanchuangtsun, Hopei, and inflicted 10 casualties; ( c ) at 12:30 p.m., a plane fired machine guns at a passing train in the vicinity of Yuanszehsien, Hopei, killing more than 10 persons; (2) the Foreign Office is lodging a protest 37 with the Japanese Embassy which inter alia: ( a ) demands that the Japanese military be instructed to cease these illegal activities and give guarantees of non-recurrence; ( b ) holds the Japanese Government responsible for the actions of the planes; ( c ) reserves the right of the Chinese Government to make further demands in connection with the incidents. 2. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Hankow. Peck 37 This protest was confirmed in telegram No. 299, July 19, 4 p.m., not printed. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9067 [Document 196] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 19, 1937. I called on the Chinese Ambassador yesterday afternoon and stated that I had dropped in simply to ask for the latest information received by the Ambassador. I said that I had just been informed that a radio announcer had stated that two Japanese airplanes had attacked a Chinese train. Dr. Wang said that he had had a telegram stating that Japanese planes had bombed a Chinese troop train at a point south of Paotingfu and that 20 persons had been killed. He said that this was the only telegram that he had had all day. He said that he was glad that I had dropped in as he wanted to ask me what was my personal opinion with regard to the intent of the Japanese: were the Japanese “bluffing.” I replied that, speaking personally and unofficially, I thought that the Japanese “mean business”; that it appears that they are intent upon getting some new agreement. The Ambassador said: “They will not get an agreement.” I said that it looked as though they wanted to obtain withdrawal of the 29th Army. The Ambassador said: “They will not get that.” He said that there was no area to which the 29th Army could go. I inquired how many men there are in that Army. The Ambassador replied that there were about 12,000. I said that I would like to ask for the Ambassador’s opinion as to whether our Ambassador, Mr. Johnson, should remain in Peiping: we had kept him there thus far because when the present incident began he was there and we had felt that an erroneous interpretation might be put upon a departure by him from there. The Ambassador said that he felt that it was preferable that our Ambassador remain in Peiping; and at a later point in the conversation he repeated his expression of that view. I asked whether the Ambassador could tell me the facts with regard to Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador replied that it was his understanding that Chiang Kai-shek was still at Kuling. I said: “How about his health?” The Ambassador said that Chiang’s health was good but that, due to the injury to vertebrae, he is wearing a steel cast and has to be very careful about refraining from any sudden movements. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the French Chargé (Henry) 793.94/9066 [Document 197] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation With the French Chargé ( Henry ) [ Washington ,] July 19, 1937. Mr. Henry called me on the telephone yesterday afternoon and stated that he had a telegram from his Foreign Office, dated July 16, which had been delayed in transmission. He said that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors at Paris in a sense similar to that in which the United States Secretary of State had spoken to the Embassies here of those two countries, urging maintenance of peace. He said that he also had a later telegram in which his Government wished to inquire what would be the view of the American and the British Governments, in the light of steps which have already been taken, of an appeal to the League of Nations or representations based on the Nine Power Treaty. To an inquiry on my part, Mr. Henry said that he thought that this matter need not be brought to the attention of the Secretary until this morning. Comment: It seems to me that we should be very cautious about committing ourselves in reply to this inquiry. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8829: Telegram [Document 198] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 19, 1937—noon. [Received July 19—6:30 a.m.] 298. Our 295, July 18, 11 a.m. 1. An officer of this Embassy has obtained from a responsible officer of the Japanese Embassy a “draft translation” made by the latter of the aide-mémoire , dated July 17, which Hidaka left with the Chinese Foreign Minister following their conversation of midnight July 17 as follows: 2. “As was made clear in their statement of the 11th of July, the Japanese Government, firmly resolved to prevent the situation from being aggravated and still pinning their hope on the negotiations for peace, are exerting every effort with a spirit of utmost restraint and perseverance to bring about an amicable settlement of the incidents at the hands of the local authorities concerned. It is a matter of great regret for the Japanese Government, however, that the Chinese Government not only persist in an unnecessarily provocative attitude but also are putting obstacles by all available means in the way of Chi Chia [ Hopei-Chahar ] Political Council authorities in carrying into effect the terms for settling the incidents, thus endangering the peace and stability in North China. The Japanese Government are therefore compelled to fear that, should the present situation be allowed to have its own course, it may take an unanticipated turn of extremely grave nature. In view of the repeated assurances of His Excellency, Dr. Wang Chung Hui, Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs, that the Chinese Government also entertain the policy of preventing the situation from being aggravated, the Japanese Government earnestly desire that, if such are the real intentions on their part, the Chinese Government will, in substantiation of their avowed intentions, put an immediate stop to all their provocative actions and refrain from impeding the carrying into effect of the terms reached between the local authorities concerned for the settlement of the incidents”. 3. Well informed news agency sources state that the Japanese Embassy has informed the Foreign Office that its reply to the aide-mémoire is expected by 11:30 tonight. Sent to Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8844: Telegram [Document 199] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 19, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 19—10:25 a.m.] 258. Following has been received from Peck: “July 18, 5 p.m. The British Ambassador seems to think it would be desirable for you to come to Nanking. In view of the Japanese bombing operations today and probable widening of conflict I am inclined to think you should be in personal contact with the Chinese Government. They evidently regret your absence. I [understand?] the British Embassy has sent circular telegrams to all British Consular officers and the commander-in-chief informing them of the present state of affairs. Since there is at least a possibility that general hostilities may now start I suggest we might similarly notify Consuls”. My position on the question of proceeding to Nanking remains as stated in my 228, July 13, 6 p.m., and paragraph 3 of my 256, July 18, 3 p.m. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8842: Telegram [Document 200] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 19—11:14 a.m.] 209. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires called on the Vice Minister yesterday afternoon for another conversation. The Vice Minister said that the situation looked brighter; that no Japanese troops had gone forward except from Manchuria and Korea; that the Japanese were doing their best to expedite a local settlement; that no political demands were included in the Japanese terms for settlement and that he could give assurances that the military would not demand more than the Government in Tokyo authorized. The Vice Minister added that the Japanese Government was not prepared to act on the “standstill” proposal communicated by the Chargé d’Affaires on July 16, as this was a matter for local consideration. He said that the proposal had been received only through Dodds and from no other source. 2. The Chargé d’Affaires tells me that the British Ambassador in Nanking has learned from Donald 38 that Chiang Kai-shek is planning to issue a proclamation calling for general resistance against Japan and that the Ambassador has strongly urged Donald to prevent the issuance of the proclamation. The Ambassador informs the Chargé d’Affaires that unless the Generalissimo resists the Japanese demands he will be eliminated from the picture and that an early local settlement is therefore most desirable. 3. In yesterday’s conversation the Vice Minister in Tokyo inquired of the Chargé d’Affaires “what the British Government had asked other Governments to do and what they had replied.” Dodds answered that the British Government had made no suggestions to the French or Soviet or any other Government except the United States. To the United States they had suggested that the American diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking should cooperate with the British representatives along the lines of Dodds’ various conversations with the Vice Minister in Tokyo but the American Government “had not seen fit to do so.” 4. Embassy’s 207, July 17, 3 p.m., paragraph 2. The British Foreign Office did not disapprove of the action taken by the Chargé d’Affaires here on July 16. In fact in the meantime he received instructions to take precisely the action which he did take. 5. The Chargé d’Affaires says that Eden is planning to make another statement in the House of Commons and that he is being pressed to announce that the proposed Anglo-Japanese conversations are definitely canceled. 6. The German Counselor today called on the British Chargé d’Affaires and inquired what steps he has taken here. Dodds tells me that he declined to answer. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 38 W. H. Donald, Australian adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8843: Telegram [Document 201] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 19, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 19—10:55 a.m.] 300. 1. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Kawagoe is not coming to Nanking at present but will remain for a while at Tientsin. The Secretary said confidentially that Hidaka very recently had occasion to repeat to the Chinese Foreign Office the remarks of his Ambassador addressed to the Vice Minister Chen Chieh about July 2 that, in the absence of the Ambassador, Hidaka would be the Ambassador’s personal representative and had full authority to act for the Japanese Embassy in China and that any question which might arise would be dealt with in the discretion of Hidaka or of the Japanese Government. This would seem to indicate that Kawagoe has practically eliminated himself for the time being from purely diplomatic Sino-Japanese business. 2. The informant said that Hidaka considered that, in view of the above, repetition by Foreign Office spokesman of the Foreign Office’s desire that Kawagoe come to Nanking was “quite insulting.” 3. Sent to Peiping, Tokyo, Tientsin. Peck The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8839: Telegram [Document 202] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 19, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 19—8:55 a.m.] 261. Tientsin’s July 18, 8 p.m. 1. Sung Che Yuan returned this morning to Peiping. 2. It is not believed that the alleged agreement, whether verbal or written, as described in the above-mentioned telegram and in the press, would satisfy the Japanese. A Chinese official under Sung claims the truth of the report is that Sung and Kazuki mutually expressed regret. A secretary of the local Japanese Embassy states that the truth of the report is that only Sung apologized. This informant believes that Sung has come to Peiping to effect the withdrawal from Peiping to west of the Yungting River of soldiers of the 37th Division of Feng Chih-an. An official of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council describes the situation at present as “a verbal truce”. 3. The above-mentioned secretary called at the Embassy this morning to explain the Chinese press reports of firing by Japanese planes on trains of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. He stated that only one such instance had occurred; that one Japanese scout plane was flying yesterday near the southern border of Hopei; that it saw a train with soldiers on its roof moving north on the Peiping-Hankow line; the above-mentioned plane flew over the train to observe, was fired at by soldiers on the train, and returned fire amounting to 150 rounds of machine gun bullets; and that the Japanese do not know whether there were any casualties. The informant stated, in reply to an inquiry, that the plane had no legal right to be flying in Southern Hopei. 4. An officer of the Military Attaché’s office has reported that the 27th and 31st Divisions of the 42nd Army Corps had reached Paoting by July 17, coming either from Southern Hopei or Northern Honan. Another officer of that office has reported that 10 carloads of soldiers of the 1st Division of the 1st Army Corps passed on July 17 northward through Hsuchow on the Tientsin–Pukow Railway and that one train of 18 cars, carrying about 900 infantry of the 57th Division, departed July 18 from Hsuchow westward on the Lunghai Railway. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8837: Telegram [Document 203] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 19, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 19—11 a.m.] 211. My 208, July 17, 7 p.m. 1. We are informed by Yoshizawa of the Foreign Office that the Chinese 29th Army has not proposed to the Japanese military any alteration in the terms of the so-called agreement of July 11; that General Sung Che Yuan, as the ranking officer of the 29th Army, had tendered an apology to the Japanese commander in fulfillment of one of the terms of that agreement. He also stated that the Japanese are on the alert to see whether the other terms will be carried out but that complete fulfillment will necessarily take some time. It is his estimate that prospects are favorable for a peaceful settlement of the “local situation” in the Peiping area but he stressed that the Japanese military will not consider the situation to have been liquidated until the 29th Army has completely fulfilled the terms of the above-mentioned agreement. He had no comment to make with regard to the Japanese representations at Nanking. 2. The Naval Attaché 39 was informed at the Navy Department this afternoon that thus far no troop reenforcements have been sent to North China from Japan proper but that beginning today two vessels would leave Japan daily, one to Fusan and one to Taku, carrying ammunition supply units; that no naval landing force had been sent to China to reenforce landing force already there; and that no vessels have been sent to reenforce the China squadron. 3. The Military Attaché called at the War Office this afternoon and he also was informed that no reenforcements have been sent as yet from Japan to North China. The liaison officer in the War Office stated that no accurate information is available with regard to the size of the Chinese forces south of Paoting and north of the Lunghai Railway but it is believed that such units do not exceed five divisions and that the main forces of the Nanking Government are still well south of that railway. The Military Attaché received the definite impression that the War Office does not believe that the movement of Chinese troops toward the Peiping area has sufficiently progressed to constitute an imminent threat to the safety of the Japanese troops in North China. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 39 Capt. Harold M. Bemis. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8836: Telegram [Document 204] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 19, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 19—10:20 a.m.] 262. Caldwell telephoned today stating that Japanese have established mail censorship in Chinese post office at Tientsin. Caldwell, after stating that matter would be brought before consular body meeting tomorrow, asked for instructions. I instructed him to take position, and so inform his colleages at the meeting, that if any instance of censoring American official or private mail by the Japanese censors should be brought to his attention, he was authorized to lodge a protest with the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin and report all of the facts to the Embassy at Nanking. Repeated to Nanking. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8847: Telegram [Document 205] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 19, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 19—5:35 p.m.] 301. Our 297, July 18, noon [ midnight ], and 295, July 18, 11 a.m. 1. We have just obtained from the Foreign Office the translation of its aide-mémoire handed this afternoon to the Japanese Embassy in reply to the latter’s aide-mémoire of July 17. 39a This translation is being released by the Foreign Office to the press and is as follows: 2. “Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident China, having not the least desire to aggravate the situation or provoke a conflict with Japan, has repeatedly declared her readiness to seek a settlement by pacific means. The Japanese Government, while professing anxiety not to see the situation aggravated, has at the same time despatched large numbers of troops to the province of Hopei. The movements of Japanese troops, which have not yet ceased, indicate a clear intention on the part of Japan to resort to force. In the circumstances the Chinese Government has been compelled to take adequate precautionary measures for self-defense, but the Chinese Government has not relaxed its consistent efforts for peace. On July 12, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in discussing the situation with Mr. S. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, proposed mutual cessation of military movements and withdrawal of troops on both sides to their original positions. It is to be regretted that no reply to this proposal has yet been received from Japan. The Chinese Government now wishes to reiterate its desire for a peaceful settlement of the incident as well as its intention not to aggravate the situation. It is therefore proposed that the two parties jointly fix a definite date on which both sides shall simultaneously cease all military movements and withdraw their armed forces to the position occupied prior to the incident. In view of the peaceful aspirations voiced by the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government trusts that the proposal will be acceptable to Japan. As regards the procedure to be followed for a settlement of the Lukouchiao incident, the Chinese Government is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government through regular diplomatic channels. The settlement of questions of a local nature susceptible of adjustment on the spot shall be subject to the sanction of the Chinese National Government. In short, the Chinese Government is ready to exhaust all pacific means for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia. Therefore, all methods provided by international law and international treaties for the pacific settlement of international disputes—such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediators, arbitration, et cetera—are equally acceptable to the Chinese Government.” Sent to the Department and Peiping. By mail to Tokyo. Peck 39a See telegram No. 298, July 19, noon, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 793.94/8958: Telegram [Document 206] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , July 19, 1937—7 p.m. 351. The French Chargé d’Affaires informed us yesterday that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors at Paris in a sense similar to that in which the Secretary of State had spoken to the Embassies here of those two countries, urging maintenance of peace. He said further that he was instructed to inquire what would be the view of the American Government, similar inquiry being addressed to the British Government, in the light of steps already taken, of an appeal to the League of Nations or representations based on the Nine Power Treaty. He did not further elaborate. We are replying to the French Embassy this afternoon that, in the absence of further indication of just what kind and method of appeal the French Government envisages, we do not feel in position to reply to this inquiry. We again call attention to the statement made by the Secretary on July 16 40 and request expression of the French Government’s views. Hull 40 Vol. i , p. 699 . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/8958 [Document 207] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 19, 1937. Reference, memorandum of conversation with the French Chargé d’Affaires, July 19, and Department’s telegram 351, July 19, 7 p.m., to Paris. This morning I brought to the attention of the Secretary the inquiry from the French Government of which account is given in my memorandum of July 19. This noon Mr. Henry came to me at the Club and repeated almost exactly what he had said on the telephone yesterday and then asked that we give him a reply at our earliest convenience. At 7:30 this evening I spoke with Mr. Henry on the telephone and gave him our reply in the terms indicated in the second paragraph of our telegram to Paris referred to above. I said that we were in the dark with regard to just what the French Government envisaged and therefore we did not feel ourselves in position to express a view. Mr. Henry said that he had felt somewhat the same way: that his Government’s inquiry was vague; and that he understood our feeling that we were not in position to make a reply to the inquiry as made. I said that I should point out that insofar as the inquiry was in the nature of consultation we were not failing to reply: that it should be noticed that in what I had said there were two parts: (1) we stated that we were not in position to reply to the inquiry made; and, (2) we were calling attention to the statement which the Secretary had made on July 16 and were requesting an expression of the French Government’s views in reaction to that statement. Mr. Henry said that he understood and that he would so report to his Government. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8848: Telegram [Document 208] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 19, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 19—6 p.m.] 1008. Delbos in the course of our conversation this evening expressed to me extreme pessimism with regard to the situation in the Far East. He said that he did not wish to bring forward any proposals for the settlement of the dispute; but it had occurred to him that inasmuch as all the great powers had a right to have the Peiping-Tientsin Railroad kept open that right might be a good basis on which the great powers might make a simultaneous démarche in both Tokyo and Nanking. Bullitt The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8865: Telegram [Document 209] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 20, 1937—2 a.m. [Received 6:40 a.m.] 302. Our 301, July 19, 7 p.m. 1. The Chinese aide-mémoire was delivered by a subordinate official to the Japanese Counsellor of Embassy July 19, 3 p.m., and the latter regarded it as unsatisfactory because it did not deal specifically with the July 11 agreement. He asked whether it was intended as an answer to the Japanese aide-mémoire of July 17 and the bearer could not reply. According to the report the Counsellor asserted his conviction that the document would not be accepted by his Government as adequate and he would be willing to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs before midnight to receive further oral assurances and would hold the document in the meantime. On receiving this message the Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would be away all day but would see the Counsellor July 20, 8 a.m., which appointment the Counsellor accepted. 2. At half past 10 the British Ambassador suggested that I call and told me he had seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs that afternoon and was informed of the gist of the aide-mémoire . He was favorably impressed thinking it dignified, reasonable and conciliatory but when he read the text as released he saw clearly it would not satisfy the Japanese. The Ambassador said incidentally the section outlining possible methods of settling the dispute embodied suggestions made by him informally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs some days ago. He said the Minister showed distinct signs of the strain he has been under in making a decision which we both agreed threatens to involve China either in internal dissension or war. 3. Our conversation took place in the British Embassy chancery. Shortly after 11 the Japanese Counsellor called by appointment and discussed the situation with the Ambassador for more than one hour in his residence. The Ambassador subsequently told me that he pointed out to the Counsellor that the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not reasonably be expected to accept the July 11 agreement since he was aware neither of its contents nor implications. The Ambassador urged that the agreement be fully explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of [ at? ] the forthcoming interview and that the Counsellor take into consideration the difficulties confronting the Minister. He intimated that upon the effort of the Counsellor to straighten out this point which in itself was of trivial importance might hang the issue of peace or war. The Counsellor admitted the force of these arguments in part but insisted that the Japanese point of view must be considered. 4. The Ambassador and I fear that the Japanese military will force events in the North and that the conversations in Nanking will be of no effect unless the Chinese Government surrenders unconditionally. He stated he has discussed the matter in a frank and common sense manner with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and a [ the? ] Japanese Counsellor at their desire separately several times hoping for a compromise. He has scrupulously avoided delivering messages and everything that might hint of mediation. He has also courteously kept me informed for the benefit of the American Ambassador and the Department. 5. The Chinese Foreign Office at midnight issued an account of a conversation July 19, 1 p.m. between the Minister of War and the Japanese Military Attaché. The Military Attaché is reported as intimating that failure to withdraw “Central Government troops” from Hopei might result in bringing the crisis to its final stage. To this the Minister of War is reported as saying inter alia that the sending of troops as a precautionary measure had been necessitated by the large increase in the Japanese forces. He asserted China’s right to move troops in its own territory but intimated that withdrawal of additional forces by Japan from Hopei might lead China to consider similar action. Sent to Peiping, Tokyo. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8867: Telegram [Document 210] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 20, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 12:05 p.m.] 304. 1. The Foreign Office unofficially “for information” issued the following statement to the press last night: “That military precautions taken by the Chinese Government are for no other purpose than self defense was emphasized by General Ho Ying Chin, Minister of War, in a talk with Major General Seirehe [ Seiichi ] Kita, Japanese Military Attaché, this afternoon. Calling on the War Minister at 4 o’clock p.m., Major General Kita asked for the withdrawal of ‘Central Government troops’ from Hopei. He intimated that failure to comply with the request may result in the aggravation of the Sino-Japanese crisis which ‘is rapidly approaching the final state’. General Ho told the Japanese visitor that the present tension in the north was entirely due to Japanese sending large military and air forces to Hopei since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident. The War Minister reiterated China’s desire for a peaceful settlement as well as her intention not to aggravate the situation, but declared that precautionary measures were rendered necessary on account of the dispatch of large numbers of Japanese troops to North China. These measures, General Ho emphasized, were purely for self defense and were without the least intent at provocation. General Ho said that all units of the Chinese Army were National forces and that there never was any distinction between ‘Central Government’ and ‘non-Central Government’ troops. While defending China’s inalienable rights to have [ move ] her troops within her own territory, General Ho intimated, however, that if Japan withdraws her newly increased forces from Hopei the Chinese Government would consider making a similar move. In conclusion, General Ho reminded the Japanese Military Attaché that whether or not the North China situation would be further aggravated depended solely upon the attitude of Japan”. 2. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8860: Telegram [Document 211] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 20—7:35 a.m.] Six thousand Japanese troops with twenty-four 75-millimeter field pieces and miscellaneous equipment including a number of machine guns and trench mortars arrived here from Manchuria during the past 2 days; about 3,000 of them left here last night on foot by the Peiping Highway. Unconfirmed report is that large number of Japanese troops will land at Tangku within a few days. Japanese military authorities have imposed censorship of mails at the central post office here since July 18th. Caldwell The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8882: Telegram [Document 212] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 20, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 21—6:40 a.m.] 305. 1. The following translation of an address given at Kuling by Chiang Kai-shek is published this morning by Central News Agency, Nanking, under yesterday’s date: “When China is carrying out her cardinal policy of maintaining external peace and internal unity the Lukouchiao incident suddenly broke out, throwing the nation into a state of profound indignation and causing great concern to the whole world. The consequences of the incident threatened the very existance of China and the peace of East Asia. At this present juncture, in answer to many inquiries, I wish to state the following: First, the Chinese race has always been peace loving. The internal policy of the National Government has always been directed towards maintaining internal unity and in our foreign relations, mutual respect and coexistence with other nations. In February this year at the plenary session of the Central Executive Committee a manifesto was issued in which these points were clearly emphasized. For the last two years, as actual facts show, the National Government in its policy toward Japan has constantly sought to confine to all pending problems to proper recognized channels of diplomacy so that a just settlement could be reached. Our people should understand our own strength. For the past few years we have bent all our efforts towards patient endeavors and ensured peace in face of grave difficulties and grievous pain so that we may achieve national reconstruction. For this reason in my report on foreign affairs at the fifth plenary session, the year before last, I stated that while there is the slightest hope for peace we will not abandon it, so long as we have not reached the limit of endurance we will not talk lightly of sacrifice; and the subsequent explanation at the Central Executive session shows beyond the least doubt our anxiety to maintain peace. But although a weak country, if, unfortunately, we should have reached that least limit, then there is the only thing to do. This is to throw the last ounce of energy of our nation into a struggle for national existence. And when that is done, neither time nor circumstance will permit our stopping midway to seek peace. We should realize that to seek peace after war has once begun means that terms would be such that subjugation of our nation and complete annihilation of our race would be encountered. Let our people realize to the full extent the meaning of ‘limit of endurance’ and the extent of sacrifice thereby involved. For once that stage is reached we have to sacrifice and fight to the bitter end though with always the expectancy of eventual victory. Should we hesitate, however, and vainly hope for temporary safety we shall perish forever. Second, there may be people who imagine that the Lukouchiao incident was a sudden and unpremeditated step. But already a month ago there were symptoms that an incident would ensue because of statements from the other side made both through their press directly and indirectly through diplomatic channels. Besides, before and after the incident we received news from various sources to the effect that the opposite side was aiming to expand the Tangku Agreement to enlarge the bogus East Hopei Government, drive out the 29th Army, force out General Sung Che Yuan and try to impose other similar demands. [From] the above, it can easily be seen that the Lukouchiao incident is not a sudden and accidental development. From this incident we must realize that the other side has a definite purpose towards us and that peace is not to be as easily secured. According to our reports, the only way by which the Lukouchiao incident could have been avoided was to allow the foreign armies to come and go freely within our territory without limitation while our own army must abide by the imposed restrictions upon its movements or allow others to fire upon our soldiers and for us not to return fire. Any country in the world that has the least self-respect could not possibly accept such humiliation. The four northeastern provinces have already been lost to us for 6 years, following that there war [ was ] the Tangku Agreement and now the point of conflict at Lukouchiao has reached the very gates of Peiping. If we allow the bridge to be occupied by force then the result would be that our ancient capital of 500 years and the political, cultural and strategic center of our entire North would be lost. Peiping of today would then become a second Mukden, the Hopei and Chahar provinces would share the fate of the four northeastern provinces. If Peiping could become a second Mukden what is there to prevent Nanking from becoming a second Peiping? The safety of Lukouchiao therefore is a problem involving the existence of the nation as a whole and whether it can be amicably settled comes within the comprehension of our term ‘limit of endurance’. If finally we reach the stage where it is impossible to avoid the inevitable, then we cannot do otherwise than to resist and to be prepared for the supreme sacrifice. This resistance is forced upon us. We are not seeking war. We are meeting attacks upon our existence. Our people must realize that today the Central Government is in the might [ act? ] of preparing measures to defend ourselves. A weak nation as we are, we cannot ensure the very, existence of our nation. It is impossible for us not to safeguard the heritage of our fathers, a duty which we must fulfill to the utmost. Let us realize, however, that once war has begun there is no looking backward. We must fight to the bitter end. If we allow one inch more of our territory to be lost then we would be guilty of committing an unpardonable offense against our race. What would be left to us other than to throw every resource of the nation into a struggle for the final victory? Third, at this solemn moment, Japan will have to decide whether the Lukouchiao incident would result in a major war between China and Japan. Whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace between China and Japan depends upon the action of the Japanese Army. Even at the very last second before we abandon all hope of peace we would still be hoping for peace, we would still be seeking a solution through proper diplomatic channels. The following four points will clearly show what our stand on this issue is: first, any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of our nation; second, the status of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government and we should not allow any illegal alteration; third, we will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those local officials appointed by the Central Government such as the Chairman of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council; and fourth, we will not allow any restriction being placed upon the position now held by the 29th Army. These four points constitute the minimum conditions possible as a basis for negotiations for any nation no matter how weak it may be. If the opposite side will place itself in our position and have due regard for maintaining peace in the Far East and does not desire to force China and Japan into hostilities and to make them enemies forever, it shall realize that those conditions are the minimum that can be considered. To sum up, during the Lukouchiao incident the Central Government, ensuring the very existence of our nation, has taken a clear and unequivocal stand. But let us realize that we are a nation. We seek for peace but do not seek for peace at any cost. We do not want war but we may be forced to defend ourselves. During this grave crisis the Government may be counted upon to guide the nation with calmness and restraint, the people likewise must show sobriety and discipline. In discharging our obligations to our race let there be no distinction between North and South, age or youth but let all implicitly and with iron discipline follow the guidance of the Government.” 2. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping. Peck The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8861: Telegram [Document 213] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 20, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 20—5:50 a.m.] 263. Embassy’s 255, July 18, 11 a.m. 1. The informant referred to in the first paragraph of the above-mentioned telegram, together with some of his associates, visited Sung Che Yuan yesterday. Sung’s statements are given in paragraph 2 of this telegram. 2. The facts with regard to Sung’s alleged acceptance on July 18 of the agreement of July 11 were ( a ) Sung and the Japanese expressed mutual regret for the deaths of Japanese and Chinese soldiers, ( b ) Sung said he would consider the question of punishment of Chinese officers involved, ( c ) he made no reference to withdrawal of troops, and ( d ) he informed the Japanese that he had always followed a policy opposed to anti-Japanese and Communist activities. Major General Hashimoto, Chang Tzu Chung and Chen Chueh Sheng are now discussing in Tientsin the definition and details of the terms of the agreement of July 11 (see Embassy’s 230, July 13, 8 p.m.) 3. A responsible Chinese official under Sung informed the group mentioned in paragraph 1 that Sung is now investigating the attitude of the 29th Army with regard to the scope of the negotiations going on in this connection. Apparently this means that Sung wants to discover how far he can go in making concessions to the Japanese without alienating from himself the 29th Army. 4. It has been confirmed that the recent amelioration of martial law in Peiping was the result of a request for such amelioration made by the local Japanese Assistant Military Attaché. 5. Chinese allege that they have no intention of removing from Peiping soldiers of the 37th Division. 6. The situation in Hopei Province seems to remain approximately unchangeable since my telegram 255, July 18, 11 a.m., except that the Japanese position is becoming stronger militarily. The future of the situation seems still to depend upon those factors mentioned in the final paragraph of that telegram. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8862: Telegram [Document 214] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 20, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 20—5:50 a.m.] 264. Embassy’s 263, July 20, 2 p.m. 1. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff at noon today to the following effect: Firing by Chinese troops at Japanese troops has taken place from time to time in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge in disregard of the truce which was to have ended fighting in that area; another instance of such firing occurred yesterday afternoon, which resulted in the wounding of a Japanese; the Japanese military subsequently informed the 29th Army that, unless firing by the Chinese ceases by noon today, the Japanese military will take adequate measures. Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8876: Telegram [Document 215] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 20, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 20—2:35 p.m.] 306. Our 302, July 20, 2 a.m. 1. Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, has just held a long conversation with me. Brief summary follows: 2. His conference with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs July 20, 8 a.m., occupied 2 hours. First 15 minutes were consumed by each waiting for the other to introduce the principal subject of the conversation. Finally the Minister inquired whether the Counsellor had received his reply Monday afternoon. The Counsellor asked in surprise whether the aide-mémoire was intended for a reply. The answer was affirmative. The Counsellor pointed out as he had done the previous day to the bearer that the Chinese aide-mémoire was unsatisfactory in that (1) it did not state whether the Chinese Government would cease from provocative acts by which the Japanese aide-mémoire meant sending additional troops into Hopei and (2) did not say that the Chinese Government would cease from impeding local negotiations in the North. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the proposal in his aide-mémoire that troops of both sides be simultaneously withdrawn and the statement that local settlements should be subject to the sanction of the Chinese National Government as replies to the two questions mentioned. He said that China had committed no provocative acts and could not agree to cease therefrom without giving a false implication. In reference to local settlement he said however (according to the Counsellor) that any suitable settlement reached locally would be welcomed by the Chinese Government. 3. The Counsellor said that the oral assurances given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs were therefore on the whole satisfactory but they could not materially improve the present gloomy outlook because of two circumstances. The first was the mistake made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in sending to the Japanese Embassy an evasive and generally unsatisfactory reply to the aide-mémoire of July 17 by the hand of an emissary unable to supplement or elucidate it. The failure of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to grant the request of the Counsellor for a further interview on July 19 compelled the Counsellor to send the document to his Government as being presumably the awaited reply. On receiving it the Japanese Government had immediately issued a statement denouncing it as unsatisfactory. The second circumstance was the publication of the speech made by General Chiang at Kuling (see my 305, July 20, 11 a.m.). These two circumstances had crystallized the situation beyond possibility of improvement by the well intentioned but not plausible explanations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs this morning. 4. The Counsellor said with apparent sincerity that he personally felt deeply unhappy over the threat of hostilities between Japan and China which in the present temper of the Chinese seemed almost unavoidable. If unhappily the worst should happen he felt there would nevertheless be brighter days after the storm. The Chinese presumably feel that Japan is bluffing but after a sudden and extremely severe punishment they will feel more friendly to Japan. This was the experience after the Chinese-Japanese war. 42 At any rate the two countries must continue to be neighbors and the Chinese even if they continue to cherish ill-will will learn not to materialize that sentiment in continual insulting and provocative acts as in the past. 5. I refrained from arguing but I inquired whether the Counsellor did not think it possible that the sending of large Japanese reenforcements to China had so alarmed the Chinese as to create a heroism of despair. He said that this was possible. 6. The Counsellor said that mobilization orders for troops in Japan had been approved July 11, issued July 15 and are now being executed. He again earnestly asserted that the sole object of the impending military operations was to compel the Chinese to execute the Ho–Umezu and July 11 agreements and to treat the Japanese with sincerity and respect and that there were no other political objectives such as might be inferred from the number of troops sent to North China. 7. In order to show appropriate friendliness I asked for an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. He was too busy and his secretary telephoned that this was true today also. I explained that I merely wished in the absence of the Ambassador to maintain friendly contact. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Peck 42 1894–95. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8863: Telegram [Document 216] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 20, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 20—9:50 a.m.] 213. My telegram No. 211, July 19, 6 p.m. 1. The Chinese reply to the Japanese representations at Nanking was sensationally displayed in this morning’s issues of Japanese papers. The only editorial comment on the reply was that of the Nichi Nichi which contended that the reply left Japan no choice but “to cross the Rubicon”. Other editorial opinion was obviously written before the reply was received here and agreed that a serious state of affairs would arise if the Chinese reply were unsatisfactory. 2. A statement issued to the papers late last night by the Foreign Office charges the Chinese Government with seeking to befog the issue, which the Japanese contend is only whether or not the Chinese Government will continue to obstruct implementation of local agreement reached by the Japanese on July 11 with the Hopei–Chahar authorities. The Japanese authorities in China are reported to have expressed strong dissatisfaction over the reply. 3. At the War Office today for the first time pessimism was expressed to the Military Attaché over situation, this sentiment being created by the character of the Chinese response. We learn at the Foreign Office that the Chinese reply is regarded as not responsive to the Japanese representations so much so that the Japanese Counselor at Nanking arranged to have a further interview this morning with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain clarification of several of the points stressed by the Chinese note. Our informant at the Foreign Office stated that although final opinion with regard to the Chinese now [ note? ] would have to await reports of this morning’s interview that note was believed to be reflective of desire by the Chinese Government to avoid termination of discussions between the two Governments. 4. The Foreign Office informant states that one development yesterday which may influence future developments adversely was the fact that the Ho–Umeza line was crossed by several Chinese contingents. The situation in North China, however, was holding out greater prospects of favorable settlement by reason of the fact that in further fulfillment of the reported July 11 agreement Chinese troops were being withdrawn from Peiping. If it were not for the fact that the 37th Division were getting out of hand it could be said that the situation in the Peiping area was developing satisfactorily. 5. Other than military action the alternatives open to Japan seem to be to renew the discussions at Nanking or to allow matters to drift until there is introduced into the situation some factor which cannot now be foreseen. It will be apparent that no responsible expression of opinion with regard to the future attitude or action of the Japanese Government can be obtained at this moment. 6. The foreign editor of an important Japanese paper stated today to a member of my staff that notwithstanding sensational treatment by Japanese press of the Chinese note editorial boards are privately of the opinion that the Chinese Government does not intend its reply to be construed as final rejection of Japanese representations. He regarded General Chiang’s proclamation issued last night as being intended principally for Chinese consumption and that while firm in tone it was so drafted as to be capable of interpretation by Japan as a conciliatory statement. 7. In appraising the chances of war we should bear in mind the fact that the Chinese have offered the Japanese an armistice and have proposed settlement by diplomatic negotiation. It must be evident to the Japanese Government that its case before the world would be improved if it could accept the proposal. On the other hand such acceptance would be difficult to reconcile with its previous contention that the matter is a local issue. 8. Another factor possibly enters the picture. It is reported today that Soviet forces have again attacked on the Manchurian frontier. The possibility of Soviet action in case of war can hardly be ignored in the calculations of the Japanese Government. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/8824: Telegram [Document 217] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , July 20, 1937—5 p.m. 129. Your 257, July 18, 4 p.m. The Department shares your doubts whether the proposal of the French Ambassador to address identic letters to the Japanese Ambassador and General Sung Che-yuan would accomplish the purpose in mind. However, should the diplomatic representatives of the other Protocol powers be prepared to take such a step, the Department would not be disposed to interpose objection to your joining them in making, as on your own initiative, the suggested démarche . (Note: Should it be decided to carry out the French Ambassador’s proposal it is suggested that “the occupation corps, the guards of the Embassies” be changed to read “the guards of the Embassies and other Protocol troops, and.”) In reaching a decision in regard to the French Ambassador’s proposal it would seem that two factors, among others, should be given consideration, as follows: (1) whether hostilities appear to be imminent, and (2) whether the hostilities would be likely to be of such a character as to prevent open communication between Peiping and the sea, and to expose American nationals, including the personnel of the Embassy, to serious danger. Hull The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) 793.94/8883: Telegram [Document 218] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) Washington , July 20, 1937—5 p.m. Yesterday the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires called at the Department 43 and during the conversation which he had with an officer of the Department he inquired whether the Department had received any reports of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese at Hankow and made the statement that anti-Japanese sentiment at that place was growing and that his Government was apprehensive with regard to it. The Department desires that you report promptly by telegraph in regard to the extent and character of anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese at Hankow during the past 3 months, describing particularly the situation in that regard now existing. Please send copies of report to Embassy. Hull 43 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 19, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 328 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8853: Telegram [Document 219] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 20—8:40 a.m.] 267. Embassy’s July 20, 3 p.m. 1. According to Japanese and Chinese military sources, firing broke out at about 3 this afternoon in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge between Japanese and Chinese forces. 2. Major General Kawabe, who is understood to be in command Japanese forces in that area, is reliably reported to have informed a foreigner about half an hour before the outbreak that in his opinion the 37th Division needs a very strict and severe lesson. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8875: Telegram [Document 220] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 20—3:25 p.m.] 489. My 479, July 16, 6 p.m. At his request I saw Eden this afternoon. He told me that the situation in the Far East had taken a grave turn for worse and that his Government was greatly concerned over it; that he had discussed the matter with the French as he had with us, but he had not felt it desirable to bring Russia into it. In addition, he had merely sent telegrams to Berlin and Rome, although he felt neither would take any direct interest in the situation. While he felt himself barren of ideas, he said he would welcome any suggestion from the American Government as to any action which might tend towards appeasement; that he understood and fully agreed with the Secretary of State’s position that American action and British action should be along parallel lines, and was confident that separate action by the two Governments with the same objective would have at least greater weight than any action by his Government alone. He read to me a message he had received from the British representative in Tokyo, which stated that the Japanese Foreign Office said that neither the American nor the French Government was moving and indicating that only the British Government had taken any action. Referring to the Secretary’s statement, which he said he thought was all that could be desired, he pointed out that the British message practically to the same effect had been delivered by the British representative in Tokyo, while the Secretary’s message had been delivered to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. He thought possibly the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had not transmitted the Secretary’s statement in full. With this exception he could see no difference between the positions taken by the American Government and the British Government. He was unwilling to take any other step for his Government, without the knowledge and approval of the American Government and he expressed the hope that action along similar lines if any could be taken by both Governments. He reiterated his inability to see what could be done to stop the Japanese, but again requested advices and suggestions from the American Government and ended by saying he would keep me immediately and constantly informed of all that his Government would do about the situation. Bingham The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/8827: Telegram [Document 221] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , July 20, 1947—6 p.m. 130. Your 258, July 19, 3 p.m., and 256, July 18, 3 p.m., paragraph 3. Department continues to hold the view expressed in its 116, July 13, 7 p.m. On July 18 the Chinese Ambassador here, in response to an oral inquiry, expressed personal opinion that it was preferable that you remain at Peiping. Please continue to keep the Department informed of developments and of your views in this regard. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8869: Telegram [Document 222] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 20, 1937—midnight. [Received July 20—2:10 p.m.] 214. At the termination of an emergency meeting of the Cabinet tonight, its third meeting today, the following statement was issued: “An agreement to settle the North China incident locally was concluded at 11 o’clock on the evening of July 11 but among the Chinese regiments were some who impeded enforcement of the agreement and lawlessly fired on the Japanese, disturbing peace and order. Moreover as there could be seen no sincerity at all on the part of the Chinese to enforce the terms of the agreement the Imperial Government has decided in accordance with its already fixed policy to take self defense steps adequate for surveillance of the Chinese in enforcement of the agreement”. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/8920 [Document 223] The British Embassy to the Department of State 44 The British Government is gravely preoccupied by the developments in the Far East and have been considering whether it would not be possible to make one more effort to avert hostilities which may have far-reaching consequences. In the circumstances they would be willing to make a joint approach with the United States Government to the Japanese and Chinese Governments asking them to agree: a ) To issue instructions that all further movement of troops be suspended; b ) To agree that the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government should put forward proposals in an attempt to end the present deadlock. Would Mr. Hull agree to such a course of action and would he join with his Majesty’s Government in taking it? It is fully appreciated that the chances of success may be slender, but in view of the serious consequences to the prosperity of the Far East and to peace in those regions which must result from a clash between the armed forces of Japan and China, His Majesty’s Government consider that the attempt should be made. Obviously if the approach is to be made it should be done with the least possible delay. Washington , July 20, 1937. 44 Handed by the British Ambassador to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on July 20. The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/9068 [Document 224] The Department of State to the British Embassy 45 undated The Secretary of State expects to speak again tomorrow with the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors and urge upon them the view of this Government that it is most important that hostilities be avoided. 45 Handed to the British Ambassador by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 20. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9068 [Document 225] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 21, 1937. At the end of a conference held last evening, at which there had been present the Secretary, Mr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Hornbeck took to the British Ambassador, at the British Embassy, a penciled statement of which a copy is here attached. 46 Mr. Hornbeck said that he was instructed to express regret that owing to the late hour at which the British Embassy’s memorandum had been received it had been found impossible to give at the moment this Government’s reply to the inquiry made in the memorandum but that we wanted to have the Ambassador and his Government informed of a step which the Secretary of State expected to take as indicated in the penciled statement. The Ambassador asked whether I had been informed of the conversations which had been held between Mr. Eden and Mr. Bingham. I said that we had received a report on that conversation. 47 The Ambassador handed me a sheaf of papers on which I found what obviously was the text, in pencil, of a telegram in which the British Foreign Office had informed the Ambassador of that conversation. This text had on it office instructions indicating that it had been sent from London to several British missions. The text gave a much longer and detailed account of the conversation under reference than that which had been given us by Mr. Bingham. In it, Mr. Eden was reported as having expressed himself as by no means dissatisfied with the efforts at “collaboration” in which the two Governments had engaged but as feeling that what we here speak of as a “united front” would be more effective than “parallel action.” He said that he had found that Mr. Bingham had no specific suggestion to make for further action. (Note: It will be remembered that Mr. Bingham had reported the same in regard to Mr. Eden.) When I had finished reading the telegram, the Ambassador said that it was his impression that his Government did not feel insistent that there should be taken the form of action which it suggested in the memorandum which he had brought us, but that they wanted to leave no possible line of action unexplored and they felt that they had gone further than we had gone toward ensuring that their views were understood at Tokyo and at Nanking and they felt that clear indication to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that the British and the American Governments view the matter with the same kind and the same degree of concern would be helpful. I said that I had given the Ambassador all that I was authorized to give for the moment and that what I had given him should be regarded simply as information and not as a reply, which would be given in due course, to the memorandum under reference. 46 Supra . 47 See telegram No. 489, July 20, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] . The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8880: Telegram [Document 226] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , July 21, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 21—7:23 a.m.] 338. My 333, July 17, 4 p.m. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in a conversation yesterday evening stated that although he had not at that time heard that general hostilities had started in China he believed that they were inevitable. He said that from what he had heard from De Stefani (high adviser to the Chinese Republic) who had spoken with General Chiang Kai-shek it seemed certain that unless Japan should withdraw her demands China would have to “declare war” on [Japan]. Count Ciano said that knowing both countries as he did he was clearly of the opinion that the Japanese would have the upper hand in all hostilities and that the result would be the further development of the process of setting up independent provinces in China under Japanese tutelage. He added that in so far as the world in general is concerned the greatest danger lay in the threat of complications with respect to Russia. Phillips The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8899: Telegram [Document 227] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 21, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 21—4:36 a.m.] 310. My 306, July 20, 4 p.m., paragraph 7. 1. Vice Minister Hsu Mo asked me July 21, 10 a.m., to communicate to the American Ambassador the personal hope of General Chiang Kai-shek that Mr. Johnson will come to Nanking in order that he may exchange views with him more promptly and directly. The Vice Minister asked me to maintain secrecy in regard to this message from General Chiang. 2. The German Embassy and possibly other International Settlement missions have been informed by the Chinese Foreign Office in more emphatic terms than before that it is the hope of the Chinese Government that Chiefs of Mission will return as soon as possible to the capital. 3. Sent to the Department, Peiping. Peck The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8877: Telegram [Document 228] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 21, 1937—noon. [Received July 21—7:15 a.m.] 492. My 489, July 20, 6 p.m. The Foreign Secretary telephoned me at 8:45 last night saying that since he had seen me in the late afternoon the Far Eastern situation had taken a still graver turn for the worse and that he and the Prime Minister 48 had been in conference and had agreed upon a suggestion to be made to the United States Government; that while he did not wish to read this to me over the telephone he wanted me to know that such a message was going forward and that he would expect to show it to me today. I saw him this morning and he has read the message to me and said that he expected an answer at any time from Lindsay and when it arrived he would ask me to meet with him again so that he could inform me of our [ the? ] reply to this communication. Since dictating the above I have received a message from Eden asking me to see him again this afternoon at 4:45. Bingham 48 Neville Chamberlain. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8900: Telegram [Document 229] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 21, 1937—noon. [Received July 21—10:10 a.m.] 311. My 306, July 20, 4 p.m. 1. I received message by telephone from the Foreign Office July 21, 9 a.m., that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was too busy to receive me as I asked but that Vice Minister Hsu Mo would receive me at 10 o’clock. I informed the Vice Minister that the American Ambassador was in North China not because he minimized the importance of the situation in Nanking but because he and the Department of State believed it important that he remain in Peiping during this crisis. I said the Ambassador had entrusted to me the performance of all duties he would perform if in Nanking. I said the American Embassy had probably the largest diplomatic staff in Nanking and that all events and public documents had been promptly reported by cable to the Ambassador and Washington and that all this had been done because the American Government attached the greatest importance to maintaining full and friendly contact with the Chinese Government at this time. 2. I asked the Vice Minister whether he thought serious hostilities would occur immediately and he replied that this depended on Japanese action. Answering questions, he said that he thought China would not declare war because in his opinion no signatory to the Kellogg Pact could declare war just as there could in theory be no neutrals. Any nation utilizing war to enforce national policy automatically ranged other signatories against it as an outlaw. The position of China if Japan attacked the 29th Army would be in theory and fact that of a sovereign power defending its own territory against invasion. He had examined the Chinese law creating the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and could find in the list of powers delegated to the Council nothing to justify the Japanese contention that in insisting upon diplomatic settlement of this dispute the Chinese Government is interfering with matters legally entrusted to the Council. 3. Donald has just called. He said that there is a powerful group around General Chiang who may desire avoidance of war at any price. He does not know what the decision of the Chinese Government will be but he believes the Japanese military are determined to seize Hopei and more territory just as they planned and executed seizure of Manchuria and Jehol and that China’s position would be morally and legally hopeless unless China resisted such aggression. The power of General Chiang would he thinks inevitably be lost if the Government were not to oppose force to force but he is also convinced that if the Japanese were to negotiate at Nanking they would find the Government willing to yield a great deal to avoid war. 4. It is reported that General Chiang attended an important meeting of the Central Political Committee this morning. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8902: Telegram [Document 230] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 21, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 21—9:40 a.m.] 312. Donald has telephoned that Sung Che Yuan has asked the Chinese to retain at Paoting the four divisions now there and not to send them further at present [because he has] private hope of effecting a local settlement with the Japanese even yet. Donald quoted a report that the Japanese had ceased firing after firing some 450 shots killing only a few Chinese. (Area concerned presumably is near Peiping.) Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8888: Telegram [Document 231] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 21, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 21—9:55 a.m.] 216. The British Chargé d’Affaires has just shown me a telegram from his Government reporting Eden’s proposal to you through Bingham for an Anglo-American offer of mediation in Tokyo and Nanking as a last resort in view of what he considers to be a very serious situation. 2. I told Dodds that in my opinion neither the Japanese nor the Chinese Government wants war and that both sides are encountering difficulties in finding a way out (with all of which Dodds concurs) but that I doubted if the Japanese Government would either welcome or accept an offer of foreign mediation. I told him once again of the various steps which you have taken in Washington. 3. The private secretary of the Japanese Minister of War today told the British Military Attaché that they realize the difficulties of the position of Chiang Kai-shek but that the Japanese Government “still considers that the Nanking Government intends nothing beyond a war of words”. The private secretary added that the nearer the troops reach the scene of fighting the less reliable they become. The possibility of an extension of the trouble cannot be excluded but it is not probable. The British Chargé d’Affaires interprets this statement as an indication that the Japanese still believe that Nanking is bluffing. 4. Today the British Chargé d’Affaires has received a telegram from the British Ambassador in Nanking date 2 o’clock this morning in which the Ambassador takes a very serious view of the situation. Dodds has accordingly decided to see the Vice Minister this afternoon and read to him the following excerpt from that telegram. “I feel I must emphasize the extreme seriousness of the present situation. It is quite clear that Chiang Kai-shek still desires a peaceful solution but that anything amounting to complete surrender to the present Japanese demands would bring about his fall. A member of the Chinese General Staff (Major General Chu) informed the Military Attaché today that it was no longer a question of settling the Lukow-kiao incident but of loss or retention of two Chinese provinces (Hopei and Chahar). Position of the Central Government is that they are willing to negotiate with Japan through diplomatic channel on the present dispute in all its aspects and have offered arbitration and other method of settlement but that they cannot commit themselves to blind acceptance of some local settlement which will destroy their position in the north once and for all. If the Japanese Government imagine that there is any element of bluff in the Chinese attitude they are making a great mistake. The Chinese Government feel there is a point beyond which public opinion will not allow them to go in the direction of compliance with the Japanese demands. If the Japanese Government insist on settlement with the local authorities in North China to the exclusion of the Central Government they must realize that war will be inevitable” (end of oral communication). 5. In reading the foregoing statement to the Vice Minister, Dodds will inform him that he is acting without instructions and entirely on his own initiative but that he cannot accept the responsibility of failing to convey what may be information of vital importance. 6. Later. The Chargé d’Affaires informs me that the Vice Minister listened without comment to the foregoing statement and merely expressed his thanks. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The French Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/8945 [Document 232] The French Embassy to the Department of State 49 Washington , July 21, 1937. The French Ambassador in China called the attention of the French Government upon the opportunity on the part of the principal interested Powers to request the Japanese authorities to respect the Protocole of 1901 concerning the principle of freedom of communications between Peiping and the Sea. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France gave his approval to the suggestion of the French Ambassador. Therefore the latter brought the matter up to the attention of the Ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain and Italy in China. The French Government has instructed his Chargé d’Affaires in Washington to secure an expression of views of the American Government on the matter. 49 Transmitted by the French Chargé in his personal note of July 21 to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, in confirmation of a telephone conversation that afternoon. The Department of State to the French Embassy 793.94/8945 [Document 233] The Department of State to the French Embassy 50 Washington , July 21, 1937. The American Ambassador in China has informed the Department of State by cable 51 of the proposal made by the French Ambassador in China that the diplomatic representatives in China of the principally interested powers address identic letters to the Japanese Ambassador and to the Chairman of the Hopei–Chahar Political Council in regard to the principle of freedom of communications between Peiping and the sea. In reply to the American Ambassador’s request for instructions, the Department of State telegraphed 52 the Ambassador stating that we were not enthusiastic over the proposal but that we would not interpose objection to his participating along with the French and British and other Embassies if the Ambassadors decided it advisable to make such a move. The American Ambassador was informed that the Department of State would prefer that, if any such move were to be made, the move be made by the respective Ambassadors as a local one taken on their own initiative. 50 Transmitted to the French Chargé on July 23 by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in confirmation of a telephone conversation on July 21. 51 Telegram No. 257, July 18, 4 p.m., p. 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] . 52 Telegram No. 129, July 20, 5 p.m., p. 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8889: Telegram [Document 234] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 21, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 21—10:30 a.m.] 217. 1. A foreign informant 53 who is regarded as reliable and well informed today communicated to us the following information and views: 2. Informant understands, on reliable authority, that Prince Konoe’s illness is real and not feigned and that, if the present situation in North China continues difficult or grows worse, he will resign as Premier and be succeeded by General Sugiyama. 54 When Hirota was suggested as a possibility, informant repeated that Sugiyama will follow Prince Konoe. 3. Informant confirmed the estimate of our Military Attaché that the Japanese mobilization to date has been partial as it has affected some and not all divisions and only increased somewhat the strength of units instead of raising them to war strength. He also confirmed the estimate of our Military Attaché that only a part of a division (probably a reenforced brigade of the 6th Division) and some transport and communications troops have gone to North China from Japan proper; that about a division has gone from Chosen and that about a reenforced brigade of Japanese from the Jehol garrison of the Kwantung Army has gone. Informant believes, “on unofficial information”, that in addition to the above about a division of the Kwantung Army has gone. The Military Attaché has no knowledge of this last movement. 4. Informant characterizes the situation in North China as “negotiations progressing with armed intervention”. 5. Informant agrees with William H. Chamberlin 55 that Soviet Russia will do nothing in a military way to help China due to internal effects of the purge. 6. Reports from foreign instructors with the Chinese Army showing the comparatively few divisions (five or six) of that force and Chinese troop movements and dispositions to date lead informant to believe that China does not intend to fight Japan seriously. Military Attaché agrees with informant. He also agrees that Japan wishes to avoid war but is prepared to use whatever force is necessary to insure Chinese execution of the agreement of July 11 and to give General Sung Che Yuan enough to encourage him to resist the extension of Nanking influence in North China and advance toward practical independence of the Central Government. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 53 The German Military Attaché in Japan. 54 Japanese Minister of War. 55 Chief Far Eastern correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8897: Telegram [Document 235] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 21, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 21—11:15 a.m.] 272. Embassy’s 267, July 20, 6 p.m., and 268, July 20, 9 p.m. 56 1. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff this morning that firing in the vicinity of the town of Wanpinghsien ended at about 9 o’clock last night to the satisfaction of the Japanese as the Japanese attained their objective of ending sniping in that area by ( a ) driving out of that town and to the west bank of the Yungting River soldiers of the 37th Division which had reentered the territory after their first retirement, and ( b ) by destroying the east gate and the north wall of the town. 2. The informant claimed that negotiators in Tientsin had arrived at a satisfactory and detailed definition of the clause of the July 11 agreement with regard to suppression of anti-Japanese activities. However, the progress of negotiations in Tientsin remains obscure as Chinese and Japanese statements with regard thereto continue to disagree. 3. Sung Che Yuan is reported by a Chinese official to have had conversations yesterday with Colonel Matsuda and Major Imai. 57 One subject discussed was apparently the withdrawal to west of the Yung-ting River of troops of the 37th Division stationed at Hsiyuan (near the Summer Palace) and within Peiping. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy said in conversation this morning that it had been agreed that the troops at Hsiyuan were to withdraw 10 o’clock this morning and that those in Peiping would not withdraw for some time. Although it is reliably reported that no movement had begun at Hsiyuan up to noon today, some amicable though perhaps temporary arrangement with regard to these two groups of troops was apparently reached. Other subjects discussed in Tientsin conversations are reported to have been comparatively minor ones. 4. Although fresh barricades of sand bags were erected last night by Chinese across some streets in Peiping, the city is quiet, trains are running, and, reports to the contrary notwithstanding, the troops of the 37th Division in Peiping are not causing trouble at present. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Johnson 56 Latter not printed. 57 The latter was Japanese Assistant Military Attaché in China at Peiping. The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/8920 [Document 236] The Department of State to the British Embassy 58 The Government of the United States shares the grave preoccupation of the British Government as a result of the developments in the Far East. It fully concurs in the feeling expressed by the British Government that every practicable effort should be made to avert hostilities which undoubtedly might have far-reaching consequences. It desires to cooperate with the British Government in urging upon both parties that hostilities are not warranted and should be avoided. It further believes that cooperation between the two Governments in urging a peaceful solution of the controversy which has arisen is eminently desirable. In the light of all the information which has come to us—and we assume that the British Government has received much the same information—we feel that the courses of action thus far pursued by our two Governments on parallel lines have been truly cooperative and that, in continuation of a common effort to avert hostilities, both Governments should again, each in its own way, urge upon the Japanese and the Chinese Governments the importance of maintaining peace. It is the understanding of this Government that the Chinese Government has already suggested to the Japanese Government, and that the British Government has already called to the attention of the Japanese Government the Chinese Government’s suggestion, that troop movements be suspended. This Government also understands that the Japanese Government has indicated that it is not receptively disposed toward any such suggestions. The Secretary of State has this morning once more expressed to the Japanese and to the Chinese Ambassadors in Washington the solicitude of this Government that their countries respectively exercise effective self-restraint, has emphasized the view of this Government that hostilities between their countries would be a calamity both to them and to the world, and has again invited any suggestions that either of their Governments may feel inclined to make for assistance which this Government might appropriately render toward a solution of the issues over which they are contending. The American Ambassadors to Japan and to China are being informed by telegram of the representations made by the Secretary of State and have been instructed to carefully inform the Governments to which they are accredited of these representations. Might not the British Government feel that similar action by it at this moment would be helpful? 59 Washington , July 21, 1937. 58 Delivered to the British Embassy on July 21. 59 In a memorandum of July 23 the British Embassy informed the Department of State that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had spoken along similar lines to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors in London (793.94/8997). The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/8912a: Telegram [Document 237] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , July 21, 1937—6 p.m. 122. 1. The Japanese Ambassador called this morning at my request. 60 I told the Ambassador that we continued to be greatly interested in and seriously concerned over the situation in the Far East and that we wanted constantly to have the latest and best information that the Ambassador possessed. The Ambassador replied that yesterday there had occurred a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese used artillery only; that the Japanese purpose was to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities; that he still had hopes that this result might be accomplished. I then very seriously informed the Ambassador that of course he must be fully aware that when two nations comprising 500 million people are engaged in a controversy in which danger of general hostilities appears imminent, this country cannot but be greatly interested and concerned; that it is in the light of this situation and of the intense desire of this country for peace everywhere that I have been undertaking to confer from time to time with the Ambassadors from both Japan and China with regard to developments, present and prospective; that I have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality, in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East. I reemphasized points which I had referred to in previous conversations with the Ambassador, including an earnest appeal to each government, from every possible standpoint, for peace, and an earnest expression of the opinion that a war would result in irreparable harm to all governments involved and would prove disastrous, in the present unsettled state of world affairs, to all phases of human welfare and human progress. I mentioned again the great objective and beneficent purposes of the program adopted at Buenos Aires, including the eight-point pillars of peace proposal in my address there, 61 and I emphasized the view that general hostilities now would jeopardize the whole program of improving world relationships and bringing about stabilization. I said that I had been seeking to emphasize to all governments and all nations alike the basic points of the broad Buenos Aires program and that to that end I gave out a statement on last Friday 62 based on the eight-point pillars of peace statement; that I was bringing this statement to the attention of foreign governments, a few each day, and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of the principles stated therein. I said that I was glad to hand the Ambassador for his Government a copy of the statement of last Friday, and I added that it would be most pleasing to us if the Government of Japan joined in carrying forward this great program. I then said that I would like to repeat what I had already said at the beginning—that this Government is ready and would be glad at any time to say or do anything, short of mediation which of course would require the agreement of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute toward composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China. I made it clear that I was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese or the Chinese Governments and that I was not making any offer or suggestion of any method to be followed. The Ambassador said that he understood. I told the Ambassador that I was anxious that my point of view be completely understood and that I would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have our Ambassadors report what I said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom I spoke here would report to the Japanese and to the Chinese Governments. 2. The Chinese Ambassador also called this morning at my request and I made to him statements along substantially the same line as the statements made to the Japanese Ambassador, indicating our great solicitude for peace. 3. Please arrange to call at an early moment upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that I wished him to have through our diplomatic representative there information in regard to what I had said to his country’s Ambassador here. Please then read to the Foreign Minister the statements contained in numbered part 1 of this telegram. You may add that I had a conversation along the same general lines with the Chinese Ambassador here. Hull 60 See memorandum by the Secretary of State, July 21, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 330 . 61 See Department of State Conference Series No. 33, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 1–23, 1936 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 11, 82. 62 July 16; for text of statement see vol. i , p. 699 . The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) at Nanking 793.94/8800: Telegram [Document 238] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) at Nanking Washington , July 21, 1937—6 p.m. 111. Your telegram No. 287, July 16, 3 p.m., paragraph 3. The Department feels that your reply probably served a useful diplomatic purpose. However, for your own orientation the Department points out that according to the Neutrality Act that Act becomes applicable “whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war between, or among, two or more foreign states.” Hull The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) at Nanking 793.94/8897a: Telegram [Document 239] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) at Nanking Washington , July 21, 1937—7 p.m. 112. 1. The Chinese Ambassador called this morning at my request. I inquired with regard to the Ambassador’s latest news and the Ambassador replied that he had nothing recent of importance except the text of the statement which Chiang Kai-shek had made. 63 He said that he knew nothing about the clash reported yesterday at Wanpinghsien except what he had seen in the newspapers. I then referred to our great solicitude for peace. I spoke of the policy which we have followed and of the importance of stabilizing various situations and exercising restraint and doing constructive things. I said that hostilities anywhere would jeopardize hopes of improving world relationships. I said that I had been seeking to emphasize to all governments and all nations alike the basic points of the broad Buenos Aires program and that to that end I gave out a statement on last Friday based on the eight-point pillars of peace address which I had made at Buenos Aires; that I was bringing this statement to the attention of foreign governments, a few each day, and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of the principles stated therein. I handed the Ambassador a copy of the statement of last Friday and I asked that it be brought to the attention of the Ambassador’s Government. I then said that we wanted to do anything that we appropriately could that might be helpful; that I had been undertaking to confer from time to time with the Ambassadors from both China and Japan with regard to developments, present and prospective; and that I have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality, in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East. 2. The Japanese Ambassador also called this morning at my request and I made to him statements along substantially the same line as the statements made to the Chinese Ambassador, indicating our great solicitude for peace. 3. Please arrange to call at an early moment upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that I wished him to have through our diplomatic representative there information in regard to what I had said to his country’s Ambassador here. Please then read to the Foreign Minister the statements contained in numbered part 1 of this telegram. You may add that I had a conversation along the same general lines with the Japanese Ambassador here. 4. Repeat to Peiping. Hull 63 See telegram No. 305, July 20, 11 a.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] . The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8894: Telegram [Document 240] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , July 21, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 21—11:35 a.m.] Department’s July 20, 5 p.m. Manifestations of anti-Japanese sentiment in Hankow have been almost totally absent during the past 3 months and Japanese trade has apparently flourished. Early in June a Japanese alleged geologist was detained near Ichang apparently on account of espionage but turned over to Japanese Consul at Ichang. In view of situation in North there is at present surprisingly little manifestation of anti-Japanese feeling here. Japanese move freely about the streets and according to the Acting Japanese Consul General there has been only one very minor case of annoyance. Domei News Agency reports that its Chinese translator was captured by Chinese soldiers July 17 but later released. Japanese have about 300 marines in their concession and both Chinese and Japanese are taking certain military precautions. An officer of this Consulate General called on Acting Japanese Consul General this afternoon and received the impression that latter, while naturally apprehensive regarding local developments in case of possible war, felt that to date conditions at Hankow were no cause for alarm. Sent to Peiping and Nanking. Josselyn The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8908: Telegram [Document 241] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 21, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 21—3 p.m.] 497. My 492, July 21, noon. I saw Eden this afternoon and he read to me Lindsay’s telegram to him relating to the message sent through Lindsay to you. He said that he hoped to receive a reply from you probably later tonight. He said also that the British Ambassador in China had sent a telegram which made him take a very gloomy view of the situation. Eden then gave me a copy of a question and the answer he had made in the House of Commons today stating the British Government would not open general conversations with the Japanese as long as the present situation in China continued. Question and answer read as follows: “Captain Plugge to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether in view of the existing circumstances in North China he will reconsider the advisability of holding Anglo-Japanese conversations. Mr. Eden: So long as the present situation in North China persists, it would not seem opportune to open the conversations to which His Majesty’s Government were looking forward, and I have been obliged to inform the Japanese Government that that is the view of His Majesty’s Government.” Finally he referred to a statement in Lindsay’s message to him that you expected to see the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors today and Lindsay’s statement that he understood you would reiterate to both Ambassadors urgent representations against war in China. He said he was to see both the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors here this evening and that he would make statements to them along similar lines. Bingham The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8896: Telegram [Document 242] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 21, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 21—11:10 a.m.] 219. 1. An officer of the Military Affairs Bureau, who has been fairly cordial and informative, today told our Military Attaché that a conversation yesterday between Suma and an officer of the State Department in Washington 65 showed the United States lack of understanding of the North China situation and indicated our pro-Chinese attitude. 2. He then repeated the explanation of Japan’s aims as previously reported and ended with the statement that the only progress so far in the execution of the 29th Army’s agreement was General Sung’s apology and that the execution of the other terms of the agreement was being retarded by pressure on General Sung by the Central Government. He admitted that Central Government troop movements and dispositions do not indicate that that Government expects war. While not hopeless the present situation is more difficult than heretofore in this officer’s opinion. He ended by stating that he could no longer see our Military Attaché every day. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 65 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 19, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 328 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8898: Telegram [Document 243] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 21, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 21—11:30 a.m.] 274. A Secretary of the Japanese Embassy asked a member of my staff this morning whether any Americans were residing in the Western Hills. When informed that there were two or three the Secretary replied that his Embassy had been informed by their Consulate General in Tientsin that in case negotiations with the Chinese broke down it might become necessary for the Japanese military to drive the 37th Division away, an action which might make the Western Hills a place of danger. In reply to question the Japanese Secretary stated that he assumed that they would learn prior to an outbreak of fighting that fighting is imminent. The member of my staff requested him to inform this Embassy in such a case so that due warning could be issued in adequate time to American citizens. The Secretary said that he would do so. This Embassy had already communicated a warning to these Americans. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8919: Telegram [Document 244] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 22—5:46 a.m.] 317. An American-educated Chinese Army officer who is acting as liaison between the Chinese General Staff and foreign military attachés yesterday informed me that long before July 7 the General Staff knew that the Japanese felt that their military force at Fengtai was seriously exposed to attack and wished to get possession of Nanyuan airdrome-Marco Polo Bridge areas. He said also that the Chinese military headquarters in Peiping had reported to Nanking 10 days before the bridge incident, and the Japanese authorities had warned Japanese in Peiping that an event necessitating precautions on their part would occur before long. Repeated to Peiping. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 811.3394/265: Telegram [Document 245] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 22, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 22—5 a.m.] 221. Department’s 121, July 20, 8 p.m. 66 The Embassy has just been orally informed by the Foreign Office that there is no objection to the visit of the U. S. S. Augusta and accompanying vessels on the proposed dates. 67 The Japanese Government however requests that these vessels do not enter the Inland Sea during the month of September. They may do so in October after the Kobe visit. Grew 66 Not printed. 67 September 20–October 8 to Yokohama and Kobe. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8927: Telegram [Document 246] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 22, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 320. My 317, July 22, 2 p.m. Informant stated that the Chinese were not especially afraid of hostilities with Japan. They feel they have better airplanes even if fewer in number. Informant thought hostilities would probably be localized in that the Japanese would entrench themselves in limited areas and would be immobilized by Chinese forces. The Japanese would derive no profit from areas thus occupied and would be exposed to enormous expense for maintenance of troops. If, on the other hand, areas of occupation were expanded the odds would be in favor of the Chinese defenders in a familiar and friendly territory. Informant added that the present complete unification of the [country] had given the Chinese great self-confidence. A Secretary of the Italian Embassy has made the comment to me that the Ethiopians who were much worse prepared for war than the Chinese were able to prevail against the Italians with considerable efficiency for 7 months. Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping. Peck The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8913: Telegram [Document 247] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 22—9 a.m.] 223. Department’s 122, July 21, 6 p.m. 1. I carried out your instructions at 5:30 this afternoon 68 immediately after your telegram had been decoded. 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he fully understands your message which he had not yet received from Saito, and your views. He will not however reply “for a few days” because the situation in North China is steadily improving and he is more optimistic than heretofore as to a satisfactory settlement of the controversy. He states that practical evidence of his optimism is given by the fact that all troop movements from Japan to China have been stopped for the present. 3. The whole situation he says depends on the carrying out of the agreement drawn up on July 11 and signed on July 19 by General Chang representing General Sung. The main difficulty is that the Nanking Government will not recognize this agreement and is actively obstructing a settlement. Hirota does not ask that Nanking recognize the agreement but only that it shall withhold obstruction. He is at present working along those lines and says he already sees signs of a more favorable attitude on the part of Nanking. 4. The Minister said that General Sung desires the precise terms of the above-mentioned agreement to be kept confidential for the present. Hirota, however, read to me a rough translation from the Japanese text as follows: ( a ) Apology; ( b ) Punishment of the Chinese captain responsible for the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge and the censuring of the army commander; ( c ) Assurances for the future which comprise voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in North China who obstruct Sino-Japanese cooperation; expulsion of Communist elements from that district; control of the Blue Shirts and other organizations hostile to Japan; control of education in the schools; cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda; ( d ) Withdrawal of the 37th Division from Peiping. 5. The Minister pointed out that no political demands are involved in this agreement and that headway is already being made toward carrying out its terms. 6. The Minister said that in view of the great sensitiveness of the Japanese press at the present moment he will answer any questions from newspapermen regarding the purpose of my call to the effect that I had come to inquire with regard to the present situation. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 68 Cf. the Ambassador’s memorandum of July 22, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 333 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8921: Telegram [Document 248] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , July 22, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 22—10:55 a.m.] 384. 1. In conversation this morning with the Acting [British Consul General] and the Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council, we agreed that in event of disturbances at Shanghai the Council should avoid declaring a state of emergency and calling on the foreign military and naval forces to put into effect their so-called defense plan. That plan includes the Japanese forces, the Japanese commandant would be the senior commandant, and if the plan were put into force it might be used by the Japanese to justify invasion of Chapei as in 1932. 2. I later talked with the American chairman of the Municipal Council and also with commander of United States Marines who are in agreement with the above. I understand from British Consul General that his military commandant is also of like opinion. 3. If disorders occur the Secretary General of the Council tells me that he will advise the Council to use the police reserves and corps, and only in event the situation cannot be met by such forces would he recommend consultation with the American and British consular and military authorities as to possible measures to support the police in maintaining order in the areas known as the British and American sectors. 4. I do not wish to be understood from the foregoing, however, as suggesting that our marines and naval forces are not necessary at the present time for the protection of Americans in this area. To the Department, to Peiping, courier to Nanking. Gauss The Military Attaché in Japan (Crane) to the Adjutcmt General, War Department (Conley) 793.94/8910 [Document 249] The Military Attaché in Japan ( Crane ) to the Adjutcmt General, War Department ( Conley ) 69 No. 323 Tokyo , July 22, 1937. By way of Tientsin today I received your No. 405. Information as follows was given to the Assistant Military Attaché on July 21 by a reliable officer of the Japanese General Staff. Japanese troops gone to North China are the following only: 70 Of the 20th Division about two-thirds at war strength; from the Jehol garrison approximately one regiment of infantry and one battalion of field artillery; and from Japan proper about two tank companies of the 2nd Regiment and about 400 trucks with three transport battalions. There were sent composite units comprising two squadron types 95th pursuit and two squadrons types 94th observation by both the 4th and 5th air regiments. “Mobilization preparation” orders have been issued to divisions west of Kyoto only. Replacements for aviation and transport personnel dispatched to North China account for movements of reservists reported. Mobilization has taken place in the 20th Division only. North China is comparable to a game of poker in that war is expected by neither China nor Japan. There is anticipation of a local settlement, although, to insure execution of the agreement of the 11th of July by the 29th Army, Japan is ready to use all the military force that is necessary. The statement just given has been in general confirmed, but there is no confirmation of the reports in radiograms of the American Embassy of other mobilization preparations and movements of troops. The following is my estimate of the situation: There is danger in the situation in North China chiefly because the 37th Division of the Chinese 29th Army lacks control and because both Japan and China feel it necessary to save “face”. Information regarding the disposition and movement of Chinese troops conveyed by the Japanese War Office gives less the impression of serious war preparations than of a demonstration. Anticipation of war is not indicated because of Japanese restraints and limited mobilization and movement of troops. As to local settlement of the incidents there is some progress reported. In order to secure Chinese fulfillment of the July 11th agreement entered into by the 29th Army, the Government and army as well as the people are prepared to exert all the military force that is necessary. Agreement of July 11 is published without economic or political provisions. The possibility of a local settlement is held by those foreign observers and Japanese Army officers best informed. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, I concur that a local settlement is possible and hold the belief that there will be no war between Japan and China, although there may be some incidental fighting connected with movement of the 37th Division of the 29th Army. 69 Copy of paraphrased radiogram transmitted to the Department by the War Department. 70 Penciled notation added: “21,982 officers and men, 48 pursuit planes, 40 observation planes.” The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8933: Telegram [Document 250] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 23, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 23—12:24 a.m.] 322. Department’s 112, July 21, 7 p.m. 1. I have just returned from the Foreign Office where I read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs paragraph 2 of numbered part 1 and paragraph 1 of section 2 of the Department’s instruction. I also informed him of the purport of the remainder. The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his pleasure at receiving the message. 2. He confirmed the information that there is a slight withdrawal by both Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping but was unwilling to state that there had been substantial improvement in the general situation. He emphasized that the Chinese Government did not know the terms of any agreement which might have been reached. 3. I informed him that I had reason to think the American Ambassador might possibly leave Peiping for Nanking today but I had received no information definitely announcing his plans. Sent to Peiping. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8934: Telegram [Document 251] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 23, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 23—9:40 a.m.] 323. 1. Hidaka told a foreign correspondent this morning that the Chinese were very much mistaken if they thought the Japanese were bluffing in respect to the sending of National Government troops in Hopei; the Japanese Government had made three démarches in this respect (Japanese Assistant Military Attaché to Vice Minister of War July 17, Hidaka to Wang Chung Hui midnight July 17, and Kita to Ho Ying Chin July 19) and these were not empty gestures. 2. We learn from reliable source that 10 cars of Chinese troops passed northward yesterday through Hsuchowfu, Kiangsu, into Shantung. 3. As far as known no official reports from foreign military observers in Japan have been received here confirming the despatch from Japan of 35,000 troops which are persistently reported in the press as having been scheduled to arrive in Tangku yesterday or today. Sent to Peiping. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8939: Telegram [Document 252] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 23, 1937—noon. [Received July 23—11:25 a.m.] 324. The Soviet Ambassador, who came to Nanking from Shanghai July 21, told a foreign correspondent this morning that in his opinion (1) North China was lost to the National Government with the conclusion of the Ho–Umeza Agreement; (2) the Japanese troops now occupied the key positions in the Peiping-Tientsin area and the Chinese would not be able to dislodge them; (3) the most Chiang Kai-shek could do would be to concentrate his troops in Southern Hopei as a bulwark against any southward extension of the area of Japanese influence; (4) the Japanese would probably not challenge troops because they would be able to go ahead quietly and obtain the essentials of what they wanted in North China. He said he was surprised at the gullibility of Chinese who believed, perhaps because they so hoped, that a war between Japan and Soviet Russia would solve their problems; the Japanese would never undertake such war unless Germany also attacked Russia and there was no present prospect of this eventuality. Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8936: Telegram [Document 253] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 23, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 6:23 p.m.] 282. Cowan, 71 British Embassy, informed me today under instructions of his Ambassador that the British Ambassador had seen Chiang Kai-shek on the 21st. Chiang Kai-shek agreed with British Ambassador’s definition of his position as having the appearance of being perilously like a dilemma between disappearance before an outburst of popular feeling or resistance to Japan. Chiang informed British Ambassador that the only chance of a settlement was for the British and American Governments to approach Japan and urge a peaceful solution. Chiang expressed himself as being very anxious to reach a peaceful solution which would be consistent with the four points of his declaration reported to the Department in Nanking’s 305, July 20, 11 a.m. British Ambassador suggested possibility of negotiations based on agreements arrived at in Tientsin but Chiang stated he was unwilling to accept agreements reached here because of uncertainty as to details regarding the suppression of anti-Japanese agitation and anti-Communism. British Ambassador suggested that Chiang inform Japanese of his willingness to negotiate but Chiang stated that he thought it would be better for the British Government to do this. British Ambassador explained why British Government could not. Chiang stated that it was no use for him to do it at the present time as it would seem like weakness for one thing, and for another, a “guarantor” was necessary to insure against distortions and unfair interpretations of any agreement. Chiang stated that his four points represented his “last ditch”. I told Cowan that I would communicate this to you. I stated that it was just as impossible for us to act as it was for the British. Cowan agrees with me that at the moment local situation is very much improved. Sung Che Yuan appears to be complying with Japanese demand for elimination of 37th Division from the immediate neighborhood of Peiping. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Johnson 71 David John Cowan, First Secretary of the British Embassy in China. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8935: Telegram [Document 254] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , July 23, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 23—9:50 a.m.] 387. Shanghai remains quiet but tense. Both Chinese and Japanese authorities are making every effort to prevent any unfortunate incident. Chinese members of the Shanghai Municipal Council yesterday were much disturbed over a report that Japanese would hold night maneuvers last night or early this morning. British Consul General and I made friendly inquiry of Japanese Consul General who consulted his naval authorities and assured us that the report was without foundation. He stated that Japanese forces are merely continuing to carry out their daily routine exercises on a small scale, these have been going on for some months. To Peiping and Nanking by courier. Gauss The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8943: Telegram [Document 255] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 23—3:16 p.m.] 326. 1. Reuter has circulated this afternoon an information bulletin confirming by implication news from Tokyo that a settlement has been reached in Hopei. The Chinese Government insists that it is ignorant of the terms of the settlement. Assuming that a settlement has been reached and hostilities between the Japanese forces and the 29th Army avoided, the Chinese Government may still face serious internal difficulties. Such a settlement may seriously affect its prestige and even its continuance because (firstly) the Japanese will have flouted the authority of the Government in Hopei and (secondly) the Chinese public will hold the Government responsible for failing to prevent the strengthening of Japanese control over Hopei which will inevitably result from this so-called “local settlement.” The settlement will obviously appear to the Chinese public to be local only in the sense that it was forced by the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government was excluded from participation. 2. It seems probable in Nanking that a settlement of this nature will be viewed by the Chinese public as a political victory of the Japanese Government over the Chinese Government and that the Chinese Government will suffer the more humiliation because as in the case of the loss of Manchuria the victory was practically uncontested. It is doubtful whether the political and military leaders who advocate resistance to Japan will ignore so favorable an opportunity to attack General Chiang and the present administration and it is possible that General Chiang may be forced in defense of the Government to continue the controversy even though he might prefer to accept the reverse rather than resist Japanese advance prematurely. Many Chinese believe that a major object of Japan’s policy is to weaken the National Government by promoting internal dissension. (For a description of the Government’s predicament by a responsible official see the first half of my 293, July 17, 7 p.m.). Sent to the Department and Peiping. Peck The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8938: Telegram [Document 256] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 23, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 23—9:30 a.m.] 285. Embassy’s 280, July 22, 4 p.m. 72 1. The military situation today does not differ substantially from that described in the above mentioned telegram. Movement toward the south of troops of the 37th Division apparently continues. Sand bag barricades in the streets of Peiping were removed last night. 2. There is the feeling, which is almost a conviction, that Sung has already agreed to, or will before long agree to those concessions which the Japanese want. The agreement which is rumored as having been signed at Tientsin on July 19 is presumably an agreement in which have been incorporated the details of the clauses of a general character which Chang Tzu Chung apparently signed in Peiping July 11. 3. The clause with regard to suppression of anti-Japanese and Communist activities is regarded as having grave political implications. Local educators regard it as intended, among other things, to end Peiping as the educational center of China as presumably the best Chinese educators of Peiping will not be able to remain here under the fulfillment of that clause. In fact under the guise of suppression of anti-Japanese activities, so many substantial patriotic Chinese might have to go that there would remain only docile puppets. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo. Lockhart 72 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9259 [Document 257] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2506 Tokyo , July 23, 1937. [Received August 9.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose a memorandum 73 entitled “The North China Incident of July 1937[”], prepared by a member of my staff. This memorandum is almost entirely factual in character, that is to say, it is largely a narrative of events based on information, obtained by the Embassy from official Japanese sources and from the Japanese press, from diplomatic colleagues, and from the reports of American Governmental representatives in China. It is intended to be a summary record of the developments of an event which, whatever its immediate outcome, is destined to be a milestone in relations between China and Japan. Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me last night (see my telegram No. 223, July 22, 7 p.m.) 74 of events which, if true, might be interpreted as a recession by the Chinese Government from the uncompromising position taken in its communication of July 19 to the Japanese Government, the situation has not, in my opinion, sufficiently unfolded to warrant final appraisal of the significance of the incident in terms of future consequences. However, I present certain thoughts which, while not conclusive, may be helpful to the Department in making an estimate of the situation. There has been wide speculation on the question whether the incident, beginning with the fighting on July 7 at Marco Polo Bridge, was engineered by the Japanese military in North China. It is not difficult to surrender to subjective considerations, and, by drawing parallels with previous instances of fighting, where Japanese instigation has been demonstrated beyond peradventure, to conclude that in this instance also the fighting was deliberately brought about by the Japanese military. A careful examination of the information thus far available from both Japanese and Chinese sources leads to the conclusion that indifference to the dangers inherent in a situation where virtually hostile troops are in close juxtaposition, indiscretion in an extraordinary measure, and intolerance of the rights of the Chinese, can all be properly charged to the Japanese in fixing responsibility for the initial fighting. There is no doubt also, as pointed out by Mr. Ambassador Johnson, that the Japanese military unwarrantably profited by the fighting to aggravate the situation. On the other hand, evidence is lacking that the Japanese brought the fighting about by design. In any objective examination of the question presented, it needs to be borne in mind that the “window-dressing” which has invariably accompanied incidents which the Japanese have instigated in the past has not been apparent in this instance. There has not been a succession of minor incidents involving Japanese “rights” over which the Japanese have affected to feel intense indignation. On the contrary, the fighting was preceded by a period of relative quiescence, and after the Marco Polo Bridge affair there was systematic effort—so palpable as to be evident even to the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo—on the part of the Japanese Government to restrain the Japanese public from viewing the situation emotionally. It is also a fact that Japanese officialdom, including the War Office, absolved the Chinese troops of any premeditation, which it probably would not have done had the Marco Polo Bridge affair been the result of Japanese calculation. So long as definite and conclusive evidence of Japanese guilt is lacking, it seems to me that little is to be gained by public discussion of this question for the reason that to discuss it would be to digress from the basic cause of the incident. The Japanese have invoked the Boxer Protocol to justify the stationing of a large number of troops in North China and for the holding of extensive military manoeuvres, but it is a self-evident fact that the stationing of troops in large numbers and the holding of military exercises are calculated to solidify the Japanese position in North China and thus have a purpose and objective which lie entirely outside the purposes and objectives of the instrument which the Japanese invoke. It may be imagined that the Japanese Government would be glad to have an examination made of the circumstances in which the affair originated, as even the raising of that particular issue by the interested powers would, regardless of the findings, imply a certain validity in the action of the Japanese in stationing near Peiping an unnecessarily large force and in other forms of action antecedent to the fighting. A brief reference might be made to public opinion in Japan, which, as I have stated in my telegrams, is solidly behind the Government. Several foreign correspondents and diplomatic colleagues who have discussed the situation with individual Japanese have been led to believe, by the apparent dismay with which such Japanese have watched the serious turn toward which events have taken, that popular support of the Government is lacking. Such a conclusion would be warranted if such support and a feverish desire for war were synonymous, as they have been in the recent past. In the present instance, the hope that war can be avoided is universal, but there has come to my knowledge no evidence that there exists any body of opinion which does not believe that, failing a modification of Chinese attitude, resort to force by Japan would not be justified. As matters stand today, it would seem fair to say that, although the incident may not have been provoked by the Japanese military, the latter lost no time in realizing that an opportunity was presented still further to weaken the influence of the Chinese Government in North China. It was made evident to us more than a week ago by the Foreign Office that Japanese diplomatic strategy called for emphasis upon settlement of the incident as a “local matter” with local officials, so that, if a local settlement were obtained, the courses open to the Chinese Government would be to approve the settlement, or to ignore it, or to prevent by force its fulfilment. To follow either of the first two courses would be failure by the Chinese Government to resist further whittling away of its influence over North China: to follow the third would involve taking the initiative for hostilities for which it is not prepared. The indications now being received primarily from Japan sources are that the situation in North China is in process of settlement and that Japan now looks to China either to resist or to acquiesce in the reduction to a shadow of its sovereignty in North China. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 73 Not printed. 74 Cf. the Ambassador’s memorandum of July 22, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 333 . The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8956: Telegram [Document 258] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , July 24, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 24—10 a.m.] 347. My 338, July 22 [ 21 ], 10 a.m. Foreign Office officials here continue to regard the Sino-Japanese crisis with concern. The impression is that Chiang Kai-shek having lost prestige during the past few months may feel that he must now adopt an intransigeant stand and this attitude combined with the pressure to which he is being subjected by the communistic elements may result in the rejection by the Nanking Government of the local agreement reported to have been reached in the Peiping area. In that event, it is believed here that the Japanese will proceed on their course and that although there may be no actual declaration of war, hostilities will ensue. Phillips The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8960: Telegram [Document 259] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 24, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 24—11:25 a.m.] 1037. Delbos gave me last evening a detailed account of a conversation he had had yesterday afternoon with the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires. The Japanese Chargé d’Affaires had first thanked him on behalf of the Japanese Government for his kindness in offering to mediate between Japan and China; but had said that his Government was of the opinion that the question would only be complicated by the intrusion of any third party. There was an excellent chance yesterday that the dispute would be settled without war. The Japanese Foreign Office was most anxious to avoid war and was convinced that General Chiang Kai-shek also desired to avoid war. The leaders of two of the Chinese divisions in the Peiping area also desired to avoid war. The leader of the other division desired to fight. The officer who had ordered the original firing on the Japanese troops had already been punished. The Japanese Chargé d’Affaires had then asked him if it were true that England had proposed joint intervention by England, France, and the United States. He had denied this. The Japanese Chargé d’Affaires had then asked if the Soviet Union had asked for joint action by France and the Soviet Union. He had denied this also. Delbos assured me that the Soviet Union had had no serious discussion whatsoever with France with respect to the present situation in the Far East. Bullitt The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8965: Telegram [Document 260] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 24—11:35 a.m.] 290. Embassy’s 285, July 23, 7 p.m. 1. The military situation has altered since the above mentioned telegram was sent only in that further withdrawal of troops of the 37th Division has taken place. Four train loads of these troops have so far left Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow railway. Through traffic on Peiping-Hankow line has been partially restored. 2. A competent informant closely connected with the Kuominchun for many years has expressed in confidence to a member of my staff the views that: ( a ) Sung Che-yuan went no further in the agreement of July 19 than he believed would be acceptable to the National Government, ( b ) the Japanese will find themselves again obstructed by the local Chinese officials when they attempt to implement this agreement in accordance with the Japanese interpretation of its meaning, and ( c ) within a few months Japanese exasperation will again result in a clash, which may then take the form of real warfare, but meanwhile China will have become stronger militarily and financially. The informant does not believe that acceptance by the National Government of Sung’s solution of the situation will seriously weaken the power of Chiang Kai-shek or the National Government. He added that Sung had conferred with his military subordinates prior to approval of the agreement. Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking. Lockhart The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8962: Telegram [Document 261] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , July 24, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 24—11:41 a.m.] While the local conditions described in my July 21, 7 p.m., have not altered, there is an appreciable increase in tension. The mayor of Hankow called this morning and discussed local situation in the course of which he referred to possibility of hostilities here and inquired whether American patrol would accede to a request to move American gunboats in case latter should be in Chinese line of fire. Commander of the [Yangtze] patrol has been informed. On the other hand I learn that orders which had previously been given for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Chungking to [ and other ] Yangtze ports above Hankow have been canceled within the past 2 days. Repeated to Peiping and Nanking. Josselyn The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9260 [Document 262] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2514 Tokyo , July 24, 1937. [Received August 9.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 199 of July 14, 5 p.m., in paragraph six of which I presented views with regard to the attitude of the American Government in the event of organized hostilities between China and Japan resulting from the current North China Incident. In view of the constantly changing situation, my telegraphic reports on the incident had necessarily to be rapidly drafted and despatched, and in reviewing them it occurred to me that in one or two instances my thoughts could have been more happily phrased. In the paragraph mentioned of the above-cited telegram, we stated that protests against Japanese should be made only in certain circumstances, including instances when American citizens and property are molested, but we should have added “or other rights”, as it was not our intention to suggest or to imply that there has been any change in our view that the American Government should protest in the event of violation of any treaty to which it is a party. The violation of a treaty to which we are a signatory involves American rights; protest must be made. But the method and manner of the protest or protests are important. Common sense dictates that there is no use in spurring the aggressor still further to injure those rights as a direct or indirect result of our unnecessarily irritating and aggravating the situation. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8966: Telegram [Document 263] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 25, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 25—6:10 a.m.] 292. No change of importance in the military situation has taken place in past 24 hours except that Chinese claim that all contingents of 37th Division have now withdrawn from Papaoshan area. Normal conditions are gradually being restored in Peiping. Approximately two companies of Japanese troops still remain in Lukouchiao area, ostensibly as a rear guard and also to check on withdrawal of 37th Division. The presence of these Japanese troops in the above area is a potential source of trouble and until they are withdrawn to Fengtai danger of further liberties [ disturbances ] will not have been removed. Japanese military are not committing themselves to any fixed date for withdrawal these units or for withdrawal to Manchuria of reenforcements sent to North China in past 2 weeks. Persistently claim that this depends entirely upon the attitude of the Nanking Government. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8980: Telegram [Document 264] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 25, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 25—7:35 p.m.] 328. 1. I have just seen the Generalissimo who asked me to convey to you the following message: 2. He stated that the Central Government of China out of a sincere desire for peace had acceded to Japanese demands and had withdrawn its opposition to a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge incident between General Sung Che-yuan and the Japanese military along the lines of the three points covered by the settlement of July 11. 3. He then asked that the American Government watch Japanese actions carefully from now on because he believes that the Japanese Government will shortly present further demands to the Chinese Government which the Chinese Government cannot accept. He stated emphatically that the local settlement now agreed to represents the absolute limit to which the Chinese Government can and is prepared to go. He stated that if the powers and especially the United States and Great Britain accepted this settlement as concluding this affair they would discover too late that war between China and Japan was inevitable. 4. He stated his belief that the Japanese had originally intended to use the Marco Polo Bridge incident for the purpose of bringing about the complete separation of Hopei and Chahar Provinces from the control of the Central Government but that when they met the determined resistance of the Chinese they changed their tactics and resolved upon a local settlement along these [ the? ] lines of the July 11 truce and transferred their attention to the larger issues between themselves and the Chinese Government. He said that he anticipated that before very long the Japanese would present new demands to the Chinese Government which would include ( a ) a settlement of all questions relating to Manchukuo, ( b ) cooperative action on a national scale against communism (this, he explained, was against Russia), and ( c ) the withdrawal of all Central Government troops from Hopei. He stated emphatically that the Chinese Government would not accept these demands and that war would therefore be inevitable. Believed that the Japanese would attempt to compel acceptance by China. He pointed to the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and Manchuria in addition to what has already been put into Tientsin as reason for his conviction that Japan is preparing to force China to accept new demands far beyond the present local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge affair. 5. He expressed the hope that the United States and Great Britain would continue to watch Japanese activities closely. He expressed belief that the only way in which war between China and Japan could be averted would be by cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted. He pointed out that the outbreak of a war between China and Japan would affect the interests of the United States and of Great Britain. He referred to the moral obligation which devolves upon the United States and Great Britain as signatories to the Nine Power Agreement, the interest of the United States in the maintenance of world peace and our general interest in the welfare of humanity as reasons why we should anticipate the outbreak of such a war (and an attempt to draw aside from such a war by means of the Neutrality Act after war had commenced) and cooperate with the British Government now and quickly in making it crystal clear to Japan that if it does not want war with China then it must not attempt to force China to make further concessions. That Japan must be made to understand that China will fight rather than make any further concessions. 6. He concluded by saying that in his opinion this was the only way that war might be averted. He stated that the United States and Great Britain were the only powers in a position to bring this home to the Japanese Government in such a way as to persuade them to desist from their designs. He urged that immediate action along these lines was necessary. 7. By way of comment I would like to say that I was much impressed with the earnestness and with the logical force with which the Generalissimo set forth his arguments. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) 793.94/9612 [Document 265] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ) 75 Nanking , July 25, 1937. Conversation: Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Johnson; Present: Mr. Peck. After preliminary remarks, Dr. Wang said that he might tell Mr. Johnson confidentially that General Sung Che-yuan had communicated to the National Government the three terms of the agreement arrived at between General Sung and the Japanese military. The three terms were identical with those already published in the press. Mr. Johnson observed that two of the terms as published in the press seemed to have been carried out or to be in the process of execution, namely, an apology from the Chinese to the Japanese and the withdrawal of Chinese troops, the 37th Division being in process of withdrawal from Peiping southward, and of being replaced by the 132nd Division. The third term, including suppression of Communist activities, seemed more vague. However, when he left Peiping on July 23 the tension seemed to have been greatly eased. Dr. Wang said that the Chinese Government was still very apprehensive of an impending major clash. This apprehension was caused by the reports received by the National Government of still continuing mobilization in Japan and transportation into North China of Japanese troops and munitions. The reports stated that morning, afternoon and evening such reenforcements were continually coming down the railway from Shanhaikwan into Tientsin and were then being despatched toward the Peiping area. Dr. Wang said that the so-called “incident” which took place on July 7–8 was after all merely an incident and was easily susceptible of settlement. This incident could not account for the mobilization in Japan and the continuing arrival of Japanese reenforcements already described; the Chinese Government was convinced that the Japanese Government must still have a major objective and had accepted the present truce merely as a means of bringing about a lull during which preparations might be made for the attainment of the major objective in North China. Mr. Johnson made the comment that the Japanese forces had not achieved anything with regard to North China; they had merely produced a change in the status of Tientsin and Peiping. Dr. Wang said that the Chinese Government did not know where the next blow would fall, whether in Hopei Province as a whole, or in Shantung, or elsewhere. Dr. Wang said that General Chiang Kai-shek had made the position of the Chinese Government perfectly clear in his address which was published a few days ago. In that address he had indicated four points as a minimum beyond which the Chinese Government could not yield anything to Japan. Over and above that minimum there was opportunity for negotiation with the Japanese, but the very term “minimum” meant that the reservations indicated in the “four points” could not be diminished in any way. The Chinese Government was very anxious to avoid a war with Japan and would be willing to negotiate with Japan any issues not violating the four minimum reservations. General Chiang was convinced by the continued arrival of Japanese reenforcements and munitions in Hopei Province that the Japanese did not intend to accept the minimum reservations and that renewed hostilities on a major scale could not be avoided unless such reenforcements were stopped immediately and the principal Powers interested in the Far East were to take more positive steps than those taken hitherto to induce Japan to negotiate with China for a fundamental settlement of issues between the two countries. Dr. Wang told Mr. Johnson he had told Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, as early as July 12 that the Chinese Government would be willing to agree to an immediate cessation of troop movements into Hopei by both sides and thereafter to discuss outstanding issues, but no reply to this proposal had been received. The same offer had been reiterated in the Chinese reply of July 19 to the Japanese memorandum of July 17; still no reply had been received and movements of Japanese troops into Hopei continued. The Chinese offer seemed a reasonable one, because both sides asserted that reenforcements were being brought into Hopei merely as a measure of self-defence. If the excuse of self-defence could be removed, re-enforcements could cease and the so-called “incident” could be settled through negotiation. The refusal of the Japanese to adopt this obvious course was another reason why the Chinese Government felt sure that the Japanese Government had a larger objective in view than the mere settlement of the Lukouchiao Bridge incident. Mr. Johnson particularly inquired whether the Chinese Government had positive evidence that Japanese troops were continuing to come into Tientsin down the railway from Shanhaikwan, because his information was that no additional Japanese troops had arrived over this route during the last couple of days. Dr. Wang replied that reports received from the railway confirmed the fact that additional Japanese reenforcements were continually arriving. Dr. Wang admitted that the Japanese assertion that troops were not being sent from Japan proper to China might be true, since it appeared that Japanese troops were going from Japan to Korea and Manchuria and that the troops arriving in Hopei Province were drawn from either Korea or Manchuria. The Japanese assertion was, therefore, merely a subterfuge. Nevertheless, the Japanese Premier had officially announced that mobilization was taking place in Japan, Korea and Manchuria. Dr. Wang said that General Chiang was very anxious to see Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson said that he held himself ready and willing to see General Chiang at any time that might be set; 76 he had come down from Peiping to Nanking for this express purpose. Mr. Johnson remarked that he had thought it advisable to remain in Peiping until recently so that he might be in a sense an “official witness” of what might transpire there. Dr. Wang dwelt at some length on conflicting reports concerning the alleged disappearance of a Japanese sailor from the International Settlement on the evening of July 24. He said the Japanese and Chinese authorities had each informed the other of an intention not to magnify importance of this incident. 75 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 546, July 27; received August 23. 76 See telegram No. 328, supra . Memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 793.94/9012 [Document 266] Memorandum by Mr. Myrl S. Myers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] July 26, 1937. In conversation with Mr. Myers on July 24, Colonel Bratton 77 stated that according to information received from our Military Attaché at Tokyo the Japanese have reenforced their north China garrison since July 7 with units as follows: about two-thirds of the 20th Division (which is at war strength) from Korea, or about 17,000 troops; one regiment of infantry and one battalion of field artillery from Jehol Province; 500 transport, signal corps and service troops from Japan. These forces, plus the regular north China garrison estimated at about 8,000, brings the total number of Japanese forces in north China up to some 32,000 troops. Note: It is interesting to note from the above that except for Japanese troops withdrawn from Jehol Province there appear to have been no withdrawals from Manchuria for the purpose of reenforcing the north China garrison. 77 Col. Rufus S. Bratton, Military Intelligence Division, War Department. Chapter III: July 26–August 13, 1937 Chapter III: July 26–August 13, 1937 Further armed clashes, Japanese demands for Chinese troop evacuation of Peiping–Tientsin area; Chinese military withdrawal from Peiping–Tientsin area; China’s determination to resist continuing Japanese aggression, July 29–30; Chinese Ambassador’s inquiry of Secretary of State as to possible invocation of 1922 treaty relating to China; Chinese Finance Minister’s suggestions of U.S. aid to China, August 6; Chinese warning against use by Japanese armed forces of Shanghai International Settlement, August 8; shooting incident near Hungjao military air field at Shanghai, August 9; American offer of good offices at Tokyo, August 10; proposal by foreign powers to exclude Shanghai from area of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese, August 11; interview of foreign Ambassadors with Generalissimo Chiang; Japanese reply to foreign proposal, August 13 [267] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 26, 1937—noon. [Received July 26—5 a.m.] 793.94/8981: Telegram [268] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 26—8 a.m.] 793.94/8971: Telegram [269] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 26—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/8975: Telegram [270] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 26, 1937. 793.94/9072 [271] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 26, 1937. 793.94/9071 [272] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 26, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 26—2:05 p.m.] 793.94/8989: Telegram [273] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 26, 1937. [Received August 23.] 793.94/9610 [274] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 27, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 27—3 a.m.] 793.94/8998: Telegram [275] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 27, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 27—4:30 a.m.] 793.94/8999: Telegram [276] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 27, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 27—9:30 a.m.] 793.94/8993: Telegram [277] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 27, 1937—1 p.m. 793.94/8993: Telegram [278] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 27, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 27—4:30 a.m.] 793.94/9000: Telegram [279] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 27—8:55 a.m.] 793.94/9003: Telegram [280] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, July 27, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/9021a: Telegram [281] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 27, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 27—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/9005: Telegram [282] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, July 27, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/8993: Telegram [283] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 27, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 27—1 p.m.] 793.94/9008: Telegram [284] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 27, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 27—1:07 p.m.] 793.94/9007: Telegram [285] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 27, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 27—1:40 p.m.] 793.94/9009: Telegram [286] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 27, 1937. 793.94/9080 [287] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 28, 1937—7 a.m. [Received July 27—4:45 p.m.] 793.94/9013: Telegram [288] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received July 29—4:30 a.m.] 793.94/9059: Telegram [289] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 28, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 28—6 a.m.] 793.94/9029: Telegram [290] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 28, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 28—6 a.m.] 793.94/9033: Telegram [291] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 28, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 28—6 a.m.] 793.94/9034: Telegram [292] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 28, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 28—7:50 a.m.] 793.94/9023: Telegram [293] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 28, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 28—7 a.m.] 793.94/9024: Telegram [294] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 28—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/9015: Telegram [295] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) at Peiping Washington, July 28, 1937—3 p.m. 793.94/9037a: Telegram [296] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 28, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 28—6:45 a.m.] 793.94/9021: Telegram [297] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 28, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 28—3:18 p.m.] 793.94/9043: Telegram [298] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 28, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 28—7:27 p.m.] 793.94/9045: Telegram [299] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 29, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/9043: Telegram [300] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 29, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 29—10:28 a.m.] 793.94/9060: Telegram [301] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 29, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 29—9:15 a.m.] 793.94/9056: Telegram [302] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) at Peiping Washington, July 29, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9013: Telegram [303] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 29—10:12 a.m.] 793.94/9057: Telegram [304] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 29—10:35 a.m.] 793.94/9073: Telegram [305] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 29, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 29—9:03 a.m.] 793.94/9050: Telegram [306] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 29, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 29—9:25 a.m.] 793.94/9058: Telegram [307] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, July 29, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 29—4:55 p.m.] 793.94/9085: Telegram [308] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—9:55 a.m.] 793.94/9054: Telegram [309] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—10:41 a.m.] 793.94/9061: Telegram [310] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—12:43 p.m.] 793.94/9075: Telegram [311] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—2:20 p.m.] 793.94/9081: Telegram [312] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, July 29, 1937—9 p.m. 793.94/9037: Telegram [313] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 30, 1937—2 a.m. [Received 7:40 p.m.] 793.94/9086: Telegram [314] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 30, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 30—10 a.m.] 793.94/9094: Telegram [315] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 30, 1937. 793.94/9311 [316] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 30, 1937—noon. [Received 3:30 p.m.] 793.94/9098: Telegram [317] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, July 30, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 30—2:04 p.m.] 793.94/9096: Telegram [318] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 30, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 30—9:34 a.m.] 793.94/9092: Telegram [319] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, July 30, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/9023: Telegram [320] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 31, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 10:35 a.m.] 793.94/9111: Telegram [321] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, July 31, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 31—3 a.m.] 793.94/9106: Telegram [322] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 31, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 31—12:35 a.m.] 793.94/9104: Telegram [323] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 31, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 31—6:35 a.m.] 793.94/9102: Telegram [324] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 31, 1937—noon. [Received July 31—10:55 a.m.] 793.94/9107: Telegram [325] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador (C. T. Wang) [Washington,] July 31, 1937. 793.94/9312 [326] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 31, 1937—3 p.m. 793.94/8993: Telegram [327] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 31, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 31—8:46 a.m.] 793.94/9110: Telegram [328] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 31, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 31—8:13 a.m.] 793.94/9105: Telegram [329] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 31, 1937. 793.94/9145 [330] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 1, 1937—1 [5?] p.m. [Received August 1—11:34 a.m.] 793.94/9120: Telegram [331] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 1, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 1—12:21 p.m.] 793.94/9117: Telegram [332] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 2, 1937. 793.94/9139 [333] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, August 2, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 11:10 a.m.] 793.94/9127: Telegram [334] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 2, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 1:46 p.m.] 793.94/9128: Telegram [335] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 2, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 6:39 p.m.] 793.94/9131: Telegram [336] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 2, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 2—5:45 a.m.] 793.94/9122: Telegram [337] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, August 3, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 3—9 a.m.] 702.6193/78: Telegram [338] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 4—6:40 a.m.] 793.94/9172: Telegram [339] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, August 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 3—10:55 a.m.] 793.94/9149: Telegram [340] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) at Peiping Washington, August 3, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9122: Telegram [341] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 3, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 4—2:15 a.m.] 793.94/9159: Telegram [342] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 3—7:05 a.m.] 793.94/9136: Telegram [343] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 4—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/9165: Telegram [344] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 3, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 3—2:40 p.m.] 793.94/9151: Telegram [345] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 3, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 3—10 a.m.] 793.94/9143: Telegram [346] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 3, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 3—4:20 p.m.] 793.94/9152: Telegram [347] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 4, 1937—noon. [Received 12:25 p.m.] 793.94/9191: Telegram [348] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 4, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2:55 p.m.] 793.94/9175: Telegram [349] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 4, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 7:10 p.m.] 793.94/9179: Telegram [350] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, August 4, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 4—2:38 p.m.] 793.94/9180: Telegram [351] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 7:25 p.m.] 852.00/6164: Telegram [352] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, August 5, 1937—noon. 793.94/9151: Telegram [353] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 5, 1937—noon. 793.94/9151: Telegram [354] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 5, 1937—1 p.m. 811.3394/265: Telegram [355] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 5, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2:15 p.m.] 793.94/9193: Telegram [356] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 5, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 5—9:40 a.m.] 793.94/9189: Telegram [357] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, August 5, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 5—9:45 a.m.] 793.94/9183: Telegram [358] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 5, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/9102: Telegram [359] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 5, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 5—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/9192: Telegram [360] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 6, 1937. 793.94/9231 [361] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, August 6, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 6—9:03 a.m.] 793.94/9203: Telegram [362] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 6, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 6—2:15 p.m.] 793.94/9215: Telegram [363] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 6, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 7—9:30 a.m.] 793.94/9234: Telegram [364] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 6, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 6—9:45 a.m.] 793.94/9204: Telegram [365] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 6, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 6—10 a.m.] 793.94/9200: Telegram [366] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 6, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 8:10 p.m.] 793.94/9220: Telegram [367] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 6, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 6—3:50 p.m.] 793.94/9217: Telegram [368] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 6, 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 6—3:26 p.m.] 793.94/9218: Telegram [369] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 6, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 6—10:25 a.m.] 793.94/9205: Telegram [370] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 6, 1937. [Received August 23.] 894.032/171 [371] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 6, 1937. [Received August 23.] 741.94/131 [372] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, August 7, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 7—1 a.m.] 793.94/9227: Telegram [373] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, August 7, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 7—8:50 a.m.] 793.94/9225: Telegram [374] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 7, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 7—9:05 a.m.] 793.94/9237: Telegram [375] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, August 7, 1937—1 p.m. 793.94/9217: Telegram [376] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 7, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 7—6:45 a.m.] 793.94/9228: Telegram [377] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 7, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 7—10 a.m.] 793.94/9235: Telegram [378] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 7, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/9191: Telegram [379] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 7, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 8—10 a.m.] 793.94/9239: Telegram [380] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 7, 1937—3 p.m. 793.94/9228: Telegram [381] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 7, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9204: Telegram [382] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) Washington, August 7, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9221: Telegram [383] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 7, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 7—12:45 p.m.] 793.94/9241: Telegram [384] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 8, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 7:50 p.m.] 793.94/9242: Telegram [385] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 8, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 8—6 a.m.] 793.94/9238: Telegram [386] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 8, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 5:23 p.m.] 793.94/9243: Telegram [387] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 8, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 8—11:15 a.m.] 793.94/9244: Telegram [388] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 8, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 8—10:55 a.m.] 793.94/9246: Telegram [389] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 9, 1937—noon. [Received 4:15 p.m.] 793.94/9264: Telegram [390] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 9, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 9—7:15 a.m.] 793.94/9245: Telegram [391] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State [Peiping, August 9, 1937—3 p.m.] [Received August 9—6 a.m.] 793.94/9250: Telegram [392] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 9, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 9—8:32 a.m.] 793.94/9252: Telegram [393] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) Washington, August 9, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9125: Telegram [394] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 9, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 9—2:40 p.m.] 793.94/9262: Telegram [395] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 9, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/9245: Telegram [396] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 9, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 9—1:05 p.m.] 793.94/9261: Telegram [397] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 10, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 10—2:35 a.m.] 793.94/9265: Telegram [398] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 10, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 11—4 a.m.] 793.94/9283: Telegram [399] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, August 10, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 7:55 p.m.] 793.94/9279: Telegram [400] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 10, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 10—2:20 p.m.] 793.94/9278: Telegram [401] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 10, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 10—10:34 a.m.] 793.94/9267: Telegram [402] Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma) [Washington,] August 10, 1937. 793.94/9647 [403] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 10, 1937. 793.94/9487 [404] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 11, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 11—6:40 a.m.] 793.94/9281: Telegram [405] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 11, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 11—10:05 a.m.] 793.94/9285: Telegram [406] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, August 11, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 11—1:40 p.m.] 793.94/9290: Telegram [407] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 11, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 11—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/9288: Telegram [408] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 11, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 11:15 p.m.] 703.94/9303: Telegram [409] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 11, 1937—midnight. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 793.94/9306: Telegram [410] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 12, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 12—6:10 a.m.] 793.94/9297: Telegram [411] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 12, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 793.94/9307: Telegram [412] The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State Canton, August 12, 1937—noon. [Received 1:15 p.m.] 793.94/9316: Telegram [413] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 12, 1937—noon. [Received 1:25 p.m.] 793.94/9315: Telegram [414] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 12, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 793.94/9301: Telegram [415] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 12, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 12—8 a.m.] 793.94/9304: Telegram [416] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 11 [12?] 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 793.94/9296: Telegram [417] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 12, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 12—6:05 a.m.] 793.94/9298: Telegram [418] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 12, 1937. 793.94/9940 [419] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 12, 1937. 793.94/9649 [420] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, August 12, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9296: Telegram [421] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 12, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 7:55 p.m.] 793.94/9320: Telegram [422] The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State Canton, August 12, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 12—8:18 a.m.] 793.94/9300: Telegram [423] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 12, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 12—1:55 p.m.] 793.94/9314: Telegram [424] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 12, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 8:45 p.m.] 793.94/9329: Telegram [425] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 12—9:59 a.m.] 793.94/9305: Telegram [426] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 12, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/9305: Telegram [427] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 12, 1937—9 p.m. 793.94/9151: Telegram [428] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 12, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 12—2:28 p.m.] 793.94/9318: Telegram [429] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 12, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 12—6:50 p.m.] 793.94/9325: Telegram [430] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 13, 1937—1 a.m. [Received 8:10 a.m.] 793.94/9321: Telegram [431] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 13, 1937—2 a.m. [Received August 12—5:12 p.m.] 793.94/9317: Telegram [432] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 13, 1937—8 a.m. [Received August 13—5 a.m.] 793.94/9330: Telegram [433] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 13, 1937—11 p.m. [a.m.?] [Received August 13—6 a.m.] 793.94/9331: Telegram [434] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 13, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/9317: Telegram [435] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 13—7:52 a.m.] 793.94/9337: Telegram [436] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 13—10:59 a.m.] 793.94/9336: Telegram [437] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 13—10:20 a.m.] 793.94/9335: Telegram [438] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 13, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94/9329: Telegram [439] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 13, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 13—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/9339: Telegram [440] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 13, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 13—11:50 a.m.] 793.94/9341: Telegram [441] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 13, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 19—5:40 a.m.] 793.94/9497: Telegram [442] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 13, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 13—1:16 p.m.] 793.94/9345: Telegram [443] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 13, 1937—midnight. 793.94/9345: Telegram [444] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Legation in Canada (Key) [Ottawa,] August 13, 1937. 793.94/9509 The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8981: Telegram [Document 267] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 26, 1937—noon. [Received July 26—5 a.m.] 293. Embassy’s 292, July 25, 3 p.m. 1. Fighting took place during last night between Japanese and Chinese troops at Langfang on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway. 2. The local Japanese Embassy gives this Embassy following version: One company of Japanese troops went to Langfang to protect small detachment engaged in repair of telephone lines; they were encircled at 11 o’clock last night by a regiment of Chang Tzu Chung’s 38th Division, which is stationed at points between Tientsin and Nan-yuan and serious fighting broke out after midnight; fighting ended at about 6 o’clock this morning as the result of participation by Japanese planes; the Japanese demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese troops involved to the South of the Yungting River; the incident will be negotiated in Peiping between Japanese and Chang Tzu Chung, who arrived in Peiping last night from Tientsin. 3. The only Chinese version of the clash so far obtainable is one from the semiofficial Central News Agency, which is as follows: One company of Japanese troops arrived at Langfang at 11 o’clock last night and demanded to take over the station; the Chinese troops refused; the Japanese opened fire; some hours later Japanese reenforcements arrived from Tientsin; five Japanese bombing planes arrived and caused heavy destruction and casualties among the Chinese; the Japanese occupied the station at 7 o’clock; fighting ended at 9 o’clock. 4. Train service between Tientsin and Peiping has been suspended. Telephone service between the two cities is disrupted. 5. According to a Secretary of the local Japanese Embassy, the withdrawal of the 37th Division (Feng Chih An’s) is not proceeding satisfactorily as two of its regiments are still in Peiping and five still at Hsiyuan and vicinity. The informant stated that he expects the question will be discussed with Chang Tzu Chung. Repeated Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Lockhart The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8971: Telegram [Document 268] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 26—8 a.m.] Military authorities this morning stated that Japanese forces have occupied Langfang station and are slowly driving Chinese forces up [ toward ] river; that the Japanese have demanded Chinese forces involved withdraw to other side of Yungtingho but are not very optimistic of compliance; that the Chinese have had heavy losses, and that Japanese losses are also believed to be considerable [although they] have no positive knowledge because communications are cut off. Caldwell The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8975: Telegram [Document 269] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 26—8:45 a.m.] 297. Embassy’s 293, July 26, noon. 1. Local Japanese officials claim that the clash at Langfang has been virtually settled by the defeat of the Chinese troops involved and their retreat to Huangtsun, Peiping [ which ] is about 12 miles south of Fengtai on the Peiping–Tientsin railway. Those officials expressed the opinion that the incident will not become important. However, train and telephone services between Peiping and Tientsin are still suspended. 2. It is too soon to gauge the significance of the clash at Langfang in respect to future military and political developments, but there is a growing feeling here that serious repercussions may issue from the incident. The proximity of Japanese and Chinese forces in this area and the anti-Japanese feeling existing among the Chinese forces render future outbreaks not unlikely, which would make a peaceful solution difficult even along the lines already approved by the highest authorities on both sides. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo. Lockhart Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9072 [Document 270] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 26, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador 78 called at his own request at twelve noon today. The Ambassador said that the situation again looked very threatening in north China. He said that all the indications are to the effect that the Japanese are determined to push matters to the point of extensive hostilities. He had no proof of this, but his Government had telegraphed him Saturday 79 that the indications and their own estimates were to that effect. He wanted to know whether there was not some action which the powers might take. He thought that representations by the American and the British Governments might be effective to restrain Japan. He said that these might not need to be joint action but they might be parallel action. There had been another clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers. (Note: Just before this interview, the Secretary and Mr. Hornbeck had gone over the latest news dispatches received on the ticker, which dispatches had indicated that a serious situation was developing and had stated that after having delivered two ultimata the Japanese had made an attack upon and entered the southwest gate of Peiping before the expiration of the time set in either of the ultimata.) The Secretary said that he was very sorry to have the news and view which the Ambassador had brought. He asked whether the Chinese envisaged general hostilities or hostilities merely in the north. The Ambassador replied that they envisaged general hostilities; they thought that the Japanese would present demands which it would be utterly impossible for the Chinese Government to meet and would follow up with major hostilities. The Secretary said that we had been urging in every way possible that peace be kept. He asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any statement or ask any question. Mr. Hornbeck said that he had nothing to add. He inquired whether the Ambassador had had news of the attack on the city of Peiping. The Ambassador said that he had, that he understood that the Japanese had entered the southwest gate. He repeated his expression of hope that the powers might take some action. He referred to the action which the British Government had taken on the last occasion of a crisis, in making representations to the Japanese Government, which representations he thought had been effective in restraining Japan. Mr. Hornbeck said that it seemed to him that the British and the American Governments had done as much in this case as they had done in December 1935: at that time the British had spoken through their Ambassador at Tokyo, and the Secretary of State had made here a public statement; in the present case, the British had spoken through their Ambassadors at Tokyo and at Nanking, the Secretary of State had urged peace upon the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors here and had made two public statements here; and this Government had spoken through its Embassies both at Tokyo and at Nanking. The Ambassador asked on what date we had taken the last mentioned of these actions. Mr. Hornbeck said that it was on Friday or Thursday of last week. 80 The Secretary said that we were greatly distressed over the situation and that he hoped the Ambassador would bring him any news of any new developments at any time; we hoped very much that some way would be found by which the peace could be kept. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 78 Chengting T. Wang. 79 July 24. 80 See telegram No. 223, July 22, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9071 [Document 271] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 26, 1937. The Japanese Ambassador 81 called at his own request at 12:45 this afternoon. The Secretary sent for Mr. Hornbeck. (Note: Before this conversation, the Secretary and Mr. Hornbeck had discussed the latest news which had come over the ticker. This included news of an increasingly threatening situation in North China, of a Japanese attack upon and entry through the southwest gate at Peiping, and news that the Japanese Ambassador had been ordered by his Government to leave tomorrow for Tokyo.) When Mr. Hornbeck entered, the Secretary said that he was greatly relieved to find that the Ambassador had not been ordered home. The Ambassador stated that he had had no word of any such instruction but that he was told that a close friend expected to talk to him on the telephone from Tokyo this evening. Mr. Hornbeck remarked that in a good many cases we are informed or misinformed of coming events by the press before we have any information from our own sources. The Secretary asked then what was the character of the news which the Ambassador had of the situation in North China. The Ambassador said that on the whole it was reassuring. He then proceeded to read, somewhat stumblingly, from telegraph forms on which there were Japanese characters. What he read related to certain very minor clashes between Japanese and Chinese troops, (especially in connection with the cutting of telephone wires) with a considerable amount of detail, all of which sounded of no consequence. He said that this probably related to minor clashes which had occured in connection with evacuation by Chinese troops. He said that evacuation was taking place but that a part of the 38th Division ( sic ) was recalcitrant and that, even though the Chinese generals had given appropriate orders, their troops were badly disciplined and there were bound to be some minor incidents. He thought that the situation was well in hand and that there was no reason for apprehension. The Secretary referred to the messages which had been exchanged between Mr. Hirota and himself when Mr. Hirota became Foreign Minister (the first time). 82 The Ambassador explained that Hirota had been Foreign Minister and then, early this year, had resigned; and that later, when Prince Konoye became Prime Minister, Hirota wanted to help Konoye (who had never before held a cabinet post) and had accepted the post of Foreign Minister. The Secretary inquired when had Prince Konoye made his visit to this country. The Ambassador replied that it was in 1934 shortly after Hirota had become Foreign Minister (the first time). The Secretary said that he placed great reliance on what Hirota had said in his message to him and on the good intent of Prince Konoye. The Ambassador expressed concurrence. The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any comment or ask questions. The Ambassador, without waiting, said that there was another matter, which he had intended to take up with Mr. Hornbeck but which he might as well bring up while we were all together: with reference to the incident of the rough handling of two American ladies in Peiping, he had reported to the Japanese Ambassador at Peiping the purport of what Mr. Hornbeck had said to Mr. Suma last week (July 22) 83 and he now had a telegram from the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires there saying that on July 22 in the course of a conversation with the American Ambassador the Chargé d’Affaires had brought this matter up casually and had referred to the apology which had been made by the commanding officer of the Japanese guard and the American Ambassador had expressed himself as satisfied. The Secretary looked inquiringly at Mr. Hornbeck, as did also the Japanese Ambassador. After a moment of reflection, Mr. Hornbeck said that, as he had stated to Mr. Suma, we are not pressing the matter, but, in the light of what the Ambassador had just said, it could not be but noted that no Japanese diplomatic official had as yet expressed any regret; what he, Mr. Hornbeck, had said to Mr. Suma had been intended to make it possible for the Japanese to understand the American reaction; here was a case where a little indication by Japanese diplomatic officialdom of simple and polite regret would be in international relations what the dropping in of a little oil into a piece of machinery that is creaking is in the realm of mechanical friction. The Ambassador smiled and nodded assent and said that he would mention this again to his people in Peiping. Mr. Hornbeck said that he would not suggest that that be done, in fact he would suggest that it be not done, as there was no use magnifying the incident as such. The Secretary asked when the Ambassador intended to return to Hot Springs. The Ambassador said that it was his present plan to go tomorrow afternoon—unless something came up in the interval to interfere. The Secretary said that he hoped that further developments would be reassuring: the world is in a great state of uncertainty and confusion; we set great store by the thought of cooperation among the more responsible powers in efforts toward stability and peace. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 81 Hirosi Saito. 82 Exchanged February 21 and March 3, 1934, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 127 – 128 . 83 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 22, vol. iv p. 236 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8989: Telegram [Document 272] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 26, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 26—2:05 p.m.] 300. Embassy’s 297, July 26, 6 p.m. 1. According to a Japanese closely associated with the Japanese military, three Japanese officers presented this afternoon to the Mayor of Peiping and other Chinese officials two demands: ( a ) the troops of the 37th Division in the Papaoshan and Marco Polo Bridge area must withdraw to west of the Yungting River by noon tomorrow and, ( b ) the troops of the 37th Division in Peiping and at Hsiyuan must similarly withdraw by noon of July 28. 2. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy states that the two demands presented this afternoon are ( a ) troops of the 37th Division inside Peiping must withdraw by noon tomorrow to Changhsintien, west of the Yungting River on the Peiping-Hankow Railway and ( b ) troops of that division at Hsiyuan and vicinity must withdraw to west of the Yungting River by noon July 28th. 3. The Secretary of the Japanese Embassy stated at 8:30 this evening that word had been received from the Japanese military headquarters that Embassies should warn their nationals residing in the Western Hills to withdraw presumably because the Japanese anticipate driving the 37th Division out in case it refuses to obey the ultimatum. 4. It is impossible to tell from Chinese officials whether the ultimatum will be rejected. The Mayor of Peiping is reliably reported to have stated yesterday afternoon that the 37th Division does not intend to withdraw. Fighting broke out about 7 this evening at Changyimen which is the gate in the West Wall of Peiping from which goes the road to Wanpinghsien. Japanese troops allegedly numbering four or five hundred according to one Japanese source attempted to enter and were refused. Fighting ensued for more than an hour and it is understood that the question of entry is now being negotiated. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9610 [Document 273] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State No. 545 Nanking , July 26, 1937. [Received August 23.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 305 of July 20, 11 a.m., from the Embassy, Nanking, which transmitted a translation of an address delivered to an educational conference at Ruling by Chiang Kai-shek on July 17 and published by the official Central News Agency at Nanking on July 19. Because of the similarity between the views of General Chiang Kai-shek as expressed in this address and opinions subsequently expressed in conversations held by him with the British and American Ambassadors, the address merits study. It has added importance, also, from the fact that it was obviously intended to place before the population of the entire country and before their some times clashing leaders the views of the quasi-dictator at a grave moment in the history of China. So far as the Embassy is able to learn, the responses to the address from all factions of the Chinese people have been characterized by enthusiastic approval and determination to follow the lead of General Chiang in extreme measures, if such should become necessary to put a stop to Japanese aggression. If differing opinions are held anywhere, they probably have not been published. In any event, the Embassy believes that the whole Chinese nation has reached a more determined resolution to resist what it regards as Japanese aggression than on any previous occasion. Whether this impression is justified, time probably will show, because the indications are that the Japanese Government intends to utilize the July 7 incident near Peiping as the start of a consolidation of Japanese control over the Province of Hopei, the first area inside the Great Wall in which China’s sovereignty has been seriously challenged by Japan. [Here follows summary of General Chiang’s address.] As showing the extreme repugnance with which the Nanking Government regarded the prospect of major hostilities with Japan, it may be recalled that as late as July 25 there were reliable indications that the National Government would be willing to pass over as a “local settlement” the terms said to have been signed by a subordinate of General Sung Che-yuan on July 19 and subsequently approved by him, even though those terms perilously resembled a whittling away of the four “minimum conditions” just quoted. As reported in a telegram of July 20, from the Embassy, Nanking, the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking informed this office that two circumstances had crystallized the North China crisis beyond the possibility of any improvement by explanations of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and one of those circumstances was the publication of the address of General Chiang Kai-shek. Observing the published responses to the address made by various Chinese leaders one finds additional evidence for the belief that the principles enunciated by General Chiang will be the criterion by which his future conduct of relations with Japan will be judged. If his handling of the present crisis falls below his own standard in resolution and heroism, his position with respect to those political opponents who have already accused him of undue submission to Japan, will be extremely vulnerable. For example, in a release dated July 22 by the Kuo Min News Agency, an organization sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kwangsi leaders, Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who a year ago raised open revolt against General Chiang on this very score of Chinese-Japanese relations, are represented as praising General Chiang’s address in the highest terms and as swearing to lead the entire military and civil population of Kwangsi Province in support of General Chiang’s campaign of resistance to Japan “to the bitter end”, and as adding the significant words, “The future of the State depends on your decision”. A copy of this news release is enclosed. 84 In addition to the unequivocal position taken by General Chiang in his address, a position from which there would appear to be no retreat, there is another factor which, in the opinion of observers in Nanking, makes the avoidance of major hostilities in North China almost impossible. This factor is found in the size of Japanese re-enforcements sent into Hopei Province and the way in which the whole incident has been dignified in Japan by special meetings of the Cabinet, et cetera. In the face of this emphasis given to the whole affair by the Japanese Government, it seems inconceivable that the decisions taken can be reversed and the reenforcements withdrawn unless the Japanese achieve in Hopei a political objective of commensurate importance. Such an objective could hardly be of such slight significance as the enforcement of the July 11 and 19 agreements, as alleged by the Japanese, or even the implementation of the Ho-Umetsu agreement of 1935. It seems equally improbable that the Japanese will be satisfied with any result within the limitations of General Chiang’s minimum conditions. Respectfully yours, Nelson Trusler Johnson 84 Not reprinted. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8998: Telegram [Document 274] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 27, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 27—3 a.m.] 301. Reference paragraph 5, Embassy’s 300, July 26, 10 p.m. 1. The facts of the clash last night at Changyimen are, according to foreigners who visited the scene during the fighting, that some four or five hundred Japanese soldiers arrived at the garrisons at about 7 p.m.; the Chinese soldiers at the gate allowed 10 trucks, carrying perhaps 150 Japanese soldiers, to enter; the Chinese then closed the gate; fighting ensued; including the use of hand grenades and trench mortars; some Japanese reenforcements allegedly arrived outside the gate; fighting finally ended at about 10 p.m.; Chinese officers escorted Japanese troops inside the gate to the Japanese Embassy barracks; those outside the gate failed to enter and are believed to have retired. 2. Japanese admit two killed and four wounded but foreign observers believe casualties greater. Chinese casualties are not known. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8999: Telegram [Document 275] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 27, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 27—4:30 a.m.] 302. Embassy’s 300, July 26, 10 p.m. 1. A secretary of the local Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff at 6:30 this morning that General Chang Wei-fan, managing director of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, accepted last night on behalf of the Chinese authorities the two Japanese demands with regard to withdrawal of the 37th Division and that the Japanese Embassy had issued an order that all Japanese residents in Peiping should withdraw to the Legation quarter. He said that he did not expect fighting in the city but that the withdrawal to the Legation quarter was ordered for the purpose of avoiding difficulties between Japanese and Chinese during the process of withdrawal of the 37th Division. A large influx of Japanese nationals into the Legation quarter has been in progress since 8 o’clock this morning. 2. It has so far been impossible to obtain from Chinese sources confirmation of the allegation that the two demands have been accepted. 3. A responsible American residing near Hsiyuan informed the Embassy this morning that there is as yet no indication of withdrawal on the part of troops of the 37th Division in that vicinity. No evidence is so far obtainable of preparation by troops of the 37th Division in Peiping to withdraw. 4. The above-mentioned secretary of the Japanese Embassy called at 11:30 this morning and said that, if the troops of the 37th Division stationed from Papaoshan to Marco Polo Bridge area do not withdraw to Changhsintien by noon today, Japanese military will take military action against them and that, if the troops of the 37th Division in Peiping and at Hsiyuan do not withdraw to west of the Yungting River by noon July 28th, the Japanese military will take military action against them. 5. When asked what kind of military action will be taken in Peiping, the secretary replied that bombing and artillery corps fire would be avoided if possible. He believed it might be difficult to avoid those kinds of warfare because Japanese troops in Peiping are greatly outnumbered by Chinese troops. 6. A leading local educator has just informed the Embassy that, according to his understanding, the local Chinese officials have decided to resist the Japanese inside Peiping. 7. According to the above-mentioned Japanese Secretary, there is one brigade of the 37th Division stationed between Papaoshan and Marco Polo Bridge; two regiments of the division are in Peiping; and one regiment and two battalions of that regiment are at Hsiyuan. It is the opinion of military officers of the American Embassy that there are only about 300 Japanese troops inside Peiping. 8. Train service between Peiping and Tientsin still suspended as well as telephone communication. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. For the Ambassador: Lockhart The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8993: Telegram [Document 276] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 27, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 27—9:30 a.m.] 505. I have just seen Vansittart 85 at his request and he showed me a telegram received this morning from the British Embassy at Peiping stating that the Japanese liaison officer has informed the senior commandant that the Japanese would launch at noon a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city irrespective of whether or not the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily. The British Embassy in Peiping has instructed its representative at Tientsin to call on the Japanese Ambassador and to strongly urge upon him that Japan should refrain from any unnecessary violence and to point out that if at noon the 37th Division is in fact withdrawing, an attack by the Japanese military can only be regarded by the civilized world as without any possible justification. The British Embassy at Peiping understands that the Japanese have given assurance that no bombs or artillery will be directed against the city but Vansittart points out that any form of attack would endanger foreigners. The Foreign Office is very much concerned about this situation in view of the possible danger to British lives and Vansittart stated that an instruction would go out immediately to the British Embassy at Tokyo to urge the Japanese Government to refrain from any precipitate action and to emphasize the danger to which any form of attack on Peiping would subject the foreign communities, while expressing the hope that the report from Peiping of Japanese intentions is untrue. The Foreign Office feels that the presence of large numbers of British nationals in Peiping gives them a very strong locus standi for pressing moderation upon the Japanese and Vansittart said that they earnestly hope you will be able to make similar recommendations to the Japanese. Bingham 85 Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/8993: Telegram [Document 277] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 27, 1937—1 p.m. 320. Your 505, July 27, 1 p.m. Department is telegraphing Peiping and Tokyo 86 instructing our Embassies there to confer immediately with the British Embassies and in their discretion to take action on lines parallel with the British action toward dissuading the Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger the lives of American nationals. Please inform the Foreign Office. Hull 86 See telegram No. 128, July 27, 1 p.m, vol. iv , p. 238 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9000: Telegram [Document 278] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 27, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 27—4:30 a.m.] 303. Embassy’s 302, July 27, 1 p.m. A local Chinese official in a position to know the facts has informed the Embassy that the Chinese and Japanese sides entered into negotiations last night in regard to the demands for the withdrawal of the 37th Division, with Matsui 87 representing the Japanese side; that verbal agreement was nearly reached in regard to certain items, but that a general agreement was yet to be reached; that negotiations were still in progress. The official intimated at the same time that the Chinese side would find it difficult to accept Japanese demands made without basis in reason; and this expression seems to accord fairly closely to that discovered in other important sections of Chinese opinion. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 87 Col. Gennosuke Matsui, Peiping representative of the Japanese North China garrison. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9003: Telegram [Document 279] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 27—8:55 a.m.] 306. Embassy’s telegram No. 303, July 27, 2 p.m. The official previously referred to now informs the Embassy that the negotiations of this morning between Matsui and Chen Chueh Sheng and Chang Tzu Chung were inconclusive by reason of the Chinese negotiators’ refusal to give unqualified acceptance to the Japanese demands, and that the Japanese attitude “leaves no further room for negotiation”. He states, and other sources of information indicate, that the Chinese forces are not withdrawing but are on the contrary preparing to offer resistance. Order inside the city is good despite the excitement caused by removal of Japanese nationals into the Legation quarter. There is nevertheless considerable tenseness. Maintenance of order is said by the aforementioned officials to be in the hands of Chinese troops in the uniform of Peace Preservation Corps. The Chinese authorities have informed the Chinese press that negotiations with the Japanese were broken off this afternoon at 3 o’clock with the Chinese rejection of the Japanese demands. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo. Lockhart The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9021a: Telegram [Document 280] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , July 27, 1937—6 p.m. 129. For your information. At the press conference today the Secretary, in reply to a question asking for his comment on Hirota’s speech yesterday, stated that he did not have any comment to make, but added that the position of this Government has been thoroughly defined in an exchange of communications made some time ago (1934) between himself and Foreign Minister Hirota. In answer to another question the Secretary stated that he had instructed the American Ambassadors to China and to Japan to express the hope to the two Governments concerned that hostilities would be avoided, which action was in line with the hope expressed to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors here on several previous occasions that means would be found to settle the controversy amicably and that hostilities would be avoided. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9005: Telegram [Document 281] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 27, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 27—11:10 a.m.] 226. 1. The Foreign Office states that text of Minister for Foreign Affairs’ address on foreign relations delivered this morning in the Diet has been telegraphed to Japanese Embassy at Washington for distribution. 2. An official statement released by the Cabinet this afternoon reaffirms the intention of the Japanese Government to take measures to maintain communications between Peiping and the sea and to protect nationals in that area. The statement declares that the Japanese Government has no territorial designs and that it will take every precaution to protect the rights in that area of the other powers. The statement concludes with an expression of hope that the Chinese Government will take measures to restrict the scope of the present difficulties in order that a satisfactory solution may be found as soon as possible. 3. The Cabinet’s statement while uncompromising in its content is believed to have been put out at this time in order to render more easy compliance by the 29th Army with the terms of the ultimatum delivered by the Japanese commander in the Peiping area to the Commander of the Chinese 29th Army. We understand that that ultimatum which is to expire tomorrow was given on the initiative of the Japanese commander himself but the Cabinet statement indicates that the Japanese commander will probably be given full authorization to act in the event that the ultimatum expires without compliance by the Chinese with its terms. 4. Information from reliable sources indicates that there are extensive movements of troops toward the southwest of Japan in various parts of the country and that the troops being moved contain a greater proportion of men from combat branches than has heretofore been noted. The Military Attaché 88 believes, however, that thus far the movements are precautionary or preparatory in nature rather than part of a general mobilization. 5. Facts are elusive but the impression one obtains on all sides is that a crisis is approaching. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 88 Lt. Col. William C. Crane. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/8993: Telegram [Document 282] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) 89 Washington , July 27, 1937—7 p.m. 130. Department’s 128, July 27, 1 p.m. 90 Counselor of Japanese Embassy called at the Department this morning, 91 gave miscellaneous information about recent clashes, stated that the Japanese Government had ordered reinforcements to be sent from Japan Proper to China, said that the Chinese were in various ways aggravating the situation and that his Government was continuing to exercise self-restraint. The Counselor inquired whether the Department had any important news. He was told that we had received a report, for which we could not vouch but which had the appearance of authenticity, to the effect that the Japanese forces were contemplating launching a general attack against Chinese forces both in and around Peiping; that we felt that such an attack, if made, would be attended with great hazards, jeopardizing lives of non-combatant population among whom there were a considerable number of foreigners, most especially of concern to us more than 700 Americans; that such action endangering or destroying foreign lives would produce an unfavorable reaction throughout the world; that it would be taking place on Chinese soil and in a region where the treaty powers, including Japan, have special and common rights and obligations. Mention was made to him of the Japanese Government’s assurance that it is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the powers in China. He was told that the lives of our nationals are with us a very important interest and that we wanted to ask that the Japanese Government give most serious consideration to all the implications and possibilities which might flow from such action if taken. Also, in repetition, that we were not charging or affirming intent but that if such action is even in contemplation it seemed to us better to ask this before it happens. Hull 89 Repeated on the same date as telegram No. 139 to the Ambassador in China, with reference to a similar previous telegram (No. 138, July 27, noon, not printed). 90 Vol. iv , p. 238 . 91 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 27, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 334 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9008: Telegram [Document 283] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 27, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 27—1 p.m.] 330. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 92 called the British Ambassador and me to his house this evening at 5 p.m., and asked us to convey confidentially to our respective Governments the following message. He said that he was making this communication to us first. I inferred that he expected to make a similiar communication to other ambassadors shortly. 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the incident at Langfang, the attempt of Japanese soldiers to enter forcibly the gate of Peiping and a clash between soldiers of a regiment of the 29th Army at Tungchow and Japanese soldiers had now been followed by an ultimatum delivered to General Sung Che Yuan which went far beyond the agreement of July 11 in that it required the retirement of Chinese soldiers to Paotingfu. He said that these continuing incidents and the news which the Chinese Government had received of continuing mobilization of military force in Japan convinced the Chinese Government that the Japanese Government had a far greater purpose in mind than a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge affair. He said that it was evident that the Japanese intended to occupy the cities of Peiping and Tientsin and the time was now come when the Chinese Government must make a decision to take defensive measures. He said that the Chinese Government had done everything it could to restrain its own people in the course of these events but that it was now driven to the point where it must take a stand and he said that such a decision would probably have to be made in the course of 2 or 3 days. When asked what the Chinese intended to do he said that they would begin by breaking off relations with Japan. When asked if they intended to declare war he said that they did not intend to declare war, that they did not want war, they merely wished to defend themselves against aggression and were still anxious to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Japan if this were possible. Repeated to Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson 92 Wang Chung-hui. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9007: Telegram [Document 284] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 27, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 27—1:07 p.m.] 227. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires 93 is telegraphing to his Government in the following sense with regard to the suggestion made on July 25 by General Chiang Kai-shek to the American, British and French Ambassadors to China. ( a ) Dodds’ first reaction was that Chiang was attempting to save face by exaggerating Japanese menace. He does not agree that war fever is being worked up by the Japanese Government as there is little evidence of effort to stir up the Japanese people. ( b ) The thought occurs to Dodds that Chiang wishes to throw on the powers approached by him the odium of making representations to the Japanese. ( c ) There is danger of the Japanese Army exceeding their instructions especially if the Chinese do not act on the settlement which they signed. In Dodds’ view Japan has a fixed policy of domination in North China which would be pursued by successive stages but in his opinion the Chinese themselves must decide when to resist seriously. However, he thinks it unlikely that the Japanese Government intended this stage to take place at the present moment. ( d ) Without further evidence Dodds does not feel prepared to recommend to his Government compliance with Chiang’s request that the powers ask Japan not to make further demands. He believes that such action would provoke the retort that Japan has no intention of doing so. His view is based on statement made to him twice by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 94 that the Japanese military would not go beyond their instructions but this position, of course, goes by the board if the Chinese do not carry out the agreement which they signed. 2. I concur in the views above outlined. I do not think that “cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted” or in fact any foreign diplomatic representations would favorably affect developments. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 93 J. L. Dodds. 94 K. Horinouchi. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9009: Telegram [Document 285] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 27, 1937—10 p.m. [Received July 27—1:40 p.m.] 307. Embassy’s 306, July 27, 6 p.m. 1. Apparently as a result of the breakdown of negotiations this afternoon, fighting between Japanese and Chinese broke out in the latter part of the afternoon at Huangtsun and Tuanho, which are near and south of Nanyuan. (Huangtsun is the town on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway to which allegedly retreated the Chinese troops of the 38th Division defeated at Langfang yesterday morning). Fighting seems to have stopped about 8 o’clock this evening, according to one usually reliable source, for the reason that the Chinese troops involved have been ordered to retire into Peiping to assist in defense of this city. 2. There are reports of one or two other engagements during late afternoon at points further away from Peiping. Tungchow and Tangshan (Hot Springs north of Peiping) are mentioned, but the clashes so far do not appear to be important. 3. Defenses in Peiping are being rapidly strengthened and increased. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Lockhart Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9080 [Document 286] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 27, 1937. Reference, Nanking’s telegram 328, July 25, 9 p.m. (by Ambassador Johnson), and memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and the Chinese Ambassador of July 26. The statements made by Chiang Kai-shek to Mr. Johnson parallel and are in accord with the statements made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Secretary. These statements indicate that the Chinese Government is convinced that the Japanese intend to insist, even at the price of major hostilities if necessary, upon extensive concessions by the Chinese Government. Chiang Kai-shek expects Japanese demands to include: ( a ) a settlement of all questions relating to “Manchukuo”; ( b ) cooperative action on a national scale against communism; and ( c ) the withdrawal of all Central Government troops from Hopei. He states that the Chinese Government will not accept these demands, and that he believes that the Japanese will attempt to compel their acceptance. Chiang expresses the belief that the only way in which war between China and Japan can be averted would be by cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain “along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted” (Ambassador Johnson’s words in report). He urges immediate action along such lines. Ambassador Johnson makes the comment that he was “much impressed with the earnestness and with the logical force with which the Generalissimo set forth his arguments.” Comment : The issue so far as Japan and China are concerned is whether Japan shall gain or China retain control of a valuable region which is of great strategic importance in north China. (It may be that incidentally the Japanese wish to impress on the Chinese the effectiveness of the Japanese military machine.) This is an issue which involves and which will depend upon the relative effectiveness of the combined diplomatic and military forces of the two countries which are thus in conflict. The issue so far as the powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, are concerned is whether pursuit of national policy by force, in contravention of treaty obligations and with complete indifference to the question of peace, is or is not to be objected to by those powers to whom it seems objectionable, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, then by what process. In the present instance, the United States and Great Britain, of course, find objectionable the prospect that Japan and China are about to enter upon serious hostilities. However, no mere words which either or both of these powers may utter by way of expostulation will prevent that eventuation as against whatever may be the deliberate intent of the Japanese or the Chinese in regard to the method of handling the issue between those two countries. Nothing short of a definite indication on the part of one or more of the great foreign powers that it would be prepared to throw some type of force into the equation would appreciably affect the play of force (forces) which is now taking place on the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic and military battlefield. As neither Great Britain nor this country is prepared to throw in any kind of force (other than that of moral suasion), we need not expect that action on our part (use of words) is going to be in any way decisive. We have spoken on behalf of peace, and we probably should continue to do so. We are speaking on behalf of the safety of our nationals, and we are and will be warranted in speaking on that subject. We may have to speak, as the situation unfolds, emphatically on these and perhaps on some other subjects. We should take full account of the fact that once a stage of real and serious hostilities is embarked upon all sorts of interests of ours may, from time to time and increasingly, become involved. In whatever we say, we should take great care to say only those things which may tend to pacify and to avoid saying those things which may tend to inflame the parties directly in conflict. This Division shares the view expressed by Ambassador Grew in numbered paragraph 2 of Tokyo’s 227, July 27, 9 p.m., that “cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted” would not favorably affect developments (at this stage)—unless such action can carry some implication of a sanction. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9013: Telegram [Document 287] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 28, 1937—7 a.m. [Received July 27—4:45 p.m.] 308. 1. At conference tonight [ last night? ] of British, French, Italian, and American [diplomatic representatives] and commandants of guard it was decided to withdraw our respective nationals into the Legation quarter beginning early tomorrow morning. In the case of Americans it was understood that if situation shows any improvement in the morning (which I do not expect) action will be held in abeyance. 2. At the same meeting it was decided that in behalf of the Embassies represented I would call on the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy tomorrow morning if possible and inform him of the necessity of maintaining strict neutrality in the Legation quarter and emphasize the hope that the Legation quarter would not be used in the slightest degree as a base for military operations but merely as a refuge for foreign nationals, pointing out particularly the dangerous possibilities that might follow if Japanese sorties were made from the quarter with subsequent retreats into the quarter. It was also agreed that Colonel Marston, 95 the Senior Commandant, in behalf of the Embassy guards, would call on the Commandant of the Japanese Embassy guard, refer to assurances recently given by the latter to Colonel Marston that the Japanese Embassy compound would not be used as a base for military operations, and emphasize the importance attached by the Commandants to these assurances. 3. It is respectfully suggested that the Department may care to make similar representations to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and to the Japanese Foreign Office through the Embassy at Tokyo. It seems to me that the danger to foreign nationals in the Legation quarter which might result from Japanese military activities in the quarter cannot be too much emphasized. 4. Allessandrini, Counselor of Italian Embassy, who arrived in Peiping tonight by motor car from Tientsin, reports having seen 125 lorries of Japanese troops, with armored cars and supplies, moving in the direction of Peiping. He reports a lull in the fighting at Tungchow. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Lockhart 95 Col. John Marston, U.S.M.C., Commandant of Embassy guard at Peiping. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9059: Telegram [Document 288] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received July 29—4:30 a.m.] 331. 1. Foreign Office spokesman last night issued following statement to the press: “Although the responsibility for the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident does not rest with China, the Chinese Government, anxious to preserve the peace of East Asia, has consistently strived for a pacific settlement through regular diplomatic channels. The Chinese Foreign Minister has repeatedly proposed that a definite date be fixed for the mutual withdrawal of troops. Unfortunately Japan not only refused to accept the Chinese proposal but persisted in sending large reinforcements to North China. In the meantime a settlement was agreed upon by the local Chinese and Japanese military authorities. The Central Government raised no objections to the terms of the settlement which were not fundamentally inconsistent with the position it has taken. The extreme forbearance of the Chinese Government in thus endeavoring to preserve peace must be plain to all observers. On the other hand Japan has not only failed to withdraw her troops but continued to send heavy reinforcements into the Peiping and Tientsin area. On the night of July 25th the Japanese troops made an unprovoked attack on the Chinese garrison at Langfang during which a large number of Japanese bombing planes were brought into action. The Japanese further presented impossible demands to the local Chinese authorities and staged a rapid succession of provocative acts in the outskirts of Peiping. All these clearly indicated that the Japanese are bent on aggravating the present crisis with a view to achieving their sinister designs in North China. China has exhausted her efforts for peace and the responsibility for future developments in North China rests solely with Japan”. Sent to Peiping, by mail to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9029: Telegram [Document 289] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 28, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 28—6 a.m.] 332. 1. Donald, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, told an officer of the Embassy last evening, that the National Government had ordered Sung Che Yuan to resist the Japanese and pointed to a news article published at Nanking morning of July 27th stating that the Government had received a telegram from Sung reporting that he had issued instructions to this effect to the 29th Army. The informant said that “fighting” was now inevitable. 96 2. Local news agencies last night received reports, said to be from reliable official source, that the Central Government troops in South Hopei had been ordered to proceed north to Changhsintien just south of Lukouchiao, but this has not been confirmed. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Tientsin, Hankow. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson 96 The Ambassador’s telegram No. 334, July 28, noon, added: “It Is probable that Minister for Foreign Affairs had knowledge of this fact when he made statement to British Ambassador and myself reported in my 330, July 27, 8 p.m.” (793.94/9022) The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9033: Telegram [Document 290] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 28, 1937—1 p.m. [Received July 28—6 a.m.] 311. Embassy’s 307, July 27, 10 p.m. 1. Japanese planes heavily bombed Nanyuan from 5:30 this morning for some time, presumably aiming at the 38th Division. The number of casualties is unknown. 2. There has been fighting this morning outside the city to the west and north. An American eye witness saw planes west and north of Peiping, presumably bombing the headquarters of the 37th Division at Hsiyuan near the Summer Palace. The significance of the fighting in these places cannot yet be learned. 3. There have been rumors this morning that Fengtai and Marco Polo Bridge have been taken by Chinese troops. A Chinese military officer who is not given to spreading rumors and in whom the Embassy has so far had confidence has just informed the Embassy that 29th Army troops took Fengtai shortly after 8 o’clock this morning, have taken Langfang, and that the Japanese troops which have been stationed along the road from Peiping to Wanpinghsien are retiring. These reports lack confirmation. 4. An American at Tungchow has informed the Embassy that no fighting took place there yesterday afternoon or last night. Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai. Lockhart The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9034: Telegram [Document 291] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 28, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 28—6 a.m.] 312. 1. A member of the Embassy staff called on the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy this morning and stated that American, British, French, and Italian diplomatic representatives and commandants of the guards conferred last evening; that they had authorized the American Embassy ( a ) to inform the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy of the view of those conferring that the maintaining of strong position [ strict neutrality ] in the Legation quarter is of vital importance; ( b ) to express their hope that the Japanese would not in the slightest degree use the Legation quarter as a base for the military operations but only as a refuge for foreign nationals; and ( c ) to point out the very dangerous possibilities which might follow if Japanese sorties were made from the Legation quarter with subsequent retreats into the quarter. 2. The Japanese Counselor stated that he understood and concurred in the views, that strict neutrality would be maintained, and that sorties would not be made. Repeated to Nanking. Repeated to Tokyo via Nanking. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9023: Telegram [Document 292] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 28, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 28—7:50 a.m.] 335. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has orally stated to the Embassy that the Chinese Government is anxious to deprive Japanese airplanes of such assistance as they may receive from broadcast weather forecasts relating to China, especially the interior. The Minister understands that such forecasts are broadcast by an American radio station in Manila and rebroadcast by American naval vessels. The Minister inquired whether such weather forecasts could not be terminated or transmitted in code during the present difficulties and asked for an early reply. Johnson The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9024: Telegram [Document 293] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 28, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 28—7 a.m.] Japanese censorship of mails has been revived in central post office. Consular Corps has made complaint to Japanese Consul General who undertook to investigate the matter but stated that as this is a military measure it is beyond his control. No evidence so far that any American or other foreign mail has been censored. Tientsin quiet today. Japanese Consul General stated that Japanese military will not disarm Paoantui here and will endeavor to avoid disturbance in the city. Consular Corps is referring to this assurance and asking Chinese chief of police to make an effort also to avoid disturbance. Caldwell The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9015: Telegram [Document 294] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 28—8:45 a.m.] 229. 1. A telegram reporting the result of my call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs 97 in compliance with Department’s 128, July 27, 1 p.m., 98 will follow shortly. 99 2. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called me up on the telephone and at Hirota’s request has read to me the substance of a report just received from the commander of the Japanese forces in North China to the following effect: A Japanese officer called this morning on the Mayor of Peiping and stated that complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from the walled city would not be required by noon today but that such withdrawal would be expected to begin and to be completed “in due course;” measures are being taken to safeguard the interests in Peiping of other foreign powers. The statement added that the Japanese troops within the walls of Peiping would not attack unless challenged. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 97 Koki Hirota. 98 Vol. iv , p. 238 . 99 Telegram No. 230, July 28, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, ibid ., p. 239 . The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) at Peiping 793.94/9037a: Telegram [Document 295] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) at Peiping Washington , July 28, 1937—3 p.m. 141. Did a Japanese liaison officer inform Senior Commandant on or about July 27 that the Japanese intended to launch an attack on Chinese forces both within and without Peiping? 1 Hull 1 The Embassy’s telegram No. 325, July 29, 2 p.m., replied: “The Senior Commandant at no time received from a Japanese liaison officer information” to this effect. “The nearest approach to that information is that contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of my 302 of July 27, 1 p.m.” (793.94/9063) The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9021: Telegram [Document 296] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 28, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 28—6:45 a.m.] 231. My 229, July 28, 5 [ 4 ] p.m. 1. Domei has issued a statement to the effect that I called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make inquiry with regard to the situation in North China. I assume that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has in this instance deemed it expedient not to disclose the actual purpose of my call (see my telegram No. 223, July 22, 7 p.m., paragraph 6). I shall not issue correction to the press unless directed by you to do so. 2. Fleisher 2 has telephoned to New York the text of a statement issued this morning by the Foreign Office setting forth reasons for abandonment by Japan of hope for peaceful settlement of the North China incident. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 2 Wilfred Fleisher, Tokyo correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9043: Telegram [Document 297] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 28, 1937—8 p.m. [Received July 28—3:18 p.m.] 509. My 505, July 27, 1 p.m. Johnson 3 telephoned the Department’s 320, July 27, 6 [ 1 ] p.m., to Vansittart last night. I saw Eden 4 at his request this afternoon. He showed me a telegram from the British Ambassador in Tokyo stating hostilities had actually begun but that he had been assured by the Japanese Foreign Minister that foreign nationals would be protected in lives and property as far as possible, 5 and that he, the Foreign Minister, 6 had telephoned the Mayor of Peiping, informing him the Chinese troops within the city must be withdrawn although it could be done gradually and without the ultimatum of a time limit. The Mayor had likewise been informed that there would be no fighting in Peiping which might endanger foreign nationals unless Chinese troops remained in the city and attempted to resist the Japanese. Eden then gave me to read a telegram from the British Ambassador in China stating hostilities had begun at 3:30 this afternoon but so far there had been no attack on or within Peiping itself. Eden stated that he had asked the French to make the same sort of recommendations at Tokyo which had been requested of you (my 505, July 27, 1 p.m.) and that the French had done so. He then showed me a despatch from the British Ambassador in Rome reporting a conversation with Ciano 7 in which Ciano had said that Italy and Germany had both complied with the British request to make representations to the Japanese and had urged moderation. He then gave me to read a telegram from the British Ambassador in China reporting a conversation with the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in which the latter stated the Japanese were doing just what he had predicted on July 12th they would do, that is, take possession of the five North China provinces and then make representations to foreign governments in the attempt to camouflage their purpose and further designs. Eden referred to the fact that Germany was interested in the China situation because Germany’s trade with China ranked third after Japan and the United States; Germany, therefore has a material interest in preserving the status quo . He declared that when Dr. Kung 8 was here the latter had told him of a conversation with Hitler in which Hitler had referred to the volume and value of German trade with China and therefore Germany’s interest in hostilities in North China being avoided. Eden said that he had been in conference with the Prime Minister 9 this morning and that both the Prime Minister and he wished us to have everything his Government knew and explained that he had sent off the instructions to Tokyo mentioned in my telegram 505, July 27, 1 p.m., without notifying me beforehand because he felt no time should be lost. He asked again for advice as to what further steps, if any, could be taken and gave me a copy of the telegram sent to Lindsay 10 on July 20 reading as follows: “His Majesty’s Government are gravely preoccupied by recent developments in Far East and have been considering whether one more effort cannot be made to avert hostilities which may have far-reaching consequences. In the circumstances we should be willing to make with the United States Government joint approach to Japanese and Chinese Governments and ask them to agree: (1) to issue instructions that all further movement of troops be suspended; (2) to agree that the United States Government and ourselves should put forward proposals in attempt to end existing deadlock.” He stated that, in view of the changed circumstances, he now wished to renew this suggestion because there was nothing else he could think of doing, although he would welcome any suggestion from the United States Government. He further said that although such suggestions would probably be refused by the Japanese, he felt that it not only could do no harm but probably would do good in the long run. Bingham 3 Herschel V. Johnson, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom. 4 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 5 See telegram No. 230, July 28, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iv , p. 239 . 6 For correction, see telegram No. 511, July 29, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] . 7 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 8 Chinese Minister of Finance, who attended British coronation ceremonies. 9 Neville Chamberlain. 10 British Ambassador in the United States. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9045: Telegram [Document 298] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 28, 1937—9 p.m. [Received July 28—7:27 p.m.] 1067. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador, returned to Paris this morning by airplane from London where last night he was present at a conference called by H. H. Kung at which were present the Chinese Ambassador to London and the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow who flew from Moscow yesterday. Koo said that this conference had been called by Kung in order to advise Chiang Kai-shek with regard to help which he might or might not expect from European powers. The conference was based on the assumption that the Chinese Government would have to fight. Koo stated that the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow had expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union would preserve strict neutrality and would do nothing whatever to aid the Chinese Government during the first few months at war. He believed, however, that if the war should be protracted the Soviet Government, provided it could obtain assurances of support from either England, France or the United States, would intervene. The Chinese Ambassador to London was of the opinion that Great Britain would do nothing. He, Koo, was of the opinion that while the French Government would be prepared to act in concert with Great Britain and the United States, France was relatively impotent in the Far East. Koo went on to say that it was the consensus of opinion at the meeting that Chiang Kai-shek would fight and could continue to fight, being defeated in each battle and retreating for a period of 6 to 8 months, not longer. Ultra confidentially Koo informed me of a remarkable pair of conversations in Moscow. He asserted that a few days ago in Moscow the German Chargé d’Affaires at a reception had said to the Chinese Ambassador that he desired to have a most serious conversation with him. The Chinese Ambassador had replied that a reception was perhaps not an appropriate place for such a conversation and that he would be glad to see the German Chargé d’Affaires at his Embassy the next day. The German Chargé d’Affaires had sent a Secretary of Embassy the next day who had said to the Chinese Ambassador that if the Soviet Union should intervene on the side of China, Germany would be compelled to intervene on the side of Japan. The same day Rosso, Italian Ambassador in Moscow, had sent a Secretary of Embassy to the Chinese Ambassador. The Italian Secretary had stated that if the Soviet Union should intervene on the side of China, Italy would be compelled to intervene on the side of Japan. I asked Koo if this information had been communicated to our Government or to the British Government. He replied that it had been communicated to no one except Chiang Kai-shek and last night verbally to Kung by the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow. Koo went on to say that he felt certain that Chiang Kai-shek was determined to fight but that his decision would be influenced by the prospect of financial and economic support from the great democracies of the world. Koo then talked about various methods of mobilizing world public opinion in favor of China and intimated that the Chinese Government might make a formal demand for collective action by the powers signatory to the Nine Power Pact or might call on the League of Nations or invoke the Kellogg Pact or indeed might possibly appeal under all three instruments simultaneously. 11 In the course of our conversation Koo showed me a telegram which he had just received from Nanking which stated that Chinese troops in a counter attack had ejected Japanese troops from two villages in the neighborhood of Peiping. Bullitt 11 Cf. telegram No. 1077, July 30, noon, vol. iv , p. 2 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/9043: Telegram [Document 299] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 29, 1937—2 p.m. 322. Your 509, July 28, 8 p.m., especially last two paragraphs. 1. As replied here last week to the British Government’s suggestion of the 20th, quoted and renewed now as reported in your telegram under reference, we desire that in every practicable way there be cooperation between and among the most interested powers toward ameliorating the present north China situation. We feel, however, that both this and the British Governments have expressed clearly and repeatedly to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments our attitude and view that peace should be maintained and hostilities be avoided, and our willingness to receive sympathetically any suggestions which the disputants may put forward for assistance on our part toward resolving their controversy. Can the British Government indicate to us what type of proposal it envisages as susceptible of being put forward by our two Governments toward “ending the present deadlock” in the event of the two Governments having first jointly approached the Japanese and Chinese Governments suggesting that they agree to the two points which the British Government suggested we should propose and of our having received from the Japanese and the Chinese Governments favorable responses? 2. In express reply to Eden’s invitation for any suggestion, has the British Government given any thought to the possibility of suggesting a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of and based on proposing evacuation of Peiping by all foreign personnel, both civilian and military, including Japanese, and by all Chinese military forces exclusive of the Peiping gendarmerie; or, to any possible and practicable variant of such a possibility? 3. You may read this to Eden without giving him any written text. 12 Hull 12 The Ambassador replied in telegram No. 516, July 30, 7 p.m., that the British Foreign Office would answer shortly (793.94/9100). The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9060: Telegram [Document 300] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 29, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 29—10:28 a.m.] 338. The Italian Ambassador informs me that as the result of fighting which broke out at East Station Tientsin between Chinese and Japanese last night one Italian marine was accidentally killed and another wounded. It is evident that there has been during the last 24 hours considerable fighting between Chinese and Japanese around Tientsin. French Ambassador informs me that Japanese Consul General has demanded use of south bridge at Tientsin by Japanese troops, although previously Japanese commandant had given French Consul General an understanding that Japanese would not use this bridge. In view of serious development at Tientsin it would seem necessary that interested governments should make representations at Tokyo urging Japanese Government to refrain from any activity there which would jeopardize peace of concession area. My Italian colleague has brought up question of using draft note proposed by French Ambassador which I communicated to the Department from Peiping. 13 I feel that events have progressed now to the point where the address of such a note to the parties in conflict on the spot is of little value and that the only possible effective steps that can be taken should be taken at Tokyo. Repeated to Peiping, Tientsin, Tokyo. Johnson 13 See telegram No. 257, July 18, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9056: Telegram [Document 301] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 29, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 29—9:15 a.m.] 232. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday made in the Diet the following statement: “The fact is that before the situation (in North China) arose conversations between Japan and Great Britain with regard to Far Eastern question had made substantial progress. However, even though methods were to be devised for the rendering of assistance to China by Japan and Great Britain, such methods would be entirely inapplicable in the existing circumstances, and due to the deplorable situation which has arisen the conversations have terminated for the time being”. 2. The papers yesterday evening took notice of the calls which Dodds and I made yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and although the purposes of Dodds’ visit were discussed at some length from a conjectural point of view, the purpose of my visit was merely stated to be to convey the earnest hope that hostilities in North China would be avoided. 3. This morning the Japanese papers closely examine the attitude shown by Great Britain toward the present Sino-Japanese crisis, and certain facts are stressed, as follows: ( a ) The British Government through Dodds has offered to the Japanese Government its good offices as mediator; ( b ) Eden stated in the House of Commons that the situation in North China was not a matter for local discussion but one to be settled by negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese Governments; and ( c ) the House of Commons was informed that the Anglo-Japanese conversations had been suspended. The conclusion is drawn that the British Government is seeking a favorable opportunity to intervene in any military action which may be taken by Japan and that it is building up for this purpose a close association between Great Britain, United States, Soviet Union and France. Several papers charge Great Britain with hostility and bad faith toward Japan. 4. It is to be specially noted that the Foreign Office has waited until now to disclose to the Japanese press the purport of the statement made by Dodds to Horinouchi (see my telegram No. 206, July 16, 7 p.m. 13a ). Repeated to Nanking. Grew 13a Ante , p. 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 175 ] . The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) at Peiping 793.94/9013: Telegram [Document 302] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) at Peiping Washington , July 29, 1937—4 p.m. 146. Your 308, July 28, 7 a.m., paragraph 3. Having given this matter careful consideration in the light of all the information available and of action taken in the interval, the Department is of the opinion that the express action you suggest need not be taken at this time. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9057: Telegram [Document 303] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 29—10:12 a.m.] 233. My 229, July 28, 4 p.m. 1. The objective of the current Japanese military operations as explained in committees in the Diet and to foreign Military Attachés by the War Office are as follows: ( a ) Japanese operations including use of bombing by aircraft are intended to disperse concentrations of the Chinese 29th Army, Peiping and Tientsin, driving the 29th Army to the southwest of the Yungting River and to clear the area between the two cities of hostile Chinese forces. These operations are progressing favorably and should be completed shortly, perhaps by the end of next week. ( b ) A path has been left open from Peiping to the west and northwest for the peaceful withdrawal of Chinese units still in Peiping. ( c ) After the completion of current operations no further military action is contemplated unless the central Chinese troops now concentrated along and north of the Lunghai Railroad should proceed toward the North. 2. The Military Attaché is informed by the War Office that the situation in Shantung is quiet. He was further informed that fighting in the vicinity of Tientsin, reported today, involves small bodies of troops and is not considered important. He was given the impression that the Japanese military expect that the situation around Peiping will be settled with the ousting of the 29th Army for the reason that reenforcements of that Army by the Central Chinese Government troops seems improbable. 3. It is not yet known what naval steps are being taken by Japan. The Naval Attaché 14 was told at the Navy Department this morning that notwithstanding press reports to the contrary no additional warships have been sent to China since the situation began to develop on July 7. 4. There should be added to previous assurances of this character an assurance given to Byas 15 by official of the Foreign Office that no planes or heavy guns will be used by the Japanese military to effect entrance into the walled city of Peiping. 5. In order to protect our sources of military information this telegram has not been repeated to Nanking. Grew 14 Capt. Harold M. Bemis. 15 Hugh Byas, Tokyo correspondent of the London Times and the New York Times . The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9073: Telegram [Document 304] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 29—10:35 a.m.] 2. Some firing all day and heavy bombing by Japanese planes of Central Police Station, Nankai University and other areas. Consular Body has been trying all day to assist in bringing agreement between Japanese and Chinese for cessation of hostilities within the city; no success as yet but still some hope. As fighting may be resumed tonight, Americans in areas that may be in danger are being advised to move into official [ foreign? ] Concessions and assisted in doing so. Chinese and Japanese each accuse the other of starting the firing last night, which seems to have started when Japanese occupied police station of fourth special area about 10 p.m., and became serious at 2 a.m., between small body of Japanese troops in East Station and surrounding Paoantui both of which fired across Italian Concession killing one Italian sentry and making Italian Consul’s residence uninhabitable. At the same time there was rifle, machine gun and artillery firing between Japanese barracks and Chinese troops near Pailitai, in course of which one French soldier was killed on defense line at extreme end of French Concession, and in all special areas. One shell, apparently Japanese, burst in Country Club. No Americans injured so far as I know. Small groups of Japanese have been surrounded by Paoantui all day near East Arsenal, East Station and in the fourth special area. Japanese insist that they were taken entirely unawares and were unprepared for trouble here having relied on assurances of General Li, Chief of Police, that Paoantui would not attack. There seems to be no doubt that most of Japanese forces had been sent toward Peiping and force here is not more than enough to hold Japanese Concession without rescuing their isolated parties. Regardless of which side started firing it appears that the Japanese did not anticipate present situation. Caldwell The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9050: Telegram [Document 305] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 29, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 29—9:03 a.m.] 341. Donald, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, has just told an officer of the Embassy that preparations are being made to break off relations with Japan and to undertake general hostilities against Japanese troops. He said that in Chiang’s words the Chinese will fight to the finish. Sent to Tokyo, Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9058: Telegram [Document 306] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 29, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 29—9:25 a.m.] 234. Embassy’s 230, July 28, 5 p.m. 16 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires yesterday reported to his Government that in his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirota had said that decisions for military operations in North China now lay with the commander of the Japanese troops in that area. Eden thereupon instructed Dodds again to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to say to him that he was greatly perturbed by this observation which appeared contrary to Hirota’s statement in the Diet to the general effect that Japan does not want war with China. As the Minister could not receive him Dodds called on the Vice Minister and left with him a letter for Hirota carrying out his instructions. 2. The French Ambassador has received instructions to take action “analogous” to that taken by the British Chargé d’Affaires. The French Ambassador sees no purpose in entering a plea for peace when hostilities have already started and has not yet decided to act. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 16 Vol. iv , p. 239 . The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9085: Telegram [Document 307] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , July 29, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 29—4:55 p.m.] 353. My 347, July 24, 1 p.m. During my conversation with Count Ciano this afternoon I asked for information with regard to the Far Eastern situation. He said that a telegram had just been received from Peiping to the effect that all of the Italian residents in Peiping, some 35 in number, had been assembled in the Italian Embassy. He was confident that there would be no declaration of war on the part of the Chinese Government for obvious reasons. He had already instructed the Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo and in Nanking to urge the respective Governments to adopt peaceful measures and at the same time he had offered the services of the Italian Government “in mediation” if that would be of help in the present situation. Phillips The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9054: Telegram [Document 308] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—9:55 a.m.] Japanese have stated military measures too far advanced and communications with their troops too incomplete to stop now. Japanese expect serious fighting tonight and consider their Concession in grave danger. Caldwell The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9061: Telegram [Document 309] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—10:41 a.m.] 342. My 341, July 29, 6 p.m. I have just seen Minister of Foreign Affairs who told me that although the situation is very grave Central Government has not yet made any decision in regard to breaking off relations with Japan. He stated that such a decision would be made only as a last resort and probably in connection with some major clash, as Government was very anxious not to take any initiative in the matter and on the contrary wished to preserve as long as possible any channel through which negotiations might be conducted. Minister of Foreign Affairs still views situation as most critical. Sent to Tokyo, Peiping, Shanghai. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9075: Telegram [Document 310] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—12:43 p.m.] 329. I received the following letter dated July 28 from the Japanese Embassy this morning: “While the Japanese authorities have been exerting their best efforts in trying to reach an amicable settlement of affairs since the Lukouchiao incident of July 7th, it is most regrettable that the successive acts of betrayal on the part of the Chinese troops, especially Langfang and Ku-an-men, have forced us to take steps which we deem necessary for our self-defense. It is our earnest desire that the city of Peiping should be put aside from the field of battle and, even if the Chinese troops adopt some provocative measures in Peiping and inflict some damage on the Japanese residents properties in the city, we shall take every possible step so that the noncombatants should be able to avoid danger”. The above letter was apparently despatched before the sudden change in the situation which took place last night. 17 Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart 17 General Sung Che-yuan, with his troops, left Peiping; the mayor, Chang Tzu-chung, remained in charge as acting Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9081: Telegram [Document 311] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 29—2:20 p.m.] 511. Correction to be made in opening paragraph my 509, July 28, 8 p.m.: Japanese military officials (presumably in China) and not the Japanese Foreign Minister telephoned the Mayor of Peiping. It was stated by a high Foreign Office official in a conversation today that the Foreign Secretary had been much disturbed by a report from the British Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo of a conversation with the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in which the latter had stated that, conditions in China being what they are, the question of opening an attack would have to rest with the commander of the Japanese troops. The Foreign Secretary had immediately telegraphed the British Chargé d’Affaires to point out to the Japanese Foreign Office the danger of such wide discretion being given in these grave circumstances to a military commander. The same official, who is one of the Foreign Office experts in Far Eastern Affairs, said that he did not believe for one moment that a war in the technical sense of the word would arise out of the present situation. Bingham The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9037: Telegram [Document 312] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , July 29, 1937—9 p.m. 133. Your 230, July 28, 5 p.m. 18 1. Department’s 128, July 27, 1 p.m., 19 which I personally signed, was an instruction calling, in its second paragraph, for action in the light of and based on information given us and repeated to you in part in the first paragraph, which information related to a threatened attack on and in Peiping. I regret that our telegram did not make absolutely clear the integral relationship between the two paragraphs. Department’s 129, July 27, 6 p.m., was a brief “for information” message sent you later in the day mentioning answers given in press conference to only two among a number of questions asked and answered. You will note that it contains no reference to telegram 128. By noting Department’s telegram 130, July 27, 7 p.m., which contains an express reference to telegram 128, you will see what I had especially in mind in giving the instruction conveyed in my telegram 128. I gave you, however, expressly, your discretion in the matter, and I am in no way dissatisfied with your handling of it. 2. Beginning on July 12, I have repeatedly urged on both the Japanese and the Chinese that hostilities be avoided and peace be kept. We were, however, on July 27 (our date), and we have been since, especially solicitous that a general attack upon and in Peiping such as had been reported intended should not be proceeded with. I have no hesitation in urging that such an attack be not made. Immediately after sending you Department’s telegram 128, I expressly authorized the action taken here as reported to you in Department’s telegram 130. 3. It is our intention, as regards the general course of our diplomatic effort in regard to the present north China situation, not to make uncalled for and likely to be futile protests or gestures of interference; but, when, where and as it seems to us that action on this Government’s part on behalf of peace or toward safeguarding lives of our nationals or calling attention to American rights and interests is warranted and may serve a useful purpose I shall be inclined toward taking such action. 4. In view of the radio bulletin service, telegraphic reports of press conferences are likely to be few and sketchy. Hull 18 Vol. iv , p. 239 . 19 Ibid ., p. 238 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9086: Telegram [Document 313] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 30, 1937—2 a.m. [Received 7:40 p.m.] 343. 1. Following statement of Chiang Kai-shek in the form of an interview with Central News Agency was released to that Agency in Chinese by the Foreign Office at midnight and was [ will be ] published here today: “Question: The sudden departure from Peiping of General Sung Cheh-yuan has resulted in the fall of an important city. What will the Central Government do in regard to question of his personal responsibility? Answer: Speaking from the military point of view Sung should have been in Paoting and not have gone to Peiping or Tientsin. From the very beginning I have maintained this point. As I am the commander in chief of the Nation’s forces and concurrently head of the executive branch of the Government, I and not General Sung should be responsible for the military reverse in Peiping and Tientsin. I am confident that I shall be able by exerting my full energy to bear the entire responsibility for relieving the critical situation. In fact this sudden turn in the situation in Peiping and Tientsin has been foreseen by keen chief observers. Japanese military invasion and political pressure did not begin today. Instead they have a long history and the present situation is not accidental. What is more, temporary military reverse must not be considered as defeats and the hostilities in the Peiping-Tientsin area are not to be regarded as having been terminated. Since the Japanese military have been deliberately planning to invade China and have used all kinds of methods to achieve this aim it is obvious that the warfare in the Peiping-Tientsin area only marks the beginning of a war of aggression and not its end. An absolute singleness of purpose is necessary to overcome the national crisis. As to the personal responsibility of General Sung Cheh-yuan it does not deserve serious attention. Question: What is the Government’s future policy toward Japan? Answer: After the outbreak of the Lukouchio incident I definitely declared in a speech in Ruling that this would mark the limit of our endurance. I also listed four minimum conditions for a settlement of the incident. These conditions have been made known to the nation in particular and the world in general and there is wholeheartedly [ absolutely ] no possibility of changing or revising them. I said then that we would not seek war, that we would meet war when forced on us. Since we have arrived at the ‘limit of endurance’ how could we consider the state of affairs in Peiping and Tientsin as a local question and let the Japanese military encroach upon our territorial and sovereign integrity or let them set up another puppet regime? The Government has the responsibility of defending national territory and sovereign rights and of protecting the people. The only thing to do is to put into operation its comprehensive plan to lead the entire nation in a struggle for the protection of the nation to the very bitter end. Henceforth absolutely no local settlement will be possible. We must remember that the four minimum conditions I laid down form a deciding point of our existence or extinction. Our troops have not suffered any great reverse and even if they did we should be determined to perish with the state and never would we compromise or surrender. In short the ultimate position of our Government has been consistent and inalterable, namely, no territory must be lost and no sovereign rights impaired. I am sure that our people finding their fatherland at this critical point of existence or extinction will like one man fight to the finish. Meanwhile, I wish to announce that I have decided upon all necessary measures in regard to the situation. My only wish now [is?] that our people will seriously but cautiously fulfill their respective duties and at the same time have the common determination to sacrifice everything including their very lives for their nation. I am confident that the final victory will be ours.[”] 2. Sent to the Department same date [ only ]. Summary will be telegraphed to Tokyo and radioed to Peiping. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9094: Telegram [Document 314] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 30, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 30—10 a.m.] 344. Peiping’s 327, July 29, 5 p.m. 20 1. A responsible official of the Foreign Office told a member of the Embassy last night that (1) the National Government was completely at a loss to understand Sung’s sudden departure from Peiping; (2) in regard to stories that Sung had not received support from the Government, the fact was Sung had repeatedly requested Chiang Kai-shek not to send Central Government troops into the Peiping area and the Government therefore had sent only troops such as former Kuominchun units. We learn from reliable informant that the original draft of Chiang’s statement (our 343, July 30, 2 a.m.) severely criticized Sung for his departure from Peiping and stated that the Government had not sent troops to assist him because of his specific request and that he should have been directing operations from Paoting instead of subjecting himself to Japanese and pro-Japanese pressure in Tientsin and Peiping. 2. Donald last night informed an officer of my staff that Chiang had said to him that Sung’s departure would not alter the Government’s military plans because Chiang had considered Peiping lost in 1935 and his plans had been formulated upon this consideration. Donald repeated previous statements that the Chinese were determined to fight and said that “things were really just beginning”. 3. I do not yet view the situation in Peiping with optimism. While a Chinese Cabinet official states that Chang Tzu-chung is reported to have issued orders to the 38th Division to cease resistance, it seems clear that in the fighting at Langfang, Tientsin and other places elements of this division were not under his control. Central News reports that Feng Chih-an instead of proceeding to Paoting with Sung is at Lukouchiao directing defense operations. The formation of a Sino-Japanese committee for maintenance of order in Peiping suggests the beginning of a regime there like the early regime in Mukden and with the temper of the Chinese as it is, calm but desperate, there are many possibilities dangerous incidents which might easily result in further Japanese military action around and in Peiping. I make these observations by way of pointing out that it is too early to assume that the situation at Peiping has definitely or permanently been freed from danger. To Department and Tokyo, code text by mail to Shanghai. Johnson 20 Not printed. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9311 [Document 315] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 30, 1937. The British Ambassador called on me this morning at about 11 o’clock. The Ambassador asked whether we had had any report from our Ambassador at Nanking of a discussion between the British and the American Ambassadors of the possibility of a settlement by negotiation between the Chinese and the Japanese Governments with a “guarantee by the British and the American Governments.” I said that I had no knowledge of our having received any such report. The Ambassador then took from his pocket and handed to me a paper which obviously was the text of a telegram which he had just received from London. The telegram quoted a telegram from London to Nanking in which London instructed its Ambassador that under no circumstances could there be considered the possibility of a “guarantee by the British Government.” I said that the instruction seemed to me obviously logical. The Ambassador inquired again whether we had had anything from our Ambassador on the subject. I said that I was sure that we had not. I then telephoned to Mr. Myers 21 and asked whether he had seen any telegram reporting on discussion by our Ambassador and the British Ambassador at Nanking of ways and means by which the Chinese-Japanese controversy might be brought to an end. Mr. Myers replied in the negative. I asked him to check through the telegrams and he later reported that we had nothing under that description. The British Ambassador thanked me and then said that his Government naturally was interested in the question of what the American Government was going to do about the Neutrality Act. 21a I said that I had no information on that subject. I inquired whether he had noted in the paper this morning what Senator Pittman 22 had said, and the Ambassador replied that he had noted that. I said that, giving only my strictly personal opinion, I was sure that this Government was not going precipitately into a decision on that subject. The Ambassador said that that was his impression. With exchange of courtesies, the conversation there ended. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 21 Myrl S. Myers, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 21a Approved August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081. As amended February 29, 1936, 49 Stat. 1152, and May 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 121. 22 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9098: Telegram [Document 316] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 30, 1937—noon. [Received 3:30 p.m.] 1078. Continuing my 1077. 23 (I talked with the Soviet Ambassador in Paris this afternoon who expressed the opinion that his Government would do nothing whatsoever to assist China at the present time). Delbos then said that the Soviet Government had made the position that France would take if the Soviet Union should intervene. If the Soviet Union should contemplate intervention he felt sure that the Soviet Union would first inquire in Paris as to the attitude that France would take in case Germany or Italy or both should intervene against the Soviet Union. It had been clearly understood at the time of the signature of the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance 24 that France was not bound to take any action whatsoever in the case of conflicts arising in the Far East. In so far as he could foresee the future, the position that France would take would depend entirely on the position of England. France could not undertake alone to fight Germany and Italy. The position of France would be the same as her position in the Spanish affair. If England should wish to stand firmly by the side of France against Germany and Italy, France would act. If England should continue to hold aloof, France could not act. France would never be caught in the position of having the Soviet Union as her only ally. Bullitt 23 Dated July 30, noon, vol. iv , p. 2 . 24 Signed at Paris, May 2, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvii , p. 395. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9096: Telegram [Document 317] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , July 30, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 30—2:04 p.m.] 407. My July 29, 4 p.m. 25 Admiral Hasegawa, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Third Fleet, last night issued a statement here in which he referred to “the growing rampancy of anti-Japanese activities in south and central China” and the “acceleration of the unnecessary preparations for war”. Such “provocative actions” the communiqué declared, “not only form a stumbling block in the way of peaceful relations between the nations, but may also lead to a most unhappy situation”. The statement concluded that the Third Fleet would make every effort to prevent the outbreak of new incidents, but “watching with grave concern” the attitude of the Chinese. 2. From a reliable Japanese press representative it is learned that this statement is intended as a warning to the local Chinese authorities and was issued because, first, the Shanghai-Woosung garrison is reported to have said on several occasions that the Japanese marines would be bombed out of their barracks if they caused any trouble in Shanghai; second, because the Japanese believe the strength of the Peace Preservation Corps in this area has been greatly increased, that it has been conducting night maneuverings and that it is hostile and belligerent. He added that Japanese naval authorities are concerned about these indications of Chinese hostilities. 3. Shanghai quiet. Repeated to Peiping and the Department. By mail to Nanking. Gauss 25 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9092: Telegram [Document 318] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 30, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 30—9:34 a.m.] 237. 1. In a press conference this morning Kawai, the Foreign Office spokesman, asserted that the Japanese Army has conquered Peiping and that the military phase is over. In response to questions he mentioned as entirely possible a movement by the inhabitants of the Peiping-Tientsin area for the establishment of some peace preservation organization which might lead to a movement for autonomy. He referred to Manchuria following the 1931 incident and said that many movements for autonomy spontaneously sprang up among the inhabitants which movements the Japanese finally came to assist because of Chinese inexperience in government. Kawai stated that in a similar way Japanese authorities in the Peiping-Tientsin area probably will be approached and that they perhaps will have to help. 2. The spokesman gave out a long prepared statement to place blame for the Tientsin fighting on the Chinese and to show that buildings fired upon by the Japanese were buildings from which the Chinese had opened fire. 3. July 29 the Japanese Diet received and passed without discussion a bill to appropriate 96,800,000 yen for expenses of the North China incident. This sum is in addition to 10,100,000 which the Cabinet previously alloted for the same purpose from an available reserve. The press states that a further large appropriation will be requested soon. The present session of the Diet continues willing to cooperate with the Government and to support the policy toward China. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9023: Telegram [Document 319] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , July 30, 1937—8 p.m. 122. Your 335, July 28, 2 p.m. The weather reports broadcast by the United States Navy Radio Station at Cavite comprise ships’ observations from the North Pacific Ocean, surface weather reports from land stations in the Far East, forecasts, typhoon warnings, a summary of general atmospheric pressure distribution, and synoptic weather reports from observation stations in the Philippine Islands and in the China Sea. These weather broadcasts are made pursuant to Resolution 46, passed by Sub-Commission 1, of the International Meteorological Organization. This Resolution reads: “The Commission places on record its deep appreciation of the offer made by the United States Navy to place at the disposal of the weather services of the Far East the facilities of the Cavite Radio Station and thus to provide for inter-continental broadcasts in the Far East.” As indicated above this station broadcasts weather information received from ships and from weather observation stations in the Far East including such stations in China. This information is transmitted in plain except the synoptic reports which are transmitted in the international weather code. There was held at Hong Kong between January 13 and 21, 1937, a Far Eastern Weather Conference for the purpose of improving the dissemination of weather information in the Far East. Resolution 46 was adopted at this Conference. Chinese delegates attended the Conference but withdrew on January 16. For your orientation, we are informed by Navy Department informally to the effect that most of the data on weather conditions in China incorporated in broadcast reports by Cavite originates from Chinese stations, and that the weather reports broadcast from the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet are reports on weather conditions principally over water areas disseminated for the information of units of the Fleet. The Department desires that you orally and informally explain to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the international basis and the character of these broadcasts, inform him that in view thereof this Government feels that they should be continued, and point out that insofar as they may be of assistance in connection with aviation their value is general to all who may be engaged in aviation. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9111: Telegram [Document 320] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 31, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 10:35 a.m.] 345. Following a conference with my British, French and Italian colleagues July 30, 5 p.m., I have sent the following instruction to Lockhart: “July 31, 9 a.m. Your July 29, 5 p.m. 1. Please prepare two communications following the text of the suggested note 26 and signed ‘For The Ambassador’. One should be addressed to the Chairman of the Hopei–Chahar Political Council without personal name and handed to a responsible officer and the other addressed to the Japanese Ambassador by name and handed to the Counselor in charge of the Japanese Embassy. When this action has been taken you should inform Tientsin. The communications should be delivered in person on the same day as similar communications are sent or delivered by the diplomatic officers of the British, French and Italian Embassies but not in company with them. On July 30, 6 p.m., the British Ambassador had not received final instructions from his Government and you should keep in touch with Cowan. 2. In the third paragraph of the text use ‘Japanese’ or ‘Chinese’ as the case may be. After ‘indirectly’ insert ‘to’ and incorporate the other changes indicated in the Department’s 129 of July 20, 5 p.m. 3. When I receive information that these communications have been delivered by you I intend to hand copies to the Chinese Foreign Office for its information. Department informed regarding this instruction in my 345, July 31, 9 a.m.” Only to Tokyo. Johnson 26 See telegram No. 257, July 18, 4 p.m., p. 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] . The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9106: Telegram [Document 321] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , July 31, 1937—10 a.m. [Received July 31—3 a.m.] 7. City quiet today. Some firing during the night as Japanese cleared out some remnants of Paoantui or other hostile Chinese from the Chinese city. Japanese yesterday afternoon completed destruction of Nankai University by artillery fire, air bombing and burning, and bombarded several buildings in the Chinese City, particularly Nankai middle school and girls school. Caldwell The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9104: Telegram [Document 322] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 31, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 31—12:35 a.m.] 238. Department’s 133, July 29, 9 p.m. 1. For purposes of the record permit me to say that the integral relationship between the two paragraphs in the Department’s 128, July 27, 1 p.m., 27 was perfectly clear and in my representations to the Foreign Minister on July 28th I prefaced my remarks by communicating to the Minister the substance of paragraph 1. Referring to that report as to Japanese intentions the Minister said “No, that is not true” and proceeded to make the statement reported in paragraph 5 of my 230, July 28, 5 p.m. 28 2. I am in complete concurrence and sympathy with every step thus far taken by the Department in connection with the present Sino-Japanese hostilities and with the general policy outlined in paragraph numbered 3 of Department’s 133, July 29, 9 p.m. Grew 27 Vol. iv , p. 238 . 28 Ibid ., p. 239 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9102: Telegram [Document 323] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 31, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 31—6:35 a.m.] 346. Department’s 115, July 13, 2 p.m. 29 and my 247, July 16, 6 p.m. from Peiping. In a conversation which I had with British and French Ambassadors yesterday it appeared that communication made to French Foreign Office by Japanese Ambassador in Paris was not made to British Foreign Office by Japanese Ambassador there. Can Department inform me whether Japanese Ambassador in Washington gave any assurances regarding South China or made any statement as to Japanese intentions in regard to North China? Johnson 29 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9107: Telegram [Document 324] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 31, 1937—noon. [Received July 31—10:55 a.m.] 347. A Foreign Office spokesman confirms a Central News Agency report dated July 30th that Rear Admiral Honda, Japanese Naval Attaché, called yesterday on Chinese Minister of the Navy and a Vice Minister of War and gave warning that unfortunate incidents in Central and South China should be prevented. Honda said the Japanese naval authorities regretted the Sino-Japanese hostilities in the Peiping–Tientsin area and feared that present tension there would spread to other parts of China. In that case, he said, the Third Japanese Fleet would take arbitrary action. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Hankow, Canton. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador (C. T. Wang) 793.94/9312 [Document 325] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador ( C. T. Wang ) [ Washington ,] July 31, 1937. The Ambassador called this morning at 11 o’clock at his own request. The Secretary opened the conversation by inquiring after the health and comfort of the Ambassador and his family. The Ambassador replied with thanks and stated that personally he and his people here were well and comfortable but that they were going through a hard period (in regard to matters in China). The Secretary said that for his own information and orientation he would like to ask a few questions, and he put various questions with reference to the position and movements of Chinese and Japanese troops in north China. The Ambassador said that the 29th Army seemed to have retired to the west and south of the Yungting River and that he thought that the Japanese have about 30,000 men in the area of hostilities, perhaps more. The Ambassador then said that he had been thinking over the question of possible ways and means of cooperation. He would like to know what we were thinking about the Nine Power Treaty. He had gained the impression from reports received from the Chinese Ambassador in London that the British Government was inclined toward taking a stronger position provided the American Government would go along but were saying the American Government inclined to hold back. He would like to know whether that was true. If it is true and if it should become known to the Chinese, who are always friendly to the United States, it would have an unfortunate effect. The Secretary said that if the Ambassador was prepared to show us anything to that effect we would give it consideration. The Ambassador said that that was the impression that he got from London and he would like to know our impression of the British Government’s position. The Secretary said that he would have to leave it to the British Government to speak of that, as, if he undertook to interpret the British Government’s position, he might easily give a wrong impression. The Ambassador inquired: How about consultation under the Nine Power Treaty? He said that he was speaking not under instruction but on his own initiative. The Secretary said that we and the British had been constantly in consultation and that we had been giving consideration to all angles and phases of the situation and were neglecting nothing. He repeated that he must refrain from trying to speak for the British. The Ambassador then said that there was another matter about which he would like to speak: the question of H. H. Kung’s negotiation for a credit. (Note: See separate memorandum. 30 ) At the end of the conversation, the Secretary said that the situation in north China is a heartbreaking situation. The Ambassador said that it was indeed, and he went on to say that he himself was terribly distressed over the destruction of Nankai University, an institution which represented the life work of his good friend Chang Po–lin; especially the very fine library. He said that the Japanese had not succeeded in destroying some of the well constructed buildings with their bombs and had then deliberately used kerosene and set fires. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 30 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/8993: Telegram [Document 326] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 31, 1937—3 p.m. 331. Your 505, July 27, 1 p.m., first paragraph. The Department has been informed by our Embassy at Peiping that the Senior Commandant at no time received from a Japanese liaison officer information such as is reported in the paragraph under reference, and that according to information received from the British Embassy at Peiping that Embassy telegraphed London a corrected version of that matter in a telegram despatched a few hours after the original message. It is assumed that you were not informed of the receipt by the British Foreign Office of the corrected version. The Department suggests that you may care informally to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Foreign Office with comment that the action taken was, fortunately, entirely appropriate. Hull The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9110: Telegram [Document 327] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 31, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 31—8:46 a.m.] 343. Reference paragraph 2, Embassy’s 327, July 29, 5 p.m., and paragraph 4, Embassy’s 333, July 30, 2 p.m. 31 1. Interested Chinese met yesterday afternoon in connection with the forming of a “committee for the maintenance of order”. Six Japanese attended including the local Assistant Military Attaché. 2. Domei reports that the committee was inaugurated at that meeting and that it is understood that the Japanese military say that the situation will not come up [ clarify ] if leaders of the 29th Army and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council participate in the committee. 3. The Embassy is reliably informed that attitude of the first [ August 1st ] was decided on for the inauguration and that the committee may not be inaugurated because a number of Chinese who have been approached to serve on it have refused. It is understood that Chiang Chao Tsung, a former Premier who was slated to be its chairman, has decided not to serve. 4. Evidently those behind the forming of the committee are attempting to obtain the participation of some Chinese of good reputation who have not been active in affairs for some time. If the [ such ] Chinese refuse to participate, it is supposed that a committee with a larger proportion of less desirable Chinese will be formed. The refusal of some Chinese to serve on the committee is presumably the result of Japanese participation in the preliminaries and realization that the committee will be a Japanese tool. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Lockhart 31 Neither printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9105: Telegram [Document 328] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 31, 1937—5 p.m. [Received July 31—8:13 a.m.] 239. 1. Yesterday afternoon following conference with the Foreign, War, Navy, Finance and Home Ministers, the Premier was in audience with the Emperor for an hour beginning at 4:30. Newspapers interest was aroused and the Cabinet issued a release. The Premier had reported to the Throne on the situation. 2. This morning one newspaper, the Yomiuri pictures yesterday’s conference and audience as having authorized a decision of the greatest importance, a “second step” in Japan’s program in China. 3. Activities apparently aimed at the further increase of Japanese troops in North China are everywhere evident here. The Japanese determination to use decisive force against any Chinese military advance into the North China zone of activities would appear increasingly firm; but there is no evidence that any important new decision was reached by the Cabinet yesterday unless in the form of approval of further troop movements to North China. 4. In response to a question, Foreign Minister Hirota yesterday told the House of Representatives Finance Committee that the United States has been taking an independent attitude since the outbreak of the North China incident and that there has been no joint approach to the Japanese Government by the powers. On preceding day, replying to a question about the Soviet Union, he stated that neither the Soviet Union nor any American or European power has transgressed the limits of neutrality. Yesterday evening Premier Konoe told newspapermen that there is no anxiety with regard to relations with the powers. 5. In conversation with a member of my staff today an official of the Foreign Office expressed Japanese gratitude for the great kindness of the American Consul General in Tientsin in recently saving the lives of six Japanese civilians who had fallen into Chinese hands. Repeated to Nanking; final paragraph to Tientsin. Grew Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9145 [Document 329] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] July 31, 1937. Mr. Secretary : With regard to the question which you asked me yesterday afternoon, whether it is likely that the fighting will continue and spread,—I would answer the question in the affirmative on both points. With regard to the resignation of the President of the Bank of Japan,—I am by no means sure it would be safe to assume that this resignation occurred because of Mr. Ikeda’s dissatisfaction with his Government’s China policy. Any one of several causes or an accumulation of causes may have led to that action. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9120: Telegram [Document 330] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 1, 1937—1 [ 5? ] p.m. [Received August 1—11:34 a.m.] 355. Hsiung Shao-hao, now officially connected with Chang Tzu Chung’s office, called today and stated that he had been sent by General Chang to request that I intercede on behalf of the Chinese authorities with the Japanese to arrange to remove from Peiping the two regiments of the 132nd Division now here and stated that the men of the regiments wanted to be removed from the city. He stated also that the Japanese wished these two regiments removed and I inquired whether any efforts have been made by the Chinese to arrange with the Japanese for the peaceful evacuation of these troops. Hsiung replied in the negative and said that it was thought of General Chang that if American Embassy would intimate to the Japanese that it would be desirable if these troops were removed or if they be given safe conduct out of the city they would not be molested once they are outside of the wall. I told Mr. Hsiung quite frankly that I was not in any position to make any representations to the Japanese authorities in the matter and added (1) it would seem to be desirable for the Embassy to remain aloof from any connection with negotiations here between the Japanese and Chinese on military or political questions, and (2) such representations would in all probability be unwelcome and ineffectual, and (3) it seemed to me to be a matter which might well be discussed between the Chinese and Japanese authorities themselves in view of the statement made that both desired the evacuation of the troops from Peiping. Unless I am instructed to the contrary I shall adhere to this position. I have conferred with the Military and Naval Attachés 32 and the Commandant of the Guard and they agree with me that there is no occasion at this time to interfere in the matter. I may add that a similar proposal came to me through a well-known and old resident of Peiping early this morning, the matter having been brought to his attention during the night with a request that he approach the Embassy on the subject. I informed the emissary substantially as set forth in the first paragraph of this telegram. He promised to inform me of the result of any conference which might take place today between the Chinese and Japanese authorities. Up to 1 o’clock no conference had taken place. Later at 4:30 this afternoon I was informed by the American referred to above that the Chinese and Japanese have come to an agreement and that the troops will leave for Kalgan tonight or tomorrow. Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart 32 Col. Joseph W. Stilwell and Commander Harvey E. Overesch. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9117: Telegram [Document 331] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 1, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 1—12:21 p.m.] 353. 1. Chiang Kai-shek called a gathering of high officials this morning and explained to them the reasons he has delayed launching Central Government troops into action against the Japanese. The exact nature of his remarks is not known but it is understood from a source close to him that he expects to complete military preparations within 10 days, the main front in the north will be a line from Paoting east to Tsangchow, and after formation of this line diplomatic relations will be severed and eventualities will be met with force. During a call at General Staff Headquarters July 30 an officer of the Embassy gained definite impression that present Chinese military plans do not contemplate immediate if any advance by Central Government troops north of Paoting. Some Chinese troops, presumably three divisions of 53rd Army and elements of 37th Division of 29th Army, are reliably reported to be now digging in at Liuliho, south of Changhsintien, where 2 days ago the Government railway’s biggest repair shops were destroyed by Japanese air bombs. 2. We are reliably informed that last few days the Chinese Government has been purchasing and shipping west from Hankow presumably to Chungking large quantities of supplies including 3 million gallons of gasoline, 1½ million gallons of aviation gasoline, 500,000 gallons of fuel oil. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9139 [Document 332] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 2, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador asked me to dine informally with him last Saturday evening, July 31. Upon my arrival at his house, the Ambassador showed me a paper which purported to be a translation of a telegram which he had received on Saturday afternoon from the Chinese Ambassador at London, Dr. Quo. In the telegram Dr. Quo stated that the British Foreign Office was giving thought to the question of a possible invoking of the Nine Power Treaty but they had made the observation that to do so would require “some preparation.” The Ambassador asked whether I could elucidate for him the American Government’s position. I replied that I did not feel in position to do so; that I wished to leave anything that might be said in that connection to be said by the Secretary of State. After dinner, when taking leave, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that, while I was not willing to speak regarding express points of high policy, I felt that I would be warranted in referring to statements which have repeatedly been made by Chinese leaders during recent years to the effect that China must cease to expect the foreign powers to fight her battles or take action which might be in the nature of taking sides in relation to Chinese-Japanese controversies. I said that, speaking as an observer and as between friends rather than as between officials, I could make the observation that the safest thing for any country to do is to frame its policies and conduct its activities on the basis of the best estimate that it can make of its own capacity without reference to the possibility of assistance from any other country or group of countries: if assistance comes from outside sources, so much to the good; but if any country bases its plans on expectation of assistance from others and then when the time comes the assistance is not forthcoming, it may frequently happen that there is not only disappointment and disillusionment but disaster. The Ambassador said that he had in mind all these things. I mentioned the statements which the Secretary has made repeatedly since July 12 urging that peace be maintained, and the conversation there ended. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9127: Telegram [Document 333] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , August 2, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 11:10 a.m.] Department’s July 31, 1 p.m. 33 1. Conditions quiet this consular district. Chinese residents have been leaving Japanese Concessions in considerable numbers during past few days and numbers of Japanese residents are leaving for down river. United States Navy reports Japanese Consulates closed at Chungking and Ichang and residents have left for down river August 1st and 2nd. Japanese naval forces at Hankow increased by one destroyer. Large quantities military supplies being sent north by Peiping-Hankow Railway, but comparatively little troop movement northward by rail during past few days. 2. On July 27th this office sent confidential letter to American residents of Hankow to be prepared in case of necessity to concentrate in certain designated areas and places. Copy of this letter sent to Embassy by despatch July 28th. I am keeping in close touch with Yangtze Patrol Commander who is at present in Hankow. British and other foreign Consuls are taking similar precautions. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Josselyn 33 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9128: Telegram [Document 334] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 2, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 1:46 p.m.] 358. Embassy’s 353, August 1, 1 p.m. 33 1. An officer of the China Foundation has informed the Embassy that it has decided to wind up its business in Peiping, although the Executive Committee must give the final order. There are not enough members of that Committee in Peiping to do this. Its books and documents have been safely stored. 2. He informed the Embassy that police have verbally ordered the National Library, the Museum Library, the China Foundation, and presumably other organs regarded as being connected with the National Government to destroy all pictures of Sun Yat Sen and all books of his and of his followers. 3. So far as known there have been no arrests other than the arrests of several Chinese newspapermen, and some of those connected with National Government news organs. However, it is alleged among leading Chinese that a list of 125 “undesirable” Chinese has been made by the Japanese. Whether it is the purpose of the latter merely to have these Chinese leave this area or whether it is for some other reason is not known. As some of the city gates are now under Japanese control, and as all are closing, escape of such Chinese would seem to be impossible. 4. The Japanese having gained military control of this area, it is becoming increasingly evident that they are now working to eliminate all possible opposition to their direction of affairs and any possible connection with the National Government. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Lockhart 33 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9131: Telegram [Document 335] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 2, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 6:39 p.m.] 417. My July 23, 4 p.m. Commandant of Japanese Naval landing party in a statement published in the local Japanese press regarding the disappearance of seaman Miyazaki 35 states that “the landing party sincerely regrets having been the cause of such commotion at this time of crisis and hereby pledges itself to enforce self-discipline so that it may be better [able to?] carry out its duties for the protection of Japanese lives and property”. The statement also expresses “deep respect and appreciation” of the cooperation given by the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Chinese authorities in the search for the missing man. The statement has somewhat eased local tension and would appear to be a further indication that Japan does not want trouble in the Shanghai area at the present time. The Chinese authorities have forbidden parades and mass meetings and are continuing their efforts to prevent trouble. Repeated to Peiping and Department. By mail to Nanking. Gauss 35 The seaman was found safe. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9122: Telegram [Document 336] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 2, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 2—5:45 a.m.] 360. My 355, August 1, 3 [ 5? ] p.m. The two regiments of the 132nd Division, under arms, passed quietly out of the north gates last night unmolested and are proceeding to a point on the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway, probably Nankow, where they will entrain for Kalgan. So far as is known up to noon today they have encountered no difficulties in their march across the country. The exit of these troops from Peiping has further relaxed the tension and practically all shops, except Japanese, have reopened. The removal of these troops presumably completes the evacuation of all the troops [stationed] there under General Sung Che Yuan. Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 702.6193/78: Telegram [Document 337] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , August 3, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 3—9 a.m.] 207. This morning’s papers contain in addition to the report of the raid on the Soviet Consulate in Tientsin a Tass communiqué to the effect that the Soviet Government holds the Japanese Government responsible for this raid and demands satisfaction. For this reason the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo has been instructed to make a strong protest to the Japanese Foreign Office. The Soviet Government “expects the immediate arrest and exemplary punishment of the guilty parties, particularly since the names of some of them are known and have been communited [ communicated? ] to the Japanese Government”. The Soviet Government also demands the return of the stolen property, compensation for losses and immediate measures for the protection of the Consulate. Editorial comment in the Pravda and Izvestiya is sharp and abusive but does not give the impression that the Soviet Government intends to make a really serious issue of this incident or to take any position for the time being which would be apt to involve it seriously in the Japanese-Chinese dispute. The general tone of the editorials is that the raid represented another deliberate attempt at provocation on the part of the Japanese; but this attempt will not be forgotten or allowed in the long run to go unrequited; but that the Soviet Government will not permit itself to be provoked at this moment. A large share of the blame for the entire Japanese action in North China is placed on “the other capitalist powers” for having failed to take effective measures against Japanese aggression. Henderson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9172: Telegram [Document 338] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 4—6:40 a.m.] 361. 1. According to information reliably reported to have emanated from the highest sources, while Chinese troop movements northward and other military preparations will continue, Chinese plans contemplate no extensive fighting until after an emergency meeting of the National Defence Council August 10 and that after that date a state of (undeclared) war will exist and all the Government’s resources including the air service will be called into action to hold the Northern Paoting-Tsangchow bund [ line? ] and where possible to repel any landing of enemy forces at coastal points. Sent to Tokyo. Johnson The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9149: Telegram [Document 339] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , August 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 3—10:55 a.m.] 11. Japanese Consul General yesterday informed Senior Consul that his Military Attaché had informed him that in the event of further concentration of troops of the Central Government around Peiping Hankow and Tientsin–Pukow Railways north of Yellow River and in the event of advance of the Central troops already there, hostilities might eventually spread to these regions, and requested that the other Consuls be informed in order that they might warn their nationals. Tientsin quiet today. Japanese lieutenants reorganizing administration of First Special Area. Rumors are current of a Chinese-Japanese clash south of Tientsin on the Tientsin–Pukow Railroad. It was also reported that Japanese air divisions [omission?] area bombed Tehchow and Kalgan yesterday. Caldwell The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) at Peiping 793.94/9122: Telegram [Document 340] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) at Peiping Washington , August 3, 1937—4 p.m. 168. Your 355, August 1, 1 [ 5? ] p.m., and 360, August 2, 7 p.m. 1. Department feels that the hazards of the situation at Peiping, to all concerned, including the Chinese, should be substantially diminished by the withdrawal of troops to which you refer. 2. Department suggests for your consideration: Might it not be well in future, in any analogous case where either side may come to you with such request or proposal as the Chinese made in this case for go-between action, to reply that you will lay the matter before your colleagues of other diplomatic missions; this, to the end that, before replying, whether in the negative or in the affirmative, you may have the benefit of the views of your diplomatic colleagues and possibly, if needed, of your Government and theirs, so that, when answer is made, responsibility for the reply and its possible consequences may be distributed among the official agencies of the countries whose nationals and interests would be affected and may not have to be borne by you alone. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9159: Telegram [Document 341] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 3, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 4—2:15 a.m.] 362. Our 358, August 3, noon. 36 1. We learn from reliable source that during Han Fu Chu’s 37 visit to Nanking he gave National Government satisfactory assurances of his determination to resist any Japanese military activity in Central China and to cooperate fully with Central Government troops. According to this source, he promised the Generalissimo that he would oppose by force any incursion of Japanese troops into the province or the landing of Japanese naval parties at Tsingtao. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Peiping, Tsingtao and Tsinanfu being informed. Code text to Shanghai. Johnson 36 Not printed. 37 Chairman of Shantung Provincial Government. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9136: Telegram [Document 342] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 3—7:05 a.m.] 244. My No. 239, July 31, 5 p.m. 1. By direction of the War Department the Military Attaché of the Embassy is today telegraphing his estimate of the North China situation. I have read his report and have expressed to him my concurrence. 2. The Naval Attaché was informed today at the Navy Department that contrary to newspaper reports of the visit of the Commander of the Japanese Third Fleet on the Chinese Navy Minister, the Commander did not threaten arbitrary action in case of further anti-Japanese demonstration in Central and North China; that no ships or landing reenforcements have been sent to China; and that of the three Japanese destroyers which engaged the Chinese land forces at Taku on July 29 two destroyers were based on Port Arthur and the third destroyer belonged to the Third Fleet. 3. The Cabinet yesterday approved provisional increase for one year of the income tax and several other taxes, the increase to yield an additional revenue of yen 102 million to be applied to the expenses of military operations in North China. In addition to supplementary estimates of about yen 105 million already appropriated for military expenses in North China it is understood that there is being presented to the Diet a further supplementary budget of yen 300 million for military expenditures in Manchuria and in North China. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9165: Telegram [Document 343] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 4—8:45 a.m.] 363. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, stated to Peck 38 in a general conversation this afternoon that the principal object in closing Chungking and Ichang Japanese Consulates and in evacuating a portion of the Japanese population along the Yangtze is to avoid possible instances of maltreatment of Japanese subjects which might enlarge the scope of the hostilities in North China. Japanese women and children in Nanking will all have left in 2 or 3 days. He reiterated earlier statements that the Japanese reenforcements in North China have not come to conquer that area and that Japan has no plan to subjugate China. He had explained to his Chinese friends that while Japanese popular feeling is at present incensed against China this animosity will probably be alleviated by the lesson administered in the North and amicable feeling will return. He said no discussions whatever are in progress between the Japanese Embassy and the Chinese Government. The Japanese Ambassador expected to fly from Tientsin to Dairen today and take a steamer to Shanghai. It is still uncertain whether he will come to Nanking. Hidaka volunteered to inform the American Embassy if he received advance intimation of any event likely to affect welfare of American residents here. Sent to the Department, Peiping. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson 38 Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Embassy in China. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9151: Telegram [Document 344] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , August 3, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 3—2:40 p.m.] 521. My 516, July 30, 7 p.m., opening paragraph 39 and your 322, July 29, 2 p.m. I saw Vansittart this afternoon and he told me that his Government appreciates your message to which he wished to make the following considered reply: The real problem would seem to be whether it is possible to frame proposals which if adopted by both sides would stop the fighting. After the clash between the Chinese and Japanese which took place on July 9, it would seem to be impossible to ask for withdrawal of Japanese troops. Some of them are scattered in small detachments and subject to danger of attack from armed Chinese bodies who are not under a central high command or control. It is perhaps true that the Japanese have used excessive force but in view of recent events at Tientsin and Tungchow it would seem more than ever impossible to ask Japan to withdraw her troops or that Japanese commanders should refrain from measures to safeguard Japanese life and property. In these circumstances Vansittart said that his Government desires to submit for consideration of the United States Government that the only proposals which can be put forward would seem to be to the effect that both sides should appoint plenipotentiaries to discuss terms for a settlement. The United States and British Governments might offer their good offices ( a ) in providing neutral ground where the plenipotentiaries might meet and ( b ) during the negotiations in smoothing any difficulties that might arise. If both sides agreed in principle that the matter should be settled by negotiation, then it might be urged that no more Chinese Central Government troops should be sent north and that no more Japanese troops should enter Hopei either from Japan or Manchuria; further arrangements with regard to troops would be a matter for the plenipotentiaries to discuss. The British Government thinks it desirable for it to be made clear that any proposals on these lines are not more than an offer of good offices and in no sense intervention; any appearance of intervention might inflame public opinion in Japan and have the effect of strengthening the military; it might also encourage the Chinese to believe that the United States and British Governments intend to take active measures toward restraining Japan. His Majesty’s Government have given careful consideration to the suggestion that a proposal for evacuating Peiping should be the basis for suggesting the suspension of hostilities; it seems to the British Government, however, that the developments of the last few days have already made such a plan inapplicable to the present situation. Hostilities might continue anyhow and probably will in North China until China and Japan have agreed on some new form of administration. If you should agree in principle with the suggestion of an offer of good offices Vansittart is strongly of the opinion that before the two Governments decide whether or not it is feasible to make such an offer they both should consult their Ambassadors in Japan for their opinions as to its probable reception by the Japanese Government. Bingham 39 Not printed; see footnote 12, p. 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9143: Telegram [Document 345] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 3, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 3—10 a.m.] 418. The Chinese Mayor of Shanghai called on me yesterday afternoon, saying he came privately and unofficially to discuss the existing tension here and the efforts he has been making to avoid any clash between Japanese and Chinese. Incidentally, but as the obvious purpose of his visit, he brought up the situation in 1932, when he said the Japanese had been “permitted” to use the Settlement as a base for hostile operations against the Chinese, and suggested that if this were to occur again the situation would become difficult in reference to safety of foreign residents. What he wanted undoubtedly was to sound out opinion as to the action which would be taken if the Japanese were again to use the Settlement as a base of operations. I confined myself to refuting his statement that the Japanese had been “permitted” to use the Settlement as a base in 1932, and to emphasizing the necessity for both sides to avoid imperiling the safety of the large foreign population of Shanghai. He was critical of the action of the Japanese in having sent their forces into Chapei on the night when the Japanese sailor Miyazaki was found missing, stressing the difficulty he had had in restraining the Peace Preservation Corps and police from resisting such intrusion which he considered a violation of the 1932 truce. In reply I suggested that it would be wise to avoid any rash action by the Peace Preservation Corps and that the mere presence of small guards of Japanese [sailors?] near Japanese premises outside the Settlement and extra-Settlement roads in an emergency should not be promptly interpreted as an invasion of Chinese territory. I urged that if any further incidents occurred at Shanghai the utmost effort be made to localize them and not permit them to enlarge and become the occasion of any serious clash imperiling the safety of both Chinese and foreign residents of the area. 2. In view of recent inquiries from prominent unofficial Chinese as to the possible neutralization of Shanghai in event of war between China and Japan, I asked the Mayor whether he knew anything of any such proposal or had given it any thought. He said that he had not thought of it. 3. My British colleague tells me that he had a similar visit from the Mayor, and that he knows that the question of the possible use by the Japanese of the International Settlement as a base of operations as in 1932 was mentioned recently to the British Ambassador by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. 4. The question of the possible neutralization of Shanghai is, I am aware, quietly being discussed in local foreign circles. It seems to me that while China might be persuaded to agree to such a proposal on the basis of providing a haven of refuge for foreign nationals throughout the country, it would be difficult to persuade the Japanese to such a proposal although they took such action in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95. If anything is proposed by way of suggesting the neutralization of the Shanghai area, preparations therefor should of course be made in advance so as to permit of prompt action should the sphere of the present clash be extended and a state of war impend. 5. As I see it, the neutralization of Shanghai would necessitate the establishment of a neutral zone to the extent of 5 or 10 miles beyond the Settlement and concession boundaries, the withdrawal of all Chinese and Japanese military and naval forces from such areas, the “policing’ of the area by or under the supervision of foreign troops, which would require that present forces be augmented, the withdrawal from Shanghai of all Chinese National Government offices, the impounding of customs and other Chinese revenues except municipal revenues, and supervisory control of the posts, telegraphs, radio and cable facilities. 6. I have discussed the foregoing telegram with the Ambassador who is here on a very brief visit. We are agreed that any proposal for neutralization would have to originate with the powers chiefly interested, namely, the British, French, Americans, and that the proposal would have to be made by those powers to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. We are without information enabling us to forecast what the reactions of China and Japan would be, but we are both of the opinion that the matter should be given some consideration as the situation here in Shanghai would become very precarious if hostilities on a general scale were to develop in China. Repeated Tokyo. Copy handed to Ambassador. To Peiping by first courier. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9152: Telegram [Document 346] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 3, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 3—4:20 p.m.] 420. Local French newspapers state that as a measure of reprisal against the French authorities at Tientsin for preventing Japanese troops from passing through the French concession, the Japanese who now occupy the third special area have erected barbed wire entanglements and a machine gun post at the end of the International Bridge, and have refused to permit French troops to proceed to the French barracks located at the East Arsenal. This paper reports also that a surprise attack was made by Japanese soldiers on July 29 on a small detachment of French troops who were stationed at the East Station; that the detachment was disarmed and a French sergeant seriously wounded. The paper reports further that the French Consul General at Tientsin has protested to the Japanese authorities and has sent a detailed report to the French authorities. Repeated to Peiping, the Department and Tientsin. Mail to Nanking. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9191: Telegram [Document 347] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 4, 1937—noon. [Received 12:25 p.m.] 367. Shanghai’s 418, August 3, 10 p.m. I spent yesterday in Shanghai and discussed matter set forth in above telegram with Gauss. I agree with his estimate of the situation. It occurs to me that something might be accomplished by the powers by representations at Tokyo and Nanking suggesting that both countries agree to the elimination of the Shanghai area from war activities somewhat along lines taken by the four diplomatic representatives at Peiping as quoted in Peiping’s 312, July 28, 2 p.m., and as contemplated by Department’s 138, July 27, noon to Peiping. 40 Repeated to Shanghai and Tokyo. Johnson 40 Latter not printed. See telegram No. 128, July 27, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iv , p. 238 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9175: Telegram [Document 348] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 4, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2:55 p.m.] 368. My 366, August 4, 11 a.m. 41 On August 2, 3 p.m., Embassy sent following telegram to Canton, Chefoo, Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Amoy, Foochow, Tsinanfu, and a summary was telegraphed to Tokyo: 1. August 2, 3 p.m. For your information. Japanese Naval Attaché delivered on July 30 oral warning to Chinese Minister of the Navy and Vice Minister of War that Chinese Government must prevent incidents in Central and Southern China, otherwise the Third Japanese Fleet would “take arbitrary action”. 2. Please keep Embassy informed of important developments in Sino-Japanese relations including any indications which may appear in regard to possibility of Japanese démarche in your districts, concentration of Japanese naval vessels, movement of Chinese troops, et cetera. Repeat your messages to the Department and Peiping and in case of emergency report pertinent information to Tokyo. Embassy will attempt to keep you advised of significant developments in North China and elsewhere. Canton please mail to Hong Kong. Johnson 41 Ibid ., p. 246 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9179: Telegram [Document 349] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 4, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 7:10 p.m.] 371. My 358, August 3, noon, 42 paragraph No. 2. In consequence of the Chinese Government’s official advice to its officers to send their families away from Nanking the railway has been extremely congested for 2 days. Steamers going up and down river have likewise been crowded with departing residents. Tables of warning signals for air raids have been distributed. While I do not think there are any substantial reasons as yet for anticipating a Japanese attack on Nanking in the near future the Embassy has taken steps to ascertain the number and residence of American citizens in Nanking. Repeated to Peiping. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson 42 Not printed. The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9180: Telegram [Document 350] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , August 4, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 4—2:38 p.m.] 15. Embassy’s 356, August 3, 10 a.m. 43 French Consul on July 28 informed Consular Corps that he called on General Kazuki on July 22, described the delicate situation of the French Concession bordering the Japanese Concession and asked him in case of open hostilities between Japanese and Chinese to refrain from passing Japanese troops through the French Concession, as otherwise Chinese troops also would have to be passed, which might cause hostilities to take place in French Concession; and that General Kazuki gave the French Consul formal assurance that in such a situation there would not be passage of Japanese troops through the French Concession. The British Consul General and the Italian Consul were in agreement with the attitude of the French Consul, but the Japanese Consul General stated he presumed that Japanese General’s assurance was based not on legal grounds but was mark of good will; French and Italian Consuls and British Consul General declined to admit that they did not have legal right to bar Japanese troops from their Concession during hostilities between Japanese and Chinese, and Japanese Consul General reserved his opinion pending instructions from his Government. On July 29th the French Consul informed the Consular Corps that, following the outbreak of Chinese-Japanese hostilities early that morning he had sent a notice to General Kazuki prohibiting the passage of Japanese forces through the French Concession, but that the Japanese had sent through the Concession troops who by threat of arms forced their way past the French guards and crossed the bridge toward the East Station. The Japanese had a small detachment of their soldiers surrounded by the Chinese in the East Station which they could approach only by the International Bridge, the south end of which is in the French Concession; they continued to force their troops through until the French Consul placed himself at the bridge head with armed French troops and barred passage of Japanese troops, stating that he would fire if necessary and that he was acting on prior instructions of his Government. The Japanese gave up trying to force their way through but as soon as they occupied the third area between the bridge and the station they placed Japanese sentries at the north end of the bridge with sand bags and machine guns aimed at the French end of the bridge and for some time refused passage to the French military although other nationals were allowed to pass, stating that the French could not pass until the Japanese military were allowed to pass through the French Concession. This cut off the French forces at their East Arsenal barracks from the French Concession; the French also state the Japanese cut the telephone line between these points. After negotiations the Japanese eventually agreed to the passage of the French military but left their bridge sentinel in place. French Consul also had difficulty in preventing Japanese soldiers from occupying South Manchuria Railway office near French end of bridge and firing on Chinese near station, thus make Chinese fire upon French Concession. French Consul also stated that when fighting began at East Station seven French soldiers were on duty there in accordance with orders issued years ago by senior military commandant under Boxer Protocol, without whose orders they cannot be withdrawn; that they were attacked and disarmed by the Japanese soldiers and confined to their room; that they were fired upon by Japanese machine guns and one critically wounded; and that they were left for a long period without medical attendance, food or water. This was taken up by the French with the Japanese whose version of the above is not the same as that of the French. The Japanese admit that the French soldier was wounded by Japanese fire during the early hours of the fighting but contend that this was an accident due to the French room being in the Japanese line of fire against the attacking Chinese. The French soldiers were rescued by their comrades near the end of the fighting and after about 2 days confinement in the station. The Soviet Consulate General was raided on the night of August 1st and the contents wrecked by band supposed to have been White Russians; Russian Vice Consul in charge and his staff were already in the British Concession with most important archives as the result of earlier warnings. Russian Consulate is in former Russian Concession, now third special area, which was under control of a military officer at the time of the raid but in which no police were posted. Russian Vice Consul states that he had appealed to the Japanese Consul General for protection of the premises in advance of raid and had been denied it. Tangku quiet and in Japanese hands. It is reported that Japanese shelled Taku and destroyed navy yard; that Japanese forces there have been fully equipped and large quantities of war supplies landed, but little accurate information available yet due to the interrupted communications. Best information available is that 2700 additional Japanese troops have arrived in Tientsin since July 29th, 2200 by rail through Shanhaikuan and 500 by sea through Tangku. Caldwell 43 Not printed. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 852.00/6164: Telegram [Document 351] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , August 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 7:25 p.m.] 1118–1119. Continuing my 1117, August 5, 11 a.m. [ noon ]. 44 Also he 45 repeated once more emphatically that he was as fully prepared as Blum 46 to go to war if Germany should attack either Czechoslovakia or Poland. France had learned from her experience in letting Austria-Hungary be crushed at Sadowa that if she should permit Germany to conquer the weaker states of Central and Eastern Europe her turn would come next as it had come in 1870. With regard to the Far Eastern situation Chautemps repeated to me a conversation that he had had yesterday with the new Japanese Ambassador Sugimura which tallied with the account of the same conversation given me by the Japanese Ambassador yesterday afternoon. Sugimura said to me as he had said to Chautemps that when the French Prime Minister argued with him on the basis of principle that Japan had no right to be engaged in her present activities in China the argument was unanswerable; but we must remember that as one traveled eastward from Europe principle became less and less important and prestige became more and more important. He could assure me that the Japanese Emperor was intensely opposed to war with China. The Army, however, felt that its prestige was involved and was engaged in reestablishing that prestige. Now that the Army had taken Tientsin and Peiping he believed that the Army would feel that its prestige was once more secure. He believed that the Army would insist on occupying a strategic line which would run east and west approximately 50 miles south of Tientsin and Peiping and would be content to hold that position of Chinese territory if it should be provided that troops of the Central Government were not permitted to come anywhere near that line. He added, however, that he was not sure that the Army would not insist on occupying the better strategic line of the Yellow River. He felt that it would be most unwise for Japan to engage in a long war to crush Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek was a useful person to keep China from collapsing into communism. Moreover, the complications which might be created by a long war were incalculable. It was the part of prudence to occupy at this time merely Peiping and Tientsin and a satisfactory strategic line to protect them. If Chiang Kai-shek troops should attempt to advance to the Peiping-Tientsin area there would be war. Chautemps said that in the discussion that he had had with the Soviet Ambassador yesterday Souritz had not made the slightest attempt to ascertain the position of France if the Soviet Union should intervene in the Chinese-Japanese dispute and added that he felt certain that the Soviet Union would remain completely quiescent for the moment. If the Soviet Union had had the slightest intention of intervening the recent attack on the Soviet Consulate in Tientsin would have offered an excellent pretext. Bullitt 44 Telegram in four sections numbered 1116 to 1119. Sections 1116 and 1117 are printed in vol. i , pp. 370 and 115 , respectively. 45 Camille Chautemps, President of the French Council of Ministers (Premier). 46 Leon Blum, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/9151: Telegram [Document 352] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , August 5, 1937—noon. 334. Your 521, August 3, 7 p.m., and previous. As this Government has understood the British Government’s suggestion, as conveyed in your 509, July 28, 8 p.m., and in the memorandum given the Department by the British Ambassador here on July 20, that suggestion has been that our two Governments approach the Japanese and Chinese Governments and ask them to agree (1) to suspend troop movements and (2) to receive from the American Government and the British Government proposals toward dissolving of “existing deadlock”. In Department’s 322, July 29, 2 p.m., we asked whether the British Government could indicate to us what type of proposal it envisaged as possible under part 2 of what it had suggested. Vansittart’s statement reported in your 521, August 3, 7 p.m., does not seem to us to answer that question. It seems to us to relate merely to the subject of the possibility of offering good offices in exercise of which the offering governments should provide a neutral ground for negotiations between the Japanese and the Chinese and play the part of impartial advisers or go-betweens toward smoothing out difficulties which might arise during the negotiations; and Vansittart emphasizes that the British Government feels that it would be desirable that it be made clear that what is offered is in no sense intervention but is simply good offices. As this Government views the situation, there have already been made by each of our two Governments what definitely amount to offers of good offices; the Japanese Government has clearly indicated that it is not responsively disposed toward these approaches (first by its diplomatic silence in regard thereto and second by express statements made by various of its high officials to the press and in the Diet that it will not be responsive to offers of mediation and will not tolerate interference by other countries). This Government is constrained to believe that these Japanese officials have expressed the considered determination of the Japanese Government. However, believing that no possible course which might serve toward maintenance of peace should be overlooked or be omitted, this Government, in line with Vansittart’s opinion communicated in the concluding paragraph of your telegram, is asking of the American Ambassador in Japan his opinion and his estimate of what might be the probable reaction of the Japanese Government to such an approach if made. May we suggest that the British Government likewise obtain the opinion of their representative in Japan. Please inform the Foreign Office of the above. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9151: Telegram [Document 353] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 5, 1937—noon. 138. Reference, Department’s 123, July 21, 7 p.m. 47 British Foreign Office, following up suggestions made by it through British Ambassador here on July 20 and repeated by it through American Ambassador in London on July 28, now suggests consideration of possible action as follows: that American and British Governments might offer to Japanese and Chinese our good offices, (1) in providing neutral ground where Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries might meet to negotiate and (2) in smoothing out difficulties that might arise during the negotiations; that if both sides agreed in principle that the matter should be dealt with by negotiation, it then might be urged that no more Japanese troops should enter Hopei and no more Chinese Central Government troops be sent north, further arrangements regarding troops to be a matter for discussion by the plenipotentiaries; and that if such approach is made it should be made clear that any proposals along these lines are in no sense intervention but simply an offer of good offices. In laying this before Bingham, Vansittart expressed the opinion that before the two Governments come to a decision whether or not it is feasible to make such an offer both Governments should ask their diplomatic representatives in Japan for their opinions regarding probable reception, if made, by the Japanese Government. Please give Department your comments. Hull 47 This telegram reported the exchange with the British Embassy on July 20 and 21. (793.94/8920) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 811.3394/265: Telegram [Document 354] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 5, 1937—1 p.m. 139. Reference, your 221, July 22, 5 p.m., and previous. 1. For your information. Commander-in-Chief 48 recommends through the Navy Department that in view of the situation in Far East this Department notify Japanese Government that proposed visit of the Commander-in-Chief to Japan be indefinitely postponed. Both Departments approve. 2. Please appropriately inform Foreign Office that visit will be indefinitely postponed. Hull 48 Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, at Shanghai. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9193: Telegram [Document 355] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 5, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2:15 p.m.] 374. 1. We are reliably informed that a group of influential Chinese intellectual leaders have secretly initiated a movement for peace and are proposing to the Generalissimo that China offer to recognize Manchukuo in return for withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China. They claim to have the active support of Yen Hsi Shan 49 and, working through some one in the Chinese Foreign Office, to be responsible for the journeying hither of Kawagoe. 50 2. How far this movement may develop is impossible to say. However, it may be seen in an editorial in Kung’s Shanghai China Press this morning which approaches an argument for peace on the theory that Japanese terms now would not be as harsh as those which might be expected after an inevitable defeat and points out that China’s only hope of avoiding ultimate capitulation would be in wearing down the enemy by long drawn out guerrilla warfare which might break the enemy financially. 3. While we feel that the Chinese Government would eagerly seize upon almost any solution of the crisis with Japan which would not mean political suicide, the proposal cited seems impracticable because (1) it is too late and (2) Japanese desires have gone far beyond it and appear to be widening in reference to North China. A peaceful settlement does not therefore seem possible on that or any similar basis as the situation now stands. 4. According to a source close to Chiang Kai Shek, the Generalissimo’s headquarters do not now expect extensive hostilities before August 15, because it is considered that the Japanese are not yet fully prepared. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Johnson 49 Pacification Commissioner for Shansi. 50 Japanese Ambassador in China. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9189: Telegram [Document 356] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 5, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 5—9:40 a.m.] 246. My telegram No. 244, August 3, 5 p.m. 1. A responsible official in the Foreign Office who has thus far furnished us with accurate information with regard to the North China situation during a conversation this morning with a member of my staff apparently inadvertently made reference to the “imminent battle at Paoting”. After being pressed for an explanation he stated that the concentration of Chinese troops near Paoting is regarded as “menacing” and that when sufficient Japanese reenforcements have arrived in North China operations will be started to eject the Chinese forces from that portion of Hopei Province north of a line which he indicated on the map which line runs latitudinally from the western boundary of Shantung Province to North Honan Province and approximately through the city of Kwangping in South Hopei. He could not indicate when such operations would be started but he gave the impression that they would occur in the very near future. 51 2. There are well confirmed reports of the departure of reenforcements from Japan proper but so far there is no indication of their having reached the mainland. 3. The Assistant Military Attaché was informed this afternoon at the War Office that Japanese troops in North China will not attack Chinese forces along the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways without serious provocation; and that the mere presence of these forces in Hopei in violation of the Ho-Umezu agreement does not constitute “serious provocation”. 4. I am repeating this telegram to Nanking with the request that circulation be restricted to the Ambassador and Peck. Grew 51 The Embassy’s telegram No. 382, August 5, 2 p.m., from Peiping reported the Japanese Embassy Secretary as stating “he believes that there is possibility of fighting in the Paotingfu area within a week or 10 days.” (793.94/9190) The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9183: Telegram [Document 357] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , August 5, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 5—9:45 a.m.] 19. I have been reliably informed that during the first 4 days of August 14,000 troops, 10 heavy howitzers, twenty-four 75-millimeter field pieces, 4 tanks, 25 armored cars and huge quantities of military supplies have been brought to Tangku by the Japanese. Nearly all of the troops came by train but a few troops and quantities of supplies were brought by ship. These troops and supplies are being transferred to Tientsin and Peiping but it [is] not possible to check on them here at the present time. No activity on the part of Japanese airplanes here today as Tientsin airfields are too wet for bombers to take off and low heavy clouds make airplane reconnaissance work impossible. Caldwell The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9102: Telegram [Document 358] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 5, 1937—6 p.m. 129. Your 346, July 31, 11 a.m., and Department’s 123, July 31, 3 p.m. 52 So far as the Department’s records indicate, the Japanese Ambassador here has made no express reference to south China. His statements in regard to Japanese intentions in north China have been confined to protestations of a general character such as, for instance, that Japan did not desire war and could be expected to come out of China in due course; that it was the purpose of the Japanese to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities, et cetera. In a written statement, apparently from his Foreign Office, which the Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State on July 12, 53 there appears this: “In the circumstances, the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations, including the dispatch of additional military forces to north China”; and, in a concluding paragraph, “In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the powers in China.” In a conversation on July 16 with an officer of the Department, the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy here gave the impression, by the vagueness of his remarks in reply to questions in regard to Japanese objectives, that Japan wished to establish Japanese influence (in north China) more completely. Hull 52 Latter not printed. 53 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 318 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9192: Telegram [Document 359] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 5, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 5—11:10 a.m.] 427. There is a heavy exodus of Chinese from Chapei and Hongkew area to the Settlement and Concession area south of Soochow Creek. Heavy Chinese passenger traffic is congesting the Shanghai–Nanking railroad. Many Chinese are moving to the interior while others are coming to Shanghai. Chinese have worked themselves into a high state of excitement over the probability of war and of Japanese attacks on Nanking and Shanghai. 2. There is much uneasiness [amongst] Chinese bankers who fear that at any time the Japanese may attempt to seize the Central Bank and foreign Chinese banks in the Settlement. They seem to feel that Municipal Council and foreign authorities would not oppose such Japanese action and suggestions have been heard, perhaps intended to disturb foreign interests, that the Chinese might send military forces into the Settlement to quiet China’s financial structure. 3. I understand the British Legation [ Embassy ] are giving thought to possibility of persuading Chinese Government to declare it has no intention of sending troops to Shanghai area and of persuading Tokyo to a similar declaration hoping thus to ease the situation here. It might be worth while to attempt to obtain such declarations. Repeated to the Department, Nanking, Tokyo, Peiping. Gauss Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9231 [Document 360] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 6, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador called this morning at his own request at 11:30. The Ambassador stated that there is developing in China an extensive battle front and that a major battle may begin soon. The Secretary asked certain questions with regard to place and to command. The Ambassador indicated a battle front sweeping in a curve from Nankow Pass southwestward of Peiping and eastward, south of Tientsin, to the sea. He said that the line would be an average distance from Peiping of about 25 miles and south of Tientsin of about 40 miles. The Ambassador then said that what he wanted to speak about was the Nine Power Treaty. He said that, as he had stated to the Secretary on the occasion of his last call, he was informed that the British Foreign Minister had spoken to the American Ambassador in London on that subject, and that he now was informed that the French Government was interested in the subject; it seemed that the British and the French Governments wanted to cooperate or collaborate with the American Government in regard to the Nine Powder Treaty. The Secretary spoke to the effect that, as he had stated to the Ambassador in the previous conversation to which the Ambassador referred, he did not wish to undertake to speak for the British Government or about its position. He said that we had published a statement 54 of our position and had urged upon other governments that they take a position with regard to the subjects about which he had spoken. We were keeping on the alert with regard to every phase of the situation. We were being guided by developments. There was no new development regarding the Nine Power Treaty and nothing new that he could say in regard to it. The Secretary asked Mr. Hornbeck whether that was not a complete account of the situation. Mr. Hornbeck replied that it was absolutely such, and that there was nothing new on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty. The Secretary then said again that he could not speak for the British Government. The Ambassador spoke to the effect that what he really wished to know was what was our attitude on the subject of invoking or appealing to the Nine Power Treaty. The Secretary, in reply, said that we could not speak, in advance of developments, of what we would do if and as events occurred. (He made it clear that he was not going to make any commitment on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty.) He asked whether he had not made his position clear. The Ambassador replied to the effect that it had not become clear to him. He said that the British Foreign Minister had told the Chinese Ambassador in London that he, the Foreign Minister, had talked with the American Ambassador there on the subject of collaboration under the Nine Power Treaty. The Secretary spoke again of our endeavor to be guided by developments as they take place without making definite commitments on the subject of future action. He said that he thought the Ambassador could make forecasts for himself. The Ambassador said that he thought he understood. The Secretary then asked whether Mr. Hornbeck had any suggestions or would wish to make any comment, Mr. Hornbeck said that, in the light of what had preceded, he wondered whether there was any reason why it would not be appropriate for the Chinese Ambassador in London to ask the British Minister for Foreign Affairs just what the British had said to us on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty. The Ambassador then asked whether there was any news that we could give him. He mentioned the subject of exchange of information. He expressed the hope that our nationals were being “taken care of.” The Secretary spoke to the effect that we had no special information over and above the information which appears in the press. He said we had no reporters located in inside circles with the interested governments. He asked whether Mr. Hornbeck had anything to mention, and Mr. Hornbeck replied that the press accounts, when reduced to a least common denominator, seemed to give about the same picture of the situation as that produced by synthesizing the reports which come in from official sources. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 54 July 16, vol. i , p. 699 . The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9203: Telegram [Document 361] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , August 6, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 6—9:03 a.m.] Japanese Acting Consul General informed me this morning that Japanese military precautions in Japanese Concession were increased last night on account of “bad news from Nanking”; that he has told Japanese women and children to leave and that about 400 of them will leave Hankow today and tomorrow for Shanghai. In interview published this morning in local British paper Acting Japanese Consul General is reported to have said inter alia that in the event of Nanking declaring war on Japan, he would do his utmost to endeavor to arrange for a truce to allow for the complete peaceful evacuation of the Japanese Concession here and would also do what he could to arrange to keep hostilities from this area if at all possible. He confirmed to me that the interview as published is substantially correct. United States Navy states that Japanese gunboat and all Japanese including Consul left Changsha yesterday morning and arrived Hankow today. Japanese Consul and nationals left Kiukiang for down river. Sent to Nanking and Peiping. Josselyn The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9215: Telegram [Document 362] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 6, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 6—2:15 p.m.] 377. Embassy’s 371, August 4, 4 p.m. 1. Exodus of Chinese from Nanking continues. While some are proceeding to Hankow and interior places, the majority appear to be going to Shanghai and it is a curious circumstance that a number of Chinese evacuating Shanghai are coming to Nanking for safety. According to official sources, the general plan of the Government is to reduce Nanking’s population of more than one million to about 200,000 able bodied men. The nervousness of the population has been increased by air defense instructions posted by the War Office which give warning that “enemy planes may come at any moment and drop bombs” and many Chinese women and children living in the Hsiakwan section near the river are moving to the south city because of fear of bombardment by gunboats. These developments will undoubtedly intensify and spread the nervousness already apparent and may result in exaggerated press reports. 2. The British American Tobacco Company has ordered wives and children of its foreign employees to leave Nanking and Kiukiang. 3. Sent to the Department and Peiping. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9234: Telegram [Document 363] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 6, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 7—9:30 a.m.] 398. Nanking’s August 5, 10 a.m. I am unable to discover any outward signs in the Peiping area indicating any special preparation now in progress on the part of the Japanese for an immediate drive southward unless the additional forces and equipment described in Tientsin’s 19, August 5, 6 p.m., can be said to be such an indication. The general military situation is [ in ] this area has shown no substantial change in the past 3 days, with the possible exception that there are now some signs that the Japanese Army may take means by which to drive out the Central Government troops now near Nankow. It is realized, however, that a change could take place in a few hours in connection with some new “incident.” The Chinese population at Peiping has remained amazingly calm thus far under circumstances which a few years ago would have thrown them into a panic. The Embassy here, in reply to inquiries from missionaries at nearby summer resorts who desire to return to their posts in the interior, has advised them to postpone their return. Japanese diplomatic and military officers during the past few days have been unusually restrained in giving information to newspapermen and others, and there is reason to believe that they themselves do not know what form the next developments will take. Their guarded statements usually do not go beyond the assertion that a continued movement towards, and concentration in, the north of Central Government troops will lead to the expansion of military operations. If this should take place and the Japanese should by some circumstance not now forseeable suffer a severe defeat, leading to military and political chaos, protection of Americans by our own forces [would be?] difficult, the question of the evacuation of American citizens from North China might then arise. But the present signs do not point in that direction. Repeated to the Department, Hankow and Canton. Lockhart The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9204: Telegram [Document 364] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 6, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 6—9:45 a.m.] 247. 1. Last night the Press Bureau of the Foreign Office informally issued a statement concerning the reports that a considerable number of Americans are planning to offer their services as aviators to the Chinese Army. 56 The statement could be read as implying that the American Government is responsible for not deterring these aviators and that this may reflect on good relations between the United States and Japan. The statement also invoked our Neutrality Act. 2. I therefore called this morning on Minister for Foreign Affairs telling him that I had come on my own initiative and not under instructions and that I was making no formal representations but that since he himself had recently spoken to me of the present sensitiveness of the Japanese press and the importance of avoiding undesirable comment and speculation, I desired to bring this statement to his attention. The statement had not been published in this morning’s Japanese newspapers but I said I hoped it would not appear in the afternoon press. I told the Minister that as he must well know the American Government will do everything in its legal power to discourage or deter Americans from fighting in foreign armies. I also pointed out that the Neutrality Act is a domestic matter and that its interpretation by foreigners is difficult. 3. The Minister seemed much upset and immediately telephoned to the Chief of the Press Bureau who informed him that the statement had thus far been given only to one correspondent, Byas of the New York Times . Hirota promised me that it would not be permitted to appear in the Japanese press and he thanked me for bringing the matter to his attention. 4. I believe that my step was justified because of its possibly restraining influence on future Foreign Office press comment concerning the United States. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 56 For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv , pp. 520 – 527 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9200: Telegram [Document 365] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 6, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 6—10 a.m.] 248. 1. In the course of an informal conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office today he said to me “As I told you some time ago Japan does not want war with China. If Chinese central troops which have come to Hopei Province will withdraw there will be no more fighting”. 2. I took this occasion to say to the Minister as on my own initiative and responsibility that if he ever saw ways by which I could be of help in the situation I hoped he would not fail to let me know. 3. This informal observation while involving no official commitment of any nature nevertheless indicates to the Minister that if our good offices should ever be desired a channel is open through which he could without embarrassment informally explore the ground. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9220: Telegram [Document 366] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , August 6, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 8:10 p.m.] 1127. H. H. Kung, who reached Paris yesterday, and Wellington Koo lunched with me today. Kung read me a telegram which he asserted he had just received from Chiang Kai-shek. The telegram stated that the Japanese Government desired to send a high ranking official to Nanking to confer with General Chiang about a settlement of the present Sino-Japanese conflict. I asked Kung what terms he believed the Japanese would propose. He and Koo agreed that the Japanese terms probably would consist of a demand for an independent government in the Tientsin-Peiping area, control of the Tientsin-Peiping-Kalgan Railroad by Japanese troops, establishment of a strategic line approximately 50 miles to the south of this railroad, and a promise that troops of the Nanking Government would not approach this line. (The Department will note that this prediction is on all fours with the prediction of the Japanese Ambassador reported in my 1116–1119, August 5, noon.) 57 I asked Kung if he believed that Chiang Kai-shek would accept these terms or would prefer to fight. Kung said that General Chiang personally wished to fight but that there was much opposition to fighting in the most influential circles in Nanking. Kung added “I am afraid he will fight.” I gathered the impression from both Kung and Koo that the Chinese are in a less belligerent mood than they have been in the past week. Kung asked me to transmit the following five presaging messages from him to the President. 1. He considered it of the utmost importance that the $50,000,000 loan 58 with regard to which he had talked with the President, Jesse Jones 59 and Pierson 60 should go through. If the Japanese should become convinced that their invasion had succeeded in scaring off all the friends of China, they would be greatly encouraged to make their demands impossible. 2. He had talked with Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, who had assured him that if the United States, England, and France would make a joint protest against Japan’s action and would offer mediation and if Japan should reject the offer, the Soviet Union would go to war on the side of China. (My own opinion is that Maisky may have said this to Kung but that there is no truth in his statement). 3. Kung said that Eden had assured him that if the United States would act in the Far East, Great Britain would cooperate to the fullest extent. 4. Kung suggested that it might be possible without arousing any attention to see to it that American banks should call all their short term loans to Japanese companies’ banks, and, 5. Kung suggested that it might be possible to start a campaign in America against the wearing of silk stockings. Kung expressed the opinion that the carrying out of the suggestions in paragraphs numbered 4 and 5 would be sufficient to throw Japan into the gravest economic and financial difficulties. Kung will leave Paris on Sunday and sail for China on a German boat from Italy. He expects to reach China in about a month. Bullitt 57 See telegram sections 1118–1119, August 5, 11 a.m., p. 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] . 58 See vol. iv , pp. 568 ff. 59 Chairman, Board of Directors, Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 60 Warren Lee Pierson, President, Export-Import Bank of Washington. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9217: Telegram [Document 367] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , August 6, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 6—3:50 p.m.] 531. Your 334, August 5, noon, was conveyed orally to the Foreign Office this afternoon. With reference to your feeling that Vansittart’s statement reported in my 521 August 3, 7 p.m., did not seem to answer part 2 of the British proposals of July 20, the Foreign Office official said that the proposals of August 3 superseded those of July 20, owing to the development of events and the declared Japanese objections to mediation and intervention. It was regretted that this had not been made clear during the conversation of August 3. The British Ambassador in China has pointed out to the Foreign Office that although there were communications between the Chinese and Japanese Governments between July 17 and July 20 they dealt with the immediate situation only and that no attempt has been made by the two governments to deal with fundamentals; the absurdity was pointed out of war without negotiations first between the two parties. The British Ambassador in China has further pointed out that the Chinese have repeatedly declared their intention of fighting to a finish and that military preparations indicate they will do so if necessary. At the same time he says the Chinese are still anxious to keep an opening for negotiations and the Ambassador asks the Foreign Office if negotiations could not be suggested to both sides. The Foreign Office feels therefore that the suggestion for direct negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese, with the Chinese apparently entirely willing to enter such negotiations, might well be suggested by our two Governments. The proposals of August 3 have been telegraphed to the British Embassies in Nanking and Tokyo with request for their opinion. The Foreign Office agrees with the Department’s belief that no possibility of a move which might serve toward maintaining peace should be omitted. They will inform us at once the replies from Nanking and Tokyo have been received. Bingham The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9218: Telegram [Document 368] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 6, 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 6—3:26 p.m.] 250. Department’s 138, August 5, noon. 1. We feel as previously reported that there exists no discernible enthusiasm among the Japanese Government or people for war with China. Obviously the military machine must be omitted from this characterization. We believe that the prevailing feeling among the Japanese Government and the people is that the present situation was brought about by Chinese manifestations of enmity towards Japan and that if China should demonstrate by action that it wishes war the Japanese people will support whatever military or other measures the Government may decide to take but that the Government and the people would still be glad to avoid a general war. The appropriations exceeding 400 million yen for military operations on the Continent together with the assurance of steadily mounting costs in case of an extensive campaign present a powerful and practical argument for peace. 2. The Japanese Government insists that the initiative for either war or peace must now come from China. (See Hirota’s statement to me today as reported in my 248, August 6, 5 p.m.) On the other hand while deferring to any contrary opinion on the part of Johnson it now seems to us highly unlikely that the Chinese will take any initiative toward peace now that Chinese civil and military authority in the Peiping area has been virtually eliminated. If the Chinese Central forces continue to concentrate and to move forward into Hopei a general clash appears to be inevitable. 3. In view of the extreme importance of our leaving no stone unturned to avoid war I cannot conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices on the practical basis proposed by the British Government making it abundantly clear that the proposal is in no sense intervention. We feel that the chances of acceptance in Tokyo are small but not necessarily hopeless. Much would depend on the method and manner of approach. Publicity should be most carefully avoided. If the two Governments should decide to proceed I would recommend that the British Chargé d’Affaires and I separately should ask to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence instead of at the Foreign Office and should present the proposals in the utmost confidence thereupon inquiring whether from the Japanese point of view the Minister thought that any useful purpose would be served by our Governments proceeding with the suggested plans. A similar approach in a similar manner might be made simultaneously in Nanking if it were felt undesirable to sound out one of the powers before the other. 4. As regards the probable reception in Tokyo, I think that an exploratory and confidential approach such as I have outlined would offer the best prospects of forestalling open resentment. No resentment whatever was shown today when I asked Hirota on my own initiative and responsibility to let me know if I could ever be of help (see my 248, August 6, 5 p.m.). The proposed offer by the American and British representatives could profitably be phrased in a way which would indicate that these channels were open to the two adversaries either now or later if needed. 5. I wish to emphasize that in my careful opinion an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the British proposal would be more likely to bring favorable results and certainly more likely to avoid any possible resentment than the communication of a formal proposal delivered as a “diplomatic démarche ”. It is highly important that publicity be avoided. 6. With full awareness of my previously expressed view that we have left nothing undone which could favorably affect developments, I should like to feel that history will regard the record of American action in this most critical and pregnant period in Far Eastern affairs as exhaustive, unstintedly helpful and impartially correct. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9205: Telegram [Document 369] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 6, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 6—10:25 a.m.] 251. My 250, August 6, 9 p.m. The British Chargé d’Affaires has not yet received from London a request for his opinion and comment concerning the proposal of his Government to extend good offices in the Sino-Japanese conflict. In view of the Department’s 138, August 5, noon, however, he will probably cable his opinion to London tomorrow. He states that he fully agrees with my views as to the best method of approach but believes that an early clash between the opposing forces is unlikely and that any proposal of good offices had better be made somewhat later after the adjournment of the Diet. He will inform me tomorrow of the nature of his recommendations to his Government which I shall then cable to the Department together with my comment thereon. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 894.032/171 [Document 370] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2525 Tokyo , August 6, 1937. [Received August 23.] Sir : On July 23, 1937, the seventy-first session of the Japanese Diet convened. This is a session required by the 45th article of the Japanese constitution, which states that when the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, members shall be caused by imperial order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution. The previous House was dissolved at the close of March by the Hayashi Cabinet, and the present seventy-first session is the first convocation of the membership chosen by the general election of April. Organizing activities occupied the first days. On July 25 the Emperor formally opened the session. The Cabinet had announced that the session would be for two weeks, which expires on August 8. The seventy-first session thus far has uncovered no surprises, and no surprises are expected in the remaining days. The state of affairs in China has dominated the discussions, which have confirmed the view that there exists no body of opinion opposed to the prevailing belief that, failing a modification of Chinese attitude, resort to force by Japan is justified. Addresses of Government leaders, and the reaction to such addresses, have served as an important index to Japanese policy. Secondly, the session has given favorable consideration to a number of large appropriations, dominantly for the China incident. Thirdly, a number of Government bills have been submitted, though not yet acted upon. I. Addresses by Government leaders . On July 27 Premier Konoe delivered his opening address to the seventy-first session of the Diet and asked for support in the national emergency; stated that the Government is prepared to carry out reforms where reforms are needed, accomplishing them one by one; and explained that bills ready for presentation to this Diet, following so closely on formation of his Cabinet, must of necessity be few. He expressed regret for the north China incident, said that the Japanese Government has been compelled to make an important decision with regard to it, asserted that Japan’s object is the preservation of peace in eastern Asia, spoke on behalf of national defense measures, a comprehensive national economic plan, and the conception of Japan and Manchuria as a single unit, deferred the question of administrative, parliamentary and educational reform, and announced that a bill is being submitted to provide for a separate department of health and social affairs. He said that the present crisis will lead to greater heights of power and prosperity. Text of the address is given in translation in enclosure. 61 In replying to an interpellation in the House of Peers on July 28 the Premier defined social justice as a state under which all persons can earn a living, and defined international justice as a state of fair distribution of territory and natural resources. Foreign Minister Hirota also delivered an address to the Diet on July 27. The translation supplied by the Foreign Office is embodied in enclosure 2. 62 In referring to relations with China Mr. Hirota spoke of the necessity of harmony between Japan, “Manchukuo”, China, and the Soviet Union; in connection with anti-Japanese sentiment in China mentioned past recalcitrance of the Nanking Government in negotiations with regard to it; alluded to Japan’s policy of stopping the communist invasion of the Orient; repeated that Japan desires to settle the north China incident by local settlement and without aggravation; pleaded for Chinese reconsideration and faithful execution of the settlement of July 11; asserted that China has it in her hands either to settle the issue or to make it more serious; and declared that Japan is prepared to use all available means which may be called for in the defense of Japanese nationals. With regard to the Soviet Union the Foreign Minister again favored a commission to determine the Manchurian frontier and a commission on border incidents, and in reference to fishery rights made the declaration that it is Japanese policy never to tolerate anything in substance destroying enterprises sanctioned by treaty. In reference to Great Britain he spoke highly of the Chichibu 63 visit to London and of an agreement of view between the two Governments concerning the advisability of frank conversations to adjust relations (Mr. Hirota ignored reports of British breaking off of such conversations). His remarks about relations with the United States were in translation as follows: “Japanese-American relations have been of late really good, being marked by ever-growing amity and good will. I am glad to say that the economic mission which visited the United States some weeks ago has by its candid exchange of views with various circles accomplished much toward establishing closer contact between our two nations economically and otherwise.” The Foreign Minister concluded his address with a discussion of the necessity of expansion of Japan’s export trade. He pledged the Government to furtherance of such commercial interests and to endeavors to insure freedom of trade and free access to natural resources. He also said: “It is gratifying to note the growth of certain tendencies favorable to restoration of the freedom of trade. I desire to take this opportunity to declare the readiness of the Japanese Government to participate heartily in any international undertaking to convert these tendencies into reality.” The following day, July 28, in response to an interpellation in the House of Representatives, Foreign Minister Hirota made a further statement on the subject of the conversations with Great Britain, as follows: (Embassy’s translation): “Our Foreign policy, as I stated in my address yesterday, has as its background the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East; and to effect such maintenance close association between Japan, Manchukuo and China is necessary. It is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that the present situation has developed. The fact is that before the situation arose conversations between Japan and Great Britain with regard to Far Eastern questions had made substantial progress. However, even though methods were devised for the rendering of assistance to China by Japan and Great Britain, such methods would be entirely inapplicable in the existing circumstances, and due to the deplorable situation which has arisen the conversations have terminated for the time being.” To another interpellation in the House of Representatives on July 28 Mr. Hirota said (Embassy’s translation): “Replying to a request by Dr. Akamatsu for expression of view with regard to the future development of the situation in North China, I may say that the policy of the Government thus far has been to seek settlement locally and to prevent aggravation of the situation. We have had in the past various agreements with Sung Che Yuan and with other Chinese authorities, and if these agreements had been carefully observed peace and order in North China could have been maintained; but unfortunately the Chinese did not carry out their obligations. And the latest reports indicate that disorder has broken out in North China, and anxiety is felt not only for Japanese nationals but for nationals of Western countries as well. In the present state of mind of the people of China, improvement in relations between Japan and China is a matter of extreme difficulty. With reference to the state of feeling in China, it may be stated that of course there has been animosity toward Japan, and from that there is developing a feeling of contempt toward this country. We feel that some method must be devised to urge reconsideration of such an attitude”. Finance Minister Kaya also addressed the Diet on July 27. He proposed a revaluation of specie reserves of the Bank of Japan, stating nevertheless that the Government has no intention of changing the present foreign exchange value of the yen, one shilling and two pence (Embassy’s telegram No. 215, July 21, 4 p.m. 64 ). He reported that, for the Japanese Empire including colonies, exports during the first 6 months of 1937 were ¥1,602,000,000 and imports ¥2,243,000,000, an adverse excess of ¥641,000,000 which is double the adverse excess of the same period of 1936. He went on to refer to gold shipments and stated that for the future the Government desires to limit the amount of annual gold shipped within the limits of the annual domestic production of gold. He mentioned the striking rise of commodity prices since December 1936 and said that the matter is being referred to the price control commission. He enumerated certain appropriations necessary for the north China incident (which are referred to hereunder). [Here follow sections on appropriations and bills.] Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 61 For extract of address, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 336 . 62 Not printed. 63 Younger brother of the Japanese Emperor. 64 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 741.94/131 [Document 371] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2532 Tokyo , August 6, 1937. [Received August 23.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 2482 of June 24, 1937, 64 relating to the preliminary Anglo-Japanese conversations which had taken place in London between the Japanese Ambassador there and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and also with Mr. Eden. It will be recalled that although these conversations were largely of an exploratory and preparatory nature, they had nevertheless reached the point where it is evident that formal negotiations were about to begin. While the results might have fallen far short of the expectations on the part of certain enthusiastic instigators and supporters of the plan, it may be supposed that the conversations would not have been permitted to develop unless there were prospects of the net result being favorable to Anglo-Japanese relations. However, with the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities conditions have rapidly changed in Anglo-Japanese relations. Whether or not we were correct in our reasoning in the despatch under reference that one of the main reasons which impelled the Japanese to seek a rapprochement with Great Britain was a further effort to seek to emerge from her isolated position in the family of nations, it is becoming increasingly evident that this North China affair has already greatly damaged Japan’s chances for gaining additional friends among the major powers and it is practically a certainty that should the present situation become more serious or should be greatly protracted, Japan’s position will rapidly revert to the same state of isolation in which she found herself from 1932 to 1936. Even the anti-Comintern agreement with Germany appears to be failing in the present instance to evoke for Japan any great measure of open sympathy on the part of Germany, at least so long as the struggle with China does not involve the Soviet Union. Within a week of the first incident in the present Sino-Japanese difficulties, Mr. Eden informed the Japanese Ambassador at London that the expected negotiations with Japan could not be hoped for if further Japanese troops were sent into China and the British Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo recommended to his government that “in certain eventualities” he be authorized to make a similar statement in his conversations with the Foreign Office in Tokyo. The obvious implication was, of course, that the British Government wished to use the proposed negotiations as a lever to force Japan to employ moderation in dealing with the Chinese situation. This belief on the part of the British that a threat to break off the Anglo-Japanese conversations would be really effective in preventing Japanese action in North China is clearly indicative of the naїveté, if not fatuity, of the British attitude toward Japanese policy on the mainland as well as a lack of comprehension of the motives behind the Japanese desire for the negotiations in London. Among the chief benefits to Japan from the successful conclusion of the negotiations would have been the removal in some part of the friction which has recently marred the interests between the two countries due to the conflict between their respective interests in China; but the advantages to be gained by such a step are not to be compared, in Japanese eyes, to the conversion of North China into an area completely dominated by Japan and in which her commercial advantages will become even greater with a corresponding detriment to the interests of Great Britain and others. If we are correct in our analysis of the arrangement with Great Britain which was contemplated by the Japanese Government, namely, that Japan would refrain from molesting British commercial and economic interests in China, in return for which Great Britain would undertake not to discriminate against Japanese commerce with British areas (see pages 5 and 6 of the despatch under reference) we must see that the uncertainty of any assurances which Japan could give for non-molestation of British interests in China has become much greater in view of the present situation. The record in “Manchukuo”, where as implacably as the flow of the incoming tide, the Japanese are driving out the established interests of other nations, speaks for itself. While Japan may not be seeking to set up in North China a second “Manchukuo” * , the form which their domination of the North China area takes is of no consequence. It is perfectly obvious that the Japanese are now determined that this area is henceforth to be under their exclusive control under one guise or another, whether it be out and out separation, semi-autonomy or by any other device by which the Nanking Government is forced to relinquish all effective control. If, then, the prospects of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations reaching a successful conclusion were somewhat uncertain prior to the North China incident, it appears probable that these prospects will become even more uncertain in proportion to the seriousness with which affairs with China develop. It must be increasingly clear to the British that while the Japanese may sincerely desire a rapprochement with Great Britain they are not in a position to offer the British any proposition sufficiently attractive to compensate the latter for the sacrifices which they would be called upon to make. It may be of interest to report a remark made by a highly placed official of the British Embassy to a member of my staff. This official stated that he felt the best thing for us all (meaning the United States and Great Britain) would be for Japan in the present instance to become involved in a long and difficult military campaign in China which would become such a drain upon the resources of Japan that she would suffer a financial collapse and thus be removed from the field as an economic and a naval threat for years to come. While, of course, such remarks are irresponsible in themselves, they do indicate the trend of feeling in some British quarters toward Japan. During the frequent contacts which I have had during the past month with the British Chargé d’Affaires I have been surprised, not by the firm determination of the British Government to resist within practicable limits any extension of Japanese influence in China, but by their indifference to (and at times ignorance of) the elements of Japanese policy. The Japanese for their part have shown little confidence in the disinterestedness of the efforts of the British Government toward resolving the present difficulty between China and Japan. There has, in short, developed on the part of both Great Britain and Japan an attitude of irritation, suspicion, and resentment which seems to have effectively removed for some years to come any possibility of there being concluded between the two countries a political agreement such as that contemplated a few weeks ago. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 64 Not printed. * Embassy’s despatch No. 2506 of July 23, 1937. [Footnote in the original; for despatch see p. 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] .] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9227: Telegram [Document 372] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , August 7, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 7—1 a.m.] On inquiry this morning I have been informed by the Mayor of Hankow that yesterday Acting Japanese Consul General called on him and stated that he had received orders from Tokyo to withdraw all of his nationals from Hankow including Navy and naval forces ashore. Three naval vessels escorting Japanese merchant vessels will leave today and the remaining two tomorrow. Acting Consul General and staff will remain for the time being. Mayor and Acting Japanese Consul General are meeting this morning to arrange details. Sent to Nanking, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai. Tokyo informed by telegraph. Josselyn The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9225: Telegram [Document 373] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , August 7, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 7—8:50 a.m.] American and British Admirals in company with British Consul General and myself interviewed the Mayor of Tsingtao yesterday on the present situation in this city. The Mayor reiterated that if the Japanese landed in Tsingtao he could not give up the city without such resistance as he could make. To me personally, notwithstanding Mayor’s reassertion that he would resist a landing of Japanese forces, his attitude appeared to be less obdurate than that reflected in his interview with the British Consul General as reported in my telegram of August 3, 9 a.m. 66 Sokobin 66 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9237: Telegram [Document 374] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 7, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 7—9:05 a.m.] 380. Embassy’s 374, August 5, 1 p.m. 1. It is reliably reported but not confirmed that conversations as to possibility of peace have been secretly proceeding in Shanghai between General Kita, Japanese Military Attaché, and Hsiung Shi Hui, Kiangsi Chairman. The story is that Konoye sent Saionji’s 67 grandson to China about 2 weeks ago to approach T. V. Soong in the matter; Soong came to Nanking to talk with the Generalissimo and Hsiung was delegated to talk with Kita. According to this report, the Japanese terms as suggested by Kita are not too onerous and chiefly concern so-called economic collaboration in the north (mining rights, the Tientsin-Shihkiachuang railway, et cetera) without any emphasis on the political implications in the Japanese economic program and not requiring recognition of Manchukuo. Whether or not an ostensibly economic settlement would be sufficiently face saving for the Chinese Government’s continuance in authority is a matter for conjecture. That mandatory aims are definitely much wider in scope seems indicated by Mei’s despatch dated Tokyo August 5 reporting a [repetition?] by Hirota of the point concerning communism in his 3-point program and Hirota’s saying to the Diet that “the major point of our proposals to China consists of cooperation in joint defense against Communism” and that “side by side with military operations in North the Japanese Government is conducting negotiations with Nanking to secure the latter’s reconsideration of its stand.” 2. According to observers who are interested in furthering the intellectual’s scheme for peace described in Embassy’s telegram under reference, the conferences being held here between Chiang Kai-shek and regional leaders are not so much for discussion of defense measures as for the purpose of giving Chiang opportunity to win over the leaders such as Pai Chung Hsi to the peace plan. One Government official denies this. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code texts to Peiping, Shanghai. Johnson 67 Prince Kimmochi Saionji, surviving “Elder Statesman” (Genro) of Japan. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/9217: Telegram [Document 375] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , August 7, 1937—1 p.m. 338. Your 531, August 6, 8 p.m. 1. Ambassador Grew has now informed the Department of the substance of the telegram which the British Chargé at Tokyo has sent to the British Foreign Office stating that the Chargé believes that another offer along the lines proposed by London would do no harm and that there is some basis for hope that the making of such a proposal would have a useful effect. Ambassador Grew has also telegraphed the Department that he “cannot conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices on the practical basis proposed by the British Government making it abundantly clear that the proposal is in no sense intervention. We feel that the chances of acceptance in Tokyo are small but not necessarily hopeless. Much would depend on the method and manner of approach. Publicity should be most carefully avoided.” Ambassador Grew emphasizes that in his opinion an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the British proposal would be more likely to bring favorable results and certainly more likely to avoid any possible resentment than the communication of a formal proposal delivered as a diplomatic démarche. 2. The Department is telegraphing Ambassador Grew 68 authorizing him, when his British colleague is authorized and prepared to take action along similar lines, to make at a reasonably early date an approach to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines indicated. The Department concurs in Ambassador Grew’s view that the approach by the American and British diplomatic representatives should be made separately and not jointly and in an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory way. The Department feels also that there is greater likelihood that such approaches by our two Governments may be productive of good results and that unfortunate publicity be avoided if the approach is made in first instance to the Japanese Government alone. The Department is therefore instructing the American Ambassador at Nanking to take no action toward approaching the Chinese Government in the matter pending the receipt of further instructions. 3. Please inform the Foreign Office immediately. Hull 68 See telegram No. 140, August 7, 3 p.m., p. 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9228: Telegram [Document 376] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 7, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 7—6:45 a.m.] 252. My 251, August 6, 9 [ 10 ] p.m. The British Chargé d’Affaires is today telegraphing his Government substantially as follows: ( a ) Hirota has already made it clear in the Diet that any attempt at mediation would be rejected. Although the British Government has already tendered its good offices Dodds believes that another offer along the lines proposed by London would do no harm. If, however, any cause were given for the Japanese to believe that such new offer were made primarily in the interests of China there would be violent adverse reaction in Japan. ( b ) The massacre at Tungchow has not put the Japanese people in a mood to consider proposals of peace. ( c ) Although intelligent Japanese look with distaste upon war with China the military consider the moment opportune for further development of expansionist plans in China and have no conception of the dangers into which they are running. ( d ) Dodds believes that there is nevertheless some basis for hope that proposal would have useful effect. He is reporting to London that I substantially agree with him and am recommending action on lines of British proposal but only as an informal confidential and exploratory step. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9235: Telegram [Document 377] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 7, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 7—10 a.m.] 435. An American colleague of the Japanese Consul General informs me confidentially that the Japanese Consul General has visited the Mayor in reference to the situation around Kiangwan, immediately north of the Settlement, where the Peace Preservation Corps have been holding night maneuvers. The Japanese Consul General found the Mayor indifferent and indeed belligerent in his attitude; the reverse from which he has been in the past. Japanese Consul General has reported to Tokyo. 2. Japanese naval landing party has recently been unusually quiet and is apparently avoiding giving cause for any alarm. 3. Belief is growing amongst responsible Chinese at Shanghai that China would not respect the Foreign Settlement area in the event of a clash with the Japanese in Shanghai. 4. Frankly, I consider this possibility a real danger. I respectfully suggest the desirability of representations to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the end that they undertake not to carry on hostilities in the Shanghai area in view of the danger to safety of large foreign population here. 5. At my suggestion the American Emergency Committee is organizing, British have not yet taken similar step. Repeated to Peiping, by mail to Nanking. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9191: Telegram [Document 378] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 7, 1937—2 p.m. 132. Your 367, August 4, noon, and Shanghai’s 418, August 3, 10 p.m., and 427, August 5, 8 p.m. 1. The Department is of the opinion that the neutralization of Shanghai by international agreement such as is envisaged in Shanghai’s 418, paragraph 5, would not be feasible, and doubts whether a proposal toward that end would prove acceptable to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. However, in view of the large foreign communities and extensive foreign interests at Shanghai, particularly American, British, French and Japanese, the Department feels that an approach might be made to the Chinese and Japanese Governments suggesting that each of those Governments give assurances (1) that it has no intention of increasing its respective armed forces in the Shanghai area (say, within a radius of 10 miles of the International Settlement), and (2) that its armed forces will not use that area as a base for military operations outside or inside the area. 2. Department further feels that, in order to save time and to ensure against crossing wires, it would be expedient that diplomatic representatives in China of the powers most concerned endeavor to formulate common proposals for reference to their governments respectively. With that end in view, you are authorized to discuss this subject with your British and other interested colleagues and to take a position in advocacy of there being made to the Chinese Government and the Japanese Ambassador to China, by agencies in China of the powers concerned, an approach suggesting the procedure outlined in the second sentence of the paragraph above. Repeated to Shanghai, referring to Shanghai’s 435, August 7, 2 p.m. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9239: Telegram [Document 379] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 7, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 8—10 a.m.] 384. 1. According to estimate of the Military Attaché’s office, there are now about 130,000 Chinese troops concentrated on the Paoting-Tsangchow “front” including elements of the 29th Army at Chochow, 31,000 at Paoting, 43,000 in the Tinghsien-Shihkiachwang area, 17,000 in the Shuntefu-Hantai region, 12,000 at Tsangchow and 27,000 at Tehsien. Of these I am told 13 divisions totaling some 43,000 are Central Government troops. At Tsinan there are 8,000 soldiers, from Yangchikow to Chefoo 9,000, and Weihsien to Tsingtao 8,000. 2. General von Falkenhausen, Chief German Military Adviser, is reliably reported to be now at Paoting. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9228: Telegram [Document 380] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 7, 1937—3 p.m. 140. Your 250, August 6, 9 p.m., 251, August 6, 10 p.m., and 252, August 7, 2 p.m. You are authorized, when your British colleague is authorized and prepared to take action along similar lines, to make at a reasonably early date an approach to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines indicated. The Department concurs in your view that the approaches by you and by your British colleague should be made separately and not jointly, and in an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory way. The Department feels also that there is greater likelihood that such approaches by our two Governments may be productive of good results and that unfortunate publicity be avoided if the approach is made in first instance to the Japanese Government alone. The Department is therefore instructing the Ambassador at Nanking to take no action toward approaching the Chinese Government in the matter pending the receipt of further instructions. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9204: Telegram [Document 381] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 7, 1937—4 p.m. 141. Your 247, August 6, 4 p.m. American press has carried accounts of statement made on August 6 by Hirota to the Diet to the effect that the American Government was carefully guarding against reported attempts by Chinese to enlist American aviators. The Department feels that your prompt initiative has served effectively to dispose of reports which might have been a source of harm to relations between the United States and Japan. Your statement and Hirota’s subsequent statement accord with the facts. You may in your discretion so inform Hirota. Hull The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) 793.94/9221: Telegram [Document 382] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) Washington , August 7, 1937—4 p.m. Your August 7, 11 a.m., and previous on same subject. By way of caution, Department feels that American official agencies should be on guard against giving any impression of attempting to influence Chinese authorities in relation to questions of military operations. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9241: Telegram [Document 383] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 7, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 7—12:45 p.m.] 388. 1. Following statement in English was released for the press by the Foreign Office at 9 o’clock this evening. “Interviewed by newspapermen today, a spokesman of the Foreign Office stated that he had no definite information whether Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe was coming immediately to Nanking from Shanghai, although when the Japanese Ambassador left for Tientsin he told Chinese officers of his intention to return southward after about a month’s absence. Questioned concerning the Government’s attitude in the event of Mr. Kawagoe desiring to open negotiations with Nanking, the spokesman said that such negotiations might be entered into at any time so long as diplomatic relations continued to exist between China and Japan. He emphasized however that Sino-Japanese relations had reached such a critical stage that the issue of peace or war would have to be determined at this very next moment. ‘It is still not too late to avert a disastrous conflict by a strong determination and the greatest efforts on the part of Japan toward that end,’ the spokesman declared. ‘Failing such efforts’ he added, ‘it would be difficult to discover any ray of hope for peace’“. 2. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9242: Telegram [Document 384] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 8, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 7:50 p.m.] 389. 1. Mr. Tuan, Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called this morning and read to me a statement. The following is a reproduction made from notes taken from the original document which he could not leave as he was under instructions to read it also to British and French Ambassadors: 2. “The Chinese military authorities in formulating their general defensive plan, entertain no intention of launching an attack on the Japanese forces now stationed in Shanghai. It is our sincere wish that peace could be maintained in and around that city. While, however, the Chinese defensive forces will refrain from attacking the Japanese forces in Shanghai under the present circumstances the situation would be entirely altered if the Japanese on their side should choose to break the peace either by opening an attack, which would immediately meet with resistance, or by unjustifiably sending any more armed forces to Shanghai. In the latter event, the Chinese defensive forces for strategic reasons cannot permit the Japanese to consolidate their positions from which they might direct assaults on the Chinese Government, but will take the first opportunity to prevent them from disturbing peace and order in Shanghai. We recall with regret that in 1932 the Settlement authorities should have permitted the Japanese marines and troops to use the Settlement as a base of operations for attacks on the Chinese Army. We hope that the powers concerned, profiting by their past experience, will now take such effective steps as will prevent the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai from using any part of the Settlement as a base of operations or a place of retreat in their clash with the Chinese defensive forces. Should such a contingency unfortunately arise, the Chinese defensive force would be compelled to take such necessary measures against the Japanese combatants in the Settlement as will deprive them of their fighting strength. In such a case it would be clear that responsibility for all the consequences does not rest with China.” 3. I objected to the use of the phrase stating that the Settlement authorities permitted Japanese marines and troops to use the Settlement as a base in 1932, pointing out the Japanese forces there were the defensive forces sent for protection of Japanese in Settlement, and that Settlement authorities took all steps in their power to prevent hostilities spreading within the Settlement area. I expressed the hope that whatever happened the Chinese military forces would take every necessary step not to injure the great number of noncombatant Chinese and foreigners who live in the International Settlement at Shanghai. 4. I believe that this statement was perhaps precipitated by joint appeal made to the Japanese and Chinese at Hankow by the interested Consuls on August 3rd which was followed by a similar joint appeal by interested Ambassadors including myself yesterday evening to Japanese Embassy and Chinese Foreign Office to the end that hostilities might be avoided in the Wuhan area. 5. This statement emphasizes the need for some action to be taken by interested powers along the lines of Shanghai’s telegram of August 3, 10 p.m. or my telegram No. 367, August 4, noon. Repeated to Tokyo; by mail to Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9238: Telegram [Document 385] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 8, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 8—6 a.m.] 436. My August 7, 2 p.m. 69 Japanese Ambassador to China arrived here yesterday afternoon from North China and in brief statement to the Japanese press declared that “the Sino-Japanese situation is grave and the circumstances seem to me to be gradually pointing towards a dangerous crisis. I intend to exhaust all diplomatic steps in securing a solution.” According to press reports the Japanese Ambassador refused to amplify his statement and informed reporters he did not know whether he would proceed to Nanking. Shanghai quiet. Repeated to Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking. Gauss 69 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9243: Telegram [Document 386] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 8, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 5:23 p.m.] 390. My 389, August 8, 10 a.m. My British colleague has just called and we have discussed Chinese communication preparatory to a meeting with our French, German and Italian colleagues tomorrow at 11 a.m. We propose to discuss with them a joint communication to the Japanese Embassy using following text: “In the midst of the general uneasiness occasioned by recent events in North China, we have been feeling increasing anxiety for the safety of our nationals and the welfare of the immense foreign commercial and shipping interests in Shanghai and its vicinity. You will agree that it would be deplorable if hostilities should unfortunately occur in that region precipitating inevitably a chain of events which would gravely endanger foreign life and property. In an oral communication the Chinese authorities have already announced to the American, French and British Embassies their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region. We now address ourselves to Your Excellency in the hope that the Japanese authorities concerned may be willing to give indication of a corresponding desire on their side to avoid any action which might lead to an increase in the tension, or to armed clashes with the Chinese forces in that area”. This text as it now stands avoids any commitment on our part as to attitude of the Chinese and asks an expression from the Japanese of their desire to avoid hostilities at Shanghai. We feel, however, that this communication should be backed up by our Governments by representations at Tokyo urging the Japanese not to use Shanghai as a base of military operations against the Chinese. Oral communication made by the Chinese to us this morning must be taken as warning that the Chinese will oppose by military force any attempt of the Japanese to base military activities against the Chinese on Shanghai or the International Settlement, and if hostilities are to be avoided in Shanghai steps must be taken to obtain an assurance from the Japanese that they will not use their defensive force at Shanghai in such hostilities, or Shanghai as a base for conducting hostilities with an augmented force. Repeated to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9244: Telegram [Document 387] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 8, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 8—11:15 a.m.] 391. Hankow’s August 4, 10 a.m., to the Department, 70 paragraph 2. 1. August 61 received the letter described by Hankow dated August 3 from the German Consul General at Hankow signed as Senior Consul and addressed to me as “Dean of the Diplomatic Body”. 2. The British, German and Italian Ambassadors and I and French Ambassador, represented by a secretary, signed a collective note to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and a letter to the Japanese Ambassador and Peck delivered them August 7, 5 p.m., to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy. Signatures were in order of seniority. 3. The text of the collective note follows: 71 “August 7. We have the honor to state that our consular representatives at Hankow have reported to us that in their view grave danger threatens the lives, property and shipping of their respective nationals in Hankow because of the tense feeling between the Chinese authorities and the Japanese officials at that port. The reports state that military preparations have been made by Chinese and Japanese forces and while both sides declare that these preparations are only for defense, such dispositions makes the outbreak of hostilities possible at any moment. If fighting should begin, it is obvious that the danger to life and property would not be confined to the two nations immediately concerned but would confront [ threaten ] all foreign nationals at this important center of trade. The reports continue that no assurance can be given by the Chinese authorities or Japanese officials at Hankow that the hostilities which are feared will not occur. [Our consular representatives feel that it is their duty, therefore, to request that the matter be brought to the attention of the National Government.] Because of the gravity of the crisis [ danger ] and loss which would immediately [confront] the Wuhan cities and foreign life [and property] there if hostilities should occur in that area, we hasten to bring this report to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for transmission to the Departments of the National Government most concerned, with a request that measures be taken to avert hostilities in the Wuhan area, if that is possible, and that, in any event, sufficient warning of a crisis be given to the consular representatives to allow for the taking of such measures for the safety of foreign nationals as may be practicable. A similar communication is being addressed to His Excellency, the Japanese Ambassador. We avail, et cetera”. 4. The text of the informal letter to the Japanese Ambassador was the same as that of the note mutatis mutandis. Johnson 70 Vol. iv , p. 245 . 71 Corrected on basis of copy transmitted by the Ambassador in China in despatch No. 560, August 10; received October 11. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9246: Telegram [Document 388] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 8, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 8—10:55 a.m.] 402. Embassy’s 399, August 7, 5 p.m. 72 1. About 2,000 Japanese troops, with guns, tanks, and trucks, entered Peiping at noon today by three gates. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy states that this is the Kawabe Brigade, that, according to his information, most of the force will leave the City after taking a short rest, and that meanwhile they will occupy seventeenth [ various? ] barracks in the City, including those at the Temple of Heaven and near Peihai. 73 The Japanese Embassy Guard has informed the American Commandant that Japanese soldiers will guard Chienmen Gate. The entry of the Brigade created no disorder. 2. Prior to their entry, hand bills were distributed from motor cars which read in translation: “Notice to the people of the Municipality. Our beloved friends: Our Headquarters is entering the City at the present time, having come to assist in the maintenance of order and to take responsibility for protection of the peace of the people within and without the city. It is hoped that all will understand this purpose and will live as usual at peace and enjoy their enterprises. They should not listen to stupid words. Then all will be all right. Should there appear illegal persons or organizations who wilfully create rumors to stir up society or should they unreasonably create disorder or obstruct activities and principles of our Army in the maintenance of peace, this Headquarters fixes by order that they shall be taken and dealt with severely. Definitely there will be no leniency. Our beloved friends, please be at peace. (Signed) The Headquarters of the Japanese Army entering the City of Peiping on August 8th”. 3. After the entry of the troops, other hand bills were distributed in which it is said inter alia that the Japanese troops will preserve peace and order in Peiping; that they will have no ill will toward those who understand the righteousness of the Japanese Army; that “we are concerned only with military matters and there is a separate Japanese military organization, which is the Peiping special service organ, which will be responsible for political affairs”; that their enemies are Chinese soldiers who ignore righteousness; that they shall be wiped out; and that it is expected the people of Peiping will “wait for the victory [in] this holy warfare”. 4. Under instructions from the Japanese the local wireless and land telegraph offices of the Chinese Telegraph Administration were closed yesterday for an unstipulated period. Essential parts of the mechanical equipment were taken by the Japanese gendarmes from the wireless station. The telephone service in town is normal but long distance service is disrupted. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Lockhart 72 Not printed. 73 North Lake. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9264: Telegram [Document 389] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 9, 1937—noon. [Received 4:15 p.m.] 393. Embassy’s 388, August 7, 10 p.m. 1. An officer of this Mission has been informed by a secretary of the Japanese Embassy that Kawagoe has not yet decided when or whether he will come to Nanking. He indicated that the Japanese Ambassador has in mind a formula for settlement but realized that if he put forth this formula at this time it would be rejected; later on when the situation should have changed, the formula might have some chance of success. 2. He indicated that by change in the situation he meant further hostilities in Hopei which he considered likely because of continuing concentration of Chinese troops there. (See Embassy’s 384, August 7, 3 p.m.) He said there were now 6 Chinese divisions numbering from 60 to 70 thousand men along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway from Tsangchow south and 15 divisions numbering over 150,000 men on the Peiping-Hankow Railway. With reference to Peiping’s 402, August 8, 6 p.m., he said that the Kawabe Brigade took garrison duties in Peiping because it needed a rest after almost one month of fighting. 3. In regard to present conferences in Nanking between the Generalissimo and regional leaders, he said his Embassy’s information was that Chiang was laying his cards on the table before these leaders and discussing with them the pros and cons of war, his purpose being to divide the responsibility for decision with them. 4. He said the Japanese evacuation of the Yangtze valley, particularly Hankow, was a most extraordinary step to undertake purely with a view to avoidance of hostilities in this region. There was no question of Japan’s surrendering or retroceding the Hankow Concession; administration of the Concession was being handed over to Chinese authorities merely as a temporary measure because no Japanese would be left to administer it. Japanese evacuation now proceeding includes Chengchow, Honan, and closing the Japanese Consulate there, Wuhu and Chingkiang. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code text and reading by mail to Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9245: Telegram [Document 390] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 9, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 9—7:15 a.m.] 394. Department’s 132, August 7, 2 p.m., and my 390, August 8, 1 p.m. 1. The telegrams in reference crossed in transmission. The same five Ambassadors at a conference August 9, 11 a.m., unanimously accepted the draft communication to the Japanese Embassy given in my August 8, 1 p.m., and also approved a draft of a corresponding communication to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The second draft uses the same opening. And then reads: “In an oral communication addressed by Your Excellency to some of the Ambassadors most interested there has been indicated the desire of the Chinese authorities to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region. Basing our action on this communication the undersigned diplomatic representatives are addressing a communication to His Excellency, the Japanese Ambassador, expressing the hope that the Japanese authorities concerned may be willing to give indication of a similar desire on their side to avoid any action which might lead to an increase in the tension, or to armed clashes with the Chinese forces in that area. We are confident in the belief that the Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities and we should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give.” 2. My colleagues are ready at once to sign these communications as a preliminary to any further steps to obviate hostilities in the Shanghai area which the interested powers may later decide to take in Tokyo or Nanking. While I feel that the Department’s August 7, 2 p.m., would authorize me to sign the two communications, out of caution I shall await Department’s reply to my August 8, 1 p.m. Repeated to Tokyo. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9250: Telegram [Document 391] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State [ Peiping , August 9, 1937—3 p.m.] [Received August 9—6 a.m.] 406. Embassy’s 402, August 8, 6 p.m. 1. No incident has occurred in Peiping as a result of the entry yesterday of Japanese troops. 2. The two branch telegraph offices in Peiping now under [of the] Chinese telegraph administration were visited this morning, as was the head office yesterday, by five Japanese in plain clothes who removed essential instruments, rendering the sending of message impossible. 3. Chang Tzu Chung resigned at some time during the past few days from his remaining posts; namely, Acting Mayor of Peiping and Acting Hopei-Chahar Pacification Commissioner. A new mayor has not yet been appointed. A Secretary of the Japanese Embassy describes the Hopei-Chahar Political Council as being of no practical importance as affairs in Peiping and Tientsin are directed by the Maintenance Committees and as affairs outside those two cities are directed by local officials as best they can. 4. Police have been instructed to inform all schools to cease instructions in the principles of the Kuomintang and the use of books of that character. Police are visiting bookstores in western part of city today instructing them what kinds of books they must not sell. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Lockhart The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9252: Telegram [Document 392] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 9, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 9—8:32 a.m.] 439. Japanese Consul General called this morning to ascertain my attitude toward proposal by several members of the Joint Commission to consider Japanese complaint that Peace Preservation Corps has been heavily increased and is holding night maneuvers and digging trench holes north of Shanghai. He says Chinese authorities claim Peace Preservation Corps are taking defensive measures only. 2. I stated I would attend a meeting if called by the Chairman but that I could anticipate no satisfactory results unless both sides are prepared to make declarations not to engage in hostilities at Shanghai, the Chinese being fearful that as in 1932 the Japanese would use the Settlement as a base. He replied such matters would seem to be outside a purview of Joint Commission but added that Japanese have no desire for hostilities in Shanghai. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo; to Peiping by courier. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) 793.94/9125: Telegram [Document 393] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) Washington , August 9, 1937—4 p.m. Department’s July 31, 1 p.m., 74 and your August 7, 10 a.m. Can you confirm press reports to the effect that Japanese military and civilian residents at Hankow have now almost completely evacuated the Japanese Concession; that the administration of the Japanese Concession has been turned over temporarily to Chinese officials; and that the Communist army is moving out of Shensi into Suiyuan? Hull 74 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9262: Telegram [Document 394] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , August 9, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 9—2:40 p.m.] 532. Your 338, August 7, 1 p.m., was conveyed to the Foreign Office yesterday and your 340, August 8, 7 p.m. [ 11 a.m. ], 75 this morning. Foreign Office advises that the British Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo is being instructed by telegraph today to consult with Ambassador Grew and to proceed along the lines agreed upon. Vansittart entirely agrees with your suggestions that the approach be first made to the Japanese Government and as to the method of approach, and with the necessity of the utmost secrecy. He referred again to a telegram from the British Ambassador in China mentioned in my 531, August 6, 8 p.m., where the Ambassador had pointed out the obvious fact that there was the possibility of a major war ensuing and the absurdity of a situation where there had been no attempt at negotiation on fundamentals between the two possible combatants. The British Ambassador in China reported in a later telegram that certain conversations had taken place between the Japanese Military Attaché and Chinese authorities in Nanking but the purport of these conversations was not specified. Bingham 75 Latter not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9245: Telegram [Document 395] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 9, 1937—7 p.m. 137. Your 390, August 8, 1 p.m., and 394, August 9, 1 p.m. Although the Department is prepared to authorize you to sign the two communications as drafted, the Department feels that it is desirable that the proposed communications plainly indicate that the interested Governments had been giving serious thought and consideration to the situation at Shanghai which would arise were hostilities in that area to occur and that they had already reached a decision to make an approach to both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments with a view to seeking their assurances that their respective forces will not use the Shanghai area as a base for military operations. With that in mind, the Department suggests for your consideration and the consideration of your colleagues changing the draft of proposed communication to the Chinese Government to read substantially as follows: The opening paragraph as given in your 390. Second paragraph: “Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested were, at the moment there was delivered to some of them Your Excellency’s oral communication indicating the desire of the Chinese authorities to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region, preparing to approach simultaneously both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on this subject. The undersigned diplomatic representatives, in the belief that the Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give. We are addressing a similar communication to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador.” It is also suggested that a similar communication, with appropriate changes, be sent to the Japanese Ambassador. The Department is authorizing Tokyo to make the representations suggested in your 390 upon receipt from you of information that you and your colleagues have taken at Nanking the action envisaged and of textual changes in the communications that may be made. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9261: Telegram [Document 396] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 9, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 9—1:05 p.m.] 444. Late this afternoon at Chinese military airdrome at terminus of Hungjao Road about 6 miles from western boundary of the Settlement a sentry of Chinese Peace Preservation Corps challenged an approaching motor car and stated he was fired upon and wounded. Car was stopped by a burst of machine gun fire and a Japanese official passenger is reported killed. Chinese servant of American resident injured by stray bullet. Investigation proceeding. Nanking informed. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9265: Telegram [Document 397] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 10, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 10—2:35 a.m.] 395. My No. 394, August 9, 1 p.m., paragraph No. 1. Consul General [at] Shanghai has just telephoned that Italian Consul General has demanded the calling of an immediate meeting of the consular body to consider situation at Shanghai arising out of shooting affair between Chinese and Japanese at Hungjao Aerodrome which occurred yesterday afternoon. Gauss stated he did not wish to take stand contrary to action contemplated here reported in my telegram above quoted. I suggested that consular body Shanghai might forthwith take action along lines taken at Hankow (see Hankow’s August 4, 10 a.m. 76 ) in making representations to both sides to refrain from hostilities at Shanghai. Gauss asked whether they should request no further troops be sent. I suggested that any request along this line should be made orally. I feel that the two communications reported to the Department in my telegram above quoted should be sent at once in view of this latest occurrence. My colleagues are, I believe, prepared to sign immediately. I therefore urgently request authorization to join them in this action. Johnson 76 Vol. iv , p. 245 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9283: Telegram [Document 398] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 10, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 11—4 a.m.] 445. My August 9, 11 p.m. Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident which occurred yesterday evening near the Hungjao Aerodrome are conflicting and it has thus far proved impossible for independent and impartial investigators to check on the details of what actually occurred. 2. The official statement issued by the Japanese naval landing party as quoted by the press is to the effect that at about 5 o’clock yesterday evening sub-Lieutenant Ohyama was motoring along Monument Road, an extra-Settlement road, with seaman Saito at the wheel. The statement continues: “The automobile was suddenly surrounded by members of the Peace Preservation Corps who fired upon the automobile with machine guns and rifles. Sub-Lieutenant Ohyama was killed outright, many bullets lodging in his body—the entire picture was one of extreme brutality by members of the Peace Preservation Corps. Monument Road is an extension road of the International Settlement of Shanghai and foreigners have free use of it. The Chinese have recently constructed defense works and sandbag barricades, and set land mines around Shanghai. At night people were prevented by the military from using the road. Even in the daytime, the military dared to search the passersby threatening the latter with pistols. These actions on the part of the Chinese clearly formed not only a violation of the Shanghai truce agreement but also presented an insult to the foreign residents of the International Settlement. Such actions were clearly of a provocative, illegal and anti-Japanese nature on the part of the Chinese—the special naval landing party of the Imperial Japanese navy is now ready to seek a thorough solution of the incident. While assuming a fair and firm attitude it will demand that the Chinese authorities bear the responsibility for this illegal act.” 3. The Chinese version as issued by the Central News Agency is that two Japanese officers riding in a motor car insisted on entering the Hungjao Airfield despite warnings from the Chinese guards and that when the guards attempted to stop the car the Japanese opened fire with their pistols. The guards it is said did not return the fire as they had no orders to do so but members of the Peace Preservation Corps in the vicinity hearing the firing rushed to the scene “for the purpose of investigating. The Japanese officers opened fire on the Paoantui members killing one of them. The Paoantui members returned the fire in self-defense, killing one of the two Japanese instantly and hitting the other who immediately took to his heels but before he could run very far he collapsed and died of wounds”. The Japanese this morning also confirm the death of seaman Saito. 4. The press further reports that Mayor Yui called at the Japanese Consulate General at 10 o’clock last night and expressed profound regret over the incident but is said to have called attention to the fact that the Chinese authorities had on many occasions lodged protests with the Japanese naval landing party concerning repeated Japanese spying at the Aerodrome and to have asserted that this incident grew out of a similar attempt. He is also said to have expressed the hope that the Japanese would maintain a calm attitude. 5. From reliable Japanese sources it is learned that at a conference of Japanese consular and naval officials last night it was agreed that every effort should be made to settle the incident by negotiations and that the naval landing party would take no action for the time being. Landing party did not rush out patrols last night and have taken no special measures. In consequence the extremely tense atmosphere of last night has eased somewhat this morning; both the Chinese and Japanese press have refrained from printing sensational accounts of the affair. The civic center and the Kiangwan area were closed last night following the incident but traffic has been resumed although barricades are reported still in place on some roads. An American’s Chinese servant who was hit by stray bullet last night has since died. Repeated to Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking. Gauss The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9279: Telegram [Document 399] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , August 10, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 7:55 p.m.] 1. The agreement between the Mayor and the Acting Japanese Consul General referred to in my August 7, 10 a.m. provided as follows: (1) While the Japanese naval forces are being evacuated, the Chinese authorities will undertake to stop communication between Japanese Concession and surrounding areas; (2) members of the Japanese consular and police force including the consular officers at Hankow, Chungking, Changsha, Ichang and Shasi will remain at Hankow for the time being; (3) a Japanese merchant vessel will remain in Hankow for the final evacuation of the consular officers; (4) following evacuation of the Japanese Navy, 30 Chinese police will be sent to the Japanese Concession to maintain order in cooperation with the Japanese police; (5) after the evacuation of the Japanese consular officers, which will be effected when final instructions are received from Tokyo, the Hankow municipal authorities will take over the administration of the Japanese Concession upon the request of the Japanese Consul General. 2. In accordance with the above agreement, five Japanese naval vessels and two Japanese merchant vessels left Hankow for Shanghai on August 7 and August 8 taking all Japanese, both civilians and military, from the Japanese Concession and other parts of Hankow except those mentioned in clause 2 above. One Japanese merchant vessel still remains at Hankow as provided in clause 3 above. I have learned from the Mayor that he was informed today by the Acting Japanese Consul General that final evacuation of the consular officers mentioned in clause 2 will take place tomorrow, August 11, and that in accordance with clause 5 the Hankow municipal authorities will take over the administration of the Japanese Concession as from that date. 3. This office has been able to obtain no authoritative information concerning alleged movement of Communist army from Shensi into Suiyuan although Japanese press reports to that effect had appeared as early as July 25. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, and Shanghai. Josselyn The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9278: Telegram [Document 400] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 10, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 10—2:20 p.m.] 254. Department’s 140, August 7, 3 p.m. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires received affirmative instructions today. 2. I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence at 5:30 this afternoon and informally and confidentially presented the American Government’s offer of good offices along the lines of the two points set forth in the Department’s 138, August 8 [ 5 ], noon. 3. The Minister received the offer in an entirely friendly manner. He said however that an opening for negotiations had already been made through the conversation between Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Office, and Ambassador Kawagoe at Shanghai yesterday. The Ambassador had presented to Kao the Japanese “plan” for a Sino-Japanese understanding and the latter had immediately departed for Nanking to communicate the proposal to Chiang Kai-shek. Hirota said that he was not yet in possession of the complete details of the Shanghai conversation but that if Chiang Kai-shek would respond with some proposal (obviously a counter proposal) which could serve as a basis for negotiations war might be avoided. Hirota however characterized the situation as critical and indicated that an early and favorable reply from Chiang alone could prevent general hostilities. 4. The Minister then said that if the American Government desired to be helpful the most effective action it could take would be to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to take prompt action as envisaged in the foregoing paragraph. 5. The Minister seemed reluctant to reveal even the general nature of the “plan” proposed by Kawagoe except that it included conditions for eliminating all anti-Japanese activities in China and for “good relations” with Manchuria. 6. Hirota requested that I regard as strictly confidential the fact that an opening for negotiations had been made. He states that the press knows nothing about the nature of Kawagoe-Kao conversation. 7. The British Chargé d’Affaires expects to see Hirota tomorrow and to take action along similar lines. 8. Hirota said that the recent murder of a Japanese naval officer in Shanghai had rendered matters worse. The Japanese Navy is very angry but is observing self restraint in order not to inflame the situation in Shanghai. 9. While I am unaware of the conditions laid down by Kawagoe in his talk with Kao it seems to me of the utmost importance that Chiang Kai-shek should return some reply which will not effectually close the door to further negotiations. If the American and British Ambassadors in Nanking are to offer good offices this point might appropriately be stressed as a final effort to avoid general warfare. 10. In view of the possible importance of haste I have communicated the foregoing to Dodds who is cabling the gist of it in strict confidence tonight to London and to Hugessen. 77 Repeated to Nanking. Grew 77 Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador in China. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9267: Telegram [Document 401] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 10, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 10—10:34 a.m.] 447. Treaty Power Consuls at Shanghai met this afternoon on call of the Senior Consul to discuss local situation. The Japanese Consul General spent some time in giving assurances of Japanese desire to avoid any clashes at Shanghai and of his belief that “for the present” there is no reason for uneasiness but he dwelt at length upon the provocative activities of the Peace Preservation Corps and their increased strength and armament. He admitted, however, in reply to my inquiry that 300 Japanese bluejackets landed here today. He stated that they were from the Hankow garrison. After discussion it was agreed that the Senior Consul should address the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the Japanese Consul General to the following effect: “In view of the general uneasiness prevailing in Shanghai as a result of recent unfortunate events in China and the fear of an armed clash in the Shanghai area, the interested consular representatives desire to direct the attention of the Mayor and of the Japanese Consul General to the fact that there is a large foreign population in Shanghai and also extensive and important commercial, industrial, property and shipping interests in the port which would be seriously endangered by any conflict in the Shanghai area, and these representatives therefore express the hope that it may be necessary definitely to exclude the Shanghai area from the sphere of any possible hostilities and that all armed forces of whatever character now here may be restrained from any acts which might disturb the peace or cause uneasiness or alarm to foreign and Chinese residents of the port”. This communication is to be delivered tomorrow; it is also to be communicated to the interested diplomatic representatives at Nanking. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma) 793.94/9647 [Document 402] Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy ( Suma ) [ Washington ,] August 10, 1937. Mr. Suma said he wished to report that he had received a telegram from Peiping to the effect that Mr. Powell, an American concerning whom there were reports of maltreatment by the Japanese, had called at the Japanese Embassy there, that he was safe and that he was now proceeding from Peiping to Tientsin. Mr. Suma stated that the situation in Shanghai had become more serious as a result of an incident involving a Japanese lieutenant and a first-class private who had set out on an inspection tour of the Japanese cotton factory district in the western section of Shanghai. The lieutenant was subsequently found killed on Monument Road riddled with 37 bullets and the private has been missing so that it was feared that he too was killed. Mr. Suma felt that this affair has been deliberately provoked by the Chinese. Mr. Suma then proceeded to relate that in the last few days five Chinese divisions and a force 20,000 strong of the Peace Preservation Corps had surrounded the neutral zone in Shanghai and were preparing trenches there. He felt that this action might be the forerunner of trouble. Mr. Suma said that he had learned that the Chinese authorities at Nanking had approached our diplomatic representatives there with a plan for the neutralization of Shanghai. Mr. Ballantine said that we had been informed of this, but, that, as a matter of fact, prior to the receipt of the Chinese proposal the representatives of the interested powers had been considering the question of making an approach to the Japanese and Chinese authorities with a view to obtaining assurances that each side would refrain from sending troops into the Shanghai area. Mr. Ballantine said that this was not a neutralization proposal but a plan, prompted by a desire to ensure the safety of our large numbers of citizens and great interests in Shanghai, to minimize the possibility of hostilities in the Shanghai area. (Mr. Ballantine did not tell Mr. Suma whether any action had been taken in connection with this proposal.) Mr. Suma asked who had originated this proposal and Mr. Ballantine said that he understood the consular representatives of the powers in Shanghai had initiated the suggestion. Mr. Suma said that Japan has completed its evacuation of Japanese civilians from Hankow and various up-river ports on the 9th. He said that the Japanese Concession at Hankow was being held by the Japanese Navy and that Japan had no intention of relinquishing it. He said that the Chinese were adopting an increasingly provocative attitude at Hankow but that the Japanese Government with a view to localizing fighting as far as possible had taken the measure of evacuating Japanese civilians. Mr. Suma noted that in South China Foochow and Swatow had been evacuated but not Canton or Amoy. Mr. Suma observed that the situation in Chahar had become more serious as a result of the central government’s having dispatched five divisions there, including the 84th, 89th, 4th and 143rd. Mr. Suma said that he assumed that the incident in Peiping involving maltreatment of two American women by Japanese soldiers had now been settled and he expressed the hope that if any other incident arose the Department would let him know so that he might take appropriate steps. He said furthermore that if the Japanese Government could extend its good offices in connection with the evacuation of Americans from danger zones, the Japanese Government would be pleased to render every assistance. Mr. Suma made reference to resolutions in Congress 78 calling for the evacuation of American military forces from Tientsin and Peiping and asked what the status of this question was. Mr. Ballantine said that, so far as he was aware, there was no question of the evacuation of American forces in China before the Government. 78 S. Res. 170, on August 6, by Sen. J. Hamilton Lewis, of Illinois, and H. Res. 304, on August 9, by Rep. George H. Tinkham, of Massachusetts, Congressional Record , vol. 81, pt. 7, p. 8351, and ibid. , pt. 8, p. 8579. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9487 [Document 403] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 10, 1937. I perceive no basis whatever for an expectation and no foundation for even a hope that considerations of finance (cost of fighting and inability or unwillingness on the part of the people of Japan to pay the bills) will substantially influence such decision as the Japanese may make “to fight or not to fight” in connection with the present phase of their movement of expansion. The Japanese decision will be made by the armed forces; not by the diplomats, the bankers and the business men; least of all by the best informed and most conservative members of the so-called “moderate” (conservative) small minority. Japan is expanding and the Japanese people are almost a unit in the belief that their expansion is a natural, a rightful, even a righteous, a practicable, a possible, and an inevitable phenomenon. It must be remembered that Japan has not at any time in recorded history been defeated in a war with a foreign country; that in all of her major military efforts against foreign armed forces during recent decades Japan has been victorious; that the Japanese have today every reason to believe that the only foreign armed forces with whom they will have to deal are those of China; that they know that the Chinese are hopelessly vulnerable because they possess no Navy; that Japan can set for herself such limitations as she may choose to make for the extent of the military operations, it being possible always for the Japanese, in the event of unexpectedly strong resistance on the part of the Chinese, to fall back on shortened lines or even to withdraw entirely from newly occupied territory. It must be remembered that, whereas, in the World War, many other powers made great expenditures of men and money, with consequent impairment of their man power and their financial positions, Japan did no such thing; on the contrary, Japan lost almost no men and added considerable increments to her national wealth during the War. Such expenditures as other powers were able to make then without collapse, Japan is able to make now. True, Japan is, as compared with several of the occidental powers, a poor country; but, Japan is, as compared with China, a nationally affluent country; the Japanese will, in my opinion, neither be deterred from fighting China by financial considerations nor, if the two countries fight, find herself hamstrung and compelled to forego her objectives in consequence of financial exhaustion. In making the above statements, I am not undertaking to prophesy, for many other factors may enter into the making of Japan’s decision. I merely wish to express emphatically the opinion which is mine that the financial factor alone will play little part in the matter. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9281: Telegram [Document 404] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 11, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 11—6:40 a.m.] 256. Embassy’s 254, August 10, 7 p.m. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and presented his Government’s offer of good offices, leaving with him a brief pro memoria embodying the two points proposed. 2. Hirota read the document very slowly and with great care and after a long pause (which Dodds estimated as at least 5 minutes) observed that it might be possible later to consider taking advantage of the offer. He then made to Dodds in confidence practically the identical statement which he had made to me yesterday. No mention was made of my own conversation with the Minister. 3. Dodds is reporting to his Government that Hirota in subsequent conversation had expressed optimism but that for the first time he seemed to be less certain that Chiang Kai-shek would not fight. Hirota admitted that Chiang is in a difficult position; that he is surrounded by generals who do not want to fight but that the younger Chinese officers are eager for war. 4. Dodds is adding to his telegram to London the opinion that the action taken by us was well worth while. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9285: Telegram [Document 405] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 11, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 11—10:05 a.m.] 257. 1. Information recently obtained by us in official Japanese quarters is as follows: ( a ) The evacuation of Japanese nationals from the Yangtze Valley was made compulsory by the Japanese Government and was not voluntary. There still remain along the Yangtze about 100 nationals, mostly official. ( b ) All Yangtze gunboats and Hankow landing force have been withdrawn to Shanghai. ( c ) Arrangements have been made to augment the Japanese landing force at Shanghai in case of need. ( d ) A new naval unit designated as the southern squadron has been organized. This unit will probably operate in South China waters. ( e ) The sending for the time being of reenforcements to North China has been completed but the exact number and whereabouts of reenforcements are not known to us. Indications are that the 5th and 6th Divisions have reached North China or adjacent Manchuria and that the 10th Division has been mobilized and may be en route. 2. The War Office expressed to the Military Attaché the view that movements and distribution of Chinese troops in North China can now be definitely regarded as “threatening” but no date has been set for beginning operations by Japanese forces which are still waiting for signs that the Chinese Government has reconsidered its attitude. The Vice Minister of War told the Military Attaché today that in spite of the threatening positions of Chinese forces the Japanese Army will not attack unless Chinese troops advance. 3. We conclude from the information now available that preparations have been completed to act without delay if development toward peaceful settlement reported in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 254 August 10, 7 p.m., should prove abortive. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9290: Telegram [Document 406] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , August 11, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 11—1:40 p.m.] My August 11, 11 a.m. 79 A Japanese naval vessel is leaving this afternoon for Shanghai carrying all remaining Japanese. The Chinese population of the Japanese Concession which had all previously evacuated will now be permitted to return. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping and Shanghai. Josselyn 79 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9288: Telegram [Document 407] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 11, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 11—11:10 a.m.] 401. Tokyo’s 254, August 10, 7 p.m. I hope that the Department in considering any instructions which it may issue me in this regard will give consideration to the difficulty which I will be under if I am to urge the Chinese to give an early and favorable reply to a proposal which is understood to include conditions for eliminating all anti-Japanese activities in China. Heretofore this very general statement has appeared to cover not only obvious anti-Japanese activities but the whole form and purpose of Chinese nationalist education of the young as well as a positive attitude toward what Japanese are pleased to term communism. Repeated to Tokyo. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 703.94/9303: Telegram [Document 408] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 11, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 11:15 p.m.] 451. My August 10, 8 p.m. Accompanied by Secretary of Consular Body, [Senior] Consul called personally this afternoon on Mayor and Japanese Consul General and delivered memorandum referred to in my telegram August 10, 8 p.m. 2. Secretary of Consular Body informs me that the Mayor expressed appreciation of the interest displayed by the Consular Body in the maintenance of peace in Shanghai and said it was his policy and that of the National Government to prevent hostilities in this area. The Mayor expressed himself as concerned at the probability that the Japanese Ministry of Navy had rejected decision to negotiate the Hungjao Road incident and at the reported arrival of the Japanese Second Fleet off the coast. 3. Upon calling on the Japanese Consul General they were handed a prepared statement which Secretary of Consular Body states expresses Japanese desire for an avoidance of trouble in this area but refers to provocative activities of the Peace Preservation Corps. Japanese Consul General said the Japanese had conclusive evidence that the two Japanese involved in the Hungjao Road incident were deliberately murdered; that it [ he? ] was calling this evening on the Mayor to commence negotiations for a settlement of the recent incident and for the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and that similar negotiations would be commenced in Nanking by the Japanese Embassy. He intimated the Japanese Navy was becoming restless and might take independent action if negotiations were unsatisfactory. The fact that four Japanese light cruisers have today arrived and are reported to be disembarking additional reenforcements; that six Japanese destroyers have arrived in the river while six more are reported off Woosung lends significance to the statements of the Japanese Consul General. I have received information from a number of independent American sources that the Peace Preservation Corps is actively engaged in digging trenches and preparing military works in the vicinity of Shanghai and also at Woosung. These activities would seem to exceed the functions for which the corps was intended under the 1932 Agreement. The local significance might be eased if they were withdrawn or substantially reduced and such activities suspended. Repeated to Peiping and Nanking. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9306: Telegram [Document 409] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 11, 1937—midnight. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 403. 1. I joined with my German, British, Italian and French colleagues in addressing notes of today’s date to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ambassador. They were delivered about 9 o’clock this evening. 2. The first paragraph of the note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs was given in my 390, August 8, 1 p.m., to the Department. The second paragraph was changed by the Department’s 137, August 9, 7 p.m., to Nanking to read as follows: “Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested [in the hope that the] Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give. We are addressing a similar communication to His Excellency, the Japanese Ambassador”. 3. The first paragraph of the letter to the Japanese Ambassador was the same as above. The second paragraph read as follows: “In an oral communication the Chinese authorities have already announced to some of the Embassies most interested their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region. Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested were, at the moment there was delivered to some of them the oral communication of the Chinese authorities indicating their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region, preparing to approach simultaneously both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on this subject. The undersigned diplomatic representatives, in the hope that the Japanese authorities will do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give”. Sent to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9297: Telegram [Document 410] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 12, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 12—6:10 a.m.] 404. 1. We have been reliably informed that Chu Teh and Mao Tze Tung, military leaders of the communistic forces in Shensi, visited Nanking within past few days as sequel to an earlier visit by Chou En Lai, Secretary General of the communistic régime at Yenan, Shensi, and that an agreement was reached for the cooperation of the communistic forces with Government troops against the Japanese. According to one informant, the Shensi Communists have now been organized into 60 units for guerrilla warfare and are moving on their designated front along the Tatung-Puchow Railway in Shensi north of Taiyuan, their plan being to advance eastward “when hostilities begin” either in Chahar or Southern Hopei and to attack the Japanese lines in the rear. 2. This information was received with injunctions of secrecy because of the possible effect of these developments on Sino-Russian and Russo-Japanese relations. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code text to Peiping, Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9307: Telegram [Document 411] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 12, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 405. 1. We are reliably informed that the National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission are being reorganized to take control of military and other government affairs during the emergency. A new body, which will bear designation something like Supreme War Council, is being formed with Chiang Kai-shek as President, Wang Ching-wei as Vice President and former Foreign Minister Chang Chun as Secretary General and possibly head of the Political Department. Other appointments being considered include: Pai Chung Hsi, Chief of Staff, T. V. Soong, finance; Shao Li Tzu (now head of Central Party publicity), intelligence and publicity. The plan also embraces operations and administration departments and contemplates that the Central Executive and Central Political Committees shall continue in existence but shall not function during the life of the new body which will temporarily replace them and will assume full direction of the Government and the military forces. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9316: Telegram [Document 412] The Consul General at Canton ( Linnell ) to the Secretary of State Canton , August 12, 1937—noon. [Received 1:15 p.m.] Understand uneasiness prevails in more patriotic Chinese circles on account of continued lack of news of positive military action by Central Government. Addressing his subordinates day before yesterday General Yu Han Mou reportedly explained Nanking’s plan as one of prolonged resistance but apparently said nothing of immediate military action; and this change of emphasis seems reflected in the press. Police Commissioner in broadcast speech has warned public of probable necessity of resistance in Kwangtung and of importance of storing foods. Informed by Japanese consular authorities that two-fifths Canton Japanese colony have left and another two-fifths are to be evacuated; leaving about 100 in Shameen who will remain; that primary reasons for evacuation are the Japanese Government’s desire to avoid incidents and the difficulty of obtaining food locally on account of boycott; that complaints of coolie boycott continues; and that Swatow situation is very tense. Sent to Peiping, Nanking and by mail to Swatow, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Linnell The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9315: Telegram [Document 413] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 12, 1937—noon. [Received 1:25 p.m.] 407. 1. According to a responsible official of the Foreign Office no demands have as yet been presented by the Japanese Embassy to the Foreign Office in connection with the Shanghai incident of August 9. He states that yesterday the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai in the course of 3-hour conversation with the Shanghai Mayor made several “proposals or demands”, including (1) apology; (2) compensation for families of victims; (3) withdrawal of Peace Preservation Corps; (3 [ 4 ]) removal of Chinese barricades near the International Settlement. Last evening Japanese Counselor at Nanking called on the Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and requested that the Chinese authorities in Shanghai be instructed to arrange “an equitable settlement”. 2. He said the demands concerning apology and compensation could be easily negotiated because action upon them would depend upon the question of responsibility as determined by investigation. The other two, in every particular, were a stumbling block in the way of reaching an amicable settlement of the incident. The advance posts of the Paoantui had already been withdrawn as a conciliatory measure but he did not believe that the Government would be willing to order the Paoantui to withdraw as desired by the Japanese and it was doubtful whether the Paoantui would willingly obey such orders if issued. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9301: Telegram [Document 414] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 12, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 452. Following is text of statement made by Japanese Consul General yesterday afternoon to the Senior Consul in reply to the consular body representations quoted in my August 10, 8 p.m.: “It has been my sincere desire to keep Shanghai free from trouble in the present Sino-Japanese crisis and with this object in view and acting under instructions from my Government, I have been making earnest efforts on our part to avoid any untoward happenings in Shanghai. However, in view of the increasing warlike preparations now being undertaken by the Chinese in the districts immediately adjacent to the foreign controlled areas of Shanghai, I avail myself of this opportunity to draw the serious attention of the interested consular representatives to this flagrant violation of the agreement of the cessation of hostilities of 1932. 2. In these circumstances the consular body is well advised to direct the attention of the Chinese authorities to this deplorable state of affairs, which may prove a serious menace to the safety and integrity of the Settlement and Concession of Shanghai.” Sent to the Department, Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9304: Telegram [Document 415] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 12, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 12—8 a.m.] 453. A large number of Japanese cruiser[s] and destroyers has now assembled in Shanghai harbor. Japanese airplane carrier reported to be off the coast in Chusan Island area. Also reported but not definitely confirmed that two Japanese transports with troops are approaching the mouth of the Yangtze. Japanese are converting Japanese golf course immediately outside eastern boundary of the Settlement as a landing field for aircraft. 2. In discussions last evening between Japanese Consul General and Mayor, the former asked for withdrawal of Peace Preservation Corps. A Japanese consular officer confirms this but insists there was no ultimatum or time limit. The Mayor did not agree and is presumably referring [to his Government?] for instructions. 3. There has been confirmed reports this morning of intensive preparation by Peace Preservation Corps in the area near Shanghai. Situation very tense. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9296: Telegram [Document 416] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 11 [ 12? ] 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 12—5 a.m.] 454. Secretary of the Joint Commission informs me that Japanese Consul General has asked for an immediate meeting of the Commission as Chinese troops are moving into the Shanghai area in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. 79a Repeated to Nanking. Gauss 79a Signed at Shanghai, May 5, 1932, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 217 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9298: Telegram [Document 417] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 12, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 12—6:05 a.m.] 455. Mayor Yui reported abandoned civic center headquarters and city government is reported moving to Minghong, about 15 miles west of Shanghai. I have requested Americans in outlying areas to come within the Settlement and usual defence lines, as have British. Chinese panicky with heavy exodus to Settlement south of Soochow Creek. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9940 [Document 418] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 12, 1937. Mr. Secretary : In regard to the question of “good offices” for any possible efforts on the part of this Government to influence or persuade the Chinese or the Japanese Governments in relation to proposals which may be put by either to the other, it seems to me that we should be very much on guard in considering any suggestion that we exert ourselves toward inducing the Chinese to make concessions. However, it seems to me that there is one thing which we might well consider now doing, a thing for which there would be a good deal of warrant: we might reasonably suggest to and even urge upon the Chinese Government that it withdraw troops which it apparently has introduced (over a period of some time past) into the area around Shanghai which falls within the so-called “demilitarized zone” which was set up by agreement between the Japanese and the Chinese in 1932. The Japanese have made the introduction of those troops the basis of complaint, and they may make it an excuse for action there. The Chinese claim that the agreement of 1932 was only for temporary purposes and that they have a full right to have introduced troops into the area. Regardless of reasons or of rights, those troops are not needed there for purposes of maintaining order; their presence there implies or suggests a military purpose; they serve as an irritant to the Japanese. Their withdrawal would tend to clarify the military atmosphere in that region and remove one at least of the grounds upon which the Japanese might attempt to justify military operations on their part around Shanghai, and thus facilitate the bringing about of an agreement that hostilities shall not be engaged in at that point. Inasmuch as the Chinese themselves have proposed something in the nature of a “neutralization of Shanghai,” I see no reason why we should not urge upon them withdrawal of these troops toward that general end. FE 80 is drafting. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 80 Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/9649 [Document 419] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 12, 1937. At the conclusion of the conversation this morning on another subject, the Chinese Ambassador stated that after his last conversation with the Secretary he had telegraphed to the Chinese Ambassador in London suggesting that the Ambassador (Dr. Kuo 81 ) ask the British Foreign Minister just what he had said to the American Government on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty. It had developed that Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan 82 were both absent from London and the inquiry had not yet been put. The Ambassador continued with observations and allusion to the Nine Power Treaty which caused me to put the question: “Just what do people have in mind when they speak of invoking the Nine Power Treaty?” The Ambassador said that they have in mind Article VII. I inquired what does Article VII provide. The Ambassador replied that it provides for consultation. There followed a discussion which I introduced with the statement that, as I had said to the Ambassador a few days ago, I was not in position to inform him with regard to questions of high policy but that I could make certain observations. In the course of what followed I think I made it plain to the Ambassador that consultation is a process in which governments always have engaged and which was not suddenly discovered and made use of when and since the Nine Power Treaty was concluded; that neither the Nine Power Treaty nor the Kellogg Pact contains any specifications specifying what action, if any, is to be taken in case one or more of the signatory powers disregard the pledges which they have made in the treaty; this, in contrast to a treaty such as the Covenant of the League of Nations in which courses of action are expressly provided for. The Ambassador finally said that what he really wished to know was what courses of action were being discussed in course of consultations between and among the American and the British and the French Governments. He said that he realized that I was not in position to inform him on that point but that, if at any time the Secretary should be in position to give him information, he would greatly appreciate being given whatever was possible. I stated that I would so report. With amenities, the conversation there ended. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 81 Quo Tai-chi. 82 Sir Alexander G. M. Cadogan, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/9296: Telegram [Document 420] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , August 12, 1937—4 p.m. 210. Your 454, August 11 [ 12? ], 3 p.m. Following has been sent to Nanking: “Unless you perceive strong objection, the Department desires that you call immediately on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, referring to the suggestions which Chinese authorities have expressly made that arrangements be made to exempt the Shanghai area from hostilities, present the view that the presence or the moving into that area of Chinese troops would seem likely to aggravate the situation; that troops are apparently not needed there for purposes of maintaining order; and that your Government has raised question whether the Chinese Government ought not in its own interest and that of all concerned exclude its forces from that area. You should state that you are making this approach without reference to the question of the 1932 truce agreement or to the sovereign right of China. You should emphasize that the approach is based upon this Government’s solicitude with regard to the safety of its nationals and with regard to the problem of peace. It is suggested that you may care to discuss this matter with your most interested colleagues in the hope that they may consider desirable the making of similar representations.” You may, in your discretion, make an approach along similar lines to appropriate Chinese authorities at Shanghai. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9320: Telegram [Document 421] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 12, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 7:55 p.m.] 408. My 403 [August 11, midnight]. Colleagues mentioned met with me today to consider latest developments. We explored situation from all angles and reached the conclusion that there is nothing we can do here beyond what has already been done. We feel that initiative lies with Japanese. We understand Japanese have or intend to present a demand at Shanghai for withdrawal of Paoantui from that area. We believe that this demand will not be met by Chinese and that if Japanese attempt to enforce it hostilities are inevitable. We believe that only possibility of avoiding repetition of disastrous situation which existed in 1932 is for interested powers to approach Tokyo urging Japanese not to attempt to enforce such a demand at that place. Repeated to Tokyo, Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9300: Telegram [Document 422] The Consul General at Canton ( Linnell ) to the Secretary of State Canton , August 12, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 12—8:18 a.m.] Following from Ketcham, 83 Swatow. “August 12, 1 p.m. Japanese Consul is leaving this afternoon. Japanese Consulate turned over to Chinese police for protection. Remaining Japanese are evacuating this afternoon but Japanese Consul informed me about 70 Formosans are remaining in Swatow. Japanese Consul states that his departure is due to increasing anti-Japanese [campaign?] but that Japanese Navy will not take action if Chinese do not attack naval vessels, Japanese subjects or property. Department has not been informed”. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking and by mail to Shanghai, Hong Kong, Amoy. Linnell 83 John B. Ketcham, Consul at Swatow. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9314: Telegram [Document 423] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , August 12, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 12—1:55 p.m.] 537. My 532, August 9, 7 p.m. I saw the head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office this afternoon at his request. He showed me a telegram of August 10 from the British Chargé d’Aiffaires at Tokyo reporting that the American Ambassador had made the approach agreed upon to the Japanese Foreign Secretary and outlining very briefly what Mr. Grew had told him of the interview. It seems that the Japanese Foreign Secretary had stated to Mr. Grew that the Japanese Ambassador to China, now at Shanghai, had made proposals to an emissary sent him from Chiang Kai-shek which offered a possibility for opening of negotiations, provided a favorable reply was received from Chiang Kai-shek. I was also shown a second telegram from the British Chargé of August 11, reporting that he had made a similar approach to the Japanese Foreign Minister the day before, following the action taken by the American Ambassador. The British Chargé reported that the Japanese Foreign Minister received his proposals with apparent interest and said that they would receive consideration. The Japanese Foreign Minister also told him in strict confidence that the Japanese Ambassador at Shanghai had held conversations with Kao, representing Chiang Kai-shek, and had suggested to him for transmission to Chiang Kai-shek that representatives of the two countries should meet together to discuss (1), a settlement of Sino-Japanese difficulties, and (2), possible measures for stopping the fighting in North China. Kao has returned to Nanking to consult with Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Ambassador is awaiting the reply. The Japanese Foreign Secretary intimated to the British Chargé that the Japanese realize that Chiang Kai-shek is in fighting temper but that he is surrounded by generals who do not want to fight, although the younger Chinese are, the Japanese Foreign Minister cautiously admitted, in fighting temper. He made no mention to the Chargé of the fact that he had been already approached by Ambassador Grew. The Chargé concluded his telegram by saying that in his opinion the démarche made to the Japanese Foreign Minister had been helpful and that the American Ambassador agreed with him. The Foreign Office feels that the tone of these two messages is slightly encouraging. Both have been repeated from Tokyo to the British Ambassador at Nanking for his information only. The Foreign Office has instructed the British Ambassador at Nanking by telegraph to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for “keeping the door open”. Bingham The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9329: Telegram [Document 424] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 12, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 8:45 p.m.] 410. My 405 [ 403 ], August 11, noon [ midnight ]. 1. When the collective note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs was delivered to him August 11, 9 p.m., he appeared greatly perturbed over the crisis at Shanghai and in general. He said that it had always been the desire of the Chinese Government to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities and that orders had in fact been issued to that end. He said that the prospect of war was “horrible, horrible”; that information from Japan reported preparations to send 500,000 troops to China and that in addition to the score of Japanese vessels which had reached Shanghai that day numerous other naval vessels were stationed all along the coast. On returning to the Embassy after delivering the note, Peck telephoned to Dr. Wang by urgent request and the latter told him in apparent agitation that his oral remarks were not a reply to the note but that the Chinese high military authorities would draft the reply and that its nature would be partly determined by the attitude of the Japanese. 2. It is evident that Wang is personally vacillating between a policy of yielding to Japan, prompted by his realization of and extreme repugnance to the disasters that will inevitably follow armed resistance, and his loyalty to the official position of the Chinese Government that no further yielding is compatible with China’s continued existence. I feel that indecision between these two policies is typical of Chinese thinking minds generally. 3. The struggle between Japan and China ramifies into psychological, political and economic fields which are obscure. Although there can be therefore no infallible appraisal of its causes or outcome I hesitatingly but from a sense of obligation submit my opinion that the Japanese military faction is forcing Japan along a road of compulsory piecemeal domination of China (See Tokyo’s 252, August 7, 2 p.m.) and that any offer of good offices to the two countries should carefully avoid any implied advice to China to yield to Japan. It is my opinion that nothing can save China from the necessity of deciding sooner or later whether to oppose Japanese aggression with force or sink to the condition of a vassal state. If these are in fact the only alternatives open to China, there is a probability any appearance of urging China to purchase peace with the loss of sovereign rights would appear to be encouragement to a predatory national policy on Japan’s part of a sort condemned by the pact against war, by various treaties, and, as late as July 16, by your statement of American policy. 84 4. If serious hostilities occur between Japan and China, they will inflict untold damage on China and possibly Japan, but they may correct in China a tendency to rely on foreign aid and in Japan a belief in the profitable results of imperialist expansion. 5. In conclusion I believe a compromise truce at this juncture would merely postpone the inevitable decision whether China shall be dominated by Japan without resistance, and the urging of such a compromise by the United States would seriously impair the public stand we have taken against war and against violation of international agreements. It would follow from this conclusion that any representations to either party should be carefully noncommittal in regard to the fundamental issue and should be strictly confined to safeguarding of American interests unless frankly made on behalf of humanity or international morality. Johnson 84 Vol. i , p. 699 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9305: Telegram [Document 425] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 12—9:59 a.m.] 458. My No. 454, August 12, 3 p.m. At meeting Joint Commission, Japanese Consul General charged, and Chinese Mayor admitted that units of Chinese Regular Army have arrived at Shanghai and are occupying Haskell Road immediately adjoining northern boundary of Settlement. Chinese delegate maintained Chinese forces entered area because of heavy Japanese naval concentration. He alleged 1932 truce agreement was violated by Japanese Consulate about a year ago when they sent a small detachment to Japanese property outside Settlement and extra-Settlement Roads. Up to the present time Japanese have remained in their barracks and taken up no defensive positions. Japanese delegate announced that unless some arrangement could be made Japanese must take defensive positions without further delay. Effort was made to avoid possible clash by mutual withdrawal. Effort failed, but Chinese and Japanese delegates undertook to approach their commanders to ask them not to attack unless attacked. Italian delegate suggested that neutral forces be [sent?] into this dangerous sector but he has only a handful of sailors. Situation is acute and dangerous. Mayor admitted he and local garrison commander have no control over the Chinese troops of 88th Division arriving in the area. Their commander is somewhere in the rear. 2. I recommend that Ambassadors at Nanking make urgent representations to the Chinese Government to avoid a clash pending diplomatic settlement, and at the same time endeavor to obtain undertaking that Chinese troops will under all circumstances respect the area of the Settlement south of Soochow Creek as a neutral area of refuge which they will not seek to enter. If such an undertaking can be had we can endeavor to localize any clash in the northern area of the Settlement as in 1932. 3. Warning Americans to evacuate from threatened section of northern area immediately. Repeated to Nanking. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9305: Telegram [Document 426] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 12, 1937—8 p.m. 144. Reference Shanghai’s 458, August 12, 7 p.m., second paragraph, and Department’s 141, August 12, 2 p.m. 85 The Department authorizes you, in your discretion, to make the representations recommended by Shanghai. Hull 85 Latter not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9151: Telegram [Document 427] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 86 Washington , August 12, 1937—9 p.m. 145. Tokyo’s 254, August 10, 7 p.m., and your 401, August 11, 6 p.m. 1. The Department’s telegram No. 138, August 5, noon, to Tokyo, is quoted below for your strictly confidential information as follows: [Here follows text of telegram printed on page 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] .] 2. Tokyo’s 254, August 10, 7 p.m., indicates that the Japanese Foreign Minister has not accepted the offer of good offices. Consequently, it seems to the Department that no useful purpose would be served by making this approach also to the Chinese Government at this time. 3. We do feel, however, that action by you at Nanking along the lines suggested in Tokyo’s 254, August 10, 7 p.m., paragraph 9, might possibly be helpful. You are therefore authorized, if and when your British colleague is prepared to act along substantially similar lines, to call upon the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and, referring to press reports and rumors to the effect that conversations have been held between representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments which might form an opening for negotiations between the two Governments, ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether there is any basis in fact for these reports and rumors. After the Minister for Foreign Affairs makes reply, the Department suggests that you state that this Government continues earnestly to hope that peace will be preserved; that since the beginning of the present situation we have urged upon both sides that they each exercise moderation and proceed with the utmost circumspection before making any decision which might plunge the two countries into armed conflict; and that we would urge further that, if either the Chinese or the Japanese Governments put forward to the other any proposals designed to afford a basis for settling the present situation by negotiation, the government to which the proposals are made should not return a reply of a character which would effectually close the door to negotiations. You should emphasize and make abundantly clear the fact that this Government would not wish to become involved or to be committed with regard to the question of the merits of any specific proposal. 4. In the event that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should ask whether the American Government is making a similar approach to the Japanese Government, it is suggested that you reply to the effect that it is your understanding that it expects to do so. 5. Please keep the Department promptly informed of developments, and repeat your telegrams to Tokyo. 6. The Department has just received a telegram from the Embassy at London reporting that the British Foreign Office has instructed the British Ambassador at Nanking by telegraph to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for “keeping the door open.” Hull 86 Paragraphs 2 to 6, inclusive, repeated to the Embassies in Japan and the United Kingdom in telegrams Nos. 145 and 347, respectively, August 13, 7 p.m. No. 347 added the Department’s request that the contents be orally repeated to the British Foreign Office. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9318: Telegram [Document 428] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 12, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 12—2:28 p.m.] 462. Supplementing previous urgent messages I complained to Mayor this afternoon of action of the Peace Preservation Corps in taking up defensive positions and not permitting Americans to pass freely into the settlements without any warning to me or to foreign residents. I had to send Consul Stanton 87 with a Marine Officer under American flag to the area to facilitate and check departure of Americans. They had to proceed long distance on foot, bridges being mined so that cars could not pass. Mayor alleged he was in his office. British Consul General told me he in an emergency also had difficulty in contacting him. He seems to be remaining mostly in French Concession. 2. At Joint Commission meeting Japanese Consul General and Japanese naval delegate offered not to provide for defensive positions if the Chinese regular troops in Haskell road area would be moved to other side of railway tracks. Chinese Mayor, who was unaccompanied by military delegate, could not agree. 3. American returning from mission station at Liuho with the missionaries states countryside full of Chinese regular troops moving toward Shanghai. 4. It is impossible to expect that opposing forces can avoid a clash. Heavy Japanese patrols are reported to have been established in North Szechuan road area tonight. 5. Shanghai Volunteer Corps and municipal police were ordered mobilized this evening and request was made for assistance of American and British forces. Commanding Officer Fourth Marines is now conferring with British Commander. In conference with American Commander I made the suggestion that from the political standpoint all that might now be necessary would be outposts in support of police at bridge heads, at ferries and roads in the usual American and British sectors in order to take precautions to protect the neutral area south of Soochow Creek and yet give no pretext for action by Japanese forces based on strong defensive precautions of forces in the neutral area. However, in view of the Chinese attitude that if Japan bases on the Settlement the usual neutral character of the Settlement cannot be respected, it seems desirable that the neutral forces take their precautionary measures and announce their action as providing the refuge for foreign nationals. I am cooperating closely with Commander of United States Marines. 6. Commander Fourth Marines has just called and informs me that the plan as outlined above is being carried out, his detachments are supporting the police. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss 87 Edwin F. Stanton, Consul at Shanghai. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9325: Telegram [Document 429] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 12, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 12—6:50 p.m.] 411. Following is text of Foreign Office reply to joint notes referred to in my telegram to the Department No. 403, August 11, midnight: “I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication of yesterday’s date, jointly addressed to me by Your Excellency and Their Excellencies the German, French, British, and Italian Ambassadors, in which the hope was expressed that the Chinese Government would do all in its power to exclude all the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities. You also informed me that a similar communication was being addressed to the Japanese Ambassador. In reply I have the honor to refer Your Excellency to the verbal message which I caused to be delivered to you on August 8 on the subject. Despite the menacing attitude shown [by] the Japanese force? in Shanghai, the Chinese authorities, while adopting certain precautionary measures, have entertained no intention of directing any attack on them on their own initiative. In view of the large population and the immense commercial and other interests of foreigners as well as Chinese in Shanghai, it has been the sincere wish of the Chinese Government that all parties concerned would use their best endeavors to urge that peace might be maintained in that port. I regret, however, to have to call Your Excellency’s attention to the fact that the situation being already fraught with danger has now been aggravated by Japan’s despatching to Shanghai large numbers of war vessels, marines and other armed forces, coupled with demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense. Japanese aeroplanes have already flown over Shanghai, Hangchow, Ningpo, and other places along the Kiangsu and Chekiang coast, evidently with a view to starting military operations. In such circumstances, the Chinese Government, anxious as it is to see peace undisturbed in the Shanghai region, can not bear any responsibility for the outbreak of any hostilities occasioned by the aggressiveness of the Japanese forces. I avail myself, et cetera”. Repeated to Tokyo, Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9321: Telegram [Document 430] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 13, 1937—1 a.m. [Received 8:10 a.m.] 413. 1. Following statement was released to the press by the Foreign Office just before midnight: “A Wachiaopu 88 spokesman made the following statement today: ‘Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident, the Japanese have repeatedly professed that they had no intention to aggravate the situation, but their actions have been diametrically opposed to their verbal professions. In North China the Japanese at first professed their desire for a local settlement, but they have since brought in huge reinforcements with which they attacked Peiping and Tientsin and indulged in wanton acts of indiscriminate killings and incendiarism. Now they are extending their operations by launching a fierce attack on Nankow and threatening various places in Southern Hopei. Their actions clearly indicate that there is no limit to their territorial ambitions. At Shanghai, where an incident occurred on August 9 involving the loss of lives of one Chinese sentry and two Japanese naval men, the Japanese have verbally agreed to our proposal that an equitable settlement be sought through diplomatic channels but, in spite of this undertaking, the Japanese Government has despatched to Shanghai large numbers of warships, airplanes, marines and other armed forces. At the same time the Japanese have presented various demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense. Japanese airplanes have made illegal flights over Shanghai, Hankow, Ningpo, and other places evidently with a view to commencing military operations. All these actions infringe upon Chinese territorial sovereignty and violate the various international treaties. Under these circumstances China’s endurance has been taxed to the limit. There is no other way for her but to act in self defense by resisting aggression and violence. The responsibility for the future development of the situation must rest entirely with Japan’.” Sent to the Department, Peiping. Johnson 88 Foreign Office. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9317: Telegram [Document 431] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 13, 1937—2 a.m. [Received August 12—5:12 p.m.] 414. Your [ Shanghai’s ] 458, August 12, 7 p.m. to the Department. I have discussed recommendation in your paragraph 2 with British Ambassador. We are agreed that we have done everything possible to persuade Chinese Government to avoid a clash at Shanghai. As regards obtaining an undertaking to respect area south of Soochow Creek we think this is a matter for commanders of neutral defense forces of Settlement who should request both sides to respect area patrolled by them by not sending their armed forces into said area as in 1932. Sent to Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9330: Telegram [Document 432] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 13, 1937—8 a.m. [Received August 13—5 a.m.] 415. 1. August 12, 10 p.m., the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy telephoned to Peck for my information under instructions from his Foreign Office, that the danger at Shanghai was caused by the increase in the numbers of the Peace Preservation Corps and their threatening preparations. He added that Government troops were occupying the North Station and that there was an especially threatening concentration near the Japanese military headquarters. He urged that the Ambassadors try to persuade the Chinese authorities to withdraw their forces since the Japanese landing party could not withdraw and no other method was possible to separate the opposing forces. 2. The British and American naval commanders here were informed yesterday afternoon by the senior naval officer in command that the Yangtze had been blocked at an undesignated point above Woosung. The Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both refused to confirm this although the former informally admitted it might be true and stated that the passage of vessels was very dangerous. They said an official announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be made in due course. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9331: Telegram [Document 433] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 13, 1937—11 p.m. [ a.m.? ] [Received August 13—6 a.m.] 463. My August 12, 11 p.m. The area now held by outposts of police and volunteers and American and British forces are those known as Sectors B, C and D in the defence plan. Please note that Sector B includes West Hongkew area north of Soochow Creek. Chinese and Japanese reports indicate that a small clash occurred this morning just north of North Station. In the vicinity of Nantao, Chinese have thrown boom across river consisting of small steamers and junks, perhaps preparatory to sinking them and blocking channel. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping and Nanking. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9317: Telegram [Document 434] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 13, 1937—2 p.m. 146. Your 414, August 13, 2 a.m. The Department is of the opinion that while the action which you suggest be taken at Shanghai is appropriate and may prove helpful, that action should be reenforced by an approach made by you at Nanking, as authorized in the Department’s telegram No. 144 of August 12, 8 p.m. Shanghai’s reports indicate definitely that the foreign representatives there are experiencing difficulty in getting in touch with Chinese authorities and that the Chinese authorities at Shanghai may have insufficient authority to take effective action in the matter. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9337: Telegram [Document 435] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 13—7:52 a.m.] 468. Nanking’s August 13, 2 a.m., to Shanghai. In view of Chinese intimations that if Japanese should base on the International Settlement they will be unable to respect the so-called neutrality of the Settlement, may I respectfully urge further consideration of my suggestion. It would be extremely desirable that National Government be asked to instruct their military headquarters and commanders in the field, which are not available here at Shanghai, to respect the areas patrolled by neutral forces and Shanghai volunteers and police as a haven of refuge for our nationals and Chinese noncombatants. I will urge that all possible steps be taken here as required but I feel that the pressure should be [brought to bear at?] Nanking to instruct the responsible Chinese headquarters. Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department, Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9336: Telegram [Document 436] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 13—10:59 a.m.] 419. It is believed here that sniping between Chinese and Japanese forces began this morning at Shanghai at 9:15. At a meeting of colleagues named in my 403, August 11, noon [ midnight ], the British Ambassador stated that Hidaka had come to him this morning and made to him substantially the same communication as reported in my 415, August 13, 8 a.m. British Ambassador stated that he had emphasized to Hidaka that it was not possible for us to ask Chinese to remove Paoantui or other forces unless Japanese were willing to remove forces recently sent to augment Japanese landing party at Shanghai. British Ambassador also emphasized that this would have to be a matter of independent agreement between Japanese and Chinese. We discussed matter for some time. We agreed that we should not act as mediators between Chinese and Japanese; [regarding?] reduction of or withdrawal of forces at Shanghai; that we could not act as guarantors for either side; but we were agreeable that if Chinese and Japanese should be able to agree as between themselves to withdraw forces now facing each other at Shanghai we would be prepared to allow representatives to serve on a board of observers to watch simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese armed forces in the Shanghai area. We are agreeable that it is little likelihood that either side will now be willing to agree to such a withdrawal. We have been requested to visit the Generalissimo at 5 p.m. this afternoon to receive some kind of a communication. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9335: Telegram [Document 437] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 13—10:20 a.m.] 261. Embassy’s 254, August 10, 7 p.m. 1. Dodds informs me that the British Ambassador in Nanking has been authorized by his Government to urge the Chinese Government not to close the door to further negotiations. 2. Referring to Nanking’s 401, August 11, 6 p.m., I wish to make perfectly clear that it was and is far from my intention to recommend action in Nanking; demurring [ please see? ] the precise phraseology of paragraph 9 of our 254. I entirely concur in Ambassador Johnson’s views as expressed in his telegram. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9329: Telegram [Document 438] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 13, 1937—5 p.m. 147. Your 410, August 12, 6 p.m. Your analysis and opinion are helpful and are in general accord with the concept of the Department. In the drafting of its telegrams to you Nos. 141 89 and 145, August 12, the Department had in mind considerations similar to those which you advance in your telegram under reference. To the Department it appears that the presence of Chinese troops in the Shanghai area affords the Japanese an excuse for military operations in that region, whereas, were the Chinese troops not there, the Japanese would be deprived of that excuse and would have little or no ground on which to engage in military operations there. Department feels that, unless you and the Consul General at Shanghai perceive definite and strong reasons why it would be inadvisable, action along the lines of the Department’s instructions in the telegrams under reference should be proceeded with, if possible, under existing circumstances. Hull 89 Telegram No. 141 not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9339: Telegram [Document 439] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 13, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 13—11:10 a.m.] 262. 1. A meeting of four Ministers (Foreign, War, Navy, and Finance) was held last night to consider the serious situation at Shanghai. This was followed by an emergency Cabinet meeting this morning resulting in the issuance of a statement which will be reported in the American press. 2. In a conversation with the Naval Attaché after the Cabinet meeting the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister stated that Vice Admiral Hasegawa commanding the Third Squadron at Shanghai had recommended yesterday afternoon that a last effort be made to effect a peaceful settlement. The Japanese naval landing forces at present at Shanghai number only 3,000 and they are faced with the task of guarding 30,000 Japanese nationals now concentrated in the Japanese concession. Against the Japanese at present are 10,000 of the Chinese 88th Division in Chapei and 20,000 to 30,000 of Central forces to the eastward of Chapei in the direction of Woosung. Last night the 88th Division crossed the Nanking-Woosung Railroad and the Japanese landing force took up defensive positions along North Szechuan Road facing the Chinese. 3. The Senior Aide took occasion to say to the Naval Attaché that at yesterday’s meeting of consular officials in Shanghai the American attitude was “very fair and just” whereas the attitude of British, French and other consular officials was “different.” 4. While the Senior Aide was unable to disclose the Japanese plans it is the opinion of the Naval Attaché that no further reenforcements of troops or vessels are to be sent to Shanghai at the present juncture to avoid aggravating the situation. The 4 cruisers and 10 destroyers of the Third Squadron which arrived with the naval landing forces have left Shanghai. 5. Regarding the situation in North China, War Department officers consider the present disposition of Chinese troops as threatening to the safety of the Japanese forces. General Umezu 90 informed the Military Attaché that the Japanese would not attack unless the Chinese advanced but the prompt and overwhelming “counter attacks” of Chinese “attacks” at Nankow and Lianghsiang are evidence of the Japanese determination to enforce fulfillment of the various military agreements and to force a definite settlement of the North China situation. (See the Military Attaché’s telegram of August 13 to the War Department 91 ). Repeated to Nanking. Grew 90 Japanese Vice Minister of War. 91 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9341: Telegram [Document 440] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 13, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 13—11:50 a.m.] 263. Department’s 142, August 9, 7 p.m., 92 Shanghai situation. 1. I have received from Nanking the texts of the two communications as signed and delivered. 2. My Italian and German colleagues have not yet received instructions to act. They will inform me if and when such instructions come. 3. My French colleague this morning received authorization to support action if taken by the British Chargé d’Affaires and myself. He will do so in that event but is averse to making representations here on the ground that it is now too late to influence Japanese action in Shanghai. 4. The British Chargé d’Affaires this morning received mandatory instructions to urge the Japanese Government (1) not to use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and (2) not to land further forces there. He called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon ostensibly to inquire concerning the situation and brought up these two points incidentally. The Vice Minister replied that the Japanese desired to avoid hostilities and that if the Chinese forces would withdraw the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original positions and that some of these forces would withdraw from Shanghai altogether. He said that Hidaka would today inform the concerned ambassadors in Nanking to this effect. 5. While most deeply appreciating the critical situation in Shanghai I reluctantly share the views of most of my colleagues here that (1) representations by the concerned ambassadors in Tokyo to the Japanese Government would have no preventative effect and (2) that such representations even though made separately unless very carefully handled would risk provoking an anti-foreign outburst in the Japanese press which would tend to inflame the already bitter feeling engendered by the assassination of the Japanese naval officer in Shanghai. The Cabinet this morning decided “to take all measures to protect Japanese lives and property in Shanghai”. 6. I am nevertheless prepared to act with careful discretion on the Department’s authorization provided that my concerned colleagues eventually take similar action. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 92 See Department’s telegram No. 137, August 9, 7 p.m., p. 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9497: Telegram [Document 441] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 13, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 19—5:40 a.m. 93 ] 423. My 419, August 13, 4 p.m. I accompanied colleagues and we saw the Generalissimo at 11 [ 5? ] this evening. The Generalissimo opened the conversation by asking what information we had from Japan. The German Ambassador on his own initiative read to the Generalissimo text of reply which Japanese Ambassador delivered to us this afternoon to our joint note reported in my 403, August 11, midnight. He made the point that Japanese Ambassador expressed the hope that we could persuade Chinese to withdraw beyond fighting distance of Japanese, stating that Japanese in such a contingency would withdraw to previous positions. We pointed out that this was first time that Japanese had communicated to us any desire for help; that we were informing Generalissimo of this informally; that we could not undertake to define what Japanese meant by “fighting distance” nor were we prepared to define what Japanese meant by “withdrawal to their original positions”. Generalissimo stated that if we were prepared to guarantee good faith of the Japanese, Chinese would accept our guarantee and be prepared to negotiate with Japanese. We informed Generalissimo that we were in no position to act as guarantors of either side in these matters. Generalissimo stated that he wanted to emphasize that China had no desire to precipitate hostilities; that China desired peace. With reference to Japanese reply to our joint note, Generalissimo suggested that matter would be considered by the Foreign Office if brought to its attention. We stated that any understanding which Japanese and Chinese might reach would have to be through direct negotiations between the two sides; that we were not prepared to act as mediators; but that if an agreement could be reached between the two sides in regard to a mutual withdrawal at Shanghai we would be prepared to appoint observers to watch the fulfillment of such an agreement. I stated that whatever happened in regard to the situation at Shanghai, I hoped the Chinese would remember that foreigners had been collected for purposes of safety in that part of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek patrolled by the police of the Municipal Settlement and neutral armed forces, and that I hoped that in any operations in or near Shanghai the Chinese would remember this fact. Generalissimo stated that they had every desire to protect all foreign civilians even including Japanese, but that if Japanese used International Settlement as a base of attack it would be dangerous for foreigners there. I stated that we were using every means possible to withdraw foreign nationals from that area where Japanese were in order that they might be away from places of danger. Generalissimo in course of conversation expressed the hope that we would look below the surface in this connection to fundamental situation. He said that it was their information that Japanese intended to create a special area which would run roughly to a line from Sungkiang through Soochow and include the mouth of the Yangtze. We feel that there is little or no hope that we can prevent hostilities at Shanghai in view of large concentration by Japanese there. However, French Ambassador expects to see Hidaka this evening and with our approval he is informing Hidaka that we have brought substance of Japanese reply informally to the attention of the Generalissimo, and that it is our belief that if he could furnish Chinese Foreign Office with official text of Japanese proposal regarding mutual withdrawal this might serve as a basis for discussion between the Japanese and the Chinese. Sent to Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 93 Original telegram not received; duplicate sent upon report of missing orifirinal. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9345: Telegram [Document 442] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 13, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 13—1:16 p.m.] 264. Embassy’s 263, August 13, 7 p.m. 1. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to meet him at the Tilson [ Tokyo ] Club late this evening and gave me the text of the statement, the sense of which Hidaka has been instructed to communicate today to the five Ambassadors in Nanking in reply to their communication of August 11. In case any error should have occurred in communicating this message the Vice-Minister expressed the hope that I would cable the precise text to Washington. The text follows in section 2. 94 2. The Vice-Minister said that the situation in Shanghai is dangerous because Chinese troops have been sniping at the Japanese landing forces who have naturally returned the fire. The Japanese, he said, earnestly wish to avoid hostilities. He expressed the hope that the Ambassadors in Nanking would arrange through their consular representatives in Shanghai for the Chinese troops to withdraw “to an arranged point” whereupon the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original position. I asked the Vice-Minister if this was a request for mediation. He replied “yes, local mediation”. 3. I took the opportunity of this unsolicited interview to say to the Vice-Minister that I desired to support and earnestly to urge the importance of the representations made by the five Ambassadors in Nanking to the Japanese Embassy to the effect that the Japanese would not use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and that they would not land further forces. The Vice-Minister made no further comment except to thank me for having consistently had in mind the avoidance of undesirable publicity in the various steps which I have taken here. 4. The Vice-Minister told me that he was communicating also to the other concerned Ambassadors the instructions sent to Hidaka. 5. It does not now appear that anything further can usefully be done at this end of the line. [Text:] “(1) Since the Japanese Government desire most earnestly the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese and foreign residents in Shanghai, they sincerely hope that hostilities will be avoided in and around Shanghai. (2) It is, however, necessary that the Chinese regular troops and the equally armed Peace Preservation Corps which have been concentrated in the neighborhood of the International Settlement constituting a grave menace to the Japanese should be withdrawn at least to a point out of the fighting range and their military works around the International Settlement abolished, as the first step toward the ultimate securing of a faithful execution by the Chinese of the agreement of May 1932 regarding the cessation of hostilities around Shanghai. (3) The Japanese naval landing party are under a strict order to act with the utmost patience and have, therefore, no intention whatsoever of embarking, without provocation, upon aggressive action against the Chinese troops or the Peace Preservation Corps. The Japanese Government are prepared to restore the naval landing party to their original position when the Chinese accede to the amendments above set forth. (Furthermore, when the Chinese have faithfully carried out the agreement mentioned above, the strength of the naval landing party will also be restored to the normal footing.) (4) The Japanese Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the powers concerned will use all available means to expedite the withdrawal of the Chinese troops and the similarly equipped Peace Preservation Corps from the neighborhood of the International Settlement with a view to saving Shanghai from the imminent danger of an armed conflict.” Repeated to Nanking. Grew 94 For another version of text see communication from the Japanese Ambassador in China to the American Ambassador in China, et al. , Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 343 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9345: Telegram [Document 443] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) 95 Washington , August 13, 1937—midnight. 146. Your 263, 7 p.m. and 264, 11 p.m., August 13. In a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador this morning the Secretary urged emphatically that combat operations between Japanese and Chinese at Shanghai, if engaged in, would involve terrific hazards for all concerned, and that, regardless of technicalities, of argument over rights, of contention over who was at fault, or of disagreement as to who had fired a first shot, the world would consider each and both sides responsible if the Shanghai region is made a theater of battle. 96 Information of this has been given to the British Ambassador here. Also, he has been informed of Department’s instruction to Nanking to present to colleagues the view that Chinese authorities should be urged to avoid aggravating the situation in the Shanghai area. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Hull 95 Repeated as No. 213, August 13, midnight, to the Consul General at Shanghai to be sent as No. 149 to the Ambassador in China at Nanking. 96 See memorandum of August 13, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 342 . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Legation in Canada (Key) 793.94/9509 [Document 444] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Legation in Canada ( Key ) 97 [ Ottawa ,] August 13, 1937. [Present:] Sir Robert Craigie (British Ambassador to Tokyo) Mr. Armour (Minister) Mr. Key (Second Secretary of Legation) Following an informal luncheon given for Sir Robert and Lady Craigie at the Legation on August 13, 1937, Sir Robert, the Minister and Mr. Key, Second Secretary of Legation, retired to the library where the following conversation ensued. At the outset, Sir Robert expressed his regret that he had been unable to go to Washington for a talk with State Department officials en route to his new post, but explained that there had been two reasons for this. In the first place, he was somewhat pressed for time. In the second place, he felt that his presence in Washington at this particular time would probably have given rise to misapprehension on the part of the Japanese: the latter might think that his purpose in coming to Washington was to hatch some scheme for concerted Anglo-American action against the Japanese. It was particularly in order to avoid creating any such unwarranted suspicions, on the part of the Japanese, that he had decided against proceeding to Washington. He added that he would be grateful if the reasons for his failure to come to Washington were made known to the Department should the Minister shortly be communicating to Washington. The Minister stated that he shared Sir Robert’s views about the desirability of not stirring up Japanese susceptibilities unnecessarily and would be glad to inform the Department of what Sir Robert had told him. Turning to the general outlook in the Far East, Sir Robert felt that it was indeed gloomy. Until recently, his government had felt that, what he termed, the “civilian” and moderate groups in Japan had been making steady progress and that a more tolerant attitude towards China was being created: Japanese public opinion was more and more coming around to the view that peaceful methods of composing Sino-Japanese differences must be sought. Notwithstanding the ever present danger of assassination, civilian leaders had become increasingly bold in their utterances and actions. This changed situation had so alarmed Japanese military groups that they had felt impelled to put a stop to it, hence the present military adventures in China. The present war fever in Japan and the strong public support now being given the militarists showed that, for the present at least, the latter had regained the upper hand. The possibility of large scale military operations by Japanese groups in China was now unfortunately very real: civilian and moderate groups in Japan were apparently powerless to stem the rising tide of feeling against China. The only hope was that the general situation would soon improve and that the Chinese would have the good sense not further to provoke the Japanese. Meanwhile, it was more important than ever before to do everything possible to strengthen the hands of the civilian and moderate groups in Japan. Undoubtedly there were large and influential groups in Japan which were out of sympathy with present Japanese policy towards China. The present military adventure was costing a lot of money: soon it would be reflected in increased taxation. When you touch a man’s pocketbook you touch him in a sensitive spot: further taxes piled on top of the already exhorbitant taxes now levied in Japan eventually could create only further unfavorable reaction to the Japanese military. Although the outlook was grave and no one could foretell what would be the outcome of the present military operations in China it was not unlikely that, in the long run, the intransigeance of the Japanese military would serve in the end to weaken them further politically. Sir Robert expressed the view that one sure way of strengthening the hands of the civilian and moderate groups in Japan was for Great Britain and the United States to refrain from exerting any joint or concerted action against the Japanese Government. The moment that the Japanese military could rightly claim that joint Anglo-American pressure was being brought to bear on Japan, Japanese public opinion would solidify in support of the military. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the British and American Governments avoid the possibility of giving the Japanese military even the pretext for asserting such a claim. He felt it unnecessary to say that the British and Americans should keep each other fully informed as to what policies they would pursue and were pursuing in the Far East, but whatever action might result from these policies should be taken independently. Probably any steps taken would be more or less identical since both Governments view the situation along the same general lines, but under no conditions should the Japanese be given grounds for the belief that the British and American Governments were in league against them. On the other hand, in Sir Robert’s opinion, it was extremely important that the Japanese Government and more particularly the Japanese military, be made to understand, beyond any doubt, that the British and American Governments hold common views on Far Eastern policies. Let there be nothing to make the Japanese militarists think that there was even the possibility of a rift in Anglo-American relations. Sir Robert stated that in the Foreign Office there had been an important and influential group which held the view that the chief hope of curbing the Japanese lay in joint Anglo-American action. He had not subscribed to this belief himself and felt therefore that the attitude of the American Government in discouraging joint action had been most “wise”: the Japanese knew perfectly well that neither in Great Britain nor the United States was there any considerable group which was willing to say to Japan “you may go thus far, but no further”. This had been the fundamental weakness of the so-called Stimson policy. Furthermore, threats, whether or not they contained an element of bluff, would only weaken the hands of the civilian and moderate groups in Japan. He remarked laughingly that perhaps he should not have expressed his views so frankly, as some of them ran somewhat contrary to those held at the Foreign Office. Sir Robert then went on to say that it ought to be comparatively easy to adjust Sino-Japanese economic relations: strictly from an economic viewpoint, conditions were nearly ideal for a rapprochement . Japan was primarily industrial while China was essentially agricultural, thus making the economics of the two countries complementary. Each was dependent on the other and if only a peaceful era in their political relations could be ushered in it would be to their great mutual advantage. Furthermore, even the Japanese militarists recognized Japan’s dependence on China. They admitted that if Japan were to become embroiled in a war with Russia it was vital for the former that China remain neutral. Nevertheless the military elements in Japan were so shortsighted as constantly to aggravate the Chinese and thus to make it almost certain that China would cast in her lot with the U.S.S.R. in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. The Minister asked Sir Robert for his opinion as to how real was the fear in Japan of the Soviet air force and particularly the important Soviet aviation elements said to be concentrated in and near Vladivostok, which it has been claimed could, if required, easily fly to Japan, bomb many of the leading Japanese industrial centres and return to their base. Sir Robert stated that in his opinion the Japanese believed it inevitable that sooner or later they would have to square their accounts with the U.S.S.R. There had been considerable uneasiness in Japan about the Soviet air force, but the recent purges in the U.S.S.R. had considerably lessened this fear, at least among the Japanese military. The latter apparently felt that the wholesale executions which had been taking place in Russia during recent months had more or less disrupted the Soviet Army because so many of their leading generals had been put to death. This situation was no doubt one of the contributing factors to the decision of the Japanese military to undertake the present adventure in China. In closing, Sir Robert stated that he was looking forward with pleasure to renewing his acquaintance with Mr. Grew, with whom he had been en poste in Berne during the World War and of whom he entertained a very high opinion. The Minister stated that he felt sure that Sir Robert would find Mr. Grew unusually well informed on current affairs in Japan and that he was equally sure that he would find him at all times ready and willing to cooperate fully. 97 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Canada in his despatch No. 1553, August 17; received August 19. Chapter IV: August 13–31, 1937 Chapter IV: August 13–31, 1937 Commencement of hostilities at Shanghai between Chinese and Japanese forces, August 13; American protest to China concerning bombing of International Settlement; representations to China and Japan concerning fighting at Shanghai, August 14; U. S. Marine reinforcements from San Diego for Shanghai, August 17; mutual recriminations over situation at Shanghai by China and Japan; failure to reach compromise to stop hostilities there; American representations to Tokyo regarding safety of Tsingtao as undefended city, August 23; announcement of nonaggression pact between China and Soviet Union, August 28–29 [445] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 13, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 13—10 a.m.] 793.94/9332: Telegram [446] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 14, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 793.94/9347: Telegram [447] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 793.94/9354: Telegram [448] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 793.94/9359: Telegram [449] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—noon. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 793.94/9363: Telegram [450] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 14, 1937—noon. [Received August 14—10:45 a.m.] 793.94/9367: Telegram [451] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 14—9 a.m.] 793.94/9357: Telegram [452] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 6 p.m.] 793.94/9370: Telegram [453] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 14—6:50 a.m.] 793.94/9348: Telegram [454] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 14—9:37 a.m.] 793.94/9361: Telegram [455] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 16—7 a.m.] 793.94/9416: Telegram [456] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 14—8:38 a.m.] 793.94/9353: Telegram [457] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 14—11:24 a.m.] 793.94/9366: Telegram [458] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma) [Washington,] August 14, 1937. 793.94/9651 [459] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 16—1:40 p.m.] 793.94/9422: Telegram [460] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 14, 1937—10 p.m. 793.94/9366: Telegram [461] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 15—9:48 a.m.] 793.94/9372: Telegram [462] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 14—4:40 p.m.] 793.94/9373: Telegram [463] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14, 1937—noon [midnight]. [Received August 15—11:40 a.m.] 793.94/9374: Telegram [464] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 15, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 15—6 a.m.] 793.94/9377: Telegram [465] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 15, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 15—2 p.m.] 793.94/9378: Telegram [466] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 15, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 15—3 p.m.] 793.94/9392: Telegram [467] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 14 [15], 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 15—3 p.m.] 793.94/9375: Telegram [468] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 15, 1937—midnight. [Received August 15—4 p.m.] 793.94/9380: Telegram [469] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 16, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 16—8 a.m.] 793.94/9418: Telegram [470] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 16, 1937. 793.94/9652 [471] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 16, 1937. 893.0146/575 [472] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 16, 1937. 793.94/9652 [473] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 16, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94111/34: Telegram [474] The Navy Department to the Department of State August 16, 1937 793.94/9419: Telegram [475] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 16—11:50 a.m.] 793.94/9425: Telegram [476] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 16, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 16—2:15 p.m.] 793.94/9427: Telegram [477] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, August 16, 1937—midnight. 793.94/9151: Telegram [478] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 16, 1937—midnight. 793.94/9372: Telegram [479] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 17, 1937—noon. [Received August 18—9:59 a.m.] 793.94/9471: Telegram [480] Press Release Issued by the Navy Department on August 17, 1937 August 17, 1937 793.94/9469 [481] The Consul at Tsinan (Allison) to the Secretary of State Tsinan, August 17, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 18—6 a.m.] 793.94/9459: Telegram [482] The Consul at Hong Kong (Donovan) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong, August 17, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 19—5 a.m.] 793.94/9491: Telegram [483] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 17—4:04 p.m.] 793.94/9456: Telegram [484] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 17, 1937. [Received November 1.] 793.94/10922 [485] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 18, 1937—11 a.m. 793.94/9372: Telegram [486] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 18, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 22—6:20 a.m.] 793.94111/35: Telegram [487] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 18—10:30 a.m.] 793.94/9473: Telegram [488] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 18—9:35 a.m.] 793.94/9470: Telegram [489] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 18, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 18—3 p.m.] 793.94/9484: Telegram [490] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, August 18, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/9456: Telegram [491] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 18, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 18—7:28 p.m.] 793.94/9485: Telegram [492] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Shanghai,] August 18, 1937—9:30 p.m. [Received August 18—12:05 p.m.] 793.94/9474: Telegram [493] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , August 18, 1937. 793.94/9756 [494] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, August 19, 1937—8 a.m. [Received August 20—6 a.m.] 793.94/9527: Telegram [495] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 19, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 19—3 a.m.] 793.94/9488: Telegram [496] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 19, 1937—noon. [Received August 19—5:55 a.m.] 793.94/9493: Telegram [497] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 19, 1937—noon. [Received August 20—6:45 a.m.] 793.94/9528: Telegram [498] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, August 19, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2 p.m.] 793.94/9512: Telegram [499] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 19—7:30 a.m.] 793.94/9499: Telegram [500] The French Embassy to the Department of State undated 793.94/9977 [501] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 19, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 19—3:25 p.m.] 793.94/9517: Telegram [502] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , August 19, 1937. 793.94/9756 [503] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] August 20, 1937. 793.94/9977 [504] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 20, 1937—noon. [Received 9:05 p.m.] 793.94/9541: Telegram [505] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 20, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 21—6 a.m.] 793.94/9551: Telegram [506] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 20—3:03 p.m.] 793.94/9537: Telegram [507] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 20, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 20—1:20 p.m.] 793.94/9534: Telegram [508] The British Embassy to the Department of State [ Washington ,] August 20, 1937. 793.94/9643 [509] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, August 21, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 21—5 a.m.] 793.94/9550: Telegram [510] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , August 21, 1937. 793.94/9643 [511] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Shanghai,] August 21, 1937—7:05 p.m. [Received August 21—11:38 a.m.] 793.94/9560: Telegram [512] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 21, 1937—11 p.m. 793.94/9527a: Telegram [513] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 23, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 23—1:20 a.m.] 793.94/9588: Telegram [514] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 23, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 23—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/9596: Telegram [515] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 23, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 23—6:50 a.m.] 793.94/9627: Telegram [516] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 23—4:45 p.m.] 793.94/9631: Telegram [517] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 23, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 23—8:45 p.m.] 793.94/9634: Telegram [518] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 24, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 5:04 p.m.] 793.94/9660: Telegram [519] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 24, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9588: Telegram [520] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 24, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9560: Telegram [521] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 24, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 24—8:05 a.m.] 793.94/9639: Telegram [522] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 24, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 24—7:05 a.m.] 793.94/9637: Telegram [523] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , August 24, 1937. 793.94/9979 [524] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the British Chargé (Mallet) [Washington,] August 24, 1937. 793.94/9979: Telegram [525] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 24, 1937. 793.94/9980 [526] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 24, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 24—7:57 p.m.] 793.94/9659: Telegram [527] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 24, 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 24—12:11 p.m.] 793.94/9655: Telegram [528] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, August 25, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 25—6:47 a.m.] 793.94/9669: Telegram [529] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 25, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 25—6:30 a.m.] 793.94/9672: Telegram [530] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 25, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 5:12 p.m.] 793.94/9687: Telegram [531] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 25, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 25—5:25 p.m.] 793.94/9688: Telegram [532] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 25, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/9634: Telegram [533] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 25, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/9672: Telegram [534] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 25, 1937—9 p.m. 793.94/9659: Telegram [535] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 26, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 26—8:40 a.m.] 793.94/9706: Telegram [536] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, August 26, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 26—7:45 a.m.] 793.94/9704: Telegram [537] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 5:32 p.m.] 793.94/9719: Telegram [538] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 9:10 p.m.] 793.94/9723: Telegram [539] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 26—11:35 a.m.] 793.94/9707: Telegram [540] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 26—12:40 p.m.] 793.94/9710: Telegram [541] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, August 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 26—2:55 p.m.] 793.94/9711: Telegram [542] The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Berlin, August 26, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 28—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/9753: Telegram [543] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, August 26, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 26—7:30 p.m.] 761.93/1600: Telegram [544] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, August 27, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/9723: Telegram [545] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 27—1:35 p.m.] 793.94/9732: Telegram [546] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 27, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/9707: Telegram [547] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 27, 1937. 793.94/9830 [548] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State [ Washington ,] August 27, 1937. 793.94/9884 [549] The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Berlin, August 28, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 28—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/9755: Telegram [550] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] August 28, 1937. 793.94/9831 [551] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State Washington , August 28, 1937. 793.94/9883 [552] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 29, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 29—5:40 a.m.] 793.94/9771: Telegram [553] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 29, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 29—5:40 a.m.] 761.9312 (Aggressor)/3: Telegram [554] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 29—2:48 p.m.] 793.94/9772: Telegram [555] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 29, 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 29—1:05 p.m.] 701.4193/102: Telegram [556] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, August 30, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 29—2:10 p.m.] 793.94/9779: Telegram [557] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 30, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 30—9:55 a.m.] 793.94/9788: Telegram [558] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, August 30, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 30—2:48 p.m.] 701.4193/103: Telegram [559] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 30, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/9788: Telegram [560] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, August 31, 1937—noon. [Received August 31—1:50 a.m.] 793.94/9804: Telegram [561] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, August 31, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 31—11:30 a.m.] 761.9312 (Aggressor)/4: Telegram [562] The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Berlin, August 31, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 31—12:54 p.m.] 761.9312 (Aggressor)/5: Telegram [563] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, August 31, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 9:16 p.m.] 793.94/9820: Telegram The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9332: Telegram [Document 445] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 13, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 13—10 a.m.] 474. Artillery firing northeastern area between Japanese and Chinese since 4 o’clock this afternoon. At 8 o’clock tonight extending to general area civic center. Japanese Vice Consul informally requested member of my staff to inform appropriate American nationals and I have done so that Japanese Navy had decided to use anti-aircraft guns against Chinese planes and that commercial planes would fly over Japanese naval vessels at their own risk. Repeated to Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9347: Telegram [Document 446] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 14, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 476. My 474, August 13, 10 p.m. Heavy artillery firing still continues same area at intervals. So far as I am able to ascertain all Americans at Shanghai are safe and have withdrawn from areas of firing. 2. Chinese City Government functioning just outside of French Concession at Fenglingchao. Sent to the Department, Nanking and Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9354: Telegram [Document 447] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 426. Your [ Shanghai’s ] 468, August 13, 4 p.m. See my 423, August 12 [ 13 ], 6 [ 8 ] p.m. to the Department. I emphasized to Generalissimo in as strong terms as I could the necessity for protection foreign life in area south of Soochow Creek. His message, repeated to you last night in my August 13, 11 p.m., is, I believe, confirmatory evidence that Chinese military will not interfere with area patrolled by international defense force where foreigners have been collected, provided, of course, that area in question is not used as a base for attack on Chinese forces outside. Neutral forces policing and patrolling area should exclude fighting forces of both sides and I have no doubt that neutrality of area will be respected. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9359: Telegram [Document 448] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 427. Your 146, August 13, 2 p.m. We made use of opportunity offered by visit to Generalissimo last evening (see my 423, August 13, 8 p.m.) to emphasize necessity for respecting neutrality of that part of Settlement patrolled by international forces and Settlement police into which foreigners have been drawn. Warning that Americans be evacuated [from] Hongkew and Yangtzepoo areas indicates that Chinese are prepared to respect neutrality of area south [of] Soochow Creek provided, of course, that that area is not used by Japanese as a base for an attack upon Chinese forces. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9363: Telegram [Document 449] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—noon. [Received August 14—3 a.m.] 428. Your [ Shanghai’s ] 474, August 13, 10 p.m., last sentence. For the strictly confidential information of yourself and the Commander in Chief. 1 General Chiang has sent me word very confidentially that he feels great anxiety over the presence of Japanese naval vessels at Shanghai in close proximity to the Settlement and to foreign naval vessels. The Chinese may be obliged to attack the Japanese vessels from the air and the anxiety of General Chiang would be relieved in part if foreign vessels could moor at some distance from the Japanese ships. For some reason the Chinese authorities expect intensive Japanese action August 15. Sent to Shanghai. Johnson 1 Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9367: Telegram [Document 450] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 14, 1937—noon. [Received August 14—10:45 a.m.] 477. At midnight on 13th Shanghai Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated it was instructed to notify all foreign diplomatic and consular representatives to instruct their respective nationals to remove from the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo areas to other places as quickly as possible. Warning is being given Americans concerned. 2. Chinese air craft are bombing at Shanghai. I am confidentially informed that American aviators have threatened to join Chinese air forces. It is intimated that Colonel Chennault, 2 retired officer United States Army Air Corps, now believed to be at Nanking, is implicated. Sent to the Department, Nanking and Peiping. Gauss 2 Claire L. Chennault. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9357: Telegram [Document 451] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 14—9 a.m.] 266. 1. With respect to the press reports of the naval bombardment yesterday at Shanghai, a naval informant stated to the Naval Attaché 3 that as several Japanese Yangtze River gunboats were leaving for a down river rendezvous yesterday afternoon they were fired on from shore a few miles below Shanghai. The fire was returned and the ships proceeded down river. 2. As regards blocking of the Whangpoo: two Chinese steamers and several large junks were sunk by the Chinese above the naval anchorage, apparently to prevent Japanese gunboats proceeding up river to capture Chinese gunboats undergoing overhaul at the Shanghai Whangpoo dockyard. 3. Informant further stated that 500 additional men were landed last night from the Idzumo (flagship) and other Japanese ships to reinforce the naval landing force, bringing the number of the latter up to 3,500. As all of the landing force is on the front line, there are no reserves which makes the tactical situation precarious. The use of guns from the ships present to support or cover the landing force would be most dangerous to the civilian population and property as it would be necessary to fire over the Settlement. 4. Naval Attaché, from the statements made by informant today and yesterday (Embassy’s 262, August 13, 6 p.m.), is of the opinion that the Cabinet decided at the meeting this morning to send army troops to Shanghai. 5. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, after the Cabinet meeting this morning, told to press representatives that the Cabinet had determined “to take concrete measures.” No other statement was made and the Chief Secretary’s words are interpreted by many to mean that military reenforcements will be sent to Shanghai. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 3 Commander Harvey M. Bemis. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9370: Telegram [Document 452] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 6 p.m.] 429. Chinese authorities state that three squadrons of planes this morning bombed and set on fire Japanese landing force headquarters and the Kunzta factory where Japanese ammunition is stored and attempted to bomb Japanese cruiser Idzumo but missed and hit wharf. Also several Chinese planes were hit, only one has as yet failed to return. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9348: Telegram [Document 453] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 14—6:50 a.m.] 480. Repeated and increasingly heavy bombing by Chinese planes is continuing. Several bombs have dropped within area of foreign refuge near waterfront. Palace Hotel hit. Chinese planes are not respecting Settlement or area of refuge. I urge strongest representations to the Generalissimo. Sent to Department and Nanking. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9361: Telegram [Document 454] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 14—9:37 a.m.] 268. Embassy’s 263, August 13, 7 p.m., paragraph 3. The French Ambassador who was summoned last evening to an interview with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 4 (see our 264, August 13, 11 p.m., paragraph 4) did not take that opportunity to support the representations of the five Ambassadors in Nanking because he felt such action to be superfluous in the face of the Vice Minister’s statement. 5 Repeated to Nanking. Grew 4 K. Horinouchi. 5 The German Embassy also did not participate in any collective démarche . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9416: Telegram [Document 455] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 16—7 a.m.] 431. Radio broadcast Shanghai states at 5:30 that aircraft bombarded Hongkew, bombs falling in Settlement south of Soochow Creek. I have telephoned Donald 6 reminding him of statement I made to Generalissimo yesterday afternoon that American nationals were taking refuge in the settlement south of Soochow Creek and he told me that General Chiang had issued renewed strict instructions to the Chinese military authorities this morning to avoid all injury to that area. He said the Chinese authorities would investigate this latest occurrence immediately. Sent to the Department, Shanghai. Johnson 6 W. H. Donald, Australian adviser to Generalissimo Chiang. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9353: Telegram [Document 456] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 14—8:38 a.m.] 481. Increasingly heavy bombing by Chinese air craft at Shanghai is going on. Their objective is Japanese flagship tied up near Japanese Consulate General. There are urgent pleas that this war vessel proceed to an anchorage down stream as its present situation is bringing bombs short dropped into the area of foreign refuge where a large number have been killed and others, including Americans, wounded. Situation grave. I have asked Embassy, Nanking, to make representations. 7 Repeated to Department and Tokyo. Gauss 7 See telegram No. 485, August 15, 11 a.m., from the Consul General at Shanghai, vol. iv , p. 255 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9366: Telegram [Document 457] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 14—11:24 a.m.] 269. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires 8 again called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs 9 today and under instructions from his Government presented a further communication, the text of which I append. Dodds took the responsibility of considerably moderating the text of his instructions which included such terms as “preposterous” and “glaring” with reference to Japanese action in Shanghai. 2. At first Dodds considered an approach to the four concerned Ambassadors here to support his step but finally decided to omit the Italian and German and to communicate only with the French Ambassador and myself. In his letters to us he expressed the hope that we would be prepared to support the representations which he has made. 3. The French Ambassador tells me that he will reply to Dodds immediately to the effect that he believes the proposed step too late to be effective but that he will refer the matter to his Government and will await instructions. He believes that these instructions will be negative. 4. I told Dodds orally that I am not prepared to take further action unless so instructed by my Government. [Text:] “14th August 1937. My Dear Minister: I have this morning received a most immediate telegram from my Government regarding the reports which have reached them of fighting in the Hongkew district of Shanghai. His Majesty’s Ambassador at Nanking and I are instructed to impress upon the Governments to which we are accredited once more in the strongest terms the importance of avoiding hostilities in Shanghai. Both the Japanese and Chinese Governments are under the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action likely to lead, whether through their own immediate fault or that of the other party, to such hostilities and to the incalculable danger which will ensue to the many thousands of foreigners in no way concerned. Not only contact between the troops of the opposing parties but their presence in that area must be recognized as constituting a naked flame in a powder magazine and the responsibility cannot be avoided by argument as to who started firing or what technical right exists to have troops on the spot. Both sides will be responsible for the disastrous results which cannot humanly speaking be avoided if their present attitude is maintained. To the impartial onlooker that attitude is the one most certainly leading to the very trouble which each side profess to wish to avoid. No word can alter this fact and His Majesty’s Government must appeal to both the Japanese and Chinese Governments with the utmost insistence to make their deeds conform to their assurances. I am instructed to point out to Your Excellency that His Majesty’s Government find it difficult to reconcile the assurances of Your Excellency’s Government that they are most anxious not to imperil Shanghai with the measure recently taken because two members of their landing party have been killed far outside the city boundary. I am to appeal to Your Excellency for the sake of the good name of Japan and in the interests of humanity to undertake that every effort will be made to avoid not only a recurrence of such incidents but exaggerated measures if and when they do occur and in general such disposition and use of their forces. Under this heading certainly comes the use of the International Settlement as a base in any form such as would lead to Chinese counter measures. It is to be hoped that Your Excellency’s Government will, on the contrary, take every possible measure to prove to the Chinese that serious action is not intended in Shanghai. Believe me, My Dear Minister, Yours very sincerely, J. L. Dodds”. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 8 J. L. Dodds. 9 Koki Hirota. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma) 793.94/9651 [Document 458] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy ( Suma ) [ Washington ,] August 14, 1937. Mr. Suma called on me at his request this morning. Mr. Suma opened the conversation with a narrative of events at Shanghai, in the course of which he mentioned nothing of which we had not already had reports either in telegrams or in press dispatches. He interspersed his account with statements attributing all blame and responsibility for the military situation around Shanghai to the Chinese. He affirmed that the Japanese were acting under necessity and that it was “impossible” for them to withdraw from the scene. At that point, on the basis of authorization given me by the Secretary before Mr. Suma arrived, I first asked Mr. Suma why it was “impossible,” and, after he said that the Chinese made it impossible, I said that I would like to repeat, under instruction, in substance something which the Secretary of State had said on the previous day to the Japanese Ambassador. 10 I said that in our opinion both Japan and China are responsible for the present military situation at Shanghai. I said that it takes two parties in conflict to make a fight. If neither the Chinese nor the Japanese had sent armed forces to Shanghai there could not be a fight there; if either side had stayed away there could not be a fight; if either would withdraw there could not be a fight. We could not—and we felt that the world would not—be impressed by an affirmation of either side, in repudiation of its own responsibility, that the whole blame lay with the other side. I said that I was not expressing a personal opinion, I was expressing an official opinion, I was telling Mr. Suma how it looked to the American Government. I said that we were saying the same thing to the Chinese and that we wanted each side to understand that we considered each and both sides responsible. I then suggested to Mr. Suma that in whatever report he made of the conversation he should make clear the whole of what I had said and that it might be helpful if he were simply to say that this was what had been said to him at the Department of State, without needing to attribute it to any particular officer by name. Mr. Suma said that he would be very careful in the making of his report. 10 See memorandum of August 13, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 342 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9422: Telegram [Document 459] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 16—1:40 p.m.] 432. Shanghai’s 480, August 14, 5 p.m., and my 431, August 14, 6 p.m. I have forwarded written protest to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 11 I also called in person upon him this evening and protested against dropping of bombs in Settlement south of Soochow Creek now used as refuge by Americans and other foreigners. I appealed to him to urge Chinese military authorities to do everything possible to stop this wanton violation of Settlement now packed with refugees. Minister of Foreign Affairs promised to take matter up with Generalissimo. British and French Ambassadors have filed similar protests and matter has been brought to the attention of Generalissimo again through Mr. Donald. Johnson 11 Wang Chung-hui. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9366: Telegram [Document 460] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 14, 1937—10 p.m. 149. Your 269, August 14, 6 p.m., paragraph 4, and Department’s 146, August 13, midnight. 1. Counselor of Japanese Embassy called on Chief of Far Eastern Division this morning and began a narration “for information” of events at Shanghai, attributing all blame to the Chinese. Speaking under authorization, and saying so, Hornbeck then reiterated what had been said by the Secretary yesterday to Saito as reported to you in Department’s 146, first paragraph, emphasizing the point that the military situation at Shanghai is a situation to the making of which both Japan and China have contributed and for which neither country can, in the opinion of this Government, repudiate responsibility. This view, thus communicated here yesterday and today, coincides with that expressed by the British Foreign Office to the Japanese Foreign Office through the British Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo as reported in your 269 under reference. Department is by no means sure that Japanese Embassy reports fully to Japanese Foreign Office. The only hope of there being averted probably extremely dangerous and destructive military operations at Shanghai would seem to lie in the possibility that one or both sides withdraw armed forces from that locality. 2. In the light of all of the above, Department feels that, without making a special occasion, you should take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the view that, if the Shanghai region is made a theater of battle, neither side can divest itself of responsibility by accusing the other. You might urge that, although withdrawal might be psychologically difficult for either side, it would be physically easier for the Japanese than for the Chinese. You could also say that your Government has urged upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. You may use your discretion both as to action and as to substance. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9372: Telegram [Document 461] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 15—9:48 a.m.] 433. Your 141, August 12, 2 p.m., 12 and 144, August 12, 8 p.m., received 3:30 p.m. today. Your 147, August 13, 5 p.m., received 5 p.m. today. I saw British Ambassador this evening and he told me that he had just made to Wang Chung Hui the following statement under orders from his Government: “Reports today of fighting having broken out in the Hongkew District of Shanghai make it urgently necessary to impress on the Chinese and the Japanese Governments once more in strongest terms the importance of avoiding hostilities in that city. Each side is under the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action likely to lead, whether through their own immediate fault or that of the other, to such hostilities and to the incalculable danger which will ensue to thousands of foreigners in no way concerned. Not only contact between troops of opposite parties, but their presence in that area, must be recognized as constituting a naked flame in a powder magazine, and responsibility can not be avoided by petty arguments as to who started firing or what technical right exists to have troops on the spot. Both sides will be responsible for disaster which is inevitable if their present attitude is maintained. To the casual onlooker that attitude is one of the most certain to lead to the very trouble which each side professes to wish to avoid. No words can alter the fact, and His Majesty’s Government must appeal to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments with the utmost insistence to make their actions conformable to their assurances. Please point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the folly and inconsistency of the Chinese bringing their troops into contact with the Japanese at Shanghai. They cannot ultimately do themselves any good by such action but will in fact only increase the danger of the Japanese ultimately controlling the destiny of Shanghai and main source of the customs revenue while endangering the city itself and the foreign lives in it.” He asked me whether I would support this. Subsequently when I went to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs to protest against bombs dropped in Settlement I told Minister of Foreign Affairs that I had been informed of British Ambassador’s statement to him and that I wished to support the British Ambassador to the point of expressing the hope that some means might be found whereby the two Governments might get together and bring about a cessation of hostilities in neighborhood of Shanghai. Minister of Foreign Affairs asked me whether I was informed of formula quoted in paragraph 1 of Shanghai’s No. 473 of August 13, 9 p.m. 13 I had previously been informed that British Ambassador had handed this formula to Minister of Foreign Affairs. I told Minister of Foreign Affairs that I was informed of this formula and I expressed the hope that Chinese Government would give it serious consideration. Minister of Foreign Affairs took matter to the Generalissimo this evening. I shall probably hear tomorrow of result. [ Johnson ] 12 Not printed. 13 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 346 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9373: Telegram [Document 462] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 14—4:40 p.m.] 434. Embassy’s 432, August 14, 8 p.m. and 431, August 14, 6 p.m. 1. Donald telephoned at 10 p.m. and said that the Generalissimo was taking a very serious view of the dropping of bombs by Chinese planes today in the International Settlement, the pilots responsible were being called up for court martial and instructions were being issued against any further flying by Chinese military planes over the foreign areas. He said that according to Chiang’s information the planes in question had as objectives the Japanese naval vessels in the river and when in the course of diving they flattened out over the neighborhood of the Cathay Mansion Hotel they were damaged by anti-aircraft guns and bombs were loosened and dropped. There were three Northrop planes engaged, two of them landed in Hongkew due to the damage incurred and the pilots are in hospital. 2. He added that Chiang’s headquarters had received a report that 11 Japanese planes from Formosa this afternoon raided Hangchow but the damage was not great and Chinese planes which engaged them brought down 2 of the heavy bombers. 3. Sent to the Department, Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9374: Telegram [Document 463] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14, 1937—noon [ midnight ]. [Received August 15—11:40 a.m.] 435. My 433, August 14, 10 p.m., British Ambassador has just informed me that Minister for Foreign Affairs called on him this evening and stated that Generalissimo expressed interest in formula presented by Consuls at Shanghai (see Shanghai’s 473 of August 13, 9 p.m. 14 ) but wanted to know what guarantee he had that Japanese would carry out and keep such an agreement. British Ambassador suggested that he should discuss this with Japanese and renewed offer of neutral observers to watch carrying out of any agreement for mutual withdrawal two countries might reach. Johnson 14 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 346 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9377: Telegram [Document 464] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 15, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 15—6 a.m.] 439. Nanking visited by planes about 2 p.m. which dropped a number of bombs apparently on objectives south of city of Nanking, presumably air field. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9378: Telegram [Document 465] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 15, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 15—2 p.m.] 440. My 439, August 15, 2 p.m. Just after the conclusion of the first flight of Japanese bombers about 2 p.m., Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, telephoned to Peck 15 and said that he had received instructions to proceed with Embassy officials to Tsingtao and had asked the Chinese Foreign Office for airplanes. He did not expect to be able to leave before the morning of August 17. He thought the reason for his instructions was the increasing difficulty of communicating with the Ambassador at Shanghai and with Tokyo. Refering to earlier conversations with Peck which he had asked should not be regarded as official but which Peck had reported to me he said the Chinese Foreign Office would look after the Japanese Embassy buildings but he asked whether the American Embassy would be willing to serve as a medium of communication between the Japanese and Chinese authorities in this connection “if communication between them should become difficult”. Acting on authorization I had already given him, Peck said the Embassy would gladly do this and in reply to an inquiry said that no written request would be necessary. He inquired whether the American Ambassador had made representations to the Chinese Foreign Office and Peck replied that the British Ambassador and the American Ambassador had done so but that the latter had been principally interested in the Shanghai events of yesterday. Hidaka then earnestly advised that people should not go out-of-doors during the afternoon. Peck replied that Japanese planes had already dropped bombs on the city and had departed, at which news the Japanese Counselor expressed surprise and inquired how many planes had participated. He expressed his earnest hope for the safety of the American Embassy. At intervals of 20 minutes two more flights of Japanese bombers occurred, the second time with two planes and the third time with four. Bombs were dropped principally on the flying field inside the city and the barracks just south of the city. The planes flew in formation and very low apparently indifferent to numerous anti-aircraft attacks. No Chinese planes appeared until after the Japanese planes had finally disappeared. Chinese sources report that two Japanese planes were brought down but this was not observed by the Embassy staff which saw the whole proceedings. The Embassy is about 2 miles from the area bombarded inside the city and about 3 miles from that outside the city. Owing to the elevated site all operations were clearly visible. It is reported that planes and hangars inside the city were not damaged. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow. Johnson 15 Counselor of Embassy in China. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9392: Telegram [Document 466] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 15, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 15—3 p.m.] 490. Consular body this afternoon decided to ask Senior Consul to make three representations to the Mayor to following effect: (1) With reference to report said to have reached the Mayor that Japanese anti-aircraft and machine guns have been mounted on certain Japanese buildings on the Bund, the consular body was assured by Japanese Consul General that the report is altogether erroneous and that he is prepared to arrange for inspection of the site by Chinese officials designated by the Mayor to verify these assurances. If reports are found to be untrue consular body hoped that the Mayor would give the fact publicity. (On this point the Mayor said he was satisfied from the information given from various sources that the report is untrue. He refused to give publicity but said he would answer any press inquiries made to him.) (2) The consular body has been assured by Japanese Consul General that no Japanese war planes will fly south of the Soochow Creek over the foreign areas. Consular body hopes Mayor will give a similar understanding for the Chinese side. (Mayor stated that as long as the Japanese flagship remains in its present position he cannot give an understanding. I am informed by the Secretary of consular body that Japanese Consul General has stated subsequent to the meeting that the Japanese Admiral had reminded Japanese Consul General that this assurance involves military matters and that all that can be given by way of assurance is that it is the intention that no Japanese naval bombers will fly over the area.) (3) Consular body offer their services and put themselves at disposal of both sides in any way designed to prevent further hostilities in Shanghai area. Sent to the Department, Nanking, and Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9375: Telegram [Document 467] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 14 [ 15 ], 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 15—3 p.m.] 436. 1. Foreign Office last night issued lengthy official statement mentioning reconstruction efforts of past few years and stating that in connection with aspirations for national independence she has scrupulously upheld all international treaties such as League Covenant, Nine Power, and Paris Peace Pact. Japanese activities in China are then reviewed from the Manchurian to the Lukouchiao incident which “must be fundamentally attributed to the excessive increase of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin and frequent maneuvers unlawfully held at places not permitted under the treaty of 1901. This was followed by a sudden attack upon Wanping and the Japanese, while giving assurances that their Government did not desire to aggravate the situation, sent large numbers of additional troops into Hopei. On July 12 the Chinese Foreign Minister suggested to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy immediate cessation of military movements but received no response. On July 19 the Chinese Government formally renewed its proposal in writing proposing also mutual withdrawing of troops to original positions and stating that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means recognized by international law and treaties—direct negotiations, good offices, mediations or arbitration. This démarche failed to elicit response. Meanwhile Chinese local authorities in the North accepted Japanese terms to which the Central Government “with the greatest forebearance” did not raise objections, but Japanese troops without any pretext directed further attacks on Chinese positions at Lukouchiao, Langfang, and other places. A Japanese ultimatum was delivered July 26 demanding inter alia withdrawal of Chinese troops from Peiping which was entirely outside the terms already agreed upon. Without waiting for a reply before the expiration of the time limit, Japanese troops started a fierce offensive against Peiping and Tientsin causing great loss of life and destruction of property. Following these atrocities Japanese forces are now advancing toward southern Hopei and carrying the war into Chahar with attacks on Nanking. Meanwhile the Chinese Government repeatedly ordered Shanghai local authorities to take precautions against occurrence of incidents there. The August 9 incident was precipitated by Japanese attempt to force entry into the Hungjao military airdrome regardless of Chinese warnings. The local Chinese authorities immediately proposed seeking equitable settlement through diplomatic channels but the Japanese Government despatched large number of warships and additional armed forces to Shanghai and presented demands designed to reduce Chinese strength for self-defense. Japanese planes flew over Shanghai, Hangchow, Ningpo and other cities near the coast with a view to commencing military operations. On July 13 Japanese forces launched vigorous attacks on the Shanghai civic center. Using the 1932 armistice agreement as pretext, Japan sought to prevent China from taking legitimate measures of self-defense during the emergency. “The Chinese Government now solemnly decrees that China’s territorial integrity and sovereign rights have been wantonly violated by Japan in glaring violation of such peace instruments as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and Paris Peace Pact. China is in duty bound to defend her territority and her national existence, as well as the sanctity of the above mentioned treaties. We will never surrender any part of our territory. When confronted with aggression, we cannot but exercise our national right of self-defense. If Japan did not entertain territorial design on China, she should use her efforts to seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese problems and at the same time cease all her armed aggressions and military movements in China. In the event of such a happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with her traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to avert a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities both for east Asia and for the world at large. In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for a world cause, not only for the preservation of our own territory and sovereignty but for the maintenance of international justice, we are confident that all friendly nations, while showing sympathy with us, will be conscious of their obligations under the international treaties to which they have solemnly subscribed.” 2. Sent to the Department only. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9380: Telegram [Document 468] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 15, 1937—midnight. [Received August 15—4 p.m.] 443. Generalissimo’s adviser states that three air raids were made upon Hangchow this morning by five Japanese planes from Formosa, the first raid at daylight, that the Japanese lost four planes and the Chinese two. Reports of other casualties and danger lacking. He said also that Nanchang was bombed this morning but had no details. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9418: Telegram [Document 469] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 16, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 16—8 a.m.] 444. Following has just been sent to Shanghai: “August 16, noon. My British, French, Italian and German colleagues have discussed following suggestion which I now quote to you for communication to the Commander-in-Chief. We are firmly convinced that it is a complete waste of time to discuss any solution based on a ‘withdrawal to original positions.’ The Japanese maintain that the presence of their landing party is necessary for the protection of their nationals; the danger envisaged being (1) organized attack by Chinese armed forces from outside the Settlement, (2) sporadic attacks on individuals by anti-Japanese fanatics inside the Settlement; in which connection they complain that they receive insufficient protection from the Shanghai Municipal Police. It is clear that it is the presence of the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai which is attracting the danger to the life and property of Japanese nationals. The Japanese authorities must make up their minds whether they are more interested in the presence of their armed forces or in the safety of their nationals. If the former there is nothing for it [to do?] and the issue must be fought out; if the latter then they can be assured most positively that the best way of securing the safety of their nationals in Shanghai is to withdraw their armed forces subject to arrangements on the following lines: ( a ) simultaneous withdrawal of all Chinese armed forces from the Shanghai zone; ( b ) temporary protection to be afforded by other foreign forces pari passu with Japanese withdrawal of Japanese nationals until Chinese evacuation is completed and until ( c ) a considerable increase has been effected in the number of Japanese officers of the Shanghai Municipal Police so as to afford confidence to the Japanese community. The figure I have in mind is about 100. In my opinion if these terms could be accepted they would afford complete security to the Japanese. It may be pointed out to them that once Chinese armed forces are withdrawn all Japanese nationals in Shanghai need fear is an outcrop of incidents with which the augmented police force should be quite capable of dealing. I am well aware of the objections to increasing the Japanese personnel of the police, but the situation is so serious that other considerations take second place. Please discuss urgently with Commander-in-Chief, Council authorities, your Japanese colleague and any others you think desire it, and see whether there is any possibility of a solution on these lines”. I commend this plan for discussion. I am communicating it to the Department recommending that we cooperate in considering this plan. Johnson Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 793.94/9652 [Document 470] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 16, 1937. Admiral Yarnell has asked that he be given reenforcements of about 1,000 Marines “from the United States, as soon as practicable.” In reply to a question: Do you prefer this to Army reenforcements from Manila, he has replied “Affirmed.” It would be possible to send the 6th Regiment of Marines (about 1,200 men) from San Diego, to arrive at Shanghai about 5 weeks hence. It would be possible to send the 31st Regiment, U. S. A., from Manila, to arrive within a few days. In 1927, this Government sent Marines from the United States. In 1932, this Government sent Army reenforcements (31st Regiment) from Manila. The obvious advantage of sending Marines is that, as we already have Marines at Shanghai, and as the whole force there comes under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of our Asiatic Fleet, this would give us a uniform force instead of a combination of two types of forces. The obvious advantage of sending Army reenforcements from Manila would be that those reenforcements could arrive at Shanghai at an earlier date. Admiral Yarnell has expressly affirmed his preference for Marines from the United States. It is reasonably inferable that he feels that the emergency situation is likely to be long drawn out. The Marines are better adapted to the type of action called for than are Army forces. A uniform force of Marines under the Commander-in-Chief can operate more economically and with less overhead of officer personnel than can a combined force. An important consideration contra sending the 31st Regiment from the Philippines is that (so I am informed) it is the only complete white personnel regiment that we now have in the Philippines, whence the sending of that force from the Philippines would substantially weaken our military “set-up” in the Philippines. Among other persons whom I have consulted in giving consideration to this question are Admiral Taylor, U. S. N. Retired, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet in 1932, General Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. Marines, Admiral Richardson, Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and Colonel Eichelberger, of the General Staff, U. S. A. On the basis of what I know thus far of the situation, of past experience, and of what seem to be the possibilities of the immediate future, it seems to me desirable to act on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, which has been approved by the American Consul General at Shanghai, and to recommend that we send Marines from the United States. (Note: I am not oblivious of the fact that political considerations within the United States need to be taken into account. I am recommending, however, the procedure which seems to me most sound and practicable from point of view of the problem presented in the Far East from the angles of (1) giving adequate protection to our nationals and interests and (2) best serving the interests of this country in the field of international relations.) (Note: Since dictating the above, I have had a conference with officers of the Navy Department and Marine Headquarters. These officers have given me full details with regard to the 6th Regiment, U. S. Marines, which is ready at San Diego, with regard to sailing possibilities, time factor, etc. General Holcomb strongly recommends that, if Marines be sent from this country, the whole Regiment (1,200 men) rather than only 1,000 men be sent. This seems to me altogether reasonable. (We have in the Philippines, at Cavite, less than 400 Marines. Of these, 102 men and 2 officers are now on their way to Shanghai.) S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State 893.0146/575 [Document 471] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 16, 1937. Mr. Secretary : With further reference to the question of sending reenforcements to Shanghai, may I say: As I understand it, in 1927 the American Government, when appeal was made for us to send armed forces to Shanghai, at first replied in the negative and then a little later decided to send an armed force. There thereupon was sent, from San Diego, a regiment of marines. To send this force there was chartered a ship of the Dollar Line. The cost of transportation amounted to about $120,000. From that time until now we have maintained a force of marines at Shanghai. In 1932, when reenforcements were asked for, we sent the 31st Regiment, U. S. A., and a small number of marines. At the outset there was some difficulty in fitting the army force into the requirements of the situation at Shanghai. The 31st Regiment is organized like a small army: it has an elaborate staff and is prepared for field operations. For the purposes of defense operations at Shanghai it possessed a superfluity of staff and of equipment. Also, because of army regulations and procedure, it had not the degree of elasticity for administration which prevails in a detached organization of the Marine Corps. No matter whether we send army from Manila or marines from San Diego the critics will complain of the essential fact, namely, that we are sending additional forces to Shanghai. Nevertheless, I feel that we should send additional forces. The port of Shanghai is a unique and extremely important political and economic entity. It has been developed by international effort—over a period of more than a hundred years. The “Settlement” there is actually as well as in name “International”. Although it is not a sovereign entity, it has long been controlled by the Powers rather than by the Chinese Government. Its own municipal organization is an organization wherein there exists a Council, which is elected by the taxpayers and on which several Powers, including the United States, are represented. At the present moment, the chairman of that Council and its permanent secretary are American nationals. Under that Council there functions a volunteer military organization made up of volunteers from among the residents of the various nationalities. Ever since 1927 there have been at the port armed forces, including the American force (marines). There now exists a situation of emergency. There will be operations for the sending away of a considerable number of foreign nationals, especially women and children. But, I do not envisage a complete “evacuation” on the part of the 40,000 foreign residents. Moreover, there has been invested at Shanghai a tremendous amount of capital of all nations, including American, and including Chinese and Japanese. A complete abandonment of the port, leaving the city to be fought over and fought for by China and Japan would be calamitous to the whole world both from the economic and from the political points of view. Unless other Powers are prepared to make such an abandonment, the United States should not abandon its responsibilities in connection with the common world interest which there exists. Shanghai is the economic nerve center of China and even in a way of the whole commercial Far East. Destruction of that nerve center would disorganize the economic system, insofar as organized business is concerned, for the whole of China and would seriously affect the trade of all parts of the world with China and even with other parts of the Far East, Moreover, the system of extraterritorial rights applies in regard to Shanghai, and the interests and rights of the Powers there are inextricably interwoven. We must keep in mind the fact that the situation and the problem there are unique and cannot be compared, as regards similarities, with the situation and problems at any other port in the world. No matter whether we now or within a few days find that a “state of war” exists; no matter whether we apply the neutrality act; no matter whether we ultimately decide to evacuate all of our nationals from all parts of China; no matter whether in course of time we make such a decision effective (it would take time to do it); no matter what changes in attitude and in policy we may make with regard to the Far East; the situation at Shanghai now is one in which responsible officers on the spot have asked for reenforcements. The British Government is already sending reenforcements. The French Government is reported to be preparing to send reenforcements (from Indochina). We would assume a very grave responsibility and we would be on this account in an unenviable position from point of view of world opinion if we responded in the negative to the recommendations of our own officers in the premises. We could give orders today for the Navy Department to have the Marine Corps prepare the marines at San Diego for embarkation. There will elapse between now and the period when embarkation could be effected a period of perhaps ten days or a little more. Should the situation change so as to make inadvisable actual embarkation at the moment when embarkation is possible, we could then cancel the orders. I feel strongly that the orders should be given and that publicity should be given to the fact that they have been given. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9652 [Document 472] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 16, 1937. Mr. Secretary : May I recommend that this matter 16 be taken up urgently with the President. May I suggest that if the President has any hesitation about authorizing the sending of the 6th Marines, 1,200 men, from San Diego, an opportunity be given for discussion of the whole question by officers concerned of this Department, the Navy Department, and the War Department, before a final decision is made. In 1932, there was held on a Sunday, at the White House, an emergency conference, a decision was arrived at, and within a very short time reenforcements were on their way to Shanghai. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 16 See supra. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94111/34: Telegram [Document 473] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 16, 1937—2 p.m. 152. Please telegraph me as soon as possible your estimate of the probable reaction in China should the President decide to invoke the so-called Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937. 17 Any further comments that you may feel moved to offer on the question of the advisability of the President taking such action would be welcomed. Hull 17 50 Stat. 121. The Navy Department to the Department of State 793.94/9419: Telegram [Document 474] The Navy Department to the Department of State 18 August 16, 1937 0016. Japanese continue hold Hongkew sector with positions generally unchanged, some reinforcements to naval landing force made. Naval vessels and air force active throughout day bombing Chinese positions in Nantao, Chapei, Hongkew, Kiangwan, Pootung and Woosung. Unconfirmed reports that Japanese again bombed Sanchow [ Hangchow? ], Soochow and Nanking airfields. Japanese naval vessels in Yangtze reported shelled Liuho area and there are unconfirmed but persistent reports that three army divisions now enroute Shanghai from Japan. Chinese troops advanced toward Whangpoo and Woosung from Kiangwan area, numbers unknown. Pootung side Whangpoo occupied in considerable force by Chinese who have begun shelling Japanese vessels in river. Chinese bombers made two attacks during day first on Japanese Consulate, reported killing five Russians and nine Chinese, second on Japanese landing force headquarters. In spite heavy shelling and bombing, casualties comparatively small both sides. One hundred Augusta landing force ashore to augment Fourth Marines. Augusta at buoy 16 may have to shift berth to clear Chinese fire from Pootung, Sacramento at naval buoy. 18 Copy of telegram, apparently from Shanghai, August 16, 9 p.m., forwarded to the Department by the Navy Department on August 16. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9425: Telegram [Document 475] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 16—11:50 a.m.] 273. Following is Naval Attaché’s report of statements made to him today at the Navy Department. “1. Japanese Government is considering a plan to stop shipment of armament (munitions of war) to China without becoming involved in complications with other governments. The purpose of such a move was stated to be ‘to avoid prolonging the existing situation’. He inquired whether American ships were carrying such to China now. He did not appear conversant with the recent ruling of the Japanese Government whereby manifests of cargo of Dollar Line ships arriving at Yokohama from the United States were to be presented to local authorities irrespective of whether the cargo was destined for China or the Philippines. 2. The Navy Department was criticized on Friday 19 and Saturday for not taking positive action at Shanghai to save their landing force and to protect their nationals. It held off as long as possible in order not to aggravate the situation hoping that a peaceful settlement could be made. Finally when the Chinese air attacks were made Saturday morning the Navy made its decision for a direct offensive. Unfortunately the typhoon then existing off the Yangtze prevented all but two of ship based planes at or near Shanghai from going into action. These two planes one from the Idzumo and one from the Sendai gave a good account of themselves. They shot down one Chinese plane and were responsible for the destruction of another. Cruiser planes bombed the Chinese airdromes near Shanghai the following day. Realizing that further action was necessary immediately the Navy Department consented to the flight of three squadrons Sunday across China Sea in the face of the typhoon then centering near Nanking. These planes had been placed under the command of Admiral Hasegawa. A technical report will be submitted to the Navy Department of [ on? ] the air operations. Eight of these planes were lost, six shot down by antiaircraft fire from the airdromes they were attacking. This morning as 20 Chinese planes were in the air over Japanese forces at or near Shanghai the Navy would not yet consider the transportation of troops to Shanghai as safe. The inference is that further bombing raids will be launched to wipe out Chinese air forces at their source. In fact the senior aide practically committed himself to that statement. The landing force supported by guns from the ships present could take care of themselves. (Estimated 5 or 6 cruisers, 12 gunboats, 15 to 20 destroyers, are at Shanghai or Woosung.) When asked whether troops had been or would be sent he said ‘please wait a few days’. 3. The French and Soviets believe the Chinese propaganda that bombing of Shanghai was done by Japanese planes. He stated that they would find out their mistake shortly. 4. From July 7th the Navy had been very much concerned about spread of trouble to Central and South China. I believe it was the Navy that advocated withdrawal of nationals from the Yangtze Valley, Swatow, Canton, et cetera, as they were powerless to protect them. 5. No Japanese carriers are in Chinese territorial waters. 6. Situation at Tsingtao is quiet and the Navy confidently hopes that it will remain so. All Japanese nationals have been withdrawn from Canton though the situation there is not ‘too bad’”. Naval Attaché has not repeated to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Grew 19 August 13. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9427: Telegram [Document 476] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 16, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 16—2:15 p.m.] 274. The British Chargé d’Affaires this afternoon presented the following pro memoria to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs: “1. The situation that has arisen at Shanghai must be considered as ultimately due to the presence of the Japanese landing party there. The best practical contribution which the Japanese Government can make to a solution of it would be to withdraw their landing party. His Majesty’s Government are urging the Chinese Government to guarantee that there will be no attack on the Japanese quarter and to dispose their forces so as to remove apprehension of any attack. 2. Arrangements are being made to evacuate a large number of British nationals from Shanghai and His Majesty’s Government count upon the Japanese Government to enable this to be done. 3. The greatest and most immediate danger to the lives and property of non-combatants in the International Settlement arises from the presence of the Idzumo adjacent to the Settlement wharves and without prejudice to other aspects of the situation, the best practical demonstration that the Japanese Government could give of their expressed desire to avert danger to foreign life and property would be the removal of the Idzumo to some more distant station. His Majesty’s Government are at the same time urging upon the Chinese Government in the most insistent manner possible that they should refrain any repetitions of bombing raids.” Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 793.94/9151: Telegram [Document 477] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , August 16, 1937—midnight. 353. Department’s 347, August 13, 7 p.m. 20 On August 13 the British Ambassador called upon the Under Secretary and left a memorandum 21 containing the text of instructions which the British Government has sent to its diplomatic representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo directing its representatives to impress on the Chinese and Japanese Governments once more in the strongest terms the importance of avoiding hostilities at Shanghai. On the same day but prior to the call of the British Ambassador, the Secretary in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador urged emphatically that combat operations between Japanese and Chinese at Shanghai if engaged in would involve terrific hazards to all concerned and that regardless of technicalities, of argument over rights, or contention of who was at fault, the world would consider each and both sides responsible if the Shanghai region is made a theater of battle. On August 14 the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy called on the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and Hornbeck, speaking under authorization, reiterated what had been said by the Secretary on the previous day, emphasizing the point that the military situation at Shanghai is a situation to the making of which both Japan and China have contributed and for which neither country can, in the opinion of this Government, repudiate responsibility. This view thus communicated here on the 13th and 14th coincides with that expressed in the text of the instructions which the British Government has sent to its diplomatic representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo. The Department has again instructed our Ambassadors at Tokyo and Nanking to take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present the view to the Japanese and Chinese Governments that if the Shanghai region is made a theatre of battle neither side can divest itself of the responsibility by accusing the other. They have been authorized, however, to use their own discretion both as to action and as to substance. Please inform Foreign Office orally and informally. Hull 20 See telegram No. 145, August 12, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in China, and footnote 86, p. 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427 ] . 21 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9372: Telegram [Document 478] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 22 Washington , August 16, 1937—midnight. 154. Your 433, August 14, 10 p.m. 1. On August 14 the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs reiterated to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy what had been said by the Secretary on the 13th to Saito 23 as reported to you in the Department’s 149, 24 first paragraph, emphasizing the point that the military situation at Shanghai is a situation to the making of which both Japan and China have contributed and for which neither country can in the opinion of this Government repudiate responsibility. This view thus communicated here on the 13th and 14th coincides with that expressed by the British Foreign Office to the Chinese Foreign Minister through the British Ambassador at Nanking as reported in your 433 under reference. The only hope of there being averted probably extremely dangerous and destructive military operations at Shanghai would seem to lie in the possibility that one or both sides withdraw armed forces from that locality. 2. On the 14th the Department instructed the Embassy at Tokyo that in the light of the above the Ambassador should take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the view that if the Shanghai region was made a theatre of battle neither side could divest itself of responsibility by accusing the other. The Ambassador was also authorized to say that this Government had urged upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. The Ambassador was authorized further to use his discretion both as to action and as to substance. 3. Department desires that you be guided by the foregoing in connection with the making of further representations to the Chinese Government on this matter. Hull 22 Received by the Ambassador on September 3. 23 See memorandum by the Secretary of State, August 13, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 342 . 24 August 14, 10 p.m., p. 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9471: Telegram [Document 479] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 17, 1937—noon. [Received August 18—9:59 a.m.] 453. On August 15 I lodged a written protest against operations of Chinese aircraft in Shanghai on August 14th with consequent danger to American warships. This protest was in addition to protest against damage done in Settlement by bombs, bombs having fallen near U. S. S. Sacramento and U. S. S. Ramapo . I now have received following reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Replying to your letter of August 15th regarding the operations of Chinese aircraft in Shanghai on August 14th, which are alleged to have endangered some American warships and the power plant, I have the honor to state that instructions have already been given to the Chinese forces in Shanghai to avoid as far as possible any direct injury or damage to the persons or property, respectively, of other foreign countries. In this connection, however, I would like to make the observations: The Chinese forces in Shanghai as well as elsewhere are fighting only in self defense—defense against a party who is not only taking aggressive actions on the territory of China, but has also violated all peace preserving treaties, including the Nine Power Treaty and the Anti-war Pact, of which all the powers chiefly interested in the present situation in Shanghai are signatories. In such a struggle, according to the simple dictates of justice, the party defending itself must at least have equal opportunity for legitimate operation as the aggressive party. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai, the Chinese Government had already made it clear to the powers that, if the Japanese forces should use any part of the International Settlement as a base of operations or a place of retreat, then the Chinese defensive forces would be compelled to take all necessary measures against Japanese combatants in the Settlement, and that for all the consequences of such actions the Chinese Government could not beheld responsible. The Japanese combatants are now still using Hongkew and Yang-tzepoo as their base of attack, while a large number of Japanese warships operating in the Woosung Harbor and along the Whangpoo River are continually bombarding the Chinese positions. Chinese aircraft in taking action against such warships have exercised utmost care to avoid unnecessary harm or danger to the ships or property of third parties. No attacks have been and will be deliberately made by any Chinese aeroplanes on any other foreign warships or property. It, however, due to the proximity of other foreign warships to the Japanese warships, any apparent danger has been unavoidably caused to them during the operations of the Chinese aircraft, it would seem that the best way of avoiding such a situation would be for the powers concerned to make the Japanese warships move out of the Whangpoo, failing which the warships and other ships of these powers would have to move out of the danger zone themselves. We believe that the position thus taken by the Chinese Government is based on fairness and justice, especially in view of the fact that we are fighting for the security of Chinese territory, including the area of Shanghai. Sincerely yours, Wang Chung Hui”. Sent to Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson Press Release Issued by the Navy Department on August 17, 1937 793.94/9469 [Document 480] Press Release Issued by the Navy Department on August 17, 1937 August 17, 1937 The Navy Department announced today that the Headquarters of the 2nd Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, and the 6th Regiment, composed of approximately 1,200 Marines, will sail in the naval transport Chaumont accompanied by the light cruiser Marblehead from San Diego, California, for Shanghai. Brigadier General John C. Beaumont, U. S. M. C., commanding the 2nd Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, will be in command. (Attached is a list of officers to sail in the Chaumont ). The Consul at Tsinan (Allison) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9459: Telegram [Document 481] The Consul at Tsinan ( Allison ) to the Secretary of State Tsinan , August 17, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 18—6 a.m.] 1. Japanese Consul General, staff and entire Japanese community left here on special train this morning. Japanese Consul General requested me to meet Mr. Hidaka and staff of Embassy from Nanking who passed through this afternoon. Mr. Hidaka expressed appreciation for courtesies extended by American Embassy. 25 2. Sixteen Americans from interior passed through here for Tsingtao today and 4 more expected to do so tomorrow. Including myself, 28 Americans remain in Tsinan, of whom 21 are Catholic sisters and priests. Refusal of local banks to cash Shanghai checks is causing hardship and it has been necessary for me personally to assist several Americans so that they may leave the interior. In an interview with General Han 26 this morning he stated definitely that the 51st [Group Army?] consisting of two divisions under the command of Yu Hsueh Chung is along the Kiautsi Railway. I have been reliably informed that all silver dollars in Tsinanfu which General Han has previously refused to permit to leave the province are now being shipped to Hankow under orders from the Generalissimo. Repeated to Department and Peiping. Allison 25 The Ambassador in Japan in his telegram No. 280, August 18, 9 p.m., quoted a letter of appreciation from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, (793.94/9483). 26 Chairman of Shantung Provincial Government. The Consul at Hong Kong (Donovan) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9491: Telegram [Document 482] The Consul at Hong Kong ( Donovan ) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong , August 17, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 19—5 a.m.] Evacuation of Canton by Japanese nationals including the Consul General and staff is interpreted by British military operations headquarters as due to a keen desire on the part of Japan to avoid further incidents especially in an area where military operations would be difficult and possibly involve complications with Great Britain. Donovan The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9456: Telegram [Document 483] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , August 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 17—4:04 p.m.] 1171. Leger 27 who in the absence of Chautemps 28 and Delbos 29 is in charge of French foreign policy expressed to me today the following opinions with regard to the situation in the Far East: He believed that the present conflict would result in a long war. He saw no possibility whatsoever of stopping this war. He believed that the Japanese were counting on being able to disintegrate the Chinese armies within a few months and make a peace which would give them North China and Inner Mongolia. He said that he was absolutely certain that the Soviet Government would not intervene at this time and he was almost certain that the Soviet Government would not intervene no matter how long the war should endure. Leger said that he would have to decide within the next few days what attitude the French Government would take toward exports of arms, ammunition and airplanes to both China and Japan. In this connection he asked me what attitude our Government would take. I told him that I had no information whatsoever on this subject. He asked me if, for the confidential information of the French Government, I could obtain the point of view of my Government with regard to this matter. He asked if the President would declare shortly that a state of war exists. I replied again that I had no information. Again Leger asked me to obtain the point of view of my Government. I should be greatly obliged if you would instruct me exactly how to reply to these questions. Bullitt 27 Secretary General of the French Foreign Office. 28 President of the French Council of Ministers. 29 French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10922 [Document 484] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State No. 1377 Peiping , August 17, 1937. [Received November 1.] Sir : I have the honor to report events from the clash late in the evening of July 7 between Chinese and Japanese troops in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao) to the agreement signed July 19 at Tientsin. [Here follows review of events.] Responsibility for the clash at Marco Polo Bridge: Legality of the Japanese maneuvers: Presumably it will never be established whether a Japanese or a Chinese fired the shot which precipitated the fighting in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge. The Assistant Japanese Military Attaché, Major Takeo Imai, claimed in his initial statement that Chinese troops had fired suddenly on Japanese soldiers at Lungwanmiao, a point about half-a-mile north of Marco Polo Bridge, and that the challenging attitude of the Chinese necessitated Japanese measures of self-defense. The Chinese version, as given out by the Mayor of Peiping, General Ch’in Teh-ch’un, made no claim with regard to the initial firing. The Mayor stated that the Japanese military authorities had reported to the Chinese authorities that Chinese had fired on Japanese troops and that a Japanese soldier had subsequently disappeared; that the Japanese demanded entry into Wanping to discover who had done the shooting; that the demand was refused; that the missing soldier soon returned; that the Japanese persisted in their demands to enter the town; that Japanese negotiators were permitted to enter; and that, while negotiations were in progress, Japanese opened fire. (Copies of these two statements, as they appeared in the English language press, are enclosed. 30 ) Regardless of the accuracy of these versions, the responsibility for the outbreak rests with the Japanese for the reasons that (1) the Japanese were unnecessarily holding maneuvers at night in close proximity to a regularly stationed Chinese garrison at a time when a tense political situation existed, (2) the Japanese authorities knew well that the Chinese troops concerned were a part of the reputedly anti-Japanese 37th Division, and (3) the Japanese claim that they had a right to maneuver in that area under the terms of the Protocol of 1901 was ill-founded as the area lies well outside of the zone delimited in that Protocol for the movement of foreign troops. The unestablished claim of the Japanese that they had received permission from the local Chinese authorities to maneuver in that area is scarcely pertinent in view of the dangers known to attend such maneuvers. The only legal basis for the maneuvers in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge appears to be a note which was addressed November 15, 1913, by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers at Peking. * (A copy, in translation, of this note addressed to the American Minister is enclosed 31 for ready reference.) This note designated four places, including Lukouch’iao (Marco Polo Bridge) as drill grounds for the use of all foreign guards, with two provisos; namely, (1) the four places are designated “temporarily” and (2) “when foreign troops are drilling in these places ball cartridges are not to be used”. Putting aside the question whether “temporary designation” could be effective for 24 years, the company of the Japanese Embassy Guard drilling July 7 in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge definitely carried ball cartridges. The above-mentioned note is further weakened as a legal basis for Japanese argument by the fact that, between the time of its departure from Peiping and the time of its arrival in the Marco Polo Bridge area, the Japanese company concerned had been maneuvering at Fengt’ai with other units of the Kawabe Brigade, of which that company and the Embassy Guard are a part. There is no legal basis, so far as known, for Japanese troops, either of the Embassy Guard or of other units, to maneuver at Fengt’ai. Japanese motives in enlarging the incident: Although it was inevitable that the proximity of Japanese and Chinese troops in Hopei Province would result in some such clash as that of July 7, the Embassy does not believe that the clash of July 7 was deliberately planned by the Japanese military. It does believe, however, that the Japanese military decided shortly after the outbreak to make use of it as a pretext for extension of Japanese influence in North China. This belief is based on the following developments: (1) the advance on July 10 to the Wanping area of some 1,000 Japanese troops, notwithstanding the withdrawal on July 9 of a large proportion of the Japanese troops involved and the fulfillment by the Chinese, according to competent foreign eyewitnesses, of the agreement that Chinese troops in the Wanping area would withdraw to west of the Yungting River, (2) evidence that the Japanese concerned were, from at least July 10, less interested in an immediate settlement of the military problem of disposition of troops created by the incident than they were in effecting a political settlement under the guise of an agreement whereby the Chinese would promise to suppress “blue shirts”, communists, and anti-Japanese activities, and (3) the rapid increase of Japanese military strength in the Wanping-Fengt’ai area and the entry into Hopei Province of troops of the Kwantung Army, an increase in strength far exceeding Japanese needs if the incident were to be settled locally and non-politically. Various factors presumably motivated the Japanese in their apparent decision to use the incident of July 7 as a pretext to extend their influence in North China, ( a ) The Japanese military perhaps believed that a reasonable settlement of the incident would be interpreted in Japan and China as an indication of weakness on the part of the Japanese military, ( b ) The Japanese military probably believed that they would have to use force sooner or later to achieve their designs with regard to North China, ( c ) The Japanese military had been frustrated in those designs, economic and political, by General Sung Che-yuan and his subordinates, notwithstanding the fact that General Sung owed his dominant position in Hopei Province to Japanese aid in 1935. For example, General Sung had been in retirement in Shantung for almost two months prior to July 7 for the primary purpose of avoiding Japanese representations, ( d ) Furthermore, the Japanese designs were being threatened by the increasing influence in North China of the National Government, ( e ) The threat to the plans of the Japanese military was enhanced by the growth of unity and nationalism in China, its increasing military and economic strength, and the growing popularity and power of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. ( f ) Apprehension of the Japanese military with regard to the above-mentioned developments in China was probably enhanced by the rapprochement between the National Government and the communist leaders in northern Shensi, which might be expected to popularize eventually throughout China a political ideology inimical to the extension of Japanese influence, ( g ) The international situation was presumably regarded by the Japanese military as favorable to their action in China, principally in respect to Russia, as there was evidence of internal difficulties which might be expected to deter Russia from entering into conflict with Japan, regardless of what infringement of Chinese sovereignty the Japanese military effect. The attitude of Sung Che-yuan and his subordinates: The withdrawal of Sung Che-yuan from the Peiping-Tientsin area was facilitated by ( a ) the lack of intelligence on the part of the leaders of Sung’s regime requisite to cope with the situation, ( b ) vacillation and uncertainty of General Sung, ( c ) divergent views of General Sung’s subordinates, and ( d ) defection of General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tientsin and Commander of the 38th Division of the 29th Army. General Sung seemingly labored under the misapprehension that he could perhaps cope with the Japanese in conversation and in military action. At the same time he labored under the apprehension that perhaps the National Government wished to see him and his army eliminated from the political scene. He was handicapped by the kind of advisers he had. On the one hand, he presumably was advised by General Feng Chih-an, Commander of the 37th Division, to use military force against the Japanese. Judging from the facts that General Chang Tzu-chung, Commander of the 38th Division, signed the agreements of July 11 and 19, General Sung was presumably advised by him to temporize. General Liu Ju-ming, Commander of the 143rd Division (in Chahar), probably sided with General Chang Tzu-chung, inasmuch as his division, so far as known, has taken no action, even in the present defense of Nank’ou Pass. The fourth and remaining divisional commander, General Chao Teng-yu, was in central Hopei Province with his 132nd Division during the early period of negotiations, although he was subsequently killed in action at Nan-yuan, and presumably was not in a position to influence the situation. General Ch’in Teh-ch’un, Mayor of Peiping, seemingly wavered between the two extremes of view, while Chinese not of the 29th Army, such as the influential Ch’en Chueh-sheng, half-Japanese Managing Director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, who had flocked around General Sung in 1935 for the alleged purpose of personal gain, presumably advised him from the viewpoint of their mutual profit. At the same time, General Sung was subjected to advice from Japanese, whose purpose was to gain control of Hopei Province and whose advice was reinforced by great military strength. General Sung’s relations with the National Government: One of General Sung’s primary handicaps appears to have been his uncertainty of the intentions of the National Government. He seems to have been uncertain whether the National Government would not welcome his elimination and was not, in fact, working toward that end. If this is true—and it is not an impossibility—it is not surprising that General Sung attempted to carry on alone as long as possible, although he should have realized that he could not stand alone against the Japanese either in negotiation or in military conflict. Certain Chinese claim that General Sung had been ordered prior to July 7 by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw to Paoting, the provincial capital, in case of an armed conflict between his troops and Japanese forces. He is said to have been instructed again on July 11 to withdraw to Paoting. If there were such orders, he may have disobeyed them in the belief that he could cope with the Japanese by himself and that, were he to withdraw, it would mean his elimination by the National Government and his being stigmatized as a national traitor. On the other hand, General Sung may have expected—or hoped—that he would receive material aid from the National Government for resistance to the Japanese. In this he was disappointed. The (Kuominchun) troops which the National Government sent into Hopei Province remained remote from the Peiping-Tientsin area and were so poorly equipped as to be of doubtful value in any conflict with Japanese forces. The results of General Sung’s vacillation will be discussed in a subsequent despatch. Dislocation of normal life from July 8 to 19 arising out of the Marco Polo Bridge incident : As a result of the clash in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge and delay in settlement, the dislocation of ordinary life in the Peiping-Tientsin area soon began. Martial law was put into effect in Peiping; Japanese civilians began to leave as early as July 12; intermittent suspension of train service between Peiping and Tientsin began on July 9, as well as disruption of service on the Peiping-Hankow Railway as a result of occupation of a part of it near Wanping by Japanese troops; small and unimportant armed clashes began to take place as early as July 12 outside the west and south walls of Peiping between Chinese and Japanese forces, although in some instances firing was apparently the result of nervousness in the darkness of night and took place when no enemy was in the vicinity; and trains from Shanghai began to stop as early as July 12 at Central Station at Tientsin and to proceed no further, in part because of the arrival in Tientsin of large bodies of Japanese troops from the north. No important military clashes occurred during this period, other than the fighting at Wanping, although one Japanese plane fired July 18 on a Chinese troop train moving north in southern Hopei on the Pei ping-Hankow Railway. The explosion July 13 two or three miles south of Peiping of a Japanese truck loaded with munitions gave rise to false reports of heavy fighting at that time in that area. Fighting which occurred after July 19 will be described in a later despatch. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Frank P. Lockhart Counselor of Embassy 30 Neither reprinted. * The only mention of this note as the legal basis for the presence of Japanese troops in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge which has come to the notice of the Embassy was contained in a Japanese press despatch of August 2 from Tientsin, published in the Manchuria Daily News . This report read: “Investigation, however, has shown that the Japanese troops, which conducted maneuvers at Lukouchiao on the fateful night of July 6 had by virtue of both precedent and an official Chinese note to the Foreign Ministers in 1913 acted fully within their rights. Lukouchiao in that year was designated by the Chinese Government, along with three other villages, namely, Ercha, Huangtsu and Heilungtan(g), as sites for maneuvers by the foreign garrisons in North China. This decision was conveyed to the Ministers of the foreign powers in Peking by the Foreign Office. In thus notifying the foreign powers the Chinese Government had really done nothing more than recognize a situation which obtained at that time, as the foreign garrisons had in the past been in the habit of going to the four aforementioned places for maneuvers. The Japanese troops consequently had every right to be at Lukouchiao, it is said.” [Footnote in the original.] 31 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9372: Telegram [Document 485] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 18, 1937—11 a.m. 158. Department’s 154, August 16, midnight. In a conversation which I had yesterday morning with the Chinese Ambassador at his request, 32 I referred to the deplorable situation at Shanghai and said that we had been doing everything possible to urge upon both sides that they should not come into conflict and that in particular they should not fight in the vicinity of Shanghai. The Chinese Ambassador then made statements attributing the responsibility to the Japanese, and said that the Chinese had offered to withdraw their forces if the Japanese would withdraw theirs, that such an offer had been made at Shanghai and that their offer stood good. He said that he would be glad to telegraph his Government suggesting such an offer now. I made no reply. In view of the foregoing the Department believes that it would be timely for you to supplement action reported by you in your 433, August 14, 10 p.m., by further representations along the general line taken by the Embassy at Tokyo as reported in its No. 272 of August 16, 6 p.m. 33 Hull 32 See memorandum of August 17, vol. iv , p. 261 . 33 For latter, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 347 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/35: Telegram [Document 486] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 18, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 22—6:20 a.m.] 461. Department’s 152, August 16, 2 p.m. was received last evening at 5 p.m. 1. The reaction in China should the President decide to invoke the Neutrality Act will depend upon how the Chinese Government interprets to its people the meaning and effects of the application of the Act as hostilities advance. The first reaction will be a moral one. The Chinese leaders and press may be expected to express keen regret that the United States, the country which has by word and deed been such a close friend of China for more than a century, should be the first nation formally to interdict all acts of concrete assistance to China. Later, if the application of the Act operates to the disadvantage of China, fancied or real, the Government will be disposed to play up that fact both for internal and external consumption in explaining its reverses. It must not be forgotten that the Chinese Government cannot rid itself of the feeling that the powers party to the Kellogg Pact and Nine Power Treaty should have done something in the past and still should do something now or in the future to restrain Japan. It clings to the belief that it is fighting now not only for its own life but also for the safety of the British Empire. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to me 2 days ago his belief that it is Japan’s aim to extinguish the Chinese Government, gain control of China’s resources in man-power and raw materials and in another 20 years be ready to challenge the position of England, France and the United States in the Pacific in the order named. Other Chinese leaders have long expressed this opinion which is widely held. The Chinese Government has therefore continued to hope for material assistance in a situation which it believes threatens all. The Chinese Government and people, I think, have come to accept the fact that the United States will not give material assistance. It is true that leaders in the Government are also well aware of the fact that the Neutrality Act places upon the President the heavy responsibility of deciding when war exists and when the Act must be applied. They even understand that sooner or later the Act is to be applied but they have not been able to resign themselves to the possible effect of the Act upon their position vis-à-vis Japan. If the effects of the application of the Act are in fact injurious the reaction in China will be resentful. See the statement made to Peck reported in Embassy’s 287, July 16, 3 p.m., paragraphs 3 and 4. 33a 2. It is difficult for me to appraise the actual or probable effect of the application of the Act upon China’s ability to resist the Japanese, Even if the Act was not applied it seems hardly probable that the Chinese could hope to hold the coast or access to foreign sources of supply except through Hong Kong or over the borders. This situation exists now for all practical purposes. In such case it might be expected that the effect of the application of the Act would be more harmful to Japan than to the Chinese who would be free to buy from sources other than the United States while Japan would be cut off from the United States, its quickest source of materials and funds. Johnson 33a Ante , p. 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9473: Telegram [Document 487] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 18—10:30 a.m.] 277. Embassy’s 273, August 16, 7 p.m. Following is Naval Attaché’s report of statement made to him today by Senior Aide to Navy Minister. “1. When asked as to plan for stoppage of munitions, Senior Aide stated that it was his opinion that the Japanese Government may evolve some such plan. It might be [expected?] to make this point clear to Washington as the Embassy telegram was to the effect that the Japanese Government was considering the plan. However, I believe that the Government is actually considering a plan. The British Naval Attaché mentioned the matter to me yesterday, having obtained intimation of it from the same source. 2. Naval landing force reenforcements were landed at Shanghai yesterday and this morning (less than 500). Army reenforcements had not been sent ‘up to the present moment’. Inferentially army reenforcements are due soon. All operations—air, land and sea—up to now have been by naval forces under the command of Vice Admiral Hasegawa. 3. Air operations yesterday and today were directed at ( a ) Chinese heavy artillery positions in and around Shanghai; ( b ) at the numerous Chinese air bases in the Yangtze Valley area. The naval landing force has no artillery. The majority of their recent casualties have been from Chinese heavy artillery. They are making efforts to bomb them out. They are apparently surprised at the continued Chinese air raids as they thought they had cleaned out about all the Chinese air bases within striking distance. Japanese claim to have destroyed 53 Chinese planes with the possibility of 20 more. Eight Japanese planes have been lost. 4. Air operations Monday 34 and Tuesday were similar in nature to those of Sunday, that is as to types of planes and their origins. It is believed that heavy navy bombers have been flown from Kyushu and Formosan air bases, and seaplane bombers from seaplane tenders off the China coast and from cruisers off Woosung. Participation of Aircraft from carriers is suspected but cannot as yet be verified. 5. Situation in Tsingtao is becoming threatening. The customs guards which the Japanese claim are central forces in disguise are closing in on Tsingtao. Two Japanese cruisers, Tatsuta and Tenryu , are there under command of Rear Admiral Shimomura, formerly Naval Attaché at Washington in, 1930–32. So far no landing force units have been put ashore from them in order not to aggravate the situation. 6. When asked what the War Minister meant by the statements quoted in press report today ‘abandonment of policy of non-expansion adopted at outbreak of North China incident’ and ‘unanimous support for Government’s future drastic policy towards China’, it was explained as follows: ‘In order to avoid a prolonged struggle and repeat the calamity now in Spain, a solution to the situation must, in the shortest possible time, be reached by every means possible.’ Asked if this meant the striking of a telling blow, the answer was in the affirmative.” Grew 34 August 16. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9470: Telegram [Document 488] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 18—9:35 a.m.] 279. 1. The British Chargé d’Affaires under instructions from his Government today presented to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the following pro memoria: “If both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will agree to withdraw their forces including men of war from the Shanghai area and will both agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to undertake this responsibility if other powers will join with them in doing so. In putting forward this proposal His Majesty’s Government are actuated solely by the desire to keep the International Settlement free from hostilities and the commitments contemplated would be of a temporary nature to hold good during the continuance of the crisis.” 2. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that this was a very important communication but ( a ) that he doubted the ability of the concerned powers with the forces at their disposal at Shanghai to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and ( b ) that the Japanese Government might find it difficult to accept in face of Chinese aggressive tactics at Shanghai. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Japanese reenforcements were ready to start from Japan but had not yet started, stating, Dodds pointed out, that if the British proposal could be accepted and put into effect it would become unnecessary for these reinforcements to sail. Favorable reaction from the Vice Minister was not forthcoming. Dodds inquired if the Japanese proposed to extend aggressive tactics to South China as well as in North China, The Vice Minister replied definitely in the negative. Dodds said that this was at least the fourth or fifth time that his Government had taken steps in Tokyo in an effort to bring about peace. The Vice Minister refrained from comment. 3. In this connection our 272, August 16, 6 p.m., 35 paragraph 2. 4. The Vice Minister said that the Japanese war vessel Idzumo had moved downstream and away from the Settlement wharves. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 35 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 347 . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9484: Telegram [Document 489] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , August 18, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 18—3 p.m.] 546. Your 347, August 13, 7 p.m., 36 and 353, August 16, midnight, conveyed orally to appropriate officials of the Foreign Office. Eden 37 left London this morning after two nights and a day here spent entirely in conference with available Cabinet Ministers and permanent officials. I saw Vansittart 38 this afternoon and he told me the contents of his Government’s message to you sent last night through Lindsay. 39 I asked if there was anything else he wished to convey and he said that he would like to say that the method proposed seemed to offer the only means they could devise; that of course without offering any protection to the 18,000 Japanese in the International Settlement, there would not be the slightest chance that the Japanese would agree to any kind of withdrawal. He referred also to his Government’s hope that if it became absolutely necessary some refuge might be accorded to British nationals in the Philippine Islands, assuming that a situation arose in which no more could be taken care of in Hong Kong and other places available to them. Vansittart said that the message transmitted to you last night through Lindsay would be given to the press for publication here tomorrow morning. He concluded by saying that he had just received a telegram from the British Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo in which he spoke in terms of highest praise for the work being done there by Ambassador Grew. Bingham 36 See footnote 86, p. 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427 ] . 37 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 38 British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 39 British Ambassador in the United States. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 793.94/9456: Telegram [Document 490] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , August 18, 1937—7 p.m. 436. Your No. 1171, August 17, 7 p.m. Under the terms of the Neutrality Act, the President whenever he “shall find that there exists a state of war” between Japan and China is obliged to proclaim that fact and to put into effect an embargo on direct or indirect shipment of arms to both belligerents. The hostilities in progress do not appear to have taken on as yet such a character that they must clearly constitute war between the two nations. At this time it is impossible to predict whether application of the law will become necessary. As the President stated in his press conference yesterday in reply to an inquiry on this subject, “things are on a 24-hour basis” and it is not possible to say when they may change. Meanwhile, we are continuing to urge upon the Chinese and Japanese that both sides withdraw their forces from Shanghai, taking the position that the responsibility for the fighting there is joint and cannot be thrust by either party upon the other. In the event that we should take action under the Neutrality Act we will endeavor to let you know in advance. I endeavored in my press conference 40 which was carried in yesterday’s Radio Bulletin to give the picture as we see it and to emphasize certain of the factors which are controlling us in the formulation of our policy. Hull 40 See Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 349 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9485: Telegram [Document 491] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 18, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 18—7:28 p.m.] 507. Military situation as I see it is that the comparatively small Japanese force is very hard pressed and has had to give way somewhat in certain areas but Japanese now seem to have superiority in the air, their planes conducting bombing raids on Chinese positions and air fields. This probably is preventing annihilation of the Japanese force by overwhelming Chinese forces exceeding 70,000 surrounding the Settlement areas. Japanese batteries and naval craft have been conducting heavy gun fire on Chinese positions. Chinese seem to have only limited artillery. Japanese military forces are not yet reported as having landed in this area. Transports are believed to have arrived off Liuho. When they land they will probably be in force and unless they are successful in a positive flank movement which might force rapid Chinese withdrawal, Shanghai area will become a field of desperate battle with the area of foreign refuge in serious danger. It is conceivable but I hope not probable that a situation may develop where foreigners may have to evacuate almost entirely. This is one of the reasons why we will encourage departure of men as well as women, so that the number of Americans left to be finally evacuated might possibly be handled on men-of-war. The definite danger always exists that either Chinese or Japanese forces or both might break into the area of foreign refuge at any time when hard pressed or hard pressing. There are hundreds of thousands of Chinese refugees in the Settlement and Concession additional to the usual resident Chinese population of about 2,000,000. The problem of dealing with them and feeding them is enormous but it is in the hands of China’s relief committees and municipal authorities who are doing their best and have not yet called for assistance. Health and sanitation problems are becoming serious. Public utilities are threatened with breakdown. Electricity, water, and gas plants serving Settlement but not French Concession are inside Japanese area and near present theatre of intensive shell fire. There is an increase of rowdyism, looting, and fighting amongst the Chinese. Rice shops have been the object of hungry crowds. There have been fights in streets and adjourning [ adjoining ] ways when crowds attacked lone Japanese or alleged Chinese traitors. Several of the victims have died of their injuries. The situation may be expected to become increasingly serious. The populace is being fed stories of Japanese victories and it is possible for a hungry and reacting mob to get completely out of control. Repeated to Nanking. Gauss The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 793.94/9474: Telegram [Document 492] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) 41 [ Shanghai ,] August 18, 1937—9:30 p.m. [Received August 18—12:05 p.m.] 0018. No change in general military situation Hongkew, Pootung, Woosung areas. Japanese have insufficient forces these areas to make gains and Chinese attacks have resulted only minor advances. Bombing and shelling both sides has continued throughout day. Japanese have landed force estimated one army division at Liuho and small bodies naval force in Yangzepoo. Unconfirmed report two additional Japanese army divisions expected by 20th. Japanese have occupied Tsungming Island, constructed air field including temporary hangars and work shops. Chinese troops in Liuho-Nanziang area reported to be 55th and 85th divisions. Efforts being made by Chinese authorities evacuate approximately 300,000 refugees now in Settlement. Chinese commanders have again stated intend refrain attacking sections International Settlement not occupied by Japanese troops. Believe Shanghai Power Company will not be attacked. Reliable report that Chinese have lost only seven planes to date. Believe that highly colored exaggerated press reports regarding dangerous conditions under which Americans are evacuated being sent by press to the United States. Evacuation Americans and other nationals carried out in comparative safety. Reliable reports state that more than 10,000 Japanese in Shanghai and about 9,000 in Tsingtao will be evacuated during next week. This may indicate intention occupy Tsingtao in near future. C[ ommander ] in C[ hief ] Asiatic Fleet 41 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/9756 [Document 493] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have instructed His Majesty’s Representatives at Nanking and Tokyo to place the following proposal before the Chinese and Japanese Governments in the hope of easing the present situation at Shanghai:— “If both the Chinese and the Japanese will agree to withdraw their forces, including men-of-war, from the Shanghai area, and will both agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on extra-Settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to undertake this responsibility if other Powers will join them in doing so”. His Majesty’s Representatives have been instructed, when making this communication to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, to emphasize that in this matter His Majesty’s Government are actuated solely by a desire to keep the International Settlement free from hostilities, and to explain that the commitment contemplated would be of a temporary nature to hold good during the continuance of the crisis. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn whether the United States Government would be prepared to accept with them joint responsibility in carrying out the proposal outlined above, and whether they would be prepared to instruct their Representatives at Nanking and Tokyo accordingly. His Majesty’s Government feel that the scheme affords the only possible chance, slender as it is, of restoring the situation at Shanghai and averting even greater danger in the near future. It was put forward by His Majesty’s Ambassador in China, who has discussed it with his diplomatic colleagues and found a large measure of support for it. Washington , August 18, 1937. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9527: Telegram [Document 494] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , August 19, 1937—8 a.m. [Received August 20—6 a.m.] Referring to my telegram of August 17, 7 p.m., 42 as a result of my personal efforts, Mayor of Tsingtao and the local Japanese Consul General have published statements almost identical. Following appear in Mayor’s statement: “In accordance with policy of Chinese Government to settle all questions by peaceful means, I shall continue uninterruptedly my efforts to assure a continuance of peace and order in this area—so far as it is humanly possible the Chinese authorities are striving for the continuance of peace in this region”. The Japanese Consul General’s statement includes: “It is my solemn duty in accordance with policy of Japanese Government to continue my efforts in the direction of peace in this region”. Sokobin 42 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9488: Telegram [Document 495] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 19, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 19—3 a.m.] 465. My 444, August 16, 11 a.m. Following telegram has been received from Shanghai: “August 18, 1 p.m. Your August 16, noon. I met with my British, French, German and Italian colleagues this morning. We agreed to reply to our Ambassadors owing to developments and in the light of the earlier more limited proposal to which Mayor Yui returned no answer and which the Japanese Consul General had informed me had come too late, we consider the scheme impracticable. 2. I discussed matter with American Commander in Chief who feels that under present conditions the proposal is hopeless”. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9493: Telegram [Document 496] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 19, 1937—noon. [Received August 19—5:55 a.m.] 281. 1. My German colleague 43 told me today that in a long conversation yesterday the Minister for Foreign Affairs assured him that the Japanese forces in Shanghai are willing and prepared to withdraw to their original positions and numbers provided that the Chinese troops also withdraw in accordance with the general proposals of the concerned powers. Hirota thought that such a mutual withdrawal should be accomplished in two steps: first, an armistice and cessation of firing; and second, negotiation as to localities of withdrawal. Hirota, however, thinks it highly unlikely that the Chinese will take favorable action and for the first time since hostilities began he gave von Dirksen an impression of pessimism. He reiterated his opinion that Chiang Kai-shek does not want war but that he is powerless to stem the tide. 2. When reference was made to the British proposal that the powers assume responsibility for the safety of Japanese nationals in Shanghai, the Minister said that he doubted very much if the powers possessed adequate forces to assume such responsibility. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 43 Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador in Japan. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9528: Telegram [Document 497] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 19, 1937—noon. [Received August 20—6:45 a.m.] 467. The informant cited in Embassy’s 460, August 18, noon, 44 states that Chinese Communist troops are already in Suiyuan moving toward the Chahar front for guerilla acting [ warfare? ], thus confirming similar information reported in our 404, August 12, 9 a.m. 2. Further word that Chinese Communists are joining with the Government to form a popular front has been received from an official who recently attended a social affair given by Chiang Kai-shek at which were present at one table Feng Yu Hsiang, Yen Hsi Shan, Pai Chung Hsi, Chu Teh, Mao Tze Tung and Chou En Lai. 45 Repeated to Tokyo. Johnson 44 Not printed; the Soviet Military Attaché in China was cited. 45 The last three were Chinese Communist leaders. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9512: Telegram [Document 498] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , August 19, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2 p.m.] 378. In the course of a conversation with Count Ciano 46 yesterday afternoon, I said I should appreciate any information he could give me with regard to his policy and viewpoint in connection with the Far Eastern crisis. Ciano replied that the Italian Government was in particularly friendly relations with the Japanese Government, that Japan had not taken any part in the sanctions and had been among the first to recognize the Empire. Speaking generally theretofore Japan occupied a particularly favorable position in Italian circles. With this preface Count Ciano continued that the policy of the Italian Government was that of strict neutrality between Japan and China. He added that some little time ago he had had an opportunity to counsel the Chinese with whom he personally was on particularly friendly terms in view of the official positions which he had occupied in China. He had advised the Chinese Government to come to terms with Japan, that it was better “to lose a leg even though the operation was a painful one than the more vital parts of the body”. He had remarked that the Japanese forces were so vastly superior to the Chinese that the only safe policy for China was to reach some peaceful solution. Ciano informed me that Italian interests in China did not justify any initiative on the part of the Italian Government but that Italy would gladly follow that of the United States or of Great Britain if there was any movement contemplated for the purpose of localizing the conflict and of reaching a peaceful solution. He also told me that he had information which satisfied him that the Soviet Government had been urging China to resist Japan, that Russian war materials had gone forward and that it was clearly the intention of the Soviet Government to create in China as much turmoil as possible; that this would serve two purposes: the weakening of Japan and the spread of communism throughout China. Phillips 46 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9499: Telegram [Document 499] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 19—7:30 a.m.] 453. Embassy’s 448, August 18, 6 p.m. 47 1. The Hopei–Chahar Political Council met last night and agreed to suspend its activities from today, including the Foreign Affairs, Finance, Communications, Reconstruction and Law Codification Commissions. Employees have been discharged, throwing some 400 out of work. Complete and permanent dissolution of the Council is expected within a few days. This will bring definitely to an end the structure of Sung Cheyuan’s régime. The Hopei-Chahar pacification headquarters was abolished August 9. 2. It is not known whether some new organ will be formed, in addition to the Peiping local maintenance committee and the association of district maintenance committees of Hopei. 3. Chiang Chao Tsung, chairman of the Peiping local committee, became Mayor of Peiping this morning as the result of action yesterday by the Hopei–Chahar Political Council. Leng Chia Chi, who was reported in the Embassy’s 416, August 11, 5 p.m. 47 as becoming Mayor, was actually appointed to that post in accordance with the wishes of a group of Japanese Military but was prevented from assuming office by other group of Japanese military, headed allegedly by Matsui, Chief of the Japanese special military organ at Peiping, opposed to Leng. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo. Nanking repeat to Tokyo. Lockhart 47 Not printed. 47 Not printed. The French Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/9977 [Document 500] The French Embassy to the Department of State 48 undated The French Minister for Foreign Affairs has signified his willingness to concur with the procedure suggested by the British Government, provided the participation of French forces in the general protection of the Japanese be given only within the limits of the French concession. He has therefore instructed the French Ambassadors in Nankin[g] and Tokyo to confer on the matter with the British, American and eventually Italian Ambassadors, and should an agreement be reached on that basis, to recommend earnestly such a plan to both Governments./. 48 Handed by the First Secretary of the French Embassy on August 19 to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9517: Telegram [Document 501] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 19, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 19—3:25 p.m.] 283. Embassy’s 279, August 18, 6 p.m. 1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today informed the British Chargé d’Affaires that Japan could not accept the British proposal for Chinese-Japanese withdrawal of forces in and around Shanghai on condition that foreign powers would assume responsibility for the safety of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads because (1) foreign forces would not be adequate; (2) it is Japan’s duty to protect her own nationals, and (3) the Chinese are entirely to blame for the present situation. 2. Dodds however obtained assurances that this refusal was only pro tern and might be reconsidered. 3. Dodds believes that the Japanese realize that they are “in a jam” in Shanghai and that reconsideration of their refusal to accept the British proposal is not unlikely. 4. The French Ambassador has informed the Foreign Office that France will undertake to protect Japanese in the French concession provided that the powers undertake the protection of Japanese in the International Settlement. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/9756 [Document 502] The Department of State to the British Embassy Reference is made to the British Embassy’s urgent aide-mémoire of August 18, 1937, setting forth a proposal, which the British Government has instructed its representatives at Nanking and Tokyo to place before the Chinese and Japanese Governments in the hope of easing the present situation at Shanghai, to the effect that if the Chinese and the Japanese Governments will agree to withdraw their forces, including men-of-war, from the Shanghai area, and will both agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on extra-settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, the British Government will be prepared to undertake that responsibility if other interested governments will join it in doing so. Careful and close attention has been given to the British Government’s inquiry whether the American Government would be prepared to accept with the British Government joint responsibility in carrying out the proposed action and would be prepared to instruct the American Ambassadors at Nanking and Tokyo accordingly. Shortly after receipt of this inquiry, this Government received in a telegram from the American Ambassador at Tokyo information to the effect that the British Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo had presented to the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the British Government’s proposal under reference and that the reaction of the Vice Minister to the proposal was of a character which could only be construed as unfavorable. There has subsequently appeared no indication of an affirmative interest on the part of the Japanese Government in this proposal. In the light of this evidence, it appears to this Government that the question of a possible assumption of a joint responsibility such as is envisaged in the British Government’s proposal has already been disposed of, adversely, by the attitude of the Japanese Government in regard to the proposal. However, toward avoiding any possible misunderstanding, it should not be expected that this Government would be favorably inclined toward any project envisaging military or police responsibilities over and above those which relate to the already existing missions of its armed forces now present in China. Washington , August 19, 1937. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.94/9977 [Document 503] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] August 20, 1937. Mr. Gaucheron of the French Embassy telephoned this morning and said that he wished to supplement the information contained in the informal memorandum which he gave me on August 19 by stating that the French Government would be prepared, if such action were needed to make effective the British proposal, to furnish a small detachment for use also in the International Settlement at Shanghai. 50 I thanked Mr. Gaucheron for his courtesy in communicating this information. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 50 This information was transmitted to the British Ambassador on August 21 in a note from the Under Secretary of State (793.94/9642). The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9541: Telegram [Document 504] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 20, 1937—noon. [Received 9:05 p.m.] 477. British Ambassador has furnished me a copy of following communication addressed to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs August 18: “His Excellency, the Commander in Chief of the British Naval forces in China, has drawn my attention to the fact that the attempt to torpedo the Japanese flagship Idzumo at the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Wharf at Shanghai was effected by a Chinese coastal motor boat passing through that section of the Whangpoo River which runs directly in front of the International Settlement south of the Soochow Creek. His Excellency points out that owing to hostilities which are being carried on in the stretch of the river from the Soochow Creek to Woosung, that section of the river is unsafe for neutral vessels, which have been removed, and that the foreign men-of-war are collected in the section fronting the International Settlement south of the Soochow Creek and the French Concession. This has hitherto been regarded as a comparatively safe anchorage. The action of the Chinese authorities in attacking the Idzumo by means of a vessel from the west coast [ sic ] area has, however, now brought hostilities into this area and the position of foreign men-of-war, already hazardous, may become untenable if this attitude is allowed to continue. Every effort has been made by the interested powers to ensure that the International Settlement southward of the Soochow Creek and the French Concession should not be used as a base for military operations, and the necessity of maintaining the neutrality of this area has been recognized by both the Chinese and Japanese authorities. In order that this neutrality may be maintained, it is of the first importance that that portion of the river which fronts the area in question should also be neutralized. I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will draw the attention of the Chinese Government to this matter and that instructions will be given which will ensure that no military or naval action of any kind is taken in that portion of the Whangpoo River fronting the International Concession south of the Soochow Creek and the French Concession”. Sent to the Department, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9551: Telegram [Document 505] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 20, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 21—6 a.m.] 479. 1. Following statement of “spokesman” of Foreign Office issued to the press last evening: “The Chinese forces in Shanghai as well as elsewhere are fighting against an aggressor who, in his violent actions on Chinese soil, has violated all peace preserving treaties such as the Nine Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact, of which all the powers chiefly interested in the present situation are signators. In such a struggle, according to the simple dictates of justice, the party defending itself must at least have equal opportunity for legitimate operations as the aggressive party. Before the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai, the Chinese Government had already made it clear to the powers that, if the Japanese forces should use any part of the International Settlement as a base of operations or a place of retreat, the Chinese defensive forces would be compelled to take all necessary measures against the Japanese combating in the Settlement, and that the Chinese Government could not be held responsible for the consequences. The Japanese forces are now using the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo districts of the Shanghai International Settlement as their base of attack, while a large number of Japanese warships operating in the Woosung harbor and along the Whangpoo River are continually bombarding the Chinese positions. The Chinese air forces, in taking action against such warships, have exercised, at considerable risk to themselves, the utmost care to avoid unnecessary harm or danger to the ships or property of third powers. No attacks have been and will be deliberately made by any Chinese airplanes on any other foreign warships or property. However, the Chinese Government cannot assume any responsibility for such unavoidable damage as may happen to the other foreign warships on account of their proximity to Japanese warships during the operations of Chinese aircraft. It would seem, therefore, best for the powers concerned to make the Japanese warships move out of the Whangpoo River, failing which to move their own warships and other vessels from the danger zone. It is believed that the fairness and justice of the position taken by the Chinese Government will be readily appreciated, especially in view of the fact that we are not only fighting for the security of Chinese territory but also for the maintenance of international justice.” 2. Sent to the Department, Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9537: Telegram [Document 506] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 20—3:03 p.m.] 287. Embassy’s 283, August 19, 11 p.m., paragraph 4. 1. The French Ambassador called this morning and gave me the following additional facts: ( a ) On August 17 he called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to express the hope that the Japanese warships would be withdrawn from in front of the French Concession in Shanghai as they constituted a danger. (They were later withdrawn.) ( b ) The Ambassador took this occasion to say to Hirota that without any desire or intention to interfere he would be glad to know whether the Japanese Government would welcome an effort by the powers to neutralize the international areas in Shanghai. To the Ambassador’s surprise Hirota “simply jumped at the suggestion.” ( c ) The Ambassador accordingly cabled to his Government and received instructions to support the British proposal for neutralization and for the protection of Japanese nationals in the international areas by the concerned powers, with the understanding that the French forces would remain within the French Concession. The Ambassador carried out instructions in a note to Hirota. ( d ) The Ambassador subsequently learned of the statement of the Vice Minister to the British Chargé d’Affaires that Japan would not accept the British proposal. (Embassy’s 283, August 19, 11 p.m., paragraph 1.) As this statement by the Vice Minister appeared to be diametrically at variance with the attitude of Hirota, as expressed to him, the Ambassador today sent his counselor to Horinouchi to inquire the precise attitude of the Foreign Office. ( e ) Horinouchi replied that Hirota, in his conversation of August 17th with the Ambassador, had not accepted any proposition of neutralization: that he had merely promised to give any such proposition, if presented by the powers, his sympathetic consideration (the telegram of the Ambassador to Paris, which was later read to us, reported that the Foreign Minister had stated that he was “in favor of that proposition and would be prepared to give it sympathetic consideration”). Horinouchi then stated that, with regard to the British proposal, the Japanese Government had ( a ) serious doubt whether the Chinese forces at Shanghai would conform to instruction from Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from Shanghai; ( b ) that it had doubt whether the foreign powers had sufficient forces at Shanghai to make effective any guarantee to protect the lives of Japanese nationals; ( c ) that it can not delegate to other governments its responsibility for the protection of the lives of Japanese nationals. 2. Both the French Ambassador and Dodds appear to have difficulty in distinguishing between a proposition of neutralization, such as that put forward by the French Ambassador, and the British proposal with regard to assuming responsibility for protection of the lives of Japanese nationals. Whereas one of the results of making effective any neutralization plan would be to afford protection to Japanese nationals and whereas, conversely, it would perhaps be difficult to make effective the British plan unless there were established a neutral zone, we feel that the two plans are essentially different and involve essentially different sets of consideration. It seems to us to be evident that the two ideas have given rise to misconception and muddled thinking in various quarters. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9534: Telegram [Document 507] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 20, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 20—1:20 p.m.] 288. Embassy’s 287, August 20, 6 p.m. 1. The following information was gained by the Military Attaché through an interview with the secretary of the Minister of War at 3 o’clock today. a . No Japanese Army units have left for Shanghai although troops are ready and prepared to go. b . The War and Navy Departments have been under great pressure from Rightist organizations to take some decisive action at Shanghai, but the sending of large reenforcements has been delayed in the hope that they might not be necessary. c . The secretary of the Minister of War gave as his “personal opinion” that a peaceful solution of the situation in Shanghai is improbable due to the pressure on both Chinese and Japanese Governments of public opinion. d . As regards the British proposal for the complete withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese forces, the secretary of the Minister of War thought it entirely unacceptable as it would be very humiliating to Japan to entrust the safeguarding of its nationals to troops of other countries. e . He said that he thought the only solution agreeable to Japan would be a return to the situation prescribed in the truce agreement of 1932, the violation of which by the Chinese was responsible for the present Shanghai incident. Due to the large numbers of Chinese troops in the Shanghai area, to the comparatively poor control over them by the Central Government and the pressure of Chinese public opinion, he thought it would be very difficult for the Nanking Government to arrange for a withdrawal of its troops from the area prescribed in the 1932 truce agreement. f . The situation in North China remains comparatively quiet with the reinforcement of Chinese concentrations limited to that near Nankow. 2. With reference to paragraph b , well informed Japanese officers uniformly explain the reluctance to send army units to Shanghai as due to the necessarily prolonged dispersion of forces involved and the difficulty and costliness of extensive operations in the Shanghai area. The Military Attaché is of the opinion that the Japanese Army desires to avoid sending troops to Shanghai primarily because units sent there will be occupied for an indefinite period at a time when the settlement of the North China situation is the Army’s objective during the accomplishment of which all available troops are wanted for protection against possible interference by Soviet Russia. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/9643 [Document 508] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have received the reply which the United States Government were good enough to return on the 19th of August to their proposal with regard to the situation at Shanghai. His Majesty’s Government understand that the Japanese Government while indicating preliminary doubts have not given their final answer to the proposal put to them by His Majesty’s Government. His Majesty’s Government wish to emphasise that if the Chinese and Japanese Governments genuinely accept the scheme quite small numbers of foreign troops should be sufficient for the protection of Japanese nationals. Since this scheme appears to be the only chance of averting further and even more terrible dangers to the International Settlement His Majesty’s Government earnestly trust that the United States Government will be able to declare their readiness to cooperate. The French Government, though mainly concerned with the French concession, are understood to be ready to contribute something to indicate their solidarity outside of their concession. [ Washington ,] August 20, 1937. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9550: Telegram [Document 509] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , August 21, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 21—5 a.m.] City remains quiet. A group of foreigners are agitating for a large “neutral zone” in Tsingtao. Plan would naturally involve important political questions and therefore this Consulate unable to conceive of practical methods for its realization. Has Department any suggestions? 51 Admiral Shimomura, Japanese senior naval officer, informed me last night that Japanese forces would absolutely make no attack on or in Tsingtao unless Chinese forces move against Japanese here. The Mayor previously contended Chinese would make no attack on Japanese except to resist. There has been a very considerable strengthening of Chinese forces on outskirts of Tsingtao. Nearly all Japanese women and children have been evacuated. Sokobin 51 The Department replied that the matter was being given consideration. The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/9643 [Document 510] The Department of State to the British Embassy The American Government acknowledges receipt of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of August 20 with regard to the situation at Shanghai. As stated in the Department’s memorandum of August 19, it appeared to this Government at that time that the question of a possible assumption of a joint responsibility such as is envisaged in the British Government’s proposal had already been disposed of, adversely, by the attitude of the Japanese Government in regard to the proposal. All information available, including press reports and reports received from American official sources, tends conclusively to confirm that impression. Washington , August 21, 1937. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 793.94/9560: Telegram [Document 511] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) 52 [ Shanghai ,] August 21, 1937—7:05 p.m. [Received August 21—11:38 a.m.] 0021. Strongly recommended proposal of making any or all of Tsingtao a “sanctuary” for the safety of the many Europeans and Americans now residing here to your earnest consideration. At present both Chinese and Japanese authorities in Tsingtao are earnestly striving to solve present difference. If the nations most interested could unite in securing agreement to such a plan by the Chinese and Japanese Governments it should be a godsend to several thousand Americans and Europeans now here. C[ ommander ] in C[ hief ] A[ siatic ] F[ leet ] 52 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9527a: Telegram [Document 512] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 21, 1937—11 p.m. 159. 1. Please consider presenting to the Government to which you are accredited a note as follows: “In the light of the situation existing in China wherein the lives and interests of a considerable number of American nationals are in danger in consequence of the carrying on of military operations by armed forces of Japan and of China, and of statements made by the Japanese Government on and since July 12, both in writing and through spoken words, indicating that Japan is solicitous with regard to the lives of the nationals and the interests of other countries, this Government requests, for the reassurance of its people, both at home and abroad, an express and specific formal assurance by the Japanese Government that the operations of the Japanese armed forces in China will not be directed against or into the city of Tsingtao where American nationals are at present concentrated. As the Japanese Government is aware, this Government has been encouraging and facilitating the withdrawal of American nationals from exposed areas in China to places of comparative security. Many nationals of the United States along with the nationals of other countries have sought refuge at Tsingtao. In addition there are in that city a large number of Americans who had proceeded there to spend the summer and who have been advised against endeavoring to return to their normal places of residence because of disturbed conditions. In order that these Americans as well as other nationals now at Tsingtao may be reasonably secure the American Government feels warranted in suggesting that Tsingtao not be made a theater or base of military operations. Furthermore it seems to this government reasonable and desirable, in the interests of all concerned, that the fact of an intended immunity of Tsingtao from military operations should be announced and be generally and publicly understood. The American Government is prepared to address also to the Chinese Government a similar request for such an assurance. I may add that such an assurance would serve to confirm the oral assurance given on August 20 by Admiral Shimomura to the American Consul at Tsingtao that the Japanese forces would make no attack on or in Tsingtao unless the Chinese forces move against the Japanese there.” 2. In case you should already have made any approaches in regard to Tsingtao, the Department would desire that unless you consider it not advisable, you nevertheless present a note substantially as above as under instruction from your Government, making appropriate alterations to conform with the approach which you may have already made. If you feel it expedient to make the approach above outlined, please so act at once and inform Department promptly of Foreign Office reaction. If you feel otherwise, inform Department at once of your views and any suggestions which you may have to offer. This is being sent at present only to you. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9588: Telegram [Document 513] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 23, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 23—1:20 a.m.] 297. Department’s No. 159, August 21, 11 p.m., Tsingtao. Department’s instructions received this morning were carried out in a formal note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs which I delivered to the Vice Minister shortly after noon. No alterations were made in the Department’s text. The Vice Minister made no comment except to say that the matter would be studied. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9596: Telegram [Document 514] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 23, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 23—8:45 a.m.] 538. My 530, August 21, 8 p.m. 53 Japanese military at press conference this morning announced the arrival and landing “at several places around Shanghai” during the night and early this morning of Japanese troops. The above is confirmed by foreign military observers who believe that Japanese troops are being landed at Woosung under cover of heavy naval barrage and that landing has been made or is being attempted at Liuho approximately 15 miles up Yangtze River from Woosung. Exact number of troops not known but estimates vary from 15 to 30,000. Military spokesman mentioned said that Japanese troops would immediately take the offensive and attempt to cut off Chinese retreat. It is therefore probable that large scale Japanese offensive operations will take place in and around Shanghai within the next day or two unless the Chinese rapidly withdraw to prepared positions said to be 25 or 30 miles west of Shanghai. Sent to the Department, Nanking and Peiping. Gauss 53 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9627: Telegram [Document 515] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State 54 Nanking , August 23, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 23—6:50 a.m.] 497. Tsingtao’s August 21, 10 a.m. and Commander in Chief’s August 21, 7 [ 7:05? ] p.m. concerning Tsingtao. 1. At meeting of five interested Ambassadors this morning we decided to send following collective letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Dear Mr. Minister: Information received from apparently reliable sources is to the effect that the Chinese and the Japanese Government authorities in Tsingtao are endeavoring to solve present differences between them in such a way as to avoid an outbreak of hostilities at that port. There are in Tsingtao many hundreds, if not some thousands, of nationals of countries not concerned in the controversy between China and Japan and the undersigned Ambassadors earnestly request that the Chinese Government promote in all possible ways arrangements whereby there may be assurance that fighting may be avoided in Tsingtao and in its vicinity between the military forces of China and Japan. An early indication of the view taken by the Chinese Government toward this idea will be heartily welcomed by the undersigned Ambassadors.” 2. My German, British, French, and Italian colleagues asked that I transmit the contents of the collective letter to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and ask him to communicate them to the respective Embassies, it being our hope that they will all urge the Japanese authorities to take energetic measures in Tsingtao to avoid opening of hostilities. 3. Because of delay in telegraphic communication with Tokyo, I request that the Department cable this request to Grew. 4. Naval report to the Commander-in-Chief dated August 23 states that the tension at Tsingtao is at such high pitch only a slight spark would be necessary to start serious trouble. Sent to the Department, Shanghai. Johnson 54 The Department repeated this telegram to the Ambassador in Japan for communication to his British, French, German and Italian colleagues. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9631: Telegram [Document 516] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , August 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 23—4:45 p.m.] 1192. The Chinese Ambassador called on me today and said that he and Dr. Kung could not understand a telegram received from the Chinese Ambassador in Washington asserting that the Secretary of State had said to him that if China should invoke the Nine Power Pact the United States would have to declare at once that a state of war exists and put in force the provisions of the Neutrality Act. 55 I expressed doubt that the Secretary of State had made such a statement to the Chinese Ambassador in Washington. The Chinese Ambassador went on to say that the great question for China today was the maintenance of a free flow of war supplies. His Government was intensely anxious that the Neutrality Act should not be brought into play and that the flow of supplies from the United States to China should continue to be as uninterrupted as at the present time. He asked me if I could give him the position of our Government with regard to this matter and I gave him the substance of your 436, August 18, 7 p.m. In the course of our conversation the Chinese Ambassador said that the Soviet Government had informed the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow that it would supply planes to the Chinese Government; but would refrain from taking any active part in the conflict at the present time. He said that the Soviet Government had explained that Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, had asked Eden how Great Britain would view Soviet intervention in the present conflict and that Eden had replied he believed the Soviet Union could only make matters worse by taking any action whatsoever. In the course of a conversation this afternoon Leger said to me that the French Government was in a most difficult situation with regard to shipment of military supplies to either of the parties in the Far Eastern conflict because of the fact that the manufacture of munitions and airplanes is now in the hands of the State. He asked me if in spite of our position with regard to the Neutrality Act which I had explained to him in accordance with the terms of your 436, August 18, 7 p.m. our Government was not by indirect pressure attempting to persuade all manufacturers of arms, munitions, and airplanes in the United States to refrain from any shipments to belligerents. I replied that I had no exact information with regard to this matter. Bullitt 55 The Secretary replied (telegram No. 448, August 24, 6 p.m.): “No such statement made to anyone.” For memorandum of August 20, see vol. iv , p. 3 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9634: Telegram [Document 517] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 23, 1937—11 p.m. [Received August 23—8:45 p.m.] 504. Buck 56 requested that following message dated August 23 be transmitted to Secretary Morgenthau: 57 “Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek granted an interview today and asked me to send you and the President a message to the following effect: ‘I am truly disappointed that the United States did not cooperate with England in an attempt to avert the present crisis which could have been averted by joint representation to Japan and China. China and the world will long remember Simon’s 58 failure to cooperate with the United States in 1931 regarding Manchuria and now Britain will long remember the failure of the United States to cooperate. United States should not lose her prestige in the world as an upholder of international justice and if she will continue her Stimson policy the present conflict can be prevented also from extending to other countries including the United States. I do not want United States to be dragged into the war, but I do look to her to maintain her position in the Pacific and to maintain peace there. It is not too late for action and I trust United States to work out a just settlement for permanent peace. China will protect her new currency and without difficulty. To date she has spent less than 10 million yuan in the war. There will be no serious problem of financing the war.’ The Generalissimo looks well and is in good spirits, and to answer your question of 2 years ago more fully, he does have a very sympathetic feeling toward America. He suggests it will be necessary for their information and guidance return and explain every consideration told you in detail. A representative of the Chinese Government is proceeding to the United States on receipt of this important mission by Clipper Thursday. He has given me considerable inside information on situation here and I have given him a letter of introduction to you as he will pass on many things which seem inexpedient to send by message.” Johnson 56 Professor J. Lossing Buck, University of Nanking. 57 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. 58 Sir John Simon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1931–35. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9660: Telegram [Document 518] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 24, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 5:04 p.m.] 547. In an interview granted today to Reuters aboard Japanese flagship, Admiral Hasegawa made the following statement which the Japanese Consul General confirms: “It has been the intention of the Japanese Government to localize the Sino-Japanese conflict and to bring about ultimately closer and better relations with China. However, with the situation aggravated by Chinese to such an extent as it is, we deem it important that a safety zone should be established in and around Shanghai, and that all causes of further trouble should be removed once and for all.” Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9588: Telegram [Document 519] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 24, 1937—4 p.m. 163. Your 297, August 23, 1 p.m. Nanking reports that the Embassy and other Embassies are addressing a joint note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that the Embassies in Tokyo are being requested to take similar action there. You may inform your interested colleagues of the action already taken by you, and if you feel that any useful purpose might be served thereby, you are authorized in your discretion to participate with your colleagues in such action as may be decided upon regarding this matter. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9560: Telegram [Document 520] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 24, 1937—4 p.m. 173. Your 500, August 23, 7 p.m., and the Department’s 171, August 23, 7 p.m. 59 The Department approves of your action. With regard to paragraph 1, second sentence of your telegram under reference, on August 23, the Embassy at Tokyo under instructions from the Department addressed a formal note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs asking for formal assurance by the Japanese Government that the operations of the Japanese armed forces in China would not be directed against or into the city of Tsingtao. The Vice Minister to whom the Ambassador delivered the note said that the matter would be studied. You may inform your interested colleagues of the foregoing. Hull 59 Neither printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9639: Telegram [Document 521] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 24, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 24—8:05 a.m.] 470. Embassy’s 467, August 23, 5 p.m. 60 1. Foreign newspaper correspondents were informed this morning by the local press section of the North China garrison that Japanese troops occupied Kalgan August 22, having arrived there from Jehol; that these troops are proceeding toward Nankou; that Japanese planes are today bombing towns along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway between Kalgan and Nankou; and that the Japanese expect the Chinese troops in that area to retire westward. 2. An American newspaper man went yesterday to within sight of Chuyungkuan, which is one-third of the way within Nankou Pass from the south. He states that a Japanese heavy offensive against Chuyungkuan was in progress yesterday. According to Japanese military, a Japanese offensive at that place was in progress August 20 (Embassy’s 457, August 20, 5 p.m. 60 ). 3. Disturbed conditions in the Western Hills continue. Chinese and foreign eye witnesses report that the bandits, allegedly troops of the notorious Lin Kuei Tang, are fraternizing with Japanese soldiers in that area. 4. The Japanese are remodeling a building on Legation Street in the Legation Quarter for the purpose of establishing a post office for the use of Japanese residents of Peiping. It is authoritatively stated that the Japanese military authorities as from yesterday have established a censorship of mails in the central post office at Peiping, apparently under the same conditions as those prevailing at Tientsin and previously reported. Repeat to Embassy at Nanking. Lockhart 60 Not printed. 60 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9637: Telegram [Document 522] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 24, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 24—7:05 a.m.] 307. Embassy’s 297, August 23, 1 p.m. In conversation today with the Naval Attaché, the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister stated that full evacuation of all Japanese from Tsingtao is in process and will be completed within a few days. He added that landing of Japanese forces will be avoided if at all possible. Grew The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/9979 [Document 523] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire The Foreign Office have received a telegram from British residents at Tsingtao urging that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government should propose that China and Japan should agree to declare Tsingtao a safety area, on the basis that Chinese troops will not advance beyond a determined line provided that the Japanese agree not to land forces. 2. In view of the large numbers of British and American nationals including women and children now at Tsingtao, whose lives would be endangered and the evacuation of whom would involve great difficulty and hardship, His Majesty’s Government consider that every effort should be made to avert hostilities in this area. 3. His Majesty’s Government wish therefore to enquire urgently of the United States Government whether the latter would be prepared to instruct their representatives at Tokyo and Nanking to concert with their British colleagues with a view to putting forward the above proposal to the Japanese and Chinese Governments respectively. Washington , August 24, 1937. Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the British Chargé (Mallet) 793.94/9979: Telegram [Document 524] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation With the British Chargé ( Mallet ) [ Washington ,] August 24, 1937. When Mr. Mallet brought me the attached aide-mémoire , 61 I inquired whether I might give him a reply orally. He having assented, I said that the answer would be: We are already acting in this matter; we asked our Ambassador at Tokyo to sound out the Japanese Government with regard to it; the Japanese Government replied that they would give it consideration; in the interval, we have been informed, the diplomatic group at Nanking had made joint representations to the Chinese Government on the subject and has asked representatives of their governments in Tokyo to take the matter up there; and we have asked our Ambassador in Tokyo to cooperate with others there. We have expected if and as soon as we should receive favorable reply from Tokyo to inform the British Government. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 61 Supra . Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 793.94/9980 [Document 525] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 24, 1937. At the time of my handing to the British Ambassador on August 21 the Department’s reply to the British Embassy’s memorandum of August 20 in which the British Government for the second time urged on this Government that we commit this country to participation in a joint responsibility at Shanghai envisaged in a proposal which the British Government had made to the Japanese Government, at Tokyo, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador, as from the Secretary, that we could not but view with the opposite of gratification the pressing upon us by the British Government of a project which we regarded as already having been disposed of adversely by the Japanese Government, together with publicity given in London to the fact of this approach, and that we hoped that at no time would there be brought against us the charge that the project had come to nothing because of rejection of it by us or refusal on our part to cooperate. The Ambassador at that time said that he would bring what I had said to the attention of his Foreign Office. The Ambassador called this morning and said that, in reference to what is reported above, he had informed his Foreign Office of what I had said on behalf of the Secretary and that he had a message in reply. The Ambassador made the observation, speaking apparently on his own authority, that in viewing each other’s actions and in connection with communications inter se , governments must take account of the difference in their respective situations. He said that the proposal which his Government had made to the Japanese Government and in connection with which it had sought a commitment from us had originated in the diplomatic group at Nanking. His Government had felt that the situation was urgent, there was great immediate danger at Shanghai and out of the Shanghai trouble there might come greater trouble, and they thought that no suggestion offering any possibility of diminishing the hazards of that situation should be disregarded. They had possibly been too optimistic. But they had not felt that the Japanese had conclusively rejected their proposal. It had not been any part of their thought to embarrass us. They regretted any embarrassment caused to us. In conclusion, and most important, they wished to assure us that there would be no attribution of blame to us; rather, they felt that if blame was placed anywhere it would be placed upon the Japanese. At that point, I made the observation that the last statement sounded to me like a diplomatic way of affirming that responsibility for failure of the project would be attributed to the Japanese. The Ambassador said that that interpretation had not occurred to him. I then said that, with regard to the origin of the suggestion which the Ambassador had mentioned as having emanated from Nanking, it had been my understanding that the suggestion discussed by the diplomatic group at Nanking had been one envisaging and revolving around the idea of removal by the Japanese of the Japanese population at Shanghai. This, I said, was not at all what the British Government had proposed at Tokyo and submitted to us: what they had proposed had been expressly that Japanese nationals and interests at Shanghai be placed under the protection of such powers as would assume joint responsibility for such protection. The Ambassador said that he fully realized that there had been that difference. The Ambassador then said that, as he sees the situation, his Government and this Government are in very different situations in relation to pressure from their respective publics. The British Government, he said, is under heavy pressure from its public to “do something” in regard to the Chinese-Japanese conflict; but the American Government not only is not being so pressed by its public but on the contrary is being urged to keep entirely away from and out of the difficulties in China. He asked whether that was a fair estimate. I replied that so far as this country is concerned, it seemed to me that what the Ambassador had said was at least approximately correct. The Ambassador then referred to the much greater British material interest immediately at stake, the necessarily great solicitude of the British Government, and the naturalness of the desire of the British Government that no possible suggestion which might ameliorate the situation be overlooked, together with their constant desire that there be cooperation between them and us. I said that, in reference to the matter under discussion last week, our impatience with them had arisen not out of the fact that they wanted action and that they sought our cooperation but out of the fact that they brought us a proposal which seemed to us already to have been “killed” before they brought it to our attention. The Ambassador said that he understood that point. However, he said, his Government still seemed to have an idea that there was a possibility of the Japanese favoring some kind of an idea about a “neutralization of Shanghai.” I said that this last statement was very interesting. To me, it at once suggested that Foreign Offices concerned should be on the alert against a possible confusion of concepts and against discussing proposals which might be made without having made sure that implications and possibilities were exactly and reciprocally understood. I said that in 1932 there had originated from somewhere a suggestion for “neutralization of Shanghai.” If I remembered correctly, the Japanese had been very favorably disposed: they apparently envisaged a permanent “neutralization” of an area with a large radius around Shanghai. They probably would favor such a proposal at any time. But, an action of that sort would be a reverting to the old idea of making amputations of Chinese territory, the idea expressed in “leased territories,” etc.; the occidental powers have been proceeding for many years in the opposite direction; the tendency has been to give back leased territories, etc., rather than to add to their number; neither the British nor the American Governments would, in my opinion, wish to become involved in any new adventures in “special privilege” in China. The Ambassador said that he was sure that this was a correct estimate. I then mentioned the message which we had had from Tokyo yesterday in which Mr. Grew said that the British Chargé d’Affaires had called on him and had expressed the opinion that he, the Chargé d’Affaires, had perhaps given his Government an over-optimistic report. I also mentioned the telegram which we had had from Shanghai in which Mr. Gauss informed us of the clearing up of the misunderstanding about the broadcast, without any previous notification, by the British Consulate of its plans for evacuation of British nationals. The Ambassador expressed gratification over being informed of both of these matters. The Ambassador then said that he anticipated that there would continue to be situations with regard to which his Government or this Government would make suggestions and would seek cooperation; and he hoped that a cooperative attitude would prevail. I said that I agreed with him on both points. Referring back to the opening item in this conversation, I said that I felt that I might say, in advance of informing the Secretary, that the Department appreciated and the Secretary would appreciate the courtesy of the British Government in their having offered the explanation which the Ambassador had communicated to us. The Ambassador said that he appreciated my having expressed that view. I wished the Ambassador a safe voyage and a pleasant holiday. The Ambassador said that he would be back in October. The conversation there ended. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9659: Telegram [Document 526] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 24, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 24—7:57 p.m.] 514. My 504, August 23, 11 p.m. Buck requests that the following message be communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury: “August 24, 1937. Hu Shih, an intellectual leader and a member of the new war Senate, has seen me and states ‘until August 13 possibility peaceful settlement good and even on August 3 [ 13? ] a peace delegate was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to see Kawagoe but interruption communication prevented a meeting before hostilities began. A peaceful settlement is still hopeful especially if England and the United States will assist and that Davidson neutral zone plan 62 probably acceptable to China if at end of three months after cessation hostilities a peace conference between Japan and China is held to settle all outstanding questions. This would be the first step. The next would be to strive for non-aggression pact between Russia and Japan and perhaps later other Pacific countries. Peace is acceptable to the Generalissimo partly with the idea of conserving unity and strength of China to prevent possible internal chaos in case of defeat perhaps possible because of limited military equipment.’ Chen Li Fu, one of the new Cabinet members, stated to me this morning that perhaps we can look forward to the attainment of Sun Yat Sen’s prediction that the United States, Russia, and China can become the guardians of international peace. Chinese opinion is that application of neutrality law would be discriminatory against China even if not so intended and that all China asks is a chance to fight for her life until peace seems possible. A sample survey made by me today shows that in Nanking one-fourth of 432 consecutive shops on two streets are closed which is indicative of effect of air raids on business.” Johnson 62 See last paragraph of telegram No. 530, August 26, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9655: Telegram [Document 527] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 24, 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 24—12:11 p.m.] 309. Department’s 162, August 23, 8 p.m. 63 Following is résumé of remarks by the Senior Aide of the Navy Minister in a conversation today with the Naval Attaché. (Paragraphs 1 through 3 were in general confirmed today by the Secretary to the War Minister in conversation with the Military Attaché): 1. All surface vessels of the combined fleet including aircraft carriers took part in a large operation to land army troops and naval landing force in the region of the lower Yangtze at dawn on August 23. The vessels had proceeded at top speed from various points in Japan to take the Chinese by surprise. Small boats and destroyers carrying a part of the Shanghai landing force came from Shanghai and participated in the landing. Transportation of artillery was a difficult problem. 2. The landing was covered by naval gunfire and naval planes. It was carried out on the lower Whangpoo and on the south shore of the Yangtze northwest of Woosung. Chinese opposition was 27 planes, nine of which were brought down. Japanese losses were about 20 killed and 60 wounded. The fleet promptly withdrew. Vice Admiral Hasegawa was in command of landing operations. Henceforth Japanese operations in the Shanghai area are joint Army-Navy action. 3. The plan is to repeat the operations of 1932 and by a flanking movement to force Chinese withdrawal from the Woosung peninsula. About 40,00 Chinese troops oppose the Japanese. 4. Since fighting commenced in Shanghai the Japanese Navy has lost 200 killed, 400 wounded and 15 planes. 5. Destruction of inland flying fields is to prevent Chinese air attacks on the coast. 6. War supplies are entering China from the Soviet Union through Mongolia and the Japanese campaign northwest of Peiping is to cut off this traffic. 7. Japan must prevent munitions from reaching the Chinese. An effort will be made to induce nations concerned to place a voluntary embargo on war supplies to China. This is a problem for the Foreign Office. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew 63 Not printed. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9669: Telegram [Document 528] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , August 25, 1937—10 a.m. [Received August 25—6:47 a.m.] 386. It is announced today that the first battalion of the 10th Regiment of Savoy Grenadiers left Addis Ababa on August 23 for Massawa, where it will embark for Shanghai to reenforce the San Marco Marine battalion in the defense of Italian interests. It is understood that this battalion is composed of between 600 and 700 men, including supply troops. Phillips The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9672: Telegram [Document 529] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 25, 1937—1 p.m. [Received August 25—6:30 a.m.] 312. 1. In conversation with the British Chargé d’Affaires on August 23 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs asked why the United States had not supported the British proposal for neutralization of Shanghai as had the French. Dodds replied that question should be addressed to me but that he understood that our attitude was determined by the belief that Japan had already closed the matter by rejection. 2. I report this otherwise trivial circumstance to add to many which show how minutely the Japanese Government is scrutinizing our attitude and acts with regard to Japan and China, and how the American Government’s restraint and consideration of all circumstances is noted and appreciated. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9687: Telegram [Document 530] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 25, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 5:12 p.m.] 552. While the Japanese have been successful in effecting the landing of their army forces at Woosung and at points between Woosung and Liuho on the Yangtze and between Woosung and the settlements on the Whangpoo, the question now is whether the Japanese have landed in sufficient force and can advance sufficiently rapidly to force the Chinese forces to retire to their prepared positions in the interior. Unless this is done large scale military operations will take place at the doors of the foreign settlements. There is some indication that the Chinese may be preparing to withdraw at least partially. We hope this may be the case. 2. If heavy fighting occurs in and around the foreign areas, we of course face a dangerous situation, with the possibility of the Chinese forces breaking through our foreign defense lines and perhaps of the large Chinese population within our lines getting out of hand. 3. With this before us as the extreme possibility of the situation, the American Emergency Committee is organizing so as to be able promptly as possible to effect the concentration of our nationals at places where they might be protected in large groups until the storm passed or until they might be moved down and evacuated on warships. We are moving quietly in this matter and are not permitting an alarmist attitude. Sent to the Department, Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9688: Telegram [Document 531] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 25, 1937—7 p.m. [Received August 25—5:25 p.m.] 557. Following is the full text of a memorandum handed to me by the Commander in Chief, Admiral Yarnell, today. My comments will follow by separate telegram. “Memorandum for the Consul General: 1. Since the arrival of the Japanese Army, it seems to me that this situation has entered on a new phase. 2. Until yesterday the Japanese landing party was fighting more or less on the defensive in the Hongkew section under the theory that they were part of the defensive forces of the International Settlement. With a considerable stretch of the imagination, the bombardment of widely spread areas by Japanese men-of-war anchored in the Whangpoo River within the limits of the Settlement might be included in the same understanding. 3. With the landing of the Japanese Army at Woosung, Liuho, and at Chapoo on Hangcnow Bay, the operations obviously change from a defense of the Settlement to an extensive campaign against the Nanking Government covering a wide field. 4. It is understood that the Japanese naval landing party becomes a part of this field army. 5. The question then arises as to what extent the Japanese forces are to be allowed to use the docks and warehouses of the Hongkew harbor in furtherance of their operations without protest from the neutral powers. 6. The Nanking Government has protested several times against the use of the Settlement as a base of operations against their forces. 7. If this use is continued under present conditions, their objection becomes considerably more valid and acquiescence in this use by the neutral powers will be the cause of increasing bitterness on the part of Nanking. 8. It is recommended that the neutral powers arrive at some agreement on this matter and voice a warning to the Japanese Government against the further use of the International Settlement as a base for their war operations”. Sent to the Department, Nanking, and Tokyo. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9634: Telegram [Document 532] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 25, 1937—8 p.m. 179. Your 504, August 23, 11 p.m. 1. Please inform Buck that the Department appreciates his having brought to you for transmission the message under reference. Inform Buck that the whole message has been noted by the Secretary of State and a copy is being transmitted to the President; and that the portion (three paragraphs) which relates to financial matters is being communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury. Point out that messages or statements relating primarily or entirely to a political subject, especially such as involve questions of foreign relations, should be channeled through and be handled by the agencies and agents most responsible for the conducting of foreign relations, and that those officials here are the Secretary of State and the President. Also suggest that if Buck is further asked to transmit political messages he should say to the applicant that the United States has an Ambassador in China and the Chinese Government has an Ambassador in the United States, functions of whom are the handling of such messages, and that, while he will be glad to communicate messages to you, such messages, when their substance is matters of foreign relations, should be destined for the Secretary of State and through the Secretary of State for the President. 2. Please take a copy of the first paragraph of the message to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, with regard to its substance, state that the Generalissimo is evidently under a misapprehension with regard to the policy and action of the American Government in regard to the present crisis to which the Generalissimo has referred. You will state that the American Government has repeatedly urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, through the Ambassadors here of those two countries and through the American Ambassadors in those two countries, that hostilities be avoided and peace be maintained. Call attention to the texts of my statements of July 16 64 and August 23. 65 Say that from the beginning of the present situation the American Government and the British Government have been in constant consultation; that the efforts which each of the two Governments has made have been along parallel lines; and that it is believed that the efforts of each have been directed toward the same fundamental objective, namely, preservation of peace. Request that if and when any official of the Chinese Government wishes that a message regarding high political policy be transmitted to any high official of this Government, such message either be given to the American Ambassador to China or be sent to the Chinese Ambassador to the United States for communication in first instance to the Secretary of State. Hull 64 Vol. i , p. 699 . 65 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 355 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9672: Telegram [Document 533] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 25, 1937—8 p.m. 168. Your 312, August 25, 1 p.m. In course of a lengthy conversation yesterday afternoon British Ambassador stated to Hornbeck that his Foreign Office still felt that there was some hope for the effecting of an arrangement for “neutralization” of Shanghai. There followed references by Hornbeck to the origin of and attitudes adopted toward a “neutralization of Shanghai” suggestion in 1932. This morning Department has received from Shanghai information regarding a statement made yesterday by Admiral Hasegawa to Reuters at Shanghai and confirmed by Japanese Consul General there in course of which Hasegawa is quoted as saying “with the situation aggravated by Chinese to such an extent as it is, we deem it important that a safety zone should be established in and around Shanghai.” To the Department, it is clear that British and French are confusing two entirely different concepts. For your strictly confidential information, the Department does not look with favor upon either of these concepts insofar as it understands the connotation of the terms in which they have hitherto, in current connections, been mentioned. Recollecting various “plans” which were suggested from various sources in 1932, Department desires that, if and when anything further is said to you in mention of suggestions or proposals relating to Shanghai, you endeavor to draw out the propounder but be yourself completely non-committal and report at once to the Department. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9659: Telegram [Document 534] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 25, 1937—9 p.m. 181. Your unnumbered [ 514 ,] August 24, 8 p.m. Please inform Department what is the “Davidson neutral zone plan” and give your comments on each of the two statements made in the second sentence of the quoted message communicated in your telegram under reference. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9706: Telegram [Document 535] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 26, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 26—8:40 a.m.] 564. Reference my 557, August 25, 7 p.m. Commander in Chief’s memorandum presents problem of Japanese use of part of International Settlement as a military base. Further problems likely soon to arise and which should have some advance consideration are possible Japanese demands to suppress, control or take over the post offices, telegraph, cable and radio facilities, the seizure of other Chinese Government revenue administrations, and perhaps the Central Bank whose operations are important to stability of Chinese currency. Most of these institutions are in the International Settlement or the French Concession. 2. Some of these questions recently arose at Tientsin with respect of British and French Concessions. We were not involved and I am not informed as to their final settlement. 3. As there has been no declaration of war, it seems to me that the Japanese cannot maintain they have the rights of an army of occupation entitled to control or suppress these activities or to confiscate government properties. However, if the situation is not liquidated promptly these problems will come up one after the other and we will be involved in the decisions to be made. I would therefore appreciate instructions for my general guidance. 4. It is believed that after they have fully occupied the Shanghai area the Japanese may be disposed to consider some plan for “neutralization” or a demilitarized zone or a free city, provided it does not exclude them from participation. 5. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Gauss The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9704: Telegram [Document 536] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , August 26, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 26—7:45 a.m.] The attitude of the local Japanese Consul General is disquieting. He called on me yesterday and dwelt at length on the presence of the revenue guards (see my despatches of May and June) which he stated not he personally but his Government regarded as a menace to the peace of Tsingtao. He proposed that I ask Chinese to withdraw revenue guards for some distance and Japanese would withdraw some of their men-of-war. I declined to convey this request in view of (1) repeated statement of the Mayor to me in respect to his determination not to alter disposition of troops outside of Tsingtao and also his lack of authority over Central Government forces, (2) as well as my desire that this Consulate be uninvolved in unnecessary mediation, inasmuch as to date both sides have ostensibly observed their announced intention of nonaggravation of the situation and of maintaining the present peaceful status quo in Tsingtao. Sokobin The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9719: Telegram [Document 537] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 5:32 p.m.] 530. Your 181, August 25, 9 p.m. Hu Shih called on me on August 21 and stated that he was still optimistic about peace negotiations. He said that when he arrived in Nanking on July 28 he went to see the Generalissimo and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and urged upon them the necessity of keeping open diplomatic relations with Japan and of their accepting responsibility of attempting to find a peaceful settlement even to the point of being ready to discuss thoroughly with the Japanese all possible fundamental differences between the two countries. His idea was first a truce with restoration of the status quo ante bellum and after 3 months a second and final step would be an official peace conference at which all matters could be discussed and settled. He said that authorities were favorably disposed and had even invited Kawagoe to come to Shanghai to meet an emissary, but that all this was stopped when trouble began at Shanghai on the 13th. Hu Shih stated that the Shanghai trouble had completely obliterated his first opinions, but that he was still optimistic and had recently again sought out the Generalissimo; however, he had found him somewhat less interested in peace measures. Hu Shih then referred to the proposal of the consuls at Shanghai which called for the evacuation of Shanghai by the forces of both sides. He said that he felt that General [ Mayor ] Yui’s response to this proposal, while official, was not completely final, and that there was a possibility that responsible Chinese authorities might yet be willing to accept it. I told Hu Shih that if responsible persons in the Chinese Government were to place before me and my colleagues a definite undertaking to accept the consular proposal as a basis for discussion, I felt no doubt that we would be willing to transmit this in order that it might be placed before the Japanese Government. Hu Shih stated that he expected to attend a meeting on the night of the 21st and would see whether something could be done along this line. I have not heard from him since. I did not report this conversation to Washington as I did not consider it of sufficient importance. I decided to await further word from Hu Shih which he referred to. I do not know what is meant by the Davidson neutral zone plan unless it is the consular proposal referred to by Hu Shih and reported in Shanghai’s 473, August 13, 9 p.m., to the Department. 66 On the other hand the press at Shanghai at one time designated the British proposal referred to in the Department’s telegram 165, August 19, 10 p.m., 67 as having been put forward by British Acting Consul General Davidson at Shanghai. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson 66 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 346 . 67 Not printed; it transmitted Department’s views on the British proposal as set forth in memorandum to the British Embassy, August 19, p. 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] . The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9723: Telegram [Document 538] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , August 26, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 9:10 p.m.] 1202. Delbos, who has just returned to Paris, dined with me alone last evening and we had an exhaustive conversation with regard to foreign affairs. First China. Delbos said that he believed Great Britain, France and the United States should make a united appeal to Japan and China to enter negotiations for the establishment of peace in the Far East. He said that he understood it would be difficult for the United States to enter any joint démarche with France and England; but he hoped that it might be possible for the Secretary of State to summon the Japanese Ambassador (and immediately afterward the Chinese Ambassador) at the same moment that he should summon the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors in Paris and that Eden should act simultaneously in London. He believed that those charged with the direction of foreign affairs in Paris, London and Washington should say to the Ambassadors of both countries in the most polite manner that they had no intention of abandoning any of their rights, privileges, or obligations in China; that the present hostilities in China were infringing gravely on those rights, privileges and obligations; that menace to world peace was involved; and that it was felt that China and Japan should cease fighting and attempt to reach an adjustment of the dispute by peaceful means. Delbos added that the Russians would of course support any such démarche if their support should be desired. He personally was feeling violently hostile to the Soviet Government at the moment. The insults which had been poured upon him by the Communists when he had spoken at the celebration at the Pantheon in honor of Jaures recently had given him a severe emotional shock. He had feared at one moment that he was about to be murdered. Nevertheless he felt that the Russians should be made use of, if they could be useful. The Russian Government had informed him that it was entirely ready to threaten the Japanese with intervention if any approval from either England, France or the United States should be forthcoming. His views with regard to the Japanese attack on China were the following: He believed that the final objective of the Japanese attack was not China but the Soviet Union. The Japanese desired to seize the railroad from Tientsin to Peiping and Kalgan in order to prepare an attack on Inner and Outer Mongolia and later on the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the neighborhood of Lake Baikal. He felt that the Japanese had chosen the present moment for this attack because they were fully cognizant of the disorganization of the Russian Army produced by the recent slaughtering of its leading officers. In his opinion the vital question was whether Russia would feel strong enough to intervene before the Japanese had overwhelmed Chiang Kai-shek. He felt that the interests of England, France and the United States were identical in the present Far Eastern conflict. Neither Japan nor Russia should control the Far East. If the present war should go on and Russia should not intervene Japan would first control China and later drive the Soviet Union off the Pacific and establish Lake Baikal as the Japanese frontier. The Far East would become a Fascist area. If on the other hand the Soviet Union should intervene and should defeat Japan there was a considerable chance that social revolution in Japan would follow and the entire Far East might become Bolshevik. Both eventualities were entirely opposed to the ideals and interests of France, England and the United States. Therefore it was desirable to do everything possible to stop the war in China as rapidly as possible. France was ready to cooperate in any maneuver that might be invented by either Great Britain or the United States, even though it might involve the use of force. The Chinese Ambassador had informed him yesterday afternoon that the Chinese Government had decided to appeal to the League of Nations at the September meeting. He believed that the League must act in this matter as strongly as possible. The aggression of Japan on China was flagrant and if the League should refuse to take cognizance of it, the League would become a complete farce. The whole world would realize that naked force was the only factor of importance in world affairs. 68 The French Government had decided yesterday to continue to supply airplanes to China. The decision had been made on the basis of a somewhat dishonest subterfuge. The production of munitions and most airplanes was now entirely in the hands of the French Government. There were, however, a number of airplane factories which were not nationalized. The Chinese Government would be permitted to buy all the airplanes it wanted from those French factories, and the French Government would explain to the Japanese Government that the French Government had no control over private enterprise in this matter. Parenthetically he stated that the Japanese had not shown any great concern over the French supplying arms and ammunition to the Chinese Government; but when the Japanese Government had learned that a retired French General had been invited to go to China to assist on the staff of the Chinese armies, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris had made a protest of the most violent nature. Delbos added that he feared the Japanese military were becoming as crazy as the German naval authorities had become when they sank the Lusitania . The French Ambassador in Tokyo had telegraphed him yesterday that a series of facts and events had compelled him to reach the conclusion that Japan was likely to declare war on the Soviet Union although the Soviet Union might remain completely passive. At this point he remarked that the Soviet Union undoubtedly would supply large numbers of airplanes to the Chinese Government. Inasmuch as I gather that you have stated a number of times to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors in Washington that we intend to defend our interests in China and have urged that China and Japan compromise their differences by peaceful means, I wonder if you might not care to have Delbos and Eden make similar statements at some future time simultaneously. If so I am certain that Delbos will make any statement that you may care to have him make to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors, and if by any chance you should wish to prepare a text, I should not despair of persuading him to employ it verbatim. [Here follows discussion of European affairs; see volume I, page 117 .] Bullitt 68 For action on this issue by the League of Nations, see vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9707: Telegram [Document 539] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 26—11:35 a.m.] 317. Embassy’s 314, August 25, 6 p.m. 69 1. Replying to my letter, the British Chargé d’Affaires today informs me that on August 25 he addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter in the following terms: “My Dear Minister: I have today received from my Government a telegram instructing me to approach Your Excellency with the request that the Japanese Government should agree to declare Tsingtao a safety area on the basis that Chinese troops will not advance beyond a determined line provided that the Japanese agree not to land forces. In view of the large numbers of British nationals, including women and children, now at Tsingtao whose lives would be endangered and the evacuation of whom would involve great difficulty and hardship, His Majesty’s Government consider that every effort should be made to avert hostilities in this area. His Majesty’s Ambassador at Nanking has received instructions to approach the Chinese Government in the same sense”. 2. The French Ambassador informs me that on August 25 he addressed to the Foreign Minister a note referring to the action of the five Ambassadors and expressing the hope that all hostilities in and about Tsingtao be avoided. The German Counselor made similar oral representations at the Foreign Office, according to the German Ambassador. The Italian Ambassador stated his Counselor supported the recommendation. 3. Although my note No. 780 of August 23 (Embassy’s 297, August 23, 1 p.m.) as authorized by the Department was comprehensive and forceful, acting under the authority of Department’s 163, August 24, 4 p.m., for the purpose of a united front in representations regarding Tsingtao I have today sent to the Foreign Minister an informal note associating my Government with my colleagues in support of their recommendation. 4. The German Military Attaché has today been informed at the War Office that the situation at Tsingtao is now much less dangerous than a few days ago. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew 69 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9710: Telegram [Document 540] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 26—12:40 p.m.] 533. Our 405, August 12, 10 a.m. 1. Announcement concerning the new War Council to take charge of Government affairs during the emergency is being delayed for unknown reasons but probably due to desire for secrecy because of reported cooperation therein by Chinese Communist leaders. The Government doubtless feels that reports of Communist cooperation might swing Italian and German sympathies toward Japan; the German press has already been quoted here as stating that the Soviet Union is supplying arms and ammunition to China and as referring to Japan as fighting against communism in China. Our latest information is that in addition to Chiang Kai-shek as President and Wang Ching Wei as Vice President the following definite appointments have been made: (1) Finance, H. H. Kung (with temporary substitute not yet agreed upon); (2) Military Affairs, General Hwang Shao Hsiung, Hupeh Chairman; (3) Political Affairs, Chang Chun; (4) People’s training, Chen Li Fu, party leader and Central Executive Committee member. It is reported but not confirmed that [Mao] Tze Tung has been given a post on the Council. 2. Chen Tu Hsiu, well known Communist leader and former Central Executive member who was sentenced in 1932 or 1933 to 8 years imprisonment for being a Communist, was recently set free. Observers here consider his release significant as indicating the changed attitude of the National Government toward Chinese Communists. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai for Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Johnson The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9711: Telegram [Document 541] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , August 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 26—2:55 p.m.] 558. The Foreign Office states that no communiqué was issued last night, as has been erroneously reported in the press, following the talks between the Prime Minister, 70 Eden and Halifax. 71 Representatives of the press merely received oral guidance. The account of the meeting given this morning in the Times is confirmed by the Foreign Office as being substantially accurate and is as follows: The Conference was largely concerned with an exchange of information; broad outlines of British policy in the immediate situation in China were confirmed and the Government is persistent in its efforts to have hostilities removed from Shanghai. At the same time warning is renewed that both the Japanese and Chinese Governments will be held responsible for the loss of British lives and property and Japan is reminded that compensation will be for the occupation of premises and for any damage done during such occupation. The Prime Minister and his associates likewise welcomed the appeal made by the American Secretary of State for a cessation of hostilities. The Ministers “observed with satisfaction the close collaboration that has been maintained with other governments, especially the American and French. They regard it as most important that such collaboration should continue”. The Times in a leading editorial today on the Far Eastern situation went out of its way to make the following statement: “The situation is, of course, an impossibly difficult one; but when in the course of time the tide of war shall have ebbed from Shanghai, the prospects of salvage work by the foreign powers would probably have been improved by closer Anglo-American diplomatic cooperation at the outset”. In a conversation this afternoon, I casually invited the attention of a Foreign Office official to this statement and said that I regretted that the Times should have expressed so useless and misleading an opinion. The Foreign Office official agreed and said that it was an example of “irresponsible journalism”. There is no reason, in my opinion, to attach undue significance to the visit of the Prime Minister to London for one day. Mr. Chamberlain has been kept informed of every major development and his presence in London immediately prior to an announced visit to the King at Balmoral Castle perhaps indicates little more than a desire to coordinate information from his closest advisers with a view to making a report to the Sovereign and to affirm to the public his personal direction of British foreign policy. Johnson 70 Neville Chamberlain. 71 Viscount Halifax, British Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords. The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9753: Telegram [Document 542] The Chargé in Germany ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , August 26, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 28—8:45 a.m.] 202. In a talk with von Schmieden, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, he formally restated the German neutral position mentioned in the Embassy’s No. 180, July 29, 6 p.m. 72 He said that Germany had remonstrated with both Japan and China over the continuance of the conflict, as had Great Britain and other powers but “along lines somewhat modified owing to their special relations with Japan”. He said that they were greatly concerned over the safety of their nationals and of their interests. They would not, however, send a war vessel or take any similar steps as, unlike other countries, they had no extraterritorial rights, were not parties to the Boxer protocols and that thus such action would be misconstrued. Moreover, they wished at this time to keep their naval units in European waters. I may say that it appears rather evident here that Germany finds herself caught between her special relations with Japan under the Anti-Communist Treaty 72a and her interests in China, and that, regarding the latter, she is thinking less of their present value than of a prospective increase. It will be recalled that the Anti-Communist Treaty was a project carried through by Ribbentrop 73 and that it has been understood here that the Foreign Office has never been enthusiastic about it. Von Schmieden, in what he had to say, appeared to confirm this Foreign Office attitude. He said that the Japanese were making a great propaganda effort out of Russian aid to China but that this effort was aimed chiefly at influencing Germany and that as far as he could ascertain Russian material assistance was, if it existed at all, extremely limited. The maintenance of full military forces along the border and the general Russian attitude was, of course, a moral support for China but while the Soviets might be furnishing some airplanes any such assistance was handicapped by lack of fuel and oil. Japanese military action was undoubtedly serving to unite China and he had indications of the Japanese directly stirring up communistic activity in China in order to point it out to the world and to Germany. Incidentally in respect of what von Schmieden said above regarding Russian border forces, the Counsellor of the Russian Embassy spoke of this in a conversation with me saying that these forces were being maintained at their full strength and to a certain extent being built up in preparation for any eventualities but that Moscow was not giving any material assistance to China at the present time. Von Schmieden’s general approach to the entire problem was that German concern respecting the Far East was common with that of all western powers or at least he endeavored to convince me that such was the case. He said that the eventuality least to be desired was either a decisive Japanese or Chinese victory. Of the two a Japanese victory was more to be feared as he believed that Japan in such a case would act to eliminate western interests from China and in general from the Far East. On the other hand, in the event of a Chinese victory, while the Chinese would undoubtedly take a strong general anti-foreign attitude they might sustain certain western interests as a continued offset to Japan. He asked me what the United States would do under the Neutrality Act in relation to the situation. I replied that as the press had reported the Neutrality Act was naturally being considered in connection with all other pertinent questions but that I had no knowledge whatsoever of any specific action being contemplated. This naturally brought up the question of a possible Japanese naval blockade of China. It was felt that this would physically be easy of accomplishment but would require a declaration of war. He said that he did not believe that Japan would declare war as it would not suit her propaganda purposes. He believed, nevertheless, that Japan could create a blockade equally as effective as a declared naval blockade by an extension chiefly by the use of airplanes of such action as she was taking at Shanghai which obviously would create such a risk for shipping as to paralyze all trade. He added that this would be equally hurtful to Japan’s trade, that Japan was already suffering severe commercial losses and he speculated as to what effect this might have on Japanese policy. In respect to Germany’s neutral or opportunistic position in regard to China there may be cited the circumstance that it appears to be understood that Kung, Chinese Finance Minister, on his recent visit to Berlin arranged for the purchase of German munitions and supplies. Incidentally I have been told on fairly good authority that for the most part this was second rate material which the Germans were glad to dispose of. The Military Attaché informs me in regard to Germany’s maintenance in Nanking of a “Military Attaché’s office” said to comprise over 100 officers who have been advising Chiang Kai-shek and assisting in training his forces that the Japanese Military Attaché here recently took up with the War Ministry the question of the withdrawal or at least the reduction in number of these officers. According to statements of German General Staff officers, the War Ministry declined on the ground that it would be dishonorable in view of the long and friendly relations which had existed between the Nanking office and Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese Military Attaché is reported to have adopted “a reasonable attitude” in the face of this response. Although the precise nature of German policy on any point is exceedingly difficult to ascertain and must be left largely to inference it would seem to be apparent in the first place that Berlin is naturally and seriously concerned over German commercial losses in China with special reference to her recent hopes of a substantial increase in profitable trade. There is, of course, the point that Germany might bargain with Japan for a special protection of her interests in return for moral or perhaps other support. I did not feel it to be opportune in my talk with Schmieden to ask a direct question on this score. His whole attitude seemed to be, however, that whatever Japan might promise at present the prospects of Germany’s being able to salvage anything out of a general Japanese success were regarded as exceedingly slender. In the second place I think it may also be felt that Germany’s maintaining a middle position is not only a policy of sustaining as friendly as possible relationships with both parties but with possibility of undertaking a profitable move as occasioned by future developments but that it is based upon a desire to come to a bargain with European or with western powers in general to take common action with them respecting all Asia in return for political and commercial concessions in Europe and commercial advantages elsewhere. On this score the German-Japanese treaty lends itself to employment as a form of blackmail. I learn from reliable sources that the Japanese Ambassador here has been pressing the Germans hard to accord Japan strong moral support. His line has been that Germany should portray Japanese action as a struggle against communism. The Chinese Ambassador in a recent conversation informed me that he has protested to the Foreign Office against the anti-Chinese tone of the German press in particular that, for the most part, items were appearing under a Tokyo rather than a Shanghai date line. The attitude of the German press impressively commented upon here as an evasion of strict neutrality since the stressing of the Communist angle in China is tantamount to an attack on the Chinese position in general. It is true that to a degree this is the tone recently adopted by the German press as suggested by the leading editorial of the Angriff of August 24 entitled [“] Moscow’s Shadow over China.[”] It is construed here as a more or less decisive swing toward Japan. At present, however, I do not feel that it can be regarded as more than a phase of the German attitude which will doubtless exhibit attention of phases none of which should be interpreted as definitive. By air mail code copies to Paris, Moscow, London, Tokyo. Gilbert 72 Not printed. 72a For text, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 153 ; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. i , pp. 390 ff. 73 Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador in the United Kingdom. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 761.93/1600: Telegram [Document 543] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , August 26, 1937—10 p.m. [Received August 26—7:30 p.m.] 234. I am setting forth herewith certain impressions obtained by this Mission of present Soviet policies and tactics with respect to the Far East. These impressions have been gained from a study of the Soviet press and from conversations with Soviet officials, members of the local diplomatic corps including Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors and other qualified observers. 1. The Kremlin is pleased that the Central Government has finally begun to offer armed resistance to Japan and is hoping that with the development of hostilities Japan will become so deeply enmeshed in Central China that it will not be able to pursue an aggressive policy to the North. 2. Although Soviet press and spokesmen intimate the desirability of collective action on the part of Western powers in order to prevent spread of hostilities, it is believed that they would have little real sympathy for any movement which might promise peace unless such movement would be of a kind likely seriously to weaken the military power of Japan. 3. The Kremlin is determined that the Soviet Union should not become embroiled; nevertheless, it does not desire for reasons of prestige that Japan or China should gain the impression that it will tolerate affronts. It is therefore protesting such provocations as the recent raids on the Consulate at Tientsin and Shanghai vigorously but at the same time in such a manner that disputes arising therefrom are not likely to develop into issues solvable only by armed conflict. 4. Soviet press and officials make no secret of Soviet sympathy for China. They are careful, however, to express this sympathy in a manner which would not give Japan ground to charge active intervention. 5. Kremlin apparently has directed its adherents in China to support the Central Government so long as that Government follows policy of resistance to Japan. It is believed, however, that Moscow would use such influence as it has over Communist and Left Wing elements in China to prevail upon them to work for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek in case he should embark on policy of temporization or mediation with Japan. 6. General impression is that Soviet Union has not as yet begun to furnish military supplies to China. Whether it will do so in the future depends almost entirely upon general international situation, direction of development of hostilities, policies of Chinese Government, and so forth. Difficulties of transportation are such that supplies in any event would probably be limited largely to certain types of aircraft. 7. Soviet Government is apparently extremely anxious that the route from Outer Mongolia to China through Kalgan should not fall into Japanese hands. There is even a possibility that Soviet Union would take active steps to assist Chinese in defense of route in case Japanese should seriously threaten it. Henderson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 793.94/9723: Telegram [Document 544] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , August 27, 1937—4 p.m. 455. Your 1202, August 26, 3 p.m. In reply to your inquiry I feel that if either Delbos or Eden or both should as of their own volition and without indication of being inspired by us, make a strong and emphatic public statement, the effect would be decidedly helpful. For your confidential guidance, we do not intend to initiate a concert of effort in regard to the Far East; we continue to believe in the advisability of approaching the problem through independent but parallel lines. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9732: Telegram [Document 545] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received August 27—1:35 p.m.] 321. 1. Recent despatches from London state that following a conference between the British Prime Minister Eden and Halifax on August 23 the British Government will renew efforts to persuade the American Government to participate in a “joint declaration” on the situation in the Far East. There is extensive speculation over the character of such proposed declaration but it is generally anticipated that it is to be vigorous. On the basis of extensive experience in Japan on the part of several of my advisers and myself I venture respectfully to submit certain of our more fundamental views concerning the present Sino-Japanese conflict in hope that they may be found helpful in formulating future policy and action. 2. Divergent opinions exist as to the question of premeditation and the immediate responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict but these points have probably not yet been established. In our opinion they are not now of great practical importance. 3. The important consideration is that the seeds for the present conflict were sown long ago and regardless of dates or provocative acts the conflict was eventually inevitable. While it is believed that the Japanese at first hoped to settle the Marco Polo Bridge affair as a local episode it was soon found that regardless of the wishes of Nanking or Tokyo the situation had rapidly developed out of hand and that the settlement of Japan’s anomalous position in North China had now become unavoidable by either side. 4. The present hostilities are an inevitable corollary of the Manchurian conflict which left Japan with an eventual choice of two alternatives: either to establish complete control in North China or to be prepared for an eventual retreat from Manchuria. There could never have been any doubt whatever as to the choice of alternatives. Japan’s effort during the past 4 years to obtain its objective gradually and by political maneuvers rather than by open force miscarried. Eventual conflict then became inevitable. There then remained only the question as to how far the conflict could be localized. There is every reason to believe that Japan would have welcomed localization but whether through Japan’s own inept tactics (in Shanghai and elsewhere) or through uncontrollable circumstances any such hope was soon shattered. General warfare was unloosed and there can be no question but that the Japanese Government solidly supported by the public is determined to see it through. 5. Predictions as to the final outcome are of course premature. Japanese confidence in overwhelming military victory within a few months appears to be complete. They believe that their mechanized army and air forces can attain their objectives. They seem incapable of pausing to consider that after repeated victories in battle and the possible virtual destruction of the Chinese armies as organized units the real war may only then begin. We doubt if they stop to think of the possible effects of almost endless guerilla warfare, of the wiping out of Japan’s commercial and industrial stake in China and of the immense financial appropriations and other drains which may progressively deplete the Japanese exchequer. We hold that they have no real conception of these risks and are unable to visualize or appraise the long range outlook as opposed to the more immediate prospective. Herein in our opinion lies the considerable risk that Japan may conceivably emerge from such a campaign shorn of much of her prestige and power. 6. We agree with Mr. Johnson’s thesis (Nanking’s 410, August 12, 6 p.m.) that China could not afford to refuse to meet Japan’s challenge and we are in complete accord with his opposition to any American step which might be considered as urging China to purchase peace with the loss of sovereign rights. We are equally of the opinion that any attempt by the United States to thwart by manifestation of disapprobation on legal or moral grounds the development of Japan’s China policy would have no beneficial effect and if persisted in would tend to obliterate the elements of friendship on the part of Japan towards the United States which have been and are daily being developed by our government’s tactics, methods and manner of procedure in the present conflict. 7. We feel that the fundamental objectives of the United States in the present situation should be: (1) to avoid involvement; (2) to protect to the utmost the lives, property and rights of American citizens; and (3) while reserving complete neutrality to maintain our traditional friendship with both combatants. The last point will need the making of special endeavor toward solidifying our relations with Japan. In a day and age when national egotism is rampant we believe that the Japanese are capable of gratitude in large measure for manifestations of good will and that by encouraging confidence in our impartiality between and friendship toward both contestants we can accomplish more than by any other method. They still constantly remember and speak of our friendship at the time of the great earthquake in 1923. 74 They likewise constantly remember the Exclusion Act 75 and our methods at the time of the Manchurian affair. Today as a result of the policy and methods now being pursued by the present Administration in Washington they are already exhibiting marked signs of appreciation. Similar appreciation is not being manifested towards Great Britain. Looking at these considerations from a purely material point of view we believe that they constitute a practical asset to American interests and that the importance of this asset will increase in direct ratio to our continuance of the policy and methods which we are now following. We have before us an important opportunity which should not be missed. If and when the time comes for the United States to act toward terminating hostilities Japan will be more disposed to heed our counsel if she has confidence in our good will and impartiality than if her attitude toward us be one of suspicion and resentment. 8. It is far from our intention to advocate the development of friendship with Japan at the expense of friendship with China. We merely wish to emphasize the importance of having constantly in mind the considerations brought about in this telegram in connection with every action taken by our Government. We feel that much may be accomplished by appealing either alone or in concert with other powers for restraining or circumscribing warfare in specific localities where foreigners and foreign property are in danger but we also feel that until there has occurred a stalemate or until military victory by one of the contestants has been achieved moral intervention by the powers which could be interpreted as partial to either contestant would have no good effect. 9. The Military and Naval Attachés and my entire staff concur in the foregoing. 76 Grew 74 See Foreign Relations , 1923, vol. ii , pp. 465 ff. 75 See ibid ., 1924, vol. ii , pp. 333 ff. 76 In telegram No. 324, August 28, 11 a.m., the Ambassador asked that the Commercial Attaché be included (793.94/9751). In telegram No. 176, August 28, 3 p.m., the Secretary cabled his appreciation of the Ambassador’s No. 321 (793.94/9732). The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9707: Telegram [Document 546] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 27, 1937—6 p.m. 173. Your 317, August 26, 6 p.m. Consul at Tsingtao reports that evacuation of Japanese nationals, excluding consular staff and a few men in important service, has been ordered by the Japanese Government. It is stated that the order for evacuation is based on “desire to avoid any possibility of a Sino-Japanese clash in Tsingtao” and that evacuation will be completed within 5 days. The Department suggests that you might ask Foreign Office for confirmation of the foregoing and at the same time take occasion to urge upon the Japanese Government an early and favorable reply to note mentioned in your 297, August 23, 1 p.m., and Department’s previous. Hull Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 793.94/9830 [Document 547] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 27, 1937. The Belgian Ambassador 77 called this afternoon. He asked several questions about the situation in the Far East the answers to nearly all of which have already appeared in the press. He seemed most preoccupied with the question whether the United States, Great Britain and France were going to take any form of collective or joint action. I explained that the Governments of these three countries have been in constant communication and have acted to greater or less extent on parallel lines, but that there has not been what is ordinarily described as “joint” action. I pointed to the fact that the American Government has gone further than has any other government in the line of public statement of attitude and policy. The Ambassador having made the observation that, in proportion to size and population, Belgium had interests at stake at least as great as those of any other country, I took advantage of the opportunity thus given to make the observation that we had begun to wonder why other governments concerned have not chosen to give utterance to their concern and their views. The Ambassador said that that was something to think about. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 77 Count Robert van der Straten-Ponthoz. The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/9884 [Document 548] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State According to an official report received at the Chinese Embassy, the Japanese, having failed to dislodge the stern resistance of the Chinese at the Nankow Pass, have gone so far as even to use poisonous gas at Chu Yung Kwan, a few miles northwest of the Nankow Pass, and its vicinity in addition to their indiscriminate shelling and bombing. The inhuman and unlawful acts were reported to be committed by the Japanese troops on August 24th and 25th. [ Washington ,] August 27, 1937. The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9755: Telegram [Document 549] The Chargé in Germany ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , August 28, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 28—8:45 a.m.] 206. Supplementing from a somewhat different political angle my No. 202, August 26, 8 p.m., concerning the expressed attitude of the Foreign Office toward Japanese action in China, a colleague who is a close personal friend of von Mackensen, at present acting head of the Foreign Ministry, informs me in strict confidence that the latter expressed himself to him heatedly respecting Japanese action and policy. Von Mackensen stated that Japan’s entanglement in China which he believed would be indefinitely protracted had practically nullified the value to Germany of the German-Japanese understanding respecting Russia which received a form of outward expression in the anti-Communist agreement. In association with the considerations discussed in my telegram under reference, I feel that von Mackensen’s preoccupations lie at the core of the question and to the extent the Foreign Office may play a part in the determination of German external policy, its views should be given careful consideration in their possible effects on Germany’s role in the European situation. Copies in code by mail to London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, Tokyo. Gilbert Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 793.94/9831 [Document 550] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] August 28, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador called today at 11:30 on his own initiative. There were exchanged some observations with regard to the military situation in China. The Ambassador said that, referring to an earlier conversation, he had received from the Chinese Ambassador in London information that Dr. Quo had had a further conversation with the British Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Eden had stated that the British Government was prepared to support any course of action (in regard to the Nine Power Treaty?) which the American Government might choose to embark upon. The Secretary inquired whether the Ambassador thought that any course of action not involving force would be effective. The Ambassador replied that he thought that for effectiveness force would be essential. The Secretary inquired whether the Ambassador could state what naval forces the British Government had in Far Eastern waters. The Ambassador replied to the effect that he did not [know?] but that he did not think that they had a very strong force. In the course of the conversation, the Ambassador stated that the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government had entered into a non-aggression pact. 78 The Secretary pointed out that the American Government had done more than any other government by way of expressing views, voicing principles applicable to the Chinese-Japanese situation and urging that hostilities be avoided and peace be kept. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 78 Signed at Nanking, August 21, 1937, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxxi , p. 101. The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/9883 [Document 551] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State The Chinese Government notes with gratification the reiteration by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, in his statement of August 23, 1937, 79 of the fact that the general principles of policy enunciated in his statement of July 16, 1937, 80 which the Chinese Government has unreservedly accepted, should effectively govern international relationships and should be applicable throughout the world. Due note is also taken of the appeal of the Secretary of State to China and Japan to refrain from resort to war and to settle differences in accordance with principles which in the opinion not alone of the American people but of practically all peoples of the world should govern in international relationships. Traditionally it has been the foreign policy of the Chinese Government to settle all international controversies by pacific means. Soon after the outbreak of the incident in Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, the Chinese Government made in vain several attempts to effect a peaceful settlement of the incident. In a Memorandum under date July 15, 1937, addressed to the leading Powers, it was made clear that while China was obliged to employ all the means at her disposal to defend her territory and national honor and existence, she nevertheless held herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known in international law and treaties. In a note to the Secretary of State on August 12, 1937, the Chinese Ambassador again took occasion to point out that the stand of the Chinese Government as to the issue with Japan remained the same as that stated in the Memorandum of July 15, 1937. Even in a recent move to seek a peaceful solution, the Chinese Government accepted in principle the British proposal for the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai, if Japan would accept the same. It is to be noted that China has never attempted to resort to war, but to resist foreign aggressions in defence of her territory and national honor and existence. She is ready as ever to settle whatever differences she may have with Japan in accordance with the principles of international law and practice. It is the sincere conviction of the Chinese Government that the relationships among the nations can be best governed by the realization and fulfillment of the noble principles enunciated and reiterated by Secretary of State Hull, and that the realization and fulfillment of these principles can only be attained by the full cooperation of all the countries. Washington , August 28, 1937. 79 See Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 355 . 80 Vol. i , p. 699 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9771: Telegram [Document 552] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 29, 1937—9 a.m. [Received August 29—5:40 a.m.] 596. I find that in the pressure of the past week I have omitted to inform the Department of the following pro forma exchanges which I now summarize to complete the record. Communication dated August 14th from the Mayor of Greater Shanghai to me and to other consular representatives stated that Japanese armed forces had attacked and invaded Chinese territory; that measures of self defense had been adopted but that in pursuance of the established policy of the Chinese Government adequate protection would be accorded to all foreign life and property in areas under Chinese control. The Mayor stated however that the Chinese military requested the Settlement authorities to restrain the Japanese forces from using the Settlement as a base of operations and that in the event the Settlement was so used no responsibility would be assumed for such consequences as might arise from measures taken by Chinese troops in self-defense. On August 15th Senior Consul made oral representations to both Chinese and Japanese informing them that the consular representatives concerned must continue to hold both sides responsible for any loss or injury to foreign national interests arising out of the present conflict; requested both sides to refrain from using the foreign areas as bases for military operations; and protested the flying of Chinese and Japanese planes over these areas and the bombing and firing consequent thereto. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 761.9312 (Aggressor)/3: Telegram [Document 553] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 29, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 29—5:40 a.m.] 552. The Minister for Foreign Affairs invited the British and the French Ambassadors and myself to receive from him this morning the announcement that on August 21 the Chinese Government signed with the Soviet Government a non-aggression treaty. He stated that text of treaty with accompanying statement has been communicated to Chinese missions abroad for communication to other governments and for the press. Treaty is to be made public in tomorrow’s press in China. He stated that treaty was simple in nature providing (1) that neither party would take direct aggressive action against the other, (2) that where a third party takes aggressive action against either of the parties to the treaty, neither party will assist the aggressor against the other, (3) that all treaties bilateral and multi-lateral to which the contracting parties are signatories are not affected by newly signed treaty. Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to us that this treaty was not expected to have any effect upon present Sino-Japanese hostilities, that it was simply a partial fulfillment of Chinese policy to cultivate and cement friendly relations with her two powerful neighbors. He said that in the statement which is to be published with the text of the treaty it would be said that China was equally prepared to enter into a similar treaty with Japan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also emphasized that despite this treaty the Chinese Government adhered to the policy of opposing communism as enjoined by Kuomintang power [ Congress? ]. Minister for Foreign Affairs is understood to have separately informed the German and Italian Ambassadors of above treaty on August 27 and 28 respectively. Repeated to Embassy at Peiping. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9772: Telegram [Document 554] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 29—2:48 p.m.] 600. Military situation. Fighting around Shanghai began on August 13. For the first few days Chinese forces held air supremacy and on the 18th land forces all but succeeded in driving a strong wedge into Japanese sector. Japanese tanks, armored cars, and strong support from war vessels probably determining factor. Inability of Chinese air force to hit Japanese war vessels and Japanese barracks near Hongkew park, all heavily protected with anti-aircraft guns, and Chinese lack of artillery doubtless enabled Japanese to hold out until Army reenforcements arrived on the 23rd, prior to which time Chinese probably had about 80,000 men in the field, Japanese naval landing party not more than 12,000. From 18th Japanese air superiority, due to the number of planes available, has been increasingly apparent and they are now bombing Chinese positions several times daily at will dropping up to 14 bombs at once. Chinese air activities at Shanghai now confined to night raids. Rough estimates of the forces in the field in this area at the present time are Chinese 100,000 and Japanese 30,000. The line of fighting according to foreign military observer runs from a point somewhat north of Liuho; slightly west of Liuho and Lotien to Kiangwan, thence west through the North Station in Chapei along the north bank Soochow Creek around the Settlement beyond the Hangchow-Ningpo Railway line to the Whangpoo near Kiangnan arsenal. Farther south, Japanese troops are reported at Chuansha and Nanhui. Fighting in the Lotien area has been especially severe. In almost all sectors the Japanese are greatly assisted by their naval guns and bombers. No reports have been received of prisoners taken by either side. Foreign physicians comment that the vast majority of cases of Chinese soldiers being received at their hospitals in Shanghai are ambulatory cases indicating that the more severely wounded are largely without assistance. Estimates of Chinese casualties in the fighting thus far run as high as 50,000 and must in fact be very large. Sixteen temporary hospitals in the Settlement are reported to have nearly 4,000 soldiers wounded. Reliable information concerning Japanese casualties is totally lacking. A large Japanese hospital ship is in the harbor. It is reported that the Japanese treatment of the noncombatant Chinese population in the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo area was most inhuman but the proof in support of such reports has yet to be forthcoming. It is to be remarked that Japanese air force bombing operations and machine gun firing from planes has been directed not only at troops and military positions but at noncombatant Chinese. For example, the bombs dropped at the South Station near Nantao, Shanghai, yesterday noon killed several hundred Chinese refugees awaiting train transportation out of Shanghai and wounded many hundred more. Foreign military observers are of the opinion that the Chinese forces will by choice or necessity soon retreat to their next line positions which would remove the fighting from the immediate vicinity of Shanghai to the Taitsang-Anting-Tsinpu line. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 701.4193/102: Telegram [Document 555] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 29, 1937—9 p.m. [Received August 29—1:05 p.m.] 327. 1. Under instructions from his Government, the British Chargé d’Affaires today presented a note to the Foreign Office concerning the wounding of the British Ambassador to China by a Japanese airplane. The note which is couched in reasonably moderate terms emphasizes the fact that the real issue is the illegality of the act because it was an attack on noncombatant and states that the foreign or diplomatic status of the occupants of the car is irrelevant. The note also brings out the points that the attack involved at best, negligence and complete disregard for the sanctity of civilian life; that the Ambassador was travelling in a locality where there were no Chinese troops nor any actual hostilities in progress; and that the absence of a declared state of war emphasizes the inexcusable nature of the incident. The note also lays stress on the wider significance of this event as an outstanding example of the results to be expected from indiscriminate attack from the air. 2. The British Government “requests”: (1) a formal apology to be conveyed by the Japanese Government to the British Government; (2) suitable punishment of those responsible for the attack, and (3) an assurance by the Japanese authorities that the necessary measures will be taken to prevent the recurrence of incidents of such a character. 3. In presenting the note to the Vice-Minister, Dodds told him that the British Government proposed to publish the note tomorrow. The Vice-Minister, however, requested that publication be delayed and Dodds has cabled this request to London. 4. Dodds requests that the note be regarded by us as confidential until officially published. 81 Copy of text by mail to the Department unless we are instructed to cable it in full. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew 81 Note was published August 30. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9779: Telegram [Document 556] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , August 30, 1937—11 a.m. [Received August 29—2:10 p.m.] Evacuation of Japanese proceeding without incident. Even the principal Japanese hospital is closing, but there will remain perhaps a total of 300 Japanese nationals, such as electric light company and Chinese Government employees, out of a normal population of 16,000 Japanese. All Japanese shipping between Tsingtao and Dairen and between Tsingtao and Japan is ceasing at the end of this month. Japanese Rear Admiral quoted in the newspapers as stating that the present hostilities are punitive measures against those possessing anti-Japanese spirit and Communists and not against the Chinese people. “It can accordingly be expected that at comparatively quiet places, such as Tsingtao, Sino-Japanese friendly relations will be restored as soon as the anti-Japanese and Communist elements are out of the Shanghai and Tientsin-Peiping areas.” Japanese Consul General from Tsinanfu now in Tsingtao emphatically stated to Allison yesterday that Japanese troops would not land in Tsingtao. Yokohama Specie Bank and Bank of Chosen have asked a local American business man to look after their property while Japanese are gone. Everything quiet here. Sokobin The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9788: Telegram [Document 557] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 30, 1937—2 p.m. [Received August 30—9:55 a.m.] 561. My 485, August 21, 1 p.m. 83 1. On the morning of August 29 the diplomatic representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy asked that I telegraph the following message to the American Ambassador in Tokyo for transmission to the diplomatic respresentatives with request for action on our behalf. 2. “The diplomatic representatives in Nanking of the five powers concerned have already asked that Japanese bombing operations be excluded from an area in this city wherein they and some of their nationals reside and where foreign shipping is anchored. They feel, however, that other aspects of the matter demand equal consideration. For example the extensive bombing of the city on the night of August 26 placed in danger the lives and property of noncombatants, both foreign and Chinese, and it has seemed to the same diplomatic representatives that the appropriate Japanese authorities, when this fact is brought to their attention, may desire to limit future action in accordance with the restraints which considerations of humanity and of international comity usually impose on the bombing of the political capital of a country, especially when no state of war exists. Both before and after the earlier request for the protection of a defined area was made, there occurred bombing operations over the city which extensively damaged the buildings and killed several of the employees of the National Central University and also resulted in the burning alive of numerous peaceful Chinese in one of the poorer quarters. These scenes of destruction have been visited by foreign diplomatic officers. The Governments and people of the nations of the indicated diplomatic representatives are in friendly relations with China as with Japan. Basing their appeal, therefore, on these friendly relations, and on the principles of ordinary humanity they request the discontinuance of activities which despite their military objectives result actually in the indiscriminate destruction of property used for educational and other non-military purposes, and in the wounding and painful death of civilians”. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson 83 See Department’s telegram No. 158, August 21, 10 p.m., vol. iv , p. 273 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 701.4193/103: Telegram [Document 558] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , August 30, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 30—2:48 p.m.] 566. In the course of a conversation a highly placed official of the Foreign Office referred to the British note to Japan published today 84 and stated that he feared a satisfactory answer from the Japanese would not be immediately forthcoming. He mentioned the special difficulties inherent in Japanese psychology in making an open admission of error and predicted that the question would probably degenerate into the type of haggling so recently exhibited in connection with the obtaining of an apology for the Keelung incident. In this connection, the following excerpt from the Evening Star is of interest. “It is understood that the British Government have no further action in mind should Japan fail to comply with the demands made in the note. The British Government request an apology, suitable punishment of those responsible and an assurance that precautions will be taken against a recurrence of the incident. British circles consider that a refusal on the part of Japan would merely show to the world once and for all that she was a nation without respect for any international decencies. It is regarded as a sufficient reproof that Japan should have rendered herself liable to receive a notice of this description.” In discussing the long range results of the Sino-Japanese conflict my informant took the view that Japan has sufficient gold and foreign assets (now in the hands of private firms and individuals which could be taken over by the Government) to hold the yen under the control system for an indeterminate time. He also thought it unlikely that Japan would find it desirable to depreciate the yen further inasmuch as that would correspondingly add to the cost of her raw material imports and he felt that the Japanese price structure could be controlled in large measure by the Government. But in any case if the conflict should be prolonged it must have an adverse effect on the Japanese standard of living and result in increased taxation; and in the absence of dramatic victories which the Japanese spirit always needed to feed upon, discontent might slowly spread. My informant said that the only hopeful precedent was the Japanese Siberian venture which had in due course become unpopular both with the Army on the spot as well as with the public at home and had caused for a time a decline in the power of the militarist faction. In discussing the Sino-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, report of which is published in today’s press, my informant took the view that Russian aid to China in the form of airplanes and pilots would be forthcoming “for it is in Russia’s interest to prolong the war as long as possible”. Johnson 84 This note protested the wounding of the British Ambassador in China. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9788: Telegram [Document 559] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 30, 1937—7 p.m. 195. Your 561, August 30, 2 p.m., has been repeated to Tokyo for communication by the Ambassador to his interested colleagues. The Ambassador has been authorized to associate himself with them in appropriate representations to the Japanese Government. 85 Hull 85 See aide-mémoire of September 1, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 494 . The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9804: Telegram [Document 560] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , August 31, 1937—noon. [Received August 31—1:50 a.m.] Japanese Consul General has just informed me that he and his entire staff will withdraw by the 5th of September. Japanese Government has also ordered complete evacuation at once of all remaining Japanese nationals. Japanese Consul General even asked that I ask Yamamoto, our Japanese clerk, to return to Japan. Reason given is reiterated desire to avoid any possible incident which might aggravate the situation. Sokobin The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 761.9312 (Aggressor)/4: Telegram [Document 561] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , August 31, 1937—3 p.m. [Received August 31—11:30 a.m.] 238. 1. In addition to publishing text in full, most Moscow daily newspapers yesterday carried leading editorials devoted to the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact. Although somewhat differently phrased these editorials were practically identical with respect to content. The points brought out in them were as follows: ( a ) The Chinese Government for internal and external reasons has for years been delaying the conclusion of the pact, negotiations with respect to which were begun in 1933. ( b ) Under pressure of the Chinese masses who are friendly to the Soviet Union and of the present complicated international situation, the Chinese Government has been impelled to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. ( c ) The pact is a new instrument of peace and collective security and shows to the whole world how the military menace which has appeared in the Far East and Europe might best be combated. ( d ) The pact emphasizes the friendly feeling of the Soviet Union for China. The Soviet Union, although following a policy of noninterference in the international affairs of China, is, nevertheless, watching with sympathy China’s struggle for independence and national unification. 2. The Chinese Ambassador in discussing the pact informed me in confidence last night that its conclusion signified that ( a ) China had abandoned all hope of coming to any amicable agreement with Japan. The pact was a definite reply to Japan. After entering into it the National Government could not, for instance, accede to Japan’s demand that it join the anti-Communist front. ( b ) The Central Government had definitely decided to resist Japanese aggression with force of arms and was therefore prepared to use every means in its power to strengthen its international position and to obtain assistance wherever there might be a promise of finding it. ( c ) China hoped to achieve a close rapprochement with the Soviet Government which might have far reaching and beneficial possibilities. It hoped that the conclusion of the pact was only a beginning. 3. Soviet officials are disinclined to discuss pact with foreign diplomats or other foreigners. Nevertheless, it is the consensus of those foreign observers here, whom I consider most competent, that the Soviet Union was glad to conclude the pact just now because ( a ) It hoped thereby to enhance its international reputation as a proponent of peace without any cost to itself. ( b ) It hoped thereby to strengthen its influence and prestige in China particularly among the liberals and left wing elements. ( c ) The existence of the pact would render it more difficult for the National Government and the Japanese Government to come to an understanding. 4. It is not believed that the conclusion of the pact connotes any change in Soviet policies with respect to China as set forth in my 234, August 26, 10 p.m. Henderson The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 761.9312 (Aggressor)/5: Telegram [Document 562] The Chargé in Germany ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , August 31, 1937—5 p.m. [Received August 31—12:54 p.m.] 212. In calling formally today on Bismarck, acting chief of the Political Bureau of the Foreign Office, he raised the question of Germany’s concern over her Far Eastern interests. He then confidentially said, referring to the recent Sino–Russian Pact, that while it was only natural that China in the position in which she finds herself would wish to close her back door it nevertheless complicated Germany’s consideration of the situation. (The press here asserts the existence of secret clauses.) I would say that the situation here is that while Germany is, of course, carefully considering the political implications of the substance and possible intent of this agreement a most important element in its effect on German policy is the probable emotional reaction of Hitler. By mail to London, Paris, Moscow. Gilbert The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9820: Telegram [Document 563] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , August 31, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 9:16 p.m.] 499. Embassy’s 495, August 30, 5 [ 4 ] p.m. 86 1. Eight [ seven? ] Europeans (one Frenchman, two Hungarians, one British subject, one Czechoslovakian, one German, and one Italian), Brothers of the Mariste (French Catholic) Seminary 12 miles out of Peiping, were kidnapped yesterday and the Seminary looted. It is not known whether the group of several hundred Chinese responsible are members of Liu Kuei Tang’s semi-bandit forces or are part of the remnants of Peace Preservation Corps, 29th Army and others allegedly organized now to harass the Japanese in the Peiping area. It is possible, therefore, that the kidnapping may have some political significance. The Japanese military are understood to have despatched a force to effect a rescue. However, with the Japanese preoccupied with the military situation at more distant points, it is doubtful if they will attempt a serious improvement in the near future of the area near Peiping. 2. The new regime in Peiping has been surprisingly slow in extending its control over cultural institutions, such as schools, libraries and museums. Steps in that direction are now apparently being taken. The local Conservation Committee appointed August 29 a committee “to preserve” the 22 schools in Peiping of the National Government. The press mentions only the “preserving” of the property. It is doubtful whether the local authorities can arrange for the opening of many of these schools in view of the cutting off of National Government appropriations for that purpose and the local shortage of revenues. The committee has three Japanese advisers. 3. It is now definitely established that the Japanese are in control of the Kalgan–Nankow area and that the Chinese forces have retreated to the west and southwest. Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart 86 Not printed. Chapter V: September 1–October 11, 1937 Chapter V: September 1–October 11, 1937 Admiral Yarnell’s instructions for defense of U. S. sector at Shanghai; American representations at Tokyo regarding Japanese bombing operations, September 1; American disapproval of Japanese policy in China, September 2; American concern over Japanese seizure of Pratas reef as alienation of Chinese territory, September 14; American representations regarding Japanese plan to bomb Nanking, September 20, and regarding bombing of non-military objectives, September 22 October 1; interpretation of American policy in response to Soviet inquiry, October 2; American representations at Tokyo regarding Japanese use of Shanghai International Settlement as military base, October 4; American readiness to consider any British plan for pacific ending of hostilities in Far East, October 5; Japanese and Chinese reaction to President Roosevelt’s Chicago speech (October 5) and to Secretary Hull’s endorsement (October 6) of League of Nations attitude on Far Eastern conflict [564] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Shanghai,] September 1, 1937—12:45 p.m. [Received September 1—4:15 a.m.] 793.94/9829: Telegram [565] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, September 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 3:03 p.m.] 793.94/9845: Telegram [566] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 1, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 1—12:15 p.m.] 793.94/9838: Telegram [567] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 1, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 2—6 a.m.] 793.94/9862: Telegram [568] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 1, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 1—11:10 a.m.] 793.94/9835: Telegram [569] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, September 1, 1937—9 p.m. 793.94/9838: Telegram [570] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 2, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/9732: Telegram [571] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, September 2, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 2—8:35 a.m.] 793.94/9859: Telegram [572] The Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 3, 1937. 793.94/9993 [573] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) at Nanking Washington, September 3, 1937—7 p.m. 894.51/505a: Telegram [574] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, September 3, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/9706: Telegram [575] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, September 4, 1937—1 p.m. [Received September 4—9:05 a.m.] 793.94/9897: Telegram [576] The Consul at Hong Kong (Donovan) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong, September 6, 1937—10 a.m. [Received September 6—2:12 a.m.] 793.94/9926: Telegram [577] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 6, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94/9947a: Telegram [578] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, September 6, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94111/35: Telegram [579] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 7—8:25 a.m.] 793.94/9948: Telegram [580] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 7—11:35 a.m.] 793.94111/49: Telegram [581] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received September 7—6:52 a.m.] 701.4193/107: Telegram [582] Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 7, 1937. 893.51/6460 [583] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) Washington, September 8, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/9994a: Telegram [584] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma) [Washington,] September 8, 1937. 793.94/10091 [585] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 10, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 10—6:02 a.m.] 793.94/10008: Telegram [586] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 13, 1937—8 a.m. [Received 8:32 a.m.] 793.94/10039: Telegram [587] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, September 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 13—10:03 a.m.] 793.94/10043: Telegram [588] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) Washington, September 14, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/10043: Telegram [589] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 14, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/10043: Telegram [590] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, September 14, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 14—1:45 p.m.] 793.94/10061: Telegram [591] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 15, 1937. [Received October 5.] 793.94/10697 [592] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 16—8:33 a.m.] 793.94/10089: Telegram [593] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] September 17, 1937. 793.94111/72 [594] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) Washington, September 20, 1937—11 a.m. 793.94/10146a: Telegram [595] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] September 20, 1937. 793.94/10672 [596] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Aboard U. S. S. “Luzon”, Nanking, September 20, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.] 124.93/356: Telegram [597] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, September 20, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 20—1:50 p.m.] 793.94/10152: Telegram [598] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 20, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 20—10:40 a.m.] 793.94/10150: Telegram [599] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 20, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/10150: Telegram [600] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, September 20, 1937. [Received October 8.] 761.9312 Aggressor/12 [601] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 21, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 22—6 a.m.] 793.94/10193: Telegram [602] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 22, 1937—noon. [Received September 22—10:02 a.m.] 793.94/10197: Telegram [603] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 22—11:40 a.m.] 701.4193/112: Telegram [604] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 22—8:40 a.m.] 793.94/10189: Telegram [605] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 22, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 22—9:45 a.m.] 793.94/10191: Telegram [606] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) [Washington,] September 22, 1937. 793.94/10280 [607] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, September 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 793.94/10221: Telegram [608] The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Berlin, September 23, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 23—3:03 p.m.] 793.94/10219: Telegram [609] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, September 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 24—1:40 p.m.] 793.94/10232: Telegram [610] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, September 24, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 24—1:13 p.m.] 793.94/10231: Telegram [611] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 25, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 25—6:26 a.m.] 793.94/10246: Telegram [612] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 25, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 25—7 a.m.] 793.94/10244: Telegram [613] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, September 25, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 7:45 p.m.] 793.94/10260: Telegram [614] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 25, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 25—3:55 p.m.] 793.94/10262: Telegram [615] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 27, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 12:01 p.m.] 793.94/10282: Telegram [616] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, September 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 27—10:15 a.m.] 793.94/10275: Telegram [617] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received September 27—6:25 a.m.] 793.94/10271: Telegram [618] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 27, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 27—9:01 a.m.] 793.94/10274: Telegram [619] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 27, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/10310a: Telegram [620] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 27, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/10268: Telegram [621] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, September 28, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/10260: Telegram [622] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 29, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 5:52 p.m.] 793.94/10325: Telegram [623] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 29, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/10271: Telegram [624] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 29, 1937—10 p.m. [Received September 29—5:43 p.m.] 793.94/10323: Telegram [625] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 29, 1937—midnight. 793.94/10312: Telegram [626] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 1, 1937—noon. [Received October 1—7:25 a.m.] 793.94/10344: Telegram [627] The British Embassy to the Department of State undated 793.94/10456 [628] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , October 1, 1937. 793.94/10419 [629] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, October 1, 1937—8 p.m. [Received October 1—3:25 p.m.] 793.94/10365: Telegram [630] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, October 1, 1937—9 p.m. [Received October 1—4:11 p.m.] 793.94/10368: Telegram [631] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 1, 1937. [Received October 18.] 761.94/986 [632] Report by the Assistant Military Attaché in Japan (Weckerling) Tokyo, October 1, 1937. 761.93/1615 [633] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , October 2, 1937. 793.94/10419 [634] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the British Chargé (Mallet) [Washington,] October 2, 1937. 793.94 Conference/28 [635] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] October 2, 1937. 793.94/10630 [636] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, October 2, 1937—3 p.m. 793.94/10394a: Telegram [637] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, October 2, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 2—12:10 p.m.] 793.94/10380: Telegram [638] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 2, 1937. [Received October 18.] 793.94/10721 [639] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 4, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 4—6:50 a.m.] 793.94/10395: Telegram [640] The Consul General in Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, October 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 4—9 a.m.] 893.20/629: Telegram [641] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, October 4, 1937—8 p.m. [Received October 4—1:24 p.m.] 793.94/10410: Telegram [642] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 5, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 5—11:45 a.m.] 033.9411/307: Telegram [643] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) of a Conversation With the British Chargé (Mallet) [Washington,] October 5, 1937. 793.94 Conference/29 [644] The Department of State to the British Embassy undated 793.94/10456 [645] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 6, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 7—10:45 a.m.] 793.94/10480: Telegram [646] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 7—9:39 a.m.] 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/10: Telegram [647] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 7—9:20 a.m.] 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/11: Telegram [648] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, October 7, 1937—11 p.m. [Received October 9—8:50 a.m.] 793.94/10545: Telegram [649] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, October 8, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 8—6:30 a.m.] 793.94/10504: Telegram [650] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 8, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 8—11:06 a.m.] 711.00 Pres. Speech, October 5, 1937/33: Telegram [651] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 8—3:30 p.m.] 793.94/10523: Telegram [652] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 8, 1937. [Received November 8.] 793.94/11020 [653] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 9, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:13 a.m.] 711.00 Pres. Speech, October 5, 1937/61: Telegram [654] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 9, 1937—9 p.m. [Received October 9—12:33 p.m.] 793.94/10543: Telegram [655] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 11, 1937—noon. [Received October 11—11:56 a.m.] 793.94/10585: Telegram [656] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 11, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2:20 p.m.] 793.94/10588: Telegram [657] The Chinese Ambassador (C. T. Wang) to President Roosevelt Washington, October 11, 1937. 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/122 The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 793.94/9829: Telegram [Document 564] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) 87 [ Shanghai ,] September 1, 1937—12:45 p.m. [Received September 1—4:15 a.m.] 0001. Inspected sector held by Fourth Marines 7,000 yards in length completely barb wired with duplicate machine gun emplacements covering all stretches of Soochow Creek. Sector cannot be forced except by determined attack of organized forces in considerable numbers. There is no likelihood of this taking place. The following instructions have been given regarding entry of troops: “Armed Chinese or Japanese troops will not be permitted to enter the American sector of the International Settlement. Chinese troops will most probably be unorganized bodies. Every effort must be made to prevent their entry by means other than rifle fire such as tear gas. As a last resort to prevent actual entry fire may be opened. Unarmed Chinese soldiers will be permitted to enter and will be segregated under guard.[”] 87 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9845: Telegram [Document 565] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , September 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 3:03 p.m.] 397. Berlin Embassy’s telegram to the Department No. 206, August 28, 11 a.m. During my conversation with Count Ciano 88 yesterday I expressed the thought that there might be less enthusiasm in German quarters towards Japan as a result of the recent Japanese attacks on Shanghai, et cetera, et cetera. Count Ciano replied that he was confident that there was no change in German cordiality towards Japan and he added that as a matter of fact there was a far closer understanding between the two Governments than appeared on the surface. Of this he said he was certain, although he did not give me any further enlightenment. By mail to Berlin. Phillips 88 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9838: Telegram [Document 566] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 1, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 1—12:15 p.m.] 334. Embassy’s 297, August 23, 1 p.m. In the course of my interview today with the Minister of Foreign Affairs he handed to me the reply of the Japanese Government to my note of August 27 [ 23 ] 89 appealing for the avoidance of hostilities in Tsingtao. Hirota said that the wholesale evacuation of Japanese from Tsingtao was carried out for the particular purpose of avoiding hostilities but that Japanese property is being looted and that even the Japanese officials who remained behind are in constant danger. He expressed the hope that something might be done in Nanking to ensure the protection of Japanese life and property in Tsingtao. I replied that I would bring the Minister’s written and oral observations to the attention of my Government and to Mr. Johnson. An official translation of the Japanese note follows: “The Japanese Government have always been solicitous of preserving tranquillity in the Tsingtao District. Unfortunately, despite the fact that every effort has been exerted by the Japanese Government in order to forestall the occurrence of any untoward incidents in that district, the measures taken in this connection by the authorities of Tsingtao have not come up to the expectations of the Japanese Government. Consequently, the situation there grew worse rapidly so that the Japanese Government were at last forced to decide upon a complete evacuation of Japanese from that city with a view to forestalling any untoward events involving Japanese which might lead to the disturbance of peace and order in the district. In view of the fact that Japan possesses vast rights and interests there and that Japanese residents have established the business through efforts of many years, the above-mentioned action taken by the Japanese Government entailed the greatest of sacrifices on their part. This fact alone should be sufficient to demonstrate the sincerity of the Japanese Government in their desire for the preservation of peace in the Tsingtao district. Since, however, the Japanese Government have gone the length of ordering their nationals to evacuate the city at an immense sacrifice, they believe that the Chinese authorities should assume on their part full responsibility for the protection of the rights and interests as well as of the property of the Japanese which have been left in the district and also of the few Japanese who may have had to remain there under unavoidable circumstances. They believe also that inasmuch as Chinese military activities in and around Tsingtao have been rendered absolutely unnecessary by reason of the peaceful steps taken by the Japanese Government, the district should be restored to normal conditions. The Japanese Government, desirous of obtaining a definite assurance from the Chinese authorities on this point, have been conducting negotiations with them. However, according to reports received up to date from their Consul General at Tsingtao, the attitude of the mayor of the city seems to be extremely unsatisfactory. Moreover, there are occurring already at sundry places lootings of Japanese property, and even the Japanese Consul General himself cannot be assured of his personal safety in the event he remains in the city. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government are urging upon the Chinese authorities to refrain from taxing unduly the patience of the Japanese Government by ignoring their friendly action and their most reasonable wishes.” Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew 89 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 357 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9862: Telegram [Document 567] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 1, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 2—6 a.m.] 584. 1. The Generalissimo asked me to see him this evening. Mrs. Chiang acted as interpreter. He stated that he hoped I would communicate the following to my Government. He said that it was not China that had violated the Nine Power Agreement (although he expressed the opinion that the Nine Power Treaty had been of great assistance to China during her real troubles), that China still stood by the Treaty, the good intent of which China recognized, and that it was the firm decision of the Chinese Government to continue resistance against Japanese aggression as long as there was a China. He recognized that China is a weak power but he knew no other road but to fight. China might be completely destroyed but that destruction would not come by way of surrender. He expressed the hope that in this conflict the United States would see that justice finally prevailed, for when the United States abandoned justice, then he felt that it was hopeless for the world to expect justice to prevail. 2. Early in conversation Generalissimo expressed himself as puzzled over American policy in the present Far Eastern situation, particularly as regards our unwillingness to associate ourselves with Great Britain in attempting to restrain Japan. I took advantage of his question to make to him the explanation outlined in paragraph 2, Department’s 179, August 25, 11 a.m. [ 8 p.m .] He questioned the word “parallel” and asked why it was that we had not been willing to take joint action with the British. I told him that we preferred to act in consultation, and when in agreement, independently, that I was not aware of any difference of opinion or purpose as between the two Governments. He stated that China realized that it had to fight its battles alone, that China was not asking anyone to fight those battles for it and then made the statements set forth in paragraph 1 of this telegram. 3. I came away with a feeling that the Generalissimo is much disappointed at what he believes to be the failure of the United States in not more publicly condemning Japanese aggression on Chinese soil in utter defiance of the Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and international justice. He feels that China is fighting for its very life and that the outcome should be of profound interest to the United States. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9835: Telegram [Document 568] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 1, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 1—11:10 a.m.] 335. Department’s 182, August 30, 7 p.m. 91 and 183, August 30, 8 p.m., 92 bombing operations in Nanking and elsewhere in China. 1. As the subject matter of the first telegram led naturally to that of the second I thought it advisable to deal with both at the same time and accordingly incorporated both representations in a single aide-mémoire 93 which I read aloud and handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in an interview at his residence this afternoon. I earnestly appealed to him on the basis of humanity as well as practical wisdom to take steps to avoid the serious risk of injuring Japanese-American relations which would inevitably occur if American citizens should be injured by the apparently indiscriminate bombing operations now being carried on by Japanese forces in various parts of China. These views were expressed with strong emphasis. I pointed out his responsibility for guiding the political relations of Japan which might be considered as paramount to military considerations. My appeal then went into the broad aspects of the situation from the humanitarian and other points of view. 2. The Minister replied that it was the intention of the Japanese forces in China to attack only military establishments but that mistakes were unfortunately inevitable. He said that he would bring my representations to the attention of the War and Navy Ministries. I fear that the Foreign Office is practically impotent in the face of the Army and Navy at this time. 3. The British Chargé proposes to take similar action and to present an aide-mémoire or note to the Vice Minister. 4. With respect to the Department’s 182 my French and German colleagues have referred the matter to their respective Governments for instructions. My Italian colleague proposes to make oral representations only. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew 91 This repeated telegram No. 561, August 30, 2 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] . 92 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 491 . 93 Ibid ., p. 494 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9838: Telegram [Document 569] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , September 1, 1937—9 p.m. 205. Tokyo’s 334, September 1, 7 p.m. The Department desires that you bring to the attention of your interested colleagues the Japanese Government’s reply to Ambassador Grew’s representations concerning Tsingtao with a view to concerting with your colleagues in urging upon the Chinese Government an early and favorable reply to the collective letter quoted in your 497, August 23, 4 p.m. You should impress upon the Chinese Government the apparent lack of any necessity, in view of the reported Japanese evacuation of the city, for Chinese military activities in the Tsingtao area and the importance of affording adequate protection there to Japanese as well as other foreign lives and property. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9732: Telegram [Document 570] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 2, 1937—2 p.m. 187. Your 321, August 27, 4 p.m. With your outline of the Embassy’s estimate and views before me, I hope that you will find it useful, toward understanding and interpreting our position, to have an outline of our general reaction to developments in the situation under reference and our present thoughts in regard to policy and methods. The course which this Government has pursued with regard to the Far East during recent years has been animated in part by the thought that it would be advantageous to encourage effort on the part of the Japanese and the Chinese to develop attitudes of real cooperativeness toward each other and toward the rest of the world. The hostilities which have been and now are going on between those two countries have produced a situation which leaves little room for hope of there being in the near future developed by and between them reciprocally any such attitude or practice. In the light of the methods which the Japanese military forces are employing, especially of their complete unresponsiveness in action to suggestions which have been quietly and patiently offered them by this and other Governments that they give reasonable consideration to the rights, interests, susceptibilities, safety, etc., of persons and countries not parties to the conflict, there is warrant for doubt whether the elements that actually control Japan’s policies and action set any appreciable value upon the friendship of other nations or the efforts toward cultivation of good will, confidence, and general stability which this and other Governments have made. This Government has endeavored in the current crisis to follow a course of absolute impartiality. We realize that manifestations of disapprobation on legal or moral grounds are not likely to bring the hostilities to an end. However, in shaping our course, it is necessary for us to have constantly in mind not only the possible serving of that objective, not only the possible effects of possible steps, upon Japan or upon China or upon both of those countries, but the attitude and wishes of our own people, the principles in which this country believes, the courses pursued by other countries, and various general and ultimate as well as immediate and particular objectives. My statement of July 16 94 made clear the principles which are guiding this Government, principles in general support of which more than 50 States of the world have expressed themselves affirmatively. My subsequent statement of August 23 95 makes it clear that we regard these principles as applicable to the Pacific area. We consider those principles fundamental to a well-ordered existence of and in the society of nations. It is evident that neither Japan nor China in their present courses of action are acting in accordance with those principles and that the course which Japan is pursuing is in direct conflict with many of them. I am gratified to know that the Japanese have felt that our course has been indicative of a desire on our part to be fair and impartial. However, our first solicitude will have to be not for the maintenance of unqualified good will toward us by either or both of the combatants; it will have to be for the welfare of our own people and the broad interests and general policies of the United States; it will be guided by laws and treaties, public opinion and other controlling considerations. I share your view that among our fundamental objectives there should be (1) to avoid involvement and (2) to protect the lives, property and rights of American citizens. I doubt whether we can pursue those objectives and at the same time expect to pursue the third of the objectives which you suggest. I therefore do not feel that we should make it a definite objective to solidify our relations with either of the combatant nations. We are opposed to the courses which they are pursuing, especially the course which Japan is pursuing. We have no desire to injure either country, we wish to be a good neighbor to both, but we should not permit ourselves to be hampered in the making of our decisions by being especially solicitous that what we do shall not be displeasing to one or the other or both of the combatant countries. We do not desire that the Japanese shall entertain any impression that this Government looks with less disapproval or less of apprehension upon the course which Japan is pursuing than does the British Government or that we condone Japan’s course in any sense whatever. Public opinion in this country has been outraged by the strategy and methods which the combatants, especially the Japanese military, are employing. It has become increasingly critical of Japan. Events of last week, especially the circumstances of the shooting of the British Ambassador and the statement of the Japanese Premier 96 that the representations of the powers are of little or no importance, intensified this divergence in popular thought and feeling from the standard of impartiality. The Chinese bombing of the Hoover 97 has, of course, tended somewhat to offset this. I do not intend, in addressing either the Japanese or the Chinese authorities, to call names or to make threats; I heartily approve of the dignified and tactful manner in which you are conducting your approaches to the Japanese Government; but I desire that it be fully understood by the Japanese that this Government looks with thorough disapproval upon the present manifestation of their foreign policy and the methods which the Japanese military are employing in pursuit thereof. I feel it desirable that you overlook no opportunity to impress upon Japanese officialdom the importance which we attach to the principles laid down in my statement of July 16 and the significance of my statement of August 23, and to suggest to them that by the course which she is pursuing Japan is destroying the world’s good will and laying up for herself among the peoples of the world a liability of suspicion, distrust, popular antipathy and potential ostracism which it would take many, many years of benevolent endeavor on her part to liquidate. This Administration has repudiated nothing in the record of the efforts which the American Government made, on behalf of peace and of principles, at the time of the Manchuria affair. In the present crisis, we have endeavored to dissuade the present combatants from entering upon and from continuing their hostilities; but we have not offered to mediate. I am by no means sure that we shall wish to assume the role and the responsibilities of a mediator. For the present at least, I should not want to encourage on the part of either side a belief and expectation that, having rejected currently our many suggestions that they exercise restraint, they can whenever it may suit their convenience rely upon this Government to serve them as a friendly broker. I should want them both to feel that, if they wish from us good will and from us any form of impartial assistance the time for them to show appreciation of our policies and methods, by being considerate of our legitimate interests and our essential solicitudes, is now. Hull 94 Vol. i , p. 699 . 95 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 355 . 96 Prince Fumimaro Konoye. 97 See vol. iv , pp. 473 ff. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9859: Telegram [Document 571] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , September 2, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 2—8:35 a.m.] 504. Embassy’s 502, September 2, 3 [ 2 ] p.m. 98 1. Secretaries of the British and French Embassies called on the Mayor and the Japanese military authorities yesterday and obtained assurances that a sufficient number of Chinese police would be armed to attempt to effect the rescue of the Europeans kidnapped August 30 (Embassy’s 499, August 31, 6 p.m.) and that Japanese military forces would take no action against the kidnappers until after the rescue. Brothers of the seminary concerned are reported as saying that the leader of the band, numbering about 100, was a Northern University man, that a number of students of other universities of Peiping were members of it, that they have asked for no ransom but stated that they would release the foreigners after the Japanese military have evacuated North China. The number of foreigners kidnapped from the seminary is now said to be 10, including 2 Spaniards but no Italians. 99 2. Heavy artillery firing was audible in Peiping yesterday afternoon reportedly being Japanese action against a group of irregulars near Mentoukou. 3. The local press published yesterday an order of the Japanese military announcing severe punishment for spies, those who oppose the Japanese Army or incite sedition and those who injure the security of the Japanese Army. The press adds that the Japanese military have indicated that offenders who are nationals of third countries will be dealt with on the basis of international law and treaties. 4. Occasional arrests of wealthy Chinese by the local authorities apparently not for political purposes continue to be reported. Examinations and search of Chinese leaving Peiping for Tientsin have become more stringent during the last few days. Numbers of Chinese who have lost their jobs as a result of stagnant business during the past few weeks are leaving for their native homes. The press indicates that the Japanese authorities are attempting to curb dishonest treatment of Chinese shopkeepers by Japanese soldiers. Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart 98 Not printed. 99 Seven Catholic priests were released by their captors in the next 2 weeks. Three other captives returned to Peiping on October 17. The Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9993 [Document 572] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Washington ,] September 3, 1937. Mr. Secretary : Mr. Mallet, of the British Embassy, called this morning and stated that he was making an entirely unofficial visit, in order to clarify a matter in which he thought his Government might perhaps have gotten a wrong slant. He stated that the Chinese Ambassador at London informed the Foreign Office that the Chinese Ambassador here 2 had been informed by you as follows: “America believes in and stands for the sanctity of treaties. If His Majesty’s Government contemplate taking any action either alone or with other powers with a view to the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties the United States Government would be glad to associate itself with them.” Mallet himself was skeptical as to whether you had used this phraseology. I told him that I thought it unlikely that you had issued a blank check, that I readily believed that you had declared that America believes in and stands for the sanctity of treaties and that any step by Great Britain or other powers for the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties would meet with your sympathetic consideration, but that beyond this I did not believe you had gone. If I have given Mr. Mallet a correct impression, no further action is necessary. Hugh R. Wilson 1 Notation on the original dated September 3: “Seen by Secretary and approved.” 2 Chengting T. Wang. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) at Nanking 894.51/505a: Telegram [Document 573] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) at Nanking Washington , September 3, 1937—7 p.m. 210. This afternoon certain American newspapers feature a United Press article with headline “U. S. Banks Helping Finance Jap War”. The simple facts, according to the Department’s understanding, are that certain American banks have continued ordinary financial transactions which consist of granting credits to Yokohoma Specie Bank against gold now in transit to the United States and against United States bonds. Hull The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/9706: Telegram [Document 574] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , September 3, 1937—7 p.m. 321. Your 557, August 25, 7 p.m. and 564, August 26, 9 a.m. 1. With reference to paragraph 8 of the Commander in Chief’s memorandum quoted in your 557 and to your 447 of August 10, 8 p.m., the Department would expect that the consular representatives of the interested powers in consultation with the interested naval commanders at Shanghai, would, if and when they consider that circumstances and developments warrant such action, make representations, in such form and manner as might be agreed upon, to the appropriate Japanese authorities at Shanghai against the use of the Settlement as a base for Japanese military operations. 2. With regard to the problems suggested in your 564, we feel that insistence by the Municipal Council and the Consular Body upon respect for their responsibilities and functions in the field of administration of the International Settlement is fully warranted and constantly desirable. In so far as any interference with Chinese Government offices (revenue services, communications facilities, et cetera) located in the Settlement might constitute disregard for or usurpation of responsibilities and functions of the Council and the Consular Body with regard to the administration of the Settlement, it would seem to be incumbent upon the Council and the Consular Body to endeavor to avert or remove, if practicable, such interference through appropriate local representations. 3. You will realize of course that the formulation now of a specific or even general plan of action to meet problems of an undetermined character would not be feasible. The form and line of any action taken to meet a specific problem would of necessity be conditioned upon the character, manner, and circumstance in which each problem might present itself, and also upon agreement among the Governments or their representatives having common interests and responsibilities. 4. With regard to paragraph 2 of your 564, there follows a brief summary of pertinent developments at Tientsin in so far as known to the Department: (1) British and French Consuls General have informed the Japanese Consul General that Japanese troops could not pass through the British and French concessions (the Japanese have indicated acquiescence); (2) the British and French authorities have refused to permit the establishment of Japanese censorship of postal and telegraph communication handled in their respective concessions; (3) our Consul General has, under authorization, informed his Japanese colleague that Japanese censorship of American mail in Third Special Area would be an unwarranted invasion of the rights of American nationals concerned and would constitute grounds for protest by the American Government, and other consular officials in Tientsin are taking similar action; (4) reports indicate that the Japanese co-district inspector has taken over the Chinese salt revenue offices in the British and Italian concessions; and (5) with regard to the Chinese Maritime Customs in Tientsin, you have received Nanking’s 576, August 31, 8 p.m. 3 Hull 3 Post , p. 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9897: Telegram [Document 575] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , September 4, 1937—1 p.m. [Received September 4—9:05 a.m.] 508. Embassy’s 500 [ 504 ], September 2, 6 p.m. 1. Nervousness among the Chinese population has been increased by an order issued yesterday by the Peiping Local Maintenance Society which prescribes the death penalty for 15 offenses. The order appears to be susceptible to interpretation which may result in grave injustices. For example, among the offenses are: political activities or “thought movements” destructive of public safety, speculation which disturbs currency or exchange, interference with public functionaries discharging their duties, possession of lethal weapons, rumor mongering which excites public opinion, and any disturbance of peace and order. The order is retroactive. 2. The press reports this morning that the Chief of Police has ordered the forming of an organ for the search of houses belonging to former officers of the 29th Army and other military, officials of the National Government and members of the Kuomintang, persons who have infringed certain laws, including narcotic addicts. The search is also to include temples, small inns, factories, and houses with several families dwelling in them. The purpose of the search is given as being the discovery of persons in hiding, weapons, books and pictures which are “reactionary or injurious to international friendship” and of whether the seal has been removed from those houses which Japanese soldiers and gendarmes have already sealed to prevent entry. 3. The Northeastern University and the Peiping Normal University have been occupied by Japanese troops. Preparations have been made by Japanese military to occupy the largest lecture building and the new dormitory of Peiping National University. A Russian and a Japanese have removed all Russian books from the library of this university. 4. A second attempt was made yesterday by the local authorities to form a “North China student union” for the purpose of cooperating with Japan. Seven students attended the first meeting; six attended yesterday’s. Thirty-eight principals of primary and middle schools also attended, but not representatives of universities. One Japanese who assists Lieutenant Colonel Matsui 4 and who is an adviser of the newly formed committee for supervision of schools was present. 5. A representative of the Bureau of Social Welfare made a speech at the meeting during which he is reported to have said that hereafter warfare will not be between nations but between races, that the black and the brown races have already been destroyed, that now only the white and the yellow races survive, that the Chinese and the Japanese are therefore foolish to fight each other. 6. An indication of the disturbed conditions outside the city walls was the killing September 2 of two Japanese military and the destroying of their car by irregulars just outside the north wall of the city. 7. Armed Chinese police have been despatched to attempt to effect the release of the ten foreigners recently kidnapped. Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart 4 Chief of Japanese Special Service Organ at Peiping. The Consul at Hong Kong (Donovan) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9926: Telegram [Document 576] The Consul at Hong Kong ( Donovan ) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong , September 6, 1937—10 a.m. [Received September 6—2:12 a.m.] Following from Nanking via Canton by mail. “593, September 3, 1 p.m. Shanghai’s 630, September 1, 8 p.m. 5 carries the announcement of the Japanese Army’s intention systematically to bomb all airfields, communications and military establishments throughout China, their objective being evidently to break down Chinese powers of resistance. Chinese power to resist attacks from air depends primarily upon lasting ability of pursuit planes 90 percent of which are American. It is said that these planes under constant usage are rapidly deteriorating and cannot last beyond a month without replacements or new parts. If unobtainable, Chinese resistance against air attacks will shortly collapse and Japanese planes can bomb at will. British Embassy informs me that Japanese are concerned over entry of arms through Hong Kong. If Japanese are able to close this gap in recently announced blockade, effective Chinese military resistance cannot last long. The Generalissimo’s statement to me (reported in my 584, September 1, 8 p.m.) indicates that there is no present likelihood of peace by surrender. Taken with above-mentioned Japanese intention of using air force throughout China the statement brings us face to face with the probability that the Japanese intend to batter away at China until the country is reduced to chaos. Kidnaping of Marist fathers in hills near Peiping affords us an example of the kind of thing that can and will doubtless occur with distressing frequency in other places in China if chaos is permitted to develop. It is not possible for us to withdraw from China all Americans now scattered throughout the interior. The result may well be that we shall find our nationals and their interests engulfed in the chaos which the Japanese seem ready and willing to create. Sooner or later the world must, in my opinion, take cognizance of what is happening in China and act for its amelioration. It cannot deny to China its right to defend itself against attacks which are being conducted entirely in its waters and upon its soil and which are evidently intended completely to influence Chinese control over its people and destiny as a nation. If the powers fail to condemn this brutal, unscrupulous and merciless blotting out of Chinese Government control within its own territories the reaction within China may well be disastrous. Chinese ability or interest in protecting the interests and lives of foreign nationals may vanish. Japan is sacrificing much, it is true, by abandoning all of its interests in China. It hopes, however, to win a greater prize by complete and undisputed domination of what remains. We can expect nothing in such an eventuality. I bring these thoughts to the attention of the Department because I feel that the march of events must inevitably bring us sooner or later where we must consider whether we are to abandon all hope of saving something, even our self respect, from the wreckage of 150 years of cultural and commercial efforts in China. Japanese pronouncements have justified more than a suspicion that Japan’s present operations are actuated to a large extent by an ambition to replace western influence and interests in China with Japanese and it would seem that this rooting out of our vested interests demands attention simultaneously with our solicitude to avoid possible implication in the struggle. In fact, a too complaisant surrender now may precipitate a more violent effort at recovery later. Johnson” Donovan 5 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/9947a: Telegram [Document 577] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 6, 1937—5 p.m. 192. Please telegraph me your estimate of the bearing of the statements made in the addresses at the opening of the Diet 6 upon the question of the existence of a “state of war” and your estimate of the probable reaction in Japan and effects upon Japan of a proclamation, if and when, by this Government putting into effect the initial provision or more of the Neutrality Resolution of May 1, 1937, 7 together with any comments you may feel moved to offer on the question of the advisability of such action now. Hull 6 Cf. reports in Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 364 – 69 . 7 50 Stat. 121. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94111/35: Telegram [Document 578] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , September 6, 1937—5 p.m. 218. Department’s 152, August 16, 2 p.m., and your 461, August 18, 1 p.m. Please review this matter in the light of the situation as it now exists and give me by priority radio the benefit of your further views and any comments you may have to offer on the advisability of putting into effect at this stage the initial provision or more of the Act under reference. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9948: Telegram [Document 579] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 7—8:25 a.m.] 354. Department’s 192, September 6. 1. My estimate of the bearing of the statments made in the addresses at the opening of the Diet upon the question of the existence of a state of war: ( a ) The addresses are liberally interspersed with phrases which reveal the determination of the Japanese Government to continue to exercise the use of armed forces until certain political objectives in China are achieved. Pertinent statements are those by the Prime Minister 8 indicating determination by Japan to give a “decisive blow to China”, “to administer a thorough-going blow to the Chinese Army so that it may lose completely its will to fight”; by the Foreign Minister 9 of the resort by Japan to “force of arms” and “calamitous hostilities”, and by the War [and?] Admiralty 10 of the intention of the Japanese Army to crush the Chinese military forces. These statements, when read in the light of the fact that there are estimated to be at least 150,000 Japanese troops in China proper, leave no room for doubt that the Japanese Government has formally taken cognizance of the existence of a de facto state of war. ( b ) The address of the Minister of Finance indicates the existence of plans for a reorganization of Japan’s financial, commercial and industrial systems under war time control by the Government on a prolonged war basis. 2. Estimate of the probable reaction in Japan to the American Government putting into effect the initial provision or more of the neutrality resolution. ( a ) Although the Japanese Government and the press and other agencies of public opinion might conceivably regard it as a mark of American disapproval of Japanese policy and action toward China especially in view of the fact that neither of the combatants has actually declared war, the predominant reaction would most probably be favorable. It would probably be regarded as evidence of the intention of the United States to make no exception in policy in a case arising in the Far East as contrasted with similar cases which might occur in other parts of the world. It would probably be regarded also as further manifestation of intention by the United States to refrain from intervention. 3. Estimate of effects upon Japan of such proclamation. ( a ) I believe that the proclamation would not materially affect Japan from a practical point of view with the possible exception of the loss of supply of aircraft which are being imported from the United States as models for adaptation. If the war is prolonged the effect might be more serious. 4. Comments. It is the declared intention of the Japanese Government to avoid interference with peaceful commerce but the Government has indicated (see my 329, August 31, 2 p.m., and my 341, September 4, 1 p.m. 11 ) that circumstances may compel resort to more drastic measures to prevent the supply of arms to China. I believe that even if such circumstances do not arise there is grave risk of action being taken by the Japanese naval forces whether intentional or otherwise which would constitute unlawful restriction of American sovereign rights. I believe that the prospects of continued American trade even “peaceful commerce” with China are being rapidly diminished by a number of factors such as the risks incident to hostilities, high war risk insurance, interruption of means of transportation in China, et cetera, and that the benefits to the United States resulting from continuously diminishing sale to China of arms and munitions are not commensurate with the risks involved. In view of the desire of the American Government to reduce the chances of the United States becoming involved in the present hostilities I believe that action now is advisable. Grew 8 See telegram No. 343, September 5, noon, from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 9 For text, see ibid ., p. 364 . 10 See telegram No. 347, September 5, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, ibid ., p. 368 . 11 Neither printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/49: Telegram [Document 580] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 7—11:35 a.m.] 620. Department’s September 6, 5 p.m. The only new element that has been injected into the situation dealt with in my 461, August 15, 1 p.m. 11a is the present Japanese effort to cut Hong Kong off from the Chinese mainland. British reaction to this effort will be watched with interest here closely where it is well recognized that if Japan succeeds Hong Kong will become a dead port. The putting into effect of the Neutrality Act would be resented by the leaders in the Chinese Government just as they resent the withholding of passports from aviation instructors and the action ascribed by them to the American Consulate General at Shanghai in persuading certain of the instructors already assigned to leave. See in this connection my 585, September 1, 9 p.m. 12 This resentment will be communicated to the people in explanation of failure of Chinese armies to hold off Japanese armies. In this connection please read my 593, September 3, 1 p.m., 13 in which I attempted to lay before the Department my considered estimate of probable course of events. It proves openly that the application of the Neutrality Act would react dangerously for Americans in China. Chinese attitude in this matter may seem unreasonable to one looking at the question from the outside but it is an attitude which exists and I believe that it cannot be changed. Mrs. Chiang had Neutrality Act in mind when she used the words quoted in my 595 [ 585? ]. Her same attitude was one of bitter resentment that the United States by withdrawing its merchantships and by refusing to permit aviation instructors to come to China seemed to be going out of its way to put obstacles in the path of China engaged in a life and death struggle, pointed out enemy already on Chinese soil. By contrast she pointed out that Italy and Germany known to be friendly to Japan were leaving their instructors to work undisturbed. The application of the Neutrality Act would be itself evidence to her and to those surrounding and supporting her husband that the United States was actively trying to disable China in its attempt at self-defense. Johnson 11a Not printed. 12 Vol. iv , p. 523 . 13 See telegram of September 6, 10 a.m., p. 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 576 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 701.4193/107: Telegram [Document 581] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received September 7—6:52 a.m.] 356. Our 327, August 29, 9 p.m., wounding of British Ambassador to China. 1. Provisional Japanese reply was handed yesterday to British Embassy and is to the effect that up to the present investigations have failed to produce any evidence that the shooting was done by a Japanese plane and that consequently it is still impossible to determine whether the responsibility rests with Japan. 2. As text has been given to the press I shall not cable it unless instructed. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) to the Secretary of State 893.51/6460 [Document 582] Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs ( Feis ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] September 7, 1937. Mr. Secretary : I informed the Secretary of the Treasury 14 this afternoon that the question of the application of the Neutrality Act in the Far Eastern situation was now under immediate consideration and that decision might be promptly reached. Therefore, I explained that this Department wished to inform itself first as to whether the Treasury would be embarrassed in fulfilling its agreements with the Chinese Government in case the Act was invoked, secondly, as to whether there was anything in the exchange situation which ought to be taken into account, and thirdly as to whether it seemed necessary to the Treasury to make any preparations in regard to the application of Section 3. After discussing the matter with Messrs. Taylor, 15 Oliphant 16 and Viner, who were also present, the Secretary of the Treasury gave the opinion that the application of the Act would not impede the operation of those phases of the Agreement with China having to do with the purchase and ear-marking of gold. (The whole of the $50,000,000 procured by China is incidentally still on ear-mark in New York.) As to any future question in regard to short-time lending upon the collateral security of such gold, that could be dealt with when and as it arose in Mr. Morgenthau’s opinion. I was also informed that there was nothing in the immediate exchange situation which need be taken into account. Finally, as to questions arising under Section 3 it was agreed to call together the inter-departmental committee which had previously been studying this matter. At the termination of the discussion the Secretary of the Treasury stated an idea which he thought might be of great importance in the event that the American and other Governments should ever undertake to try to end the conflict. It was to the effect that by agreement dollar, sterling and franc exchange would be refused to Japan in return for yen or gold—without explanation given. I did not undertake extensive discussion of this idea as it seemed beyond the field of the Department’s immediate intentions. H[ erbert ] F[ eis ] 14 Henry Morgenthau, Jr. 15 Wayne C. Taylor, Fiscal Assistant Secretary. 16 Herman Oliphant, General Counsel. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) 793.94/9994a: Telegram [Document 583] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) Washington , September 8, 1937—2 p.m. 383. During this critical period it is essential to keep posted day by day as to British point of view toward Far Eastern crisis. I appreciate all you have been doing, but would like you to keep us informed in greater detail, not only citing facts but also giving your analysis of considerations controlling developments in British policies. Hull Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma) 793.94/10091 [Document 584] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy ( Suma ) [ Washington ,] September 8, 1937. Mr. Suma called at his request and stated that in continuation of previous items of information which he had communicated to us he wished to inform us as follows: 1. He said that the Japanese Government was giving careful attention to the recent Sino-Soviet non-aggression agreement; that there were a number of unconfirmed reports to the effect that the Soviet Union was sending airplanes to China; that inasmuch as these reports were not confirmed the Japanese Government was not paying undue attention to them; that, however, the Japanese Government was of the opinion that there was special significance in that provision of the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact which stated that the provisions of the past should have no effect in reference to agreements which either party may already have entered into; that in the opinion of the Japanese Government this provision meant, inter alia , that the Chinese Government recognized the agreement signed last year between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia; 17 that such recognition by the Chinese Government represented a concession on the part of the Chinese Government in return for which the Soviet Union must have granted China some quid pro quo . Mr. Suma mentioned also the close relations which had developed following the Sianfu incident of last December between the Chinese Communists and the Nanking Government and between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. 2. Mr. Suma referred to press reports in regard to the occupation by the Japanese Military at Shanghai of property belonging to the Seventh Day Adventists mission. He said that the Embassy had received no information in regard to this matter but he remarked that in general the Japanese military had found that some American properties were being used by the Chinese for military purposes and that in these cases the Japanese military felt impelled to drive the Chinese out of the properties. 3. He referred to the steamship Wichita 18 which was carrying military equipment to China and said that the Japanese Embassy was watching this matter carefully and that he hoped that no unfortunate complications would arise. 4. Mr. Suma referred to press reports to the effect that Ambassador Bingham had returned to the United States and the Under Secretary of State had proceeded to Europe with a view to bringing about joint action between the United States and Great Britain in reference to the Far Eastern situation. I said that Mr. Hull had stated definitely that Mr. Bingham’s return to this country was a personal matter and that so far as I knew Mr. Welles had been planning this trip to Europe for some time. I referred to the statements made by the Secretary to the press in regard to consultation between the American Government and the British and other Governments. 5. Mr. Suma said that he wished to inform me for my “private information” that the French Ambassador to China had presented to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai a proposition for neutralizing Nantao. Mr. Suma said that he thought that the French Ambassador had not informed his colleagues of this proposal. Mr. Suma remarked that the Japanese Government was desirous of effecting any practicable arrangements for demilitarizing or neutralizing areas in which non-combatants lived and that in reference to the French Ambassador’s proposal that Nantao be neutralized it might be practicable for the Japanese to agree to such neutralization provided that a certain portion of Pootung were also neutralized or demilitarized. I said that with reference to Mr. Suma’s statement that the Japanese Government desired to see neutralized areas in which non-combatants lived I had noted that the Japanese Admiral at Shanghai had returned an unfavorable reply to the proposal put to him by the American, British and French Admirals there; that that proposal had been designed to protect a non-combatant area in which we and other Governments were specially interested and where many American and other foreign nationals had taken refuge; and that if any such scheme were to be put into effect it was of course necessary that the Japanese as well as the Chinese make some concession. 6. I said that in this general connection I had been very much disappointed at the reply made by the Japanese Government to an approach which we had made to that Government through our Ambassador in Tokyo in reference to the bombing of the Canton–Hankow Railway. 19 I said that that railway afforded practically the only means of egress from central China and that to me it seemed highly important that Americans and other foreigners who wished to leave central China be permitted to utilize that railway. I said that the Japanese Government had taken the position that inasmuch as the Chinese were using the railway for military purposes the Japanese Government could give no assurance that the railway would not be bombed. I said that perhaps the American and other consular authorities on the spot might endeavor to work out some arrangement for an international train to carry Americans and other foreigners from Hankow to Canton and that if such a plan were worked out I earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government would undertake to refrain from bombing the train or the tracks while such international train or trains were proceeding to Canton. I told Mr. Suma that we might later approach the Japanese Government again in regard to this matter. Mr. Suma brought up the question as to whether international airplanes might not be used for evacuating Americans and other foreigners from Hankow and the Yangtze Valley area. I told him that in my opinion it would be very difficult to mark airplanes in such a way as to insure against their being attacked and that it seemed to me much more practicable to arrange for Americans and other foreigners at Hankow to leave via the Canton-Hankow Railway. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 17 The protocol of March 12, 1936, for mutual assistance against a third party was published in Moscow on April 8, 1936; see telegram No. 100, April 8, 1936, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 105 . 18 See vol. iv , pp. 522 ff. 19 See Japanese Foreign Office note No. 108, September 3, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 495 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10008: Telegram [Document 585] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 10, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 10—6:02 a.m.] 360. 1. A prominent member of the House of Peers, with whom I am on terms of personal friendship, called today for a periodic talk and in the course of conversation spoke of the marked swing in public opinion in Japan, even including the military, towards friendship with the United States. He said that since the consummation of the pact with Germany and the results thereof, Japan is coming to regard America “as the only real friend left.” He said that events in China have moved very much farther and faster than even the military intended. He characterizes the Government as weak, with Hirota and Baba 20 the only strong characters among the civilian members, but Hirota will not take initiative and Baba is interested only in domestic affairs. 2. I took this occasion to talk to my informant along the lines of the penultimate paragraph of your telegraphic instruction 187, September 2, 2 p.m., emphasizing the present strong trend of feeling in the United States concerning the policy and course which Japan is now pursuing. My informant said that information along these lines had recently been given by a member at a meeting of the Export and Import Committee of the House of Peers. 3. I likewise took this opportunity to mention the local press reports to the effect that the Japanese Government contemplates sending a good will mission to the United States to explain Japan’s point of view and said that speaking personally and unofficially I knew that such a step at the present time would be a mistake and inadvisable. My collocutor undertook to let this “important view” be known in appropriate circles. Grew 20 Eichi Baba, Japanese Minister of Home Affairs. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10039: Telegram [Document 586] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 13, 1937—8 a.m. [Received 8:32 a.m.] 644. Official sources confirm press reports from Sian that Military Affairs Commission has appointed Chu Teh, Commander and Peng Teh Hui, Vice Commander of the Chinese Communist forces in the northwest which have been reorganized into Government forces as the Eighth Route Army. According to official sources the cooperation of these forces with Government forces in present hostilities can not be described as formation of “popular front” because the Communists have submerged themselves in that they have promised not to engage in Communist propaganda, have relinquished the class struggle, have no longer their Communist character and Chu Teh and Peng have sworn their allegiance and obedience to Chiang Kai-shek. Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping. By mail to Shanghai, Hankow. Peiping mail Tientsin. Johnson The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10043: Telegram [Document 587] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , September 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 13—10:03 a.m.] 593. 1. The Foreign Office sent for me this morning to say that they regarded seriously the Japanese occupation of Pratas Reef some distance southeast of Hong Kong. There is a Chinese meteorological station on this small island which is said to render invaluable service, particularly in warning Hong Kong of approaching typhoons. The Japanese have dismantled this station and, according to the Foreign Office, plan to establish an airplane base. It was likewise stated that the British authorities have strictly secret information that the Japanese are planning to attack and occupy the Island of Hainan. In addition both the British and the French are apprehensive that an attempt to occupy the Paracels Reef may be made. The sovereignty of this reef is said to have been long in dispute between France and China and to be of particular importance to the French as it commands the eastern approaches to Indo-China. 2. A final instruction is being telegraphed today to the British Ambassador at Tokyo to warn the Japanese Government that their occupation of Pratas Reef, already accomplished, and any projected occupation of Hainan and Paracels would inevitably involve serious difficulties with third powers and therefore be directly contrary to official Japanese statements that they had no intention of antagonizing the interests of third powers in their conflict with China. The British Ambassador in addition is instructed to protest against the Japanese dismantling of the meteorological station on Pratas Reef. The French Ambassador at Tokyo, according to the Foreign Office, has been instructed to join with his British colleague in this démarche . 3. The Foreign Office pointed out the fact that the Japanese occupation of these three points would offer potential dangers to sea communications north from Singapore, and a very general wish was expressed to know what, if any, action the United States proposed to take in this matter. There evidently exists the hope that the United States might be prepared to make similar representations at Tokyo. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) 793.94/10043: Telegram [Document 588] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) Washington , September 14, 1937—7 p.m. 392. Your 593, September 13, 2 p.m. You refer to action taken by the British Government and the French Government by way of “warning” the Japanese Government that occupation by the Japanese of various islands would involve serious difficulties with third powers; and you state that the Foreign Office expressed “a very general wish” to know what, if any, action the United States proposed to take in this matter. It is desired that you say to the Foreign Office that on January 7, 1932, the American Government sent to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments identic notes 21 declarative of this Government’s intention not to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those two Governments possessing certain characteristics or any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. This Government adheres to the principle laid down in those notes. It has subsequently committed this country in certain treaties to the application of that principle in certain situations. It also has affirmed general and particular principles of its policy in the statements of the Secretary of State of July 16 22 and August 23, 1937. 23 You should also state that the Department is instructing the American Ambassador at Tokyo 24 to confer with his British and French colleagues and in his discretion make an appropriate approach to the Japanese Foreign Office on the subject of the seizure of Pratas Reef and the dismantling of the meteorological station there. Hull 21 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. iii , p. 7 , and Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 76 . 22 Vol. i , p. 699 . 23 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 355 . 24 Infra . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10043: Telegram [Document 589] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 14, 1937—7 p.m. 206. Under date September 13 the Chargé at London telegraphed that on that day the Foreign Office sent for him and referred to action taken by the British Government and the French Government by way of “warning” the Japanese Government that occupation by the Japanese of various islands, if and when, would inevitably involve serious difficulties with third powers. The Chargé reported further that the Foreign Office expressed “a very general wish” to know what, if any, action the United States proposed to take in this matter. The Department suggests that you in your discretion make an informal approach to the Japanese Foreign Office, referring to reports that the Japanese have dismantled the Chinese meteorological station on Pratas Reef, mentioning the valuable services which the station has rendered shipping in the vicinity, and pointing out the dangers to which shipping may be subjected due to the dismantling of the station. You may inquire of the Foreign Office with regard to the Japanese Government’s intentions concerning Pratas Reef. In this connection, you make take opportunity to refer to statements made by Japanese officials to the effect that the Japanese Government has no territorial ambitions in China, draw attention to the remoteness of Pratas Reef from the scene of conflict in China, and express confidence that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to alienate Chinese territory, including Pratas Reef. Before taking any action, please consult with your British and French colleagues. Keep the Department informed with regard to the matter. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10061: Telegram [Document 590] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , September 14, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 14—1:45 p.m.] 708. My No. 697, September 13, 7 p.m. 25 Japanese attacks on the Lotien–Woosung and Yangtzepoo fronts have resulted in orderly Chinese withdrawal to a line running from Lotien southeast in a fairly straight line to the North Station in Chapei. Chinese military spokesman referring to withdrawal stated, “as the purpose of our operations has now been accomplished it is no longer necessary for our troops to operate under the guns of the enemy fleet and in accordance with the general strategic plan our forces retired by stages to our first defense line”. Japanese have been shelling Chapei almost continually today but Chinese continue to strengthen their defenses in that area. Gauss 25 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10697 [Document 591] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 15, 1937. [Received October 5.] Dear Mr. Secretary : I am perhaps taking a liberty in bothering you with these informal comments, but at a critical time like the present it seems to me of the utmost importance that no misconstructions between the Department and the Embassy should arise as a result of the phraseology or substance of telegrams or for any other reason. If I could sit down with you and talk things through I feel certain that our general views with regard to this deplorable situation out here in the Far East would be found to be close if not identical, even though we necessarily survey the situation from two different angles and though we in the Embassy cannot see the whole picture as the Department sees it. But since direct conversation is unfortunately precluded, I believe that the next best thing is to write you much as I would talk and to try to give you a fair conception of the lines along which our thoughts are working. I venture to believe that this may be helpful from two points of view, first to clarify our thoughts to you, and second to elicit your counter comments or further instructions if you find divergence between the basic reasoning and recommendations of the Embassy and the basic reasoning and policy of the Department. We are here for the purpose of representing and carrying out that policy to the best of our ability, and that, I need hardly say, is our fundamental aim. If at any time you see indications of our jumping the track in any direction, it is highly important that we understand just how and where this is being done. Put in summary form, the principal difference of views which might be held to emerge from our telegram No. 321 of August 27, 4 p.m., and your reply No. 187 of September 2, 2 p.m., would appear to lie in our recommended three guiding objectives in the present contingency (to avoid involvement, to protect American lives and rights and, while preserving neutrality, to maintain friendship with both combatants). You agree with the first and second but doubt if it is practicable to aim at the same time at solidifying our relations with either of the combatant nations. In expanding that thought you instruct me to overlook no opportunity to suggest to Japanese officialdom that Japan is destroying the world’s good will and building up a longtime liability of suspicion, distrust, dislike, and potential ostracism. I also am of opinion that the third of the objectives is less important than the first and second, but I still think it ought to remain among them—never to take precedence over the avoiding of involvement or over protection, but nevertheless kept in mind, though more as method than as principle. The mere enumeration of several principles to guide action always leaves unsettled their relative weight. I feel confident that subsequent portions of this letter will make clear that the main purpose of our telegram was to urge certain considerations with regard to the method used in manifesting American disapproval. There may occur some attempt by Japan to circumscribe American rights to trade with China or some other sovereign rights, in which case an entirely new situation, calling for new methods which might include recourse to the most drastic measures, would arise; but so long as that situation does not arise I would respectfully recommend no departure by our Government from its present official attitude and methods. I share your views, and the views of the American public, of outrage at the Japanese program. I most heartily agree with you that we should make clear to Japanese officialdom the importance which we attach to the principles enunciated by you on July 16 and August 23 and the importance of world opinion which the present program is laying up against the Japanese nation. The American attitude can be and has been made abundantly clear to the Japanese Government. In addition to our official utterances, the American press (which is of course reported to Japanese leaders) expresses that attitude unmistakably. I have also talked along the desired lines to important people here. Your pronouncements have not, however, been permitted to come before the Japanese people in any detail. In agreeing that the expression of clear disapproval of Japan’s course is desirable, nevertheless I wish at this point respectfully to raise the following consideration. This is a country of a controlled press, and treacherous twisting of news and opinion is not only possible but is the practice. If public statements could be got through to the Japanese people there are several which I should urge making, but in the present state of control of the Japanese press our messages do not reach the public. The Japanese people do not speak our language, and it is the Japanese Government which acts as interpreter. Exhort them as we may, the interpreter is in position to do what coloring he wishes—and he wishes much. Repeated American public statements critical of Japan’s course would be fully warranted, but they would not deter the course of military developments and they would reach the Japanese public so colored and so contaminated by other matter that the Japanese people would see American unfriendliness without the warrant. Lest there be any misunderstanding as to our attitude, I venture to summarize still further a few of our current thoughts on this whole problem: 1. We feel that in the present issue the Administration has acted with great wisdom and that your appeals of July 16 and August 23 and your various observations to the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors have been high-minded, broad-visioned, statesmanlike pronouncements, fully called for and completely justified. They have beyond peradventure announced and established the position of the United States before the world, the American public, the combatants, international law and history. 2. While steadfastly maintaining our position in the world as the foremost exponent of the highest international ethics and principles, of disarmament and world peace, we feel that we can be of greater practical use in the world at large and the Far East in particular, and we can keep American interests in the Far East on a sounder footing now and in future, if we aim, so far as is practicable, to avoid unnecessarily sacrificing our present relations either with China or Japan than if we throw overboard our friendship with either. 3. The Japanese people, perhaps more than most people, are capable of long-remembered gratitude for what they consider friendly attitudes on the part of other nations, and long-remembered resentment for unfriendly attitudes. Whatever we may think of the Japanese military machine, need we penalize our own future interests, and perhaps our own future helpfulness in working for peace, by creating among the Japanese people a renewed antagonism against the United States? I know by personal experience, and bitter experience, how acute that antagonism was when I came here in 1932. The good neighbor policy of the present Administration has completely overcome what formerly amounted to a festering irritation. Continuing our line of thought, we feel, whether warrantably or otherwise, that the Department has apparently read into our telegram No. 321 views which were not expressed and which were not intended to be expressed therein. The following further points are therefore brought out in order that all misconception of our attitude may be removed: 4. Our thought is by no means a question of what may be pleasing to the Japanese but rather a question of maintaining and developing what we conceive to be a situation of maximum future value to American interests. I have not for a single moment advocated that we should in any way or in any degree sacrifice American interests or purchase Japanese goodwill at the expense of abandoning any American policy or law or any treaty to which we are a party on any consideration, nor that our Government should omit any action demanded by American public opinion. I do not advocate and have not advocated our tying our hands in order not to displease Japan. I did express our opinion that any attempt to thwart Japan’s course in China by manifestations of disapprobation on legal or moral grounds would have no favorable effect on the situation, but that is quite a different matter. I have already made it clear that I thoroughly and heartily concur in every action thus far taken by our Government in the present situation. Our thought lies not at all with what has been done but rather with what might be done in future. We have feared the adverse effects which would accrue if resort were now made to the method of public censure, either alone or in concert with other Powers, as has been rumored in the press. We have felt that if such a course were now adopted, there would probably be brought about a condition of affairs in which it might be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out either or both of the two primary objectives set forth in our recommendations which are acceptable to you. We in the Embassy favor continuance of our Government’s present course, and it was the main purpose of our telegram to express that attitude. 5. Another point to which I wish to refer is the Department’s statement that it is doubtful whether the American Government will wish to act as mediator. You may recall that early in the conflict I recommended against an offer of mediation by the United States. The statement in my 321 that moral intervention by the Powers which could be interpreted as partial to either contestant would have no good effect until a stalemate occurs or until either combatant has established military supremacy over the other implied no recommendation for mediation. We envisage no action by the United States in response to the desire of either combatant that we act as “friendly broker”, but we do believe that a condition may arise when the United States may feel the need of addressing itself to both combatants in order to prevent, if possible, the development in China of conditions of chaotic disorder. In the present communistic trend such a situation may well arise. I have merely had in mind the constant aim of President Wilson during the first years of the World War to steer a course which would place the United States in the most favorable position to play just that part. 6. One last point, and then I am through. We believe strongly in a united or concerted front with Great Britain and we feel that this front has consistently been maintained since the present hostilities began. I have had this thought constantly in mind and have done everything in my power here to maintain that position. I do not, however, feel that British methods are always best calculated to achieve desired results. There sometimes appears an ineptitude in their methods, and especially in the tone and language and timing of their official communications, which does not seem to us to characterize the tone and language and timing employed by our own Government. These things count. To sum up, Mr. Secretary, I believe that the recommendations contained in our telegram 321, somewhat elaborated and perhaps clarified in this letter, center not about principle or policy or attitude but simply about method, and not about the methods already followed, with which we are in the most hearty accord, but with methods which might be followed in future. Our primary and fundamental thought is, naturally, the advancement of American interests in the Far East in future, and we feel that this in itself presupposes the advancement of world peace. These comments go to you with great respect and certainly in no spirit of controversy. I do not like to send them in a formal despatch but appreciate nevertheless the importance of having my general attitude made abundantly clear on the records, and it would therefore give me a feeling of satisfaction if you should be disposed to place this letter on the files of the Department in connection with and in elaboration of our telegram No. 321 of August 27, 4 p.m. I am [etc.] Joseph C. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10089: Telegram [Document 592] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 16—8:33 a.m.] 379. Embassy’s 335, September 1, 8 p.m., bombing operations in Nanking and elsewhere in China. The Foreign Office delivered to us a reply, of which the following is a translation: “ Aide-mémoire . His Excellency the American Ambassador, in an aide-mémoire of September 1st, 1937, conveyed the request of the American Government for the discontinuance of such bombing operations over Nanking of Japanese forces as might result in the destruction of property of nonmilitary character and in the wounding and death of civilians, and also for their abstinence from attacks upon defenseless cities, hospitals, trains, motor cars, et cetera, with a view to preventing danger to the American citizens who are still scattered in the interior of China. As His Excellency is aware, Nanking is the pivotal base wherein are planned and originated all Chinese hostile operations against the Japanese forces. In view of the fact that the city is defended by many forts; is possessed of numerous other military organs and establishments in and around it, it is quite proper that against these the Japanese should carry out bombing operations. It should be stated definitely that the objectives of their bombing are limited, from the standpoint of humanity, strictly to those military organs and establishments, and absolutely in no instance nonmilitary property and civilians are ever made the direct objectives of attacks. That, in spite of all such caution exercised on our part, noncombatants should sometimes be made victims of the hostilities and suffer unforeseen disasters in respect of their lives and property, is also regretted deeply by the Japanese Government. That, however, has been an inevitable concomitant of hostile operations in all ages. In order to ensure, as far as possible, the safety of noncombatants in the present case, it is believed that, in parallel to the caution exercised by the Japanese as above stated, the Chinese on their part should take appropriate measures, such as the evacuation of noncombatants from the neighborhood of their military organs and establishments. The Japanese Government, as has repeatedly been made known, are most solicitous for the security of the lives and property of the nationals of third countries, including American citizens, in China, and are prepared to do whatever lies in their power to facilitate their withdrawal to places of safety and to afford protection to their property. And they wish to assure Your Excellency that nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese forces than to make attacks, such as are referred to in the American aide-mémoire , upon defenseless cities, hospitals, trains and motor cars, which are not used by the Chinese for military purposes. September 15, 1937.” Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 793.94111/72 [Document 593] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] September 17, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador called this morning at his own request. The Ambassador opened the conversation with a statement to the effect that China was “disappointed” by and disturbed over the action which the American Government had taken (on September 14) 28 in reference to carrying of arms, etc., by American ships, which action they regard as being harmful to China, and that he had come officially and formally to inform the Secretary of his Government’s “disappointment.” The Secretary replied to the effect that this action on China’s part was astonishing. He said in effect that we were more greatly surprised that the Chinese should take this position than the Chinese were, as stated by the Ambassador, disappointed by the action which we had taken. He went on to explain at some length that we had taken action which amounted to only a small fraction of the action which would have been ours had we applied the Neutrality Act. The Ambassador stated that there seemed to be more in our action than was apparent from the text of the President’s statement. He said that the Chinese were finding American firms unwilling to sell arms, etc., to them. He cited a report from a Chinese agent who has been doing business with the du Pont Company for some time past and who now, when trying to purchase TNT from the du Ponts, is told that they cannot sell it to him. The Secretary said that we had taken no steps toward interfering with sale and purchase; that we had not told anyone not to sell; that the market remains open. The Ambassador said that it nevertheless appeared that from somewhere in American official circles there had gone out word discouraging sale by American firms. The Secretary recapitulated what he had already said and repeated that we had taken no action prohibiting or discouraging sales. He said that our action in prohibiting and discouraging carrying is directed only toward keeping American shipping from becoming involved in the presence of the Japanese blockade of the China coast 29 and the ability of the Japanese Navy to interfere with attempts to carry arms into China ports. The Ambassador said that when a friend suddenly pursues a course which injures his friend, the injured party cannot but feel that there is some deliberate intent. He repeated that his Government was greatly disappointed and concerned. The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any comment. Mr. Hornbeck stated that he found it difficult to understand at just what the Ambassador and his Government were directing the statements which the Ambassador had made. The Ambassador had communicated his Government’s message and was repeating and underscoring certain implications. He wondered what the Ambassador would have this Government do. The Ambassador said that this led to a matter which was much on his mind. He said that the League had met, had received the Chinese Government’s approach, and was reconvening the Advisory Committee. 30 The American Government has had a representation on that Committee. He hoped that the American Government would assist in the work of the Committee. The Secretary then said that we have not yet heard from the League on this subject but that if and when we hear from them we will give that matter consideration. The Ambassador then said that 19 planes which the Chinese Government had purchased and which had been shipped by the S.S. Wichita had been removed from the Wichita at San Pedro. The Chinese Government owned these planes and now they were being withheld. He hoped that the American Government would assist toward making it possible for them to go to China. The Secretary said that shipping other than American is available. The Ambassador then reverted to the question of the Advisory Committee, and the Secretary repeated that when the matter comes before us we will give it consideration. The Ambassador rose to leave and the Secretary said that we are always glad to have him call. The conversation there ended. The Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck proceeded together to the elevator. In the corridor, the Ambassador was intercepted by press correspondents who requested an account of the Ambassador’s conversation with the Secretary. The Ambassador said that he did not wish to make any statement. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 28 For President Roosevelt’s statement, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 201 , and also Foreign Relations , 1937, vol. iv , pp. 520 ff. 29 See also vol. iv , pp. 430 ff. 30 See ibid ., pp. 1 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) 793.94/10146a: Telegram [Document 594] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) Washington , September 20, 1937—11 a.m. 394. Please inquire and report urgently any information you can obtain from Foreign Office as to what the British Government proposes to do in respect to notice of Japanese Admiral relating to bombing of Nanking on and after 21st instant. 31 Moore 31 See telegram No. 728, September 19, 1 p.m., from the Consul General at Shanghai, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 499 . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.94/10672 [Document 595] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] September 20, 1937. Although the economic data which is so far available indicates that Japan is not in a particularly unfavorable position this data is applicable to Japan’s normal situation and does not appear to afford an adequate basis for forming a conclusive opinion upon the question of Japan’s economic and financial ability to carry on large scale and sustained military operations in China. However, certain tentative observations are offered, as follows: Japan counts for its military success primarily upon the superior mechanization of its army and greater command of matériel. As Japan is not self-contained economically, but dependent upon outside sources for many essential commodities (including cotton, wool, iron and other metals, petroleum products and automotive equipment), Japan will, with a gradual exhaustion of its reserves of matériel, become more and more dependent upon imports. Except to the extent that Japan can buy on credit (i. e., float foreign loans), Japan must pay for these imports by (1) gold shipments, (2) export of commodities, and (3) sale of services. Japan’s specie reserve is diminishing and its domestic production of gold does not exceed $60,000,000 annually. It is difficult for Japan to expand its export trade materially in the face of the restrictions now existing in other countries upon the importation of Japanese goods. Indeed on account of the losses in Japan’s China market and the extensive diversion of Japanese industry to the production of munitions, it will be surprising if Japan’s export trade does not actually show a falling off. While Japan normally relies to a substantial extent upon the earnings of its merchant marine for adjusting its negative trade balance, the diversion of shipping for the transportation of troops and equipment to China may serve to reduce earnings from that source. It is estimated that Japan now has considerably more than 300,000 troops in China in addition to 100,000 in Manchuria, and it is stated that Japan plans to increase its expeditionary force to 500,000. The occupation of Manchuria, in which perhaps 60,000 Japanese troops were involved, and which was attended with comparatively little Chinese resistance, is believed to have led directly to an increase in Japan’s national debt of over one billion yen. Military operations in China with a force at least five times as great as that required in Manchuria and with stiff Chinese resistance cannot but be infinitely more costly. Even though the drain of a sustained military campaign may prove very burdensome to Japan, there is no warrant for assuming that Japan would be likely because of that fact to abandon its military venture in China. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/356: Telegram [Document 596] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Aboard U. S. S. “ Luzon ”, Nanking , September 20, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.] 692. [To Shanghai:] Shanghai’s September 17, 1 p.m. Following informal letter has been sent by messenger today to the Minister for Foreign Affairs: 32 “Yesterday evening I received by telegraph through the American Consul General at Shanghai a communication from the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Third Fleet in which he advised the American Embassy and other diplomatic missions and foreign nationals to leave Nanking, in order to avoid possible involvement in contemplated military measures. The standing instructions of my Government, in circumstances of apparent danger to myself and staff, are to avoid that danger if possible. I intend, therefore, to embark with my staff on an American naval vessel in the near future, and thereafter to do everything possible under those conditions to maintain contact with yourself and the National Government. Needless to say, I shall return to the Embassy premises at the earliest opportunity. As of probable interest I enclose a copy of the communication referred to above”. 33 Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Johnson 32 Wang Chung-hui. 33 See telegram No. 656, September 14, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. iv , p. 327 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10152: Telegram [Document 597] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , September 20, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 20—1:50 p.m.] 601. Your 394, August [ September ] 20, 11 a.m. Foreign Office states that a telegram to the British Ambassador at Tokyo is now being encoded for immediate despatch. The Ambassador will be instructed to inform the Japanese Government immediately that the British Government cannot admit that Nanking in general, as distinct from military establishments outside the town, is a legitimate object for air attack. Any attack not confined to military establishments outside the town cannot help endangering civilian lives which the Japanese Government has declared that it does not desire. Nor can the British Government admit that the Japanese Government has any right to expect foreign diplomats and nationals to vacate Nanking in order to avoid danger of air attack or to move warships which may be there to protect their nationals and to maintain communications of the Embassy. The British Government reserves the right to hold the Japanese Government liable for any injury to British lives and property resulting from air attack. British representatives at Washington, 34 Paris, Berlin, and Rome will be instructed to advise the Governments to which they are accredited of this action. Johnson 34 The British Chargé on September 20 was asked by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs “to inform his Government of the steps which we had taken.” (793.94/10457). The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10150: Telegram [Document 598] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 20, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 20—10:40 a.m.] 395. Department’s 217, September 19, 2 p.m. 35 I called today on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made to him the most earnest and emphatic representations concerning the announced plans of the Japanese naval forces to bomb Nanking, pointing out the grave danger to the foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel and other noncombatants which would inevitably be involved if any such operations are carried out. I dwelt at length on the serious effect on American public opinion which some accident in connection with those operations would entail, and I spoke of the already mounting feeling against Japan in the United States and in the world at large and the fact that by her policy and course of action Japan is laying up for herself among the peoples of the world a liability of suspicion, distrust, popular antipathy and potential ostracism. I spoke earnestly of the responsibility which devolved on Hirota himself to guide Japan’s foreign relations and to restrain the military and naval forces from action which is rapidly sacrificing the world’s good will. Nothing whatever was left to Hirota’s imagination in the directness and force of my statement’s appeal. The Minister listened gravely but made no effort to counter my observations. He said, however, that this afternoon orders had gone out from the Japanese Government to the naval command in China that in any bombing operations over Nanking the foreign diplomatic establishments and noncombatants were to be carefully avoided. He expressed the opinion that the bombing already reported in the press tonight was unimportant and not in the vicinity of the diplomatic establishments. He volunteered the opinion that the warning given by the Navy that operations would commence tomorrow at noon was “too short”. My effort today was to try to bring home to the Minister, with maximum effect, the inevitable repercussion in the United States to so-called accidents in connection with Japanese bombing operations in Nanking and elsewhere in China. We must, I fear, reluctantly face the fact that the civil government in Tokyo wields very little influence with the military and naval forces where their general objectives are concerned and that even the strongest representations are insufficient to restrain them from incurring the grave risks of their present course of action. Repeated to Shanghai for communication to the Commander in Chief and for relay to Nanking. Grew 35 See vol. iv , p. 338 , footnote 39. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10150: Telegram [Document 599] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 20, 1937—7 p.m. 219. Your 395, September 20, 8 p.m. 1. I asked the Japanese Ambassador to call this afternoon. 36 I pointed out to him that we were deeply concerned with regard to the announced plans of the Japanese naval forces to bomb Nanking. I told him that the notice gave insufficient time for the American Ambassador and other American nationals to arrange for measures toward ensuring the safety of the American Embassy and of American property. I stressed that the shortness of the notice was extremely regrettable. I told the Ambassador that we were seriously concerned not only with regard to the safety of the American Embassy and of American nationals at Nanking but also with regard to the unfortunate repercussions which would arise should the city of Nanking be subjected to a general bombing which would lay waste large sections of the city and kill and injure non-combatants. I said that regardless of whether such destruction was premeditated or accidental, the Japanese attack would arouse widespread and hostile criticism. I told the Ambassador that you had already approached the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject. 37 The Ambassador said that he had received a telegraphic report in regard to your conversation with the Foreign Minister and that according to his telegram the Foreign Minister had pointed out that Japanese bombing operations would be directed at Chinese military establishments and that the foreign diplomatic establishments and non-combatants were to be avoided. I pointed out to the Ambassador that it seemed highly desirable that, if the bombing attack were to be carried out, the bombing be postponed and that it be restricted in area. The Ambassador said that he would telegraph his Government tonight reporting this conversation and the American Government’s concern. 2. In reply to the Department’s inquiry, the American Embassy at London telegraphs that the British Foreign Office is sending a telegram to the British Ambassador at Tokyo directing the British Ambassador to make representations to the Japanese Government. Please inform your British colleague of the action already taken by you and of my conversation here with the Japanese Ambassador. 38 Moore 36 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, September 20, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 502 . 37 See telegram No. 395, supra , and memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, September 20, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 500 . 38 See note No. 780 from the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 22, ibid ., p. 504 . The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 761.9312 Aggressor/12 [Document 600] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State No. 573 Moscow , September 20, 1937. [Received October 8.] Sir : With reference to my telegram No. 238 of August 31, 3 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, signed at Nanking on August 21, 1937. 39 The enclosed version was published in the Moscow Daily News on August 30. As it was retranslated from the Russian (the original text having been drawn up in the English language) this text undoubtedly differs considerably from the original. To complete the records of the Department, there are also enclosed full translations of the Pravda and Izvestiya editorials 40 which accompanied the publication of the treaty. Full comment on these editorials was made in the telegram under reference and it is not deemed necessary to repeat such comments in this despatch. With reference to the treaty itself, it may be stated that ostensibly it contains little more than the obligations of non-aggression and non-assistance to aggressors usually found in non-aggression pacts of this type. It should be borne in mind, however, that the pact was signed at a time when one of the signatories, namely China, was engaged in actual warfare with a third power, namely Japan, the relations of which with the other signatory, the Soviet Union, were far from satisfactory. The international situation, therefore, rather than the actual contents of the pact lends considerable importance to its conclusion. It may be said that to a certain extent at least the pact contributes to a clarification of the complicated situation in the Far East. To Japan the conclusion of the pact appears to mean, (1) that the Japanese Government can no longer count so strongly as it has in the past upon the possibility of prevailing upon the present composition of the Nanking Government to join, in the role of a Japanese satellite, the front against the Comintern, (2) that if it really intends to enforce its demands upon China it can do so only by overthrowing the present Nanking Government, and (3) that it must count upon the Chinese Communists and the left wing sympathizers with the Soviet Union supporting the Nanking Government. To the Nanking Government the conclusion of the pact appears to mean, (1) that in the conflict against Japan that Government has destroyed to an extent its own maneuvering ability in that in view of the atmosphere surrounding the treaty it will hardly be able to play the Soviet Union and Japan off against each other, (2) that it can depend upon the Chinese Comintern Communists (although not necessarily the left or so-called Trotskiist Communists or the Communists without international allegiance) and the left-wing pro-Soviet elements in China to support it so long as it does not discriminate against them and so long as it resolutely opposes Japan with force of arms, (3) that it will be compelled to reckon with the Chinese Comintern Communists as a factor not to be ignored in case the time should come when it desires to make peace with Japan, since during the course of the struggle these Communists will not fail to take advantage of the situation to strengthen their influence in China, (4) and that by giving the Soviet Union to understand that it has irrevocably decided not to concur in the demands of Japan it is in a better position to plead for Soviet assistance, at least in the form of war supplies. To the Soviet Union the conclusion of the pact would seem to mean, (1) that the Soviet Government without destroying its own maneuvering ability—since an attack upon China could not possibly have entered into Soviet international plans for many years to come—has been successful in making sure that the Nanking Government is definitely in the anti-Japanese camp in the Far East, (2) that Comintern Communists and other pro-Soviet elements in China are restored to a comparatively favorable position and are free not only to join in the struggle against Japan, but also to take steps to strengthen their own influence in China, (3) that since the Chinese Nationalists are no longer in a position to play Japan and the Soviet Union off against each other they are now more dependent upon Moscow than they have been since 1927, and (4) that the Nanking Government having once taken the decision which the agreement represents will be more likely to continue to resist Japan with the result that Japan, regardless of the outcome of the conflict, will for some time to come be compelled to dissipate in China energies which the Soviet Government has feared might be turned against the Soviet Union. My ideas as outlined above regarding the significance of the pact have been gained from conversations with the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors, with Soviet officials, and with other observers in Moscow of the international situation for whose opinions I have respect. The rumors which have appeared in various sections of the foreign press to the effect that the pact is accompanied by a secret military agreement are discounted here. It is not believed that the Soviet Government, which is extremely realistic in matters of this kind, would obligate itself in advance to render active assistance to China. In case it finds that without any great amount of self-sacrifice or any great degree of danger to itself it can furnish arms to China, it will undoubtedly do so. If later it should appear that it might be in a position to turn the scales against Japan by lending direct military aid to China either in the guise of Mongolian troops or in any other form, it may decide to enter still more actively into the conflict. In any case, it is the consensus here that the Soviet Government has kept its hands free and that for the present at least it is determined to take no action which would be likely to embroil the Soviet Union in a conflict which promises to undermine the strength both of Japan and China. It would be erroneous to assume that merely because of the conclusion of the agreement, the Soviet and Nanking Governments now have full confidence in each other. From remarks which have been made from time to time to me by various Soviet officials, I am inclined to believe that the Soviet Government is not prone to forget that the Nanking Government in the past has mercilessly ferreted out, tortured, and executed numerous agents of the Comintern and has brought to naught many well-laid plans for Soviet penetration into China. The Soviet Government also realizes that Chiang Kai-shek on previous occasions has had experiences of an unpleasant nature in cooperating with Moscow and that he fully understands the ultimate objectives of Soviet policies in the Far East. Neither signatory of the pact, therefore, in my opinion, has any illusions with respect to the other but each feels that the other may be of use to it in the solution of immediate and urgent problems. As I have already informed the Department by telegram, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow has told me that the conclusion of the pact shows that the Chinese Government has determined definitely to fight Japan and that it will look for assistance in any direction where the possibility of assistance may lie. He said that the plan of Nanking to break up the Communist armies in China had been abandoned and that at the present time these armies were fighting the Japanese as autonomous units in the northwest and were giving a good account of themselves. He made no secret of the fact that China was hoping in the near future to obtain military supplies from the Soviet Union and that it hoped eventually to receive assistance in other forms. The Ambassador stated that in his opinion Moscow was more interested at the present time in stirring up opposition to Japan in China than it was in spreading communism and that for the time being, therefore, Nanking and Moscow saw eye to eye. Of course, he added, Nanking was not oblivious to the communist danger and would endeavor to keep its communist allies under observation. A member of the German Embassy has informed me in confidence that his Embassy has received a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which took place shortly after the conclusion of the pact between the German Ambassador to China and Chiang Kai-shek, in which the latter stated emphatically that the pact did not by any means signify that the Nanking Government would permit the growth of communism in China. Chiang Kai-shek added that Nanking could not fight the Japanese and Communists simultaneously and it therefore found it advantageous to convert the Communists from a negative into a positive factor by allowing them to join in the struggle against Japan. Respectfully yours, Loy W. Henderson 39 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxxi , p. 101. 40 None printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10193: Telegram [Document 601] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 21, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 22—6 a.m.] 696. Embassy’s 615, September 6, 5 p.m. 1. The Embassy has been informed by a Departmental head of the new but not yet completed organization that the National and Departmental scheme has been abandoned and the new organization is being made a rightful part of the [Military?] Affairs Committee leaving regular party and governmental organs intact. The exact relation between the reorganized Military Affairs Committee and the rest of the Government do not appear to have been better; since the Committee’s activities are war time activities there will be no interference with some of the usual functions of the Government but since war time activities are paramount it appears that the Government in its executive branches, namely, the Executive Yuan which comprises most of the ministries, will be subservient to the Committee. Chiang Kai-shek is as formerly head of the Committee; Chang Chun has been named Secretary General; and departments corresponding in part to those which were being set up for the National Defense Government are beginning to function as follows: (1) Military Affairs, Huang Shao Hsiung; (2) General Affairs, Hsiung Shih Huang; (3) Heavy Industries, Wong Wen Hao; (4) War Economics, Wu Ting Chang; (5) Transportation and Communications, Yu Fei Peng; (6) People’s Training, Chen Li Fu; (7) Publicity, Chen Kung Po. Foreign Affairs and Finance which were included in both the first “Supreme War Council[”] and the National Defense Government schemes are omitted, being left to the Foreign Office and the Finance Ministry. Other departments will possibly be added as the organization launches more fully upon its functions. According to the informant no Communist leaders have been given posts in this or any other department of the National Government. 2. Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai. Shanghai mail to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10197: Telegram [Document 602] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 22, 1937—noon. [Received September 22—10:02 a.m.] 400. Department’s 219, September 20, 7 p.m., proposed bombing of Nanking. Following are the instructions from London upon which my British colleague based his representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. “Nanking telegram No. 466. Argument based on the absence of a state of war is open to the objection that the Japanese Government could meet it by declaring one which we do not wish to (happen). You should, however, inform the Japanese Government immediately that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept the view that the city of Nanking in general as distinct from military establishments outside is a legitimate target for air attack. Any attack not confined strictly to military establishments outside cannot fail to endanger civilian lives which the Japanese Government state that they do not wish to do. Nor can His Majesty’s Government admit that the Japanese Government have any right to expect foreign diplomatic representatives and other nationals to vacate Nanking in order to avoid such danger or to move warships which may be there for the purposes of protection of their nationals and to maintain essential communications of His Majesty’s Embassy. They must reserve the right to hold the Japanese Government responsible for any injury to British lives and property as a result of any attack that may be made. Acting for the Secretary of State.” I have informed my British colleague of the action already taken by me and of Mr. Moore’s conversation with Saito. 41 We understand that Hirota called yesterday on the Emperor just before Craigie 42 interview with the former and we are hopeful that the strong representations made in Washington and Tokyo may possibly prove to have some effect. Repeated to Shanghai for Nanking. Grew 41 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, September 20, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 502 . 42 Sir Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 701.4193/112: Telegram [Document 603] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 22—11:40 a.m.] 402. My British colleague informs me that the Japanese reply to the British representations concerning the wounding of the British Ambassador in China by airplane attack was received last evening. Craigie considers the reply as satisfactory as can be expected both in tone and substance but he does not yet know what will be the attitude of his Government. He feels that a genuine effort was made to get at the truth of the matter. While it has not been established that a Japanese plane was in the precise vicinity of the Ambassador’s car at the moment of attack, the fact that bombing operations were carried out at the same hour a few miles away has led the Japanese Government to express its sincere regret over the incident. Repeated to Shanghai for Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10189: Telegram [Document 604] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 22—8:40 a.m.] 404. Colonel Crane, 43 Military Attaché, has submitted to me the following memorandum dated today. “Memorandum for the Ambassador. 1. At the request of an officer in the War Department who has acted frequently as an official liaison officer with this office, I called at the War Department this morning and was told the following informally: ( a ) The Japanese Army appreciates deeply the strictly neutral attitude maintained by the United States Government toward the ‘China incident’. ( b ) Intelligence has been received by the Japanese Army that China plans to take advantage of the confusion incident to Japanese bombing of Nanking to have its own planes bomb foreign Embassies and Legations there and credit the attacks to Japan. My informant urged that planes attacking such Embassies and Legations be observed carefully to determine their nationality so that Japan would not be accused unjustly as in the case of the recent firing on the British Ambassador. ( c ) United States military observers with Japanese forces in China will be welcome if arranged for through this Embassy. 2. My informant ended the interview as soon as he had delivered the above message without the customary discussion of the progress of events in China.” Repeated to Shanghai for Nanking. Grew 43 Lt. Col. William C. Crane. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10191: Telegram [Document 605] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 22, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 22—9:45 a.m.] 405. Lieutenant Layton, 44 Assistant Naval Attaché, has submitted to me the following memorandum dated today: “Memorandum for Ambassador. The Senior Aide to the Navy Minister, Captain Kondo, called at 11:40 a.m. today and stated as follows: The Japanese Navy Department has received a report from Admiral Hasegawa to the effect that reliable information indicates the Chinese are planning to bomb foreign Embassies and Legations in Nanking using a plane (or planes) painted and marked to resemble Japanese air craft in order to instigate foreign nations’ participation in the present conflict. When asked if such planes (being foreign models) would not be readily recognized as non-Japanese types he said some Chinese planes closely resembled Japanese models. Comment: This is open to question.” Repeated to Shanghai for Nanking. Grew 44 Lt. Edwin Thomas Layton. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) 793.94/10280 [Document 606] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Wilson ) [ Washington ,] September 22, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador called on me and stated that he had desired to make a visit of courtesy, but after some conversation he got down to business. He stated that he wanted to keep his Government as closely informed as possible of our attitude and that he had summarized it as follows: That the American Government felt that it desired to cooperate, but wanted to know what the British and French Governments were doing; he learned from their missions in those two countries that those countries wanted to know what we contemplate; all three seemed to be desirous of cooperation, but none of putting forward suggestions. I stated that there was an additional form of cooperation, which was now coming into line, which was that of the Advisory Committee. 45 He asked for information in respect to this; I told him that only one meeting had been held and that it had been proposed to augment the membership by inviting Japan, China, Australia and Germany; the next meeting was set for Monday, 46 but would be held earlier in the event that all the replies were in. The Ambassador then said that he would recapitulate our attitude as follows: That we were heartily in favor and would do what we could for the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties and orderly relations between states, and that we would cooperate to the maximum with any effort that the other states might initiate. I replied that the Secretary’s statements of July 16th and August 23rd were convincing evidence of our faith in and desire to maintain the sanctity of treaties and orderly intercourse between states, that our willingness to maintain our membership on the Advisory Committee showed that we were desirous of cooperating in finding a method for a peaceful solution. I added that he must, however, realize that our efforts were limited by the state of our public opinion and by our existing legislation. He then said he knew we hated to talk on hypothetical questions. I agreed. He said he had seen in the papers that Great Britain was contemplating withdrawing its Ambassador as a protest against the bombing of Nanking 47 and asked whether we might consider similar action if approached by Great Britain. I told him that when I had read this item in the papers I had had a thought, which was not at all official, but I would tell it to him as man to man. The scene had occurred to me of Craigie visiting Hirota and telling him that the British Ambassador was retiring because of the bombing of Nanking, whereupon Hirota smiled and stated that the Chinese Ambassador had had no such scruples with regard to the bombing of Nanking and was remaining at his post in the normal way. I said, of course, I could not give him any views as to what we would reply if we were approached by the British in this connection. The question then came up of Chinese maintenance of diplomatic relations with Japan. I asked the Ambassador to elucidate, for my own information only, why China had not declared war, assuring him that I was not urging such a step, but was merely interested. Wang replied that China had not felt it necessary to declare war against marauders since a declaration of war might, to some extent, legalize activities, just as you don’t declare war against burglars assaulting your house; that there was a further reason—the Japanese Government had no control over the military, but that it was hoped that at some time it could establish such control; it was possible that the maintenance of a Chinese Embassy might help the Japanese Government to gain authority with the military people. H[ ugh ] R. W[ ilson ] 45 See vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. 46 September 27. 47 See also vol. iv , pp. 347 – 348 and 351 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10221: Telegram [Document 607] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , September 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 574. In the knowledge that what is set forth below may already be well-known to the Department, I submit the following observations on the combination of circumstances that have led to the present invasion of China by the Japanese military: 1. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Japanese objective is not only completely to destroy as quickly as possible the authority of the Central Government north of the Yellow River, and perhaps north of the Lunghai Railway, but also to impair the political, financial and military strength of the Central Government throughout the entire country to the point where a complete new government at Nanking will be found to be necessary if peace is to be restored, the new government to be so weak that it will be impotent against any independent regime or autonomous state that might be set up in the North. 2. The Japanese military have long harbored the belief that the Chinese program of unity, economic development and military advancement, which has been moving forward for several years with marked success, constituted a threat to the future security of Japan and that a postponement of the present process of destroying that program would only mean that its destruction would be all the more hard to achieve later. 3. The threat of communism in North China was believed by the Japanese military to be real, especially after the merging of the Communists’ forces in the northwest with the National Government Army as the result of the compromise to effect the release of Chiang Kai-shek from his captors last December. The Japanese are determined, in common with Germany and Italy, to prevent the spread of communism, and this was an important factor in the decision of the Japanese military to go ahead now as described in paragraphs 1 and 2 rather than wait for more complete preparations or, alternately, for a better justification than the Marco Polo Bridge incident or the killing of the two Japanese near the airdrome in Shanghai on August 9. In any event, what is now taking place was inevitable, but it has come sooner than expected and before Japan had completed all its plans. Its opportuneness has been questioned also because it has brought tremendous economic and financial loss to Japan at a time when it could ill afford such a loss. 4. Another determining factor has been the prospective, if not the real, loss of markets in other parts of the world for Japanese manufactured products. A firm grip on the market of a consuming population much greater in numbers than the domestic market in Japan has not been overlooked as an ultimate gain to accrue from the present aggression. 5. The ease with which the control over Manchuria and Jehol was acquired imbued the Japanese military with the idea that further aggressions might be as easily accomplished, but in this they have been greatly disappointed, as the heavy casualty lists must now convince them. 6. To the above combination of circumstances may be added Japan’s desires to fortify itself in every possible way against the Soviet Union which is now being done by acquiring control over an immense territory which would not only be of strategic importance but would also provide natural resources and almost unlimited man power (largely lacking) if the need should arise. (It is amazing the extent to which Chinese impressed labor has been utilized by the Japanese in the present military operations in North China.) 7. The merging of the transportation system of North China with that of Manchuria is an important link in the whole general plan of complete control in North China. It is not unlikely that the Lunghai Railway may be included and that it will constitute the southern boundary of the extensive transportation system now in contemplation. 8. Lastly, the political and military confusion in Europe and the internal political disturbances in the Soviet Union have not been overlooked since preoccupation in that direction would tend to minimize the possibility of any intervention on the part of a third power in any conflict in China. Ultimately, the reason or the objective, the present conflict, in its far-reaching consequences, its military strength, its effect on foreign interests, and perhaps even in loss of life and property, may be found to rank with the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905. Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10219: Telegram [Document 608] The Chargé in Germany ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , September 23, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 23—3:03 p.m.] 233. With the American note to Tokyo of September 22 48 in my mind as background, I called today on the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office and gave him a copy of that note (Radio Bulletin No. 221) making clear that I did so solely for his information and as an act of friendly courtesy. He said that he was very glad to have it as “he himself was just about to compose a note to Tokyo”. He added that Germany had already protested formally to Japan over the proposed bombing of Nanking. He believed that the Japanese objective in such an action was to present a visible disruption of Chinese relations with the powers. Von Schmieden asserted that the German policy of “neutrality” had in no way changed, that the most extended position Berlin had taken was formally to notify China and Japan that they would be held responsible for destruction of German life or property. I asked him if the Angriff article (Embassy’s 232, September 22, 10 a.m. [ 1 p.m. ] 49 ) correctly interpreted German policy. While not formally admitting this he replied that “he was very glad to see the article appear”. He added that the Japanese were causing considerable annoyance by radio propaganda in China to the effect that the German-Japanese Treaty meant that Germany stood with Japan in the latter’s activities. The British Ambassador had intimated to me that the British Government was officially keeping the German Government informed respecting British action in the Far East which might have aspects of a certain concert in action. Von Schmieden was noncommittal on this score but said that contacts were maintained between representatives of the powers at Tokyo and showed me as an example copies of certain correspondence between Ambassadors at that post. With respect to the invitation extended to Germany to participate in the League Advisory Committee, Von Schmieden informed me that Germany’s refusal had been transmitted in the usual oral manner through the German Consul General at Geneva and was based on the customary reason of this being a League activity. 50 I told him that I assumed that whether or not Germany would be willing to cooperate in any manner other than with a League body was purely hypothetical which he said was the case. Copies by mail to London, Geneva, Paris. Gilbert 48 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 504 . 49 Not printed. 50 Cf. telegram No. 325, September 23, 5 p.m., vol. iv , p. 32 . The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10232: Telegram [Document 609] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , September 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 24—1:40 p.m.] Hankow vernacular press has published manifesto reported issued by Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party in Shensi declaring that Communist Party objectives are to resist invasion, bring about popular government and improve welfare of people. Communist Party will now cooperate with whole nation in furthering these objectives. Party declared its support of three principles of Sun Yat Sen; declares it has cancelled all movements for overthrowing political power of Kuomintang including forcible confiscation of land and abolished all existing Soviet governments. The Red Army is reorganized into National Revolutional Army under command of Military Council of the National Government. Army is awaiting orders to undertake duty at the front. Josselyn The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10231: Telegram [Document 610] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , September 24, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 24—1:13 p.m.] 606. My 604, September 23, 5 p.m. 51 The Foreign Office has informed me that Sir Robert Craigie is being instructed today to make strong representations to the Japanese against their bombing of non-military objectives and to express also the horror felt in this country at the tremendous loss of life in Canton caused by the Japanese attacks. Whether these representations will be conveyed in a note or orally to the Japanese Foreign Secretary is to be left to the discretion of the British Ambassador. I understand that the British Embassy in Washington will be instructed to convey the foregoing to the Department and to express the hope that the United States may find possible to make similar representations. Foreign Office officials again mentioned with expressions of satisfaction and approval the American note to Japan regarding Nanking, 52 the major portion of which has been widely published here. Johnson 51 Not printed. 52 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 504 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10246: Telegram [Document 611] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 25, 1937—2 p.m. [Received September 25—6:26 a.m.] 413. The French Ambassador informed me today that when he went to see the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon regarding the reported bombing by the Japanese Navy of Hainan, the Ambassador sought assurances that there was no intention to occupy the island. He said that the Vice Minister was noncommittal and was disposed to give no reply until the Ambassador informed him that the War and Navy Departments had that morning given explicit assurances respectively to the French Military and Naval Attachés that the island would not be occupied, whereupon the very modest Minister hastened to corroborate the fact and to give his assurances in addition. The French Ambassador related this incident to me as what he termed another example of the fact that the Foreign Office is uninformed as to decisions made by the military. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10244: Telegram [Document 612] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 25, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 25—7 a.m.] 712. Under instructions from the Military Attaché, Captain Roberts 53 asked the General Staff to obtain permission from the Field Commander at the Shanghai Front for Captain Sutherland 54 to visit Shanghai hostilities as a military observer. Field Commander refused. On September 13 I wrote informally to General Chiang strongly urging reconsideration. I received no reply even though I indirectly brought influence to bear. On September 23 I brought the matter again to the attention of General Chiang through Donald 55 but latter informed me by letter that Chiang replied Chinese officers at the front could not assume risk of possible injuries to a foreign officer and refusal was definite. Unless Department instructs otherwise I shall not renew attempt. Johnson 53 Capt. Frank N. Roberts, U. S. A., language officer in China. 54 Capt. Edwin M. Sutherland, U. S. A., language officer in China. 55 W. H. Donald, Australian adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10260: Telegram [Document 613] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , September 25, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 7:45 p.m.] 762. Reference paragraph 1 of the Department’s 321, September 3, concerning the use of the International Settlement by the Japanese as a military base. In a letter to me dated yesterday the Commander in Chief suggests that the time has arrived for definite representations either by the Ambassadors or their Governments concerning this matter. He points out that since the arrival of the Japanese Army on August 23 the wharves of the Hongkew section have been the main base for unloading supplies and troops and evacuating wounded, that on September 23 5 transports landed 4,000 troops and that it is understood 15 transports have used the docks in the past 3 days. He points to the fact that the Chinese authorities in replying to protests concerning danger to neutrals and their ships in the river stress the point that the Settlement is being used as a Japanese base. 2. The record shows that on the 15th the consular body caused oral representations to be made on the subject to the Japanese Consul General who replied that the Japanese naval landing party, being stationed here for the protection of Japanese interests, had the right to use portions of the Settlement for the landing of supplies and reenforcements the same as other foreign military units and that the landing party or any other Japanese armed force was or would be acting only in self-defense. 3. Neither the Council nor other authorities have requested or suggested further protests and I do not think that the Department would wish me to initiate them. All protests will be futile, of course, but the Department may wish to consider a protest at Tokyo. I understand from the Commander in Chief that he has brought the matter to the attention of the British Commander in Chief who has referred it to London. 4. While it is, of course, important that the principle be maintained that no armed forces should use the Settlement as a base for hostile military operations, as a practical matter I consider it more important that we should insist that the foreign areas south of Soochow Creek now protected by the neutral foreign forces shall be respected and that neither Chinese nor Japanese troops shall enter such enclosed areas. It is pertinent to record in this connection that while Chinese and Japanese troops are not permitted to enter these areas a constant [stream?] of 5,000 wounded Chinese soldiers is being hospitalized here and when discharged they are passed out to the Chinese lines. National Government administrative offices and purchasing agencies may possibly continue to function in these areas. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10262: Telegram [Document 614] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 25, 1937—8 p.m. [Received September 25—3:55 p.m.] 716. I called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening at a small residence to which he had moved to be near a bombproof. I found him cheerful. He again stated that he had no criticism to make of the policy of the United States Government in the present matter, his criticism being directed solely at the Neutrality Act. He expressed himself as grateful that it had not been enforced and his belief that this indicated an attitude on the part of the administration favorable to China. He told us that China had circularized signatories (except China and Japan) of Nine Power Treaty and Germany and Soviet Russia, inviting attention to indiscriminate bombing of non-combatant population. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10282: Telegram [Document 615] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 27, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 12:01 p.m.] 722. Tokyo’s 404, September 22, 7 p.m. Following is memorandum in English dated September 26 received from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs September 26: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Embassy and has the honor to inform the Embassy that on September 26th, 1937, at 10:10 o’clock a.m. two Japanese monoplanes were seen flying low over Kwangteh, Anhwei, with the Chinese national emblem distinctly painted on their wings. They dropped two bombs before they left. In an armed conflict the use of the national insignia of the opponent is always considered a treacherous and therefore unlawful act, and it is doubly dangerous in the present case as Japan would evidently shift her responsibility to China should any action done under such a camouflage result in the loss of foreign lives or damage to foreign property. The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity to affirm most positively that the Chinese forces have never used and have no intention of using the Japanese national flag or emblem as a ruse of war in the present hostilities. Much less will they use such an unlawful stratagem [thereby?] causing personal injury or property damage to third parties. The Chinese Government, however, feels it necessary to draw the serious attention of the American Embassy to the use of the Chinese national emblem by Japanese aircraft and requests that this be immediately made known to the American Government in the hope that, in the interest of law and justice as well as for the safety of all third parties, such unlawful action on the part of Japan might be put an end to.” Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai for relay to Tokyo and Commander in Chief. Johnson The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10275: Telegram [Document 616] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , September 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 27—10:15 a.m.] 248. The Soviet press published today the following notes: 1. A note from the Chinese Embassy in Moscow to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated September 25, in which after referring to the bombardments of Shanghai, Nanking and Canton [it] states that the Embassy according to instructions of the Government of the Chinese Republic calls “the attention of the Soviet Government to the serious consequences ensuing from the barbarous nature of the Japanese military action in China which affects entire mankind, and to request that the Soviet Government take such measures which would facilitate the rapid cessation of such ruthless and inhuman action”. 2. A note from the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs dated September 26 which states in part as follows: “Considering the actions of the Japanese military authorities with regard to Nanking and the unlawful demand presented by them regarding the evacuation from Nanking of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. as unlawful and contrary to the universally recognized principles of international law, the Soviet Government declares its resolute protest against these actions of the Japanese military forces which are unprecedented in the history of international relations and reiterates that the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in China has been given instructions to continue to remain at its post and warns the Japanese Government that it will consider it fully responsible for all the consequences from these unlawful actions.” 3. The Soviet press contains no comment thus far with respect to these notes. Henderson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10271: Telegram [Document 617] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received September 27—6:25 a.m.] 421. Embassy’s 420, September 27, 4 p.m. 56 1. My British colleague tells me that in his talk today with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the latter informed him definitely that there would be no further bombing of Nanking after September 25. Horinouchi also said that a Japanese admiral had been sent from Tokyo a few days ago to caution the Japanese Commander in Chief in Shanghai to issue more explicit orders to navy plane pilots that only Chinese military establishments should be attacked and that all non-military points must be scrupulously avoided. Another Japanese naval officer has been sent on the same mission to the Commander of the Japanese Third Flotilla in South China. 2. This information considered in connection with Hirota’s interview with the Emperor on the morning after my oral representations to the former on September 20 convinces both Craigie and myself that the Japanese Government is becoming increasingly disturbed by the impressions created in our respective countries by the indiscriminate bombing operations on the part of irresponsible Japanese pilots in China. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 56 Not printed. It contained British protest to Japan against the bombing of Nanking (793.94/10276). The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10274: Telegram [Document 618] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 27, 1937—7 p.m. [Received September 27—9:01 a.m.] 423. Our 421, September 27, 5 p.m. As indicative of one of the considerations entering into the decision to cease bombing of Nanking, we are informed by an entirely reliable Japanese source that the Foreign Office has been “deluged” with telegrams from Japanese diplomatic missions in various parts of the world, including the United States, reporting on movements to boycott Japanese goods. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10310a: Telegram [Document 619] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) 57 Washington , September 27, 1937—7 p.m. 232. On September 25 the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy called on an officer of the Department 58 in regard to another matter and on his own initiative mentioned the notice issued by the Japanese admiral at Shanghai of the project to bomb Nanking. The Counselor said that the Japanese naval and military authorities had no intention of bombing other than military objectives. Comment was made to the Counselor that we had received a number of assurances from the Japanese Government to that effect but the fact remained that the Japanese bombing operations were resulting in the killing of large numbers of non-combatants; and that this killing of non-combatants not only at Nanking but at Canton, at Hankow and other places in China could not but create the most deplorable impression in this and in other countries. The Counselor said that there were of course a number of Chinese military fortifications and organizations in Nanking, both inside and outside the city wall. In comment on this, the Counselor was informed that although this might be the case, there were large areas in the city which were non-military in character and the Japanese bombing operations were causing the death of non-combatants in those areas. The comment was repeated that this whole matter of bombing non-combatants was deplorable and was creating a most unfortunate impression. Hull 57 Sent as No. 269, September 27, 7 p.m., to the Ambassador in China at Nanking. 58 See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, September 25, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 505 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10268: Telegram [Document 620] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 27, 1937—8 p.m. 233. Nanking reports that in Japanese bombing there on September 25, 500-pound bombs fell on four sides of French Embassy not 100 yards distant. Hull The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/10260: Telegram [Document 621] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , September 28, 1937—7 p.m. 427. Your 762, September 25, 4 p.m. The Department has repeated your telegram under reference, with the exception of paragraph 4, to our Embassy at London, and has instructed the Embassy as follows: “The Department has under consideration the advisability of instructing our Ambassador at Tokyo to make representations to the Japanese Government in regard to the continued use of sections of the International Settlement as a base for Japanese military operations. Aside from any question of the effectiveness of such representations, the Department inclines to the view that representations would be warranted if for no other reason than for purposes of record. Please consult with the British Foreign Office, using Shanghai’s telegram as a basis for your approach, and endeavor to ascertain the views and proposed action, if any, of the British Government in the matter.” Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10325: Telegram [Document 622] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 29, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 5:52 p.m.] 737. Department’s 269, September 27, 7 p.m. 59 1. So far as we know the only establishments at Nanking which could be considered with propriety to be bases for military operations are establishments such as the military airfield, arsenal and barracks outside the walls. The term military establishment can not with any legal or moral propriety be applied to such establishments as the Central University, the Central Hospital, the Ministry of Health, the Legislative Yuan, Ministry of Finance, National Minister of Police Council, 60 Ministry of Education and the electric light plant all of which have apparently been the targets of Japanese bombers and some of which have been hit and damaged by bombs. (The Central University has been bombed three times.) 2. In addition to and exclusive of these considerations the question of the bombing of Nanking resolves itself into the question of the propriety, moral or legal, of bombing the capital of a country against which the attackers’ Government has not declared war and with which that Government maintains diplomatic relations through the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo and in theory at least through the Japanese Ambassador now at Shanghai. In these circumstances the Japanese bombing of Nanking has no more legal than moral justification. 3. Incidentally, only the most negligible military purpose has been served by the numerous raids on Nanking officially counted as 46 including raids which were frustrated. Three [ sic ] military planes have been destroyed here, three or four have been brought down in air combat, damage has been done to a small building on the military airfield and a hangar, a workshop in the arsenal, and a section of the compound wall of the Central Military Academy. According to Chinese official sources, the aerial warfare inland and at Shanghai resulted by the end of August in the loss of 60 Japanese planes as against 30 Chinese losses of which 20 were irreparable and Japanese losses included 26 of the 52 heavy bombers which were based on Formosa and which made first attacks upon this city and Hankow. The Embassy feels strongly that the diplomatic representatives of countries which are in no way parties to the present conflict have a right to conduct relations with the Chinese Government undisturbed and certainly without being subjected to a [fall of bombs?] which in some instances have fallen within one-and-a-half yards of their official residences. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo, Peiping. Johnson 59 See footnote 57, p. 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] . 60 National Economic Council. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10271: Telegram [Document 623] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 29, 1937—6 p.m. 238. Your 421, September 27, 5 p.m., first sentence. Telegram received this morning from authoritative source states that on September 28 eleven Japanese bombers raided Nanking and dropped bombs in the vicinity of the Commercial Air Field. Hull The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10323: Telegram [Document 624] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 29, 1937—10 p.m. [Received September 29—5:43 p.m.] 1363. In the course of a conversation today with the Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the Foreign Office he said that the French Government had recently protested against the bombing of an area and foreign territory where there were French hospitals and against the bombing of a hospital under the direction of a French religious order at a point 60 miles south of Tientsin; no reply had been received from the Japanese Government to either protest. He said that the French Government had received “informal assurances” from the Japanese Government that Hainan would not be occupied by the Japanese. There have been two minor incidents affecting French shipping arising out of the Japanese blockade of the coast: a liner, the Chenonceaux , was hailed by a small Japanese naval vessel but refused to permit anyone to go on board; the Japanese admiral later explained to the French admiral that there had been a mistake. A smaller French vessel, the Paul Doumer , was stopped by a Japanese naval vessel and boarded; the Japanese admiral later explained that a mistake had occurred. The French Ambassador at Tokyo has just reported that the first engagement has taken place between Japanese troops and troops of the Chinese Communist army in Northern China and that a Japanese detachment had been defeated. My informant said that he thought the fact that the Japanese Government was handing out this information was of some interest, as perhaps indicating that they intended to attach importance to the activities of this Chinese Communist army. I asked wheher there was any indication that the Soviet Government might take a more active interest in the course of events in China. Hoppenot said no, that while the Soviet Ambassador to China had recently left by plane for Moscow, there was no indication of any change in the attitude of the Soviet Government; the Soviets were furnishing some munitions to China but difficulties of transportation made it impossible for them to do very much in this way. He remarked that Italy was selling important quantities of munitions to the Chinese Government which were being transported on Italian vessels. He also said that Kung had informed French officials that when in Berlin recently the German Government had urged him to purchase munitions there. Copies to London, Rome, Berlin. Wilson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10312: Telegram [Document 625] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 29, 1937—midnight. 240. Nanking’s 735, September 29, 10 a.m. 61 The Department has telegraphed Nanking as follows: “In deciding what telegrams should be repeated to Tokyo by telegraph or radio, you should have in mind the importance of Tokyo’s being promptly and fully informed of political and military developments, including results of air attacks as well as matters directly affecting American interests which may become the subject of representations to the Japanese Government.” The Department notes from your 420, September 27, 4 p.m., 61 that the British Embassy at Tokyo is taking action on the basis of telegrams received from the British Embassy at Nanking. The Department authorizes you in your discretion to make representations to the Japanese Government on the basis of telegrams repeated from Nanking in cases where you consider that a useful purpose would be served thereby. You should in each instance inform the Department of the action taken by you. Hull 61 Not printed. 61 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10344: Telegram [Document 626] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 1, 1937—noon. [Received October 1—7:25 a.m.] 438. 1. Under the general authorization contained in the Department’s 240, September 29, 1 p.m. [ midnight ], I have today addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a semi-formal note as follows: “My Dear Minister: With reference to the assurances, both written and oral, which from time to time have been conveyed by Your Excellency to my Government 62 to the effect that the bombing operations of the Japanese forces in China are aimed exclusively at Chinese military establishments, and that strict orders have been issued officers in the field that noncombatants as well as humanitarian and other non-military establishments are to be scrupulously and solicitously avoided, I consider it pertinent to bring to Your Excellency’s attention the substance of a telegram which I have received from the American Ambassador in Nanking reporting the bombing of that capital, as follows: So far as the American Embassy at Nanking is aware, the only establishments at Nanking which can warrantably be regarded as bases for Chinese military operations are establishments such as the military air field, arsenal and barracks outside the walls of Nanking. The term ‘military establishment’ cannot properly be applied to the Central University, the Central Hospital, the Ministry of Health, the Legislative Yuan, the Ministry of Finance, the National Economic Council, the Ministry of Education, and the electric light plant, all of which have apparently been the targets of Japanese bombing and some of which have been hit and damaged by bombs. The Central University has been bombed three times. It is also to be emphasized that bombs in certain instances have fallen within a hundred yards of the official residence of certain of the foreign diplomatic representatives in Nanking. I am, My Dear Minister, very sincerely yours, Joseph C. Grew.” 2. Having received no information from Canton I am unable to bring to the Minister’s attention the facts concerning the bombing of that city conveyed by the British Ambassador to the Vice Minister (see our 436, September 30, 2 p.m.). 63 Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 62 For Japanese note dated September 29, see telegram No. 431, September 29, 8 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 507 . 63 Not printed. The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/10456 [Document 627] The British Embassy to the Department of State 64 undated The United States Government will be aware that there is a strong feeling growing not only in Great Britain but in other countries that some effective action should be taken to put a stop to the conflict in the Far East, if such action could be agreed upon internationally. At present this pressure, though not yet fully formulated, seems to be taking shape that a lead should be given by the United Kingdom and the United States in some form of economic boycott on Japan. The British Government would be glad to know what is the attitude of the United States Government to such views. The British Government recognise that it would not be reasonable to ask the United States Government about their attitude without informing them of the British attitude. This is as follows: The British Government would be ready to consider this or any other action likely to curtail the present conflict, but only if they were convinced of the effectiveness of whatever course might seem advisable. At present the British Government are not convinced that the sort of action suggested in Great Britain would be effective, but they would be quite prepared to examine it further themselves or with the United States Government if the latter consider it worth pursuing. The British Government recognise that action by them alone would certainly not be effective and for this reason they would be grateful for an expression of the views of the United States Government. 64 Handed by the British Chargé to the Secretary of State on October 1. The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/10419 [Document 628] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have instructed His Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to inform the Japanese Government that His Majesty’s Government must take strong exception to the use of the International Settlement as a base of operations. Sir Robert Craigie has been asked to point out that the presence of Japanese troops in the Settlement has no justification except as a measure of defence of an area in which foreign countries generally are concerned. To go beyond this brings into question the whole status of the Settlement and jeopardises the immense interests of other countries in it. His Majesty’s Government must therefore protest against any action of the kind. Sir Robert Craigie has been instructed to consult with his United States colleague before taking action, and His Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn whether the United States Government would be prepared to instruct the United States Ambassador at Tokyo to make similar representations. Washington , October 1, 1937. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10365: Telegram [Document 629] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , October 1, 1937—8 p.m. [Received October 1—3:25 p.m.] 624. Your 399, September 28, 7 p.m. 65 was taken up orally with Cadogan 66 on September 29. At the time the Foreign Office had not received any direct information from its representatives at Shanghai. Cadogan said that he appreciated the information and agreed with your view expressed in penultimate paragraph. He said that he would consult immediately with the Foreign Secretary as to what action might be taken by the British. The Foreign Office informed me today that after my talk with Cadogan a communication had been received from the British commander in chief at Shanghai somewhat similar to the one from Consul General Gauss. Foreign Office further stated that last night an instruction was sent to the British Ambassador at Tokyo to inform the Japanese Government that His Majesty’s Government took strong exception to the presence of Japanese troops in International Settlement, and that the presence of these troops in International Settlement had no justification except as a measure of defense of an area in which foreign countries generally are concerned; to go beyond this brings into question the whole status of the Settlement and jeopardizes immense interests of other countries; the British Government therefore must strongly protest against the continued use by the Japanese Government of the International Settlement as a base for military operations. The British Ambassador was at the same time instructed to consult with his American colleague and, if possible, to make representations on the same day. If the American Ambassador had not received instructions to make such representations the British Ambassador was to make his alone. The telegram to the Ambassador at Tokyo was reported to Washington and instructions sent to the British Chargé d’Affaires to communicate it to the Department and to ask if the United States might be able to make similar representations. 67 Johnson 65 Not printed, but see telegram No. 427, September 28, 7 p.m., p. 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] . 66 British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 67 See supra . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10368: Telegram [Document 630] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , October 1, 1937—9 p.m. [Received October 1—4:11 p.m.] 625. Your 403, September 30, 8 p.m. 68 The Foreign Office informs me that they have received only a résumé of the Japanese Government’s reply to their representations regarding the bombing of Nanking. The Times of this morning, however, carries under a Tokyo despatch what purports to be the full text of the note in an official English translation furnished by the Japanese Foreign Office. The despatch states that the replies made to the British, American and French Ambassadors regarding the bombing of Nanking were identic. The telegram from the British Ambassador to the Foreign Office did not state that his reply was identic with any other. The British Ambassador’s résumé, however, checks with the text published in the Times this morning which I presume has appeared today in the American press. Following is résumé of note as published in the Times: Since Nanking is central base Chinese military operations, it is unavoidable for attaining military aims of Japanese forces that military establishments and aerodromes should be bombed. They are not directed indiscriminately at noncombatants. Warning issued in advance to noncombatants is testimony to above statement. Japanese Government hoped British Government, fully understanding that Japanese forces are greatly handicapped in operations by giving advance notice requesting nationals of third powers to seek refuge, would be good enough to cooperate with Japanese Government. All responsibility for damages suffered by nationals of third powers as result of hostilities in China is repudiated. Johnson 68 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 761.94/986 [Document 631] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2616 Tokyo , October 1, 1937. [Received October 18.] Sir : I have the honor to observe that since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities in July the question of relations with Soviet Russia has become increasingly delicate although relatively quiet on the surface. The new Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Michael Slavutsky, arrived here on August 23 to succeed Mr. Constantin Yureneff who left in May for his new post at Berlin. A few days after the new Ambassador’s arrival, on August 29, the Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact was formally announced. This had somewhat less effect here than the announcement last November of the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact had in Moscow. While the latter agreement burst like a bombshell upon Moscow the Sino-Soviet pact was less unexpected, due to the several approaches made in that direction in recent years, and consequently its effect had already been somewhat discounted. Nevertheless the conclusion of this agreement, with its supposed secret arrangement for the supplying of war material and other assistance to the Chinese, has had a serious effect upon relations between Tokyo and Moscow. On the surface there have been perhaps fewer of the ordinary run of irritating incidents between the two countries than has been the case in less troublous times. For instance, the border skirmishes and frontier violations along the Manchurian-Siberian frontier have practically ceased since the outbreak of hostilities with China, and it is argued by some observers that this fact tends to indicate that the previous border incidents were largely instigated by the Japanese, although this by no means necessarily follows. It is nevertheless probable that the Kwantung Army would not be interested at the present time in forcing a clash with the Soviets on the Siberian border. There have been incidents of other kinds, such as the arrest and detention by the Soviets of some 28 Japanese fishing vessels off the Russian coast in the Japan Sea on the charge that the Japanese vessels were violating Soviet territorial waters. This brought sharp protests and counter protests but there appears to have been no disposition on either side to allow the matter to become very serious. The Japanese have also complained that their nationals in Soviet territory have been subjected to unnecessarily harsh treatment, especially in North Saghalien where Japanese merchants and businessmen have been severely treated because of alleged minor commercial offenses. Japan has also been forced by Moscow to close its Consulates in Odessa and in Novosibirsk on the grounds that the agreement entered into in August 1925 provided that each country should have an equal number of consular offices in the territory of the other. Incidents such as these are rather the result of the truculent attitude which has governed relations between the two countries in recent years and in themselves are not so charged with potential danger as were the border incidents which involved the clash of armed troops and loss of lives. It is fairly clear that at the present time neither country wishes to force the other into a position where a break may occur or which would lead to hostilities. Probably when the time comes it will scarcely be found necessary to trump up an excuse in the form of an incident; hostilities will be launched without previous warning. There is a school of thought in this country, rather widely held, that when Japan was forced to fight either China or Russia she would be forced to fight the other; consequently the present Chinese campaign is being waged in the full realization that Russia may become an active enemy at any time. However, it appears to be the intention of the military to get the China situation in hand as rapidly as possible in order that China will be rendered ineffective if and when the Soviets are to be confronted. Some observers believe, in fact, that the best of the Japanese troops are not being employed against the Chinese, but only the younger and the older troops, while the best of the younger and physically fit reserves are being held for later possible use against the Russians. This is difficult to confirm but it is fairly certain that the army in “Manchoukuo” and Korea is being kept at full strength and at peak efficiency to meet all possible eventualities. The effective military assistance in the form of war materials which the Soviets will be able to furnish to China against the Japanese is not regarded here as constituting any great menace, although strenuous efforts are being made to cut the routes between Siberia and China through Outer Mongolia. Travel in Outer Mongolia is largely restricted to caravan routes over which the transport of any considerable quantities of heavy war material would be out of the question. Airplanes, however, are another matter as they can be flown from some point along the Trans-Siberian Railroad where they would be assembled, and light arms, such as machine-guns and ammunition could be flown and delivered, along with the airplanes themselves, into Chinese territory. Most of the assistance which could be rendered by the Soviets would necessarily be through supplying military and other advisers, and by giving moral support. For these reasons, then, the feeling against the Sino-Soviet pact is not so strong as it might be. However, the press does not hesitate to state that the attitude of the Soviets toward Japan has become more menacing since the conclusion of the pact. In the light of what has transpired it must be admitted that whoever may have fired the first shot at Marco Polo bridge on July 7, the Japanese military sensed that this was a most opportune moment to undertake hostilities with China without incurring the risk of immediate intervention on the part of Soviet Russia. Not only is the European situation thoroughly engaging the attention of the Soviets but the internal situation is believed seriously to have impaired the efficiency of the Soviet army. It will be recalled that Major General Homma, a Japanese general staff officer, on his return from England last June after visiting Moscow shortly after the recent executions of Soviet military leaders, told the press on several occasions that the “Soviet Army is greatly weakened by the recent developments within the Red Army and is facing destruction.” He also went on to say that the Japanese have consistently overrated the Soviet Army, implying that he and other Japanese officers have shared the belief of the Japanese public that the Soviet Army is stronger than is actually the case. * Such a statement coming from a high-ranking Japanese officer is especially significant in view of the fact that his opinion was expressed not more than 3 weeks prior to the outbreak of the present hostilities. If General Homma’s views prevail it will support that portion of the army, especially the younger element, which may wish to settle the Russian question once and for all in the near future. As there are generally conflicting opinions on every question, however, the Department will no doubt have in mind the view expressed not long ago by the British Chargé dAffaires in Moscow, concurred in by Mr. Eden, that the Soviet Union had not been weakened by the recent purge but on the contrary had been strengthened by the removal of elements hostile to Stalin, and that the future policy of the Union would follow lines of “intensive defense.” † There now comes a report ‡ to the effect that the U. S. S. R. is about to supply 300 airplanes to China and that preparations to receive and condition these planes are being made at Lanchow. In this connection the following memorandum has been submitted by the Military Attaché 69 : “A recent confidential cable report from the American Embassy, Nanking, stated authoritatively that 300 Soviet planes would be sent to China and concentrated at Lanchow (Kansu Province) where accommodations are already under construction. If this report is true, the planes will undoubtedly be flown via Tacheng, Tihwa, Hami (all in Sinkiang Province), and Suchow (Kansu Province) where airfields are located. Intermediate hops along this route are only about 300 miles or less and Tacheng is only 30 miles from Semiopol on the Turkish [ Turksib? ] Railroad. This is the only route from Russia along which landing fields have been established and it has the additional advantage of being beyond the radius of probable action of Japanese aviation and so immune to interruption—advantages not enjoyed by routes farther to the east.” Among the welter of rumors invariably flying about in time of war, there comes to me today a story from one of my colleagues that plans are already being developed for a Japanese attack on Vladivostok. Considering the various circumstances set forth in this despatch I regard this rumor as made out of whole cloth. The Military Attaché concurs. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew * Military Attaché’s report to War Department, No. 8882, July 9, 1937. [Footnote in the original; report not printed.] † Embassy’s telegram No. 195, July 13, 8 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.] ‡ Nanking’s telegram to the Department No. 733, September 29, 8 a.m. [ p.m. ] [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.] 69 Infra . Report by the Assistant Military Attaché in Japan (Weckerling) 761.93/1615 [Document 632] Report by the Assistant Military Attaché in Japan ( Weckerling ) 70 Report No. 9008 Tokyo , October 1, 1937. 1. Since the announcement of the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression treaty by the Nanking Government on August 29th, the Japanese have been suspicious that this treaty contains secret clauses which obligate the Soviet Union to furnish military aid to China in return for certain political concessions which the Chinese would make regarding Outer and Inner Mongolia and railway construction in that area. The Japanese press is now convinced that a mutual assistance agreement has also been reached between the two countries which is operative at once as far as Soviet assistance, particularly military aircraft, is concerned. 2. Japanese Press Reports of Soviet Aid to China . ( a ) The Japanese press has, on several occasions recently, reported definitely that Soviet aid, especially aircraft, was being given China and that early in September or late August, Marshal Bluecher, commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, flew to Ulanbator where he met Mao Tse-tung, commander of the former Chinese “communist army” and made arrangements for supplying military matériel to China. ( b ) About the same time, the Japanese press reported that 72 Soviet military planes recently arrived in Shensi via Outer Mongolia, and that 144 more were expected. ( c ) According to Domei reports, nine (9) pursuit planes about August 20th were flown to China by Buryat-Mongol pilots via Sian. ( d ) According to the Asahi , the Chinese Kwantung [ sic ] Army has been “entirely bolshevized”, having as many as 20 Soviet officers assigned to each division as instructors and advisors. 3. Other Reports of Soviet Assistance to China . A recent confidential cable report from the American Embassy, Nanking, stated authoritatively that 300 Soviet planes would be sent to China and concentrated at Lanchow (Kansu Province) where accommodations have been constructed. If this report is true, the planes will undoubtedly be flown via Tacheng, Tihwa, Hami (all in Sinkiang Province), and Suchow (Kansu Province) where airfields are located. Intermediate hops along this route are only about 300 miles or less and Tacheng is only 30 miles from Semiopol on the Turksib Railroad. This is the only route from Russia along which landing fields have been established and it has the additional advantage of being beyond the radius of probable action of Japanese aviation and so immune to interruption—advantages not enjoyed by routes farther to the east. 4. Japanese Efforts to Discover and Stop Soviet Aid . ( a ) Concentration of Air Units in Chahar: A well informed Japanese air officer said recently that a large portion of the Japanese air strength regularly stationed in Manchuria, estimated to be seven regiments, would be concentrated in western and southern Chahar for several weeks beginning September 26th or 27th, and intimated that suspicion of unspecified “Soviet actions” caused this concentration, carried out under the guise of maneuvers. ( b ) Inspection of Captured Chinese Matériel: Well-informed Japanese stated that the Japanese Army and Navy are making every effort to identify captured or abandoned Chinese equipment, clothing, matériel, etc., as being of possible Soviet manufacture. So far, nothing has appeared in the press, according to the same source, which would convict the Soviet Union of supplying arms to China. A Japanese staff officer today confirmed the above. 5. Japanese Reaction . ( a ) The utterances of prominent Japanese and the press indicate there is little doubt in Japan that aid is being supplied to China by Russia. Army officers privately admit their belief that Soviet aid is being given China in “unimportant quantities” because of the difficulties of transportation. No official statements have been made by Army leaders regarding this question, and this reticence is seen by well-informed Japanese as indicating that the Army views present relations between Japan and Soviet Russia as “alarming.” ( b ) Young Japanese staff officers state confidentially their opinion that the Japanese Army is not carrying on the China operations with the enthusiasm it would if Soviet Russia were Japan’s opponent. These young officers, who are in responsible posts in the War Office and General Staff, believe that the opportune time to deal with Soviet Russia will be immediately after the Sino-Japanese operations are concluded. These same officers, however, do not believe that Russia intends to attack Japan. 6. Japanese Troops in Saghalien . Another indication of the ill-feeling which existed between Japan and the Soviet Union even before the outbreak of the Lukowkiao incident on July 7th, was the reported dispatch of troops to Karafuto, the southern half of the island of Saghalien belonging to Japan. It was reported that the 5th Air Regiment (two squadrons each of pursuit and observation aviation) was ready to be moved to Karafuto when the China trouble started and reliable American business men stated that orders for 500,000 gallons of aviation gasoline were placed with oil companies about July 10th, subsequently cancelled. Other Americans who were in the Hokkaido and Saghalien about the middle of July and later, stated that troops, strength unknown, had been moved from the mainland and Hokkaido to Saghalien. This information was confirmed by a well informed Japanese who was in the Hokkaido about the same time, and stated that the opinion of Hokkaido residents was that “about half the troops in Hokkaido” (about 7,000 men), had been sent to Karafuto where they are still stationed. Letters and postcards from these men received by their families in Japan proper and Hokkaido, seen by the same source, are postmarked “Soya”, which is a small postoffice near the railway terminus and port of embarkation for Karafuto of Wakkanai. 7. Comments . In spite of the present hostilities in China, there is no doubt that now, as for years past, the Japanese Army regards Soviet Russia as its principal enemy, and is convinced that nothing can prevent another Russo-Japanese war. It is difficult to believe that the Japanese Army wants war with Russia while fighting is going on in China, but it is conceivable that if Soviet aid to China has a significant influence on Japanese operations in China, resentment will be too great to be controlled. Source: As indicated. John Weckerling , Captain, Infantry, DOL. 70 Copy transmitted to the Department by the War Department about October 28. The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/10419 [Document 633] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The receipt is acknowledged of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of October 1, 1937, on the subject of representations to the Japanese Government in regard to the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base for Japanese military operations. The American Government, in reply to the British Government’s inquiry whether or not the American Government would be prepared to instruct the American Ambassador at Tokyo to make representations in the matter similar to those which the British Ambassador has been instructed to make, informs the British Government that the American Ambassador has been authorized to make, in association with his British colleague, appropriate representations against the use of the International Settlement as a base for Japanese military operations. 71 Washington , October 2, 1937. 71 See telegram No. 245, October 2, 3 p.m., p. 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] . Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the British Chargé (Mallet) 793.94 Conference/28 [Document 634] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) of a Conversation With the British Chargé ( Mallet ) [ Washington ,] October 2, 1937. Mr. Mallet called. He tells me that he has another urgent message from Mr. Eden with regard to the inquiry which he made orally yesterday on the subject of an economic boycott. Mr. Eden says that in view of the fact that public interest in the Far East is still very keen in London it would help him very much for his own information to learn as soon as convenient what are the reactions of the United States Government to the inquiry which Mr. Mallet made yesterday regarding an economic boycott. Mr. Mallet is therefore being instructed to renew his inquiry and at the same time to make it clear that the question whether or not the kind of action suggested in London would in fact prove to be effective is one which clearly requires further examination. The British Government would be very glad to undertake such an examination with the United States Government if the United States Government felt able to join them in doing so. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 793.94/10630 [Document 635] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] October 2, 1937. Mr. Oumansky, Chargé d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy called to see me at his request at 1 o’clock this afternoon. Mr. Oumansky stated that he desired to obtain from me an exposition of the policy of the United States with regard to the Far Eastern situation. He said that he was not acting under instructions but at the same time said that Mr. Litvinoff 72 was leaving for Geneva on October 5 and that it was of the “most imperative importance” that Mr. Litvinoff be advised how far the United States Government intended to go in its policy with regard to the Far Eastern situation so that he could formulate his own policy in Geneva. I gathered the very distinct impression, notwithstanding Mr. Oumansky’s denial, that he was acting under direct instructions from Litvinoff. In reply to Mr. Oumansky’s inquiry I stated that it would seem to me that the policy of the United States had been made entirely clear in the most detailed manner since the time of the outbreak of the controversy between Japan and China. I called his attention specifically to the statements of July 16 and of August 23 made by the Secretary of State, to orders issued by the President 73 that vessels owned by the United States Government should carry no implements of war to Japan or China and that any privately-owned American vessels who carried such elements of war to the Far East would do so at their own risk, to the communications made by this Government to the Government of Japan during recent weeks with regard to the bombing of non-military sites and of the civilian population, and to the further communications made with regard to the rights and interests of our own nationals in China. I said that since I was certain that Mr. Oumansky had attentively studied and was fully familiar with all of these communications and of the official statements made it would seem to me that he must have a very clear comprehension of the policy of the United States and I asked what phase of our policy appeared to him to be obscure. Mr. Oumansky answered that the summary I had just given him had helped him very much to clarify the entire question but that he wanted to know what our policy might be in the future. To this I replied that, of course, it was impossible for any government official to answer a hypothetical question of this character and that, of course, he would understand that within the limits of the general policy already established, the development of policy must necessarily depend upon events and contingencies. He then asked whether it was intended to apply the Neutrality Act. I again reminded him that the President had stated that the Government of the United States was operating “on a 24–hour basis” and that I was not prepared to give him any indication, nor could I do so, as to if or when the Neutrality Act might be enforced. Mr. Oumansky then remarked that while he understood the position of the United States very well and would be frank enough to say that if Russia were surrounded by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the United States was, it probably would adopt the same policy as that pursued by the United States, nevertheless our attitude was “very discouraging”. To this observation I felt at liberty to say that in my judgment I thought no Government in the world had adopted a policy based on a more vigorous insistence upon the need for recognition of the principles which should rightly govern international relations nor had any government equalled the United States Government in seeking every possible means of urging upon the two parties to the controversy the need for a peaceful settlement of the existing situation. I asked him to be good enough to explain what he meant by the term “discouraging”. Mr. Oumansky then said that the United States could, of course, be helpful under existing circumstances by cooperating with other governments either through the imposition of military sanctions, of economic sanctions, or through consultation or through cooperation for the alleviation of human suffering in China. I then remarked that in so far as cooperation for the purpose of relieving suffering was concerned, I felt that the tradition of the United States to lend its generous assistance for the relief of suffering everywhere in the world was well recognized and that only two days ago the American Red Cross had appropriated the sum of $100,000 for that purpose; that with regard to consultation, he was, of course, not unaware of the fact that the American Minister to Switzerland was sitting, by our instruction, as an observer in the Consultative Committee in Geneva and that in this sense we were pursuing the same policy which had been adopted under not dissimilar conditions in 1932. I then said that if he anticipated cooperation by the United States through the imposition of military sanctions, he must have completely misunderstood the whole basis of the United States policy which was a policy based, under the terms of the existing neutrality legislation, on taking no sides in the present conflict and that if he grasped that fact it would appear to me difficult to understand how he could envisage the imposition of military sanctions by the United States. He then referred to cooperation in economic sanctions. I said that here again exactly the same question was raised, that the policy of this Government accepted overwhelmingly by public opinion in the United States was one of refraining from actions that could be regarded as unneutral, and that any action taken by this Government of an economic character would necessarily be action taken under the terms of the Neutrality Act, if such Act were ever applied. I referred him at this juncture to the attitude adopted by the Government of the United States in 1935 at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute 74 and said that he could understand from our former attitude that the policy of the United States was not one which would prejudice the policy of any other nations of the world who were desirous of bringing about a peaceful settlement of international disputes, although at all times our policy had been and would be parallel and taken independently. Before Mr. Oumansky left I asked him what information he might have as to whether the friction reported in the press between Japan and Russia was serious and whether he anticipated any increasing difficulties. In his reply he gave me to understand that he himself was confident that the relations between Japan and Russia had eased considerably during recent days and that he was confident that Japan was not in a position to bring about any situation which might result in armed conflict with Russia. He said that the Japanese Government had within the past few days gone out of its way to attempt to relieve the conditions which had existed and that he felt they would continue this policy. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 72 Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 73 See press release issued by the Department of State, September 14, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 201 . 74 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 594 ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10394a: Telegram [Document 636] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , October 2, 1937—3 p.m. 245. 1. Under date September 25, 4 p.m., Shanghai telegraphed substantially as follows: [Here follows quotation of telegram No. 762, page 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] .] 2. On September 28 the Department repeated to London Shanghai’s telegram of September 25, stating that the Department inclined to the view that representations would be warranted and asking our Embassy to consult with the British Foreign Office and endeavor to ascertain the views and proposed action, if any, of the British Government in the matter. 3. According to an aide-mémoire of October 1 from the British Embassy here, the British Government has directed the British Ambassador at Tokyo to make representations against Japanese use of the International Settlement as a base of military operations. The British Ambassador is under instruction to consult with you prior to taking such action. 4. The Department desires that you, after consultation with your British colleague, make appropriate representations to the Japanese Government. The Department feels that your approach should be oral, supported by an aide-mémoire or memorandum, and suggests that you inform the Japanese Government (1) that your Government has, since the initiation of hostilities at Shanghai, viewed with concern the action of the Japanese armed forces in making use of portions of the International Settlement as a base for military operations against the Chinese; (2) that you understand that the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai, replying to representations made by the Senior Consul at Shanghai acting on behalf of his interested colleagues, stated that any Japanese armed force in the Settlement was or would be acting only in self-defense; (3) that in the opinion of your Government the present Japanese military operations at Shanghai—their extent, place, and seeming objectives—cannot with warrant be construed as a measure of defense of the Settlement; (4) that you are authoritatively informed that portions of the Settlement, particularly the Hongkew section, are being extensively and continuously used as a main base for debarking Japanese troops and unloading military supplies to be employed outside the Settlement in major operations against Chinese troops; (5) that your Government feels strongly that the Japanese military forces should refrain from use of the Settlement in any way as a base or channel for military operations of any character except such as are exclusively for the protection and defense of the Settlement; (6) that the Settlement is an area in which, by treaties and agreements, a number of foreign countries, including Japan and the United States, and their nationals, have common rights and interests; (7) that use by the Japanese military of portions of the Settlement as a base for major military operations which are being conducted outside the Settlement against Chinese troops is not in keeping with the spirit of those agreements; and (8) that such use unwarrantedly endangers the rights and interests of all other countries including the United States which possess in common those rights and interests. Hull The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10380: Telegram [Document 637] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , October 2, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 2—12:10 p.m.] 628. Public opinion in Great Britain greatly shocked by the bombardment of defenseless civilians in China is gradually consolidating and resentment against the Japanese is being translated into various forms of protest. Business interests with investments in China are of course vocative in urging the Government to prevent further losses to British trade. A national protest meeting organized by Sir Arthur Salter through the News Chronicle is to be held on October 5, presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Liberal, Socialist and Labor leaders and papers are vociferously demanding a national and international boycott of Japanese goods and the National Council of Labor has publicly endorsed this scheme. At the present time the Government is letting it be known that it disapproves of the boycott idea and hence the conservative press is playing it down. There is frequent reference to the desirability of the United States joining in the boycott and it is realized by the advocates of this measure that no embargo could be effective without United States cooperation. The Manchester Guardian suggests that in order not to have the United States think “that we intend to have her pull the chestnut out of the fire for us” action should be taken through the League without making it contingent upon the United States taking similar action. It is announced that the Labor party will press the Government for an immediate convening of Parliament for the purpose of discussing the Far Eastern situation. While I have no intimation of the Government’s point of view regarding any possible international economic boycott of Japan, it may be pointed out that the foreign nations in commenting to me on the agitation for a British boycott of Japan, although entirely sympathizing with the motives of the proposal, say it is an indication of how “irresponsible” public opinion can be. The proposers of the boycott have no conception, it is said, of how easily their recommendations, if translated into action, could land Great Britain in a war with Japan. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10721 [Document 638] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2615 Tokyo , October 2, 1937. [Received October 18.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose a translation of an editorial 75 which appeared on September 24 in the Kokumin Shimbun , contrasting the attitudes of the United States and of Great Britain toward the conflict between Japan and China. On several recent occasions I have referred to the marked change during the past few years in the attitude of the Japanese people towards the United States. It is not the purpose of this despatch to examine in detail the causes of this change, but it is apparent that the principal factors have been the use of the present Administration of methods which would be expected to avoid unnecessary and useless aggravation of relations between Japan and China, the liberal attitude of the American Government in the solving of problems rising out of Japanese commercial competition and, somewhat paradoxically, the termination of the treaty for the limitation of naval armament to which the United States and Japan were party. Since the beginning of the present conflict in the Far East the changed attitude of the Japanese toward the United States has been apparent largely in a negative sense: there has been no display on the part of the press of animosity or invective toward the United States, notwithstanding the fact that, as pointed out in an editorial in the British-owned Japan Chronicle of which a copy is enclosed, 76 “there is a remarkable similarity of opinion and attitude” between Great Britain and the United States and the other concerned Powers. This similarity is as evident to the Japanese as it is to the editor of the Chronicle , and the Japanese are aware that responsible officers of the American Government and American opinon have condemned Japanese actions in China quite as “trenchantly” as have the British Government and the British press. The fact remains that our Government has been able to manifest its views in the present crisis quite as clearly as has the British Government, without, however, stirring up among the Japanese passions which would effectually prevent the production of desired results through the public recording of American disapproval. Although there has been much acrid comment in the local press on the British attitude, the press has thus far refrained from comment on the American attitude, with occasional exceptions, such as that which followed the Secretary’s statement on August 23, (See my despatch No. 2559 of August 27, 1937 77 ), when the tone of the comment was comparatively moderate. The first editorial discussion of American attitude which has been noticed since that time is that of the Kokumin . The thought may occur to officers in the Department who are familiar with this journal that it has been traditionally chauvinistic and that it is, therefore, one whose opinions have little weight in intelligent and intellectual Japanese circles. It must be emphasized, however, that, if the Kokumin is not an organ of Japanese military and nationalist elements, at least it voices with considerable confidence the views of these elements, whose influence is now dominant in Japan; and it is precisely for this reason that the editorial has significance. The gist of the editorial is compressed in the first paragraph thereof, in which emphasis is laid upon the difference in the respective methods of the United States and Great Britain, the methods of the United States being those designed to “avoid injury being done to its (United States) prestige as a great power”, whereas those of Great Britain are calculated to bring about concerted intervention by the Powers in the conflict. There is considerable force to a great deal of what the Chronicle (which erroneously translates as “sentiment” a word in the Kokumin editorial that should be more accurately translated as “passion”) has to say on Japanese objections to British policy in the Far East. Nevertheless, in putting forward as an extenuation of a “sharper” attitude of the British Government the relatively large British interests in China, the Chronicle —in line with British papers in China and elsewhere—moves the field of argument from the secure one of principle to the somewhat hazardous ground of expediency. It is in rejoinder to that point of view that the Kokumin addresses itself when it warns Great Britain of the dangers of the present British course. As we at the Embassy analyze the courses pursued by the American Government and the British Government in the present crisis, it appears to us that the American Government has succeeded in making clear to the Japanese Government and to the Japanese people that Japanese policy and actions in China are quite as repugnant to the United States as they are to Great Britain; that by taking independent action, and simultaneously refraining from encouraging other Powers to take a stronger position vis-à-vis Japan than that which they would be disposed independently to take, our Government is at the present time in a better position than is any other Government to protect its interests in China and otherwise to exert influence in a beneficial direction. As time passes, there are discernible evidences, such as the editorial just discussed, which tend to support the views put forward to the Department in our telegram No. 321. 78 It is to be remembered that that editorial appeared after the publication of our note to the Japanese Government on the bombing of Nanking, which, it might be added, has not been singled out from among the notes of other countries for special examination. In the various specific cases which we have taken up with the Foreign Office affecting the lives and property of Americans in China, we are finding eagerness—at times anxiety—to meet our wishes. We feel that this attitude has been manifested in connection with the evacuation of Americans from Hankow (see our 394, September 20, 7 p.m. 79 ), the fact that immediately after our representations concerning the bombing of Nanking the Foreign Minister sought audience with the Emperor, apparently resulting in the despatch of envoys to talk directly with the Japanese admirals in command in Chinese waters (see our 421, September 27, 4 [ 5 ] p.m.), et cetera. Without stressing other manifestations of Japanese appreciation over the attitude thus far shown by our Government, we have thus far perceived no reason, despite constant and careful examination of day to day developments, to alter our view that the course which our Government has been following during the crisis places it in a position where it can best conserve American interests and also be of potential future service to the combatant nations. Without for a moment condoning Japanese action in China, we must reluctantly but inevitably accept the patent fact that a nation at war, whether legally or illegally, will exert every effort to attain its military objectives. Non-combatant nations having interests in the theater of warfare will similarly exert every feasible effort to protect those interests. The extent to which a combatant is willing to listen to representations on behalf of such non-combatant interests depends largely if not exclusively upon the extent to which it feels there is something to be gained by such consideration. In the present situation whatever favorable results may accrue from our representations will not accrue from considerations of sentiment or principle or international law or ethics; they will accrue from a careful balancing by the Japanese Government of the advantages of maintaining and the disadvantages of losing the friendship of the United States. In our opinion, the balance in favor of maintaining the friendship of the United States will be preserved just so long as the United States is able to avoid arousing the antagonistic passions of the Japanese Government and people. Far from arousing such passions, the manner and methods of our Government’s approach to the Japanese Government in the present situation have tended to strengthen the desire of the Japanese Government and people to preserve and consolidate their friendship with the United States. And so far as the United States is concerned, we have sacrificed not an iota of our traditional position towards international law, principle and ethics. The thoughts brought out in this despatch argue that something is to be gained, and nothing lost, by continuing the methods heretofore followed by our Government. In this connection I venture to refer to my letter to the Secretary of September 15, 1937, on the general subject of American relations with Japan and especially to paragraphs Nos. 4 and 6 therein. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 75 Not printed. 76 Not reprinted. 77 Not printed. 78 August 27, 4 p.m., p. 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] . 79 Vol. iv , p. 344 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10395: Telegram [Document 639] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 4, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 4—6:50 a.m.] 444. Department’s 245, October 2, 3 p.m.—use of International Settlement Shanghai as military base. 1. I called today on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and made oral representations leaving with him an aide-mémoire 80 embodying all of the points in paragraph number 4 of the Department’s telegram. 2. The Vice Minister’s only comment was that the Chinese forces are endangering Japanese lives and property in the International Settlement by fire from Pootung and Chapei and that the Japanese have landed a very small number of troops in the Settlement, their principal forces having been disembarked elsewhere. The Foreign Office will report [ reply? ] to our representations in due course. 3. My British colleague will make similar representations to the Vice Minister this afternoon as he is instructed to act on the same lines as myself. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 80 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 378 . The Consul General in Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 893.20/629: Telegram [Document 640] The Consul General in Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , October 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 4—9 a.m.] 805. It is an open secret here that American aviators with experience in handling long distance transport planes and heavy bombers have repeatedly been approached from the Chinese side with offers of 25,000 United States dollars to fly over Tokyo at a safe height whence bombs would be released by Chinese accompanying them. In this connection, refer to the statement of Martin 81 submitted in my No. 779 of September 29, 1 p.m. 82 While the Chinese are making much of Japanese bombing raids in China, and I am in full accord with the protests made at Tokyo, I am convinced that the Chinese have been and are ready to carry on equally inhumane operations over Japan if they can induce foreign pilots to take their bombing planes over that country. There are no Chinese aviators capable of piloting such planes over Japan, but foreign airmen may be expected to be recruited for that purpose. Experienced airmen tell me the conduct of recent Chinese air raids over Shanghai give every indication that they are not being conducted by Chinese aviators but by more experienced pilots. A Russian pilot was found in one plane shot down over the Japanese occupied area at Shanghai. In conducting the raids over Shanghai the Chinese planes usually approach over the neutral foreign areas and imperil the safety of foreign and Chinese noncombatants not only from the Japanese antiaircraft fire which they draw but from a possible duplication [of] the sequence of what is known as bloody Saturday August 14th, if one of the bomb-laden Chinese planes should be hit and crash or drop its bombs in the closely populated neutral areas. I believe it is an honest statement that the Chinese raiders in approaching over the neutral areas are taking advantage of “shelter” of such areas since Japanese fire must be more carefully directed in that direction to avoid incidents involving the safety of foreign lives. 2. Japanese naval bombing planes also reconnoitering over the foreign areas at times but there is at least some noticeable indication of a disposition so far as possible to avoid such areas. The Japanese were willing at one time to undertake not to fly naval bombing planes over the neutral foreign area provided as [ that? ] similar undertaking was forthcoming from the Chinese side which declined to give it and asserted its “air sovereignty” over the areas. 3. It is rather an anomalous situation, it is true, which finds a so-called neutral area protected by foreign troops and warships in the center of a field of major hostilities, but with no declaration by either side of war or of the existence of a state of war, I believe that we may justify the effort to exclude hostilities in and over this area notwithstanding China’s protest against the use of a part of the Settlement by the Japanese as a military base and notwithstanding the Chinese claim to “air sovereignty” over the foreign areas. This is what I had in mind particularly in paragraph 4 of my No. 762, of September 25, 4 p.m., in which I emphasized the importance of having both sides respect the so-called neutral areas south of the Soochow Creek protected by foreign forces. While the Chinese may complain of the use of the Settlement by the Japanese as a militarized base, it is a fact that the right wing of the Chinese forces rests on and is against the Japanese by [ sic ] the so-called neutral foreign area, and if an examination is made of the map of the foreign defense lines at Shanghai it will be observed that the portion of “B” sector in West Hongkew, north of the Soochow Creek, now held by the British troops, effectually prevents the Japanese from driving the Chinese out of Chapei and out of Chinese territory between the railway and Soochow Creek west of the north station. 4. I share the view held by a number of disinterested foreign observers that China has deliberately made Shanghai the main theater of her war of resistance against Japanese aggression hoping thus to focus world attention on China through Shanghai and to bring about foreign intervention or involve foreign powers to the disadvantage of Japan. Repeated to Nanking. Gauss 81 Robert W. Martin, American civilian air instructor. 82 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10410: Telegram [Document 641] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , October 4, 1937—8 p.m. [Received October 4—1:24 p.m.] 810. My No. 796, October 1, 6 p.m. 83 Japanese attacks supported by extremely heavy artillery fire and heavy bombing resulted last night in the capture of Liuhang and Chinese withdrawal from that area to new positions 5 to 7 miles further west. Withdrawal extended along a front commencing approximately 3 miles northwest of Lotien south to the strategic village of Tachang which if taken by the Japanese may result in Chinese withdrawal from Kiangwan and possibly Chapei sectors. Chinese stubbornly contested Japanese advance in spite of intense and sustained artillery bombardment resulting in many Chinese casualties. Japanese casualties during the last 3 days have been unusually heavy. Shelling and bombing of Kiangwan, Chapei and Pootung continues. Nineteen Japanese shells fell in the American sector Saturday night killing 1 Chinese and injuring 12 others; the Japanese chief of staff yesterday called on General Beaumont 84 and apologized. Sent to Nanking, Peiping. Gauss 83 Not printed. 84 Brig. Gen. John C. Beaumont, commanding U. S. Marine forces in China. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 033.9411/307: Telegram [Document 642] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 5, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 5—11:45 a.m.] 449. Our 448, October 5, 5 p.m. 83 1. Kojiro Matsukata, one of the principal members of the unofficial group shortly to visit the United States, called on me today “to have a talk” before his departure on the 14th. He said that he would remain in the United States anywhere from 2 to 6 months visiting several of the larger cities especially Chicago, New York and Washington. He emphasized that he is not going as a “good will envoy” but merely as a business man seeking business contacts. With regard to the precise purpose of his trip he explained briefly that Japan is in need of several commodities notably oil, scrap iron and trucks, especially oil, and that his primary purpose is to secure a supply of these commodities. 2. Matsukata referred to the complete reversal of sentiment in Japan away from Great Britain and towards the United States and said that in recent conversation with a large number of Japanese officials, naval officers particularly expressed great indignation against Great Britain. It was felt in Japanese official circles that the representations of the American Government in the present conflict were reasonable and were apparently so formulated as to take into account Japanese susceptibilities but that the tone of British representations had been consistently offensive. It was also felt that British diplomatic and naval officers in China had repeatedly shown their hostility toward Japan. He cited the British note concerning the Hugessen 85 incident, the use by Chinese of British docks in Shanghai to facilitate the mining of a Japanese warship, the publicity given by British officials to the charge of Chinese fishermen that their vessels had been sunk by a Japanese submarine and several other matters. He said Hugessen is well known to be hostile to Japan. 3. Carrying on this line of thought Matsukata said that Japan would heartily welcome offer by the United States of good offices in the direction of peace between Japan and China whereas it would not welcome a similar offer from Great Britain. He repeatedly urged that if the United States should decide to act along this line it should do so alone and not in concert with the British Government. He also stated that he has reason to believe that any such offer by the American Government, if made even today, would be well received by the Japanese Government. 4. I warned Matsukata that he would find public opinion in the United States inhospitable to Japanese claims that the Chinese Government is responsible for the present conflict; that Japan had recently done much to render difficult the application to Japan of the “good neighbor policy”; and that the American Government must listen to public opinion in shaping its own policy and action. 5. There has been during the past few days a concerted attack by the Japanese press on British attitude and policy and we have in preparation a telegram on this subject which will cover the suggestion made by Matsukata as reported in paragraph 3 above. I may state here briefly that we are skeptical of any useful purpose being served by mediation or offer of good offices at this time. Grew 83 Not printed. 85 Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador in China. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) of a Conversation With the British Chargé (Mallet) 793.94 Conference/29 [Document 643] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Wilson ) of a Conversation With the British Chargé ( Mallet ) [ Washington ,] October 5, 1937. Mr. Mallet called, at my invitation, and I handed him the memorandum 87 in reply to that of the British Embassy of October 1st. Mr. Mallet read the memorandum. I said that I had noted in the press this morning indications of a reaction in Great Britain against the idea of a boycott. According to the press, the Conservative papers were playing it down and the [Arch-] Bishop of Canterbury himself had qualms on the subject. Mr. Mallet said that he had no telegram or message from his Government that indicated that the British Government were any less interested in the question than it was when he made his inquiry, that obviously a boycott was a thing for private initiative, but that it might be encouraged or discouraged by the government. I said that, in the first instance, the matter certainly was one for private initiative. I then read Mr. Harrison’s 88 text of Cranborne’s 89 resolution introduced in the subcommittee in Geneva. 90 Mr. Mallet and I agreed that it seemed probable, in view of this, that things have taken a slightly different direction from the way in which they were pointed when the British Government made its inquiry and that we might expect an invitation shortly as a signatory of the Nine Power Treaty 91 and that this might furnish a reasonable opportunity for consultation. Mr. Mallet said in parting that he was glad to see that our reply “left the door wide open.” Hugh R. Wilson 87 Infra . 88 Leland Harrison, Minister in Switzerland. 89 Viscount Cranborne, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 90 See telegram No. 26, October 5, 11 a.m., from the Minister in Switzerland, vol. iv , p. 54 . 91 Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/10456 [Document 644] The Department of State to the British Embassy 92 undated The inquiries communicated in the memorandum which the British Chargé d’Affaires was so good as to leave with the Secretary of State on October first relate to a situation to which the American Government has been giving earnest consideration. The people of the United States, as do the people of the United Kingdom, stand conspicuously in the forefront among the nations that desire peace, justice and order; and both countries deplore the conflict in the Far East and are desirous that it be brought to an end. Naturally, in both countries thought runs toward the problem of methods of preserving peace. The American Government feels that thus far since the present conflict unfortunately began, there have been made available clear indications of the attitude and policy both of the United Kingdom and of the United States. In a number of important respects the general policy of the Government of the United States is reflected in the enactment of the neutrality legislation 93 with which the British Government is familiar and which indicates that this country intends not to be drawn into any armed conflict. The American Government has constantly in mind and is guided by this expression of the desire and determination of the American people. The American Government, through the Secretary of State, on July 16 stated the principles which in its opinion should prevail in international relations, and on August 23 stated that those principles applied in its opinion in regard to the Far East as well as to all other regions of the world and made express reference to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 94 The American Government has forbidden the carrying by government-owned ships of arms, ammunition and implements of war to the countries parties to the conflict and has discouraged such carrying by any other vessels under the American flag. The American Government has in communications with the Japanese and the Chinese Governments strongly urged respect for law, for treaty pledges and for principles of humanity; and it has declined to give assent to any action by either of the parties to the conflict in impairment or in violation of law or of treaties. The substance, the general direction, and the possibilities of the American Government’s policy are clearly discernible by reference to this record. If, with the foregoing summary of the controlling factors of American policy in mind, the British Government sees some plan whereby the Government of the United States might cooperate by pacific methods with the British and other Governments toward bringing to an end the present hostilities in the Far East, the American Government would be glad to give it careful consideration and to consult fully. 92 Handed to the British Chargé on October 5 by the Assistant Secretary of State. 93 Approved August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081. For amendments February 29, 1936, and May 1, 1937, see 49 Stat. 1152 and 50 Stat. 121. 94 Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. i , p. 153 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10480: Telegram [Document 645] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 6, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 7—10:45 a.m.] 767. Last evening in conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs and with Wong Wen Hao, head of the Department of Heavy Industries of Military Affairs Commission, I advanced theory that Japanese might stop advance at Yellow River in north and after driving Chinese forces from around Shanghai thereafter consolidate positions with a view to making attack upon or meeting threat from Soviet Russia. Both accepted idea. I found no inclination in them toward peace but acceptance of idea that if driven close to Nanking Government would move up river. They appeared confident that Japanese would find difficulty in fighting way through defense lines between here and Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping and to Shanghai for repetition to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/10: Telegram [Document 646] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 7—9:39 a.m.] 455. Department’s 253, October 6, 6 p.m. 95 Yesterday the Foreign Office spokesman released to the correspondents a statement on the President’s address of October 5 at Chicago. Byas states that he has telegraphed the completed text to the New York Times . The spokesman asserted a right of all honest and industrious people to live anywhere in the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, referred to the doubling of the population of Japan in the past 50 years, and that the American Japanese exclusion law of 1924 is against the natural law of mankind and is greatly deplored by the Japanese. He said that if the “haves” refused to concede to the rightful demands of the “have nots” peace will be very difficult to maintain. He stated that in the present affair China has refused by force of arms the peaceful cooperation which Japan wants. At the same time the spokesman released a statement referring to an editorial of the New York Times of October 4. Byas says that he has also telegraphed this statement in full. The statement aims at showing that on the night of August 14 the lives of 30,000 Japanese in Shanghai were imminently threatened by Chinese forces and that military action of Japan taken thereupon in Shanghai was consequently defensive. Dooman 96 was told at the Foreign Office this morning, and the statement is repeated in this afternoon’s Japanese press, that the releases of the spokesman yesterday were made in the capacity of the Chief of the Press Section, not as official statements by the Foreign Office. He was also told that the Foreign Office has instructed Saito to so inform the Department. Grew 95 Not printed; for text of President Roosevelt’s address at Chicago on October 5, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 379 . 96 Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/11: Telegram [Document 647] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 7—9:20 a.m.] 456. Department’s 253, October 6, 6 p.m. 97 1. The two principal Japanese papers this morning editorially discussed the President’s address at Chicago. ( a ) The Asahi referring to the traditional partiality of the American people to the under dog states that it is natural that American sympathy should be largely with China but it objects to the President’s assuming without examination that the complaints of the party (China) which initiated the conflict are necessarily true. Although it shares the ideals of the President with regard to world peace it declares that the facts upon which the President rests his statements need revision. The editorial concludes with the statement that the President’s address by stimulating the hopes of the weakening Chinese Army will only vainly protract the hostilities; and that if the United States intends to express its views with regard to the Far East only by maintaining an attitude of neutrality will it qualify itself to be heard on that subject. ( b ) The Nichi Nichi states that it is reluctant to compare the President with the Archbishop of Canterbury who has taken a leading part in fostering a movement prejudicial to good international relations. The attitude of the Roosevelt Administration toward Far Eastern problems has thus far been fair and just but the paper considers the address at Chicago to have been imprudent and lacking in the keen political insight which Mr. Roosevelt usually shows. It regrets that the President is unable to realize that the conflict was brought about by the policy of the Chinese Government of hostility toward Japan as indicated by refusal to cooperate in the economic field with Japan and by threatening the lives and property of Japanese nationals in China. 2. The Department’s announcement of October 6 98 with regard to violation by Japan of the Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact was put this morning by the newspapers in extras and special editions. The only reaction in official Japanese circles thus far described in the press is attributed to the Foreign Office and is as follows: The Japanese Government has already made it clear that special consideration must be given to the application to the Far East of the principles set forth in Secretary of State Hull’s recent declaration. It betrays an actual lack of knowledge to propose the application to the Far East of the Nine Power Treaty which was concluded many years ago, and of the Kellogg Pact. Conditions having changed these two treaties cannot be applied as a basis for regulating relations between Japan and China. 3. As indicating one line which may be followed by the press in discussing the Department’s statement it was privately stated at the Foreign Office this morning that as the American Government has in effect declared that Japan has resorted to war it will be interesting to observe whether the American Government will continue to take the view in relation to the Neutrality Act that a state of war does not exist in the Far East. Grew 97 See footnote 95, p. 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] . 98 See telegram No. 10, October 6, 6 p.m., to the Minister in Switzerland, vol. iv , p. 62 . The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10545: Telegram [Document 648] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , October 7, 1937—11 p.m. [Received October 9—8:50 a.m.] 256. Referring to my telegram No. 255, October 7, 8 p.m., 99 the following occurrence which took place this afternoon may be of some interest. 1. Nishi, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called upon Henderson, my First Secretary, and asked him if he had any confirmation of the rumor that Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador to China, was in Moscow and whether he possessed any information other than that appearing in the press regarding the President’s speech and reported changes in American policies with respect to the Far East. 2. After Henderson had answered both questions in the negative the Counselor voluntarily discussed the Far East situation at some length alleging that, encouraged by the recent attitude of the League of Nations, the Soviet Government was becoming more and more overbearing towards Japan and no one knew how far it might eventually go. He indicated that there was even a possibility that the Soviet Government would attempt without becoming itself involved to send Mongolian troops to the assistance of China. Stating that difficulties in the Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin were due entirely to the provocative attitude of the Soviet authorities, he said that Japan feels that the Soviet Government is making every effort to persuade the League of Nations and even powers outside the League to declare an economic boycott on Japan and that under cover of this boycott the Soviet Government hopes to cancel the Sakhalin and fisheries concessions and take other measures which would permanently damage Japanese economic interests. He added that if Litvinov is successful in creating a solid front of League members against Japan a conflict is likely to ensue which will involve all Europe and Asia. 3. In attaching significance to this call it should be known that Tuesday I had arranged luncheon conferences with the Chinese, Italian, German, Japanese and other Ambassadors and Ministers covering the whole week and had been obliged to cancel the German, Japanese and subsequent luncheons because I was confined to bed with a severe cold. Possibly the Japanese Ambassador attached significance to this cancellation. 4. As a matter of fact I personally have strong reason to believe the rumor of Bogomolov’s presence here is correct and that his visit is of considerable importance. 1 Davies 99 Not printed. 1 In telegram No. 158, October 12, 8 p.m., the Department replied: “Our Embassy at Nanking reported that Bogomolov departed by special plane for Moscow on September 28 and was followed by Soviet military attaché General Lepin on October 5 also by plane.” (793.94/10545). The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10504: Telegram [Document 649] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , October 8, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 8—6:30 a.m.] 826. Lehrbas, Associated Press correspondent, has handed me following advance text of a proclamation to be issued at 4 o’clock this afternoon Shanghai time by Japanese: “Charged by His Majesty the Emperor with the task of heading the Shanghai expeditions, I have landed in Chinese soil south of the Yangtze. The Japanese Army left the country prepared to use every means within its power to subdue its opponents. The objectives of the Japanese expeditionary forces are, as clearly set forth in statements issued by the Japanese Government, not only to protect the vested interests of Japan and the lives and property of the Japanese residing in the affected area, but also to [scourge] the Chinese Government and Army who have been pursuing anti-foreign and anti-Japanese policies in collaboration with Communist influences. In short, the mission of the Japanese Army is to establish the foundations for a firm and lasting peace in East Asia. We cannot but feel sorry for the many innocent persons who are unfortunately living in the area of hostilities, and it goes without saying that the Japanese Army has no enmity toward the Chinese people in general. However, against those who bear arms against Japan, the Japanese Army will show no mercy. Toward the officials and nationals of foreign powers who have suffered from the hostilities or who have been threatened with injury to their persons or property, we express our deepest sympathies. The Japanese Army will leave nothing undone to respect and protect the lives and property of nationals of third powers. With the close cooperation of the naval forces, the Japanese expeditionary force is determined to clear the skies of ominous clouds and I am confident that the day is not so far off when the light of peace will shine again. (Signed) Iwane Matsui, General, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces to Shanghai, October 8, 1937. He is filing press report immediately after release but fears it may not be passed by censors. In handing me the information for the Department he requests that if it is possible McDermott 2 hand copy to Associated Press. Gauss 2 Michael J. McDermott, Chief of the Division of Current Information. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 711.00 Pres. Speech, October 5, 1937/33: Telegram [Document 650] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 8, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 8—11:06 a.m.] 781. Semi-official Central News Agency today reports Generalissimo as having stated in interview with Associated Press representative with reference to President’s speech: “President Roosevelt’s speech has not only deeply touched the overridden Chinese but has also aroused those powers who advocate the construction of perpetual peace on the foundation of international ethics”. Generalissimo was further reported to have stated that if China cannot check Japanese efforts to monopolize China markets and proclaim itself absolute ruler of the Pacific area and other powers vitally interested likewise fail, Japan will close huge China market to the world and there will be no peace in the Pacific; that a ray of hope has dawned following receipt of news that the League and Department of State are taking steps to censure the aggressor; 3 that Chinese will fight until all Japanese troops are expelled from China territory; and that if signatories to the treaties concerned continue to let justice and law be overrun by Japan keeping up her ruthless invasion of China it will be tantamount to supporting Japan’s plan of conquering China. Johnson 3 See vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10523: Telegram [Document 651] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 8—3:30 p.m.] 782. Following is a statement made by Dr. Wang Chung Hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at a press interview today, supplied the Embassy by the Foreign Office: “During the past few weeks there have been many heartening signs that the peace-loving nations of the world are rallying to the cause of justice and humanity with which China’s present struggle against hostile invasion is identified. A large number of resolutions expressing profound sympathy with the Chinese people have been adopted by public bodies in scattered parts of the world, and the voice of foreign statesmen and leaders in various walks of life have been raised at Geneva and elsewhere in condemnation of Japan’s acts of aggression in China, especially the mass murder of innocent civilians. To all who have given their moral and spiritual support to China in her present distress I wish to express the sincere appreciation of the Chinese Government and people, who always cherish the belief in the eventual triumph of truth and justice over brute force. The resolution 4 and the two reports 5 adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on the subject of the present Sino-Japanese conflict, though falling short of the action China believes might have been taken under the principles of the League Covenant, clearly demonstrate that the entire civilized world at least spiritually stands behind China in her present fight against the aggressor. The League reports further take cognizance of the important fact that Japanese action is a breach of her treaty obligations, notably her obligations under the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, and cannot be justified. It is hoped that positive measures will soon be devised to call a halt to Japan’s wanton violations of international treaties and elementary principles of justice and humanity. In regard to the present Far Eastern crisis, the State Department at Washington has come to the same conclusions as the League of Nations. In a statement issued yesterday 6 the Government of the United States declared that Japan’s action is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg-Briand pact. The great speech made by President Roosevelt at Chicago a few days ago eminently deserves the whole-hearted support of all peace-loving nations. The principles he enunciated further afford a timely basis for collaboration between the League of Nations and the United States in a concerted effort to put an end to acts of international aggression. Although the President of the United States made no explicit reference to the Sino-Japanese conflict, there is no doubt that the dangers against which he warns all peaceful nations exist in the present Far Eastern situation. President Roosevelt has rightly emphasized that no nation can expect to escape through mere isolation or neutrality the dire consequences of international anarchy and instability. It is only through an acute realization of this essential fact by all peaceful nations that a concerted effort will be made to check the present dangerous drift toward the utter breakdown of international ethics and morality. The consensus of civilized opinion both within and without the League of Nations has thus been that important instruments of peace have been broken in the Far East. The problem facing civilized society is how to restore the sanctity of international treaties and rescue the world from a reversion to a state of international anarchy. Events in the Far East since 1931, culminating in the present large scale invasion of China’s territory by Japan, constitute an object lesson to us all, namely, that mere reiteration of pious hopes and resolutions will be no restriction upon the aggressive action of Japan, dominated as she is by a military caste indifferent to the censure of public opinion. If peace is to be restored in this part of the world, the peace-loving nations must be prepared to take positive measures to defend laws and principles which form the very basis of civilization. I am in complete agreement with President Roosevelt that nations desiring to live in peace under widely-accepted standard of international morality can and must find some way to make their will prevail over the forces of lawlessness and violence”. Johnson 4 See telegram No. 30, October 5, 10 p.m., from the Minister in Switzerland, ibid ., p. 58 . 5 For texts see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 384 and 394 . 6 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 396 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11020 [Document 652] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2619 Tokyo , October 8, 1937. [Received November 8.] Sir : With reference to our telegram No. 449, October 5, 6 p.m., reporting a conversation with Mr. Kojiro Matsukata, the Embassy on October 6 had prepared a telegram to the Department by way of comment on Mr. Matsukata’s assertion that an offer of good offices by the United States with a view to terminating the present hostilities in China would now be timely. That telegram was held up for one day and the developments reported on October 7, namely the President’s speech in Chicago and the Department’s announced support of the action taken by the League of Nations in connection with the Sino-Japanese situation, seemed to us to render superfluous the despatch of the telegram at this date. For purposes of record however, I enclose herewith a copy of the draft of the telegram in question. There are also enclosed copies of memoranda of the conversations 7 which Mr. Matsukata had with me and Mr. Dooman on October 5. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew [Enclosure] Draft Telegram From the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 6, 1937. Our 449, October 5, 6 p.m. 1. On September 22, my British colleague gave me his impressions of the situation, which were as follows: ( a ) Parallel action by the United States and Great Britain in the Far Eastern conflict has been and can be distinctly useful in specific issues and is likely to be much more effective than identical action would be. This presupposes the use sometimes of different forms and methods of approach to the Japanese Government as well as different choice of language. ( b ) He found no resentment on the part of the Japanese Government to even the strongest representations on behalf of specific British interests. He felt that such attitude of the Japanese authorities could be preserved only so long as the British Government maintain the strictest neutrality in policy and procedure. He greatly feared the results of his Government’s repeating at Geneva or elsewhere the mistake it made in the Abyssinian crisis. ( c ) He felt that the civil Government in Tokyo, particularly the Foreign Office, and the substantial elements of civilian life including the business world, are loath to see the Japanese military in complete future control of Japan’s affairs, and that any manifestations of partiality or lack of neutrality on the part of our respective Governments would incite Japanese public opinion against us and thus play directly into the hands of the military. 2. Since the date of that conversation, there has been a concerted mass attack by the Japanese press on British attitude and policy. Emphasis is being laid on British endeavor to create a common front of the Powers to intervene in the conflict. Great Britain is charged with instigating the discussions at Geneva of economic boycott of Japan, and the receptiveness of the British Government and people to “Chinese propaganda” is referred to in terms reflective of sharp resentment. The attendance of the Archbishop of Canterbury as Chairman at a mass meeting in London for the purpose of censuring Japan has especially aroused widespread indignation in this country, the Japanese inevitably regarding the Archbishop as an officer of the British Government and therefore interpreting his action as an unfriendly step by Great Britain. 3. There are daily being cited in the press alleged instances of British partiality towards China, the cases cited yesterday, for example, being assistance by the British in repairing the Kowloon–Canton Railway, which had been damaged by Japanese bombing, the use of Hong Kong for the assembling of Chinese military airplanes purchased in Great Britain, and the use of trucks belonging to the British marines in Shanghai to smuggle Chinese plain clothes troops behind the Japanese lines. 4. I had a further conversation with Craigie on October 4. He now feels that any representations he may make to the Japanese Government are looked at askance and do much more harm than good. He said that, although representations concerning individual interests or the general protection of the lives and property of our nationals in China are entirely proper and can sometimes be helpful, general censure of Japan’s course of action can only stir up irritation which defeats its own object. He thought that anything which injured British influence in Japan would automatically injure American influence and that, therefore, it was well for us to work step by step together. He believed that eventually we might be helpful in bringing the hostilities to a close and that we should try to maintain our influence if only for that purpose. He said that the influence of the moderate and liberal elements in Japan must stand or fall on the basis of American and British friendship. If that friendship is lost, the moderates will be equally lost; the Japanese military will then become permanently predominant and Japan will be thrown directly into the arms of Germany, Italy, and other fascist countries. 5. Although the American Government has established its position in the present situation and has amply recorded its views, the Japanese press and people are not reacting adversely to the American attitude. There prevails generally the feeling that the United States is concerned primarily with the protection of its nationals and of their interests in China and with maintaining its prestige as a great Power. 6. We cannot but feel that the sharp contrast between the sentiment of the Japanese Government and people towards the United States and towards Great Britain has grown out of the differences in method employed by these two countries respectively: notably, British effort to create a common front against Japan as compared with American independent action to protect rights and interests in China. Whether Matsukata had any authority to suggest that Japan would favorably entertain an American offer of good offices and would reject any such British offer, we do not know. Nevertheless the suggestion is, we are convinced, reflective of the present sentiments of the Japanese toward the United States on one hand and toward Great Britain on the other. 7. Our conclusions at the present moment with regard to the situation, and in the light of the statements made to me by Craigie and Matsukata are as follows: ( a ) We find no evidence of there being any moderate element in Japan opposed to the carrying out of the Japanese military program in China. ( b ) Notwithstanding their common opposition to Communism, we perceive no basis for any enduring close association between Japan and the Fascist Powers, evidences of trend of Japan toward Germany and Italy being reflective, we believe, of a policy of opportunism on both sides. It is our estimate that Japan will not link itself with the latter nations unless the United States should align itself with the democratic countries in any project contemplating action, whether positive or negative, with the democratic countries. ( c ) We believe that the program of the Japanese military originally contemplated piecemeal and gradual expansion in China, and that the Japanese military were not prepared at this time for the present conflict, the successful liquidation of which will entail enormous expenditures in terms of both money and lives. Nevertheless, the Japanese military are apparently confident, in view of the rapid and favorable progress of military operations in North China, that Chinese military opposition can be crushed in the relatively near future. We have reason to believe that the Japanese military, although hopeful that disorganization of the Chinese army will lead to disruption of the Chinese Government as now constituted, are anxious to prevent there arising in China conditions of civil disorder. We believe that there is little likelihood that any offer of good offices, either by the United States or by the United States in association with Great Britain and other Powers, would be entertained by the Japanese Government until such time as Chinese military opposition has been eliminated and as foreign good offices could be expected effectively to contribute toward preserving of civil order in Cnina. 8. We understand from press despatches that the League of Nations will follow precedent of the 1933 Resolution on the Sino-Japanese conflict and will request the American Government for expression of views. We hope that this telegram will indicate to the Department the results, so far as they affect relations with Japan, of the course thus far pursued by our Government. Grew 7 Neither printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 711.00 Pres. Speech, October 5, 1937/61: Telegram [Document 653] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 9, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:13 a.m.] 785. I gave copies of President’s Chicago speech and Secretary’s statement to Generalissimo and have received letter from [General?] Chiang containing following: “At this time of shattered faith in treaties the expressed attitude of the American Government is inspiring. We hope that something tangible will develop to put an end to the wholesale use of force by nations which arm specially to try and inflict their wills upon weaker peoples.” Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10543: Telegram [Document 654] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 9, 1937—9 p.m. [Received October 9—12:33 p.m.] 464. A press ban has been issued against the publication here of the recent speech in Nanking of the German Ambassador to China on the occasion of the annual German harvest festival in which the Ambassador expresses sympathy for China against Japan. Although no report of the whole speech has yet come to me from Nanking the Italian Embassy here has given me a copy with expressions of astonishment at the tenor of the speech as coming from the German representative in China. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10585: Telegram [Document 655] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 11, 1937—noon. [Received October 11—11:56 a.m.] 795. [Here follows quotation from General Matsui’s declaration of October 8; see telegram No. 826, October 8, 2 p.m., page 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] .] This is the first statement of policy from the Japanese Army forces brought to my attention. It would appear from the telegram that it is issued on Chinese soil; that it is significant in that it now definitely separates the Japanese military effort at Shanghai from any connection with the defense of Japanese interests within the International Settlement and raises points definitely for the right of the Japanese to continue to jeopardize the International Settlement by using any part of it for their military purposes. Their presence in any part of the International Settlement will endanger lives and property of other nationals. Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai, Peiping. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10588: Telegram [Document 656] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 11, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 2:20 p.m.] 798. A highly placed Chinese official, educated in Japanese military schools, has informed me that there can be no doubt that the present Japanese military operations on the mainland were planned in advance and are part of the scheme of Japanese expansion. He stated that General Matsui who is now in command of military operations in the Shanghai area is a leader of the Pan-Asiatic movement and is determined to drive Western influence, particularly British and American, from the Orient. As an indication that hostilities following Lukouchiao incident have not resulted merely from unsuccessful efforts to settle that incident but were planned, for information [he observed that a] bombing map of Nanking taken from a fallen Japanese plane bore a legend indicating it was made by the Japanese War Office on July 7. Informant believed, however, that Siberia is the main objective of the Japanese military policy and he pointed to the fact that the Japanese forces in China are regular troops supplemented by older reserve troops, the younger reserves being held for use later presumably against the Soviet Union. Informant asserted that military preparations in Korea and Manchuria exceed forces in China. Informant said China would resist Japanese invasion to the limit of its strength but he would frankly state that China expected foreign assistance in the effort to prevent Japan from obtaining hegemony of the Far East. He said that China is anxious for peace with Japan but as an equal not a vassal and that China does not hope that any other nation will fight Japan but only that China [hopes for?] moral support and war materials. Repeated to Peiping and Tokyo. Johnson The Chinese Ambassador (C. T. Wang) to President Roosevelt 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/122 [Document 657] The Chinese Ambassador ( C. T. Wang ) to President Roosevelt Washington , October 11, 1937. My Dear Mr. President : I have the honor to inform you that Dr. H. H. Kung, Vice President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance at Nanking, who is now on his way to China from Europe, has requested me to forward to you the following telegraphic message: “Allow me to congratulate you on behalf of my country and myself for your Chicago speech which will go down in history as the most courageous and statesman-like statement ever made. It clarifies for the world the vital issues involved in Japan’s policy of armed aggression and strikes at the very core of the problem of world peace and security. Ringing through a world horrified with Japanese lawlessness and brutalism your timely message sounds the clarion call to all who cherish the ideals of justice and humanity and uphold the cause of international peace and order. Driven by frantic belief in divine mission and unbound lust for power and supremacy and encouraged by world’s inaction towards her Manchurian invasion, Japan’s militarists are ruthlessly seeking the conquest of China as a means towards realizing their frantic dream of world domination. As an individual seeks to rid the community of the robber who attacked his next-door neighbor, so must peace loving nations take concerted action to check Japan’s aggression in time lest they in turn will be forced to bear the burden of defending themselves against the public enemy of peace and humanity. A nation ignoring the dangers of destructive forces cannot live in peace but will find war brought to its very doors however peace-loving it may be. It is my sincere hope that America under your leadership will lead the world in taking active and effective measures to safeguard world peace and democracy. For this very object China though handicapped in many ways is determined to resist the common aggressor cost what it may for otherwise not only the Pacific, but the whole world will have no peace and security.” In forwarding the above message to you, I avail myself of this occasion to add my personal felicitations. 8 I am [etc.] Chengting T. Wang 8 President Roosevelt subsequently acknowledged this message. Chapter VI: October 12–November 22, 1937 Chapter VI: October 12–November 22, 1937 Problem of Ending Far Eastern Conflict; effect on Far East of Berlin–Rome–Tokyo rapprochement , October 15; French ban on transit of war material through Indochina, October 19; President Roosevelt’s reaction thereto, October 22; modification of French transit ban, October 23, November 10; preparations for transfer of Chinese Government westward from Nanking, November 16; Ambassador Grew’s review of efforts on behalf of peaceful settlement of Far Eastern conflict, November 18; Chinese Government’s announcement of removal from Nanking to Chungking, November 20; Generalissimo Chiang’s message to President Roosevelt, November 22 [658] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] October 12, 1937. 793.94/10706 [659] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] October 12, 1937. 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/100 [660] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 12, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 12—10:34 a.m.] 793.94/10614: Telegram [661] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 12, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 12—10:43 a.m.] 893.20/632: Telegram [662] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, October 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received October 12—5:08 p.m.] 701.4193/119: Telegram [663] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State [ Washington ,] October 12, 1937. 793.94/10755 [664] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman) of a Conversation With Mr. Kojiro Matsukata [Tokyo,] October 12, 1937. 793.94/11025 [665] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 13—1:35 p.m.] 793.94/10637: Telegram [666] The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Hankow, October 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 13—1:47 p.m.] 793.94/10635: Telegram [667] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, October 13, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/10585: Telegram [668] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, October 14, 1937—9 a.m. [Received October 14—7:30 a.m.] 701.4193/120: Telegram [669] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 14, 1937—noon. [Received October 14—1:20 a.m.] 793.94/10642: Telegram [670] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] October 14, 1937. 793.94 Conference/51 [671] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 14, 1937. 793.94/10791 [672] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 15, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 15—1:30 p.m.] 793.94/10678: Telegram [673] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 15, 1937. [Received November 8.] 762.94/178 [674] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 16, 1937—10 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.] 793.94/10696: Telegram [675] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, October 16, 1937. 793.94/10697 [676] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 18, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 18—3:40 p.m.] 793.94/10727: Telegram [677] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 19, 1937—10 a.m. [Received October 19—6:30 a.m.] 793.94/10730: Telegram [678] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 19—3:32 p.m.] 793.94/10748: Telegram [679] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 4:48 p.m.] 793.94/10747: Telegram [680] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 793.94111/81: Telegram [681] The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Berlin, October 20, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 21—12:20 p.m.] 793.94/10783: Telegram (part air) [682] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 20, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 20—9:44 a.m.] 793.94/10754: Telegram [683] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 20—11:39 a.m.] 793.94/10758: Telegram [684] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 21, 1937—9 a.m. [Received October 21—5:30 a.m.] 793.94/10772: Telegram [685] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 21, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 21—12:30 p.m.] 793.94111/82: Telegram [686] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 22, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 10:14 a.m.] 793.94111/83: Telegram [687] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, October 22, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 22—1:40 p.m.] 793.94/10803: Telegram [688] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 22, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 22—1:07 p.m.] 793.94/10800: Telegram [689] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, October 22, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94111/83: Telegram [690] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 22, 1937. [Received November 8.] 793.94/11023 [691] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 23, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 4 p.m.] 793.94111/84: Telegram [692] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 23, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 10 p.m.] 793.94111/86: Telegram [693] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 23, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 10:10 p.m.] 793.94111/85: Telegram [694] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, October 25, 1937—9 a.m. [Received October 25—8 a.m.] 793.94/10827: Telegram [695] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, October 25, 1937—1 p.m. 793.94111/83: Telegram [696] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 26, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 26—11:50 a.m.] 793.94/10852: Telegram [697] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , October 26, 1937. 793.94/10876 [698] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, October 27, 1937—noon. [Received 2:45 p.m.] 793.94/10870: Telegram [699] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 27—2:02 p.m.] 793.94/10867: Telegram [700] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 27—2:32 p.m.] 793.94/10872: Telegram [701] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , October 27, 1937. 793.94/10876 [702] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, October 27, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/10754: Telegram [703] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] October 28 [–30], 1937. 793.94/10975 [704] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, October 29, 1937—1 p.m. 793.94/10895a: Telegram [705] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 30, 1937—11 a.m. [Received October 30—2:11 a.m.] 793.94/10897: Telegram [706] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 30, 1937—1 p.m. [Received October 30—7:28 a.m.] 793.94/10896: Telegram [707] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 30, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 30—10:35 a.m.] 793.94/10907: Telegram [708] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 1, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 2:11 p.m.] 793.04/10925: Telegram [709] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 1, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3 p.m.] 793.94/10927: Telegram [710] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 2, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 2—6:50 a.m.] 793.94 Conference/163: Telegram [711] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 2, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 2—9:15 a.m.] 793.94/10946: Telegram [712] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 3—1:40 p.m.] 793.94/10967: Telegram [713] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 3, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 3—9:22 a.m.] 793.94/10958: Telegram [714] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 3—4:47 p.m.] 793.94/10968: Telegram [715] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 3, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 3—4:33 p.m.] 793.94/10969: Telegram [716] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Secretary of State [Shanghai,] November 3, 1937—7:20 p.m. [Received 10:24 p.m.] 793.94/10972: Telegram [717] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, November 4, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 4—5:12 p.m.] 793.94/10983: Telegram [718] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 5—9:12 a.m.] 793.94/10991: Telegram [719] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 5, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 5—5:45 a.m.] 793.94/10989: Telegram [720] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 5, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/10989: Telegram [721] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 5, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 6—6 a.m.] 793.94/11003: Telegram [722] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 5, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 5—5:15 p.m.] 793.94/10999: Telegram [723] The Commander in Chief, V. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Shanghai,] November 5, 1937—10:10 p.m. [Received November 5—7 a.m.] 793.94/10988: Telegram [724] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 6, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 6—8:10 a.m.] 793.94/11006: Telegram [725] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 6, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 6—2:35 p.m.] 793.94/11008: Telegram [726] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 8—10:50 a.m.] 793.94/11021: Telegram [727] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 8, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 8—1:10 p.m.] 793.94/11030: Telegram [728] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, November 8, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 8—7:08 p.m.] 793.94111/89: Telegram [729] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 9, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 9—5:55 a.m.] 793.94/11035: Telegram [730] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 9, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 9—2:23 p.m.] 793.94/11045: Telegram [731] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, November 9, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 7:45 p.m.] 762.94/184: Telegram [732] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Shanghai,] November 9, 1937—7:10 p.m. [Received 7:20 p.m.] 793.94/11047: Telegram [733] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 10, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 7:09 p.m.] 793.94/11064: Telegram [734] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] November 10, 1937. 793.94111/95½ [735] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 10, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 10—7:16 p.m.] 793.94/11061: Telegram [736] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 11, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 11—9:36 a.m.] 793.94/11068: Telegram [737] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 11, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 11—2:53 p.m.] 793.94/11074: Telegram [738] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 12, 1937—noon. [Received November 12—12:59 a.m.] 793.94/11075: Telegram [739] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 12, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 9:45 p.m.] 793.94/11093: Telegram [740] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 12—2:54 p.m.] 762.94/191: Telegram [741] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 12—3:45 p.m.] 793.94/11086: Telegram [742] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, November 12, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/11047: Telegram [743] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 12—3:20 p.m.] 793.94/11085: Telegram [744] The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State Canton, November 13, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 14—11:14 a.m.] 793.94/11107: Telegram [745] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, [November 14, 1937—6 p.m.] [Received November 14—9 a.m.] 793.94/11105: Telegram [746] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, November 14, 1937—3 p.m. 124.93/375a: Telegram [747] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 15, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 15—9:05 a.m.] 124.93/376: Telegram [748] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 16, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 16—12:21 p.m.] 124.93/377: Telegram [749] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 16, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 16—12:35 p.m.] 793.94/11147: Telegram [750] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, November 16, 1937—8 p.m. 124.93/377: Telegram [751] President Roosevelt to the Japanese Prime Minister (Konoye) [Washington, November 16, 1937.] 033.9411 Konoe, Fuminaro/43 [752] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, November 16, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 17—7:30 a.m.] 793.94/11159: Telegram [753] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , November 17, 1937. 793.94/11189 [754] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, November 17, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 18—3 a.m.] 793.94/11172: Telegram [755] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 17, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 17—7 a.m.] 793.94/11157: Telegram [756] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, November 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 17—4:15 p.m.] 793.94111/93: Telegram [757] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) Washington, November 17, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/11159: Telegram [758] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 18, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 18—1:02 p.m.] 793.94/11178: Telegram [759] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 18—10:40 a.m.] 793.94 Conference/270: Telegram [760] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 18, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 18—4:35 p.m.] 793.94/11181: Telegram [761] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 18, 1937. [Received December 16.] 793.94/11673 [762] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] November 19, 1937. 793.94/11285 [763] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , November 19, 1937. 793.94/11189 [764] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 19, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94 Conference/270: Telegram [765] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 19, 1937—9 p.m. [Received November 19—12:23 p.m.] 793.94 Conference/272: Telegram [766] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 19, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94 Conference/272: Telegram [767] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 20, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:45 a.m.] 124.93/379: Telegram [768] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the Second Secretary of the Chinese Embassy (Tsui) [Washington,] November 20, 1937. 893.01/556 [769] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 21, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 21—4:30 p.m.] 793.94/11208: Telegram [770] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, November 22, 1937—11 a.m. 124.93/383: Telegram [771] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 22, 1937—noon. [Received November 22—3:15 a.m.] 793.94/11220: Telegram [772] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 22, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 22—6:05 a.m.] 124.93/383: Telegram [773] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 22, 1937. 793.94/11243 [774] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 7:29 p.m.] 793.94/11232: Telegram [775] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, November 22, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/11220: Telegram [776] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 22, 1937—10 p.m. [Received November 22—6:54 p.m.] 793.94/11231: Telegram [777] Dr. Hu Shih to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) New York, November 22, 1937. 033.9311 Hu Shih/8 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.94/10706 [Document 658] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] October 12, 1937. The hostilities between China and Japan which developed from an incident near Peiping on the night of July 7 are now entering into their fourth month. The Chinese have shown a unity and a determination which has surprised the Japanese, and the Japanese have not been able to win, as they desired and anticipated, a quick and decisive victory. The hostilities are proving costly to both China and Japan, especially so to Japan, for China’s economy is still so essentially primitive that disturbances affect it less keenly than is the case with a more highly organized economic system. Militarily, Japan has already gained substantial military control of the four northern provinces of Hopei, Suiyan, Chahar, and Shansi, and Japanese troops have already pushed down into northern Shantung. It seems reasonable to conclude that Japan’s military objective in the north has been in large part attained. The Chinese may, however, offer determined resistance on the line of the Lung–Hai Railway. At Shanghai, the fighting continues to be severe. The Japanese are, however, slowly pushing the Chinese back. Should the Chinese suffer further substantial defeats in the north and/or should they be forced to withdraw from Shanghai, it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy what the effect on Chinese morale would be. The answer hinges upon a psychological factor: has the development of a national consciousness in China during the past few years, accelerated as it has been by the resentment and bitterness resulting from Japanese aggression, disciplined China’s soul sufficiently to give China a firm resolution to continue the hostilities, or will the age-old Chinese habit of compromise come to the fore? Probably no Chinese Government can or will sign an agreement with the Japanese Government recognizing Japan’s gains, but Japan can as it has in the past cause to be set up in the conquered territory new administrations independent of the Chinese Government. Regardless of whether Japan can within the next few months push her campaign in China to a decisive conclusion or whether the hostilities will continue for an indefinite period, Japan’s energies will be subjected to an increasing strain. The administering and pacifying of such a large area with a huge Chinese population will present tremendous difficulties. If active hostilities continue the drain on Japan’s resources will be a heavy one. In the diplomatic field, the League of Nations and the United States have announced conclusions to the effect that Japan’s action in China is in contravention of the provisions of existing treaties. It is believed that such announcement will have no immediate deterrent effect upon Japan but will tend rather to harden Japan’s determination decisively and quickly to defeat China. In Japan’s present mood it seems highly improbable that any proposal by the interested powers or by China that an armistice be declared would be accepted by Japan at this time. If that estimate is correct, there is then raised the question whether restrictive action by the powers directed at Japan would be advisable. It seems to me that restrictive measures to be effective must be thorough-going and should be applied in the incipient stages or in the later stages of a controversy. If they are not thus applied, are they not more likely to serve as an irritant than as a deterrent and to cause the country against which they are directed to intensify its efforts at aggression? In the present case of hostilities between China and Japan, it seems to me that there is no likelihood of there being adopted thorough-going measures of restriction, and Japan’s present adventure in China has moved far beyond the incipient stages. That adventure has not, however, yet reached a stage where Japan has been seriously weakened or even begun seriously to feel the strain. The experience of the last few years in the adoption of restrictive measures by the nations of the world indicates clearly that some one nation has always taken the lead and become the spearhead of the restrictive movement. In the Italian-Ethiopian affair, Great Britain assumed that position. Other powers were willing to go along with Great Britain because Great Britain was in the van and thereby assumed the major risk. In the present situation, Great Britain and France are so preoccupied with the European situation as definitely not to be willing to assume a leading position among the nations in the adoption of restrictive measures against Japan. The Soviet Union is so preoccupied internally and also with the European international situation as not to be in position to assume a position of leadership. The League of Nations has studiously avoided any step which would seem likely to bring about the imposition of sanctions under the League Covenant. There then remains only the United States. Should this country become the spearhead in leading a movement among nations in restrictive action against Japan? It is believed that the assuming of such a position by any country would bring that country face to face with a very real hazard. It is also believed that if no nation is willing to assume leadership in a program of restrictive measures, probably nothing very effective would or could be done. It seems to me that public opinion in the United States is definitely opposed to the United States assuming a position of leadership in the imposing of restrictive measures directed at Japan. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that if restrictive measures should take the form of economic “sanctions”, the United States would be called upon to carry the heaviest burden—for the trade of the United States with Japan is almost twice as large as the trade with Japan of all European countries combined (excluding India and the possessions in the Pacific of European countries). Inasmuch as no substantial restrictive program appears to be feasible, it is suggested that the American Government might use its influence toward causing the interested powers to approach the problem in the Far East essentially from a constructive rather than a restrictive point of view. The tensions and strains in the Far East so far as they relate to Japan result primarily from two factors: ( a ) Japan’s desire for economic security (access to raw materials and an outlet for her manufactured goods); and ( b ) Japan’s fear of other countries, principally Soviet Russia, and communism. If some program could be worked out which would give Japan a reasonable prospect of economic security and which would remove Japan’s fear of communism and attack from the Soviet Union, there would be removed some basic elements in the situation responsible for Japan’s present imperialistic program. In the economic field, an arrangement might be worked out which would give Japan readier access to and a greater share of the Chinese and other Far Eastern markets and resources. This might be done through bringing about a lowering of import and export duties on items of special importance to Japan without, however, setting up preferential rates in favor of Japan. In the political field, some arrangement might be worked out which would lessen tension along the Siberian border. Also, in Inner Mongolia there might be set up an administration along the lines of the administrative system recommended in the League Assembly report of 1933 for Manchuria: 9 China’s sovereignty would be recognized but the area would be administered in such a way that it would constitute a buffer region between the Soviet Union and China proper, thus tending to prevent the infiltration of communism from the Soviet Union into China. The basic problem today appears to be two-fold: (1) to remove the basic causes of Japan’s dissatisfaction; and (2) thereby to undermine the hold which the military now has on the Japanese nation. In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that the most realistic and practicable procedure for the United States (and for other governments) would be to devote their primary attention to the evolving of constructive measures, to present those measures to Japan (and to China), to anticipate that Japan probably will not at present be willing to consider those proposals, to be prepared to keep those proposals open until a time (which may come within the next three to six months) when Japan will have found through experience that the attempt to conquer and to administer further large sections of the Chinese Republic is costly, unprofitable and contrary to Japan’s own best interests. When that day comes, the people of Japan will have begun seriously to question the dominance of the Japanese military in the life of the Japanese nation and there will be some prospect that the Japanese Government and nation would be willing to attempt in consultation with and with the assistance of interested powers to work out a basic program of stability and peace in the Far East. Such a program would give practical application in the Far East to the principles of policy set forth in the Secretary’s statement of July 16. 9a Pending arrival by Japan at a state of mind which will make negotiation of peace possible, it is believed that the Government of the United States and other interested governments should continue to keep alive their belief in the fundamental principles of policy which in our opinion should govern international relationships. In so doing, effort should be made to make clear the fact that what the United States and other countries oppose is not Japan but warfare—with all its attendant evils and destructive consequences. We should also continue to adopt an attitude of non-cooperation toward and of disapprobation of Japan’s military gains. The American Government might go along with other nations—but not take the lead in so doing—in adopting such minor restrictive measures as may be decided upon by other powers. Probably, such measures would not be of a very drastic character. In order to gain the support of the United States, such measures would probably have to fall broadly within the compass of the United States Neutrality Act. And it seems to me that such restrictive measures should be conceived of as, and fall within the scope of, measures symbolic of our moral disapprobation of Japan’s course of action and should not be in the nature of “penalty” measures. There is one substantial risk which would be involved in connection with the presenting to Japan within the near future of a proposal that Japan agree to negotiate peace along the lines suggested hereinbefore. Should Japan refuse such a proposal, as seems to the writer of this memorandum highly likely, that fact might make very difficult any future consideration by Japan of such terms. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 9 See League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 112, pp. 56, 75. 9a Vol. i , p. 699 . Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/100 [Document 659] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] October 12, 1937. Mr. Mallet, the British Chargé d’Affaires, called upon me this morning. He said that he had an important communication to make and that he would like to have the opportunity of communicating it to me. He then read from the text of a telegraphic instruction which he had received from his Government which instruction was more or less to the following effect: that Mr. Eden 10 would like to know the exact interpretation which should be given to that portion of the President’s Chicago address 11 which referred to a possible quarantine against nations. Mr. Eden inquired whether the President had fully understood the full implication of that term and if so, whether, in the event that the United States was considering a joint imposition of a boycott against Japan, the United States had taken into account the possibility that Japan as a result of such imposition would undertake retaliatory measures which might include measures of aggression against the interests of the United States and of the nations taking part in such boycott. Mr. Mallet reminded me of the reply made by this Government last week to an inquiry from the British Government on the subject of the possible application of boycotts 12 and concluded by saying that he was informed by Mr. Eden that a further and fuller exposition of Mr. Eden’s views in this regard would be communicated to this Government in the near future. I replied that in view of the fact that a further and ampler expression of these views was to be given to this Government it would seem unnecessary for me to undertake to make any specific reply at this time. I said that I could only assume from Mr. Eden’s inquiry that he had construed the President’s address and the part under reference as implying that the President had it in mind to consider the immediate or imminent application of quarantine measures. I stated that this was not the case, and I requested Mr. Mallet to give the full emphasis required by the last paragraph of the President’s Chicago address which I quoted to him. I added that the immediate intention of the President was that this Government should undertake to cooperate with the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty for the purpose of trying to find a solution of the Chinese situation through an agreement satisfactory to all of the signatories of the treaty. I concluded by saying that, as Mr. Mallet probably knew, the President was going to make a radio broadcast this evening 13 and that I felt sure that that address would be very helpful to Mr. Mallet in advising his Government of the interpretation which should be given to the President’s Chicago address. Mr. Mallet then touched upon the subject of the recent conference held in Mexico City between the Ambassador and the Embassy staff and all of our consular officers in Mexico. He appeared concerned by reports published in the press with regard thereto and asked whether this implied that this Government intended to take a stronger policy in Mexico with reference to the oil situation. 14 I said that the meeting referred to by Mr. Mallet had nothing whatever to do with the oil situation; that it was solely for the purpose of obtaining a closer and more effective working arrangement between all of our representatives in Mexico. I then added that recent information I had received with regard to the negotiations between the oil interests and the Mexican Government had been satisfactory and that I trusted a solution agreeable to both sides might now be obtained. I inquired of Mr. Mallet whether he had any information with regard to the Mediterranean situation and he said that he had none whatever. He talked briefly regarding the general European situation but seemed in general to be uninformed. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 10 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 11 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 379 . 12 See memorandum from the British Embassy handed to the Secretary of State on October 1, p. 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] . 13 For extract see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 400 . 14 See vol. v , pp. 644 ff. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10614: Telegram [Document 660] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 12, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 12—10:34 a.m.] 800. Your [ Tokyo’s ] 464, October 9, 9 p.m., to Washington. Text of speech which German Ambassador is reported to have made on occasion of harvest festival is not available to this office. The only information regarding it was carried in a Central News Agency statement dated Nanking October 4 to the effect that the German Ambassador speaking to the German community (made up I am confidentially informed for the most part of German military advisers employed by the Chinese Government) commented upon the war of resistance waged by the Chinese and expressed the sympathies of other German nationals in China with the trial and tribulation now being undergone by the Chinese. He is reported also to have stated that the ability and courage of the Chinese on the battlefield had deeply impressed the Germans at home and to have expressed the hope that China would soon bridge over this present crisis. Press here carried a Domei report of démarche by Italian Ambassador at Tokyo in support of Japan. Representative of Italian Embassy here in reply to question of German Ambassador in my presence the other day denied that there had been any change in Italian policy in regard to Sino-Japanese hostilities. Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.20/632: Telegram [Document 661] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 12, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 12—10:43 a.m.] 801. With reference to Shanghai’s 805, October 4, 3 p.m., I took advantage of an opportunity offered in a conversation which I had with Chang Chun who now holds important position in War Activities Council as Secretary General, and with Vice Minister Hsu Mo, to express the hope that the Chinese Government would not make the mistake of using American or other foreign aviators to take large bombing planes to Japan for the purpose of demonstrating their ability to bomb Japanese cities. I was assured that they knew of no such scheme. I urged them to dissuade anyone in the Government who might be advocating such a plan. Repeated to Shanghai. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 701.4193/119: Telegram [Document 662] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , October 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received October 12—5:08 p.m.] 844. It is reported that at 4 p.m. today three motor cars, one of which carried British Assistant Air Attaché and three other British subjects, were machine gunned by Japanese planes near Sungkiang while en route Nanking to Shanghai. It appears that a number of Japanese planes spotted the cars; they dived low over the cars and one of them opened fire with machine guns. Occupants of the cars scattered to the fields and none were injured. The car carrying the British subjects was prominently marked with British flag. It is stated to have been hit a number of times. British authorities have not yet issued any official statement. They are investigating. I am unable to confirm report that an American was in one of the three cars and believe the report is inaccurate. The secretary to the Soviet Military Attaché is said to have been in one of the cars. Gauss The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/10755 [Document 663] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 15 The Japanese in the Shanghai sector have been using the poisonous gas and many casualties have already been reported. The following statement signed by Dr. H. F. Ettinger, Chief Surgeon of the Nanking Red Cross Hospital, and Dr. Borcic, Representative of the League of Nations in China for health organization, is a concrete proof. “The undersigned have examined three cases in the Red Cross General Hospital, Nanking, diagnosed as gas casualties and submit the following findings. The patients still have marked symptoms of conjunctivitis with photophobia and are covered with blisters varying in diameter between .2 to .5 centimeters. Some blisters are beginning to dry up and the others show secondary infection and ulceration. The color of most lesion is copperish, but some contain black pigment. Hoarseness is a common symptom of all cases. The eyelids in two cases are edemantous eyes lacrimating constantly. One case arrived with broncho pneumonia. The patients present no wounds and state that after three or four hours in the center of enemy attack from artillery and from air, they felt burning all over their bodies. Their eyes started to smart and water. One youngest [ youngster? ] felt pain one hour after the attack. The combination of the clinical history with the physical findings convinces us that the patients have been suffering from the effects of the vesicant agent most likely the gas of the mustard group which was released from gas bombs or shells and struck them in a low state of concentration.” Other cases are still under examination and further reports of the use of the poisonous gas by enemy are still coming in. [ Washington ,] October 12, 1937. 15 Text of message received at the Chinese Embassy dated Nanking, October 12, and forwarded to the Department. Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman) of a Conversation With Mr. Kojiro Matsukata 793.94/11025 [Document 664] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan ( Dooman ) of a Conversation With Mr. Kojiro Matsukata 16 [ Tokyo ,] October 12, 1937. Mr. Matsukata said that he had come to the Consulate General to obtain a visa and that he had dropped in to say good-bye to me. I said that I was glad to have a final opportunity to advise against his speaking in public on the Far Eastern conflict. Mr. Matsukata said that he saw no likelihood of his visit to the United States accomplishing any good result, and that—as he had just said to a group of his friends—he proposed to make of his trip a “good long nap”. I asked Mr. Matsukata whether he cared, notwithstanding the altered situation, to explain a little more fully what was in the minds of his military and naval friends who had favored American action to end the conflict. Mr. Matsukata remarked that that was now ancient history: that the feeling among naval leaders, who had been accused by the military group of being too “moderate”, had completely changed, and as a result of the President’s Chicago speech and the Department’s announcement of October 6, 17 there is intense adverse feeling toward the United States. They had believed that the attitude of the United States was so fair that a final solution of the “Pacific Problem” was at hand, and the people in control were prepared, as a token of their appreciation, to throw the “Open Door in China wide open to the United States” and to any other country taking a similar impartial position. “But that is all finished”, said Mr. Matsukata, “and the same people are saying that, if the United States continues along the policy which was recently announced, Japan will have to get ready”. E[ ugene ] H. D[ ooman ] 16 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Japan in his covering despatch No. 2633, October 18; received November 8. 17 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 379 and 396 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10637: Telegram [Document 665] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 13—1:35 p.m.] 653. Embassy’s 644, October 11, 4 p.m. 18 1. There are indications that the Japanese military are making efforts to solve the North China situation with as little further delay as possible. (There are even signs that they hope to solve the whole Sino-Japanese situation in the near future.) An early solution would be desirable to the Japanese in view of the rather unsatisfactory state into which Japanese foreign relations have recently drifted, the expense of a prolonged conflict, the extension of Japanese influence in North China already achieved, and the approach of winter. Indications are outlined in the following paragraph. 2. Military operations are being pushed successfully in Suiyuan, Shansi, and Hopei and there is little provision [ reason to believe ] that effective Chinese resistance will be necessary [ likely? ] in those provinces (or any north of the Lunghai Railway). The situation in Shantung is still confused but there is evidence that the Japanese plan is to gain control of that province through peaceful means if possible. For example, there has been but little military activity there during the past few days and there has been a report that some sort of a Chinese Committee has recently been formed in Tsinanfu allegedly for the purpose of negotiating with the Japanese for a peaceful settlement of the Shantung problem. Also, a joint declaration of the Peiping and Tientsin local maintenance societies, text of which was issued today, may have significance, inasmuch as it was probably inspired by Japanese. This declaration refers to defeats of the Chinese and destruction of Chinese property and to the [evils] of prolonged resistance, alleges that only Communists will be the gainers by such tactics, advocates Sino-Japanese friendship and cooperation, and appeals to the two governments to suspend hostilities immediately and settle their differences by diplomatic and peaceful means. The renewed Japanese offensive in Shanghai, reported in Shanghai’s 843, October 12, 7 p.m., 19 is perhaps linked with the Japanese plan for an early solution of the North China situation as a decisive victory at Shanghai would be valuable in that regard. 2. [ 3 ] It still seems doubtful, however, whether they are ready for the establishment of a new regime for North China. Two recent minor developments are regarded locally as possible preparatory steps for the establishment of such a regime. One is the order of the Peiping local maintenance society changing the name of Peiping back to Peking and the other is an order of that society to the association of the district maintenance society of Hopei provinces, inaugurated August 10, to wind up its affairs within the next few days. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 18 Not printed. 19 Not printed. The Consul General at Hankow (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10635: Telegram [Document 666] The Consul General at Hankow ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , October 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 13—1:47 p.m.] Americans who have just arrived here report that when they left Lanchow, Kansu, early this month new pursuit planes and bombers flown by Chinese pilots were arriving at Lanchow from the north; they believed that these planes were of Russian origin and that delivery to the Chinese was made in Sinkiang or northwestern Kansu. Other planes from the same source are believed to have been despatched to Ningsia, Kuyuan (north of Kansu) and Sian. Unusually large quantities of gasoline are being shipped to Lanchow over the motor road from Sian. 2. The Eurasia Aviation Corporation has transferred its head office from Sian to Yunnanfu. Its German pilots have been taken off the Sian-Lanchow run, which is being operated by small machines with Chinese pilots. It is also reported that pressure is being brought to bear by the Chinese authorities on German missionaries and merchants to quit Lanchow. 3. Mongolian cavalry have been rebelling in large numbers moving from Sining (Chinghai) towards Lanchow; their destination was believed to be Shansi. Sent to the Department, Nanking, Peiping. Josselyn The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/10585: Telegram [Document 667] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , October 13, 1937—6 p.m. 316. Your 795, October 11, noon. The American and British Ambassadors in Tokyo, acting under authorization from their respective Governments, made separate but similar representations to Japanese Government on October 4, in regard to use of the International Settlement by the Japanese as a base for military operations. No reply has yet been received. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 701.4193/120: Telegram [Document 668] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , October 14, 1937—9 a.m. [Received October 14—7:30 a.m.] 848. British Consul General here yesterday issued a statement substantially in accord with information contained in my 844, October 12, 8 p.m., adding inter alia that “due notification had been given to Japanese authorities” and “the two cars which were attacked by airplanes had Union Jacks painted prominently on their roofs.” There were no Americans in the party. A copy of the statement as it appears in today’s press will be mailed to the Department. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10642: Telegram [Document 669] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State 20 Tokyo , October 14, 1937—noon. [Received October 14—1:20 a.m.] 471. Department’s 250, October 5, 7 p.m. 21 My British colleague has sent me the following text of a note verbale which he yesterday addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to its identic note verbale of September 29 asking details of foreign cultural establishments in China. “His Britannic Majesty’s Embassy present their compliments to His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honor to refer to the Ministry’s identic note verbale No. 30 of the 29th September last 23 stating that the Imperial forces were anxious to avoid as far as possible danger to the property of nationals of third countries and requesting details of cultural establishments owned by Great Britain or by British subjects in China. While gladly taking note of the foregoing His Majesty’s Embassy have the honor, under instructions from His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state that His Majesty’s Government regret that they were unable to comply with this request. It is thought that the existence and locality of any institutions of the nature specified are doubtless known to the local Japanese authorities in all parts of China. His Majesty’s Government take the view that the responsibility for ensuring that such institutions are not made the subject of any attack must rest with the Japanese authorities concerned.” Grew 20 Telegram repeated as No. 322, October 18, 5 p.m., to the Ambassador in China. 21 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 509 . 23 Cf. telegram No. 435, September 30, 1 p.m., Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 508 . Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 793.94 Conference/51 [Document 670] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] October 14, 1937. The British Chargé d’Affaires called to see me this morning. The primary purpose of his visit was to deliver a sealed letter addressed to the President by the British Prime Minister. 24 Mr. Mallet stated that Mr. Chamberlain’s letter to the President was with reference to the letter sent to Mr. Chamberlain by the President earlier in the summer. 25 I told Mr. Mallet that I should take pleasure in seeing that Mr. Chamberlain’s letter was transmitted at once to the President, who, as Mr. Mallet might know, was for the moment at Hyde Park. Mr. Mallet then said that he had been apprised by his Government of a telephone conversation held yesterday, by instruction of the Secretary of State, between Mr. Norman Davis 26 and Mr. Eden. He said that he was not specifically instructed to advise me of the telegram he had received from his Government in this regard but that he felt warranted in doing so. He read me a portion of the message, which said that the British Government was not in the least disquieted or alarmed by any recent indications of American policy with reference to the Far East; that on the contrary the United States Government could be assured of the “whole-hearted cooperation of the British Government at all times” in approaching a solution of the difficulties which had arisen in the Orient. Mr. Mallet referred to his earlier conversation of two days ago with me with regard to the President’s Chicago address and said that he feared that our apprehension as to possible British disquiet had arisen from the message which he had been instructed to give me asking whether the President had fully understood the implications of the word “quarantine”. I took occasion to reiterate to Mr. Mallet what I had previously told him. I said that I could only assume that the British Government realized what the President’s intentions had been in delivering his Chicago address and that it could hardly question the fact that the President would not be likely to be unaware of what he intended to state in an address of that high importance. Mr. Mallet seemed apologetic. He said that, of course, the British Government had no misconception now, and he made no reference to the further “more ample exposition” which in his last interview he had advised me his Government would make to the Government of the United States. Mr. Mallet said that this most recent instruction he had received had also advised him that Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, had already been instructed by the British Foreign Office to make such representations to the Japanese Government as Grew was instructed to make. I told Mr. Mallet that no instructions had as yet been sent to our Ambassador in Tokyo; that as Mr. Davis had told Mr. Eden on the telephone yesterday, the instructions we had considered sending Mr. Grew had been transmitted to our Embassy in London for the information of the British Foreign Minister, and that these instructions would not be sent to Mr. Grew until we had ascertained the views of Mr. Eden. I said that we did not want any delay to occur through any misunderstanding in this regard and that it would be desirable for us to have Mr. Eden’s views on this matter directly at the earliest opportunity. I asked Mr. Mallet whether he had any further information as to the decision of the Belgian Government with regard to the issuance of invitations to the United States and to Japan, and with regard to the holding of the proposed meeting of the nine powers in Brussels. 27 He said that he had no further information, and that he agreed with me that it was highly unfortunate that there should be so much delay in announcing the place and date of the holding of the meeting. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 24 See letter of September 28 from Prime Minister Chamberlain, vol. i , p. 131 . 25 See letter of July 28, ibid ., p. 113 . 26 Chairman of the American delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference since 1932. 27 See vol. iv , pp. 67 ff. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 793.94/10791 [Document 671] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] October 14, 1937. The Ambassador of China 29 came in to present Dr. Hu-Shih who has just come from China, apparently bearing a message from General Chiang Kai-shek primarily to the President. He proceeded with the conversation by saying that for some weeks during the military activities he had seen and talked with General Chiang Kai-shek very frequently; that the latter is desirous of communicating his thanks and the appreciation of his Government for the moral support, as he termed it, of this country; that China, of course, does not expect this country to employ military force in aid of China; that it is her moral influence which they seek and which they are receiving as fully as they could hope for or expect. He said that his Government is interested in a stable peace in China; that by this he meant that they distrust the Japanese Government in this connection; that, therefore, it is desired that a peace be brought about based on such principles as would not permit Japanese interference and infiltration contrary to existing treaties and in violation of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China—a peace based upon such principles as this Government has proclaimed on July 16th 30 and later on August 23rd 31 with special application to the Pacific area. He said that his Government would not be in a position to abandon any right to its territorial integrity and sovereignty in any peace agreement which might be worked out; that it would be disposed to make any other reasonable adjustments relating to any reasonable complaints. I inquired whether by that he meant a return to the status quo ante as it existed on July 7th, and he replied in the affirmative. I inquired, very confidentially, as to Russia’s attitude towards Outer Mongolia and with respect to observing the integrity of China generally. He did not undertake to give an opinion, except to minimize the influence and attitude of Russia with respect to Outer Mongolia at this time, adding that Outer Mongolia continues to claim herself as a part of China and to assert Chinese sovereignty. The Ambassador and Dr. Hu-Shih both said they would like very much to see the Nine Power delegates convene as early as possible. They did state in that connection that of course they were concerned to guard against any proposals of settlement by this Nine Power group which would interfere with the integrity of China, both as to sovereignty and territory. I indicated that this Government stands for the principles I made public on July 16th and August 23rd and their application in every part of the world. I inquired about the extent and equipment of Chinese forces in Northern China, but with little definite response except that they were not the best equipped nor the best trained and that they are not yet clear as to whether Japan has practically secured control to the Yellow River. They were slow to make predictions about the future, except that they are bent on fighting and defending China and her rights. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 29 Chengting T. Wang. 30 Vol. i , p. 699 . 31 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 355 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10678: Telegram [Document 672] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 15, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 15—1:30 p.m.] 659. The Mayor, accompanied by four members of the Peace Maintenance Society, called on me late Wednesday afternoon. The first theme of their conversation and apparently the object of the call was to emphasize their desire for early peace. I associated their call with the statement issued on October 13 and briefly described in my No. 653, October 13, 5 p.m., which statement I am convinced was inspired by the Japanese, even though it may be only a feeler. The Mayor dwelt at some length on the need for assistance from the United States towards achieving peace at an early date. I reminded him of the President’s recent speech and the efforts of the Secretary of State to prevent a prolongation of the present struggle and said that it must be evident to all concerned that the Government of the United States would enthusiastically welcome some overtures for peace coming from either side. Supplementing my telegram No. 653, October 13, 5 p.m., I believe that, at least so far as offer to China is concerned, there is a clear indication of a movement taking form, participated in by both Chinese and Japanese, to bring hostilities to an end at an early date if that is at all possible. It is significant that the southward advance of the Japanese has apparently been practically unopposed since the fall of Paotingfu and Tsangchow. If there is a determination to continue the struggle, I am disposed to believe that it is centered largely at Nanking (rather than Tokyo) and is based not only on the belief that China can hold out for a long time on the Shanghai front, but on a hope that active assistance will be forthcoming from a third power plus moral support from some of the western powers. Briefly, if there is in fact a desire on the part of either the Japanese or the Chinese for an early termination of hostilities, it might possibly be an opportune moment to renew efforts to persuade the two countries to go the rest of the way to early and just peace by diplomatic negotiation, especially since they have already tested their mettle by force of arms. Repeated to Nanking and by courier to Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 762.94/178 [Document 673] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2631 Tokyo , October 15, 1937. [Received November 8.] Sir : Somewhat in amplification of the thoughts expressed in the Embassy’s recent despatch * on Italian-Japanese relations, I have the honor to observe that the question of an Italo-German-Japanese triangular rapprochement was brought into sharp relief a few days ago with the publication here of the signed article by Mussolini in Il Popolo D’Italia in which the Italian Premier came out strongly in support of Japan as defender against bolshevism in the Far East. This dramatic move, which marks a sudden termination of the policy of silent neutrality heretofore pursued by Italy in respect of the Sino-Japanese conflict, made a wide and profound impression upon this country; and great gratification was expressed when, on October 9, the Italian Ambassador, Mr. Auriti, called upon the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 32 and stated, according to the press, that Italy heartily supported Japan in her present struggle with China and considered her actions fully justified. The Italian Ambassador is further reported to have referred to the article in Il Popolo D’Italia and to have said that he hoped the attitude of the Italian people expressed therein would be conveyed to all the people of Japan. The Vice Minister is said to have replied: “At a time when the League of Nations and the United States are condemning Japan’s righteous action in China, I have no words to express the gratitude of Premier Konoye, Foreign Minister Hirota, and, in fact the whole Government and all the people for this expression of goodwill by Premier Mussolini, the Italian Government and the Italian people toward Japan. Please convey our heartfelt appreciation to II Duce.” It is significant that this sudden declaration on behalf of Japan on the part of Italy closely followed the return of the Italian Premier from his visit to Germany during the course of which the existence of a strong Berlin-Rome axis was emphasized together with the anti-communist solidarity of the two chief fascist nations. As was remarked in the Asahi Shinibun some two weeks ago. Mussolini’s visit to Berlin also had the effect of deeply impressing the people of Germany with the idea that cooperation between Germany, Italy and Japan would constitute a powerful bulwark against bolshevism and thus increased Germany’s goodwill toward Japan. The article in Il Popolo d’Italia under reference also stressed Japan’s “fascist character” and its anti-bolshevist attitude. It is therefore clear that this recent action of Italy vis-à-vis Japan virtually completes the third side of the German-Italian-Japanese anti-communist triangle, whose other two sides are reinforced by the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact and the Italian-German anti-communist front. As stated previously in the despatch under reference, it appears doubtful whether it will be considered necessary for Italy and Japan to enter into a formal anti-communist pact in view of their well-recognized identity of views toward communism; on the other hand Mussolini’s action reveals the natural tendency of the three strongest anti-communist states to proclaim their solidarity. This fact is of the greatest importance when considered in connection with the proposed meeting of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty for the purpose of discussing the present Sino-Japanese situation. Although Germany is not a signatory, Italy is, and while present press comment in Italy renders it open to question whether she will accept an invitation to the meeting, it appears certain that if she does participate she will probably—in view of her recently expressed stand in favor of Japan—destroy the moral effect which might be sought in a unanimous condemnatory resolution by voting against it. Furthermore, if Italy decides not to participate in the Nine-Power meeting, she may well prevail upon Portugal to break the unanimity which is so urgently striven for at meetings of this character by casting her vote contrary to that of the other participants. For that matter Portugal would probably need little prompting from Italy to play a contrary role at Brussels, or wherever the Nine-Power parley may be held, if we rightly judge her temper as expressed by the reply made to Secretary Hull’s July 16 statement. Japan’s present inclusion in the circle of fascist states is clear, but the question arises as to whether there is any basis for a permanent association of Japan with the fascist powers in the future. Judged by the light of the existing world political situation it would appear doubtful that there is any such basis. To begin with Japan is not essentially, or even superficially, a fascist state, if by the term “fascist state” we wish, as we should, to signify a nation which has adopted the totalitarian form which is to be found in Italy, and to a slightly modified degree, in Germany. The term “fascist” is, in fact, loosely employed by the press and the average political commentator, to describe those governments which oppose communism; but this is a gross misuse of the term. It would be as absurd to brand all antifascist states as “communist” states as to include all dictatorships or states where the military party is in the supremacy as “fascist” states. The latter term is descriptive of only a certain form of government under which the Government derives its authority from one, sole, political party in which are included all social classes (unlike the Soviet where the only political party is made up of one class only) and where, in point of fact, the party is the Government. There is a vast difference between this form of Government and that which exists in certain other states where there may be said to be a dictatorship, absolute or in modified form, either of an individual or of a group such as, for instance, the military. There is no doubt but that the military group in Japan are the most powerful force in the direction of this country’s affairs, but even the most biased observer could hardly include Japan in the group of true fascist, or totalitarian, states. The fact is that Germany, Italy and Japan are all actuated in their political affiliations by a policy of simple opportunism; these three are, in short, at least in the eyes of the territorially satisfied states, the outlaw states, the treaty-breakers, the unregenerate among nations. What, then, more natural than that they should cleave together in mutual interest? Far from being merely anti-communist in character, it is perfectly clear that these three have been driven together by a common policy opposed to the so-called democratic states. As for Japan, one has only to look at the group of states which she faces at the Nine-Power conference to see how natural it is for her to be driven into the Italian camp: The United States, Belgium, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, not to mention China itself—all these are “democratic” or at least territorially satisfied states, but not communist, not even China. There remain only Italy and Portugal and their friends to whom Japan can turn. Even the “fascist” portion of Spain has lately joined the group of Japan’s friends when the Franco 34 spokesman in Tokyo, Mr. Castillo, former Spanish Consul at Kobe, broke his policy of dignified silence to express on October 3, his “government’s” deep respect and sympathy for Japan “now engaged in a holy war of just and fair defense under the present emergency situation”. Politics make strange bedfellows, and international politics are no exception to the rule. Let any one of the “outlaw” group become territorially satisfied and the raison d’être for the adherence of that state to the foregoing group would be removed. After all, Italy found that even an ironclad, signed treaty of alliance was not sufficient in 1915 to tie her to Germany and Austria-Hungary. She joined the opposing camp and strove desperately to remain there following the war; and fascist state though she is, she had a strong political understanding with France as recently as 1935, and a traditional friendship with England, until her hunger for territory drove her to the Ethiopian campaign and with it, the sacrifice of her friendship with the democratic states. Desperation alone drove her to the establishment of the Berlin-Rome axis, despite the fact that Germany’s frontiers will some day threaten Italy at the Brenner if the “Anschluss” with Austria takes place. And most students of European politics are convinced that it surely will. Thus with Japan. From the very dawn of her modern history she has naturally fallen into close and friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States, and even though momentarily those relationships have been upset, her fundamental interests are inextricably bound up with those two nations. Between them the United States and the British Empire not only control the sources of most of the raw materials so vital to Japan’s existence, but at the same time they represent Japan’s greatest markets for the manufactured products of those raw materials. However, these two natural friends of Japan, in company with the other territorially satisfied nations of the world, have been largely instrumental in pursuing a policy, consciously or not, which has resulted in continually depriving Japan of the fruits of victory, both in the military and the politico-economic field; not only at Shimonoseki, Portsmouth, and Washington, but by the adoption of such measures as the Exclusion Act, the policy of “White Australia” and “White South Africa”, and by continuous economic pressure on the Asiatic mainland, which Japan regards as absolutely vital to her very existence. Consequently the pursuit of these policies has tended to render Japan’s territorial hunger and urge for economic expansion so acute that she embarked upon the Manchurian venture in 1931 and, now, the present venture in North China, with the result that she has become an “outcast” nation and in her search for friends she has been forced to turn to Germany and to Italy in order to avoid complete isolation. But such a grouping has been brought about solely through force of circumstances and if these circumstances change, the group will have a tendency to fall apart. Even the acquisition by Japan of territory in China which would to some extent meet her needs for raw materials would probably not prevent her from returning to her natural place within the Anglo-American sphere. The thought expressed in the foregoing pursues a parallel course to that expressed by the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, in recent conversations with me, † especially one on October 4, in which he said that moderate opinion in Japan and the substantial element of liberal thinkers in this country must stand or fall on the basis of American and British friendship; that if that friendship is lost the moderates will be equally lost for they will have no further basis on which to stand; the Japanese military will then become permanently predominant and Japan will be thrown directly into the arms of Germany, Italy, and other fascist countries. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew * Embassy’s despatch No. 2613, October 1, 1937. [Footnote in the original; for despatch, see vol. i , p. 606 .] 32 K. Horinouchi. 34 Spanish insurgent leader. † Despatch No. 2634, October 18, 1937, enclosure No. 7, page 2. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10696: Telegram [Document 674] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 16, 1937—10 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.] 1458–1460. Following from Davies: 35 “Moscow, 265, October 14, 10 p.m. For the President and the Secretary of State. I have had a long conference with … he stated the following: In August, last, the Soviet Government agreed to extend to his Government 36 a credit of 100,000,000 Chinese dollars for the purchase of war supplies. The deliveries already made have exceeded that amount. 400 Soviet planes of the best bombing and pursuit type have already been shipped to China and at least 40 Soviet instructors thereof are now with Chinese forces. Lighter supplies including airplanes have been shipped overland by air and also by caravans. He stated that 200 trucks are now in actual operation in caravan transport. Plans are also being projected for the shipment of heavy supplies by oversea route via French Indo-China with the cooperation of the French Government. A Chinese military mission has been here 6 weeks in connection with procurement of supplies and military training. He advises that England, France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia are furnishing war supplies on the basis of part cash and a large part credit and also that up to 10 days ago both Germany and Italy had been furnishing war supplies on a similar basis. The Italian arrangement was made on Italian initiative and provided for 50 percent credit and payment contingent on safe delivery in China. The Italian and German situation, he stated, may possibly have changed during the last 10 days. Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to China, arrived here on October 7 after a 9 day flight. The Soviet Military Attaché, Lapin, is expected in a few days. Their purpose is two-fold: To work out a closer and more extensive plan in connection with procurement of supplies and second to attempt to urge more direct action through actual military participation. The latter, he thinks, is exceedingly doubtful at present as the Government here apparently desires to maintain formally correct diplomatic relations. He also states that the Chinese Government forces have presently available military supplies sufficient for 6 months’ operations. He expressed confidence that if Japanese successes required it, the Chinese forces could gradually withdraw into the interior and withstand a long war if necessary and would be able to obtain adequate supplies through French Indo-China. I asked him his views as to formula for a possible settlement. His analysis was the following: Japan, he stated, would probably make maximum demands requiring, first, recognition of Manchukuo; second, agreement to the establishment of autonomous regimes in the five northern provinces; and, three, would require substantial concessions in tariff reductions. That their second alternative would be the same as the preceding except to require only two autonomous regimes, namely, Chahar and Hopei. This, he said, would entail giving up Peking which would have a disastrous moral effect upon the Orientals and would also involve difficulties with the Soviet Union and would therefore be practically impossible. He then stated it to be his opinion that the maximum Chinese concession would be the recognition of Manchukuo as a result of a compromise recommended by the powers provided that there would be a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China establishing the status quo ante . It occurred to me that it might be valuable for you to have his analysis. In connection with the transmission of these facts to you, he made the specific request that it be transmitted by code not from here but from Paris. I felt impelled to accede to his request and have sent this by courier to Paris for transmission by code from there. I regret the 48 hour delay involved thereby but it was unavoidable. I have also to report that the Japanese Ambassador made a friendly call when I was laid up in bed with a cold and in the course of the visit he brought up the Far Eastern situation. He attempted to justify the Japanese position on the widely published basis of the threat of Communism and the aggressive anti-Japanese attitude of the Chinese. In the course of the talk I stated my personal opinion to be that the Western World did not believe these were the true reasons, that Western democratic peoples believed that Japan was trying to gobble up China through sheer military force, and that the civilized world was shocked by the deliberate violation of sacred treaty obligations and by the inhuman air attacks on civilian populations and on women and children in violation of established rules of international law. He replied that that was not the truth. In my reply I suggested that it would be necessary for Japan to do something very vigorous to convince the world of the good faith of her professions as to China. While maintaining an aggressive attitude of loyalty to and wisdom of his Government, he expressed personal regret that the situation had developed in China and expressed the hope that Japan might make a statement or might take some action that would convince the world of its good faith in the near future. The implication was that it would be after the Japanese military success in the Shanghai district and after the face of the Japanese military forces would have been saved. He also stated that in his opinion if economic sanctions were applied and if the Soviet Union would come into the war, there would be nothing for Japan to do but to fight it out to the last man even if it ended in disaster. I obtained two very distinct impressions: First, that he was very much worried over the President’s Chicago speech and the Geneva situation, and, second, that a substantial part of the Japanese Government is badly worried and would welcome a solution provided they could find it and still save face.” Wilson 35 Ambassador in the Soviet Union. 36 The Chinese Government. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10697 [Document 675] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , October 16, 1937. Dear Mr. Grew : It is gratifying to me to have your letter of September 15 in which you discuss the subject of policy dealt with in your telegram of August 27 to me and my telegrams of August 28 37 and September 2 to you. It was very useful to me to have—and, as stated in my telegram of August 28, I appreciated your having given me—your telegram of August 27 and I was sure that you would find helpful what I gave you in my telegram of September 2. I am sure that your views and mins of the situation and of the general attitude and position which this Government has adopted and must maintain with regard to it are as nearly the same as can be possible, due consideration being given to the difference in the locations and the atmospheres in which you and I are respectively functioning. It has been very gratifying to me to observe the spirit in which and the skill with which you have handled the approaches which you have made to the Japanese Foreign Office, both those which you have made on your own initiative and those which you have made under and in accordance with express instructions, in regard to the delicate and difficult problems with which we have had to deal in our relations with Japan during the period while you have been representing this Government at Tokyo, and especially during the period of great perplexity which began on July 7. I have given very careful consideration to the suggestions which you were so good as to make in your telegram of August 27 and to the further analysis of problems and discussion of possibilities contained and communicated in your letter now under acknowledgment. It is useful to us to be reminded of various factors in the situation in Japan of which officers of the Department of course have a certain awareness but which need to be had vividly in mind. We know, of course, that the information which reaches the Japanese public is incomplete and probably considerably colored. Further—a point which you have not mentioned—we realize that it is not possible for us to keep you completely informed of all of the many developments which affect our attitude and influence our course. There is little that we can do with regard to the first of these matters except keep it in mind. On the second of these points, it is our constant desire to give you all that time and dictates of discretion make possible. In mentioning dictates of discretion, I have in mind especially the possibility or even likelihood that confidential communication by cable and by radio cannot be relied upon. I am making in my mind renewed note of the points which you bring out in the summary of the Embassy’s current thoughts which begins on page 5 of your letter. I can assure you that it is our desire to continue to employ those methods which have been ours since the beginning of the present administration. I fully realize the importance of exercising great patience and forbearance in relations with a people whose situation, psychology, problems, etc., are those of the Japanese. You will agree with me, I am sure, that the Japanese are making for themselves and for the rest of the world problems which seem more and more difficult of solution. They are, of course, not the only people who are doing that. We are, and we will have to continue to be, their neighbors. That fact this Government will at no time overlook. And, we will persevere in the effort to be a good neighbor. Toward further orienting you in regard to our general position, I enclose copies of two instructions which we sent by telegram to Mr. Harrison while the Assembly of the League was in session and was considering the Far Eastern question. 38 Further development of our attitude will doubtless occur in connection with and during the impending conference of powers party to the Nine Power Treaty. In its evolution, our course of action will of necessity be greatly influenced not only by the further activities of Japan and of China but by the attitude of and positions taken by other powers. I note your suggestion that your letter under reference be placed in the files, and I shall gladly implement that suggestion. Assuring you of my appreciation of the present detailed expression of your views and of my abiding confidence in your skillful handling of the many problems which devolve upon the important Embassy which is yours, in a difficult situation and at a difficult time, I am, Yours sincerely, Cordell Hull 37 Telegram No. 176, August 28, 3 p.m., not printed. 38 See telegrams No. 2, September 24, 6 p.m., and No. 7, September 28, 10 p.m., vol. iv , pp. 32 and 42 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10727: Telegram [Document 676] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 18, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 18—3:40 p.m.] 825. Peiping’s 659, October 15, 5 p.m. The determination of Nanking to continue the present struggle with Japan is based, if my estimate of the views of local officials responsible for that determination is correct, upon Nanking’s belief that it is waging a defensive struggle against military forces of Japan occupying Chinese territory. I do not discover here any willingness on the part of the Chinese authorities to concede Japan’s right to occupy North China in spite of the collapse of Chinese resistance. On the contrary, I find here a current conviction that North China is still Chinese territory in spite of Japanese military operations and believe that it will be difficult to persuade Nanking to accept any proposals for a peaceful solution of the present hostilities that will leave Japanese forces in possession of those areas. The prevailing opinion here, if I read it correctly, is that it rests with Tokyo to end present difficulties by withdrawing Japanese forces of invasion now operating on Chinese soil in Southern as well as Northern China. Japanese invasion of China has resulted in bringing into one camp all of the hitherto dissenting elements in the political life of China. This leadership of the country, which now includes Chinese who fought for the establishment of a Communist régime in China, would find it now difficult to accept a settlement of the present hostilities which would leave Japanese forces occupying Chinese territory. It is convinced of the righteousness of its position and does not yet feel that its power of resistance is exhausted. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10730: Telegram [Document 677] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 19, 1937—10 a.m. [Received October 19—6:30 a.m.] 826. 1. Nanking was raided twice during the night. Some 12 Japanese planes said to be from Lienyun harbor carrier came at 2:30 a.m., and dropped number of bombs in military airfield region causing a large fire believed to have been burning mat huts and poor dwellings near the airfield. Planes flew high, sky was cloudy. Another flight of Japanese planes of unknown number came in from the North at 4 a.m., flew over the Embassy and dropped more bombs in area of attack (these night raids followed closely after Japanese spokesman’s press interview at Shanghai yesterday in which he criticized Chinese for aerial operations at night when visibility poor and bombing necessarily inaccurate and stated that Japanese bombed only in daytime and only military objectives). 2. Another alarm at 9 a.m., which was reportedly caused by nine Japanese planes which again bombed Tanyang, southeast of Chinkiang. 3. Chinese state that (1) yesterday afternoon’s raid was conducted by 12 planes from Shanghai, (2) damage in airfield vicinity was slight, (3) one Japanese plane was shot down after raid by antiaircraft battery near Tangshan, 20 miles east of Nanking, and pilot who bailed out was captured. 4. Chinese sources also report that (1) Soochow was raided by Japanese planes 9 times yesterday and that railway tracks and passenger trains were targets for 50 bombs which caused little damage because most of them fell wide of mark, (2) Nanking-Shanghai Express which left here yesterday morning was bombed at Hushukwo Station midway between Wusih and Soochow but details of damage if any not reported, (3) two Japanese planes yesterday morning dropped four bombs at Hofei, Central Anwhei, working considerable damage. 5. Sent Department, repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10748: Telegram [Document 678] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 19—3:32 p.m.] 833. Tsingtao’s October 18, 3 p.m. 39 1. Captain Dorn 40 at Tsinan reports 17th that Japanese are continuing to withdraw along Tsinpu line and that as consequence Han Fu Chu’s 41 political plans, as Dorn envisages them, may be delayed since Japanese withdrawal would remove any excuse for change at the present time. He stated that such change was scheduled for October 19 or 20, Tsinan Paoantui and police have already been disarmed, Commander of 74th Division Li Han Chang has submitted resignation, Commander 20th Division Sun Tung Hsuan in all probability and Commanders of 81st and 22nd Divisions are in favor of peace plan. Dorn predicts that probably Shantung will become a buffer state between Yellow River and Lunghai Railway and that such arrangement is likely to be basis for Japanese peace proposals. 2. Dorn states that according to local opinion Japanese withdrawal is due to (1) situation in Shansi and (2) Soviet Russian assistance to rebels in Manchuria. 3. According to Chiang Kai-shek’s adviser, Donald, confirmation of a report of Japanese withdrawal has not been received, the Japanese were still in Tehchow last evening, and any withdrawal will be (1) for the purpose of shortening their line or (2) because of no serious reverse in Shansi which he confirmed. He states definitely that no Soviet assistance is being received at present by China, Soviet Russia does not want to become involved in hostilities with Japan, Soviet-Japanese hostilities are unlikely until at least after the Nine Power Conference unless, possibly, a crushing Japanese defeat in the northwest should influence the Russians to positive action. 4. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 39 Not printed. 40 Capt. Frank Dorn, U.S.A., language officer. 41 Chairman of Shantung Provincial Government. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10747: Telegram [Document 679] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 4:48 p.m.] 831. Embassy’s 826, October 19, 10 a.m. 1. Another air raid began 12:40 p.m. today. Twelve heavy bombers accompanied by 3 pursuits in successive flights dropped about 15 bombs in military airfield region and 12 along Pukow water front. Observers on U. S. S. Luzon which was rocked by the wash from bombs falling in the river were of opinion that bombs dropped at Pukow were 500 pounds in weight. Pukow objective was apparently railway ferry spur and terminus, bombs fell in and near railway yards, destroyed and set fire to number of huts and small dwellings and caused number of civilian casualties. Bombing planes and Japanese pursuit flew very high, well over 10,000 feet and out of range of anti-aircraft guns which constituted only defense and one flight as usual passed over Embassy before unloading. Two buildings of airfield were reportedly damaged but no Chinese planes or military personnel were destroyed. 2. Sent Department, repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/81: Telegram [Document 680] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 1468–1470. In the course of a conversation this morning with the Chinese Ambassador 42 he said that he had been greatly disturbed yesterday to learn from the French Foreign Office that the French Government had prohibited shipments in transit through Indo-China of arms, munitions and war material destined for China. As soon as he had heard of this action he had gone to the Foreign Office and made representations. He was informed that a decision in this sense had been taken at a meeting last week of the French Ministers having to do with national defense (doubtless the inter-ministerial meeting which also considered the Mediterranean problem). The decision was taken on the ground that France was too exposed as regards her possessions in Indo-China to risk being placed in a position which might cause retaliation on the part of Japan, that the French Government would be prepared to continue to permit the transit through Indo-China of arms and munitions if there was some concerted agreement or action by the other powers which would protect France. Wellington Koo said that he had protested against this decision pointing out that it ran contrary to the recommendation of the League Assembly, that nothing should be done which would weaken China’s power of resistance. Furthermore he had pointed out that under the arrangements concerning the railway between Indo-China and the Province of Yunnan it was provided that transit shipments would not be interfered with; also that in the treaty of 1930 between China and France relating to Indo-China 43 it had been provided that the shipment in transit through Indo-China of arms and munitions for China would benefit from the exemption of customs duties. The Ambassador said that he took the position that since there was no war in the Far East according to the Japanese, the French were acting in violation of conventional obligations in prohibiting transit shipments. He said, however, that while he had obtained the impression that the prohibition would stand for the time being he had also been given to understand that the French would be prepared to discuss the matter at the Brussels Conference and to consider modifying their attitude if some agreement among the powers regarding the Far East should result from the conference which would protect the French Government. Wellington Koo said that this was a serious matter for China. Since the Japanese blockade had been established China had been receiving shipments of war materials mainly through Hong Kong and through Indo-China. The damage done to the Canton–Hankow railway by bombing from the air had made it difficult to move the stock of munitions which had been piling up at Hong Kong. Furthermore there happened to be several ships en route at present for Indo-China with cargoes of munitions which it was important for the Chinese Government to obtain. He said that he understood in the strictest confidence that there was a division of opinion in the French Cabinet regarding this matter. The Socialist Ministers were in favor of maintaining transit shipments through Indo-China; the Radical Socialists with the sole excepton of Daladier, the Minister of National Defense, insisted that with the present situation in Europe it was too risky for France to run any danger of incurring retaliation from Japan. He understood that the matter would again be considered at the Council of Ministers which was to take place this morning but he does not expect any modification in the French position prior to the Brussels Conference. Wellington Koo said that he found surprisingly little interest being paid to the Far Eastern situation by the “higher ups” in the French Foreign Office. His impression is that the Foreign Office is so concerned with the Spanish and Mediterranean problems that it has not yet found the opportunity to think out carefully the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East. He went on to say that the attitude of the French Government in the matter of transit shipments through Indo-China had apparently been guided by the reports received from the French Naval Attaché at Tokyo of conversations with the Japanese naval authorities: The Naval Attaché had apparently become convinced that, unless these transit shipments were stopped, Japan would take some action against Indo-China. Wellington Koo said that he felt this was nothing but an attempt at blackmail as he did not believe that Japan would undertake any action against Indo-China: However, with the French Government so concerned with the Mediterranean, they were leaning over backwards in being cautious regarding the Far East. I asked whether there were any developments regarding the attitude of Soviet Russia in the Far East. Wellington Koo said that, while the Soviet Government was not giving direct military aid, it was furnishing war material to China. He said that, prior to the adoption of the Advisory Committee’s report by the League Assembly, the Soviet Government had been reluctant to do very much in the way of funishing material: It desired to avoid any action which might give the appearance that Russia alone of the other powers was assisting China, thereby incurring the danger of serious difficulties with Japan. Since the adoption, however, of the Advisory Committee’s report at Geneva, providing that each country should examine the possibilities it might have of assisting China, the Russian Government had felt that it was “covered” and had increased its assistance to China. He also said that the Soviet Government had been particularly helpful in a diplomatic way, as for instance in the drafting and discussion of reports and resolutions at Geneva. Wellington Koo said, however, that he saw no indication that the Soviet Government, at least for the present, intended to take any more of an active interest in the Far Eastern conflict than was involved in the furnishing of war material: If the conflict should drag out for some time and Japan show signs of becoming exhausted, then there might be a change in Soviet policy. Wilson 42 V. K. Wellington Koo. 43 Signed at Nanking, May 16, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxii , p. 99. The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10783: Telegram (part air) [Document 681] The Chargé in Germany ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , October 20, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 21—12:20 p.m.] 250. I conversed today with the individual described in my 209, August 30, 5 p.m. 44 who informed me that in line with the second paragraph of that telegram he had paid a visit to Berchtesgaden. He said that he had impressed his views concerning Germany’s Far Eastern policy on Hitler’s entourage and had prepared a memorandum on this subject which Hitler had read. He had learned authoritatively in Berchtesgaden that Hitler’s policy respecting the Far East was “to remain friendly to Japan but not be against China”. In view of this he had not urged a definitely pro-Chinese policy but rather that Germany adopt a more strictly neutral position. He told me that he had become still more convinced after his conversations in Berchtesgaden that the underlying factor in Germany’s sympathy with Japan was Hitler’s belief that communism existed to a menacing extent in China. My informant stated that there is a hidden but definite strife now in progress between the pro-Chinese and the pro-Japanese elements in Germany—the Foreign Office, the Economics Ministry and the War Ministry being pro-Chinese together with the majority of German editors and journalists; while the map-toying influence of Ribbentrop 45 and largely on a purely ideological basis is pro-Japanese. He stated, however, that the party was not solid in this matter as the idea was becoming increasingly current that not only is there no real communism in China but that Japan’s assault on China would be advantageous to bolshevism by throwing China into the arms of Russia. Rosenberg, for example, he said, was now convinced that the German pro-Japanese policy was a mistake. He felt that it was at present hard to say what result these conflicting ideas might have in respect of Germany’s ultimate Far Eastern policy. My informant added that from his examination of this question he believed that Italy’s favoring Japan was due in part to Mussolini’s remembrance that China imposed sanctions on Italy in the Ethiopian affair while Japan did not. I stated that I believed that the chief reason for the sudden exhibition of Italy’s favoring Japan was based on the desire to strike at Great Britain wherever the chance afforded. He agreed with this saying that Italy’s Far Eastern policy was undoubtedly governed largely by European considerations. I myself am inclined to feel that despite the views expressed above European considerations should be assessed in respect of Germany’s policy as well toward the Far East. My present general belief is that Germany is holding herself in a position of relative neutrality and will continue to do so in order to take advantage of any future developments. My informant told me that Germany was continuing her military mission in China on an active basis as evidenced by the circumstance that three additional officers were proceeding to China this month and that one would go next month. He also believes that German munitions are being moved to China possibly in part by the Richmer line of ships although as shipments are also probably being made through Antwerp, Rotterdam, or other ports, movements of munitions are almost impossible to trace. Copy by mail to Rome and to Brussels for American Nine Power Treaty delegation. Gilbert 44 Not printed. The informant was a leader in the “German-Chinese Society for Economic Cooperation” who had been on two missions to China. 45 German Ambassador in the United Kingdom. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10754: Telegram [Document 682] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 20, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 20—9:44 a.m.] 481. Our 444, October 4, 2 p.m. The following is text in translation of a memorandum in which the Foreign Office replies: “Number 130, Asia I. Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, October 19, 1937. Memorandum. The Japanese Foreign Office presents its compliments to the American Embassy and, having duly noted the proposal set forth in the aide-mémoire of October 4 from the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo 46 with regard to the use by the Japanese forces of the Shanghai International Settlement, has the honor to make the following reply: Japan’s present military operations at Shanghai had their origin in the fact that China massed quantities of troops around the Settlement and defied the Japanese landing force charged with protection of Japanese residents there. Thereafter China mobilized and rapidly brought up a large number of troops over a wide area in the rear of Shanghai, and assumed an antagonistic attitude against the greatly outnumbered Japanese forces. The Japanese army was therefore obliged to despatch reenforcements for reasons of defense. The area of military operations has been necessarily enlarged. Because of the need of protecting the International Settlement and because of the inherent right to protect Japanese residents, the Japanese Government is of opinion exception cannot properly be taken to the action of the Japanese army in landing troops necessary for defense, and munitions of war, in the northern area of Shanghai, an area allotted to Japan for purposes of guarding, in order to carry on military operations against Chinese forces which constitute the menace. Japan, as one power in the International Settlement, has large rights and interests there, as have also other powers. As a result of military operations against China, which assumed an unwarrantably provocative attitude in the present instance, Japan is now sustaining heavy sacrifices. In view of the fact that the Japanese Government is keenly alive to the safety and the rights and interests of nationals of other powers, it is bending every effort to the protection of such rights and interests, and is consequently obliged to use part of the International Settlement in the present military operations.” Repeated to Nanking. Grew 46 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 378 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10758: Telegram [Document 683] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 20, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 20—11:39 a.m.] 483. Our 475, October 15, 5 p.m. 47 1. The following is quoted from a letter dated October 12 from the Japanese representative of Reuter’s agency to his principals in London. “Just for your information and because I believe the company’s interests may be considerably affected I give below my ideas of what the Japanese rightists would demand if they are successful in ‘crushing China to her knees’. I propose to amend or add to these terms from time to time as I see occasion. (1) Recognition of Manchukuo. (2) An economic bloc consisting of Japan, Manchukuo, North China, and the Chinese Republic. (3) An autonomous anti-Communist North China under Japanese protection with control of all taxes and customs revenues. (4) An autonomous anti-Communist Inner-Mongolia under the protection of the ‘independent’ empire of Manchukuo or alternatively inclusion of Inner-Mongolia in Manchukuo. (5) A Japanese inspector-general of customs. Japanese advisers in all national departments and prefectural governments. (6) Revision of China’s tariffs to promote the exchange of Japan’s finished goods against China’s raw materials. (7) Chiang Kai-shek to be replaced by a pro-Japanese statesman. (8) China to join the anti-Communist bloc. (9) China to be demilitarized, her military forces being confined to peace preservation corps. (10) China will not be permitted to possess any commercial or military airplanes. (11) Air services in China will be operated cooperatively: China providing the aerodromes and ground staff and Japan the machines and pilots. (12) Japan may demand larger concessions at the coastal treaty ports: Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow and Canton with grounds for military aerodromes. She may also desire to retain certain islands along the coast already in her possession such as those lying off Haichow in the Yangtze estuary off Wenchow and the Pratas planning to use these as bases for bombing interior points which show any signs of anti-Japanism or refusal to implement the peace terms. This if carried through would mean that semi-hostilities would continue indefinitely in the Yangtze valley and trade would therefore be at a standstill. (13) I consider it likely that Japan will demand the right to ‘cooperate’ with the Chinese Government in the working of its official news agency and all China’s broadcasting stations and wireless emissions as it has become obvious that control of the dissemination of news and guidance of public opinion is vitally important if Japan’s policies in China are to be carried out successfully”. 2. With certain exceptions such as points 9 to 11 which seem to be speculative we believe that the foregoing is an intelligent and substantially accurate estimate of Hirota’s “three points” when translated into concrete terms. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 47 Vol. iv , p. 80 . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10772: Telegram [Document 684] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 21, 1937—9 a.m. [Received October 21—5:30 a.m.] 841. W. W. Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to Germany, is proceeding shortly to Germany and Chen Kung Po, former Minister of Industry who became very friendly with Ciano 48 when the latter was minister to China, is proceeding to Italy presumably for the purpose of enlisting the support of those governments for China in the present conflict. Johnson 48 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/82: Telegram [Document 685] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 21, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 21—12:30 p.m.] 1482. Reference Embassy’s 1468 to 1470, October 19, 4 p.m. The Chinese Ambassador states in confidence that he saw Delbos 49 yesterday regarding the prohibition of transit shipments through Indo-China, and pressed for a reconsideration of the matter by the French Government, stating that it was “a question of life and death for China”. Delbos gave Wellington Koo to understand that he would ask Chautemps 50 to have the matter considered again by the French Ministers dealing with national defense. Bullitt 49 French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 50 President of the French Council of Ministers (Premier). The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/83: Telegram [Document 686] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State 51 Paris , October 22, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 10:14 a.m.] 1488. I discussed with Chautemps last evening the domestic and foreign situations. He was more tranquil and happier than at any time since his Cabinet was formed. 1. Far East: I asked Chautemps if it were indeed true that the French Government had forbidden all shipments of munitions of war through French Indo-China to China. He replied that this was true; but that the decision was subject to revision if the meeting of the Nine Power Conference in Brussels should prove that an alteration should be practicable. He went on to say that the French action had been taken for two reasons. In the first place the railroad from French Indo-China to China was owned by Frenchmen and the Japanese had threatened to bombard that portion of the railroad within Chinese territory unless shipments of munitions to Chiang Kai-shek should be stopped at once. Furthermore the Japanese Ambassador in Paris had called on him and “in a most polite way but letting him feel they were inexcusable [ the iron ]” had pointed out to him that in case France should be engaged in a European war, French colonies in the Far East would have no means of protection and that the Japanese were a people who remembered those who had been friendly and those who had been unfriendly and that it would be a very good thing for France to have a friendly Japan in case she should be at war in Europe. Chautemps then went on to say that the French Government would be prepared to reverse its decision with regard to shipment of munitions across French Indo-China (adding that he knew it was a matter of life and death for Chiang Kai-shek to receive munitions by this route) provided the Nine Power Conference in Brussels should decide on such joint action as to make the position of French Indo-China safe. France herself had no means whatsoever of protecting herself. I asked him what action he envisaged and he replied that any action depended entirely on the United States. The United States alone of all the great powers was in a position to apply both its moral influence and force in the Far East. Whether the Nine Power Conference did anything or not would depend entirely on what action the United States was prepared to take in the Pacific. So far as he was concerned he had been giving very little thought to the Far East which was extremely remote from France. There was an old French proverb in which he believed which ran as follows: “you sweep your own door step before you sweep the street”. France was so occupied by grave problems in Europe that she could not occupy herself today with the remote problem of the Far East. Chautemps did not ask me what action if any the United States would propose at the Brussels Conference and I of course made no statement whatever on this subject. He asked me however if the oil and rubber supplies of the Dutch East Indies would be sufficient to keep Japan adequately supplied with oil and rubber if the Japanese should attack and capture the Dutch East Indies. I said that it was my impression that these supplies would be adequate. He then said that would mean that before the Dutch could join in any action displeasing to Japan they would have to be assured that the American Fleet would protect their colonies in the East Indies. 52 Bullitt 51 The four sections of this message were transmitted as telegrams Nos. 1488–1491. For sections 2 and 3, dealing with Germany and Spain, see vol. i , p. 147 . Section 4, on the domestic situation, is not printed. 52 Later in the same conversation, “Chautemps expressed the opinion that no effective action could be taken in the Far East unless and until a genuine peace had been established on the continent of Europe so that England, France, Germany and Italy could cooperate as friends.” (Telegrams Nos. 1489–1490, October 22, vol. i , p. 147 . The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10803: Telegram [Document 687] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , October 22, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 22—1:40 p.m.] The Mayor of Tsingtao invited me this morning to discuss the situation in Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung. He referred to numerous current rumors that an agreement had been reached between Han Fu Chu and Japan executives [ military? ], that a Peace Preservation Commission had been established in Tsinanfu which if true would commit Shantung to a separate policy and freedom of action in north. The Mayor went at length to explain that he had denied negotiation of such an agreement with Japan and had “severely rebuked” the leaders of the Peace Preservation Commission movement. It appears to the Consulate that the Mayor’s elaborate explanation was intended to cover what was probably already a fait accompli , that is a Han-Japanese understanding in regard to Shantung and a movement in Tsingtao [for?] separation from Nanking in the politico-military sphere. Sent to Nanking, Peiping. Sokobin The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10800: Telegram [Document 688] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 22, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 22—1:07 p.m.] 690. Embassy’s 679, October 20, 4 [ 7 ] p.m. 53 1. There are reports that the Japanese are making efforts to form a regime before the convening of the Nine Power Conference, with either Tang Erh Ho 54 or Tsao Kun 55 as its head. 2. The local Japanese military spokesman stated this afternoon that Japanese forces have captured a bridge of the Peiping–Hankow Railway at the Chang River in extreme northern Honan. He gave out no other information. He denied yesterday’s reports of Japanese withdrawal along the Tientsin–Pukow Railway. Japanese press claims Japanese were within 25 miles of Tsinanfu October 20. The spokesman said yesterday that Japanese forces had practically completed occupation of Hsinkow, 45 miles north of Taiyuan. 3. The spokesman also stated that air mail has been established from today between Tientsin and Tokyo; using Japanese stamps. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 53 Not printed. 54 Retired member of Peking governments between 1922 and 1927. 55 President of China, 1923–24. For correspondence concerning the “resignation” of President Tsao in 1926, see Foreign Relations , 1926, vol. i , pp. 609 – 617 . The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 793.94111/83: Telegram [Document 689] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , October 22, 1937—7 p.m. 545. With reference to your telegrams 1468, 1482, and 1488, by direction of the President, I talked to Henry 56 this morning. I told him that the President wished Chautemps to know that while, of course, he desired to make it clear that he intended in no way to touch upon questions involving the national defense policy of France, he feared that the measures under reference might result in the creation of a situation prior to the opening of the Brussels Conference which might be prejudicial to the successful achievement of that solution by agreement which this Government earnestly hopes may be attained in the conference. Henry told me that he would send this message as secret and solely for Chautemps. The President asks that this telegram be not recorded in your ordinary files. Welles 56 French Counselor of Embassy in the United States and Chargé d’Affaires. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11023 [Document 690] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2626 Tokyo , October 22, 1937. [Received November 8.] Sir : I have the honor to review in the present despatch the evidences which have come to the Embassy during the first three weeks of October 1937 of a changing Japanese public reaction to the attitude assumed by the United States toward the hostilities in the Far East. This changing reaction can be summarized thus: (1) At the opening of the month there was in Japan ( a ) general recognition that American opinion opposed Japan’s actions in China and ( b ) common knowledge that the American Government was making, and continuing to make, firm representations with regard to American damages suffered through Japanese activities in the hostilities. (2) Following the President’s Chicago address of October 5 and the Department’s declaration of October 6 feeling against the United States mounted sharply. This feeling resulted from ( a ) resentment at being condemned and ( b ) uncertainty as to American intentions of coercing Japan. (3) With the passage of the two weeks which have since elapsed, the outburst against the United States has become less articulate. At the same time the public conviction has become settled and accepted that the United States has prejudiced the issues between Japan and China, thereby abandoning any right to influence the terms of settlement. The due respect on the part of Japan for American opposition to Japan’s actions in China was expressed to the Embassy by a responsible Japanese (Embassy’s telegram 449, October 5, 6 p.m.) as late as the morning of October 5, before receipt here of news of the President’s speech. The Japanese referred to stated at that time that Japanese official circles were of opinion that the American Government’s representations had been reasonable and considerate of Japanese susceptibilities. His statement was a fair reflection of the impression which had come to the Embassy from other sources also. On October 6 the Japanese newspapers featured news of the President’s Chicago speech. Comparison with the full text shows that the Japanese reports were fairly accurate, though extracts only. The following morning the editorials of the two principal Japanese newspapers were given to the subject (Embassy’s telegram 456, October 7, 5 p.m.) Close on the heels of the President’s address came news of the Department’s October 6 statement, which was carried sensationally in all the Japanese newspapers of October 8. 57 Outspoken editorials thereafter appeared in all the important papers, and the public’s principal topic of news was this question, as interpreted by the Japanese press. Translations of editorials are enclosed herewith (enclosures 1 to 7). 58 Alongside reports of the American attitude toward Japan the newspapers of October 7 gave prominence to a Domei telegram from Rome reporting a signed article by Mussolini expressing approval of Japan’s aims and methods in the China conflict. The press has in fact shown, since the President’s address and the Department’s declaration, an increasing tendency to accept as a now closed matter an international alignment of Japan with Germany and Italy against the territory-possessing countries of the world. It should be recorded that, for better or for worse, the Department’s October 6 declaration coincided in time with the period of Japan’s settling down to the serious business of war. By the end of September the initial exhilaration of hostilities was over, and the public was beginning to realize, as the nation’s leaders already realized, that a huge effort would be necessary to attain success in the China undertaking. All Japanese were beginning to hear of friends lost in the fighting; the second heavy wave of calling up men to military service, obviously to carry through what was proving difficult, had just got under way. Just as the country was soberly taking a second breath, for the first time generally conscious of the sacrifices necessary, with determination setting itself to seeing the crusade through, came the clear condemnation embodied in the Department’s declaration. The degree of reaction to it was in part a consequence of this coincidence. Whether in the long run the impression made by the declaration on the people of Japan will be the deeper by reason of the timing of the statement is a question for the future to decide. For the present the reaction is resentment and the conviction that the United States cannot now be impartial in any international effort to restore peace in the Far East. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Cabot Coville Second Secretary of Embassy 57 See telegram No. 459, October 8, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iv , p. 66 . 58 None printed. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/84: Telegram [Document 691] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 23, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 4 p.m.] 1496–1500. For the Acting Secretary. My 1488, October 22, 9 a.m. Last evening I asked Delbos for an explanation of the French action in forbidding the shipment of munitions through French Indo-China to China. Delbos said that yesterday afternoon there had been another discussion of this question in a small gathering of the most important members of the Government. Certain members of the Government had desired to lift the ban altogether but he had insisted that it should be maintained until the meeting of the Brussels Conference. His reasons were that the Japanese had threatened not only to destroy the portion within China of the railroad leading from French Indo-China to China but also had threatened to seize the Chinese island of Hainan in the Gulf of Tonkin and also the Paracel Islands. He said that these islands had long been in dispute between China and France. Japan now was claiming that the Paracel Islands were Chinese territory and that Japan therefore had a perfect right to seize them. Delbos went on to say that if all the nations represented in the Brussels Conference should decide to supply China via their territories with munitions, France would be disposed to collaborate and permit shipments via Indo-China on condition that if Japan should attack French Indo-China France would receive physical support from the other members of the Brussels Conference in protecting Indo-China. He added that he was not at all sure that if the matter should come to actual conflict Siam would not cooperate with Japan. Both Japan and Italy had great influence at the moment with the Siamese Government. Delbos added that he feared that Indo-China soon would be the only route of supply open to China and that therefore Japan would act against Indo-China. He believed the Soviet Union had supplied a few airplanes to China but was virtually certain that no other supplies had been sent by the Soviet Union to China. His information indicated that it was almost impossible for the Soviet Union to make any shipments of importance to China by any land route. He also felt certain that the Soviet Union had no intention whatever of intervening in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. I asked Delbos what he believed might be accomplished by the Brussels Conference. He replied that he could not see that the Conference could accomplish anything but, on the spot, it might be possible to invent something. The position of the United States would be decisive. He would attend the opening meeting of the Conference and Eden, who had been reluctant to go, had been persuaded by him to attend at least for the opening of the Conference. After talking with Delbos I dined alone with Blum 59 who threw further light on the decision of the French to prohibit shipments of munitions to China through French Indo-China. Blum said that he had brought up this question again yesterday afternoon at the small meeting of the leading members of the Government to which Delbos had referred. He had suggested that at least until the meeting of the Brussels Conference, shipments through Indo-China should continue to be permitted. There had been objection that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments had been informed that the French Government had decided to forbid these shipments. Blum said that he had insisted, and finally it had been agreed that without any further statements to the Chinese and Japanese Governments all shipments now enroute would be allowed to pass through French Indo-China to China. Blum went on to say that it was obvious that if the war in China should be prolonged French Indo-China would be the one route by which China could receive munitions. This would almost certainly lead Japan to destroy the railroad within Chinese territory and might lead to a Japanese attack on French Indo-China. He also referred to the possibility that Siam might cooperate with Japan. Blum went on to say that this would leave France in a most exposed position and that if the Brussels Conference should decide that all the nations represented should supply China with munitions according to their ability and should encourage France to keep open the route via Indo-China it would be essential that at the same time they should promise France not to leave France alone to defend Indo-China in case of Japanese attack. He added that he believed that if England, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States should take a strong line unitedly there would be no danger whatever of Japan attacking any one of them. He said, however, that he was extremely skeptical with regard to the position of the Soviet Union. He had had many discussions with Litvinov 60 in Geneva recently. Litvinov had talked to him frankly as an old friend. Litvinov had said that he and the Soviet Union were perfectly delighted that Japan had attacked China. He believed that Japan would be so weakened financially and economically and would have such enormous difficulty in digesting a conquered China that the Soviet Union was now completely assured of peace in the Far East for many years to come. Litvinov had added that the Soviet Union hoped that war between China and Japan would continue just as long as possible and would result in an attempt by the Japanese to swallow just as much of China as possible. This would leave the Soviet Union free for operations in Europe. Blum said that he had argued with Litvinov that it was a vital interest of the Soviet Union to prevent the conquest of China by Japan since Japan’s ultimate object was to capture Vladivostok and to establish the Japanese frontier at Lake Baikal. Litvinov had laughed at this, proving that no matter how long the war in China might endure and no matter how much of China Japan might conquer, the Soviet Union would remain passive. Litvinov had said that whereas before the Japanese attack on China, Japan had been most hostile and aggravating, today the Japanese were all politeness and butter in their relations with the Soviet Government. The present ironclad position seems to be that while the Government has informed both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that France has forbidden shipments through French Indo-China to China; in reality, these shipments will continue to go through until the question has been discussed at the Brussels Conference. I asked Blum what he thought might be accomplished by the Brussels Conference. After a long silence he said that he thought the Conference could accomplish nothing unless the United States should be prepared to guarantee with force French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. If the Department desires me to take any definite line with regard to the question of transit through Indo-China I should be obliged for instructions. I have limited myself strictly to questions and have expressed no opinions. Bullitt 59 Vice President of the French Council of Ministers. 60 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/86: Telegram [Document 692] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 23, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 10 p.m.] 1505–7. For the Acting Secretary only. Your 545, October 22, 7 p.m. Léger 61 telephoned me this morning at about 11:50 and asked me if I could come to the Foreign Office at once to discuss with him a message from Washington to Chautemps. Before I had time to leave the Embassy he telephoned again to say that Delbos preferred to have me call on him. I saw Delbos at 12:20 p.m. He had on his desk a large map of China and French Indo-China with which he illustrated his remarks. He said that Chautemps had asked him to see me at once because of the message from the President to Chautemps which had been transmitted through you and Henry. He hoped that I would explain to the President that the French Government had had no desire whatsoever to prejudice the possibility of solution by agreement at the Brussels Conference. He felt that he was as idealistic in his attitude toward foreign affairs as anyone in the world; but it was necessary to measure one’s idealism against the hard facts of any situation. The facts were that through a number of representatives the Japanese Government had informed the French Government that unless the shipment of munitions to China through French Indo-China should cease, the Japanese would seize the large island of Hainan which is a Chinese possession at the entrance to the Gulf of Tonkin and in addition the Paracel Islands the sovereignty of which has been for a long time in dispute between China and France. Furthermore, the Japanese had said that they would destroy that portion of the French railroad from Tonkin to Yunnanfu within Chinese territory. Delbos went on to say that this railroad was the most expensive railroad per mile that had ever been built. It was a constant succession of tunnels and bridges and all traffic on it could be interrupted comparatively easily by bombardment from the air. The Japanese statements therefore had not been idle threats. The new railroad from Tonkin to Kwangsi had not been completed but was being used as a motor road over which shipments of munitions of France were being sent in trucks. This road ran much closer than the railroad to Yunnanfu to the positions that the Japanese had already occupied in Kwangtung and it would be possible to bombard it even more easily than the railroad to Yunnanfu. Moreover the Japanese Government had intimated politely that at some future date an attack on French Indo-China might not be out of the question. The fact was that France had no means of defending French Indo-China today. It was impossible to send the entire French Fleet from the Mediterranean to Indo-China at the present time. The French Government had reconsidered the question of shipments through French Indo-China at a meeting of leading members of the French Cabinet yesterday afternoon. It had then been decided that in spite of the decision of the French Government to stop this traffic, which decision had been communicated to the Chinese and Japanese, the French Government would in fact continue to permit shipments of munitions through French Indo-China to China if those munitions had already been ordered and were on the way. Delbos asked that this decision of the French Government should be held as an absolute secret. It would have the effect of permitting the continuance of shipments through Indo-China until the Brussels Conference had had a chance to meet and consider this question. If at the Brussels Conference the other signatories of the Nine Power Pact should decide that they should all continue to support China by shipments of munitions and by permitting the transit of munitions the French Government would gladly agree to continue shipments through Indo-China but on condition that the other parties to the Nine Power Pact should agree in case Japan should take reprisals against French Indo-China that they would take similar reprisals against Japan. I made no comment on this statement other than to say that the Chinese Ambassador had telephoned to say that he wished to see me urgently and that he was to lunch with me immediately after my conversation at the Foreign Office. I asked whether or not the French Government had communicated to the Chinese Ambassador the decision of the French Government of yesterday afternoon to permit in fact the continuance of shipments through Indo-China. Delbos replied that the communication had not been made and that he would be glad if I should make the communication to the Chinese Ambassador after having impressed on him the necessity of keeping this information absolutely secret. I said that I would do so and made the communication to Wellington Koo an hour later. Delbos and I agreed that no mention whatsoever should be made of the President’s message to Chautemps or of the reply. You will perceive that Delbos’ formal statement to me this morning in reply to the President’s message to Chautemps was substantially the same as his statement to me last night (reported in my numbers 1496 to 1504 [ 1500 ] of October 23) with the exception that last night Delbos did not mention the decision which had just been made to continue shipments pending a decision by the Brussels Conference. Blum’s statement to me last night (reported in my telegram 1497, October 23, 1 p.m., section 2) gave this additional fact. I believe that Delbos’ statements give an honest picture of the situation and are entirely sincere. Bullitt 61 Secretary General, French Foreign Office. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/85: Telegram [Document 693] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 23, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 10:10 p.m.] 1508–9. In the course of my conversation at luncheon today with Wellington Koo he made the following statements to me. 1. In strictest confidence he said that whereas General Chiang Kai-shek had been confident that he had sufficient munitions to carry on war for approximately 6 months, it now appeared that the rate of expenditures of munitions had been greater than anticipated. It was therefore his (Koo’s) personal opinion that the supply of munitions on hand could not last much longer than the first of January unless additional supplies should be received by way of French Indo-China. 2. Koo said that there was a Chinese military mission hidden in the country near Moscow which was negotiating daily with the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government had now agreed to furnish 350 planes to the Chinese Government. It appeared to be impracticable to ship munitions in any considerable quantity either across the Gobi desert or by way of Sinkiang. The Soviet Government had promised also to send a number of military technicians to China. 3. Koo was especially anxious to obtain from me some idea of the line which the American delegation might be expected to take at the conference in Brussels. I replied that I had no information whatsoever on this subject and that I could not speculate with regard to it. So far as I knew the conference would be a genuine conference for consultation with regard to bringing about a solution by agreement of the situation in China. If the Department should desire me to take any line in the daily conversations which are inevitable in Paris with members of the government and ambassadors I should be grateful for information and instructions. Bullitt The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10827: Telegram [Document 694] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , October 25, 1937—9 a.m. [Received October 25—8 a.m.] 276. For the President and the Secretary of State. Supplementing my telegram No. 265, October 14, 10 p.m., 62 I have the honor to report that today I received certain further information supplementary to the said cable and on the same authority which is as follows: The Soviet Government refuses any definite commitment with reference to direct military aid and cooperation with China despite strong attitude of influential Far Eastern Soviet officials and some support here in military and other circles. Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to China, is still here. He will not return to China nor will he receive final instructions until conclusion of Brussels Conference. Same authority advises that in his opinion France is throwing cold water here on project of commitments for direct military aid to China by Russia because it prefers that its ally should husband its strength against a possible German attack and not deplete its energies in the Far East. It was also stated that China is finding serious difficulties by restrictions on shipments through French Indo-China as a route for supplies. Overseas shipments are required to be split up and mixed with non-contraband goods on account of risk. There are indications that France fears lest it might become involved through shipments via this route. France and the Soviet Union are reluctant to become the spearhead in the situation without assurance of support from great powers. With adequate supplies China, it is claimed, could make strong defense indefinitely. Difficulty does not lie in procuring supplies but in their transport. Informant also advised that Germany’s attitude is not unfavorable to China and that despite formal objection raised by Japan to presence German instructors in Chinese armed forces German Government refused to require their return on the ground that it was a matter of private and individual enterprise. China deeply disappointed by England’s alleged premature statement relative to sanctions and deeply grateful for President’s Chicago speech. They contrast less performance than they had reason to hope for from England with much greater moral support from the United States than they had reason to expect. The Japanese Ambassador left here Wednesday for Berlin avowedly for the purpose of medical attention. This message has not [ sic ] been repeated to Brussels but have made no personal commitment as to manner of transmission as in case of previous telegram where names were used. Davies 62 Quoted in telegram No. 1458–1460, October 16, 10 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 793.94111/83: Telegram [Document 695] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , October 25, 1937—1 p.m. 548. Reference to your 1488, October 22, 9 a.m. and your 1508, October 23, 7 p.m., I greatly appreciate the information reported. Davis’ 63 instructions do not contemplate the advocacy of any concrete course of action. In accordance with Article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty, he is proceeding to Brussels for “full and frank communication” with the other signatory powers, in the hope that together they may work out some plan for finding an end to the conflict by agreement. Beyond the foregoing, I see no line that you could take usefully in your conversations. We will advise you from day to day of any developments in our consideration of the problem here. Hull 63 Norman H. Davis, American delegate to the Brussels Conference. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10852: Telegram [Document 696] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 26, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 26—11:50 a.m.] 697 a . Embassy’s 695, October 25, 4 p.m. 64 1. Competent, informed Japanese have supplied the information contained in this paragraph. Delay in formation of a new regime in North China is due to the fact that important military and civilian elements in Tokyo believe that a settlement of North China question should be and can be reached eventually by direct negotiations between Tokyo and Nanking and that the formation of such a regime would obstruct those negotiations. Kita, director of political affairs in Hopei, is in accord with the above view. A number of the most influential officers who might be opposed to this view are now in active service on various fronts where they cannot interfere in political matters; so this view will probably prevail. The presence of such officers at the fronts is probably the cause of a difference of opinion now evident among Japanese military as to what should be the southern limit of advances in North China. 2. There continue to be reports that local Japanese authorities are urging local Chinese officials to persuade the National Government to make peace with Japan (Embassy’s 653, October 13, 5 p.m. and 659, October 15, 5 p.m.). This factor, together with the slowing up of the Japanese advance in Shantung and Shansi, in conjunction with the approach of the Nine Power Conference, is creating an impression among some local Chinese which seems well founded, that Japan is anxious to end hostilities. In this connection and with reference to Tientsin’s 39 [ 59 ], October 21, 5 p.m., 65 reporting the departure of Li Shih Hao 66 from Tientsin for Central China, it is reliably reported that Chang Pi has gone to Shantung and Chen Chung Fu 67 to Hong Kong for the purpose of devising a settlement of the North China situation. 3. The solution of the North China situation seems to depend primarily upon the outcome of the conflict at Shanghai. 4. A reviving interest among Japanese capitalists in economic development of North China, as reported in recent press despatches, appears to be premature because of the abnormal conditions still existing and the absence of funds. 5. Japanese inspired regulation of education in Peiping continues, with changes in text books, alternation of the character of sports affected by the abolition of boy scouts and girl guide organizations and of military drill. The study of the Japanese language 2 hours weekly in middle schools is compulsory. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 64 Not printed. 65 Not printed. 66 Retired member of former Anfu Party. 67 Former member of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/10876 [Document 697] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire In reply to representations which His Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo had made to the Japanese Government regarding the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base of operations, Sir R. Craigie has received a note verbale attributing the Japanese military action in Shanghai to the concentration of considerable Chinese forces and the challenge to the Japanese landing party which necessitated defensive operations. These, it is stated, became extended owing to threatening Chinese action. Moreover the increase of Japanese personnel and material strength in the Northern sector was justified by their general obligation to police and defend the International Settlement and by their established right to protect Japanese residents there. Japan, the communication continues, has, along with other Powers, extensive rights and interests in the Settlement, and is submitting to considerable sacrifices resulting from the present operations. Although unavoidably using part of the Settlement in connexion with the present military operations, the Japanese Government entertain the most serious regard for foreign rights and interests which they are taking care as far as possible to respect. As a result of this communication, Sir R. Craigie has been instructed to inform the Japanese Government that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept the argument that all Japanese activities in the Settlement can be justified as being defence measures, but that His Majesty’s Government do not wish to prolong an unprofitable argument on this point. His Excellency is further to point out that the Japanese Government admit that they are using part of the Settlement in connexion with the present military operations, and that His Majesty’s Government must maintain their protest at this action. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn whether the United States Government are prepared to adopt the attitude referred to above if they receive a similar note from the Japanese Government. Washington , October 26, 1937. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10870: Telegram [Document 698] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , October 27, 1937—noon. [Received 2:45 p.m.] 893. My 891, October 25, 7 p.m. 68 Despite the most stubborn and determined Chinese resistance the Japanese succeeded yesterday morning in outflanking and capturing Tachang and in pushing through to the railway about 2 miles below Nanhsiang. The Japanese offensive which has been characterized by the most intensive and suffering artillery and aerial bombardment and the liberal use of mechanized units, continued unabated yesterday and last night and resulted in the capture of Chenju railway station and the cutting of the railway at several other points; Nanhsiang itself is seriously threatened inasmuch as the Japanese are within a mile of the town. The capture of Tachang and the thrust through to the railway threatened completely to close the neck of the Chapei-Kiangwan salient and forced a general Chinese withdrawal from those sectors during the night. This morning Japanese flags can be seen flying over North Station and many other buildings in Chapei. Chapei is a blazing mass of flames being fanned to greater intensity by a steady easterly wind; a thick and immense pall of smoke hangs over the entire area which is generally believed to have been fired by the Chinese to cover their withdrawal. The extent of the Chinese withdrawal is not yet clear but for the present they appear to be taking up positions south of Soochow Creek from a point just beyond Jessfield Park. Any serious attempt to hold this section of the creek will endanger the western extra-Settlement road district. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking, Peiping. Gauss 68 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10867: Telegram [Document 699] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 27—2:02 p.m.] 703. Embassy’s 697 a , October 26, 5 p.m. Japanese inspired limitation of freedom of the local press has increased with the issuing yesterday of instructions by the local censorship office to the Chinese press forbidding publication of news of the attitude of foreign nations, of defeat or movement of Japanese troops, of Chinese victories, and of activities in Peiping of Mongol and East Hopei officials, as well as news derogatory to Japanese troops, encouraging to Chinese troops, derogatory to Mohammedans, and offensive to emperors. At the same time permission was granted to publish news with regard to collapse of National Government troops, victories of Japanese troops, excellent state of affairs in Manchukuo, cooperation between Chinese troops and Communists and between the National Government and the Soviet Union, and appeals for cessation of fighting and for peace, if attributed to the people’s will, as well as news praising the Japanese troops. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10872: Telegram [Document 700] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received October 27—2:32 p.m.] 705. Your 343, October 26, 4 p.m. 69 The officer in charge of Camp Burrowes, Chinwangtao, reports that for several days Japanese troops have been moving north through Chinwangtao; that on October 22, 2500 soldiers have moved northward and on the 23rd 1300 more moved northward; that approximately 4000 wounded soldiers were being evacuated by sea through Chinwangtao weekly but he did not indicate how long this had been in progress. There is still taking place a small inward movement of troops but I do not believe that these are in excess of the northward movement. There has been a considerable movement of troops eastward from Peiping to Tientsin during the last few days. It is very doubtful whether there will be any substantial increase in the number of Japanese troops in North China unless it should be determined to push further south beyond the Yellow River or the Lunghai Railway. This seems unlikely unless the “feelers” now being put out looking to an early cessation of fighting come to nought. To push the campaign further to the south for any considerable distance would require reenforcements in large numbers. The Chairman of the Peace Maintenance Commission, who is concurrently mayor, broadcast an address last night emphasizing the need for a resumption of peaceful relations with Japan. There are increasing evidence of a desire in the North for peace negotiations and I believe that it might be an opportunity to explore the possibility of obtaining some idea, as requested by Wang Ching Wei 70 (see second sentence of paragraph 5 of Nanking’s 846, October 22, noon 71 ) of the conditions under which the Japanese would be willing to negotiate. If the peace overtures which are now emanating from North China have been inspired by the Japanese, as is believed to be the case, it would seem that they might possibly [afford?] an intimation such as suggested. The Embassy was informed October 25 by a well informed and reliable Japanese of close connections with Japanese authorities that the Japanese Government has decided in detail what it wants from a settlement with China. He states, however, that he believed that the Japanese desires would not be acceptable under the present circumstances to the National Government. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 69 Not printed. 70 Chairman of Kuomintang Central Political Council. 71 Vol. iv , p. 102 . The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/10876 [Document 701] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The receipt is acknowledged of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of October 26, 1937, with regard to representations to the Japanese Government in the matter of the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base of Japanese military operations. The Japanese Government’s reply to the American Government’s representations in regard to the matter under reference follows substantially the lines of the reply to the British Government as described in the aide-mémoire under acknowledgment. With reference to the statement that the British Ambassador in Tokyo has been authorized by the British Government to make further representations to the Japanese Government, and to the inquiry whether the American Government is prepared to take similar action, the American Government has authorized the American Ambassador in Tokyo to make further representations to the Japanese Government in the matter. Washington , October 27, 1937. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10754: Telegram [Document 702] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , October 27, 1937—6 p.m. 270. Your 481, October 20, 4 p.m. According to an aide-mémoire of October 26 from the British Embassy the British Government has instructed the British Ambassador to make further representations in regard to the use of the International Settlement as a base for Japanese military operations. You are authorized after consultation with your British colleague to inform the Japanese Government 72 that this Government continues to hold the views as set forth in our 245, October 2, 3 p.m. (your aide-mémoire of October 4). 73 Hull 72 The British and American Embassies carried out similar instructions on October 27 and 28 respectively. For the American aide-mémoire , see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 404 . 73 For American aide-mémoire of October 4, see ibid ., p. 378 . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.94/10975 [Document 703] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] October 28 [–30], 1937. I called on Admiral Richardson 74 at the Navy Department in reference to Admiral Yarnell’s telegrams to the Navy Department 0026–1620 and 0026–2105 of October 26 on the subject indicated above. 75 I told Admiral Richardson that Mr. Hull had asked me to call. I said that for the purpose of what I had to say it was not necessary to raise the question as to the merits of the order issued by Admiral Yarnell but that the Secretary of State felt that the giving of publicity to such an order operated to create serious embarrassment to the Secretary of State in the moderate course which he was endeavoring to follow in foreign relations. I said that Admiral Richardson was aware of public sentiment in the United States and of the effect of sensational newspaper reports in regard to such orders on such sentiment, particularly on the sentiment which favored adoption by the American Government of a “storm-cellar” isolationist attitude. I said that such publicity played into the hands of critics of the course which the Administration was pursuing. I referred to the fact that when Admiral Yarnell had issued certain previous orders and sensational publicity in the American press had resulted, the President in one instance had spoken to the Secretary of State in regard to the matter. I told Admiral Richardson that in view of all these various factors Mr. Hull felt that, if Admiral Yarnell could not be directed to refrain from giving publicity to such matters, Mr. Hull would have to lay the whole matter before the President for decision. Admiral Richardson said that he appreciated Mr. Hull’s position in the matter, and that he thought that Admiral Yarnell did not take into account public sentiment in this country and the effect upon the public here of publicity of this type. Admiral Richardson said that Admiral Leahy 76 was returning to Washington tonight and that he would speak to Admiral Leahy about this matter the first thing tomorrow morning with a view to the Navy Department sending a telegram to Admiral Yarnell directing him not to give publicity in regard to such matters. October 29 On October 29, Admiral Leahy telephoned me and said that he had discussed the matter with the Secretary of the Navy; that the Navy Department felt that Admiral Yarnell had a great many troubles of his own; that the Navy Department did not wish to send him an instruction along the lines which we wished to have sent; but that the Navy Department would send a message if the State Department insisted. Admiral Leahy offered to come to the Department to discuss the matter with me. I suggested that I first refer the matter to Mr. Welles. I then told Mr. Welles of my conversation with Admiral Leahy and stated that the Navy Department did not view the matter as did this Department. The next morning, October 30, Mr. Welles spoke to the President over the telephone in regard to the matter and the President stated that in his opinion the Navy Department should send a telegram to Admiral Yarnell asking Admiral Yarnell to endeavor to avoid publicity in regard to such matters. Mr. Welles thereupon telephoned to Admiral Leahy and Admiral Leahy said that the Navy Department would send such a message. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 74 Admiral J. O. Richardson, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. 75 Admiral Yarnell’s instructions for firing in self-defense; see vol. iv , p. 370 . 76 Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/10895a: Telegram [Document 704] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 77 Washington , October 29, 1937—1 p.m. 325. According to an Associated Press report from Shanghai of October 29 the German Ambassador was stated to be in Nanking acting as a mediator and messenger carrying proposed Japanese peace terms. 78 The report states further that the German Ambassador recently spent a week in Shanghai in conference with the Japanese Ambassador and other high officials. The Department has received information to this same general effect attributed to Suma. 79 Please telegraph urgently what you can discreetly ascertain in regard to this report and your estimate as to its significance. Welles 77 The same as No. 273 to the Ambassador In Japan. 78 See Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 , series D, vol. i , pp. 733 ff. 79 Japanese Counselor of Embassy in the United States. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10897: Telegram [Document 705] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 30, 1937—11 a.m. [Received October 30—2:11 a.m.] 502. Department’s 273, October 29, 1 p.m. 80 Discreet approach reveals that the German Embassy has received no information that any discussion of the character suggested by the Associated Press despatch has taken place between the German and Japanese Ambassadors in China. It is also revealed that the relations between the two Ambassadors had not been “very satisfactory” owing to the employment by China of German military instructors and also to Japanese suspicion that Trautmann 81 is “pro-Chinese” and that Trautmann took advantage of a recent visit to Shanghai to improve his relations with Kawagoe 82 (see our 464, October 9, 9 p.m.). The German Military Attaché is to return from Shanghai and the German Embassy has offered to give us any further information on this matter which he may bring. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 80 See footnote 77, above. 81 German Ambassador in China. 82 Japanese Ambassador in China. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10896: Telegram [Document 706] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 30, 1937—1 p.m. [Received October 30—7:28 a.m.] 868. Department’s 325, October 29, 1 p.m. German Ambassador has just returned from Shanghai where he went to meet wife and escort her to Nanking. He informs me that he saw Kawagoe and also Ito 83 while there, the latter at an informal tea tendered him and his wife by member of Japanese Embassy. He states that he received no impression that Japanese had formulated any terms, that they merely talked usual generalities. I do not believe that he is acting in capacity described; he seemed very pessimistic. I have just returned from a conversation with Kung 84 who in reply to a question about rumors regarding peace overtures stated that Chinese would not discuss peace terms with Japanese prior to Brussels Conference to which Japanese case has been referred. Johnson 83 Nobuni Ito, Japanese Minister to Poland until 1937. 84 H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance and Vice President of the Executive Yuan (Vice Premier). The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10907: Telegram [Document 707] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 30, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 30—10:35 a.m.] 869. 1. I asked Kung, Minister of Finance, this morning concerning the impressions gained by him during his European tour regarding the attitude of Germany and Italy toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. He said that he felt that the Governments of both countries were well disposed toward China even though aligned with Japan on the nominal ground that Japan is fighting to stem communism. He said that Germany’s refusal to enter the Brussels Conference did not indicate lack of sympathy with China and would in reality Assist China because Germany if present would be obliged to side with Japan. I inferred that he had received some explanation of this sort from German sources. In regard to Italy’s openly expressed sympathy with Japan he remarked that he had had a very cordial reception in Rome; that Mussolini [could not?] condemn Japan’s policy toward China without seeming to condemn Italy’s conduct in Ethiopia and that in any event Mussolini being a dictator could change his policy at any time. He recalled that Mussolini had placed Italian air force officers in active service at the disposal of the Chinese Government and he seemed convinced that China need fear nothing from Italy. 2. Kung asked that when convenient I convey to the President and Secretary of State his deep appreciation of the friendly counsel and hospitality he had received in Washington and he expressed the belief that American statesmen understood the necessity of curbing Japan if the peace of the Pacific area were to be preserved and if the United States and other nations in addition to China were to retain liberty to determine such domestic questions as import tariffs and immigration without being threatened by Japan. Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.04/10925: Telegram [Document 708] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 1, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 2:11 p.m.] 871. Embassy’s 814, October 16, 10 a.m. 85 1. Chen Li Fu 86 returned some days ago giving out that he had proceeded to Sinkiang for the purpose of consolidating government control there. According to informant cited in telegram under reference, he actually went to Moscow with Bogomoloff and among questions discussed with Soviet officials was possible arrangement whereby Soviet Union would make some gesture in ostensible recognition of full Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia so that Mongolian military forces including air units could assist Chinese Government forces in fighting the Japanese. Informant stated this proposal was being favorably considered in reaching agreement. Soviet Ambassador is expected to return to Nanking about November 7. 2. A German military adviser informed us that he has heard that Klein, who was sent here last year by Hitler to work out commercial details of the Sino-German barter agreement, will arrive in China within a few days. He stated that he hopes this was true and was an indication of Germany’s “real attitude” toward present situation. (The German military advisers are staunchly pro-Chinese in the present conflict and appear to function as the actual directing general staff of the Chinese armies. General von Falkenhausen, the chief adviser, has just returned from the Shanghai front and other senior officers are there and on the northern fronts.) Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson 85 Not printed. 86 Member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee’s standing committee and head of people’s training department, Military Affairs Council. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10927: Telegram [Document 709] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 1, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3 p.m.] 920. My 912, October 30, 4 p.m. 87 Under cover of a heavy artillery barrage Japanese troops yesterday afternoon crossed Soochow Creek at a point 4 miles west of Jessfield Railway. The western extra-Settlement area beyond the foreign lines was subjected to very heavy shelling last night and it is believed the Japanese will attempt to clear this area as soon as possible. However, these military operations are seriously endangering civilian life and property in adjoining foreign protected areas. Yesterday three more British soldiers were wounded by bursting shrapnel while one of those wounded on the 29th died of his wounds. With the use of artillery during the night of the 30th the Japanese succeeded in dislodging the Chinese soldiers holding out in Chapei and the 300 survivors crossed to the British lines and laid down their arms; several office and hotel buildings in the down town district were hit by Japanese shells during the attack. In Chinese circles there is an unconfirmed report to the effect that the Japanese military have presented the following peace terms to the Chinese Government: (1) disbandment of the Chinese air force (2) independence of Inner Mongolia (3) autonomy for the five northern provinces (4) departure from China of General Chiang (5) recognition of Manchukuo. Sent to the Department; repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss 87 Vol. iv , p. 374 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94 Conference/163: Telegram [Document 710] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 2, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 2—6:50 a.m.] 509. Following telegram is intended to supplement our 508, November 1, 7 p.m. 88 It now appears certain that an imperial general headquarters will be set up in the near future, probably by November 10. 2. There is on the statute books “ordinance number 293 concerning imperial general headquarters during time of war”, which was promulgated during the Russo-Japanese war. This ordinance provides for the establishment of headquarters for the exercise by the Emperor of his constitutional function as Commander in Chief of the Army and of the Navy. The ordinance further provides for the assignment to headquarters of the chief of the general staff and chief of the naval staff, along with other military and naval officers, to coordinate plans of military and naval operators. 3. A number of problems are involved in carrying out this project, the entire scope of which has not been as yet revealed. 4. It is reported that the existing ordinance will be so revised as to assign to general headquarters the Prime Minister, the Ministers of War and of the Navy, and probably the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This would raise in turn the question of a reorganization of the Cabinet from a functional point of view as well as from the viewpoint of personnel. Apparently the plan now favored contemplates placing government departments under administrative heads not of Cabinet rank, leaving the Cabinet free to consider questions of policy. 5. Another question which, we understand, has been considered is whether war should be declared to bring about a de jure state of war in order to make the ordinance applicable, or whether the ordinance should be so revised as to make it applicable under existing conditions. It now seems very likely that the second course will be followed. This paragraph should be read in the light of paragraph 3 ( b ) of our telegram above cited. 6. In the present state of obscurity surrounding the forthcoming changes, we can make no intelligent estimate of the extent and permanency of these radical changes. We can speak with certainty on one point: Japan is being placed on as complete a war basis as possible. Whether the effective military power of the country is being mobilized in preparation for, or as a preparation against, war with Soviet Russia, we cannot now say nor can we accurately estimate whether there are impending basic changes in the economic and social orders of the country. However, enough is known of the plans to raise these two questions. Grew 88 Vol. iv , p. 136 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10946: Telegram [Document 711] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State 89 Tokyo , November 2, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 2—9:15 a.m.] 510. The following report to me from the Acting Military Attaché Major Creswell 90 is in my opinion most timely and would be of interest to our delegation at the Brussels Conference. “1. Information has been obtained in the course of the past few days which tends to corroborate reports which have been current for some 2 weeks to the effect that the strength of the Kwantung army has undergone a considerable increase. The size of the army including the troops under its control now operating in Suiyuan Province is estimated by this office as in the vicinity of 230,000 men. 2. This force has been built up gradually and has reached its present size as a result of precautionary rather than preparatory considerations the elements entering into such precautionary measures being the fact that there is suspicion regarding Sino-Soviet understandings, that trouble is feared from the Outer Mongolian tribes as a result of Chinese and Russian instigation, that the disaffections in the Manchukuo army are greater than appear on the surface and finally the perennial apprehension that Russia may enter the struggle while the Japanese are embroiled with China. 3. It is felt that the Kwantung army has been built up by troops formed in Japan in the course of the mobilization activities which have been taking place for the past few weeks as well as by a certain number of additions from the North China forces, although the extent to which the forces in North China have been increased [ reduced? ] in order to add to the Kwantung army is difficult to say. Such a decision to weaken the North China force in favor of the Kwantung army could mean only that the sum of the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2 are of sufficient import to warrant the diminishing of the momentum acquired by the operations in North China in proportion as the strength of that garrison is reduced. 4. At present, however, the North China and Shanghai operations cannot be viewed as unrelated activities. The Yomiuri Shimbun of this morning carries an article covering a statement by General Matsui commanding at Shanghai to the effect that the objective of his force is Nanking. This opinion as to the direction of future operation in that sector was also voiced in other quarters and within the last week this office has secured identifications which indicate that some troops which have heretofore been engaged in North China operations are now operating at Shanghai. Identifications have also been made which indicate the presence of a certain amount of cavalry at Shanghai which points to expectation of a more open form of action than has characterized the operations in that sector prior to the recent advances. 5. Viewed in their relation to the operations in North China the sum of the statements evidenced by indications mentioned in the preceding paragraph may well mean that with what the Japanese consider as a threat from the northwest and the fact that the operations in North China have thus far failed to pin down and definitely destroy the Chinese forces in that area a decision may have been made to temporarily suspend or limit the southward movement in North China and instead to deliver the decisive blow via Nanking. However, the Japanese army has a reserve of some 3,000,000 men and with the present army being variously estimated as between 900,000 and 1,250,000 men it is evident that if the decision be to draw further upon the man power of the nation there are ample resources in that respect for continuing operations on a large scale on all fronts. 6. All classes of the people feel that the security and future existence of the nation are involved in the present situation and that there can be no turning back no matter what pressure be brought by other powers. Japanese opinion is firmly behind the armed services in this respect and they are spiritually prepared for any eventuality even though the entrance of Russia into the present struggle precipitates a world war through the spread of hostilities to the west. Reports have it that a survey of capital and bank deposits is being carried out with a view to the mobilization of capital in connection with preparations for such an eventuality as a war of 3 years’ duration. 7. Regarding the political situation it is felt that while the people in general are warmly inclined toward the Konoe Cabinet there is a growing feeling that there is a lack of decision in that body which results in a loss of time and the introduction of an uncertain element into the conduct of national affairs in this crisis. This feeling in addition to the possibility that the health of the Premier may not be equal to the occasion has given rise to the thought that should the present Cabinet be replaced the next Government should be headed by such a man as General Araki 91 or Admiral Suetsugu 92 who would be depended upon to form governments of the type which would result in all the elements of the government, army, navy and civil components functioning harmoniously toward a common goal”. Grew 89 Repeated as Department’s No. 32, November 2, 7 p.m., to Norman H. Davis at Brussels. 90 Maj. Harry I. T. Creswell, Assistant Military Attaché in Japan. 91 Former Japanese Minister of War. 92 Former Japanese Fleet Commander in Chief. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10967: Telegram [Document 712] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 3—1:40 p.m.] 885. Admiral Yarnell in a personal letter has formulated following terms of settlement of Sino-Japanese hostilities which express my own idea of outcome that possibly might be achieved and would be acceptable to the United States: A stable government in China is essential to the peace of the Far East. The only government which has given China a condition of peace and stability in recent years is the present one. Therefore it is essential that the present Government be retained in power and that the terms of settlement should not be such as to cause its overthrow. In the settlement the territorial integrity of China should be respected. Manchuria to be excluded from this territorial integrity and to be recognized by foreign nations (recognition by China should precede that of foreign nations and would in my opinion be necessary). Japanese troops to withdraw from North China to Great Wall. The terms of the Nine Power Treaty regarding freedom of opportunity for trade of all nations to be guaranteed. Within 1 year from signing of agreement, if a stable government exists in China, ( a ) extraterritoriality to be renounced by all nations, ( b ) foreign troops to be withdrawn from Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai, ( c ) International Settlement at Shanghai to be governed along lines similar to those now in existence in Hankow in British ex-concession. I feel, however, that in the present temper of the Japanese and Chinese Governments no terms of peace are possible which would be acceptable to both. Repeated to Tokyo, Peiping. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10958: Telegram [Document 713] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 3, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 3—9:22 a.m.] 886. 1. Representatives here of the former Communist troops (Eighth Route New Army) are reported as stating a second army of former Communist troops from Fukien, Kiangsi and other places is being organized at Hankow to be known as the Fourth Route New Army. 2. Li Tsung Jen is at present in Nanking. Kwangsi troops on the Tsinpu front are understood to be second and third line troops and not the best of the Kwangsi forces. 3. From information reported by hospitals caring for wounded soldiers, it is stated that Chinese wounded at present total 150,000 of which 50,000 are in the north. The number killed is variously estimated at one to every 3, 2 or 1 wounded. 4. Repeated to Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai, Tokyo. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10968: Telegram [Document 714] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 3—4:47 p.m.] 723. Local peace maintenance societies have now been organized in eight districts in Hopei Province including Tientsin, Peiping, and Paotingfu, and Lei Shou Yung, with headquarters at Peiping, has been appointed chief secretary of the group of societies. A chairman has not yet been selected and it is understood that none will be appointed for the time being as Lei will, at least temporarily, be chiefly responsible for administering the work. Lei was one of the go-betweens in the Ho–Umetsu negotiations. He was previously closely identified with Chiang Tso Pin, former Chinese Ambassador to Japan. He is said not to be a member of the Kuomintang and is in many ways an anti-party man. Reports are in circulation that efforts will be made by the Chinese, supported by Japanese advice, to have the contemplated new government in the north owe its allegiance nominally if not actually to the Central Government at Nanking. There is apparently still considerable public opinion in North China favoring peace negotiations but no conditions are being advanced. It is worthy of note that there has been no material advance of Japanese troops toward the south on the Tsinpu and Pinghan railways for a week or 10 days so far as is known. In Shansi, however, the capture of all Chinese positions in the Hsinkouchen sector, with an advance continuing towards Taiyuan, has been announced by the Japanese military; Japanese forces along the Chengtai Railway are pressing on Shouyang, half way between Niangtsekuan and Taiyuan. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking. By courier to Tokyo. Lockhart The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10969: Telegram [Document 715] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 3, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 3—4:33 p.m.] 932. My No. 920, November 1, 2 p.m. The Japanese have succeeded in firmly establishing themselves at several points south of Soochow Creek and in spite of the rainy weather are slowly advancing in a southwesterly direction. They are apparently attempting an outflanking movement designed to force the Chinese to withdraw from the western residential area immediately beyond the British defense lines. It was reported yesterday that the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps units in Nantao, Lunghwa and Siccawei were preparing to withdraw to Sungkiang approximately 18 miles southwest of Shanghai. Today foreign military observers state that some of these units are in fact withdrawing. It is not certain whether this withdrawal is being executed because of military developments south of Soochow Creek or whether it is connected with the efforts understood to have been made both by the French authorities and representatives of the International Relief Committee to cover a safety zone in the Nantao and the Siccawei areas. Pootung was heavily shelled and bombed yesterday; Chinese batteries returned the fire. At the request of the Commander in Chief I arranged for a conference yesterday between General Harada, Japanese Military Attaché, and the foreign naval commanders, 93 and for a similar conference today with General Chu Hsiao Liang, high ranking Chinese military officer. These conferences were screens in an effort to avert further indiscriminate firing into the foreign-protected areas and related questions. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss 93 See Admiral Yarnell’s telegram No. 0002, November 2, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 515 . The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10972: Telegram [Document 716] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Secretary of State [ Shanghai ,] November 3, 1937—7:20 p.m. [Received 10:24 p.m.] 0003. Conference held this morning with General Chu Hsiao Liang and Mayor Yui of Shanghai. They were informed of serious situation that has existed in neutral area due indiscriminate bombing, shelling and impressed with necessity steps being taken to avoid such incidents in future. Chinese planes flying over Settlement which draw large volume Japanese anti-aircraft fire cause of many casualties. Also discussed possibility of neutralizing Pootung and Nantao sections in order decrease loss civilian lives and property through military action. Their answer was that instructions would be given and greater care exercised prevent Chinese planes flying over International Settlement. With reference to neutralization of Nantao and Pootung they replied that while they would be willing to enter upon such an agreement they would be unable rely on any guarantee on part of Japanese that no military action would take place in that area. However, they would report matter to Nanking and let us know results. I am dubious whether any agreement can be reached in view previous failures all such attempts. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10983: Telegram [Document 717] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , November 4, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 4—5:12 p.m.] 696. An official of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office stated this afternoon that they are examining possible policies and lines of action to be taken by the British Government in the event that Japan should make a formal declaration of war against China. The Foreign Office feels that such a possibility must at least be given theoretical study and consideration as events may take such a turn that a formal declaration of war by Japan would be to the latter’s advantage particularly in controlling shipments of arms to China since the declaration of war would naturally clothe her with full belligerent rights. The British have a very particular concern in this situation because, according to the Foreign Office, Hong Kong is the only port of importance from which arms may now be shipped to China. Tsingtao is still open but it is for all practical purposes at the mercy of the Japanese. The French have closed the railways of Indo-China to arms traffic and have so informed the British. The Portuguese have followed suit and have now closed Macao. The action of the French according to Foreign Office reports has greatly disturbed and angered the Chinese. The official said that although he did not of course know what action the British Government might take if Japan declared war on China, at the present moment it would seem to him that their best course of action would be simply to tell Japan “all right go ahead” and put a complete embargo on the shipment of all arms both to Japan and China. According to the Foreign Office British interests are in fact shipping practically no arms and ammunition to China whereas considerably larger quantities are being shipped to Japan, quite contrary to British sympathies. The foregoing is repeated to the Department not as an indication of any immediate action being contemplated by the British but merely to show that study is being given to possible eventualities which may confront them in the formulation of policy. Repeated to American delegation, Brussels. Bingham The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10991: Telegram [Document 718] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 5—9:12 a.m.] 890. Report unconfirmed but from apparently reliable source is that 44 military planes have been purchased from France, 50 from Great Britain, and 300 from Russia. Some of the Russian bombers reported to carry two radio operators, 8 machine gunners, 4 aviators. The Russian machine guns must however be replaced by Chinese guns to fit ammunition. Some of these planes have already arrived in Lanchow and all are supposed to be in China ready for action by the 21st. Crews of these planes will be partly made up of Chinese, Indian and other Asiatic students trained in the Sun Yat Sen University in Moscow. The Russian Chargé d’Affaires will hold further conference with General Chiang concerning these arrangements November 5. Informant admitted evidences of war weariness and desire for peace in mercantile circles in Shanghai but said the fighting spirit in the government is undiminished and that General Chiang has issued an order to continue to contest every foot of territory for at least 4 months more. Informant said the Minister of War stated at conference that all rifle and machine gun ammunition would be exhausted by January at present rate of consumption but that the Minister of Finance asserted he would be able to finance purchase of war materials for the period mentioned. Informant was non-committal about North China but said popular enthusiasm in Central and South China with the exception of Shanghai for continuance of resistance to Japan is as strong as ever. Peiping and Tokyo please inform Military Attachés in strict confidence. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10989: Telegram [Document 719] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 5, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 5—5:45 a.m.] 521. Our 509, November 2, 2 p.m. Imperial General Headquarters. 1. The following is general tenor of a press report published this morning: agreement in principle has been reached between the navy, which has been taking a relatively conservative position, and the army that the proposed headquarters should not be clothed with any political power. The navy still believes that the establishment of hostile acts necessarily involves a declaration of war. The attitude of the army is that the prosecution of a war of long duration requires that headquarters be established but that a declaration of war will raise difficult problems with regard to trade, along with other international issues. The answer to this question is to be found at Shanghai and no decision will be reached until the military situation there further unfolds. The general tendency is however toward a declaration of war. 2. The headquarters project with its various implications, the heavy concentration of troops in Manchuria and Mongolia, the forthcoming Anti-Communist Pact with Italy, 94 and the continued agitation against Great Britian obviously are parts of a formulated plan. We are giving this matter study and we hope shortly to be in position to telegraph our estimate. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 94 For correspondence, see vol. i , pp. 605 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/10989: Telegram [Document 720] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 5, 1937—2 p.m. 288. Your 521, November 5, 2 p.m. We appreciate very much your telegrams on this important subject. We will await your analysis and estimate of the situation and hope to receive it at the earliest practicable moment. We are especially interested in ( a ) whether Japan is likely to declare war and ( b ) the probable attitude of Japan in the event of such a declaration toward American and other third country rights and interests in and with regard to China. Welles The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11003: Telegram [Document 721] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 5, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 6—6 a.m.] 939. My No. 932, November 3, 6 p.m. Japanese are reported to have made further small gains south of Soochow Creek in spite of strong Chinese opposition and the rainy weather. Their main effort appears to be developing along Monument Road with the Hungjao aerodrome as the immediate objective. Chinese are reported to have moved in replacements and perhaps some reenforcements and appear to be holding this area in greater strength. It is reported by a foreign military observer that the Japanese effected a landing in strength along the southern coast of the Pootung peninsula this morning and that Japanese reenforcements are en route from North China. I have received reports that American and other foreign residence and mission properties in the Hungjao Road area beyond the foreign defense lines have been occupied and looted by Chinese troops. I have made representations to the Chinese authorities here and suggest that Embassy support them at Nanking. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 793.94/10999: Telegram [Document 722] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 5, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 5—5:15 p.m.] 266. The Embassy understands that today’s American press carried despatches reporting rumors described as partially confirmed that offer from Germany to act on her own initiative as mediator in the Sino-Japanese conflict might be made public in the next few days. Inquiry at the Foreign Office this afternoon elicited a denial that any such plan was afoot as well as disclaimer as to the adoption of any policy toward the Far Eastern conflict other than that reported in the Embassy’s telegram 258, October 29, 1 p.m. 95 My British colleague also has no information on the rumored plan. Repeated to Brussels for American delegation. Dodd 95 Vol. iv , p. 117 . The Commander in Chief, V. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 793.94/10988: Telegram [Document 723] The Commander in Chief, V. S. Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) 96 [ Shanghai ,] November 5, 1937—10:10 p.m. [Received November 5—7 a.m.] 0004. In conference by Admiral Little 97 and myself with Admiral Hasegawa 98 question of use Soochow Creek by Japanese was discussed. Nipponese have stated that they are entitled to use it. Hasegawa was informed, with the exception of one coastal motor boat, Chinese have been denied use of Soochow Creek for military purposes. If Japanese are permitted to use it there will be breach of impartiality which neutral forces have endeavored to observe towards both contending forces; also if Creek is used by Japanese there will very likely be sniping or bombing by Chinese especially in Baker Sector guarded by British troops; also in American and Italian Sectors and that prevention of such will be difficult; that further incidents will develop which neutral forces are earnestly striving to avoid. Hasegawa replied that Soochow Creek was not part of Settlement and that legally the Japanese had the right to use it. The Navy had no intention of using it but he did not know the plans of the Army. He would have a conference with them and let us know the results. We emphasized that we desired to know their intentions in order to take the matter up diplomatically. Soochow Creek in B Sector is at present crowded with junks and sampans which have used it as a harbor of refuge. Am inclined to believe that army will insist on using Creek as it will greatly simplify supply of troops as hostilities move away from Shanghai. We will inform Department of further developments. 96 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. 97 British Naval Commander in Chief in China. 98 Japanese Naval Commander at Shanghai. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11006: Telegram [Document 724] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 6, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 6—8:10 a.m.] 943. My No. 939, November 5, 7 p.m. Heavy Japanese shelling of the Monument Road area combined with infantry attacks launched early this morning have resulted in further Japanese gains along this sector. No details are available regarding the landing operation undertaken by Japanese troops on the Pootung peninsula east of Chapu but the Japanese military describe the operation as “highly successful”. An agreement has been reached between representatives of the International Red Cross Committee and the Japanese and Chinese whereby a small safety zone to harbor the Chinese civilian population and refugees is established in the northern half of the Chinese native city immediately adjacent to the French Concession. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11008: Telegram [Document 725] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 6, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 6—2:35 p.m.] 524. Department’s 288, November 5, 1 [ 2 ] p.m. 1. Byas sent us last night a copy of his despatch of the day before to the New York Times in which there was included the suggestion that Japan might welcome American mediation. His analysis of the significance of the Imperial Headquarters project, the Italian pact, 99 and of other factors is an able piece of writing from the point of view of press reporting, but we believe that the situation is still obscure and that we cannot at this time make any sure evaluation except with the greatest reserve. 2. The Naval and Military Attachés have endeavored to procure further information on the trend of most recent discussions on the headquarters project. The statements of officials of the War and Navy Departments were carefully couched but the conclusion is reached that, ( a ) the establishment of Imperial Headquarters is still under consideration and has not been decided upon for the reason that, ( b ) although the view is favored that Imperial Headquarters should be purely an organ to formulate and coordinate military and naval functions and should not be vested with any powers in the political economic and fiscal fields, ( c ) nevertheless, no decision has been reached on the question whether or not establishment of Imperial Headquarters will inevitably involve from both legal and practical viewpoints the issuing of a declaration of war. 3. There apparently has been no serious divergence of opinion with regard to the need for Imperial Headquarters as we and other foreign observers uniformly believe that the Japanese military now expect that the hostilities in China are to be of long duration. (There is a difference of opinion among foreign observers as to the range of further implications in the project which would involve action whether positive or negative against countries other than China. This last point is hereinafter discussed.) We have had indications during the past 3 weeks of a division of thought in the army with regard to future conduct of military operations in China. One school of thought advocates the limiting of military objectives to an advance to the Yellow River because further extension would greatly expose the Japanese west flank to Russia, create difficult problems of supply, impose undue hardship on the troops, and generally require the payment of a disproportionately high price for relatively inconsequential tactical successes. The other school argues that nothing short of complete destruction of the Chinese Army can fully liquidate situation. It is therefore not unlikely that friction between these two elements has developed to a point where resort has become necessary to the device of having plans of operations issued by the Emperor. 4. With regard to point ( b ) above the Navy Department states that Imperial Headquarters if established will be organized only as an instrument of the armed services. The War Department affirms that this question has not been decided. Indications from other sources are however that the Navy viewpoint will prevail. 5. With regard to point ( c ) the theory is being advanced that as the conflict has been officially recognized by Parliament as a “national emergency” Imperial Headquarters can be established without doing violence to the provisions of its organic ordinance. We do not attach much importance to legalistic discussions of this kind. In our view the determining factor in any declaration of war will be whether supplies of arms and munitions to China continue. According to a statement made to the Naval Attaché at the Navy Department war supplies continue to be sent in to China through Hong Kong, Indo-China and Soviet Russia, 40 planes and several hundred trucks from the latter having arrived. If it has been found that the present China blockade has not effectively reduced the flow of such supplies into China the establishing of Imperial Headquarters would offer an opportunity to declare war and lay down an effective naval blockade. 6. Our thought at this moment is in view of the foregoing, that the Imperial Headquarters project is probably being determined almost entirely by considerations associated with the completion of the hostilities against China. 7. Byas’ suggestion that Japanese agitation against Great Britain has been artificially stimulated to make the Italian pact more palatable to the Japanese people is in our opinion of doubtful accuracy. As we have already reported on several occasions the resentment against Great Britain rests on the ground that Great Britain has taken the lead in endeavoring to form a common front against Japan. It cannot be denied that a pact at this time with Italy is an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual force animating three strong powers now aligned against the democratic powers. As there is a press ban on the pact we have no means of knowing how public opinion reacts to the pact but we venture the prediction that it will when announced be strongly approved as having lifted Japan out of its isolated international position. 8. The increase of Japanese forces in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia has probably been brought about by the reported Chinese proposal to Soviet Russia that the recent treaty with Outer Mongolia 1 be abrogated. (See Nanking’s 871, November 1, 9 a.m.) A report to this effect was published in the Japanese papers about 3 weeks ago. As stated in paragraph 3 above the extension of the Japanese military lines from North China is increasing the vulnerability of the Japanese right flank to attack from the direction of Outer Mongolia. Although there is a minatory significance for Russia’s notice in the movement of Japanese troops to the north and northwest, the probability is that it is dictated more by military expediency than by objectives of Japanese diplomacy. 9. In our 321, August 27, 4 p.m., we anticipated that there might arise a situation in which the American Government could with reasonable prospects of success offer its services to the two combatants to bring the hostilities to an end. Byas suggests that the thought is forming in Japan that it might be acceptable for the United States to open the way for peace discussions. We hope that our Government will not suppose that the time is ripe for any such move. 10. With regard to the Department’s specific inquiry whether in the event of a declaration of war foreign rights and interests in China will be respected: No indications are available as yet of the attitude which may be taken by Japan on this point. We have the feeling that in view of the emphasis placed abroad on observance of international law Japan will not be disposed to abandon in principle any rights which she may have as a belligerent and that the consideration she may give to foreign rights and interests would be influenced by her relations with each nation concerned. 11. We realize that the present telegram is in part speculative in character but we must emphasize that almost complete silence is being maintained as to Japan’s objectives and that our estimates must be formulated largely by weighing imponderables which change from day to day. To Nanking by mail. Grew 99 Protocol concluded by Italy, Germany, and Japan at Rome on November 6, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 159 . 1 Protocol for mutual assistance, signed March 12, 1936; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , pp. 92 ff. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11021: Telegram [Document 726] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 8—10:50 a.m.] 735. Embassy’s 728, November 5, 4 p.m. 2 1. The local Japanese military spokesman stated at noon today that Japanese forces breached the north and east walls of Taiyuan this morning and occupied the northeast corner of the city and that fighting was continuing. 2. Principals of local primary and middle schools were officially ordered this morning by Chinese police under Japanese instruction to parade their pupils today in celebration of the victory at Taiyuan. These parades are now in progress. 3. Instances of Japanese policy such as the foregoing continue to exacerbate the feelings of Chinese in Peiping. However, conditions in the city during the day time are rapidly returning to normal. Streets are still largely deserted at night due to fear of robbers and of mistreatment by Japanese soldiers. Instances of oppressive measures by Japanese soldiers against individual Chinese are now rare. 4. On the other hand reports indicate that the alleged policy of the Japanese to make friends with the Chinese is not being observed in many places in the occupied territory. Cases of indiscriminate shooting of civilians, rape, looting and other ill-treatment are among the reports. (There are also some authenticated cases of looting by Chinese soldiers.) In many towns only a fraction of the inhabitants remain, large numbers having fled to the countryside. Economic suffering is severe and will become increasingly so. Repeated to Nanking. By courier to Tokyo. Lockhart 2 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11030: Telegram [Document 727] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 8, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 8—1:10 p.m.] 945. My 943, November 6, 5 [ 2 ] p.m. Japanese landing operations on the Pootung Peninsula, effected at three points east of Chapu, apparently met with complete successes and Japanese troops are now reported to have pushed in rapidly from the coast and to have effected a crossing of the Whangpoo River to the southeast of Sungkiang. Units of the two Chinese divisions heretofore stationed in Pootung have withdrawn to check the Japanese advance. Other Chinese troops are reported to be concentrating in the vicinity of Sungkiang for the same purpose. Heavy fighting continues in the western area south of Soochow Creek where the Japanese have made further gains. The Japanese report indications of a Chinese withdrawal from this sector and from Nanhsiang and other points. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/89: Telegram [Document 728] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , November 8, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 8—7:08 p.m.] 1575. When Delbos telephoned to me this afternoon (see my No. 1576, November 8, 9 p.m. 3 ) he said that there was a question with regard to the Far East concerning which he would like to have immediate clarification. When he had attempted to discuss with Davis the question of the protection of French Indo-China in case of Japanese reprisals, Davis had replied that the question was one which was so remote in the future that there was no use talking about it and he, Delbos, had derived the impression that the United States under no conditions would consider sending the American fleet to Far Eastern waters to protect French Indo-China. On the other hand the French Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Jules Henry, had talked with the President day before yesterday and had cabled that the President had said that he regarded the situation of French Indo-China and the situation of the Philippines in much the same way and had given Henry the impression definitely that he would be inclined to extend the protection of the American fleet to French Indo-China. Delbos said that for obvious reasons he was intensely interested to know whether the impression he had derived from Davis or the impression Henry had derived from the President gave a correct picture of the point of view of the American Government with regard to the use of the American Fleet in the Far East in case of Japanese reprisals. I, of course, made no comments nor did I ask any questions as the conversation was over the telephone. I should be greatly obliged for instructions as to how I should reply to further questions on this subject. Chautemps has invited me to lunch on Wednesday, November 10, with him, Blum, and Bonnet 4 and I shall certainly be questioned at that time. Bullitt 3 Vol. iv , p. 168 . 4 French Minister of Finance. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11035: Telegram [Document 729] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 9, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 9—5:55 a.m.] 738. Embassy’s 735, November 8, 4 p.m. 1. The local Japanese spokesman has announced that the Japanese occupation of Taiyuan was completed this morning. 2. Press reports indicate that Changteh in northern Honan on the Peiping–Hankow Railroad is now occupied by the Japanese (Embassy’s 728, November 5, 4 p.m. 5 ) Repeated to Nanking, by courier to Tokyo. Lockhart 5 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11045: Telegram [Document 730] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 9, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 9—2:23 p.m.] 949. My 945, November 8, 7 p.m. Chinese troops in the western area south of Soochow Creek commenced an orderly withdrawal to the southwest about midnight last night. Japanese troops have today occupied the entire area from Soochow Creek south to Lunghwa aerodrome. Several hundred Chinese troops are said to have been caught in the area between Nantao and Lunghwa. Only one or two fires have been reported in the Hungjao Road residential district but Chinese troops before withdrawing from the Nantao-Lunghwa area fired a number of buildings. Withdrawal of Chinese forces from the immediate vicinity of Shanghai is said by military observers to have been brought about by the rapid and successful Japanese thrust from Hangchow Bay towards Sungkiang which the Japanese appear to have either captured or surrounded. The Japanese report that Nanhsiang is burning and that a Chinese withdrawal from that front is imminent. It is not yet clear where the Chinese will establish their new line. Settlement and French Concession quiet. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 762.94/184: Telegram [Document 731] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , November 9, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 7:45 p.m.] 704. My 680, October 30, 3 p.m. 6 In a conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office some further indication was given of British views regarding Italian adherence to the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact. While there was no attempt to make an authoritative assessment of the implications of the enlarged pact, it was apparent that the general trend of Foreign Office opinion is along these lines set forth in my 680, October 30, 3 p.m. That Germany’s long term objective is directed towards using the pact as the springboard of a European policy rather than as a specifically anti-Russian instrument (and pro-Japanese as far as Far Eastern policy is concerned), would seem to be borne out by information bearing on the difficulties of the German position in the Far East. According to my informant, there is a sharp cleavage of opinion in German official circles at present as to the proper objective for German policy in the Far East. German banking and business leaders and the command and staff of the army, including Blomberg, 7 are said to be frankly in sympathy with Chinese aims as they consider that China under a more or less “open door” policy, offers a more fruitful field for expansion of German commercial enterprise than the Japanese Empire or a China under the heel of Japan. The Nazi party leaders on the other hand, who at the moment have a preponderating influence in German foreign policy, are quite prepared to throw German commercial interests in China overboard in order to establish political solidarity with Japan. Which of these two views will finally prevail may still be in doubt. Some indication as to their relative strength may shortly be shown by the result of the present conflict of opinion in Berlin on the withdrawal of German military advisers from China. According to my informant, there are with the Chinese military forces 58 German officers of the highest professional reputation and great experience, some 8 or 10 of them being general officers. They have done what is said to be a very effective job with the Chinese Army and some have even passed beyond the status of advisers and have been commanding military operations. The Nazi influence in Germany desires the immediate withdrawal of these officers as a placating gesture towards Japan. To this the German Army and the conservative industrial and business leaders are opposed. Even if the official Nazi views prevail and the officers are ordered back, there is, of course, no assurance how many if any of them would be prepared to obey the order and return to Germany where no future awaits them. The Foreign Office considers the presence of these highly trained and experienced German officers in China as a factor of considerable importance in the Sino-Japanese conflict. As of interest in this connection, it may be mentioned that, according to Foreign Office information, there were secret military clauses to the German-Japanese pact of a year ago 8 and the existence and purport of these clauses were withheld by the Germans and the Japanese from the Italians in the negotiation of the Italian adherence. Further, according to the Foreign Office, the Germans carefully safeguarded themselves by those secret clauses against being attached to any Japanese kite in the Far East. Such safeguarding provisions in the secret clauses if they exist would indicate that the Nazi political leaders did not have an entirely free hand in negotiating the original pact with Japan. Concurrently with announcement of the Italian adherence to the Anti-Communist Pact have come rumors that Hitler might be asked by Japan to mediate in the present Chinese conflict. The Foreign Office professes to have no authoritative information regarding this rumor. The presence, however, of the German military advisers in China and the uncertain result of the conflict of opinion in Germany as to their withdrawal would seem in themselves sufficient reasons to exclude Germany as a mediator. If it be true that far-seeing elements in Germany are reluctant to jeopardize the existence of important commercial interests in China and the prospect of their expansion in the future by supporting the Japanese program and if there is a chance that this view will prevail, there would be further reasons to look for a European focus for the Nazi-made Anti-Communist Pact. It would moreover be difficult to escape the conclusion that it is really directed against Great Britain, not perhaps in any immediate sense but as an instrument of long term policy. If Germany is able to build up a bloc of states subservient to her leadership and whose larger interests she can make appear in some degree identical with her own and opposed to those of the far-flung British Empire, so much greater will be her strategical position in exacting from Great Britain, and secondarily France, concessions along all the lines of her ambition. Commentators have not failed to see the implications of this pact with respect to German claims for colonial expansion which are gathering increased momentum. That the British are aware of these trends may be taken for granted and there is some indication that the Foreign Office is moving to the view that the now strengthened Berlin-Rome axis must be attacked at Berlin as well as at Rome if an effective result is to be achieved. What is causing the anxiety now is how this attack at Berlin may be made. Press comment on the Anti-Communist Pact while speculative in character and somewhat consciously playing down its immediate importance, nevertheless carries an undertone of anxiety and doubt as to the real aims of the three signatories. On the surface Italy’s adherence might seem to be an innocuous endorsement of the policy expressed in the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact, but informed commentators are nevertheless aware that other factors have come into play within the last year which justify more serious significance being attached to Italy’s adherence. The published terms of the document signed in Rome are substantially the same as those conditions of the German-Japanese agreement but the circumstances in which it was signed have changed in at least two important respects as pointed out in the following brief excerpts from the leading editorial in the Times today which express with substantial accuracy the reaction of all sections of the press: “A year ago the Rome–Berlin Axis wore an aspect less imposing outwardly than it wears today; and a year ago Japan was not strenuously engaged in a large scale invasion of China. There has accordingly been no little speculation whether the new pact has a more effective scope and more portentous implications than its predecessor.… 9 The difficulties of interpretation which have been apparent in newspaper comment not only in countries outside the pact but also in the three capitals principally concerned are evident. Whether the pact will mean much or little depends on what force and value the signatories may feel from time to time impelled to give it.… 9 The truth perhaps is that the pact coming at this moment is a diplomatic demonstration which may be presumed to have an immediate value as a reassurance for Japan and for Italy, in particular, for their commitments in China and Spain respectively. Its future will be what events make it, that is to say the sympathies it implies did not in existing circumstances require a pact to create them”. Repeated to American delegation, Brussels. Bingham 6 Vol. i , p. 609 . 7 Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, German Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 8 For text of secret additional agreement, signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, see German Documents, 1918–1945 , ser. D, vol. i , p. 734, footnote 2 a. 9 Omission indicated in the original telegram. 9 Omission indicated in the original telegram. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 793.94/11047: Telegram [Document 732] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) 10 [ Shanghai ,] November 9, 1937—7:10 p.m. [Received 7:20 p.m.] 0009. Letter from Admiral Hasegawa received today same subject my cipher 4th [ 5th ] this month. In substance following: I have honor forward you reply of Commander Imperial Japanese Army forces regarding question use of Soochow Creek which you and Admiral Little brought up on board His Majesty’s Ship Idzumo 4 November; Army believes section this creek passing through and bounded both sides by International Settlement is no part thereof. In view of this, we consider have right navigate this waterway whenever in our opinion considered necessary. In cases where Nippon Army uses subject stream Navy may cooperate. Recommend that since Chinese were denied use above river in Sector Baker for military purposes State Department protest against its use in same area by Japs as violation neutrality we have been observing toward each of contending forces. 10 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11064: Telegram [Document 733] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 10, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 7:09 p.m.] 902. My 885 [ 890 ], November 5, 11 a.m. Representative of American Aviation Company states Chinese Government has asked for and is accepting tenders for pursuit and training planes costing approximately $3,000,000, $2,000,000, respectively and spare parts and engines $1,000,000 each American currency. I understand tenders submitted provide for cash payment and delivery ex-warehouse in the United States. These purchases if made will indicate that the Chinese Army has intention of resisting indefinitely. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 793.94111/95½ [Document 734] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) 11 [ Washington ,] November 10, 1937. The French Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Jules Henry, called to see me this afternoon. Mr. Henry said that he had just received a telegram from his Government which was in the nature of a personal reply from Mr. Chautemps, the French Prime Minister, to the confidential inquiry he had received recently through Mr. Henry from the President with regard to the matter of Indo-China. 12 Mr. Henry said that Mr. Chautemps wished the President to know that in his judgment the possibility of Japanese aggression against Indo-China was not a remote contingency; that on the contrary, the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Paris had intimated to the French Government that should munitions and implements of war continue to be shipped over the Yunnan Railroad, the Japanese would bomb the railroad in order to destroy that means of transportation of munitions to China. Furthermore, the French Government was informed that the Japanese had recently sent units of the Japanese Navy to South China waters and were preparing a base for the bombing operations above referred to on one of the islands in that region. The French Government consequently felt that as a measure of national defense it was obligated to prevent the further shipment of munitions over the railroad. The French Government, however, had temporized by issuing orders which permitted munitions purchased prior to October 30 to be shipped over the railroad. Mr. Chautemps further desired the President to know that the French Government was prepared to reconsider this attitude and to permit further shipments of munitions to China over the railroad should the Brussels Conference result in any definite agreement among the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty in the nature of a joint accord to permit continued aid to China. He made it clear that France would not run the risks which he envisaged by operating solely as an isolated power in this regard. Mr. Henry once more referred to the hope of his Government that France be included in any subcommittee which might be created by the Brussels Conference and to the urgent desire of the French Government for a closer identification with Great Britain and with the United States in all that related to the Far Eastern situation. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 11 Copy transmitted by the Under Secretary of State on November 11 to President Roosevelt. Mr. Welles noted similar telegraphic advices from Ambassador Bullitt in Paris and added: “I assume that you will not feel it necessary to make any reply to this message, at least for the time being.” 12 See telegram No. 1588, November 10, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, vol. iv , p. 172 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11061: Telegram [Document 735] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 10, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 10—7:16 p.m.] 952. My 949, November 9, 6 p.m. A Chinese force variously estimated at a few hundred to a few thousand is making a last stand in the Nantao area on instructions allegedly received from Nanking. This afternoon there has been heavy Japanese bombing and shelling of the Nantao area with Japanese batteries firing over the Settlement and along the concessions. Fortunately no casualties in latter areas have been reported. Chinese stand in Nantao is of no military value and is undoubtedly being undertaken for political reasons. Japanese have been consolidating their positions in the Lunghwa and Hungjao areas. Heavy fighting is reported to be in progress in the vicinity of Sungkiang. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11068: Telegram [Document 736] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 11, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 11—9:36 a.m.] 532. Our 510, November 2, 3 p.m., and 524, November 6, 6 p.m., paragraph 3. 1. A highly reliable and responsible Japanese official when speculating to us on possibilities of peace parenthetically stated in the strictest confidence that the Japanese high command has decided to meet the “challenge” of the Chinese Army to transfer the principal theater of operations from North China to Shanghai and the Yangtze area. He said that it would be unwise were the Japanese Army to penetrate very deeply into China from the north as the Japanese right flank would then be dangerously exposed to attack by Russia. He referred also to the fact that the best trained elements of the Chinese Army are collected at Shanghai and he remarked that the will to fight of the Chinese Army probably could not be destroyed until those elements could first be destroyed. 2. The Military Attaché’s office has confirmed the enlargement of the Japanese forces at Shanghai by units taken from the North China front. One division which was definitely known to have been operating previously as far south as Chengting on the Peiping–Hankow line has just been identified as taking part in the recent landing operations near Shanghai. Conclusive evidence of movement of Japanese units can be obtained only by laborious sifting of fragmentary information such as casualty lists. We believe that further investigation will disclose that substantial movement is taking place of units from the North China front to Shanghai. 3. The views of our informant with regard to prospects of peace resolved themselves to emphasizing that the Japanese Government cannot entertain for the present any proposition looking toward peace except one coming from the Chinese Government which would provide for direct negotiations. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11074: Telegram [Document 737] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 11, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 11—2:53 p.m.] 958. My No. 952, November 10, 8 p.m. The Japanese renewed the bombardment of Nantao early this morning heavily shelling and bombing the entire area until noon when their troops commenced to advance. Last night two Japanese gunboats took up position near the Whangpoo boom and shelled and machine-gunned the Nantao bund. This morning naval picketed [ sic ] boats crossed the boom at low tide and landed naval units at two points along the Nantao bund. Military observers do not believe that the defenders of Nantao can stand much longer against the combined military, naval and aerial pressure being exerted by the Japanese. Confirmation of the capture of Sungkiang by the Japanese announced officially and it is reported that Chingpu, another strategic village 15 miles northwest of Sungkiang has also fallen. During the course of an interview with press correspondents today General Matsui is reported to have said that inasmuch as he is now master of Shanghai he feels free to take “any steps” dictated by military necessity in the International Settlement as well as in Chinese Territory; that while military operations naturally could not be carried on in the French Concession he makes no distinction between the International Settlement to the north or south of Soochow Creek; that military needs might dictate Japanese control of censorship as well as customs though neither step is contemplated at present; that he preferred not to interfere with the rights of foreign countries and that he would protect foreign interests within the boundaries of the Settlement. General Matsui is further reported to have complained over the “lack of cooperation” shown by the Settlement authorities who he intimated are pro-Chinese. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11075: Telegram [Document 738] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 12, 1937—noon. [Received November 12—12:59 a.m.] 533. Our 524, November 6, 6 p.m. 1. The papers announce this morning that Imperial Headquarters will be established within the next few days on the basis of a new ordinance applicable to the existing de jure condition of affairs. It is also reported that the Headquarters will be purely an organ to coordinate military and naval operations and will have no political or other civil functions. 2. If the foregoing is correct, it is apparent that the question whether war will be declared has been dissociated from the headquarters question. It is our opinion, therefore, that a declaration of war will not be issued in the immediate future. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11093: Telegram [Document 739] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 12, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 9:45 p.m.] 909. Minister of Industries this morning described Japanese hostilities against China as dictated by the military faction partly to revenge failure of China to be subservient to Japan and partly as announced in hope of obtaining for Japan economic advantages in China. Informant said that entirely apart from any decision of the Chinese Government to resist this invasion it was foredoomed to failure by the seizure of Manchuria which solidified Chinese popular sentiment against Japan. Subsequent coercive measures have intensified this popular fear and animosity so that if the Chinese Government were now to agree to peace terms dictated by Japan the Government would be overthrown and the country would lapse into chaos and communism. Economic exploitation of China by Japan would then be impossible. Informant asserted the Japanese military faction has no intelligent policy but only the insane desire to subjugate and to wreak revenge as evidenced by methodical bombing of industrial enterprises. Whole Japanese program is based upon two initial errors: (1st) in the belief that China could not offer any resistance to invasion and (2nd) that China would yield to mere intimidation. These errors have cost Japan already 2,500,000,000 yen in military expenditures and twice that in economic losses. China can prolong resistance indefinitely because it has an agricultural economy and the people have unlimited capacity for endurance and extremely low standard of living. The losses to Japan can thus be doubled while control by Japan of the five northern provinces and of Shanghai will gain for Japan little if any economic advantages with the interior solidly opposed. Informant felt that the Brussels Conference would accomplish at least two good results if nothing more: first, the discussions would demonstrate to the world the falsity of Japan’s pretense that the present hostilities are designed to promote friendly relations with China which China unreasonably refuses, it being clear that Japan’s own actions have made it impossible for any Chinese Government to submit and continue in power. Discussions will show also that world powers like Great Britain, France and the United States cannot abstain from taking some part in the affairs of the Far East. Informant made observations indicating that the Government contemplates the necessity sometime of transferring to some city in the interior. The conviction expressed by this informant that continued resistance to Japan is inescapable is the more interesting because he can speak Japanese, has numerous Japanese friends and before the present Japanese invasion was known as a leader in the pro-Japanese faction. He is reliably quoted as stating recently in a political conference that war with Japan would end in defeat and peace with Japan would result in chaos but that from defeat China would revive as a nation whereas chaos would mean extinction. Sent to Peiping, Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 762.94/191: Telegram [Document 740] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 12—2:54 p.m.] 272. Reports from three different sources say that the major purpose of the German-Italo-Japanese pact is aimed at bringing the war to an end, enticing China to join the Hitler-Mussolini entente. From the same sources I learn that three Chinese officials are here, not even known to their Embassy, and they are being asked to help this movement, Hitler to be the arbitrator in the China break-up. The Chinese Ambassador says they are receiving arms and flying machines all the time, carried over Russian railroads. And from the the same confidential sources I learn that Germany and Italy wish American and English properties in China to be seized and used in payment for arms; and when peace is arranged this is to be done. While officials deny everything except the strengthening of the Berlin-Rome axis, so much has been said to me by well informed people that I feel that it is best to cable it to you. Certainly everything possible is being done to defeat the Brussels Conference. Repeated to Brussels for American delegation. Dodd The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11086: Telegram [Document 741] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 12, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 12—3:45 p.m.] 962. Reference Department’s No. 534, November 10, 4 p.m. 13 The matter is being arranged locally and there is now no need for representations at Tokyo. The facts are that some weeks ago the British military forces caused a light boom to be put across Soochow Creek to prevent hostilities in that section of the Creek which flows through the International Settlement within B Sector of the foreign defense lines. This action could only be justified on the grounds of military necessity as jurisdiction over the creek admittedly is Chinese and not foreign, but as I understand the Japanese also placed a boom lower down on the creek, they cannot now properly complain of the British action. To have removed the boom a few days ago would have permitted the Japanese to navigate the creek at a time when the Chinese and Japanese were fighting across the creek beyond Jessfield and might have been complained of by the Chinese as unneutral. Now that hostilities have moved into the Hinterland, there is no need for the boom and it is being removed by the police. 2. The situation has been complicated by the truculent attitude of General Matsui since his arrival near Shanghai on November 10 from his headquarters. The Japanese wish to move provisions up the creek to supply their troops in the Hinterland and there was reason to believe that the Japanese military might force their way through the boom. If they had done so they would not have been resisted but an already tense situation would not have been improved. Relations between the British and Japanese have been strained for some days. I urged my Japanese colleagues this morning to leave the matter of the boom to its natural course which would probably be its removal within a very few days by the authorities concerned for lack of further need for it and then there would be no problem for us to discuss. My British and Italian colleagues and I saw the Japanese Consul General later and the British Consul General made it clear that the boom is being removed in the natural course and not as a result of Japanese military pressure. Meanwhile, the Japanese military were pressing British military headquarters and the removal of the boom was proceeding more rapidly perhaps than was necessary or desirable. 3. In my conversations with the Japanese Consul General this morning I took the opportunity of the private discussion to urge upon him unofficially that the statements reported to have been made to the press by General Matsui are serving only to make more difficult an already difficult situation as in the instance of this boom on the creek which could probably be removed in the natural course as the need for it has disappeared but which could not be removed in compliance with a Japanese demand or Japanese military pressure. Gauss 13 Not printed; it requested recommendations in regard to Admiral Yarnell’s telegram of November 9, 7:10 p.m., p. 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] (793.94/11047). The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11047: Telegram [Document 742] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , November 12, 1937—7 p.m. 544. Reference Commander-in-Chief’s 0012—1930 [ 1826 ]. 14 With regard to Japanese use of Soochow Creek, Department is of the opinion that action, if any, in opposition thereto should be confined solely to appropriate representations. Inform Commander-in-Chief. Hull 14 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 516 ; see also Admiral Yarnell’s telegram of November 9, 7:10 p.m., p. 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11085: Telegram [Document 743] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 12—3:20 p.m.] 963. My telegram No. 958, November 11, 8 p.m. Following the Japanese attack yesterday on the Chinese defenders of Nantao some 5000 have surrendered to the French during the past 24 hours. The small number still holding out is gradually being pushed back towards the concession and is expected to surrender shortly, thus terminating hostilities in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai. The many fires in Pootung and Nantao caused by military operations during the past 2 days are gradually dying down. According to military observers, the Japanese continue to drive south and west and have been able to make rapid progress with their mechanized units. Both Chingpu and Anting, the latter town being 10 miles west of Nanhsiang, are reported to have been captured forcing the Chinese to withdraw from Nanhsiang. General Pai Chung Hsi is said to be at Kashing attempting to reform the Chinese forces to hold the Kashing–Soochow–Changshu line. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11107: Telegram [Document 744] The Consul General at Canton ( Linnell ) to the Secretary of State Canton , November 13, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 14—11:14 a.m.] Boarding parties from a Japanese destroyer newly arrived in the Pearl River lower delta yesterday stopped and searched the papers of the British-owned river steamers Fatshan and Tungon on their Way from Hong Kong to Canton. Japanese have recently several times similarly stopped and inspected papers of French and Portuguese registered steamers plying between Hong Kong and Kwangchowwan. As far as can be judged from the press and private contacts, local authorities and public while frankly disappointed over Shanghai and Shansi reverses, generally show no sign of defeatism and feel that successive withdrawals to interior are necessary features of China’s prolonged resistance strategy. This long range conception of the struggle is even more evident in Kwangsi where economic development and strategic communications construction by huge labor armies are pushed steadily, together with extensive military and aviation training, without regard to momentary fortunes of war. Chinese circulars and press generally denounced Anti-Comintern pact as camouflage of secret arrangement whereby the three countries join in promoting their aggressive aims and sabotaging Nine Power Conference. While appreciating American efforts for peace through agreement they feel that democratic countries led by America and Britain now have no alternative but strong concerted action to restrain aggressor nations. Chinese organizations continue to bombard Conference with cables urging sanctions against Japan, while steps have been taken to complete the suppression of locally smuggled Japanese goods and severance of transactions with Japanese banks. Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow. Linnell The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11105: Telegram [Document 745] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , [November 14, 1937—6 p.m.] [Received November 14—9 a.m.] 913. Japanese military successes at Shanghai are having discouraging effect upon Chinese Government. While Nanking is quiet it is believed that Government will leave for interior. Conservative report says to Hengyang in Hunan. If Government leaves I plan, unless otherwise instructed, to leave Atcheson and Paxton 15 here to maintain contact with such authorities as may emerge and myself follow Government at least as far as Hankow. Captain Roberts of Military Attaché’s staff will also remain. I shall take rest of staff. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson 15 George Atcheson, Jr., and J. Hall Paxton, Second Secretaries of Embassy in China. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 124.93/375a: Telegram [Document 746] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , November 14, 1937—3 p.m. 353. Your 913, received November 14. In the event that the Chinese Government should withdraw from Nanking to some other point, you would of course wish, whether you actually follow the Government to that point or not, to consider yourself as constructively with the Government. Department desires that you get in touch with the ranking diplomatic representatives of other principally interested governments, whether those representatives are in Nanking, Shanghai or Peiping, discuss the whole matter with them, ascertain what they plan to do in the eventuality under reference, whether they plan to follow the Government actually or at least constructively, that is, they might feel it necessary for them to remain for certain periods in other places but would consider themselves constructively as being with the Government. It would seem necessary that before making your final plans you will have to ascertain definitely to what place the Government is going, whether it will remove there in whole or in part, what Government offices and officials will be there and what offices and officials will remain at other points, and whether the Government plans to stay at the point to which it removes unless forced to withdraw to some other point. The carrying out of the procedure outlined above should not be construed as a decision on your part not to follow the Government but merely as the taking by you of sufficient time to work matters out in an orderly manner. Obviously, in connection with such a question, certain matters have to be given attention and consideration including conferences with your colleagues and with the Department. Please inform the Department completely by urgent telegram in regard to the foregoing points and in regard to any further developments which may occur and which would be of assistance to the Department. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/376: Telegram [Document 747] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 15, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 15—9:05 a.m.] 917. Your 353, November 14, 4 [ 3 ] p.m. British Chargé d’Affaires is due from Shanghai in a day or two and will consult and report when they have arrived. Hitherto its [ his? ] plan was to go to Shanghai sending a subordinate, perhaps Military Attaché, with Chinese Government. French associates intend to remain Shanghai, subordinate secretary representatives now here to follow Government. German Ambassador only other Ambassador in Nanking will go as far as Hankow with us. It is not clear here as to what Government may do or when it will do it. Department’s 353 received in such garbled condition that I shall have to reply specifically later when repeats requested have been received. But above represents information available after discussion which I had with other representatives this morning. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/377: Telegram [Document 748] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 16, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 16—12:21 p.m.] 920. Department’s 353, November 14, 3 p.m., and further reference to my 917, November 15, 3 p.m. Soviet Embassy plans to follow Government. Soviet Ambassador has not returned to Nanking. British Chargé d’Affaires informed me this morning that he would leave his Consul at Nanking and go to Hankow but would not try to accompany Government further. He would send representative if that was possible perhaps returning himself to Shanghai. It is evident that all missions desire to have representative at least follow Government if that is possible. Our difficulty is that we are unable to learn what the Government intends to do although it is obvious that they cannot remain in Nanking. In fact parts of it are already being moved up river. I think that our needs will be met eventually if we send a representative and in any case I would not think it necessary for the Embassy to go further inland than Hankow. Our decisions perhaps have to be changed as situation develops. Chinese will doubtless drop boom across river at Kiukiang as soon as Government departs or gets above it which will make our movements difficult. Does Department wish me to remain here with staff until after Japanese have taken over this city? Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11147: Telegram [Document 749] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 16, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 16—12:35 p.m.] 922. 1. The Government is definitely leaving Nanking probably within a few days. We are reliably but not officially informed that its plans on which action is now being taken will place Foreign Office, Finance and Education Ministries and Postal Directorate at Hankow; Military Administration, Wuchang; Communications, Changsha; the five Yuan at Chungking or Chengtu. Postal Directorate is removing tonight. Red Cross administrator evacuated for Hankow this morning. 2. Embassy is urging all American citizens to leave while it is possible to obtain accommodations. 3. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo, Hankow. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 124.93/377: Telegram [Document 750] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , November 16, 1937—8 p.m. 357. Your 920, November 16, 2 p.m. and 922, November 16, 4 p.m. In the event that the Government removes to Hankow or to a point inland you should follow the Government as far as Hankow. In making your arrangements for this move as well as for leaving members of the staff at Nanking you should insofar as practicable concert your action with that of the diplomatic representatives of other principally interested Governments. Hull President Roosevelt to the Japanese Prime Minister (Konoye) 033.9411 Konoe, Fuminaro/43 [Document 751] President Roosevelt to the Japanese Prime Minister ( Konoye ) 16 [ Washington , November 16, 1937.] Dear Prince Konoye : It afforded me great pleasure to welcome on November 9 your son, Fumitaka, and to receive from him your letter of September 15. 17 I was impressed by his address and bearing and I am sure that he will prove himself worthy of the traditions of an illustrious family. I take it as a compliment to our country that his education is being entrusted to American institutions. I also wish to express my appreciation of your cordial personal greetings and of your message of friendship on behalf of the people of Japan to the people of America. I heartily reciprocate your sentiments, especially the desire expressed by you regarding the promotion of the friendship between our two countries through sympathetic understanding and mutual respect and confidence. Because I so earnestly desire to see that friendship fostered and strengthened, I feel that I must acquaint you with my concern lest the existing hostilities between Japan and China do injury to the cause which we both have so much at heart. I therefore hope that a way will speedily be found for a peaceful adjustment of the situation on a basis which is fair and just to all concerned and which will, through practical application of fundamental principles indispensable to normal and healthy relations among nations, provide for enduring peace and stability. With kind personal regards, I am Yours sincerely, [File copy not signed] 16 Transmitted by the Department to the Ambassador in Japan in instruction No. 1376, November 22, for delivery to the Japanese Prime Minister. 17 Not printed. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11159: Telegram [Document 752] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , November 16, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 17—7:30 a.m.] An important Chinese official of the Tsingtao–Tsinanfu Railway has just called on me and inquired whether I would not attempt to dissuade the mayor of this city from announced policy (reiterated yesterday to a gathering of Chinese officials of the local government) that if the Japanese endeavored to take Tsingtao he would make a shambles of Japanese property in this city, particularly the mills. The reason for the request that I interview the mayor was because it was thought that the mayor would recognize my disinterestedness, whereas the Chinese caller stated that the mayor distrusted the motives of any Chinese who questioned his policy with regard to Japanese property. My caller stated that the mayor feels that such Chinese are all political rivals for his position. The mayor has again advised families of officials to leave the city with the result that [another] exodus has commenced in spite of a similar exodus of Chinese from Tsinanfu who are proceeding to Tsingtao. Despite the gathering of war clouds in Tsinanfu, Tsingtao remains quiet. There is little uneasiness among foreigners and no evidence of any hysteria among the Chinese such as was observed in August. At present there are in Tsingtao approximately 300 Americans. Sent to Nanking, Peiping. Sokobin The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/11189 [Document 753] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire The attention of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom has been drawn to reports of a statement alleged to have been made to the press on the 12th November by the General Officer commanding the Japanese troops at Shanghai to the effect that the Japanese would decide in due course what they would do about customs, postal services, censorship etc., in Shanghai. The General intimated that the Japanese would not tolerate obstructions from third parties. His Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokio was thereupon instructed to draw the attention of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to this report and he urged that the General should be instructed as soon as possible to deal with all these matters in a conciliatory spirit. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was in full agreement as to the need for settling these matters in a peaceful atmosphere and he promised to study the question at once. As the questions at issue also concern the United States Government, His Majesty’s Government hope that they will be able to see their way to instruct the United States Ambassador at Tokio to make parallel representations to the Japanese Government. Washington , November 17, 1937. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11172: Telegram [Document 754] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , November 17, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 18—3 a.m.] A representative of the mayor has just called on the Consulate to inform it that the mayor is naturally concerned about the welfare of foreigners in Tsingtao because of the rapidly increasing threat to Tsingtao as a result of the Japanese advance to the Yellow River. Under instructions from the Central Government, the mayor and the military would make every attempt to resist the entry of Japanese into this city. The military felt that the Japanese would advance on Tsingtao from the west following a crossing of the Yellow River at Tsiyang, Taitzae and Putai, all of which are fairly short distances from the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway. It would then be a “matter of a few hours” before they would approach the environs of Tsingtao. He also stated that the Japanese Navy was operating all along the coast of Shantung and that a landing was to be expected at Jihchao to the south of Tsingtao, at Kinkiakow to the north and also at Chengting and Lungko. The mayor’s representative emphasized that while the Chinese desired to preserve the peace and security of Tsingtao, the Central Government’s instructions were to make every resistance to an attack by the Japanese. I inquired if there was any foundation to reports that the mayor had stated he would destroy Japanese property before the Japanese would take this city. The representative stated that the mayor had undertaken an agreement with the Japanese Consul General to safeguard such property so long as there was no Japanese military action “in Tsingtao and nearby places”, but that the mayor considered that the moment a crossing of the Yellow River was accomplished by the Japanese, his agreement in respect to the safeguarding of Japanese property was no longer valid. When I pressed the point I gathered that the mayor might not act as wantonly as reports might indicate, but at the same time it is to be noted that it is confirmed that last night there was considerable activity on the part of Chinese soldiers at the mills. Tsingtao at the moment quiet and peaceful. Foreign officials feel fairly confident that their nationals in this city will not be endangered. Sent to Peiping, Nanking. Sokobin The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11157: Telegram [Document 755] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 17, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 17—7 a.m.] 547. Reported Japanese intention to occupy Shanghai Settlement. The Foreign Office spokesman informed press representatives today that the Shanghai correspondent in attributing to General Matsui the statement that Japan might occupy the International Settlement had not correctly quoted the General. The spokesman stated that Japan has no intention of taking over the Settlement. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 793.94111/93: Telegram [Document 756] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , November 17, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 17—4:15 p.m.] 1621. I was told at the Foreign Office this afternoon that the report that the Japanese Government had sent some sort of “ultimatum” to the French Government regarding the shipment of munitions through Indo-China to China is entirely untrue. The situation remains that munitions ordered prior to July are permitted to transit Indo-China; the Japanese know this and are displeased; but there has been nothing in the nature of an “ultimatum”. Repeated to American delegation. Wilson The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) 793.94/11159: Telegram [Document 757] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) Washington , November 17, 1937—8 p.m. Your November 16, 5 p.m. The Department assumes that you, bearing in mind the Department’s August 7, 4 p.m., do not intend to interview the mayor as and for the purpose requested. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11178: Telegram [Document 758] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 18, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 18—1:02 p.m.] 934. Embassy’s 922, November 16, 4 p.m. 1. We have been orally and confidentially informed by the Foreign Office that the National Government has been removed to Chungking and that the Foreign Office will be established at Hankow. Except that the seat of government is definitely Chungking, the location of government offices is as set forth in our telegram under reference. It is expected that a public announcement of the change will be made tonight. 2. Most of the government offices and personnel have already removed. Lin Sen 18 is in Chungking. The Foreign Minister is still here and it is believed that the other Cabinet officers are gone. Repeated Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Johnson 18 President of the Chinese National Government. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94 Conference/270: Telegram [Document 759] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 18—10:40 a.m.] 549. My 544, November 16, 1 p.m. 19 1. My British colleague has just read to me a telegram from his Government reporting a conversation between Eden and Yoshida 20 which Lindsay 21 is instructed to bring to your attention. Yoshida appears to have informed Eden that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had told Craigie 22 on November 15 that the Japanese Government would be disposed to accept an offer of good offices looking toward peace and that Hirota had made the same suggestion to me “in even more specific terms”. 2. Craigie received no such definite impression from his talk with Horinouchi. The former had called on the Vice Minister to inquire on his own initiative as to the truth of press reports to the effect that Germany was offering mediation. The Vice Minister replied that the reports were based on a misunderstanding. At the end of the interview Craigie still on his own initiative asked the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs for a personal expression of opinion as to whether supposing the moment came for an offer of good offices the Japanese Government would prefer Germany to act as intermediary rather than the United States or Great Britain. The Vice Minister said he thought not. Craigie then inquired in the same strictly personal manner whether he thought [the Japanese Government] would welcome an offer of Anglo-American good offices at the appropriate moment. The Vice Minister said he would prefer not to answer this question without consulting the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Craigie has still no information as to the view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on this point. 3. As to my own talk with Hirota on November 16 23 I received no impression that he was soliciting an offer of good offices. However, it seemed to me that he was seeking to prepare the ground for consultation with the United States to explore a possible path to peace and that he went somewhat beyond the statement which he made to me and to the other ambassadors when he handed them copies of Japan’s refusal to go to Brussels, that if our countries wished to help they could best do so by persuading Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate for peace. This appeared to me to be a purely conventional observation which he had made to me and to others on previous occasions. I am aware that the German Ambassador took this seriously and reported it to his Government and that this gave rise to the press reports that Hitler was offering good offices. Nothing came of it. 4. Craigie has suggested to his Government as a first step that he be authorized to inquire of the Vice Minister: ( a ) whether he is now in a position to answer Craigie’s question regarding Japanese attitude toward Anglo-American offer of good offices; ( b ) whether this term “good offices” can be understood to mean joint action by the two countries as intermediaries for the initiation of peace negotiations. As regards ( b ) Craigie pointed out to his Government that it would be necessary to make it clear to the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government is in no mood as yet to engage in direct negotiations with Japan adding that his conception of the function of intermediaries would be the passing of messages regarding armistice and peace terms from one combatant to the other until a basis has been found for direct negotiations between the parties. It seemed to Craigie that there would be no objection to his method if the American and British Governments were to announce in advance that they assume no responsibility for the terms. 5. Craigie and I both feel that if Anglo-American good offices are to be offered either by both or one of us our respective Governments should act only as intermediaries and with the approval of both combatants. We believe that the Japanese interpret such good offices as bringing pressure to bear on Chiang Kai-shek to enter negotiations even against his will. It is obviously out of the question that either the United States or Great Britain or both would consent to any such action. 6. We feel nevertheless that a negotiated peace now would involve far less drastic terms than if long delayed. Hirota said so to me. 7. Craigie said to me that he would inform his Government that in his view the procedure which he has in mind would not be incompatible with any declaration adopted at Brussels but that even if it were so he would deplore adherence to the principle of peace by collective action to a point where any prospect of peace lying outside the Brussels Conference would be ruled out. I would be greatly interested to learn the Department’s views with regard to this point which I had previously suggested in paragraph 14 of my 544 of November 16, 1 p.m. 8. Craigie is informing his Government of his talk with Horinouchi and of my talk with Hirota in order to correct the impression conveyed to Eden by Yoshida. 9. Craigie and I both believe that chances of success would be seriously impaired by premature publicity. 10. I wish to emphasize that my conversations with Hirota have in no way gone beyond the field indicated in my telegrams. Grew 19 Vol. iv , p. 189 . 20 Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom. 21 British Ambassador in the United States. 22 British Ambassador in Japan. 23 See also memorandum of November 16, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 413 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11181: Telegram [Document 760] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 18, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 18—4:35 p.m.] 984. My No. 970, November 15, 6 p.m. 24 Chinese resistance along the Kashing–Soochow–Changshu line appears to be increasing. Chinese reenforcements are reported to be steadily strengthening this line while the rainy weather of the past 2 days has slowed up Japanese operations. Japanese Army casualties in the Shanghai area since August 23 were announced today as 9,000 killed and 29,000 wounded. Approximately 220,000 Japanese troops are now believed to be engaged in operations from Hangchow Bay to the Yangtze River. Additional reenforcements and great quantities of munitions and supplies arrive daily and are sent to the front over land and by the Whangpoo River and Soochow Creek. The Settlement south of the Creek and the French Concession are gradually assuming a more normal aspect; many defense works are being removed; the Shanghai Volunteer Corps has been demobilized and the foreign defense sectors are now very lightly held. The refugee problem is serious but the Japanese have allowed the International Committee in charge of the safety zone in the native city to continue to function and have contributed $20,000 towards this work. The Hongkew and Yangtzepoo Districts have now been thrown open by the Japanese authorities to Japanese residents without restrictions but not to foreigners; all other areas around Shanghai occupied by the Japanese remain closed to foreigners. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping. Gauss 24 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11673 [Document 761] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2670 Tokyo , November 18, 1937. [Received December 16.] Sir : I have the honor to supplement herewith my telegrams No. 544 of November 16, 1 p.m. 25 and No. 548 of November 18, 10 a.m. 26 reporting my conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict. It will be recalled that on August 6 I expressed to Mr. Hirota the hope that he would call on me if he ever saw ways by which I could be helpful in the situation existing between Japan and China. (See my No. 250, August 6, 9 p.m.) I had, of course, been giving constant study to developments, both in Japan and abroad, with a view to seizing an opportunity to remind Mr. Hirota of the statement which I had made to him on August 6. When the Japanese Government expressed its intention to decline the invitation of the Belgian Government to be represented at the Brussels Conference, and when the Japanese Government confirmed in its note dated October 27, 1937, to the Belgian Government, evidences of intention to refrain from cooperating with the Brussels Conference, it became evident to me that, in line with the desire of the American Government, as expressed both to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, to be helpful to the combatants in bringing to an end the current hostilities and finding a mutually satisfactory basis for a lasting peace between the two countries, I should endeavor to ascertain unofficially and cautiously whether the widespread confidence of the Japanese Government and people in the disinterestedness and impartiality of the United States could in some way be profitably employed in the direction of peace. The Counselor of the Embassy had at various times had several informal conversations with Mr. Yoshizawa, Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, to explore the possibility of a further conversation taking place between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself along the line of the above-mentioned conversation of August 6. They had agreed that circumstances were not favorable. On November 8 Mr. Dooman called, with my knowledge and approval, on Mr. Yoshizawa and suggested to Mr. Yoshizawa that it might be useful to examine the situation in the light of developments then current. Mr. Yoshizawa heartily concurred. It was agreed between them, however, that any conversations which they might have would be entirely unofficial and were not to be a matter of record. However, in view of my recent calls of November 16 and November 18 on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa has consented to my reporting to the Department the general substance of the conversations between him and Mr. Dooman which took place on November 8 and on November 16, as hereinafter described. Mr. Dooman began by describing the circumstances which led to the opening of the way by President Theodore Roosevelt to the peace negotiations between Japan and Russia in 1905, and he related how Mr. Minister Griscom had, on his own initiative, obtained from the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Katsura, an engagement to reveal to President Roosevelt the Japanese peace terms if Russia were also prepared to present simultaneously its peace terms to President Roosevelt. Mr. Dooman stated that the analogy between the situation which existed at that time and the situation existing today could not be pushed too far, but that it seemed important to consider whether the events of 1905 did not suggest some method which might be used today. Mr. Yoshizawa said that it was the policy of the Japanese Government not to permit mediation by any third Power or Powers between Japan and China. The military situation was, Mr. Yoshizawa continued, in process of undergoing a change. The Chinese Government was aware that it would be unwise for the Japanese military forces to penetrate very deeply into China from the north, for the reason that the Japanese army had constantly to bear in mind the possibility of danger to its right flank from the direction of Soviet Russia. The Japanese army was now disposed to accept the challenge of the Chinese army to make Shanghai and the Yangtze region the principal theatre of military operations. Mr. Yoshizawa said that what the Japanese would regard as the perfect solution would be for the Chinese Government, following military reverses in that area, to propose to Japan direct negotiations for peace. The military situation which might lead to some such overture on the part of the Chinese Government had not yet been developed, and even if the Japanese forces inflicted severe reverses upon the Chinese forces, it might take considerable time; and also, notwithstanding such reverses, the Chinese Government might still be determined to continue the hostilities. Mr. Yoshizawa, therefore, thought that until a situation had developed which was calculated to bring about what he had previously described as the “ideal solution”, there would be little likelihood of the Japanese Government giving consideration to any proposed move toward peace involving the United States or any other third Power. On November 16, at the request of Mr. Yoshizawa, Mr. Dooman called on Mr. Yoshizawa for a further conversation. Mr. Yoshizawa referred to the conversation of November 8, and asked Mr. Dooman whether we understood the attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the part which third party powers are desired by Japan to take in promoting peace negotiations between Japan and China. Mr. Dooman said that it was his understanding that the Japanese Government hoped that the United States and other powers would persuade the Chinese Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government. Mr. Yoshizawa replied that that was so, but that the statement did not completely cover the Japanese Government’s position: that position is that Japan would be willing to consult with the United States or with any other power having important interests in the Far East, such consultation to be either with such powers individually or collectively, but that Japan would not participate in any discussion or consultation within the framework of any system of collective security such as the League of Nations or the Brussels Conference. Mr. Yoshizawa then showed Mr. Dooman a telegram from Mr. Saito, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. Mr. Saito reported that the opinion of well-informed observers in Washington was that the American Government would not permit itself to become involved, apart from the other powers party to the Nine Power Treaty, in any effort to bring about peace between Japan and China; that a suggestion had been advanced to the effect that a useful move would be for Mr. Johnson at Nanking and for me at Tokyo to sound out simultaneously the views of the Chinese and Japanese governments respectively with regard to the prospects of peace. Mr. Saito concurred in the opinion of the observers above-mentioned in respect of the attitude of the American Government and believed that any concerted move by Mr. Johnson and by me along the line above suggested would be extremely hazardous. Mr. Dooman offered the comment that he felt certain that the American Government would view with the greatest distaste any proposition which might be made looking toward the assistance of the American Government in legitimatizing the results of a Japanese military victory in China. He thought that this point should be given consideration at all times by the Japanese Government in connection with any plan for participation by the United States in a move toward peace. Mr. Yoshizawa agreed, and said that he would present the thought to Mr. Hirota. Mr. Yoshizawa said that reports received by the Foreign Office from Brussels tended to give the impression that the American delegation had been taking a leading role in the proceedings of the Conference. Mr. Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador at Brussels, has excellent contacts among press correspondents covering the Brussels Conference, and it could be surmised that the Italian delegation is keeping the Japanese Ambassador fully informed of developments within the conference. Mr. Kurusu is also receiving information from one or two other delegations. The purport of the information available to Mr. Kurusu is that the American delegation is taking a leading role in the proceedings of the conference. As an illustration of some of the reports current in Brussels, Mr. Yoshizawa said that Mr. Kurusu had heard from a Chinese source that the American delegation had advised the Chinese delegation that continued resistance by China would bring from the United States something more than moral support. Mr. Yoshizawa made the comment that the Foreign Office did not attach much importance to this report, as it had come from a Chinese source. Mr. Yoshizawa said that happily the Japanese people are convinced that, notwithstanding the President’s speech at Chicago on October 5 27 and the Department of State’s announcement of October 6, 28 the American Government and people have a just appreciation of the causes of the conflict between Japan and China, and that their concern toward the conflict does not arise from material and selfish reasons. On the other hand, it was well known that the Japanese people deeply resented the attitude of the British Government and of the British press, which has been actively encouraging some form of joint action by the Powers against Japan. He was now very much afraid that the impression which generally prevails in Brussels, that the American delegation has assumed a position of leadership in the conference, would become known in Japan, and that the animus of the Japanese people which is now directed at Great Britain would be transferred to the United States. The resolution drafted at the Brussels Conference carried a sting in its tail, and it would be unfortunate from the point of view of maintaining good relations by the United States and Japan if there were given grounds for believing that the American delegation was responsible for the conference’s recommending some form of united action against Japan. Mr. Dooman agreed that it would be extremely unfortunate if an impression such as that suggested by Mr. Yoshizawa were permitted to arise, and he wondered whether Mr. Yoshizawa had any thoughts as to some step which might be taken to remove the impression, which he was sorry to say was widely prevalent in Tokyo, that the United States had taken the initiative in organizing the Brussels Conference and is now active in directing the proceedings of the Conference. Mr. Yoshizawa said that, in his view, definite assurance from the American Government that it was neither responsible for holding the Conference nor leading the proceedings of the Conference, added to some further assurance that the United States is not actively promoting a plan for “united action”, would be extremely helpful and would effectively dispel any fear of Japan’s resentment being turned against the United States. He had been turning over in his mind the possibility of instructing Mr. Saito to call on the Secretary of State and to make a frank statement of Japan’s position in the hope of eliciting from the Secretary some assurance along the lines just described. Mr. Dooman reminded Mr. Yoshizawa that there exists conclusive evidence that, whoever was responsible for organizing the Brussels Conference, it was not the United States: that fact is clearly demonstrated in the opening sentence of the invitation of the Belgian Government to the Brussels Conference. With regard to suggestions that the American delegation is playing a leading role in the Conference, it seemed entirely likely that an impression to that effect was being deliberately fostered by parties who conceive it to be in their own interest to promote the idea of American leadership. He thought it would be unfortunate if the American Government were requested to confirm the accuracy of the statements of its own officials, such as the statement issued by Mr. Sumner Welles on November 2. 29 Further, if the Japanese Government wished, in spite of these considerations, to ascertain the position of the American Government, an approach by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington would excite undesirable conjecture and speculation. Quite apart from the question of the relations of the American Government with the Brussels Conference, it seemed to Mr. Dooman that there were other circumstances which needed to be considered. It seemed that the rapidly developing military situation around Shanghai required that, if the Japanese Government, as stated by Mr. Yoshizawa, were willing to consult with the United States as a nation having important interests in the Far East, any great delay in initiating any such consultation might result in the loss of an opportunity for opening the way to peace. It seemed highly unlikely that General Chiang Kai-shek would be in any mood to consider peace if the Chinese Government were evicted from Nanking by the Japanese military forces. Mr. Yoshizawa agreed. He said that there was a further danger, and that was the possibility that radical elements in the Nanking Government might be able to assume a position of control, in which event any possibility of peace being negotiated would have to be abandoned. If the Chinese Government were to retreat from Nanking into the remote interior of China, the need for some Chinese authority to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order would bring about the organization of some sort of new regime; and there were several Chinese prepared to organize such regimes. It was obvious, however, that no settlement reached with these regimes or, indeed, with any political figure in China other than Chiang Kai-shek could be regarded as a final settlement; and this view is being held by many important Japanese, including leading military officers. Mr. Dooman said that he would report to the Ambassador the substance of the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Yoshizawa. It seemed to Mr. Dooman, and he would so inform me, that the moment appeared to have come when I might usefully remind Mr. Hirota that he could confer with me in any situation in which he thought I might be helpful in bringing about the restoration of peace. Mr. Yoshizawa stated that he would, for his part, consult with his superiors, and that he would exchange views with Mr. Dooman the following morning. Mr. Dooman immediately reported to me the substance of his conversation with Mr. Yoshizawa. He had hardly completed his report when the private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned and requested me to call on Mr. Hirota at the official residence at 9:30 the following morning. I thereupon addressed to the Department my telegram No. 543, November 15, 7 p.m., 30 suggesting that consideration be deferred of any plan to implement the resolution drafted by the Brussels Conference. I called on Mr. Hirota on November 16 at half-past nine in the morning, at the official residence of the Foreign Minister. An extended account of our conversation was cabled to the Department (see my 544, November 16, 1 p.m.). In accordance with the Department’s instruction No. 300, November 16, 8 p.m. 31 I called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his official residence and precisely carried out the Secretary’s directions. I read to him the text of the final paragraph of the declaration drawn up by the Brussels Conference 32 and pointed out that nowhere in the declaration did the phrase “united action” appear. I remarked that the term “common attitude” is quite a different matter and I hoped that this clearing up of an erroneous impression would completely set at rest the fears which he had expressed to me the other day. Mr. Hirota assented. I then said that in the message from Mr. Hull which he had asked me to communicate directly to Mr. Hirota it was made clear that there was not an atom of truth in any allegation that the initiative in convoking the Brussels Conference was taken by the United States. It is Mr. Hull’s understanding that neither the United States nor any other Power represented at the Conference has gone farther than to assume its share of the common responsibility for an exchange of views concerning the situation in the Far East. I then once again spoke of the originally inaccurate press reports concerning Mr. Eden’s speech in the House of Commons and I also repeated Mr. Welles’s statement to the press definitely correcting the misunderstanding. I said I feared that an effort was being made in various quarters to injure the relations between the United States and Japan by spreading rumors to the effect that the United States had not only taken the initiative in convoking the Conference but is also taking active leadership in the Conference, and I appealed to Mr. Hirota, on behalf of good relations between our countries, to do everything possible to counteract the effect of these rumors and to let the actual facts be known. Mr. Hirota said that he would take definite steps in that direction and that he would also convey to his colleagues what I had said to him. I then read to Mr. Hirota Mr. Hull’s message concerning their mutual efforts to maintain and develop good relations between our countries and Mr. Hull’s apprehension lest the present situation in the Far East would injure those relations. Mr. Hirota expressed great pleasure at this message and asked me to thank Mr. Hull for it. He asked if he might have the paper on which I had written the message but as the message had come in confidential code and would have to be paraphrased I said to Mr. Hirota that I would write him the message later on the plea that the paper in my hand was not sufficiently neat to leave with him. Mr. Hirota then referred to our conversation the other day and said that reports are now coming in to him that Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Government are evacuating Nanking. He repeated that he felt this to be most unfortunate because if chaos should result it would mean an indefinite prolongation of the hostilities. He said “we want to talk with Chiang Kai-shek and this will now be very difficult.” I merely inquired once again whether diplomatic channels between the two Governments are not still in existence to which Mr. Hirota smilingly assented but without comment. I had today an extended conversation with my British colleague (see my 549, November 18, 6 p.m.). It will have been noted that Sir Robert Craigie had suggested that he be authorized to press the Japanese Foreign Office for a reply to certain questions which he had put to Mr. Horinouchi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, calculated to clarify the attitude of the Japanese Government toward any Anglo-American offer of good offices, if made. It seemed to me, in the light of the indications of Japanese attitude given us by Mr. Yoshizawa, that the procedure which Sir Robert was suggesting overlooked the holding of a discussion which the Japanese considered to be an essential preliminary to any official indication by them of departure from the formal Japanese attitude—that third countries could best promote peace by persuading the Chinese Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government. It seemed to me, further, that it would be logical to assume that the Japanese would not answer frankly the hypothetical questions put to them by Sir Robert unless and until the British Government (or the American Government) were prepared itself to answer—and to answer in a sense which the Japanese Government would regard as satisfactory—the hypothetical question: Would the offer of good offices be made by the British Government (or the American Government) within the framework of a system of collective security or as independent agents? Sir Robert’s response to those thoughts was that he expected that the Japanese Government would realize the difficulty that the British Government would have in stating, in advance of some Japanese manifestation of a spirit of receptiveness to an offer of good offices, that the offer would be made by the British Government independently of the League of Nations or of the other Powers party to the Nine-Power Treaty. He thought it possible, however, that the Japanese Government might make a point of this question, and he said that he would express to his Government the hope that it would not emphasize the principle of peace by collective action even at the cost of ruling out peace by negotiation outside the Brussels Conference. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 25 Vol. iv , p. 189 . 26 Ibid. , p. 210 . 27 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 379 . 28 Ibid. , p. 396 . 29 See telegram No. 282, November 2, 5 p.m., from the Acting Secretary of State, vol. iv , p. 145 . 30 Vol. iv , p. 187 . 31 Ibid. , p. 196 . 32 For text of declaration adopted on November 15, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 410 . Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 793.94/11285 [Document 762] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] November 19, 1937. The British Ambassador called to see me this morning in order that I might give him the reply 33 of this Government to the aide-mémoire of November 18 [ 17 ] of the British Embassy with regard to the possible tender of good offices by Great Britain and the United States to Japan and China. I likewise read to Sir Ronald Lindsay appropriate portions of Mr. Grew’s cable of November 17 [ 18 ], reporting his conversation with the British Ambassador in Tokyo concerning this same matter. 34 The Ambassador read over twice, very attentively, the aide-mémoire which I handed him, asked certain clarifications of the points contained therein and expressed himself as entirely satisfied as to the wisdom of the course therein indicated. He emphasized the fact that in his own belief it would be preferable to divorce this present step, if it proved to be feasible, completely from the Brussels Conference. I stated in reply that it seemed to me that had this possibility developed some ten days ago and had there been ample time for our two Governments to determine the basis for such possible tender of good offices and the procedure involved therein in the event of a favorable reply from Japan, it would have been helpful if the Conference when it recessed had been able to take note of the fact that good offices were under way. I said that in my judgment that would have avoided the impression which will be created inevitably in certain circles throughout the world that the Conference has recessed without practical achievement and solely with a reaffirmation of principles. I said, however, that in view of the shortness of time before the next session of the Conference, it seemed to me altogether impossible that the Conference could be in a position to take note of any prior agreement and that for that reason as well it was of the utmost importance that the whole possibility be regarded by the British Government and our own as of the most highly confidential character since any suspicion of this possibility would jeopardize any successful result. Finally, I made it clear that it was my own personal belief that the chances of any approach along these lines was for the time being excessively remote. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 33 Infra. 34 See telegram No. 549, November 18, 6 p.m., p. 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] . The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/11189 [Document 763] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The receipt is acknowledged of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of November 17 in regard to representations made by the British Ambassador at Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning reports of a statement alleged to have been made to the press by General Matsui, commanding officer of the Japanese troops at Shanghai, on the subject of the possible future attitude of the Japanese toward the customs, postal service, censorship, et cetera, at Shanghai. With reference to the British Government’s inquiry whether the American Government might instruct the American Ambassador at Tokyo to make parallel representations to the Japanese Government, the American Government has informed the American Ambassador at Tokyo that he may, in his discretion, make an informal approach to the Japanese Foreign Office in the matter. 35 In connection with General Matsui’s alleged statement, on November 12 the American Consul General at Shanghai in conversation with the Japanese Consul General took occasion to inform the Japanese Consul General that the statements reported to have been made by General Matsui were having the effect of making more difficult an already difficult situation at Shanghai. On November 17, according to information received from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office informed press representatives that General Matsui had not been correctly quoted and that Japan had no intention of taking over the International Settlement. Washington , November 19, 1937. 35 The Ambassador in Japan reported the next day that this had been done (793.94/11204). The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94 Conference/270: Telegram [Document 764] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 19, 1937—2 p.m. 305. Your 549, November 18, 6 p.m. On November 18 Lindsay brought to my attention the conversation between Eden and Yoshida as indicated in paragraph 1 of your telegram under reference. Lindsay made inquiry on behalf of the British Government whether, in case it should appear that the Japanese attitude might be favorable, the United States Government would join in offering Anglo-American good offices, and he stated that if the United States Government should approve such action, the British Government would issue instructions to its Ambassador at Tokyo to make with you a simultaneous approach to the Japanese Government. When Lindsay called, he apparently had not been informed of the suggestions made to the British Government by Craigie as set forth in paragraph numbered 4 of your telegram under reference. We have informed Lindsay this morning that the conversation which you had with Hirota was considerably less specific as to a Japanese desire to have American and British aid in bringing about negotiations than were the conversation which Yoshida had with Eden or a conversation which Suma had here with Wilson 36 and that the United States Government is of the opinion that an essential first step would be an attempt to clarify the Japanese Government’s attitude. We also referred to the suggestion made by Craigie to his Government and to Craigie’s conception in regard to point ( b ) of that suggestion. We said that we considered the procedure envisaged in that conception as not wise because the intermediaries would be called upon to transmit terms inconsistent with the Nine Power Treaty and because of the implication that the intermediaries were pressing such terms. We suggested that the informal inquiry to be made by Craigie of Horinouchi be limited to an inquiry covering point ( a ) of his suggestion. We also expressed the view that, in case Craigie should receive an affirmative reply on point ( a ), the making of subsequent specific inquiries individually by Craigie and by you of Hirota might serve to obtain the authoritative and necessary clarification as to whether the Japanese Government would be disposed to consider favorably tenders of good offices, if made by the American and British Governments. We informed Lindsay also that if the steps suggested above should convince the United States and British Governments that the Japanese Government sincerely desires to avail itself of the good offices of the United States and of Great Britain for the purpose of entering upon conversations with the Chinese Government, it would then be necessary for the two Governments to confer as to the form in which the offer of good offices might be made both to Japan and to China. We pointed out that in our opinion it would be necessary to find some formula which would indicate clearly that terms of settlement could not be recommended to China by either the United States Government or the British Government which would be inconsistent with the Nine Power Treaty. In the event that the British Government instructs Craigie to make an inquiry of Horinouchi covering point ( a ) of Craigie’s suggestion and in the event that Horinouchi should reply that the Japanese attitude would be favorable, you are authorized to make with Craigie but acting separately and individually specific oral inquiries of Hirota. In the event that Hirota should make affirmative replies to both you and Craigie, it would then be necessary for this Government to confer with the British Government as to the nature of the tender of good offices and as to the procedure involved. This matter is of course highly confidential and I desire to be kept fully informed of developments by urgent cable. Hull 36 See memorandum of November 16, vol. iv , p. 194 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94 Conference/272: Telegram [Document 765] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 19, 1937—9 p.m. [Received November 19—12:23 p.m.] 554. My 549, November 18, 6 p.m., paragraphs numbered 2 and 4. 1. Craigie has not yet heard from his Government but happening to see the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today he took the occasion to inquire personally and without instructions whether Horinouchi could now reply to Craigie’s question as to Japan’s attitude towards a possible Anglo-American offer of good offices. The Vice Minister replied definitely that at the present moment the only form of good offices acceptable to the Japanese Government would be an effort to persuade the Chinese Government to enter into negotiations for peace. 2. Craigie then inquired whether the stumbling block was Japanese distaste for an Anglo-American offer of good offices and whether Japan would perhaps prefer an offer from some other country. Horinouchi replied to both questions in the negative. 3. It, therefore, appears that the present moment is not opportune for any mediatory step by either the American or the British Government or both. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94 Conference/272: Telegram [Document 766] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 19, 1937—5 p.m. 306. Your 554, November 19, 9 p.m. was received after the dispatch of our 305, November 19, 2 p.m. We assume from your paragraph No. 3 that the procedure outlined in our 305 would, at the present time, have no chance of success and should not be attempted. If we are wrong in this assumption, please advise. In the meantime, we are advising the British Ambassador here of the substance of your 554 and of this reply thereto. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/379: Telegram [Document 767] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 20, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:45 a.m.] 937. When I shall have notified you of my departure from Nanking and in the absence of instructions for change please communicate to the Japanese Ambassador the following message and ask the Commander in Chief to communicate it to the Japanese military authorities: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government has announced its removal to Hankow and in order to perform his appropriate duties the American Ambassador has likewise left Nanking for that city. He has taken with him part of the Embassy staff, but the Embassy office at Nanking continues to function and its interests, including its property and archives, in Nanking are in charge of Secretary George Atcheson, who has Secretary J. Hall Paxton and Mr. Emile Gassie and the numerous Chinese clerks and other employees. As the officers of the Japanese Embassy are undoubtedly aware, the American Embassy premises consist of two pieces of land situated to the east and west of Shanghai Road where it is crossed by Nilgan Road. The site is an elevated one and the five large buildings occupied by the Embassy, as well as the requisitioned buildings, have black roofs and cream colored walls. Two small entrances are found on Shanghai Road and motor car entrances are reached over Ningpo Road. Formal notification of the disposition of the Embassy staff has been addressed to the Chinese National and local authorities and they have been informed that the Embassy expects full police protection. The Embassy requests that the Japanese military and civil authorities take note of the circumstances described above and should necessity arise accord full recognition to the diplomatic status of the Embassy personnel and premises and give them appropriate facilities and full protection”. Sent to Shanghai, Peiping. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the Second Secretary of the Chinese Embassy (Tsui) 893.01/556 [Document 768] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) of a Conversation With the Second Secretary of the Chinese Embassy ( Tsui ) [ Washington ,] November 20, 1937. Mr. Tsui called at the Department and presented the attached copy of the “Text of a statement issued by the Chinese Government on November 20, 1937, in regard to the removal of the national capital from Nanking to Chungking”. Mr. Tsui said that in presenting by hand the copy of the aforementioned statement he wished to inform the Department that although the Chinese Government is moving in its entirety to Chungking, the Foreign Office, and possibly other governmental agencies, will, at least for the time being, maintain branch offices at Hankow, as in the past branch offices have been maintained at Shanghai. Mr. Mackay thanked Mr. Tsui for bringing this matter to the attention of the Department. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] [Enclosure] The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State Text of a Statement Issued by the Chinese Government on November 20, 1937, in Regard to the Removal of the National Capital From Nanking to Chungking The chain of events following the Lukouchiao Incident on July 7th and culminating in the seizure of Tientsin and Peiping has opened a new phase in Japan’s program of continental conquest. Realizing that Japan’s aggression knows no bound except that of force, the Chinese Government has finally resolved to take up arms in self-defence. The Government’s decision, it is most gratifying to note, has received hearty endorsement and support of the whole nation which has turned out like one man in the common struggle against invasion. Wherever the Japanese forces chose to make their attacks, they have invariably encountered stubborn resistance of Chinese defenders who would rather die than surrender an inch of territory. The instances of heroic sacrifices in different provinces are too numerous to be mentioned here. In the Shanghai-Woosung area, the Chinese held their enemy at bay for fully three months. Responding to the call of the Government, units of fighting forces from all over country rushed to the front and fought shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy. Despite the concerted attacks by the Japanese forces from land, air and sea, the Chinese troops have maintained an excellent morale. Many of them trusting to nothing more than their blood and patriotism remained at their posts even after their defence works had been completely destroyed by Japanese bombardment. In the valor and loyalty of these officers and men the indomitable spirit of the Chinese people finds its most eloquent expression. Upon the bodies of the heroic dead the foundation of a new and independent Chinese nation may be said to have been firmly laid. Of late, the Japanese forces have shown a disposition of advancing further westward evidently with the intention of coercing the Chinese Government into accepting the humiliating terms by directly threatening the safety of Nanking, Capital of China. In this, the Japanese calculations are greatly mistaken. For in embarking upon the present course of action after all peaceful means had proved fruitless, China has fully made up her mind that her salvation lies in fighting the invaders even to the last man. Our submission to Japan is neither compatible with our national existence and honor nor with the maintenance of international justice and peace. “To be a broken jade rather than a whole tile” is today the determination of every patriotic Chinese. In order to conform to the requirements of the present state of hostilities as well as to be in a more advantageous position to direct national affairs as a whole and put up prolonged resistance, the Government has this day been removed to Chungking. There can be no doubt that hereafter China’s resistance will be on an even wider extent and of greater effectiveness than heretofore and with vast man power and natural resources at her command and with full determination of her people to give up their lives for the country, she is fully united against the Japanese invader. In her present struggle, China has behind her fully sympathy of foreign nations and solid support of her people. There can be no question that she will ultimately attain the object of maintaining her national existence and independence. Washington , November 20, 1937. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11208: Telegram [Document 769] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 21, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 21—4:30 p.m.] 996. I am informed by foreign press correspondents that at a Japanese press conference this afternoon an Embassy spokesman stated that the Japanese Consul General had communicated to the authorities of the International Settlement and French Concession certain points on which the authorities are expected to meet Japanese wishes, in effect as follows: 1. Suppression of anti-Japanese and Kuomintang organizations, of posters and literature of anti-Japanese character, of theatricals and motion picture and radio broadcast propaganda of same character, and prohibition of so-called Chinese spy mania. 2. Eviction of Chinese Government organizations and representatives both central and local and effective supervision over Chinese Government and party leaders. 3. Prohibition of Chinese censorship of communications, telegraphs and posts, of press and news services and suppression of unauthorized wireless communication by Chinese. I have been unable so far to contact any municipal authorities who will admit that such representations have been made. The Japanese naval authorities this afternoon seized some 20 or more small craft of the Chinese customs service. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 124.93/383: Telegram [Document 770] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , November 22, 1937—11 a.m. 363. A message from the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol indicates that Captain Roberts 37 will accompany you to Hankow. War Department desires to have Captain Roberts remain in Nanking with members of Embassy staff whom you are leaving there unless you have cogent reasons for taking him with you to Hankow. Hull 37 Capt. Frank N. Roberts, Assistant Military Attaché in China. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11220: Telegram [Document 771] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 22, 1937—noon. [Received November 22—3:15 a.m.] 998. 1. I learn this morning that on Saturday afternoon Major General Harada, the Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy, called on the Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council to communicate a message from General Matsui that the Council must take measures to suppress anti-Japanese activities in the Settlement and in the course of the interview let it be known that the Japanese are considering marching Japanese troops along the Nanking Bund, south of Soochow Creek, to Nantao, the opinion being expressed that such a move would be effective as a demonstration to deter the Chinese from anti-Japanese activities. 2. Without reference to the legal position, on which I think there is much to be said, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that any such ill-advised move by the Japanese military would be disastrous to the peace and order of the foreign protected neutral areas where there is a huge Chinese population of residents and refugees. 3. This morning the Chief of Staff of the Japanese naval landing party has notified the United States Marines, and is similarly informing the British forces, that it is the intention of the landing party to resume the protection of Japanese life and property in the foreign sectors, that Japanese contingents will be sent to the Japanese mills in such sectors, and that it is the intention of the Japanese to transport supplies under guard through the Settlement south of the creek to these contingents and to the Japanese forces in Nantao and west of the perimeter of the foreign lines. I understand these measures are to be taken by December 1st. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/383: Telegram [Document 772] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 22, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 22—6:05 a.m.] 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday asked me to inform colleagues of his imminent departure from Nanking and of his desire that we leave Nanking as soon as possible. I communicated information to my colleagues yesterday afternoon and we agreed that we would leave as nearly together as possible for Hankow at which place Foreign Office is expected to be established. I came aboard Luzon this morning. German Ambassador told me he was going aboard his chartered merchant ship this morning with his nationals who wished to go. Others will board respective vessels today or tomorrow. Luzon leaves Nanking tomorrow November 23, 11 a.m., after taking on Peck, 38 Aldridge, 39 Jenkins 40 and Captain Roberts. Lafoon 41 with me. We will also take on board all American citizens who wish to leave Nanking. Tomorrow night we will spend at Wuhu taking on Americans there who wish to leave with us. The next night we will stop at Kiukiang for similar purpose. I expect to reach Hankow on Friday. Atcheson, Paxton and Gassie 42 remaining at Nanking to administer office and look out for Americans who did not wish to leave. U. S. S. Panay remaining at Nanking to look out for remainder Embassy staff and American citizens. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson 38 Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Embassy. 39 Clayson W. Aldridge, Second Secretary of Embassy. 40 Douglas Jenkins, Jr., Third Secretary of Embassy. 41 Sidney K. Lafoon, Embassy clerk. 42 Emile Gassie, Embassy clerk. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 793.94/11243 [Document 773] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 22, 1937. The Ambassador of China came in at his own request and I first spoke about everything being in a more or less confused and complicated situation. I inquired as to the plans of his government for the future. He replied that their plans were to fight on to the last, adding that the one difficulty was lack of ammunition and other military supplies. He inquired if anything could be done by the other governments in the way of cooperation along this line. I said that he, of course, was aware of the situation to date; that nothing was found possible at Geneva except some utterances or declarations, while the signatories of the Nine Power agreement assembled at Brussels with this knowledge fresh in their mind, and that the United States had entered this conference along with the others with the knowledge and understanding that they were to convene there in order to explore all possible avenues of bringing about a constructive peace by agreement and, of course, these proceedings were to be short of either military force or economic coercion. I added everyone knew this and I assumed understood it and that that was the situation. The Ambassador took no issue whatever as to this but seemed to accept it as a matter of uncontroverted fact. We then discussed the possibilities of the proposed British trade agreement with this government, both in the way of economic and peace restoration, at the conclusion of which the Ambassador expressed himself as pleased and encouraged by his visit in the light of the vast possibilities of this proposed Anglo-American trade agreement. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11232: Telegram [Document 774] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 22, 1937—7 p.m. [Received 7:29 p.m.] 1002. 1. Reference my 996, November 21, 8 p.m. I have confirmed that the Japanese Consul General on Saturday morning submitted to the Chairman of the Municipal Government a five-point outline of measures which the Japanese military authorities desire be adopted by the Council. The five points are included in the points mentioned in my telegram No. 996, point 3 of the latter part covering three points of the Japanese outline. 2. On point 1 of my telegram, the Council has for some days been taking appropriate action and it is undoubtedly prepared to do all that is reasonably possible in the direction desired. 3. On point 3 of my telegram, the Chinese censors have already withdrawn from the telegraph and cable offices and there should be no difficulty whatsoever in effecting withdrawal of any remaining censorship. The difficulty will be to prevent Japanese censorship in its stead although this was not proposed. 4. On point 2, the Chairman of the Council agreed that action could probably be taken to ensure removal or closing of any Chinese Government offices now functioning except the customs, posts, and telegraphs which it was suggested are matters beyond the control of the Council and in which the foreign Consuls may be interested. The suggestion of interest of the foreign Consuls was not well received. 5. The Japanese Consul General desired the immediate eviction of O. K. Yui, the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai, Mr. T. V. Soong, Mr. Wang Hsiao Lai, Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and Tu Yueh-seng, close friend of the Generalissimo and reportedly head of the opium traffic and of a gunmen racket. He indicated that others might be added to the list. The Mayor is reported to have gone to Hong Kong but this cannot be confirmed. The others are probably in the French Concession if they have not already decamped. The Chairman of the Council informed the Japanese Consul General that the Council has no power of deportation if these persons are conducting themselves without prejudice to law and order. The impression given by the Japanese was that it would make for a better atmosphere if private persuasion could effect the departure from Shanghai of the persons named. I believe this matter is one principally for the French Concession authorities. 6. I understand that representations were made to the French Concession authorities along the same lines as those made to the International Settlement authorities. 7. I have been told from a confidential source that General Matsui contemplates forcible seizure of the customs and perhaps of the Chinese Government banks and that he is not disposed to listen to advice for a more moderate course. I am unable to say whether this was being put about for the purpose of intimidating those concerned to ready acquiescence in Japanese demands. 8. On Saturday afternoon following the visit of the Japanese Consul General to the Chairman of the Council, the Japanese Military Attaché called on the Secretary General of the Council and communicated a message from General Matsui in general terms to the effect that he expected the Council to take immediate steps to suppress subversive actions of Chinese Government organizations and other groups in the Settlement which are anti-Japanese and if the Council fails to take these steps General Matsui will be compelled to take them himself. It was at this latter interview that it was made known that the Japanese contemplated marching troops along the Bund south of the Creek as reported in my 998, November 22, noon. 9. I do not propose to take the lead at Shanghai in these matters, but I have suggested to the Senior Consul that it would be well to call a meeting of the principal interested consuls to discuss the situation and invite the Japanese Consul General to attend where we may do what we can with him to advise a moderate course which carefully respects foreign interests and which does not reintroduce Japanese troops into the area south of the creek. 10. I should add that the Japanese naval landing party, in informing the United States Marines this morning of their intention to take over protection of Japanese life and property and restore guards in the Japanese mills, pointed out that a guard of United States Marines has been stationed at the American-owned electric power plant in the Yangtzepoo area now occupied by the Japanese and that it is supplied by armed marine trucks which pass into the areas. Developments will be reported promptly. Sent to the Department, repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11220: Telegram [Document 775] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , November 22, 1937—8 p.m. 570. Your 998, November 22, noon. 1. Department is repeating your telegram under reference to the Embassy at London with the request that the Embassy inquire of the British Foreign Office what action, if any, the British Government contemplates with reference thereto. 2. With regard to paragraph 1 of your telegram, please telegraph the Department the nature and extent of the alleged anti-Japanese activities in the International Settlement and what, if any, action the Municipal Council is taking in reference thereto; whether the Municipal Council intends to make representations to the Japanese in regard to the proposed march of Japanese troops through the Settlement and whether the Municipal Council has asked you and the other interested Consuls to make representations. Inasmuch as the proposed line of march would cross the French Concession, the Department desires also to be informed in regard to the French attitude. 3. Please also give the Department by telegraph your views as to the legal position in regard to the matters discussed in both paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11231: Telegram [Document 776] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 22, 1937—10 p.m. [Received November 22—6:54 p.m.] 944. 1. At the request of the Committee named herein I transmit the following: “An International Committee composed of nations of Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, desired to suggest to the Chinese and Japanese authorities the establishment of a safety zone for civilian refugees, in the unfortunate situation of hostilities at or near Nanking. The International Committee will undertake to secure from the Chinese authorities special guarantees that the proposed safety zone would be made free and kept free from military establishments and offices, including those of communications; from the presence of armed men other than civil police with pistols; and from the passage of soldiers or military officers in any capacity. The International Committee would inspect and observe the safety zone to see that these undertakings are satisfactorily carried out. The International Committee proposes the designation of the area indicated below, as convenient and suitable for the care of civilian refugees. This area lies well within the western sector of the city which the Japanese air forces have carefully respected in their bombing operations. The proposed area is delimited as follows: On the east, by North Chung Shan Road from Hsin Chieh Kou to the Shansi Road Circle. On the north, by a line running due west from the Shansi Road Circle to Sikang Road (which is the western boundary of the new residential district). On the west, by Sikang Road from the northern line just mentioned, running southward to the intersection of Hankow Road (this intersection is the southwest corner of the new residential district); thence southeasterly in a straight line to the intersection of Shanghai Road with Han Chung Road. On the south, by Han Chung Road from the intersection of Shanghai Road to the original starting point at Shin Chieh Kou. The International Committee would see to it that the boundary of the area would be clearly marked with white flags or with other indications to be agreed upon, plain to all concerned. The Committee proposes that the safety zone become effective from the date of ratification by the Committee to the authorities of both sides that the understanding is completed. The International Committee earnestly hopes that the Japanese authorities may find it possible for humanitarian reasons to respect the civilian character of this safety zone. The Committee believes that merciful foresight of civilians will bring honor to the responsible authorities on both sides. In order that the necessary negotiations with the Chinese authorities may be completed in the shortest possible time, and also in order that adequate precautions may be made for the care of refugees, the Committee would respectfully request a prompt reply from the Japanese authorities to this proposal. The International Committee confidentially trust that there will be favorable consideration of this appeal. Respectfully submitted: (Signed) J. N. Hansen, F. Schultze Pantin, P. H. Munroe-Faure, John MaGee, P. R. Shiles, Iver Mackay, John H. D. Rabe, J. F. Pickerig, M. S. Bates, Edward Sperling, W. C. Mills, C. S. Trimmer, D. J. Lean, Charles H. Riggs, Lewis S. C. Smythe.” 2. Please communicate as soon as possible to the Japanese Ambassador and give me reply for communication to the Committee in question. 3. Sent to Shanghai. Repeated to Department, Peiping. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Johnson Dr. Hu Shih to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 033.9311 Hu Shih/8 [Document 777] Dr. Hu Shih to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) New York , November 22, 1937. Dear Mr. Hamilton : When I saw the President on October 12, he asked me one question: Can China fight on through the winter? I answered in the affirmative. But the news of the last week was a little alarming to me, so I sent a cable to Nanking asking for information. When I returned to-day from New Haven, I got the following cable signed by General Chiang Kai-shek: “Our army must fight till the very end and we will not yield to the enemy. Even if the Capital City falls, we must of necessity fight on, not only ‘over the winter’, but for a very long time to come. Please inform the American Government of this determination”. The cable is dated the 21st of November. May I ask you to be so kind as to transmit this message to the Secretary of State and to the President? I hope to visit Washington again toward the end of this week 43 and look forward to the pleasure of seeing you and the other friends in the State Department. Most sincerely yours, Hu Shih 43 Dr. Hu Shih did not return at this time. Chapter VII: November 23–December 12, 1937 Chapter VII: November 23–December 12, 1937 Failure of attempt to negotiate military-aid agreement between China and Soviet Union, November 23; arrival at Hankow of Ambassador Johnson, November 27; British inquiry as to use of naval power in Far East for protection of Anglo-American rights, November 27; German Ambassador’s conference with Generalissimo Chiang at Nanking respecting Japanese proposals, December 2; Japanese military parade through Shanghai International Settlement despite Anglo-American representations, December 3; Vice Premier Kung’s views on ending Far Eastern conflict, Chinese Foreign Office acceptance of German good offices vis-à-vis Japan, December 3; continuing American opposition to peace settlement contrary to principles of Washington Treaty of 1922, December 8 [778] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 23, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 23—9:30 a.m.] 793.94/11239: Telegram [779] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 23—6:25 a.m.] 793.94/11238: Telegram [780] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, November 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 24—12:20 a.m.] 793.94/11254: Telegram [781] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 24—9:35 p.m.] 793.94/11268: Telegram [782] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 23, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 23—9:51 a.m.] 793.94 Conference/286: Telegram [783] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 23, 1937—7 p.m. 124.93/379: Telegram [784] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 23, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 23—6:45 p.m.] 793.94/11250: Telegram [785] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 24, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 10:45 p.m.] 793.94/11280: Telegram [786] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, November 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 25—8:20 a.m.] 793.94/11279: Telegram [787] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 24, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94/11285a: Telegram [788] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 24, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 24—7:57 a.m.] 793.94/11255: Telegram [789] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 24, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/11282: Telegram [790] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 25, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 25—8:40 a.m.] 793.94/11275: Telegram [791] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 26, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:20 a.m.] 793.94/11290: Telegram [792] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, November 26, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/11280: Telegram [793] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 27, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 4:03 p.m.] 793.94/11323: Telegram [794] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 27, 1937—noon. [Received November 27—7:25 a.m.] 793.94/11308: Telegram [795] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow (U. S. S. “Luzon”), November 27, 1937—1 p.m. [Received November 27—10 a.m.] 124.93/390: Telegram [796] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 27, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 27—7 a.m.] 793.94/11307: Telegram [797] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] November 27, 1937. 603.002/411⅔ [798] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 5:30 p.m.] 793.94/11330: Telegram [799] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) [Washington,] November 28, 1937. 793.94/11430 [800] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 28, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 28—7:07 p.m.] 793.94/11325: Telegram [801] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Washington,] November 29, 1937. 893.0146/592 [802] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 29, 1937—noon. [Received 3:37 p.m.] 793.94/11358: Telegram [803] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, November 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 8:48 p.m.] 793.94/356: Telegram [804] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 29, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 29—2:26 p.m.] 793.94/11348: Telegram [805] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 29, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 29—3 p.m.] 793.94/11355: Telegram [806] The Consul General at Hong Kong (Southard) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong, November 30, 1937—9 a.m. [Received November 30—12:36 a.m.] 793.94/11367: Telegram [807] The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson), at Nanking Washington, November 30, 1937—2 p.m. 124.93/394a: Telegram [808] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 30, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 30—7:15 a.m.] 793.94/11364: Telegram [809] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, at Sea Washington, November 30, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94111/97a: Telegram [810] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 30, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 30—10:20 a.m.] 793.94/11369: Telegram [811] President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State [U. S. S. “Potomac”,] November 30, 1937—11:55 p.m. [Received December 1—1:05 a.m.] 793.94111/101: Telegram [812] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 1, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 1—7 a.m.] 793.94/11385: Telegram [813] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 1, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 3:35 p.m.] 793.94/11394: Telegram [814] Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 1, 1937. 811.515–Silver/121 [815] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 1, 1937. 793.94/11421 [816] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 1—12:21 p.m.] 793.94/11387: Telegram [817] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, at Sea Washington, December 1, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94111/98a: Telegram [818] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 1, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 1—2 p.m.] 793.94/11395: Telegram [819] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, December 1, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/11325: Telegram [820] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, December 1, 1937—8 p.m. 793.94/11395: Telegram [821] President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State U. S. S. “Potomac,” December 2 [1?], 1937—midnight. [Received December 2—1:30 a.m.] 793.94111/98: Telegram [822] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 2, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 2—7:20 a.m.] 793.94/11406: Telegram [823] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 2, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 3—6 a.m.] 124.93/395: Telegram [824] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 2, 1937—noon. [Received December 2—7:20 a.m.] 793.94/11409: Telegram [825] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , December 2, 1937. 793.94/11421 [826] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 2, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 2—1:44 p.m.] 793.94/11414: Telegram [827] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 2, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 2—8:30 a.m.] 793.94/11408: Telegram [828] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 2, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 9:55 p.m.] 793.94/11418: Telegram [829] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 2, 1937—9 p.m. [Received December 2—2:10 p.m.] 793.94/11413: Telegram [830] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 3, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 3—6 a.m.] 793.94/11427: Telegram [831] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 3, 1937—1 p.m. [Received December 3—6:55 a.m.] 793.94/11428: Telegram [832] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 3, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 3—6 a.m.] 793.94/11423: Telegram [833] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 3, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 2:37 p.m.] 793.94/11439: Telegram [834] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 3, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 3—1:04 p.m.] 793.94/11432: Telegram [835] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 3, 1937—4 p.m. 793.94/11364: Telegram [836] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, December 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 3—2:15 p.m.] 793.94/11438: Telegram [837] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 7:22 p.m.] 793.94/11443: Telegram [838] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 3, 1937—midnight. [Received December 3—1:15 p.m.] 793.94/11434: Telegram [839] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 4, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 4—8 a.m.] 793.94/11448: Telegram [840] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 4—7:33 a.m.] 793.94/11454: Telegram [841] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 4, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 4—2:35 p.m.] 793.94/11455: Telegram [842] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 4, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 4—2:20 p.m.] 793.94/11456: Telegram [843] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 4, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 4—4:35 p.m.] 793.94/11461: Telegram [844] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 4, 1937—10 p.m. [Received December 4—4 p.m.] 793.94/11462: Telegram [845] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 5, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 5—6:50 a.m.] 793.94/11471: Telegram [846] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 5—6:50 a.m.] 793.94/11458: Telegram [847] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 5, 1937—noon. [Received December 5—10:35 a.m.] 793.94/11459: Telegram [848] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 5, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 7:30 p.m.] 793.94/11481: Telegram [849] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 5, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 5—6:30 a.m.] 793.94/11464: Telegram [850] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, December 5, 1937—2 p.m. 793.94/11455: Telegram [851] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 6, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 2 p.m.] 793.94/11487: Telegram [852] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, December 6, 1937—1 p.m. 793.94/11471: Telegram [853] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 6, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 6—10:52 a.m.] 793.94/11479: Telegram [854] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 6, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 5:35 p.m.] 793.94/11492: Telegram [855] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 6, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 6—2:40 p.m.] 793.94/11486: Telegram [856] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 6, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 6—4 p.m.] 793.94/11493: Telegram [857] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 7, 1937—7 a.m. [Received December 6—11:10 p.m.] 793.94/11494: Telegram [858] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 7, 1937—noon. [Received December 7—11:27 a.m.] 124.93/397: Telegram [859] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 7—1:06 p.m.] 793.94/11512: Telegram [860] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 7—7:18 a.m.] 793.94/11500: Telegram [861] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 7—1:45 p.m.] 893.72/65: Telegram [862] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 7, 1937. 793.94/11548 [863] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) Washington, December 7, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/11181: Telegram [864] The Navy Department to the Department of State undated 793.94/11639 [865] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] December 8, 1937. 740.00/238½ [866] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 8, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 5:15 p.m.] 793.94/11533: Telegram [867] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 8, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.] 793.94/11537: Telegram [868] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 8, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 3:30 p.m.] 793.94/11538: Telegram [869] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 8—9:41 a.m.] 793.94/11526: Telegram [870] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 9, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 9—7:35 a.m.] 793.94/11544: Telegram [871] The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson), at Nanking Washington, December 9, 1937—5 p.m. 124.93/403a: Telegram [872] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 9, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 9—1:55 p.m.] 793.94/11549: Telegram [873] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 9, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 9—7:20 p.m.] 793.94/11554: Telegram [874] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 10, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 10—6 a.m.] 793.94/11559: Telegram [875] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 10, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 10—6 a.m.] 793.94/11556: Telegram [876] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] December 10, 1937. 893.0146/598 [877] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 10, 1937—6 p.m. 793.94/11538: Telegram [878] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 10, 1937—7 p.m. 793.94/11462: Telegram [879] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 10, 1937—11 p.m. [Received December 11—9:23 a.m.] 793.94/11579: Telegram [880] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 10, 1937—midnight. [Received December 10—3:15 p.m.] 793.94/11564: Telegram [881] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 10, 1937. [Received December 27.] 893.01 Manchuria/1486 [882] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 11, 1937—noon. [Received December 11—7:30 a.m.] 793.94/11578: Telegram [883] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] December 11, 1937. 793.94/11896 [884] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) Washington, December 11, 1937—1 p.m. 793.94/11554: Telegram [885] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 11, 1937. 761.94/1001 [886] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 11, 1937. [Received December 27.] 793.94/11841 [887] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 12, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:55 p.m.] 793.94/11596: Telegram [888] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] December 13, 1937. 793.94/11897 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11239: Telegram [Document 778] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 23, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 23—9:30 a.m.] 298. My telegram 265, October 14, 10 p.m. 44 I have to report direct from the same authoritative source that the former Soviet Ambassador to China Bogomolov and the Military Attaché Lepin have disappeared. My informant believes that they are under arrest. He states definitely that neither will return to China. Chinese resentment is apparently deep and arises from the fact that Bogomolov and Lepin unwarrantedly had created the belief in many quarters of Nanking that the Soviets would come to China’s aid when no such policy was entertained in the Kremlin. My informant recalled advising me that Bogomolov came here by air several weeks ago with a plan supported by Soviet military leaders in the East for direct Soviet military aid by utilizing Outer Mongolia; that shortly after his arrival my informant came to the conclusion that agreement for actual military aid was impossible. This judgment is now confirmed by developments. He states that in fairness it should be understood that the Foreign Office attitude here had consistently been straightforward and definite in refuting the possibility of any military agreement. Copy of cipher text by mail to Brussels. Davies 44 See telegram No. 1458, October 16, 10 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11238: Telegram [Document 779] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 23—6:25 a.m.] 561. Department’s 310, November 22, 2 p.m. 45 1. As reported by Associated Press and other American correspondents, Imperial Headquarters was established on November 20th. Its organization and functions follow lines indicated in our 533. 46 A statement issued that day by Imperial Headquarters is to the following effect. ( a ) Imperial Headquarters is an instrument by which the Emperor will exercise supreme command over the army and navy. Its establishment effects no change in the division between the functions and responsibilities hitherto assigned respectively to the High Command and to the Government and rumors to the effect that these two agencies will be combined are without foundation. ( b ) The duties of Imperial Headquarters are to advise the Emperor on the exercise of supreme command, to formulate high strategical plans and to assure coordination between the army and navy. ( c ) Members of the Cabinet are not to be assigned to Imperial Headquarters but they will be invited to confer with Imperial Headquarters when occasion arises. 2. Our estimate with regard to possibilities of a declaration of war as set forth in paragraph 5 of our 524, November 6, 6 p.m., is still that the determining factor will be whether supplies of arms and munitions to China continue in substantial quantities. Grew 45 Not printed. 46 November 12, noon, p. 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] . The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11254: Telegram [Document 780] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , November 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 24—12:20 a.m.] 1. This Consulate has today been informed that the Mayor upon asking the Generalissimo to confirm alleged instructions to destroy Japanese properties in Tsingtao, was instructed not to take any such action. 2. Absolutely no change in the situation in Tsingtao but newspaper reports of heavy artillery firing near Tsinanfu have alarmed local Chinese people in this port. However, these reports according to a reliable source in Tsinanfu are not accurate. In fact, today has been absolutely quiet in Tsinanfu. Sokobin The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11268: Telegram [Document 781] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received November 24—9:35 p.m.] 951. At least two Japanese heavy bombers accompanied by six pursuit flew over Nanking at 1:30 p.m., and laid a line of about 20 bombs in the central market district not far east and south of the banking circle (Hsinchiehkou). Three bombs fell by the National Art Gallery (next to National Peoples Assembly building) demolishing its courtyard wall at corners of Kuo Fu Road and Peitinghsiang, breaking the gallery windows and partially demolishing small shops across street. Five or six fell at the College Ricci, a French Catholic mission school not in session, demolishing part of courtyard wall and badly damaging main building. About six fell in Yu Fu Street off Er Lan Miao, a crowded district of small shops and the telephone exchange, killing about 40 civilians including several children. Two fell on Chungshan road east near Er Lan Miao, demolishing wall and damaging several small shops. Casualties were not larger probably because, judging from size of bomb holes we inspected, bombs dropped were very small. Only defense was anti-aircraft. 2. This is first bombing inside city since mass bombing of September 25. 3. Number of places along Shanghai-Nanking Railway and elsewhere between here and Wusih have been raided in the last few days with increasing frequency as the Japanese lines have advanced in this general direction. Three alarms at Nanking November 22, two on 23rd, and three so far today. 4. Sent to Department. Repeated to Ambassador on Luzon , American Embassy, Peiping, American Consul, Shanghai. Peiping please repeat Tokyo. Atcheson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94 Conference/286: Telegram [Document 782] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 23, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 23—9:51 a.m.] 562. Department’s 305, November 19, 2 p.m., and 306, November 19, 5 p.m. 1. In the light of the two telegrams above cited which I brought to the attention of my British colleague, Craigie yesterday read to me a message which he was about to send to London and of which he has now sent me a paraphrase. Understanding that he has repeated it to Lindsay, 47 I shall not cable the full paraphrase unless instructed. 2. Craigie stressed in that telegram his feeling that once the ball can be set rolling through Anglo-American agency its propulsion in the right direction may become easier and he suggested the possibility of the two Governments acting in the first instance as a sort of “post office” offering advice to either side only when solicited. He feels that if we surround by too many exactions at the start the conditions on which good offices would be forthcoming we might lose an important opportunity. He also believes that a great step in advance would have been taken if Anglo-American understanding could be made the basis of future action rather than a mandate under the League of Nations or the Nine Power Treaty. 48 3. While agreeing substantially with Craigie, I prefer at the present moment to avoid recommendations with regard to the relative merits of American or British or Anglo-American good offices. The Department is in possession of various data which might be helpful in appraising this question. 4. The crux of the situation seems to me to be this: granted on the one hand that we would not be willing to recommend peace terms inconsistent with the Nine Power Treaty, would we be willing to act in an effort toward peace merely as a nation having important interests in the Far East and as a friend of both combatants but bearing constantly in mind the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the determination to emphasize or to render compelling those provisions in the formulation of the final peace terms? 5. Horinouchi’s 49 statement to Craigie, reported in paragraph numbered 1 of my 554, November 19, 9 p.m., came as no surprise to me. In fact during the course of a conversation which I had with Craigie on November 18 the thought was expressed to him that before entering into any discussion of Japanese peace terms or of any method by which our two Governments could help to bring about peace negotiations between the combatants the Japanese would probably insist upon an assurance that our respective Governments would be prepared to discuss the question of good offices as independent agents and not as representatives of the collective signatories of and adherents to the Nine Power Treaty. I cannot, of course, state with confidence that even if such an assurance were given anything useful would eventuate from discussions with the Japanese Government. However, we frankly can see no other possible opening at the present time. Grew 47 British Ambassador in the United States. 48 Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . 49 Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 124.93/379: Telegram [Document 783] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 23, 1937—7 p.m. 312. Nanking’s 937, November 20, 9 a.m., repeated to you by Shanghai. Ambassador Johnson has now notified the Department of his departure on November 23 from Nanking. However, as the Consulate General in Shanghai has presumably, in pursuance of Nanking’s instructions, notified the Japanese authorities at Shanghai of the Ambassador’s departure, the Department does not consider it necessary that notification also be made by you to the Japanese Foreign Office unless similar notification is being made by your principally interested colleagues. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11250: Telegram [Document 784] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 23, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 23—6:45 p.m.] 1008. Reference paragraph 9 of my No. 1002, November 22, 7 p.m. Senior Consul invited American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Consuls General to meet with him this afternoon when the opportunity was taken to discuss informally with the Japanese Consul General the five-point outline he had submitted to the Settlement authorities but had not communicated to his colleagues of the powers interested in the International Settlement. He gave very little information in clarification of his outline. It was emphasized that such services as the posts, telegraphs, cables, and wireless are of the greatest importance to foreign interests and there is definite foreign interest in the status of the customs. He said that these matters were being studied and as to the customs stated that the Japanese being now in occupation of Shanghai they require control of the customs but will respect foreign loan and indemnity quotas and foreign personnel. 2. We then took up the question of Japanese forces passing into or through the foreign areas south of the Creek and urged that laying aside all argument as to legal rights, it would be exceedingly unwise at this time from the standpoint of peace and order to bring any Japanese into or through the areas south of the Creek where Japanese interests are now receiving full protection at the hands of the foreign forces and municipal authorities. Japanese Consul General sought to explain the conversation between General Harada and the Secretary General of the Council as a request for opinion and added that when General Harada later visited the French Consul General he found the latter unable under French statutes to permit passage through the French Concession. French Consul General confirmed this position. 3. On the question of the intention of the Japanese naval landing party to send guards to protect Japanese mill property and Japanese residents in the foreign areas, the Japanese Consul General sought to explain that in the area west of the International Settlement but within the foreign defense lines the municipal police may function only on the extra-Settlement roads and Chinese police can no longer function off those roads and there is no protection for Japanese or Japanese property. It was pointed out that these areas are all protected by the foreign forces and I emphasized that the American Marines protect a sector entirely within the boundaries of the Settlement and Japanese residents and Japanese property there have received full protection from both the marines and the municipal police. 4. Commander-in-Chief 50 informs me this evening that the naval commanders referred question mentioned in paragraph 3 of this telegram to the commander of the forces ashore who conferred with the commander of the Japanese naval landing party today and urged that any proposal to send forces south of the Creek be postponed. The Japanese commander stated he would refer to his senior officer, the Japanese admiral. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss 50 Admiral Harry E. Yarnell. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11280: Telegram [Document 785] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 24, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 10:45 p.m.] 1012. Your No. 570, November 22, 8 p.m. 1. Please see my No. 1002, November 22, 7 p.m., and No. 1008, November 23, 8 p.m. Anti-Japanese activities complained of apparently have been the Kuomintang and patriotic and propaganda organizations, radical Chinese press, posters, radio broadcasting, et cetera, which the police of the Settlement and Concession have been forbidding or suppressing for some days in a manner which in my opinion leaves no ground for reasonable complaint at this time. The municipal authorities are doing their utmost in this direction. The Municipal Council of the Settlement is in a difficult position. The Council includes Japanese and Chinese members. The burden of the present situation falls largely on the American and British members and the department executives. Secretary General tells me he advised strongly against proposal to march Japanese troops through the Settlement. The Council has made no official request to the interested Consuls General to make representations but such Consuls have been informed. As to the French Concession, the French Consul General stated he is unable to allow the passage of armed troops. He has not disclosed whether attempts to pass will be resisted by force. 2. As to the legal position, it seems to me that in view of the careful avoidance by both sides and by third powers of recognition of a state of war, the forces now in occupation of the Shanghai area are not entitled to claim the rights of a belligerent army of occupation in respect of the Settlement and Concession which have long had a special status related to extraterritoriality and the treaties and which by long usage have been recognized as neutral areas. The areas protected by the “neutral” foreign forces are areas which have been set aside in the past by mutual agreement in defense plans. These areas have been guarded and protected by the foreign forces since the Japanese took up defense positions in the sector originally assigned them under the same defense plans which sector they have later used as a base for their military operations. It does not seem unreasonable, however, to assent to the proposition that as the Japanese are now in military occupation of the area around Shanghai, Chinese activities within the foreign protected area should be discontinued except by agreement and that all propaganda and activities calculated to cause disorders or to prejudice the interests of the Japanese military forces should be forbidden. On the other hand, Government organizations furnishing public services such as the posts, cables, telegraphs, and wireless should not be unreasonably interfered with or restricted. 3. On the question of the movement of Japanese troops into areas south of the Creek, I direct attention to the last sentence of section 3, part 2 of the Shanghai defense plan which provides that any commander desiring to arrange special protection for his nationals in a sector other than his own shall first obtain the concurrence of the sector commander concerned. Under existing conditions such consent might reasonably be withheld or postponed on the ground that the introduction of the troops concerned into a thickly populated area at this time would actually constitute a grave danger to peace and order in the sector where there are foreign interests to be recognized and protected other than those only of the forces seeking to enter and where all interests are already well protected by the police and the foreign forces. 4. The United States Marine Corps detachment at the American owned electric power plant in the Japanese sector is permitted and provided for in the note under sector a , section 3, part 2 of the Shanghai defense plan. 5. But leaving aside all legal arguments, I suppose that the rules of common sense, reason and respect for other foreign rights and interests should dictate that no effort be made to march or station Japanese troops in the areas south of the Creek at this time. We have carefully excluded Chinese armed forces from such areas and in addition would be an appropriate friendly gesture if the Japanese would abstain from seeking to enter the areas at the time. With the huge Chinese population heavily augmented by refugees forced to leave the countryside during hostilities and not yet permitted to return there, the problems of the authorities of these foreign areas are tremendous. No matter how earnestly and efficiently they may endeavor to prevent it, there would certainly be “incidents” likely to lead to most serious difficulties. I cannot subscribe to the theory that the marching or stationing of Japanese troops in the areas would subdue the Chinese population and be beneficial. The proposed action would seriously prejudice the safety of foreign residents. This problem should not be added to the already overwhelming responsibility of the authorities of the foreign areas to place those areas in a state of reasonably complete “neutrality” during the conflict. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11279: Telegram [Document 786] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , November 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 25—8:20 a.m.] Consulate has been informed by commander of British cruiser now in port who visited Japanese refrigerating plant, part of which is now being used by British firm, that engine room was loaded by Chinese last night with 60 pounds of dynamite and other explosives ready to set off. I have been informed that the instruction of the Generalissimo to the Mayor in regard to destruction of Japanese property was in translation “to take such measures as the situation warrants.” Sent to Nanking, Peiping, Chefoo. Sokobin The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/11285a: Telegram [Document 787] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 24, 1937—5 p.m. 314. The New York Herald Tribune today carries an article by Fleisher, under Tokyo date line November 23, the first sentence of which reads as follows: “That Japan’s political idea is to establish a United States of Asia is the argument advanced in a pamphlet being distributed to foreign correspondents ‘with the compliments’ of Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoye.” Please endeavor to obtain a copy of the pamphlet and forward it to Department by pouch with the Embassy’s comment thereon. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11255: Telegram [Document 788] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 24, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 24—7:57 a.m.] 564. In my conversation today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 51 he said on his own initiative that the Japanese forces will take Nanking within 2 to 3 weeks, the actual time of occupation depending on weather conditions; that the Chinese forces opposing the Japanese Army in that region are now completely defeated and can put up no further resistance but that the generals are unwilling to admit defeat and are therefore sending false reports to Nanking; that General Pai Chung Hsi of the Kwangsi forces which are still in good condition has nevertheless advised Chiang Kai-shek to leave Nanking and that the latter is in a very difficult situation. As this conversation was entirely informal, I asked the Minister how he visualized further developments after the occupation of Nanking by Japanese forces in the absence of a peace settlement. He replied that the Japanese forces would remain in Nanking, would take up a defensive position and would go no farther. Grew 51 Koki Hirota. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/11282: Telegram [Document 789] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 24, 1937—6 p.m. 315. The Department is informed that the Standard Oil Company of New York has received a telegram from its Shanghai representative stating that its Shanghai representative has learned that Japan will declare war on China on December 1. The Department would welcome your comments. 52 Hull 52 A similar telegram, No. 576, November 24, 6 p.m., was sent to the Consul General at Shanghai. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11275: Telegram [Document 790] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 25, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 25—8:40 a.m.] 565. Department’s 315, November 24, 6 p.m. 1. Although there have been newspaper reports that several of the Cabinet councilors have been pressing the Prime Minister to take action toward declaration of war, we can find no evidence or any substantial belief that any decision has been taken in the sense suggested by Shanghai informant. 2. For our comment please see paragraph 2 of our 561, November 23, 3 p.m. Grew The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11290: Telegram [Document 791] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 26, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 9:20 a.m.] 958. Embassy’s 944, November 22, 10 p.m., Nanking safety zone. German Embassy here under date November 23rd requested German Consulate General [at] Shanghai (1) to communicate Committee’s proposal to local Japanese authorities and unofficially but warmheartedly support it on humanitarian grounds and (2) to ask German Embassy [at] Tokyo enter similar action. Under date 25th German Chairman of the Committee sent an appeal to Chancellor Hitler and former Shanghai Consul General Krieber that they interest themselves in the proposal and say a good word for it to the Japanese Government. Repeated to Ambassador, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping kindly repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11280: Telegram [Document 792] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , November 26, 1937—6 p.m. 579. Your 1012, November 24, 2 p.m. 1. With reference to paragraph 1 of the Department’s 570, November 22, 8 p.m., the Embassy at London telegraphs under date November 25, that according to the reports received by the British Foreign Office the local authorities at Shanghai seem to be taking all practicable steps and that the British Foreign Office does not contemplate sending at least for the present any specific instructions from London. 2. Your telegrams received by the Department subsequent to the dispatch of its 570, November 22, 8 p.m., indicate that you and the other representatives at Shanghai of interested governments and the local authorities are discussing these matters there with the Japanese authorities. We hope that such discussions will result in reasonably satisfactory local adjustments and we desire that you continue your efforts to that end. 3. Inasmuch as press dispatches from Shanghai in regard to reported Japanese actions directed toward assuming “control of the Settlement,” interfering with the functions of the International Settlement authorities and abridging American and other foreign rights are being featured in the newspapers here, we find your telegrams most helpful. Please continue to keep the Department fully informed, especially in regard to any action by the Japanese in impairment of American rights and interests. 4. Please repeat to Tokyo. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11323: Telegram [Document 793] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 27, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 4:03 p.m.] 1023. Reference your 576, November 24, 6 p.m. 53 The general manager at Shanghai of the company named tells me that he has sent no such message to New York and has received no such information from Tokyo. I learn, however, from well informed sources in touch with the Japanese that the question of a declaration of war against China has been under discussion at Tokyo and that there is some feeling that it may eventuate. The opinion is expressed that a declaration of war would permit of an effective blockade against the munitions traffic through Hong Kong and that it would give a better legal basis for many measures such as the seizure of the customs and other Chinese interests, complete freedom of action in China by the Japanese being obstructed by foreign rights and interests which could be more readily suspended or ignored under the historical precedents of international law governing belligerent armies of occupation. A general blockade under a declaration of war could of course completely disrupt the foreign position in China and facilitate any desired uprooting of foreign interests if the Japanese military are prepared unwisely to sacrifice the position of Japanese abroad for complete domination in China. A declaration of war would of course present serious problems for the International Settlement of Shanghai and bring about Japanese military dictation or control. An immediate question would be the status and disposition of our armed forces ashore. One Japanese source is quoted as saying that no decision on the question of a declaration of war is likely to be made until after the occupation of Nanking (which the Japanese expect to come off by Christmas) and the further continued refusal of China to negotiate peace. Repeated to Ambassador at Hankow. Gauss 53 See footnote 52, p. 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11308: Telegram [Document 794] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 27, 1937—noon. [Received November 27—7:25 a.m.] 569. Yesterday evening a prominent member of the Italian Embassy, with whom I have close and cordial personal relations, prefacing his remarks with injunctions of strictest secrecy, especially as regards the British, told me that the Japanese Navy had now made up its mind definitely to declare war; he did not state when but the inference was that it would be in the reasonably near future; that this decision had been made within the last few days and constituted the first step in the prosecution of an understanding of the first magnitude. When asked whether he meant war with Soviet Russia, the informant replied in the affirmative; he also added, and repeated for emphasis, that “he wouldn’t give a nickel for Hong Kong”. He elaborated his remarks by stating that the navy was becoming restive in its role of being merely a beast of burden for the army which has reaped all the glory since 1931, and that the naval authorities had now determined to take advantage of the war pitch to which the nation was aroused to complete Japan’s absolute domination of East Asia by removing her opponents from the sphere; that the navy had come to the conclusion that England, which was now paying for lagging behind in her armament program during the past 15 years, was helpless; and that, most important of all, whereas until a week ago the navy had been deterred by fear of what the United States might do, and the American Fleet was the only force of which Japan took notice, the Japanese had now reached the conclusion that the United States was determined not to become involved in the Far East and that she “would not move at any price”. I am cabling the foregoing for what it may be worth but it is impossible at this time to apprise its true value. The informant is perhaps prone to exaggeration but on the other hand it may be assumed that he is in a favored position to have access to sources of information not available to others. I am inclined to believe that he may reflect the views of younger naval officers and that their observations are likely to be a question of the wish being father to the thought. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/390: Telegram [Document 795] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow (U. S. S. “ Luzon ”), November 27, 1937—1 p.m. [Received November 27—10 a.m.] 5. My 1, November 22, 4 p.m. I arrived Hankow this morning. My colleagues have also arrived. Minister for Foreign Affairs is expected here tomorrow. Two Vice Ministers are already in Hankow. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11307: Telegram [Document 796] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 27, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 27—7 a.m.] 571. Several American correspondents are cabling extended accounts of an interview which the Prime Minister gave yesterday to Japanese press representatives. The following are summarized excerpts of statements on principal points of interest: 1. Negotiations with China: Japan does not insist that she cannot negotiate for peace because either Chiang Kai Shek or the Nationalist Party is in power. If, however, the Chinese Government pins its hope on a war of endurance, Japan is prepared for that. 2. Foreign government offices: There is no change in the Japanese attitude that peace must be attained through direct negotiations and without mediation, but there would be no objection to the gap being bridged by a third party. 3. Nine Power Treaty: It has long been evident that the treaty does not meet actual conditions in the Far East, and it is to be regretted that Japan did not at some time past propose some suitable revision. Although the Brussels Conference adjourned without formulating any plan, Japan may go so far as to withdraw from the Treaty. 4. Declaration of war: The Government has been studying the matter, but no conclusion has been reached; for the time being no action will be taken. Repeated to Nanking. Grew Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 603.002/411⅔ [Document 797] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] November 27, 1937. The British Ambassador, in the course of his conversation with me this morning, gave me to read a telegram which he had just received from his Foreign Office. The Ambassador felt unable to leave me a copy of this message but at my request permitted me to take notes so that I would be sure to get the exact phraseology used in this message in the more important portions of it. The message was as follows: The British Government has come to the conclusion that not only has the Japanese Government arrived at the determination to disregard international interests in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, but has likewise reached the conclusion to disregard the interests of third parties in China, not only with regard to human life and property, but likewise with regard to the “normal courses of international life”. The British Government desires to know whether the Government of the United States takes as serious and anxious a view of the situation above described as that taken by the British Government. The British Government likewise desires to know whether in such event the United States Government would be disposed to join with the British Government in strengthening the hands of the two Governments through supporting representations to be made with regard to the above questions “by an overwhelming display of naval force”. Should the United States Government be disposed to consider such a possibility, the British Government suggests that the two Governments undertake immediately, through the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, staff conversations “to consider appropriate and adequate combined steps”. I said to the Ambassador that in view of the very great importance of this message and in consideration of the implications involved, it would, of course, be necessary, before a reply could be made, for consideration to be given to this message by the President, by the Secretary of State and by other authorities of this Government. I said that as the Ambassador knew the President had not been well and was leaving Washington tonight. I stated that a reply would be made to this message at the first practicable moment. I asked if the Ambassador would be kind enough to clarify the phrase, “by an overwhelming display of naval force”. I remarked that only ten days ago the Ambassador by instructions from his Government had made it known to this Government that the British Government, because of the Mediterranean situation and because of certain European complications, was not in a position to divert any considerable portion of its naval force from European waters. 55 I said that in addition to this statement made to me, officials of this Government had been repeatedly advised by competent British authorities during recent months that the British Government was not in a position to employ its naval forces in Far Eastern waters and that the whole policy of the British Government, as explained to me by the British Ambassador himself, had been predicated upon its unwillingness to be drawn into a position with regard to the Japanese-Chinese controversy where the exercise of forceful measures might prove to be essential. I asked the Ambassador if my understanding was correct and he said entirely so. I then inquired whether he had any reason to believe that the situation of his Government in the regard above mentioned had recently been changed. He stated that he was not informed but that he would suppose that the position of the British Government in this connection would be brought out clearly through the staff conversations proposed. I said that that, of course, was quite probable, but that it would appear to me that the suggestion proffered, unless the policy of the British Government had changed, would imply that the “overwhelming display of naval force” would have, under present conditions, to be an overwhelming display of United States naval force and that any decision that might be reached by this Government would necessarily have to take into account that very important fact. The Ambassador said that he was without instructions to give me any further light upon this problem. 55 No record of this statement has been found in Department files. The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11330: Telegram [Document 798] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 5:30 p.m.] 965. 1. My British and German colleagues and I called yesterday evening on General and Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek who yesterday morning were planning to leave today but who are still here. We inquired concerning plans for the administration of the city and related questions affecting foreign residents. Early in the conversation Chiang said that the administration of the city would be turned over to the military; later he stated that a small part of the Municipal Government would continue to function. He said that preparations had been made to defend the city from both outside and inside the walls. The German Secretary asked if some high civil official could not remain during the turning over. Mrs. Chiang stated that official would then become a hostage to the Japanese and that after the Chinese left the city responsibility for whatever happened and for maintenance of order would rest with the Japanese. 2. Toward us they were very candid and friendly but toward any of the problems suggested by our inquiry we received the impression that they were really indifferent; that they had accepted as fact that Nanking would fall, that its fate was no longer any concern of theirs. 3. At the daily meeting of foreigners with Chinese officials defense commander General Tang Sheng Chih stated that, (1) foreigners who have no urgent business here should leave for their own safety, (2) there had been and will be disorders in the city because many of the troops in the area are of comparatively poor training and discipline, (3) strict precautions have been and will be taken to keep the soldiery in hand, (4) any troops falling back from the front and entering the city will do so in the knowledge that they will not leave Nanking alive, (5) he was determined to afford all possible protection to foreign lives and property. He explained that his warning under (1) above was personal and not official. As consequence of the warning the British evacuation plans are being expedited. 4. In response to questions he and the Mayor said that water and telephone services would be maintained by skeleton staffs. According to the Postal Commissioner, postal service there will cease in about 2 days. 5. Minister of Health returned yesterday evening but plans to leave again tomorrow. 6. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Atcheson Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) 793.94/11430 [Document 799] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Wilson ) [ Washington ,] November 28, 1937. Mr. Kojiro Matsukata, son of old Prince Matsukata, 56 called on the telephone and asked to come and see me. I had known Mr. Matsukata in Tokyo in connection with the fact that he was a graduate of Yale. Mr. Matsukata told me that he was not sent by his Government, that he had not, in fact, discussed with Mr. Hirota what he would say when he came to America. On the other hand, he had given Mr. Hirota opportunity to explain his, Mr. Hirota’s, views and had given the same opportunity to the Chiefs of the Army and Navy and other high officials in Japan. As a result of this, he felt able to express Japan’s general interest although it must be understood that he was speaking only for Mr. Matsukata and not for the Japanese Government. Again he emphasized, however, that the Japanese Government was fully aware of what he was about to say. The Japanese Government want, by all means, to stop this fighting and it has already gone much further than was expected; almost accidentally the thing got underway, gained momentum and tempo; the Japanese themselves are shocked at the magnitude of the affair; it is fearfully costly to keep up this struggle; at the same time they are injuring their best customer; hence, they hope to be able to get into negotiation with China. How to bring this about: Mr. Matsukata says that all hands are agreed that the United States is the country to bring it about; this must be done without England and in the form of “good offices”; he insisted again and again on the dislike of England which reigns in Japan at present. Turning to the form of “good offices”, he feels that Mr. Grew and Mr. Johnson should approach the two governments offering good offices to bring representatives of the two governments together so that the talk between China and Japan can be “direct”; this does not exclude the representative of a friendly third power, notably the United States in the person of Mr. Grew, from sitting with the negotiators as observer and using friendly means to get the two parties into harmony; this, according to Mr. Matsukata, would not be “intervention” and would be “direct negotiations.” I said that he could not expect me to give any more than a personal opinion, both because he was expressing his own opinion only and because I would have to consult my superior officers on a matter of this kind even if it came officially. Here, however, was my personal opinion. I could well understand that Japan wanted now to stop this war; it must be a frightful expense; it must be disagreeable to be carrying on a campaign against the moral judgment of the world; it must give anxiety to thoughtful people in Japan to see a struggle of this sort with Japan’s best customer, a struggle which will build up in China a generation of hatred, as well as destroying their purchasing power for years. Furthermore, I felt, and I thought most thoughtful people in the world would agree with me, that the time had gone by when a nation could hold in subjection alien populations; the growth of the newspapers, of the radio, of other forms of communication was such that any attempt to subjugate might well mean the destruction of the nation which attempted it; these were the thoughts that led me to think that it was natural that Japan should want to come to a halt in the proceedings. There were further considerations—Japan had pushed back the Chinese armies around Shanghai; they had penetrated deeply in north China; there was no longer any question of “face”. Here Mr. Matsukata interrupted and said that this was just the moment when “face” could be saved for both parties; with the Japanese entering Nanking Chiang would lose face; the Japanese did not want Chiang to lose face; they wanted him to maintain a unified China; he was a reasonable man and they could deal with him. Mr. Matsukata apologized for interrupting and asked me to continue. I said that I personally had a lot of doubts as to whether we could make an offer of good offices, we were bound by the Nine Power Treaty and it would seem to me difficult for us to suggest that China agree to an armistice for the purpose of entering into negotiations unless we were convinced that Japan was willing to negotiate a peace consistent with the Nine Power Treaty. I said it would be to assume a heavy responsibility for us to urge China to lay down its arms in a truce under conditions in which Japan could dictate an onerous peace. Mr. Matsukata replied that in the first place he was convinced that Japan had no idea of being unreasonable, but that certainly the longer the war went on, the more chance there was of unreasonable elements getting control; second, he said what was to prevent Mr. Grew suggesting the idea of good offices to Mr. Hirota, on condition that Mr. Hirota could satisfy him that the terms to be offered China were reasonable and generous. Mr. Matsukata then reemphasized the necessity for urgent action, if possible, before the fall of Nanking. During the course of the conversation I asked him what his plans were. He said he was staying in Washington some days and would consider it a great honor if Mr. Hull would receive him. He made no specific request for an interview and I did not encourage him in this respect as I feel that an overture for an interview with the Secretary should be made by Saito. 57 Hugh R. Wilson 56 One of Japan’s Genro, or Elder Statesmen. 57 Japanese Ambassador in the United States. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11325: Telegram [Document 800] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 28, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 28—7:07 p.m.] 1031. Reference 3rd paragraph of your 579, November 26, 6 p.m., there have as yet been no Japanese demands of the serious character suggested by such press despatches. The Japanese announce their intentions to supervise or control the Chinese posts, telegraphs and radio services but so far have moved slowly and done no more than inspect these activities. So far as I can ascertain, the present plans do not contemplate more than supervision, control of revenues and some censorship the extent of which is not yet indicated. It must be remembered that the Chinese have exercised such supervision, control and censorship in the past and the Japanese claim merely to be taking over Chinese rights. 2. Japanese Consul General has informed Municipal Council of intention to place a Chinese police force under Japanese officers in the western areas beyond the western boundary of the International Settlement but within the British and Italian defense sectors. Japanese do not deny the right of Settlement police to function on the extra-Settlement roads in such areas but claim the right in succession to the Chinese authorities to police the enclaves bounded by such roads. The proposal is ill-advised at this time as likely to lead to incidents involving the Chinese residents and the Japanese-officered Chinese police. No question has been raised as to the Japanese right to do this but it would be preferable to wait until the situation is more settled and a municipal authority and municipal police force have been set up to replace the Chinese municipal government. 3. I am endeavoring to keep Department fully informed of developments and of my views. For the present I am recommending no action. Sent to the Department, repeated to Tokyo. Gauss Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 893.0146/592 [Document 801] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) of a Conversation With the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) [ Washington ,] November 29, 1937. Admiral Leahy telephoned and referred to a telegram which the Navy Department had received yesterday from Admiral Yarnell in which Admiral Yarnell said that he understood that the British would probably withdraw some of their troops from Shanghai in January; that, inasmuch as the fighting had now moved back from Shanghai, the 1,200 Marines which had been sent from San Diego might be withdrawn as soon as a transport could be made available; and that Admiral Yarnell had recommended that if this plan met the approval of the Navy Department announcement to that effect be made. Admiral Leahy said that he had discussed this matter with the Secretary of State yesterday, November 28. He said that it was his feeling that it would be advisable for the Navy Department to make the announcement promptly so that we would not be faced with the fact that some other government had moved before the United States. Admiral Leahy asked me to take the matter up with the Secretary of State with a view to letting Admiral Leahy know what Mr. Hull’s views in the matter were. I discussed the matter with Mr. Wilson and with the Secretary and then informed Admiral Leahy by telephone that the Secretary’s views were as follows: Inasmuch as the San Diego Marines had been sent to Shanghai pursuant to a recommendation made by Admiral Yarnell and inasmuch as Admiral Yarnell now reported that there was no further need for these Marines at Shanghai and recommended their withdrawal, it was felt that Admiral Yarnell’s recommendation should be adopted. However, it was possible that before a transport could get to Shanghai, which it was understood would be toward the latter part of December, the situation might conceivably change. Consequently, it was suggested that the Navy Department arrange to send a transport to Shanghai as soon as practicable but that no publicity be given to the fact that the transport would be used to withdraw the San Diego Marines. If a question should be asked, the Navy Department might say that the transport was going back to the Asiatic station as part of its normal duties and possibly to assist in the withdrawal of American nationals. When the transport got to Shanghai or shortly before that time, definite decision could be arrived at with regard to the withdrawal of the San Diego Marines and, should the decision be in the affirmative, announcement to that effect could be made at that time. I told Admiral Leahy also that when I was discussing this matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. McIntyre 58 had telephoned on another matter and the Secretary had mentioned the subject under discussion to Mr. McIntyre. I told Admiral Leahy that Mr. McIntyre felt that it would be well for this matter to be referred to the White House in order that the President’s approval might be obtained. I suggested to Admiral Leahy that the Navy Department might send a copy of Admiral Yarnell’s telegram to the White House with a statement of what the Navy Department’s views in the matter were. Admiral Leahy said that subsequent to his earlier conversation with me he had discussed the subject with Mr. Swanson; 59 that Mr. Swanson’s view was that if the United States took the lead in withdrawing some of its armed forces from Shanghai the United States would appear to be scuttling; that if some other power wished to take the lead it could do so; that he did not wish the United States to be put in that light. Admiral Leahy said also that Mr. Swanson wished to refer the matter to the President. Admiral Leahy indicated that Mr. Hull’s views and the procedure suggested by Mr. Hull fell in general line with Mr. Swanson’s views; and Admiral Leahy said that the Navy Department would refer the matter to the President. I said that we of course would give no publicity to the matter and Admiral Leahy said that the Navy Department also would give no publicity. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 58 Marvin H. McIntyre, Secretary to President Roosevelt. 59 Claude A. Swanson, Secretary of the Navy. The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11358: Telegram [Document 802] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 29, 1937—noon. [Received 3:37 p.m.] 972. 1. Press reports alleging arrival new Soviet Ambassador may refer to new Soviet Military Attaché who, we are authoritatively informed reached Nanking yesterday accompanied by number of Soviet bombing and pursuit planes with some Soviet pilots and ground men. 2. Chiang is still here. According to very reliable source he is postponing departure in order to preclude threatened defection of several provincial commanders at the front. One ranking Chinese official came to me today with warning that we should board gunboat when Chiang leaves because trouble among troops would probably result from his departure. Another source has suggested that defenses being prepared at city gates are primarily against incursion of unruly troops. 3. It is reported that Chinese are destroying nearby airfields including that at Kwangteh whose fall is imminent. It seems to us that if troops in this area do not move out when Kwangteh falls they will probably be enveloped here with the river at their backs, making inevitable a disastrous defense of the city from inside the walls. 4. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Atcheson The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/356: Telegram [Document 803] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , November 29, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 8:48 p.m.] The state of excitement among Chinese officials and residents has greatly increased today due to a rumor of an alleged presentation of an ultimatum to the local municipal government by the Japanese to surrender the city within 24 hours. Whatever the cause may be, the extraordinary activity which has taken place today points to a belief among the high Chinese authorities that events are impending which will require them to leave Tsingtao at very short notice. The railway stations within the city, particularly those in the cotton mill district, are very heavily guarded and Chinese residents in the vicinity of the mills have been instructed by the municipal authorities to remove themselves forthwith. Also there were dismissed from municipal employment today the greater part of the few remaining subordinate officials and employees. It appears to this Consulate that the Chinese authorities are simply losing their nerve. This morning the Mayor informed the British and French Consuls who had been instructed by their Ambassadors to make representations to the Mayor in regard to the sparing of destruction of property that first any action he would undertake would be solely in accordance with instructions of the Central Government and without regard to his personal inclinations. Furthermore he could assure the Consuls that every measure would be taken to avoid damage to foreign possessions, that is American and European lives and property. Also that the foreign consuls could rest assured that no action in regard to the public utilities was contemplated. The Mayor also gave assurances that the foreign residential district would not be affected. Sent to the Department, Hankow, Peiping. Sokobin The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11348: Telegram [Document 804] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 29, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 29—2:26 p.m.] 974. Embassy’s 944, November 22, 10 p.m., and 958, November 26, 9 a.m. Please expedite communication of following message to Japanese Ambassador: “The International Committee, which forwarded to the Japanese authorities through the courtesy of the American Embassy on 22 November a proposal for a safety zone in Nanking, would again respectfully request favorable consideration of its proposal. In order that proper arrangements may be made for the care of the thousands of civilians who have no other recourse than the proposed safety zone, it is necessary that the Committee should begin its work at the earliest possible moment. For humanitarian reasons therefore an early reply to the Committee’s proposal is earnestly desired. (Signed) John H. D. Rabe, Chairman”. Sent Shanghai, Hankow, Peiping. Peiping kindly expedite repetition to Tokyo. For the Ambassador: Atcheson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11355: Telegram [Document 805] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 29, 1937—8 p.m. [Received November 29—3 p.m.] 1038. Reference my No. 998, November 22, noon. These matters were discussed yesterday afternoon between the foreign commandants and the Japanese military. While the Japanese reserved their rights, it is believed that they will not take precipitate action. I discussed these matters in a friendly spirit yesterday morning with the Japanese Consul General. He telephoned me last evening that the foreign commandants had had a conference with the Japanese military and he believed that both sides were satisfied with the result. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Hong Kong (Southard) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11367: Telegram [Document 806] The Consul General at Hong Kong ( Southard ) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong , November 30, 1937—9 a.m. [Received November 30—12:36 a.m.] Following telegram sent at the request of the Ambassador at Hankow: “6. November 29, 2 p.m. 1. From information gathered from Chinese sources since my arrival at Hankow it would appear that the Chinese Government is preparing for a contest of endurance with Japan and it is believed in Chinese circles that at a suitable juncture the Soviet Government will assist China in a more positive way than by supplying aircraft as at present. Only key officers numbering less than one-fifth of the entire number have been retained in Government departments and the rest dismissed with 2 months pay. Of the Legislative Yuan for example there remain only the President, Sun Fo, Vice President and the heads of five departments. It is reported that Sun Fo and two department heads are now en route by plane via Europe to Moscow. T. V. Soong is reported as having left Shanghai by a British naval vessel for Hong Kong whence he will join the Government. 2. A Chinese news correspondent believed to be well informed and reliable confirms the earlier forecast that the Government will be located at Hengyang in Hunan and the Foreign Office at Chungking. It is hoped that foreign diplomatic representation will be established at Chungking encouraged by the presence there of suitable foreign buildings and by relative immunity from bombing as compared with Hengyang. Informant states that General is now at Nanking but will proceed to Hengyang when the Japanese capture Kwangteh on their anticipated march on Wuhu to encircle Nanking. 3. Same informant stated that the Soviet Government would defer active assistance to China until the Japanese capture Hankow which the Chinese think will occur after 3 months but the Russians predict in 2. Reason for selection of this juncture is said to be the Russian belief that by awaiting this event they will be able to force a change in the form of the Chinese Government and that the Chinese can then cooperate more effectively by cutting a long Japanese line of communication. Moreover, the delay until a critical point is reached will enable the Soviet Government to arouse popular opinion in favor of a war of assistance to China. 4. Informant stated that during a confidential conference in Nanking recently Chen Li Fu who lately returned from a hurried trip to Moscow asked General Chiang who would replace the latter as the leader of China if Chiang should be forced to retire and that Chiang answered that his successor would have to be a military man and would be either Pai Chung Hsi, the Kuangsi leader, or Mao Tse Tung, the foremost Chinese Communist. Informant thought that Chiang himself would be willing to change the form of government somewhat to meet Soviet desires if necessary in order to enlist active Russian support against Japan. This confirms the opinion I have for some time shared that the Japanese war against Communism is likely to drive China at least toward an alliance with the Soviet Union if not into the Third International”. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. By mail to Peiping. Southard The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson), at Nanking 124.93/394a: Telegram [Document 807] The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ), at Nanking Washington , November 30, 1937—2 p.m. 368. Your 965, November 28, 9 a.m., 972, November 29, noon, and 973, November 29, 3 p.m., 60 and Ambassador’s November 29, 4 p.m. 61 The Department concurs in the Ambassador’s view that you and staff should not expose yourselves to imminent and serious danger by remaining at the Embassy, and feels that you and staff should remove to the U. S. S. Panay whenever you consider it advisable to do so. It is suggested that you keep in touch with your colleagues and in so far as practicable concert your action with theirs. You should again urge all American citizens to evacuate. Hull 60 No. 973 not printed. 61 To Atcheson; quoted in telegram No. 7, November 29, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11364: Telegram [Document 808] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 30, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 30—7:15 a.m.] 580. Our 569, November 27, noon. 1. Military officers of the Embassy have been told in widely separated Japanese military quarters that a declaration of war will be issued tomorrow or the day after. 2. There is no reliable basis for evaluating such information other than the statement made by the Prime Minister and reported in our 571, November 27, 2 p.m. Repeated to Peiping for Hankow. Grew The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, at Sea 793.94111/97a: Telegram [Document 809] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, at Sea Washington , November 30, 1937—6 p.m. 1. Ambassador Grew cables today that according to statements made to military officers of our Embassy in widely separated Japanese military quarters the Japanese Government will issue tomorrow or the day after a declaration of war. Shall we send neutrality proclamation and other drafts for you to sign in blank and return without waiting further, or shall we delay sending them until declaration of war is announced, in case it should be announced? The latter step would probably be entirely practicable should you so decide since we would automatically enter upon a state of general neutrality in case of war declaration by Japan. Matter can probably be handled satisfactorily either way, or preferably you might have the papers on hand and in case of war declaration take action upon them and return them to Washington by air mail. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11369: Telegram [Document 810] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 30, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 30—10:20 a.m.] 582. Shanghai’s 1012, November 24, 2 p.m. 1. My British colleague informed me this morning that the Japanese authorities at Shanghai have indicated that on December 1st Japanese troops are to be sent to occupy Japanese property inside sectors assigned to American and Italian contingents and also that troops will be transported through the International Settlement to Nantao and other points beyond. He stated that the Counselor of the British Embassy would make representations this afternoon. 2. In view of the urgency of the matter it seemed inexpedient to await instructions and I therefore instructed Dooman 62 to call on the Chief of the East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Office and urge that Japanese troops be directed to abstain from entering the areas concerned at this time. Dooman left with Ishii an aide-mémoire based substantially on Shanghai’s telegram above cited. 3. Ishii seemed surprised that any action such as that indicated in paragraph 1 above would be taken tomorrow. He said that no information to that effect had been received by the Foreign Office and that he would at once communicate with Shanghai. However, he made no other commitment. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 62 Counselor of Embassy in Japan. President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State 793.94111/101: Telegram [Document 811] President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State [U. S. S. “ Potomac ”,] November 30, 1937—11:55 p.m. [Received December 1—1:05 a.m.] 0030. Think it best to send the neutrality proclamation for me to sign so that there will be no delay. I take it that only the regular list of munitions will be based [ barred? ] from export but suggest immediate study of other articles so that we can discuss advisability of enlarging list later on. I think we should seek in every way possible to avoid helping one side and not the other. Please advise what probable effect declaration of war will have on our Shanghai and Tientsin position, also what is new from British angle. [ Franklin D. Roosevelt ] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11385: Telegram [Document 812] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 1, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 1—7 a.m.] 9. German Ambassador 63 left Hankow this morning accompanied by the Counsellor of Embassy for Kiukiang and Kuling on customs cruiser loaned by the Chinese Government. No information can be obtained regarding his mission but the natural inference is that he bears to General Chiang some sort of peace proposal from the Japanese. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat to Tokyo. Johnson 63 Oskar Trautmann. The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11394: Telegram [Document 813] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 1, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 3:35 p.m.] 976. 1. At the request of the Committee named therein Embassy transmits the following: “An International Committee representing the more than 100 foreign nationals now residing in Wuhu desires to suggest to the Chinese and Japanese authorities the establishment of a safety zone for civilian refugees, in the unfortunate event of hostilities at or near Wuhu. The International Committee will undertake to secure from the Chinese authorities specific guarantees that the proposed safety zone would be made free and keep free from military establishments and offices, including those of military communications; from the presences of armed men other than civil police with pistols; and from the passage of soldiers or military officers in any capacity. The International Committee would inspect and observe the safety zone to see that these undertakings are satisfactorily carried out. The International Committee proposes the designation of the area indicated below, as convenient and suitable for the care of civilian refugees. This area lies between the Wuhu–Suancheng Railway and the small river commonly called the Changho. It contains the civilian residential section of the city and is free from all fortifications and defense works. The area is bounded as follows: the north by the Wuhu–Suancheng (Ningkwofu) Railway; on the east by the East Gate; on the south by the small river and on the west by the Chungshan road. The International Committee would see to it that the boundaries of the area would be clearly marked with white flags or with other indications to be agreed upon, plain to all concerned. The Committee proposes that the safety zone become effective from the date of acceptance by the Japanese authorities, the Chinese authorities having already accepted the committee’s proposal. The International Committee earnestly hopes that the Japanese authorities may find it possible for humanitarian reasons to respect the civilian character of this safety zone. The Committee believes that merciful foresight on behalf of civilians will bring honor to the responsible authorities on both sides. In order that the necessary negotiation with the Chinese authorities may be completed in the shortest possible time, and also in order that adequate preparations may be made for the care of refugees, the Committee would respectfully request a prompt reply from the Japanese authorities to this proposal. The International Committee confidently trusts that there will be favorable consideration of this appeal. Respectfully submitted: (signed) Dr. Robert E. Brown, Bishop Zenon Aramburn, Father Justus Perez, Rev. A. Hayuan, Mr. T. F. R. Waters, Mr. Joe Wharton, on behalf of the foreign nationals of Wuhu.” 2. Please communicate as soon as possible to the Japanese Ambassador 64 and give Embassy reply for communication to the Committee in question. 3. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Department, Hankow, Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo for the Ambassador. Atcheson 64 The Consul General at Shanghai (to whom this telegram was sent) reported on December 2 that this had been done, “with request for an early reply.” (793.94/11557) Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) to the Secretary of State 811.515–Silver/121 [Document 814] Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs ( Feis ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 1, 1937. Mr. Secretary : I have been keeping the Secretary of the Treasury advised of the fact that we have heard rumors from the Far East regarding the possibility that Japan might declare war on China sometime this week; and for that reason steps preparatory to the issuance of a neutrality proclamation were being studied. The Secretary said that the chief problem that was up to him was what he should do in relation to China. He had already bought some 50,000,000 ounces of silver. He was considering within the next day or two letting the Chinese know that he was prepared to buy 50,000,000 more ounces and advise us by letter. I said I did not think the Department wished to make any comment. H[ erbert ] F[ eis ] The British Embassy to the Department of State 793.94/11421 [Document 815] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Consul-General at Shanghai reported on the 27th November that the Japanese authorities had demanded that the extra-Settlement areas between the Perimeter and the Western Settlement boundary should be policed by them. The presence of Japanese military police inside the defences of the Perimeter seems likely to give rise to incidents both with foreign troops and with the Chinese population, and is, therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, most inadvisable. Instructions have accordingly been sent to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to urge upon the Japanese Government the desirability of allowing the Municipal Council to police the area in question. Meanwhile it has been learnt that the Municipal Council have reason to think that the Japanese authorities might recognize the Council’s right to police the extra-Settlement roads in question, and for this they might consider the employment of the former Chinese police under Japanese control. In the opinion of His Majesty’s Consul-General, although this makes the position a little less serious, dangers surrounding the scheme still exist. Strictly speaking it would appear that the Municipal Council should only have the right to police the roads since in normal times the Chinese police the areas between the roads although in practice it used to be found necessary for both forces to operate on the roads. The Japanese authorities therefore have a colourable claim to police the areas between the roads, but if they do so incidents with the Chinese and with foreigners seem almost certain; there will be a risk of other incidents between the Japanese and British troops, and if the Municipal Council’s right to police the roads is not denied, as it is obviously undesirable that it should be, there will probably be difficulties between their police and the Japanese police. There will also probably be a great influx of refugees into the Settlement and consequent additional difficulties will arise for the Settlement authorities. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would be glad to learn whether in view of the circumstances outlined above the United States Government would be prepared to instruct their Ambassador at Tokyo to support Sir R. Craigie’s representations, by urging the Japanese Government to allow the Municipal Council, for the present at any rate, to police the whole area between the Perimeter and the western boundary of the Settlement. It is understood that American troops are not directly concerned with the area in question, but on broader ground, which involves the position of the Municipal Council, it is felt that the matter may be of interest to the United States Government especially since the same considerations are understood to arise in connection with the desire of the Japanese authorities to occupy certain mills in the American sector in the Settlement. Washington , December 1, 1937. The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11387: Telegram [Document 816] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 1—12:21 p.m.] 978. 1. We are confidentially informed by reliable competent source that German Ambassador is expected here shortly to discuss Japanese peace proposals which include Chinese (1) declaration of independence Outer [ Inner? ] Mongolia, (2) participation in Anti-Comintern Pact, (3) agreement to stop anti-Japanese propaganda, and on Japanese side resumption of status quo in North China as regards Japanese troops. I report this for what it may be worth. Our source states that it is second definite Japanese attempt to initiate peace discussions and that these proposals do not come from the Japanese military. 2. My German colleague has told me in confidence that Japanese some time ago asked Germany to propose to China that China initiate peace discussions but German Government refused because the Japanese would not reveal what terms would be acceptable to Japan. 3. Repeated to Hankow, Shainghai, Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, at Sea 793.94111/98a: Telegram [Document 817] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, at Sea Washington , December 1, 1937—4 p.m. 3. Draft of undated proclamation under Section 1 of the Neutrality Act, 65 together with warrant to affix the Great Seal and a copy of the Act, will be sent by plane tonight. If you will sign the proclamation and the warrant and return them, I shall hold them with a view to issuing the proclamation without delay should such a step appear to become necessary and should you authorize it. In view of the fact that the proclamation is not to be issued immediately upon its signature and in order to avoid the risk of embarrassment resulting from possible premature publicity, I have not complied in this case with Executive Order No. 7298 prescribing that drafts of proclamations be submitted to the Director of the Budget, the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Register before they are submitted to you for consideration. The list of arms in the proclamation is identical with that in your proclamation in regard to Spain. 66 Under the terms of the Act, that list could not be essentially modified. You will note that the Act prohibits the placing of an embargo on any articles other than those of the character listed in this proclamation. You will also note that the issuance of a proclamation under Section 1 of the Act places automatically in operation the provisions of Sections 3, 6, 9 and 10. I have not considered it advisable to recommend that you take action at this time under the proviso in Section 3 ( a ). I assume that your suggestion in regard to a list of other articles refers to a possible proclamation under Section 2. That Section, the application of which is dependent upon your finding that action under it is necessary to preserve the peace and security of the United States, contains the so-called cash and carry provisions but does not authorize an embargo. I do not recommend action under Section 2 at this time. We are making a careful study of the probable effects of the carrying out of the provisions of that section upon the belligerents and particularly upon our own domestic economy and are drawing up a tentative list of articles in order to be prepared should you eventually consider action under that section to be advisable. As to the question raised in the first clause of your final paragraph, we feel that the position at Tientsin and Peiping after the declaration of war would still be legally tenable under the Boxer Procotol. 67 The position in Shanghai would be dubious legally. In any case, practical and equitable considerations may arise which might outweigh the legal. The position of our national vessels in Chinese waters would depend largely on the type of declaration and subsequent blockade proclamations. We are giving careful study to these and other contingencies. There is nothing new on the British angle. We have received nothing since Grew’s telegram reported to you yesterday which would throw light on the possibility of a declaration of war nor is there any further indication that a declaration is imminent. Although we would be somewhat surprised should there be an immediate declaration of war, we need not be greatly surprised should such a declaration be made at any time. Hull 65 Act of August 31, 1985, as amended February 20, 1936, and May 1, 1937; 49 Stat. 1081, 49 Stat. 1152, and 50 Stat 121. 66 Dated May 1, 1937; 50 Stat. 1831. 67 Foreign Relations , 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11395: Telegram [Document 818] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 1, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 1—2 p.m.] 1057. The Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at noon today informed British military headquarters that it is the intention for a column of Japanese troops to march through the American and British sectors on Friday, the 3rd of December. The British Major General is tonight addressing a communication to Major General Harada, Japanese Military Attaché, as follows: “I am sure you must have realized at the conference held on Sunday that such a trip is very definitely against the wishes of the national commanders. Further, we were under the impression that you inferred that such action was not contemplated in the near future. If you intend to disregard our wishes we must point out that we cannot accept responsibility for any incident which may occur. We will, however, co-operate if you intend to take this action and make arrangements with the municipal police for the route to be cleared of refugees as far as is possible.” Brigadier General Beaumont, United States Marine Corps, has added a signed endorsement that he is in complete agreement with the views expressed by the British Major General. It would be exceedingly desirable that the Japanese be dissuaded from this unwise, unnecessary and possibly provocative demonstration. Sent to Department, repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11325: Telegram [Document 819] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , December 1, 1937—7 p.m. 598. Your 1031, November 28, 8 p.m., paragraph 2. On December 1 the British Embassy handed the Department an aide-mémoire in regard to Japanese plans for policing the area between the extra-Settlement roads. According to the aide-mémoire , the British Ambassador in Tokyo has been instructed to urge upon the Japanese Government the desirability of allowing the Municipal Council to police the area in question. The British Government inquires whether we would be prepared to take similar action. In reply we are informing the British Embassy here 68 that it seems advisable to us that at this stage our approach be made at Shanghai rather than at Tokyo. Accordingly, the Department desires that you discuss the matter with your British colleague and that you make an informal approach to the Japanese Consul General there. The Department suggests that, without raising any question with regard to the legalities involved in the Japanese plans, you endeavor to impress upon the Japanese Consul General the advisability at the present stage from a practical standpoint and to the end that possible disturbances or incidents may be avoided, of having the Municipal Council police the area in question for the time being. You may in your discretion inform the Japanese Consul General that you have consulted the Department in this matter and that the Department has authorized you to express the foregoing views. Hull 68 See aide-mémoire of December 2, p. 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] . The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11395: Telegram [Document 820] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , December 1, 1937—8 p.m. 599. Your 1057, December 1, 7 p.m. The Department is telegraphing Tokyo as follows: “326, December 1, 1937, 8 p.m., Shanghai’s 1057, December 1, 7 p.m., in regard to the proposed march of Japanese troops through the American and British sectors. The Department desires that you confer with your British colleague and that thereafter you, unless you perceive objection, make an informal approach to the Japanese Government pointing out that in the opinion of the American Consul General at Shanghai the proposed Japanese action is undesirable and possibly provocative of unfortunate incidents and thus likely to produce a result the opposite of what the Japanese have in mind.” The Department assumes that you have taken this matter up informally with the Japanese Consul General. Hull President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State 793.94111/98: Telegram [Document 821] President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State U. S. S. “ Potomac ,” December 2 [ 1? ], 1937—midnight. [Received December 2—1:30 a.m.] 3. Entirely approve your recommendations about possible declaration. Please see Secretary of Treasury at once about his telegram to me about silver and exchange. I am inclined to go along with his suggestions. [ Franklin D. Roosevelt ] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11406: Telegram [Document 822] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 2, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 2—7:20 a.m.] 979. Embassy’s 974, November 29, 8 p.m. 1. International Committee November 30th arranged for civilian associated in Shanghai to inform Japanese Embassy that Chinese authorities here had agreed in detail to the stipulation of the safety zone proposal and were providing rice and other practical assistance. 2. Following message from Nanking Committee from Shanghai Associated now received by Embassy in Shanghai December 1st. “Japanese authorities have duly noted request for safety zone but regret cannot grant it. In the event of Chinese forces misbehavior towards civilians and/or property cannot assume responsibility but they themselves will endeavor to respect the district as far as consistent with military necessity. (Signed) Jacquinot”. 3. Sent Department. Repeated Hankow, Peiping. Peiping kindly repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/395: Telegram [Document 823] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 2, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 3—6 a.m.] 980. Department’s 368, November 30, 2 p.m. 1. I am placing Gassie on Panay this evening with all codes except one gray, with all seals and fee stamps, and code room will thereafter function on board. 2. All British subjects except five are now sleeping on Jardine hulk up river. Our problem is different and more difficult than theirs. We have no such accommodations for our nationals, the Panay will be extremely crowded, and while I should prefer getting on board within next 2 days those who plan to embark, there is reluctance on part of all concerned to undertake removal at this time. Steps taken by the Chinese authorities including transfers of troops appear to have lessened at least temporarily the danger of internal disorders; and except for some untoward circumstance such as indiscriminate bombing or disorders, I am afraid we shall not be successful in embarking more than a few until artillery fire is audible. We are again urging all Americans to evacuate and have taken pains to impress upon them the probability that when fighting occurs near Nanking a panic among the intramural population would make egress through the one open gate to the Bund difficult and hazardous. 3. Developments at the front today and tomorrow will probably clarify the situation and dictate a more definite course of action. My colleagues and I have agreed as regards ourselves to take concerted action. 4. Sent to the Department; repeated to Hankow, Peiping. Atcheson The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11409: Telegram [Document 824] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 2, 1937—noon. [Received December 2—7:20 a.m.] 982. Our 978, December 1, 3 p.m. 1. German Ambassador arrived here on Chinese customs cruiser. We are reliably informed that Chiang will inform him that China, cannot consider any peace proposals which do not give recognition to her full sovereignty. 2. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson The Department of State to the British Embassy 793.94/11421 [Document 825] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The receipt is acknowledged of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of December 1, 1937, in regard to the policing by the Japanese of the extra-Settlement areas. Note is taken of the British Government’s statement that the British Ambassador in Tokyo has been instructed to make representations to the Japanese Government in the matter and of the British Government’s inquiry whether the American Government would be prepared to instruct the American Ambassador in Tokyo to take similar action. The American Government, after giving the matter careful consideration, has reached the conclusion that it is advisable at this stage that an approach be made by the American Consul General at Shanghai rather than by the American Ambassador at Tokyo. The American Government feels that its Consul General at Shanghai, in view of the peculiar character of the problem, and of the Consul General’s intimate knowledge of the numerous and intricate factors involved in that problem, is in a better position than is the American Ambassador at Tokyo to present effectively to the Japanese authorities this Government’s views. Accordingly, the American Government has authorized the American Consul General to discuss the matter with his British colleague and to make an informal approach to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai. The American Government has suggested to its Consul General that, without raising any question of the legalities involved in the Japanese plans, he endeavor to impress upon the Japanese Consul General the advisability of having the Municipal Council police the area in question for the present in order that possible disturbances or incidents may be avoided. Washington , December 2, 1937. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11414: Telegram [Document 826] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 2, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 2—1:44 p.m.] 11. My 6, November 29, 2 p.m. 69 In private conversation yesterday the Minister, for Foreign Affairs did not deny and by evasiveness admitted the truth of the theory that the German Ambassador has gone to General Chiang bearing Japanese proposals for a cessation of hostilities. Asked whether he thought there was any chance of an agreement, he expressed deep pessimism saying that from what he heard the Japanese terms would be unendurably severe and would include a demand to garrison every important city in China. It now appears that the German Ambassador was accompanied by Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the vessel transporting him arrived at Nanking this morning at 9 a.m. flying the Swastika flag. The Ambassador immediately disembarked. Conflicting reports are current, one being that the German Ambassador is acting on behalf of the Italian and not the German Government. However that may be, the recent recognition of Manchukuo by the Italian Government and the offer of services of mediation by the German Government indicate a desire on the part of these Governments either in competition or in cooperation to accord early recognition to Japan as the master of the Far East and to share in the spoils of victory. I venture to suggest also that Italy and Germany wish by prompt and “realistic” action to demonstrate that they are more important factors in the Far Eastern world than those nations like Great Britain and the United States which endeavor to support a treaty system based on international promises and not on present actualities. A secretary of the Italian Embassy remarked to me humorously yesterday that the Rome-Berlin Axis did not seem to function in the Orient for although he dined with the German Ambassador a few hours before his departure the latter gave him no hint of his projected mission. If the German Ambassador is acting on behalf of the Italian Government and not his own, this remark was, of course, intentionally misleading. The attitude of officials of Foreign Office toward the Italian recognition of Manchukuo and German friendliness with Japan is one of profound discouragement and disappointment that the nations supporting the treaty system do not take practical measures to save China from internal ruin at the hands of Japan and the world from international chaos. I have endeavored to show that the Nine Power Treaty constituted a renunciation on the part of each signatory and entailed no common responsibility for enforcement. Repeated to Tokyo. By mail to Peiping. Johnson 69 See telegram of November 30, 9 a.m., from the Consul General at Hong Kong, p. 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11408: Telegram [Document 827] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 2, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 2—8:30 a.m.] 588. Department’s 326, December 1, 8 p.m. 1. The Department presumably will have noted our 582, November 30, 7 p.m., (to which reference was made in Shanghai’s 1050, December 1, 11 a.m. 70 ) in which case we reported having taken action in anticipation of the Department’s instructions. 2. Today we informed the Foreign Office of the statement made by the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at British military headquarters, as reported in Shanghai’s 1057, 71 and again urged against sending of Japanese troops into neutral areas. The Foreign Office stated that according to a report received from Shanghai the project to march Japanese forces into such areas has been “abandoned” and “the question does not arise”. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 70 Telegram No. 1050, not printed. 71 December 1, 7 p.m. p. 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] . The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11418: Telegram [Document 828] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 2, 1937—6 p.m. [Received 9:55 p.m.] 984. My 979, December 2, 9 a.m. Please transmit to Father Jacqui-not following message from International Committee for Nanking safety zone: “Cordial thanks for your services. Committee appreciates Japanese assurance of endeavor to respect the district as far as consistent with military necessity. We have secured full agreement from Chinese military authorities for exact compliance with original proposal. Committee is therefore proceeding with work of organization and administration in safety zone and informs you refugees already entering. At proper time and after adequate inspection Committee will formally notify both Chinese and Japanese authorities that zone is in operation. Committee would ask you kindly to confer again with Japanese authorities pointing out that direct assurances from them to us would go still further to lessen the anxiety of distressed civilians and respectfully requesting them to give us early notification to that effect. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman.” Sent to Shanghai. Repeated to Department, Hankow, Peiping. Atcheson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11413: Telegram [Document 829] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 2, 1937—9 p.m. [Received December 2—2:10 p.m.] 1070. Your number 599, December 1, 1 [ 8 ] p.m. I have repeatedly discussed the matter with my colleague who, however, can do nothing in the face of the high military decision. The parade is scheduled to start at 11 o’clock tomorrow morning from Jessfield and to take 2 hours to pass down Yuya-ching Road, Avenue Haig, Avenue Foch, Thibet Road, Nanking Road and the Bund to Hongkew. About 3,000 men will be in line. Extraordinary police precautions are being taken. Gauss The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11427: Telegram [Document 830] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 3, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 3—6 a.m.] 986. Embassy’s 982, December 2, noon and 978, December 1, 3 p.m. 1. Hsu Mo, political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Counsellor of German Embassy accompanied Trautmann here and left with him for Hankow at midnight last night after conferring with Chiang Kai Shek. We are reliably informed that (1) proposals communicated to Chiang by German Ambassador were in general as set forth in our 978; (2) Chiang’s reply was substantially as indicated in our 982 and; (3) Chiang has taken the position that ( a ) any negotiations must be undertaken with the Chinese Foreign Office, ( b ) he will not recognize any settlement which violates his stipulation concerning sovereignty and, ( c ) in event of such settlement he will continue with his troops to resist the Japanese. 2. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11428: Telegram [Document 831] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 3, 1937—1 p.m. [Received December 3—6:55 a.m.] 589. 1. Our 588, December 2, 4 p.m., was sent after checking with the British Embassy, which also received from the Foreign Office the assurance set forth in last sentence of our telegram under reference. 2. The papers this morning carry a report from Shanghai to the effect that a demonstration march of Japanese troops will be held at noon today through the International and French Settlements. The Foreign Office, in reply to an inquiry which we immediately made, insists that nothing has been received on this subject from the Consul General at Shanghai subsequent to the report on the basis of which we were assured yesterday that plans to send Japanese troops into the neutral areas had been abandoned. 3. We urged that instructions be sent countermanding orders for the march, but the Foreign Office expressed doubt whether any effective action could be taken. I let the Foreign Office know that, if this demonstration is held, another example would be offered of discrepancies between the statements of the Foreign Office and the actions of the Japanese military. My British colleague is making similar representations. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11423: Telegram [Document 832] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 3, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 3—6 a.m.] 1074. At about 1 o’clock today when the Japanese forces were carrying out their ill-advised military parade through the Settlement a hand grenade was thrown by a Chinese on Nanking Road. It is reported that one Japanese soldier, one Japanese civilian and two Shanghai municipal policemen were wounded and that the thrower of the hand grenade was shot and killed by the police. The parade continued and has now cleared Nanking Road and the Bund. Sent to the Department, Tokyo, Nanking, Hankow, and Peiping. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11439: Telegram [Document 833] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 3, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 2:37 p.m.] 12. My 11, December 2, 2 p.m. In confidential conversation this morning H. H. Kung 72 discredited the theory that the German Ambassador has gone to General Chiang as the messenger or at the instigation of Italy. He said that the recognition of Manchukuo has definitely eliminated Italy from among those nations trusted by China. (There is an apparently reliable report that all Italian aviation advisers are to be dismissed.) Kung thought that Japan selected Germany and not Italy as its present emissary knowing that Italy would be regarded with distrust. I asked Kung what the reaction of the Chinese leaders would be to the proposals conveyed by the German Ambassador. He replied promptly that this would depend on the attitude of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese conflict and he asked me in turn whether I would advise China to treat with Japan stressing that he wanted my opinion not as a diplomat but as his friend and a friend of China. I said that I did not know what terms Japan was offering and in general had no adequate basis for an opinion. To my relief he did not inform me what terms are being offered. I remarked that Great Britain and France having oriental possessions would naturally be very interested in possible terms of settlement of the present conflict and I inquired what Kung knew concerning their attitude. He admitted that the two nations named would feel a keen interest in the specific terms of settlement but he insisted that the interests of the United States were as closely involved as those of other nations if not more so; he made certain statements which I did not attempt to refute, viz. that the Japanese are by nature and tradition a fighting race, that it is their ambition to utilize the manpower and natural resources of China in furtherance of schemes of military expansion, that a Japanese victory would be a victory of military despotism over peace-loving democracy, that China in this sense was fighting the common battle of international security and morality, that further enhancement of Japanese military power would disturb the equilibrium in the Pacific area and would expose even the United States to danger of incursion in the future, that every victory of imperialism like that of Italy over Ethiopia and Japan in Manchukuo further imperiled the peace of the world and that no nation could isolate itself from the consequences of a rule of predatory militarism. He made the interesting statement that even before the final Japanese victory at Shanghai the Japanese made several tentative approaches to the Chinese for cessation of hostilities and he strongly inferred from the present renewal of these approaches that the Japanese are anxious to terminate their present costly venture. He expressed the conviction that the present moment would be most favorable for some sort of international demonstration of overhauling Japan. He said that a similar favorable moment had occurred during the course of the Nine Power Conference at Brussels but that the lack of any concrete result from the conference had given renewed courage to Japan. I made the remark that from the very beginning it had been beyond the bounds of possibility that the United States would go to war against Japan either alone or in concert with other nations. Kung replied that no Chinese expected the United States to fight their battles but he insisted that it would be sufficient to halt Japan’s scheme of conquest if the leading democratic nations of the world would make some gesture such as issuing preliminary mobilization orders to their fleets or affording China assistance in money or war materials and he urged that such an act at this moment would save the necessity of far greater expenditure at a later date when Japan’s military power had been expanded and enhanced. He said that the United States held the key to the situation because Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had all signified their readiness to take some step on China’s behalf but refused to do so until they were positive the United States would take similar action, their reason being that without the cooperation of the United States no measures could possibly be effective. He urged that the United States should not abdicate from its position of leadership in support of international justice and democracy. He said that in expressing these views his position with respect to his colleagues in the Government was delicate because foreign affairs did not fall within his province but he had had the great privilege of becoming acquainted with the President and the Secretary of State and he would be grateful if his views might be communicated to them. My estimate of the situation is that while the Chinese are being subjected to a terriffic strain by the necessity of conducting military operations on a scale for which they were not prepared, nevertheless, they are encouraged to think that the Japanese are doubtful of reaping benefits commensurate with the cost and that this with the possibility, even through it be remote, that the Soviet Union may take advantage of Japan’s preoccupation in China may make Japan’s terms of settlement milder as the conflict is protracted. It seems probable that the Kuangsi leaders and the Communists would refuse to be a party to a surrender. Repeated to Tokyo, by mail to Peiping. Johnson 72 Chinese Minister of Finance and Vice President of the Executive Yuan (Vice Premier). The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11432: Telegram [Document 834] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 3, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 3—1:04 p.m.] 14. Mr. Tuan of Foreign Office called today under instructions from Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform me that the Chinese Government had accepted in principle an offer by the German Government of good offices in present Sino-Japanese matter. He referred to fact that China from beginning had been ready to accept good offices of third power and anxious to settle outstanding questions with Japan by peaceful means; that Nine Power Conference was itself in the nature of good offices; and that although the Nine Power Conference was legally still in existence it had adjourned and China had therefore accepted German offer. He expressed ignorance as to whether German Ambassador had been advised of Japanese terms. Other Missions also informed. Repeated to Peiping, Nanking. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/11364: Telegram [Document 835] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 3, 1937—4 p.m. 327. Your 580, November 30, 5 p.m. The Department desires to be informed of any information available since the dispatch of your telegram under reference and of your present estimate in regard to this matter. 73 Hull 73 The Secretary of State in telegram No. 4, December 3, 7 p.m., informed President Roosevelt, then at sea: “We have heard nothing further on the question of a declaration of war by Japan.” Then followed a brief summary of German moves. (793.94/11432) The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11438: Telegram [Document 836] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , December 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 3—2:15 p.m.] 499. Viscount Ishii, 74 who is on his way to London to explain the Japanese viewpoint, had a conversation yesterday with my British colleague 75 who is an old friend of his from Geneva days. I am forwarding by pouch a copy of Lord Perth’s memorandum of this conversation 76 which includes the following points. (1) While Chiang Kai Shek had been strongly anti-Communist and had been successful in ridding the provinces near Nanking of Red elements a number of his advisors were thoroughly sympathetic to the Communist theories and unfriendly to the Christian General 77 and the Young Marshall Chang Hsueh Liang. When Chiang Kai Shek was the prisoner of the Young Marshal a part of the agreement with regard to the former’s release was that there should be cooperation with the Communists against Japan. Chiang Kai Shek being an honorable man had performed his part of the bargain although he himself does not believe in communism. Communist theories on the other hand are likely to attack Chinese peasants because of their eagerness to possess land. 2. With regard to internal economic and financial difficulties there were two problems: ( a ) How to provide for the continuing increase in Japan’s population, and ( b ) Where to export Japanese manufactured goods and obtain the needed raw materials. As a result of difficulties in obtaining raw materials abroad Japan had decided that she must secure such material in China and it was therefore essential for Japan to lease territory as well as to cultivate raw materials especially cotton, in North China. If the Japanese needs along these lines could be met there should be no reason why a satisfactory settlement could not be arranged which would give full consideration to foreign interests in China. Japan had no desire for territorial annexations but only needed raw materials produced on lands leased through the medium of companies set up with Chinese and Japanese capital. Chiang Kai Shek knew of the Japanese terms as regards North China but could not meet them because of popular sentiment. 3. Japan could never be a Fascist state since Fascist theories are entirely opposed to the Imperial nature of the constitution of Japan. Phillips 74 Former Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs; member of Privy Council. 75 The Earl of Perth (Sir Eric Drummond), British Ambassador in Italy. 76 Despatch No. 685, December 3, not printed. 77 Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11443: Telegram [Document 837] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 7:22 p.m.] 1081. Reference to my No. 1074, December 3, 2 p.m. Following the incident this afternoon the Japanese military now controlled approximately 25 city blocks in the crowded Nanking Road area of the Settlement and prevented all movement or traffic. Some of their sentries were extended into the American sector but withdrawn after representations by the Commanding Officer, Fourth United States Marines. The Japanese Embassy spokesman at the press conference this evening is reported to have made the astounding statement that the Japanese authorities are confident the Municipal Council “will not shirk its responsibility”. This incident completely confirms the opinion repeatedly expressed that the Japanese forces should not enter the areas south of the Creek. The most elaborate precautions were taken by the municipal authorities to prevent any incident. Japanese military entry into the foreign protected areas with their heavily congested Chinese districts must serve to provoke incidents which seriously affect peace and order and may seriously prejudice the safety of foreign residents. It cannot be too strongly urged that the Japanese Government issue positive instructions to its military commanders to keep their troops outside the areas protected by the foreign neutral forces until the return of normal conditions. As this telegram is being prepared a report has been received that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn from the area concerned tonight. Sent to the Department; repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11434: Telegram [Document 838] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 3, 1937—midnight. [Received December 3—1:15 p.m.] 1073. Your number 598, December 1, 7 p.m. Your suggestion regarding temporary police arrangements for areas on both sides extra-Settlement roads within the foreign defence lines was made here in the concise form that the foreign forces should receive such municipal police assistance for the time being in protecting and insuring order in their sectors. The Japanese objected, maintaining that the municipal police have no authority whatsoever to function off the roads. At meeting on November 27th of senior naval, military, consular, and municipal authorities it was agreed that the military commanders should discuss the matter with General Harada while interested Consuls General approached the Japanese Consul General. The military commanders saw General Harada and learned from him that arrangements are being made by the Japanese for an adequate police force to be sent to Shanghai to police areas heretofore policed by the government of greater Shanghai. It was stated that these police had to be trained and that there was no intention of policing the western extension areas until the outside areas had been opened up and conditions were sufficiently normal for troops to be withdrawn from the perimeter. It was stated that these arrangements would take time and due warning would be given. In view of the foregoing the Consuls General took no further action but the subject came up in an informal discussion I had with the Japanese Consul General on the morning of November 28th before the military commanders had met and I earnestly urged a friendly arrangement. Please see my number 1038, November 29, 8 p.m. No further action appears to be necessary or desirable at this time. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11448: Telegram [Document 839] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 4, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 4—8 a.m.] 15. Tsingtao’s December 1, 3 p.m. 78 The British Embassy has renewed its inquiry of the various diplomatic missions whether they would be willing to instruct their representatives in Tsingtao to urge upon the Chinese authorities to refrain from carrying out their threat of destroying Japanese property. I replied that our information from Tsingtao was that there now seemed little prospect of such destruction but that I would be willing to instruct the American Consul to associate himself with his colleagues in oral representations to the Chinese authorities urging them to accord protection to all foreign property in Tsingtao. Sent to Tsingtao, repeated to Peiping. Johnson 78 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11454: Telegram [Document 840] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 4—7:33 a.m.] 1085. At 10:30 this morning five Japanese trucks loaded with rice and other foodstuffs and a staff car containing altogether about 35 officers and men armed with rifles or revolvers were stopped by the French at the border of their concession and the Bund. After considerable discussion and a delay of about 1 hour, I understand the French authorities granted permits after a French policeman had been placed in each truck and the staff car and the rifles placed on the floors of the trucks. With reference to my number 1081 dated December 3, 5 p.m., the Japanese cordon around the area were withdrawn by 9 o’clock last night. This morning two of General Matsui’s staff officers and the Assistant Military Attaché called on General Beaumont and apologized for entering the American defense sector yesterday. They said, according to a member of General Beaumont’s staff, that the mistake was due to their officer being unfamiliar with Shanghai and consequently unaware of the boundary of the American sector. Repeated to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Peiping. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11455: Telegram [Document 841] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 4, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 4—2:35 p.m.] 1086. I learned this afternoon that as the Japanese were preparing to withdraw their military cordon last evening they handed to the Commissioner of Police of the International Settlement the following memorandum which he was asked to sign: “Memorandum exchanged between Colonel Kusumoto, representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces, and Major Gerrard, Commissioner of Police, in front of the Sun Sun Company, in the International Settlement, on December 3, 1937. 1. The Japanese forces will in future freely pass through the International Settlement without notice whenever it is considered necessary. 2. The Shanghai municipal police authorities promise that in future adequate measures will be taken positively to prevent the recurrence of a similar relegated [ regrettable? ] incident as that of today. 3. In case of the occurrence of such a regrettable incident as that of today in future, the Japanese forces will adopt appropriate actions independently assuming that the Shanghai municipal police authorities have no power to maintain peace and order. 4. The Japanese forces will adopt appropriate measures independently in making searches and arrests should the policing on the part of the Shanghai municipal police be considered unsatisfactory”. The Commissioner of Police stated he could make no agreements but that he could bring the contents of the memorandum to the attention of the Council. He endorsed the memorandum as follows: “I have read and understood the above and will bring the contents to the notice of the Council. So far as foreign troops are concerned, every effort will be made to prevent a similar incident.” 2. The Municipal Council is preparing a communication to the Senior Consul reporting the events of yesterday and requesting the consideration and action of the interested foreign consuls. The Senior Consul is expected to summon a meeting as soon as the communication is received. Developments will be reported promptly. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11456: Telegram [Document 842] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 4, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 4—2:20 p.m.] 1087. Reference Nanking’s telegram 944, November 22, 10 p.m., concerning safety zone at Nanking. Japanese Ambassador through his Consul General has requested that the following observations be communicated to American Ambassador as prepared by Japanese authorities concerned after serious consideration of the proposal of the international community in Nanking: “1. In view of the fact that the suggested area is located within the well fortified rampart of Nanking and is fairly extensive and that there exist within its perimeter no natural vantage grounds or artificial structures by means of which communication can effectively be cut off whenever necessity arise it is considered necessary that sufficient powers, material or otherwise have to be vested in the hands of the supporters of the safety plan zone in order to check effectively the entry of Chinese armed troops which may in the event of hostilities breaking out nearby try to take shelter within the zone or utilize it for military purpose. 2. It must also be pointed out that in and around the said area there exist Chinese military establishments and that there are places in and around the said area that can hardly be considered to be left unused by the Chinese troops in case fighting will break out in Nanking in future. 3. Taking the foregoing into consideration the Japanese authorities entertain apprehension that even though the Chinese authorities had accepted the proposal under review sufficient guarantee could hardly be obtained in the event of fighting occurring in the city of Nanking for entirely preventing Chinese troops from entering into the zone or utilizing it for military purposes. 4. Under these circumstances the Japanese authorities while fully appreciating the lofty motive of the sponsors of the proposal in question are not in a position to give an undertaking that the said area will not be either bombed or bombarded. 5. It may be taken for granted, however, that the Japanese forces have no intentions whatever to attack such places as are not utilized by Chinese troops for military purposes or such areas where the Chinese troops have not established their military works and establishment and where there are no Chinese troops stationed.” Repeated to Hankow, Nanking, Peiping, Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11461: Telegram [Document 843] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 4, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 4—4:35 p.m.] 595. Department’s 327, December 3, 4 p.m. 1. The procedure in Japan with regard to declaration of war is that action is initiated by the Government but the instrument is signed and promulgated by the Emperor only upon the advice of the Privy Council. Probably only a very restricted circle would know of any such decision in the present instance if and when made by the Government but we hope through personal contacts in various quarters to be informed if and when the Privy Council has the matter under consideration. 2. It is not a Japanese trait to take decisions hastily. 3. Although Japan is aware that neither the League nor the Nine Power Treaty nations are eager to take coercive measures against Japan, the Japanese Government is reluctant as I have reason to believe to create a further issue with the League without good reason. We believe that unless conditions arise which would materially impede the successful attainment of Japanese objectives in China, such as the continuous flow of arms and munitions to China from abroad in substantially large quantities or the supply of foreign credits to China or some other form of material assistance to China, the Japanese Government will endeavor to avoid placing the League in a position where its member nations would have automatically to apply economic sanctions or overtly proclaim its impotence. 4. My British colleague has reported to his Government that the decision as to a declaration of war will depend on the amount of arms and munitions brought into China and he tells me that the flow of such arms and munitions from Hong Kong is steadily increasing. We have agreed promptly to exchange such information as may come to us. 5. Another informant in close touch with Japanese naval officers considers a declaration of war “almost inevitable” and states that those officials who wish to avoid trouble with Great Britain are “fast losing ground.” While the navy, in the event of a declaration of war, fully intends to exercise the procedure of visit and search of all vessels entering Hong Kong, naval officers are convinced that England is in no position to do anything about it. The foregoing obviously represents certain naval views. 6. We have had this matter under close observation from the very beginning (see our 509, November 2, 2 p.m.). Since that time rumors have been current that the Japanese Government has reached an affirmative decision on this matter to be effective as of various dates. The report mentioned in the Department’s 315, November 24, 6 p.m., is a case in point. These dates have come and gone without a declaration of war. We are continuing to watch for developments and we shall not fail to inform the Department as soon as any significant indication is observed. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11462: Telegram [Document 844] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 4, 1937—10 p.m. [Received December 4—4 p.m.] 596. 1. My British colleague proposes to cable his Government along the following lines: Japan is clearly beginning to feel the need of foreign capital for requirements in China, in Manchuria and at home; Japanese industrialists are now approaching American financial interests, notably through Aikawa of Nippon Sang Yo. The prolongation of hostilities would be encouraged by any success in obtaining such credits in England, France or the United States while at the same time our chances of exercising moderating influence in the final settlement would be diminished. On the other hand, an important factor in keeping responsible Japanese industrial and financial circles anxious for our good will is the hope of obtaining economic assistance after the settlement. The cause of a favorable settlement would therefore be served if an identical line with regard to Japanese requests for financial assistance in any form could be taken by the three Governments concerned. The best answer to any such approaches is to reply that everything must depend upon the terms of peace. 2. Craigie has written me privately and confidentially asking whether I would consider sending a telegram to my Government along similar lines. I have told him orally of the position of our Government concerning foreign loans and the difficulty of legally controlling their issuance. Furthermore, I have pointed out the inherent weakness of his proposal, namely that if we were to make economic assistance conditional upon favorable terms of peace and if favorable terms were then granted, we would, at least by implication, have committed ourselves to rendering such assistance. I indicated my belief that the American Government would not be willing to take such a position. I also expressed my doubt as to whether American financial interests would be disposed to provide capital for Japan under present conditions. 79 Grew 79 On December 7 the Ambassador reported that the French Ambassador had cabled his Government in general agreement with his British colleague (793.94/11501). The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11471: Telegram [Document 845] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 5, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 5—6:50 a.m.] 1089. Reference my number 1086 of December 4, 4 p.m. Secretary of the Municipal Council informs me by telephone this morning that last evening the Japanese Consul General talked with Commissioner of Police saying that the memorandum had been drawn up by junior officers, that General Matsui and he were considering withdrawing the memorandum and that he hoped if the Commissioner had not reported the memorandum to the Council he would withhold it. Commissioner replied that he had already reported the memorandum to the Council. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11458: Telegram [Document 846] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 5—6:50 a.m.] 1090. Reference my 1086, December 4, 4 p.m. Shanghai Municipal Council released statement to the press last evening that no agreement was entered into on night of December 3d by the Commissioner of Police and Japanese military representatives, that a document was drawn up by Japanese officers setting out the points made by Japanese military representative in conversation he had with the Commissioner, that the Commissioner emphasized he had no authority to enter into any agreement and in order to make it clear that the document did not purport to be an agreement he indorsed it to the effect that he had read and understood the document and would bring its contents to the notice of the Council, and that the Commissioner of Police emphasized that he could make no agreement with regard to the passage of Japanese troops through the International Settlement. The press release adds that the Council desires it to be known that its representatives had previous to the parade stressed to the Japanese authorities the inadvisability of holding such a parade at the present time. The statement concludes that the Council has made a full report to the Senior Consul of the occurrences which took place on December 3d. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11459: Telegram [Document 847] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 5, 1937—noon. [Received December 5—10:35 a.m.] 1091. Following is text of confidential report dated December 4th submitted to the Shanghai Municipal Council by the Commissioner of Police: “On the evening of yesterday, 3d December, at about 5:45 p.m., I proceeded with Mr. Aiers, D. C. (Deputy Commissioner) to a shop on Nanking Road near Kwangsi Road where the Japanese Military had established a temporary office, and there I met Colonel Kusumoto, Assistant Military Attaché to the Japanese Embassy. Colonel Kusumoto having cleared the room of all but Japanese military officers and my own officers including Mr. Young, D. C, through Mr. Uyehara, D. C. (Japanese), acting interpreter, made following statement: Speaking for General Matsui, he intimated that the Japanese military authorities took a serious view of an incident in which a foreigner at Szechuan Road had broken a Japanese flag and considered that the police were responsible for not preventing such incidents. He further stated that Japanese military, being now in occupation of the territory surrounding Shanghai, had the right to move troops through the Settlement and would do so again without notice. He then requested a guarantee that such an incident as the bomb throwing would not occur again. I informed him that I could not give such a guarantee, but was prepared to guarantee that the police would do their best to prevent such incidents. He then stated that if such incidents occur again, the Japanese military authorities would consider that the police were not capable of maintaining order and would take such appropriate action as they wished. Having made this statement, he informed me that the Japanese military troops would be withdrawn, and asked for protection for them on their way out of the Settlement, and requested us to provide means of conveyance. This was arranged. In the course of the next 2 hours they prepared some document in Japanese and English which they eventually expressed a desire that I should sign. I read the document, which purported to be a memorandum of the conversation. I made it clear that I would only sign it as such and that I could not sign any agreement that Japanese troops could pass through the Settlement. I was assured that they understood the limit of my authority and that the document was merely a memorandum of our conversation which was required for record purposes. To make my position clear, I endorsed on the copy a statement to the effect that I had read and understood what was written, and that I would bring the contents to the notice of the Council, and that as far as the police were concerned, every effort would be made to prevent a similar incident. This document having been signed, Japanese military withdrew at about 2:40 p.m., and Nanking Road was open for traffic by 9 p.m., normal police duties being established. I would suggest that the Council take into serious consideration announcement by the Japanese military representatives that the Japanese troops would march through the Settlement in future unannounced and if any incident happened they would take appropriate action they considered necessary. It is impossible for the police to carry out their normal duties under such circumstances, and it is also not in their power to prevent the Japanese military authorities doing what they announce they intend to do. If it is to be made possible for the police to function satisfactorily, this question must be checkmated by higher authorities immediately, if the interests of the Settlement are not to suffer.” Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11481: Telegram [Document 848] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 5, 1937—1 p.m. [Received 7:30 p.m.] 1092. Following is substantially full copy of letter from Chairman Municipal Council to Senior Consul. Omissions are unessential. “Although the Council did not receive information until the morning of December 2 that the Japanese forces proposed to parade through the Settlement, it had been made known to the Council for some time past that the Japanese military had in contemplation the project of marching Japanese troops along the Bund. On each occasion that this project was discussed with the Japanese authorities the Council’s representatives stressed the inadvisability of Japanese troops entering at the present time that part of the Settlement which lies south of the Soochow Creek. It was considered that while the Council has of course neither the right nor the power to object on legal grounds to the passage [of] foreign forces through the International Settlement, nevertheless, the passage of Japanese armed troops through the Settlement at the present time would cause grave embarrassment to the Settlement authorities and place a grave strain upon the municipal police. It was emphasized that with a large Chinese population having still in their minds the recent local hostilities and with an unprecedented number of destitute persons and refugees in the Settlement, it was quite impossible for the municipal police though taking every possible precaution, ordinarily [not to?] feel that a march by Japanese troops was likely to result in an unfortunate incident which would tend to disturb peace and order and the confidence of a peaceful population. I have previously stated that it was only on Thursday, December 2, that the Council received information of the course that the Japanese authorities intended to take on Friday. I myself personally again emphasized to the Japanese Consul General the Council’s view as to the inadvisability of the march which the Japanese military authorities proposed. As you are aware, the Commissioner of Police immediately upon receiving information as to the proposed march instituted special police measures. (Omission). Nothing was left undone which could have been done to prevent the type of incident which the Council feared. (Omission). The Japanese column entered the Settlement at 11 a.m. and continued along the prescribed route without any incident until the second battalion was passing Kwangsi Road. (Omission). At that moment an unknown man dressed in foreign style clothing attempted to pass the police cordon on Kwangsi Road at a point approximately 30 yards south of Nanking Road. He was stopped by a Chinese police constable on duty and told to go back. The man nodded his head but immediately turned to the right and threw a parcel wrapped in a newspaper which he carried in his right hand. Fearing that he had thrown a dangerous missile, the Chinese police constable drew his pistol and loaded. Hearing an explosion he opened fire on the thrower who was attempting to run back through the crowd. The man fell to the ground wounded. (Omission). The missile was a bomb of some sort and exploded on the north side of the marching column. Three Japanese soldiers, one Japanese civilian, one foreign police officer and one Chinese police constable were wounded. As far as is at present known none of the wounds were serious. The marching column halted and deployed, a number loading their rifles ready for action. After about 10 minutes the column re-formed and had started moving when a Japanese sentry who had taken up his position on Kwangsi Road fired a shot at a civilian who was looking out of a window of the Sun Sun Company Building causing a further halt of the column. No one was injured in the building by the shot. After a few more minutes the column again started marching and crossed the Garden Bridge without further incident. A party of Japanese military remained behind and took command of the area. After some delay the police were allowed to proceed with their investigation into the incident but were not allowed to touch the body and were denied full freedom of action, the Japanese military proceeding with an independent investigation. All traffic on Nanking Road was stopped and by 5 o’clock in the evening the Japanese military had thrown a cordon around the area bounded by Shansi Road, Kiukiang Road, Yu Ya Ching Road and Tientsin Road and also extended up Bubbling Well Road as far as Park Road. In view of its importance and in view of misleading statements which have been issued in relation to it the facts of the interview which took place subsequently between the Commissioner of Police and the Assistant Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy are set out in the Commissioner’s own words in a copy of a report made by him to the… 80 Council. I have attached to Commissioner’s report a copy of the document which we handed to Commissioner and which he endorsed (these have been telegraphed separately in my No. 1091 81 and No. 1086 82 ). While not of course questioning the fact that it was natural for the Japanese military to take immediate precautionary steps on the occurence of the regrettable incident of the bomb throwing I would stress the fact that there would appear to have been no good reason for continuing presence of Japanese troops for a period of about 8 hours in a crowded part of the Settlement. The troops in question hampered the police in performing their legitimate functions and their continued presence caused alarm and lack of confidence among the civilian population of the Settlement. I venture to express the hope that the interested Consuls may think fit to remonstrate with the Japanese authorities in regard to this aspect of the matter. It is the wish of the Council to place the full facts of the occurence under discussion before interested Consuls and to request them through you to take such steps as they may think proper in regard thereto.” The Senior Consul is asking the interested Consuls to meet with him tomorrow afternoon. Gauss 80 Omission indicated in the original. 81 December 5, noon, p. 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 846 and Doc. 847 ] . 82 December 4, 4 p.m., p. 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11464: Telegram [Document 849] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 5, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 5—6:30 a.m.] 598. Our 595, December 4, 8 p.m. 1. The papers this morning state that conferences between the Government and Imperial Headquarters will take place to decide upon a matter of “high national policy” to be made effective upon the capture of Nanking which is expected to occur before the end of the year. Some papers report that the policy under reference is the question of canceling Japan’s recognition of the Chinese Government while others say that it is the question of issuing a declaration of war. 2. The opinion is generally held among Japanese who have access in varying degrees to official despatches and among Chinese experts that notwithstanding acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the mediatory efforts of Trautmann the Chinese Government is not as yet in any mood to make peace. As they see it the Chinese Government has given its assent to German effort at mediation in order first, to stimulate rivalry between the Fascist nations and the democratic nations and eventually to secure positive intervention on the side of China by the latter group. The estimate of these Japanese is that China is relying on a war of endurance but they believe that such strategy will prove illusory unless foreign help in the form of war supplies continues. 3. There have been persistent suggestions that the removal of the Chinese Government to remote points in the interior has reduced the status of that Government to that of a local regime and that therefore recognition should be withdrawn. However, arguments of this kind would usually be a prelude to the setting up of some new Chinese regime under Japanese control and would not necessarily go to make a case for a declaration for war. 4. In our view the capture of Nanking will probably be signalized by promulgation of some new Japanese policy. That policy may take the form of a declaration of war or the setting up of a new Chinese regime or both. Repeated to Peiping and [ for? ] relay to Ambassador Johnson. 83 Grew 83 Final paragraph added on instruction of the Ambassador in Japan in his unnumbered telegram received December 6, 6 a.m. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11455: Telegram [Document 850] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , December 5, 1937—2 p.m. 615. Your 1086, December 4, 4 p.m. The Department notes that the senior consul is expected to summon a meeting as soon as a communication is received from the Municipal Council. We feel that the memorandum of Colonel Kusumoto is of such a nature and above all of such a tone affecting as it does all foreign interests in the Settlement that the occasion calls for a joint statement on the part of the interested consuls in Shanghai. We believe that such a statement should be dispassionate but basic and firm; that it should recite precedent and regulation in respect to each of the matters dealt with in the Japanese memorandum; that it should point out the effect upon the orderly functioning of the Settlement which the carrying out by the Japanese of the measures proposed would have; that it should emphasize the risk to all concerned of action provocative of disturbance in the Settlement; that it should point out that the Municipal Council has maintained order in the past and presumably can do so in the future unless disorder is invited through unwise action. In considering the joint statement you might keep in mind the advisability of a declaration to the effect that such action as is suggested by the Japanese memorandum cannot be justified by local conditions and gives rise to the presumption that the Japanese authorities are acting with the deliberate intention of setting aside the local administration and setting themselves up as complete administrators of the Settlement. Obviously the phraseology of such a statement would have to be carefully scrutinized. You will of course feel free to exercise your good judgment as to the advisability and form of such a declaration. It is our thought that such a joint statement would be presented at Shanghai but that further each consul should transmit it to his government with the suggestion that it be brought to the attention of the Japanese Government at Tokyo with such supporting recommendations as each government desires. In the event that the interested consuls should not adopt such a statement I desire to have from you a statement covering the points mentioned above for my guidance in considering the question of representations by this Government to Tokyo. Hull The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11487: Telegram [Document 851] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 6, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 2 p.m.] 999. Embassy’s 986, December 3, 11 a.m., and previous. 1. This morning Chiang Kai Shek’s adviser, Donald, gave Mc-Hugh 84 and me confidentially as his estimate of present situation the following (which, because Donald’s position with General and Mrs. Chiang is in the nature of a member of the family, may be considered as closely resembling their personal opinion): 2. The Chinese now have no means of receiving supplies to recreate their army and air force. American planes purchased cannot reach China; the French will not permit planes and other war materials purchased from Germany to proceed through Indochina or permit French planes to be set up there and flown into China; planes purchased in England cannot be set up in Hong Kong. With no material help from the powers in the way of necessary military supplies peace negotiations are inevitable. Chiang’s position is that he himself will not enter into negotiations but will leave them to the so-called pro-Japanese groups in the Government and he resigned the Presidency of the Executive Yuan some time ago to avoid responsibility of negotiations. Among matters mentioned by Trautmann during his visit here December 1–2 were Japanese desires to have Wang Ching Wei and Chang Chun prominent in the Chinese Government and Ho Ying Chin head of the army. Peace negotiations will begin shortly in Hankow between Japanese and interested Chinese officials and a new Chinese Government along lines desired by the Japanese will emerge. The Japanese want peace because they fear they cannot continue indefinitely to support large scale hostilities. Soviet Russia will not join with China unless attacked by Japan. China is helpless and China as an independent nation is finished. 3. It has been impression of the Embassy here that what hopes have remained to the Chinese were centered in a war of attrition. Up to a week ago we knew from McHugh’s daily association with Donald that hopes of recreating the Chinese air force and building up the shattered Chinese armies were still high. The arrival of the Soviet planes with Soviet flying and other personnel perhaps created an overconfidence; those planes failed to fulfill expectations, and hopes of Chinese military success on land and in the air have been dissipated. We have been unable to perceive any indication that definite plans have been adopted for the forming of any real defense line west of Nanking. To us it seems that the Generalissimo has come to realize that what remains of China under his control will be denied the source of supply from the south on which he had confidently counted for continued resistance in the west. There have been numerous indications and assurance from Donald up to now that Chiang expected to build a new China in the west. He now apparently concedes that he faces isolation and that a Chinese Government administering Szechuen, Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, (Kwangtung is vulnerable to the Japanese) perhaps parts of Kiangsi and Fukien and the distant wastes of Kansu cannot successfully pretend to be the Government of China and that the situation is hopeless for him and his cause. 4. Sent Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping, please repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson 84 Capt. James M. McHugh, U. S. M. C, Assistant Naval Attaché in China. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11471: Telegram [Document 852] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , December 6, 1937—1 p.m. 617. Your 1089, December 5, 10 a.m., just received. If the Japanese are willing to withdraw the memorandum would it not be practicable for the Commissioner of Police to withdraw his report to the Municipal Council. Hull The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11479: Telegram [Document 853] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 6, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 6—10:52 a.m.] 1002. Your 1087, December 4, 6 p.m. 84a On behalf of the Embassy please communicate as soon as possible to Japanese Ambassador following message from International Committee. “1. The International Committee has received the reply of the Japanese authorities and has duly noted the same. The Chinese authorities are already in process of reducing the number of military establishments and men within the area of the zone, and the Committee is therefore proceeding with the demarcation of boundaries, marking them with flags bearing as a symbol a red cross on a white background, the cross being surrounded by a circle to indicate the idea of a zone. The corners of the zone will be marked with the same symbol on a large sheet spread horizontally on the ground or roofs of buildings. 2. In view of the progressive removing of such Chinese military elements as still remain in the area of the safety zone, and in view of the need and anxieties of the thousands of refugees and other civilians pressing into the zone, the International Committee trust that the Japanese authorities will refrain from bombing or otherwise attacking the area during this period of active preparation of the zone, as well as during the latter period of complete fulfillment of the arrangements for the safety zone. The International Committee will press forward with its recognized tasks as rapidly as possible. 3. The International Committee is pleased to note the assurance contained in the 5th paragraph of the reply of the Japanese authorities, which reads as follows: ‘It may be taken for granted however that the Japanese forces have no intention whatever to attack such places as are not utilized by Chinese troops for military purposes or such areas where the Chinese troops have not established their military works and establishments and where there are no Chinese troops stationed’. 4. The International Committee informs the Japanese authorities that some 15 or 20 foreign nationals are standing by to aid in the administration of the zone. The continued presence of these foreign nationals within the city is evidence of their confidence in the good faith of both the Chinese and Japanese authorities in regard to the zone, and also of the International Committee’s firm intention to see that arrangements for the zone are fully carried out. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman”. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Hankow, Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo for the Ambassador. Atcheson 84a Reference is evidently to telegram No. 1087 from the Consul General at Shanghai, which was repeated to Nanking. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11492: Telegram [Document 854] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 6, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 5:35 p.m.] 1702. We were told this morning by the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office that the French representative at Hankow reported 3 days ago that he had been informed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry there that the Chinese Government “had accepted the German offer of a kind of mediation”. The Foreign Office understands that the Chinese say that the Germans took the initiative in making the offer while the Germans and Japanese say that the Chinese asked that the offer be made. The Foreign Office has no information concerning the terms of any proposals which may have been submitted to the Chinese by the Germans nor concerning the Chinese reaction to any proposals which may have been made. Hoppenot expressed the opinion that it would be impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to accept proposals of the nature which the Japanese are certain to make. He believes that about all that the Chinese would find it possible to accept would be an armistice and an agreement to withdraw troops from certain areas while the Japanese are certain to insist among other things upon recognition of Manchukuo. We were shown a memorandum from the Chinese Embassy to the French Government dated November 27 which refers to conversations between the Chinese delegation at Brussels and other delegations and submits a list of war material (aeroplanes, artillery, tanks, trucks, et cetera) required by the Chinese Government as well as a request for a credit of 100,000,000 pounds to be granted by the United States, England, and France, the credit to be guaranteed by a pledge of customs and salt revenues and by the oil monopoly in China. The Foreign Office has consulted with the British concerning the reply to be made to this request and the British have said that it is simply a question of how to say “no” in the most appropriate and courteous manner. This is also the view of the Foreign Office which assumes that the United States Government will take the same line in its reply. Hoppenot referred to the visit of Viscount Ishii saying that he arrived in Paris from Rome on December 4, was leaving today for London and would return to Paris in about 2 weeks or so. Appointments had been arranged for Ishii to call today on President Lebrun and on Premier Chautemps but these appointments had been canceled at Ishii’s request who explained that he wished to visit London first. French officials according to Hoppenot “will listen courteously” to what Ishii has to say. Bullitt The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11486: Telegram [Document 855] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 6, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 6—2:40 p.m.] 1097. Reference my number 1086, December 4, 4 p.m. and your 615, December 5, 2 p.m. 1. Interested Consuls met this afternoon with the Senior Consul who stated that immediately upon receipt of the letter from the Municipal Council he saw the Japanese Consul General who assured him that the Japanese wish to consider the whole incident closed and he should “take no notice” of the memorandum of Colonel Kusumoto. Italian Consul General stated he is told by the Japanese Consul General that the latter had succeeded in persuading the military to drop the memorandum and that it may be considered “null and void”. 2. I pointed out that the memorandum having been reported to us officially must be regarded seriously until we are definitely assured that it is withdrawn with the assent of the military. It was finally agreed that the Senior Consul should communicate to the Japanese Consul General by memorandum the pertinent portions of the letter from the Chairman of the Municipal Council and invite the Japanese Consul General to meet with his interested colleagues to consider the matter when the Japanese Consul General will have an opportunity to make any declaration of withdrawal of the memorandum on behalf of the military and such declaration may be recorded in the minutes. This will leave the interested Consuls free to take further action if deemed necessary. The Japanese Consul General has always shown complete willingness to meet with his colleagues and it is anticipated that he will be willing to do so to discuss this matter. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11493: Telegram [Document 856] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 6, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 6—4 p.m.] 1098. I learn this evening from officials of the Municipal Council, and it is also reported in the press, that at about 7 o’clock this morning Japanese police or gendarmerie accompanied by Japanese in plain clothes drove in motor cars to the Great Eastern Hotel in the Wing On Building on Nanking Road, entered the hotel and arrested three Chinese men and one Chinese woman, took them by motor car to Hongkew, there questioned them for about an hour, and finally released them and sent them back to the hotel. The Japanese did not communicate with or notify the municipal police. 2. It would seem that the Japanese are taking action exactly in accordance with the 4th point of the memorandum handed to the Commissioner of Police by Colonel Kusumoto as reported in my number 1086, December 4, 4 p.m. 3. The Council will report the matter to the Senior Consul. Council officials have inquired of me whether it would be possible to have patrols of foreign troops within the Settlement to prevent such incidents. I have replied that I do not believe such use of American troops would be approved. 85 Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss 85 The Secretary of State replied in telegram No. 619, December 7, 11 a.m., agreeing that “such a use of American Marines is not within the purview of the mission of those troops.” The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11494: Telegram [Document 857] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 7, 1937—7 a.m. [Received December 6—11:10 p.m.] 1004. General and Mrs. Chiang Kai Shek left at 6 this morning by plane for the interior. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Atcheson The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/397: Telegram [Document 858] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 7, 1937—noon. [Received December 7—11:27 a.m.] 1009. 1. My British and German colleagues and I have decided that, barring some developments which may precipitate our action, Embassy staffs including ourselves will go aboard our ships tomorrow evening, returning ashore next day if that is feasible. (Our Italian colleague, is as reported, already aboard the U.S.S. Panay .) We are not informing the press until we actually leave. Tomorrow we shall inform the Chinese authorities that we are sleeping aboard but expect to be at our offices during daytime. 2. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Atcheson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11512: Telegram [Document 859] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 7, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 7—1:06 p.m.] 1101. Reference my No. 1098, December 6, 7 p.m. According to the Japanese Domei news service, the Japanese military spokesman at press conference this morning stated that urgent necessity dictated by military requirements had caused the military police to make the arrest of the persons concerned who were suspected of being involved in a plot threatening the security of the Japanese forces and that when questioning revealed they were innocent they were released. The spokesman declared that “We did not intend to challenge or to deny the right of the Shanghai Municipal Police to police the International Settlement” and “we hope that there will be no further need for us to take such action if the Shanghai Municipal Police take the necessary steps”. 2. Municipal Council has reported the incident to the Senior Consul who is seeing the Japanese Consul General today. Notwithstanding all assurances, we may expect continuance of such measures so long as the Japanese military remain in Shanghai. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11500: Telegram [Document 860] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 7—7:18 a.m.] 603. A member of the Foreign Office commenting on press reports mentioned in paragraph 1 of our 598, December 5, 2 p.m., states confidentially that the Foreign Office has no official knowledge of any plan to withdraw recognition of Chinese Government. Our informant says that he understands that the press reports originated either at the War Office or with persons close to the Prime Minister and that, therefore, they have “some significance”. His comment was that any such plan would require careful consideration of a number of delicate problems and that the Foreign Office has not thus far made any such study. Repeated to Peiping for relay to Ambassador Johnson. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.72/65: Telegram [Document 861] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 7—1:45 p.m.] 21. Shanghai’s 1059, December 1, midnight. 86 In a communication of December 4 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested against Japanese action in seizing telegraph stations and Bureau of International Telegraphs at Shanghai and in appointing censors to function therein; the Ministry protested also the action of the Municipal Council in failing to prevent such Japanese action and in actually cooperating with the Japanese. I shall reply to this communication merely by saying that its contents have been brought to the attention of the American Consul General at Shanghai. Sent to Shanghai and Peiping. Johnson 86 Not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 793.94/11548 [Document 862] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 7, 1937. The Ambassador of China 87 came in upon his own request. I inquired about conditions and developments in China, and he replied that they were quite bad and that the Chinese Army, after leaving Shanghai, had not been able to rally and make a firm stand, even when it got back in front of Nanking; that it was probably not the purpose to defend Nanking seriously on account of the disadvantageous surroundings. The Ambassador then said that China was somewhat like Belgium in the World War, insofar as the friendly interest and cooperative attitude of the other nations were concerned, and that his Government, being desirous of fighting on for an indefinite time, was extremely interested to ascertain what is the general attitude of the nations towards helping China in the event she undertakes to fight on and to resist to the last. I replied that, frankly, I had nothing new on that subject, and added that the Ambassador, of course, knew the state of mind of the people of this country towards the situation in China, but that I could not say anything new on the other subject to which his chief inquiry related. He said that the Generalissimo was not disposed to make peace for one reason that it would simply be giving that much away instead of having it taken by force, and that on the other hand the Japanese were very desirous of peace. I asked him whether the German Ambassador, who visited the Generalissimo on this mission, knew or conveyed any terms for the Japanese, and he replied that the Ambassador did not know nor convey the Japanese terms to the Generalissimo; that he was simply seeking a preliminary step on the part of China which would lead to negotiations. The Ambassador said that the Generalissimo had left Nanking and would probably go some three hundred miles to a place not in the direction of Hankow, somewhere on a branch of the Yangtze River. He stated that the Chinese troops were in better shape than the present surface appearance of the situation in front of or about Nanking would indicate, and that they could and probably would make a better showing beyond Nanking. The Ambassador again came back to the question of supplies and armaments, stating and reemphasizing that it was a matter of great difficulty for resistance of the guerilla type without reasonable supplies. He stated that, officially, the French Road through Indo-China prohibited transportation of supplies, but that, unofficially, they were permitting some things to go over the road. He said that the British had done fairly well in facilitating the purchase and transportation of military supplies to China. The Ambassador frequently came back to the question of aid if the fighting were to go on as the Generalissimo desired it to go on. I again said to him that there had been no new developments on that subject since our previous conversations. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 87 Chengting T. Wang. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) 793.94/11181: Telegram [Document 863] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) Washington , December 7, 1937—7 p.m. 623. Your 984, November 18, 7 p.m., second paragraph. We note from your telegram under reference that the Shanghai Volunteer Corps has been demobilized and that the foreign defense sectors are being very lightly held, and would appreciate being informed what, if any, changes have occurred in regard to these matters since the sending of your telegram under reference. Are the American and other foreign forces on duty throughout their respective sectors or only in certain portions thereof? Do they maintain patrols and if so where? Hull The Navy Department to the Department of State 793.94/11639 [Document 864] The Navy Department to the Department of State 88 undated The following information has been received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet as of 11:35 p.m., under date of 7 December, 1937, and was also sent for information to the American Ambassadors to Japan and China: Because of fairness and neutrality shown, high Japanese officials have suggested suitability of the United States as mediator in present conflict[;] consider it inadvisable for the United States to accept this position because of the lack of basis for any settlement. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang left Nanking by plane today. The Japanese are concerned over future developments since there is no organized government at Nanking with which to deal. It is believed that no Chinese of any standing or ability will treat with the Japanese because of the nation wide feeling against them. 88 Received in the Department on December 8. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 740.00/238½ [Document 865] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] December 8, 1937. The British Ambassador called to see me this morning and left with me a memorandum which his Government had instructed him to communicate, covering the conversations between Hitler and Lord Halifax 89 and the recent conversations held in London between the British Government and the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. 90 I expressed to the Ambassador my appreciation of the information so given me which I assured him would be very helpful to this Government. The Ambassador then said that he had two matters he would like to take up with me. The first was the continued insistence on the part of the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, that the Japanese Government was in a receptive frame of mind towards the utilization of good offices of the United States and Great Britain between China and Japan. The Ambassador said that in the opinion of his Government this possibility had died down and there was nothing immediate, but that he would like to have an expression of opinion from the Department with regard to Sir Robert Craigie’s insistence that if and when good offices might be considered, the two Governments should not at the outset state to the Japanese Government that they would refuse to transmit to the Chinese Government any peace proposals other than proposals strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. According to Sir Ronald Lindsay, Mr. Grew had indicated to Sir Robert Craigie that he himself believed that, for reasons of expediency, a preliminary flat statement that the two Governments would refuse to transmit any proposals other than those in accordance with the Nine Power Treaty might not be necessary. In reply I said to Sir Ronald Lindsay that my recollection was very clear that, in reporting upon conversations of this character which he had had with Sir Robert Craigie, Mr. Grew had indicated plainly that he felt it would be inadmissible for the two Governments to transmit peace proposals which were in any way counter to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and that he had felt that it would be essential for this position to be made clear to the Japanese Government. I said that I felt that the position of this Government in that regard had already been made clear to the British Government, and that I considered it inconceivable that either the British Government or the United States Government would be willing to act as intermediaries in the reaching of a peace between China and Japan of a character contrary to the principles embodied in the Nine Power Treaty. The British Ambassador reaffirmed my prior understanding that the position of his Government was entirely that of the Government of the United States in this matter, but that, as a practical matter and for reasons of expediency, it might be difficult for the Japanese Foreign Office to procure the assent of the Japanese Army and Navy to the good offices of the United States and Great Britain if at the outset the two Governments came out with a flat and public statement to the effect that they would not transmit any proposals other than those consistent with the Nine Power Treaty provisions. I said to the Ambassador that, in a negotiation of that character, the precise position to be taken by the Governments concerned would, of course, depend upon conditions as they existed at that particular moment, but that it seemed to me that the only sound position for Great Britain and the United States to take in such eventuality was to make their position morally secure and perfectly plain to the two parties to the conflict from the outset. The Ambassador said that the second point which he wished to take up with me was another suggestion made by Sir Robert Craigie with regard to an agreement on the part of the British, French and United States Governments that they would prohibit any financing of Japan by their respective financial interests. I said to the Ambassador that I was already familiar with this suggestion which had been proffered, and that I felt sure it was not necessary for me to make it clear to him that the United States Government in this question had no such power as that held by the British Government. I said that the British Government already had in force an embargo on loans by British interests outside of the Empire unless such loans had received the approval of the British Government. I stated that the United States Government had no such power and that, furthermore, he knew that it was the policy of this Administration in Washington to refuse either to approve or disapprove financing by private interests. For these reasons, it was impossible for us to make any commitment in this regard. I said, however, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, private financial interests in the United States were not at present receptive to any financing of Japan and that, purely as a private opinion, it seemed to me very doubtful whether under present conditions that attitude would be modified. The Ambassador talked at some length with respect to the general situation in the Far East and the increasing difficulties of the British Government with regard thereto. He had no precise information to communicate and volunteered the information that he was without recent advice as to the situation in Spain. 91 He said, however, that his own Military Attaché had received word that the anticipated Rebel offensive in Spain would definitely not materialize this winter but would be postponed until the spring. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 89 British Lord Privy Seal. 90 See vol. i , pp. 183 ff. 91 See vol. i , pp. 215 ff. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11533: Telegram [Document 866] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 8, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 5:15 p.m.] 22. I saw Wang Chung Hui last evening. He stated that the Chinese Government was now awaiting information through official channels concerning Japanese reaction to German offer of good offices. He referred to the fact that he had seen a press report purporting to be a statement from the Japanese Foreign Office to the effect that Japan was prepared to accept mediation by a third power. Dr. Wang again referred to the fact that the Chinese felt that by accepting German offer of good offices they were not being unfaithful to the Nine Power Conference at Brussels which as he pointed out had adjourned without bringing about the negotiations which it had hoped to accomplish. He emphasized the fact that the Chinese would be glad to accept the good offices of any friendly power. Dr. Wang then put the following hypothetical question to me: “Suppose China negotiates with Japan and discovers that the terms which Japan seeks to impose are in violation of the terms of the Nine Power Treaty. What will the other powers party to the Nine Power Treaty do when China communicated this fact to them (as I infer China intends to do) and asks whether China should accept these terms or not?” I told Dr. Wang that obviously I was in no position to say what reply might be returned to such a query, and I agreed with him that in all likelihood Japanese terms would be such that they would in fact violate the principles of the Nine Power Treaty guaranteeing equality of treatment to the powers in China. Dr. Wang asked me for my estimate as to what other line the Japanese might follow upon the capture of Nanking. I told him that it was my guess that with the capture of Nanking the Japanese military would attempt to set up a regime amenable to its wishes either in Nanking or in Peiping; that it would enter into negotiations with that regime for a settlement of all outstanding questions along lines favorable to Japanese desires, and accept from that regime a mandate legalizing Japanese activities in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and other areas occupied by Japanese arms; that Japan might withdraw recognition from the National Chinese Government and treat that Government as an outlaw government and its armies as bandits in revolt against the established authority recognized by Japan. Dr. Wang concurs in this estimate. He stated that there was a difference of opinion between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy on the question of a declaration of war. He said that he had just been informed from Tokyo that it was intended to hold a Privy Council meeting in the presence of the Emperor today to decide whether Japan should declare war on China or not, and to decide the question of whether Japan should negotiate with the Chinese National Government. I stated that it was my belief the Japanese Army did not wish a declaration of war, as it felt freer to pursue its political purposes on the mainland without such declaration, and that a procedure such as I outlined above would obviate the necessity for any such declaration of war. Dr. Wang stated that he hoped within 2 or 3 days to have some information for me regarding the German exercise of good offices. The Chinese Government is obviously at the end of its power to offer too active and effective resistance to Japan, and is seriously considering the advisability of entering into negotiations immediately. There are, however, obvious difficulties in the way of any negotiations that might be acceptable to Japan. One of the Japanese demands will be cooperation against communism, and the present Chinese Government by its Non-Aggression Pact with Soviet Russia would find it embarrassing to enter into a discussion on the matter. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo. Johnson The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11537: Telegram [Document 867] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 8, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.] 1111. Department’s No. 623, December 7, 7 p.m. 1. No material changes have occurred since November 18. American forces have been occupying a reduced number of posts along the American perimeter with materially reduced personnel. Because of the adequacy of the Settlement police, patrols have been maintained only along the northern section of the perimeter and in the vicinity of the Japanese mills. Greatly reduced patrols have been maintained along the marine reserve line. 2. Two British forces have been maintaining all posts along their perimeter but withdrew from their reserve line. Patrols have been maintained throughout the sector because much of it is in the extra-Settlement roads area in which the Settlement police are not yet functioning. 3. French forces have been occupying all posts along their perimeter but with greatly reduced personnel, troops were withdrawn from the reserve line. French police have been maintaining patrols throughout the entire French sector. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11538: Telegram [Document 868] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 8, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 3:30 p.m.] 1112. Reference my 1105, December 7, 8 p.m. 92 1. At the meeting of the interested consular representatives this morning the Japanese Consul General stated in reference to the memorandum quoted in my 1086, December 4, 4 p.m. that when he learned of this document he had called on his military authorities and succeeded in having them say that the matter was settled. He added “We will not take any advantage of the incident which occurred that afternoon. We can treat it just as the Senior Consul has said, that is, just as if the conditions or demands were not presented at all.” 2. I endeavored to obtain a more satisfactory statement to the effect that the Japanese military acquiesced in or agreed to the declaration that the conditions or demands might be considered as not having been presented at all, but could get nothing further than the statement of the Japanese Consul General that he would take the responsibility for what he had said. 3. In the matter of the arrest of certain Chinese by Japanese gendarmes as reported in my 1098, December 6, 7 p.m., the Japanese Consul General stated that the Japanese gendarmes took action without consulting him, that there was some urgency as certain dangerous spies were reported to be plotting against the military authorities, and that he has been assured that this sort of thing will not occur again “so long as the municipal police will cooperate”. 4. The Japanese Consul General agreed at the meeting to a rough draft of release to the press but he has since indicated after consulting his military authorities that he cannot agree to any press release. 5. I do not regard the outcome of our efforts as entirely satisfactory but believe the Japanese Consul General is well disposed and that he has done all he can in the circumstances. The Japanese military of course will not publicly recede from any position they have taken. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss 92 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11526: Telegram [Document 869] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 8—9:41 a.m.] 23. A representative of a foreign Embassy stated this morning that a few days ago 42 Soviet planes arrived in Nanchang bringing about 100 Soviet flyers and other aviation personnel, also that about 50 Soviet flyers are in Hankow and a number of planes including an efficient pursuit plane. This information has not been confirmed but is regarded as probably reliable. Repeated to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11544: Telegram [Document 870] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 9, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 9—7:35 a.m.] 608. The Military Attaché was informed at the War Office yesterday that there is to be no change in the mission of the Japanese Army which is the destruction of Communistic and anti-Japanese forces in China and that no Chinese offer of capitulation which does not include the elimination of such forces and elements would be entertained. It is the belief of the Military Attaché that the Japanese Army opinion calls for continued military operations until this objective is reached and would not approve any settlement based on considerations of a purely political nature. Repeated to Peiping for relay to Ambassador Johnson. Grew The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson), at Nanking 124.93/403a: Telegram [Document 871] The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ), at Nanking Washington , December 9, 1937—5 p.m. 372. Your 1021, December 9, 10 a.m 93 You will of course keep in mind and be guided by the statement made in the Department’s 368, November 30, 2 p.m., to the effect that you and staff should not expose yourselves to imminent and serious danger. 94 Hull 93 Vol. iv , p. 392 . 94 For correspondence concerning the Japanese attack on the U. S. S. Panay , December 12, see ibid ., pp. 485 ff. The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11549: Telegram [Document 872] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 9, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 9—1:55 p.m.] 1026. For American Ambassador. “The International Committee has secured agreement of Defense Commissioner Tang Sheng Chih to the propositions embodied in the following telegrams: Telegram number 1: ‘The International Committee which has organized a safety zone in Nanking would respectfully make this further humanitarian proposal to the Chinese authorities, namely, that they should undertake not to carry on military operations within the walled city of Nanking, provided the International Committee can secure the agreement of the Japanese authorities not to attack the walled city. As practicable means of procedure, the International Committee proposes for the forces in the vicinity of Nanking a truce of 3 days, during which time the Japanese troops would maintain their present positions and the Chinese troops would withdraw from the walled city. International Committee would request, for the sake of the great number of civilians now endangered, the earliest possible reply to this proposal. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman’; Telegram number 2: ‘The International Committee which has organized a safety zone in Nanking would respectfully make this further humanitarian proposal to the Japanese authorities, namely, that they should undertake not to attack the walled city of Nanking provided the International Committee can secure the agreement of the Chinese authorities not to carry on military operations therein. As a practical means of procedure, the International Committee proposes for the forces in the vicinity of Nanking a truce of 3 days, during which time the Japanese troops would maintain their present positions and the Chinese troops would withdraw from the walled city. The International Committee would request, for the sake of the welfare of the great number of civilians now endangered, the earliest possible reply to this proposal. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman’. General Tang wishes us through you to communicate the first telegram to General Chiang Kai Shek. We are transmitting the second through Attaché of the Japanese authorities in Tokyo and Shanghai. Please inform the other Embassies of these proposals. The International Committee hopes the proposals may also have their endorsement. Speed essential. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman”. Sent to Hankow. Repeated to Shanghai, Peiping. Shanghai please communicate to Japanese Embassy and repeat to Tokyo. 95 Atcheson 95 The Consul General at Shanghai reported in telegram No. 1129, December 10, noon, that this was done (793.94/11568). The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11554: Telegram [Document 873] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 9, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 9—7:20 p.m.] 1125. Japanese Consul General at Shanghai has addressed me informally as follows: “I am writing to you to solicit your good offices in regard to the matter of Japanese property in Tsingtao. As you may be probably aware there are in Tsingtao particularly extensive Japanese interests in the form of investments in cotton mills and other property including public utility works and when Japanese residents in that port city were compelled to evacuate in August last as the result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities these interests were entrusted in the hands of the local Chinese authorities for safe custody. According to reliable authority emanating from Tsingtao recently, however, it is allegedly reported that the Chinese military authorities stationed there have made it known that in accordance with instructions from the higher command they intend to carry out a wholesale destruction of all the Japanese interests by systematically blowing up the Japanese cotton mills and other establishments. The report is naturally causing great anxiety as well as resentment among all the Japanese concerned and such action on the part of the Chinese authorities if actually resorted to will doubtless constitute a most unwarranted act of vandalism to civilian property which must be respected in all circumstances. Acting under instructions from my Government I wish to ask you to be so kind as to use your good influence to persuade through appropriate channels the Chinese authorities concerned to refrain from putting into effect their alleged intention. I shall deeply appreciate whatever step that you may be able to take in this matter and I am sure that any such action on your part may be had without prejudice to the policy maintained by your Government throughout the present hostilities.” I request that the Department issue any desired instructions to the Consul at Tsingtao to whom I am repeating this message and that I be informed what reply to return to the Japanese Consul General here. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tsingtao. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11559: Telegram [Document 874] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 10, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 10—6 a.m.] 24. Nanking’s 1026, December 9, 6 p.m. The following communication was sent to diplomatic missions represented in Hankow December 10, 11 a.m. “The American Ambassador at about 12 p.m. December 9 received a radio message from Mr. Atcheson, in charge of the Embassy at Nanking which was despatched at 6 o’clock and transmitted the text of two telegrams addressed by the International Committee in charge of the ‘safety zone’ at Nanking to the Japanese and Chinese authorities, respectively, making a proposal whereby fighting inside the walled city may be obviated and the probable death of many civilians avoided; the Committee asked that these messages be communicated through the agency of the American Embassies in Tokyo and Hankow to the authorities concerned. A copy of the radio message received from Mr. Atcheson is attached hereto for the information of the diplomatic missions represented in Hankow. Immediately on receipt of this message the American Embassy in Hankow delivered a copy of it to the appropriate Chinese authorities in Hankow and word was received from them this morning that the proposal has been laid before the highest military command and that when a reply should be received from them, it would be communicated immediately. Presumably the message to the Japanese authorities in Shanghai and Tokyo was similarly transmitted during the evening of December 9, 1937. It is to be noted that the International Committee solicits from the Embassies their support of the proposal in question. The American Ambassador, for his own part, has informed the Chinese authorities that the humanitarian proposal of the International Committee at Nanking meets with his approval and that he would be glad to see it put into force to the fullest extent consistent with plans adopted by the Chinese military command.” Sent to Nanking, repeated to Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Peiping repeat to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11556: Telegram [Document 875] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 10, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 10—6 a.m.] 25. My 24, December 10, 11 a.m. I have been informed orally but officially by the Foreign Office that the International Committee was mistaken in thinking that General Tang Sheng Chih had expressed approval of plan for 3 days truce and withdrawal of Chinese forces from the walled city of Nanking and I was further informed that General Chiang Kai Shek had stated he was not in position to accept that proposal. Sent to Nanking, repeated to Department, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat to Tokyo. Johnson Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 893.0146/598 [Document 876] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] December 10, 1937. I telephoned Admiral Leahy and told him that we had noted a press report from Shanghai to the effect that the San Diego Marines would be withdrawn from Shanghai next month on the Chaumont and that the remaining American Marines at Shanghai would also probably be withdrawn soon. I asked Admiral Leahy whether this report had come to his attention. He said that the Navy Department’s press officer had brought the report to his attention and that in view of the fact that the press report had already occasioned inquiry he had told the Navy Department’s press officer to inform inquirers orally that the Chaumont was going back to Shanghai in the course of its regular schedule; that the Chaumont was due back at Shanghai about the end of January; and that if at that time Admiral Yarnell should consider the situation such as no longer to require the services of the San Diego Marines, the San Diego Marines would be withdrawn. Admiral Leahy said that this statement accorded with the exact facts of the situation and that in view of the press report he felt that anything less than such a statement would not meet the situation. He inquired whether I agreed. I said that I should like to refer the matter to the Secretary. This I did. In so doing I informed the Secretary that the Navy Department press officer had already given the information along the lines indicated above to a press correspondent so that it was too late for us to do anything in the matter. The Secretary indicated that he had no objection to the action taken by the Navy Department. I asked Admiral Leahy by telephone to be so good as to get in touch with us when the time came for the Navy Department to give out a formal press release in regard to the withdrawal of the San Diego Marines from Shanghai. I said that we wished to safeguard against any statement which would imply that the Marines had been sent to Shanghai for “fighting” purposes. I said that as the Admiral knew it was our concept that the Marines had been sent to Shanghai for the purpose of protecting American nationals against dangers incident to disorders, particularly in respect to mob violence. Admiral Leahy said that he would get in touch with us in regard to any statement that the Navy Department might issue in regard to this matter. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/11538: Telegram [Document 877] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 10, 1937—6 p.m. 337. Shanghai’s No. 1112, December 8, 3 p.m. Unless you perceive objection, the Department desires that the Embassy approach the Foreign Office and with reference to previous representations made in connection with the march of Japanese troops through the International Settlement at Shanghai inform the Foreign Office that this Government has taken note of the statements made by the Japanese Consul General on December 8 at the meeting of the interested consular representatives and express the confidence of this Government that these statements and the attitude of the Japanese authorities as indicated in Shanghai’s telegram under reference would put an end to apprehensions regarding future occurrences of a nature likely to lead to consequences disturbing to the preservation of order in the International Settlement. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/11462: Telegram [Document 878] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 10, 1937—7 p.m. 338. Your 596, December 4, 10 p.m. 1. The position of our Government with respect to foreign loans as affecting the Far Eastern situation is as follows: ( a ) Should there be a declaration of war in the Far East and/or should the Neutrality Act be applied, it would become unlawful to make loans or credits to the belligerent governments or their agencies. ( b ) Except for the possible application of the Neutrality Act, the American Government has no legal authority for controlling either loans to Japanese authorities or American investment in Japan. ( c ) It is nevertheless probable that banking interests considering any large financing in the Far East, in which there was an intention of offering securities to the public, would inform the Department in advance. Such issues must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 96 which brings the facts regarding them before a Federal Commission, which, however, is empowered only to assure disclosure of the material facts for the purpose of protecting investors. In the event of investment in private enterprises in the Far East, however, there has not usually been any such opportunity afforded for taking into account our policies. 2. The following observations on the question raised by Craigie represent the present probabilities: ( a ) Even though the Neutrality Act is not applied, it is not to be anticipated that there will be any substantial loans or credits extended to Japanese borrowers during the period of hostilities. Likewise it is not to be anticipated that American enterprise will make new direct investments. Furthermore, apart from any special considerations which might enter into Far Eastern financing, it is to be observed that the recent and present position and behavior of the American capital market has been such as to make it extremely unlikely that it will be possible to issue any large foreign public security. ( b ) Subsequent to the period of hostilities, the possibilities of American investment would be influenced by (1) the nature of the agreements reached by Japan with China and with other governments in relation to China; that is, if these agreements are such as not to be inconsistent with pledges given by the Japanese Government to respect American rights and interests guaranteed by treaty, there would obviously be less hesitation in making loans and credits than otherwise; (2) the prospect of stability in the Far East, judged in the light of the nature of the peace settlement and other circumstances; this would affect not only the risk concerned but also sentiment; (3) the type of economic arrangements, including the treatment accorded foreign investment by the Japanese authorities both within Japan and in any areas of China which they may directly or indirectly control; (4) the nature of the trade arrangements that would develop; this especially would bear upon the possibilities of private direct investment. If as a part of the outcome of the present conflict in the Far East the American people and American business interests are left with a sense that the Japanese authorities are likely to continue with plans for further territorial extension of their political authority, it is probable that there would be a more or less automatic abstention from any substantial investment in territories under Japanese control and that this would take place even in the absence of any action whatsoever on the part of the American Government. Official thought would be influenced by the same considerations. The foregoing bears out what you have already told Craigie. Hull 96 Approved May 27, 1933; 48 Stat. 74. The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11579: Telegram [Document 879] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 10, 1937—11 p.m. [Received December 11—9:23 a.m.] 1031. International Committee requests following be communicated to Chiang Kai Shek as soon as possible: “The International Committee wishes respectfully to inform General Chiang Kai Shek through the proper channels that Defence Commander Tang Sheng Chih considers the Committee’s truce proposal right and proper for humanitarian reasons. But he must refer to the highest authority the question of withdrawal, since he is under orders to defend Nanking. The International Committee therefore urgently renews its proposal at this critical moment when several thousand civilians in Nanking have already lost their homes from military causes, and when 200,000 are endangered. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman”. 2. Confidential for the Ambassador from the Committee: “The International Committee upon authoritative assurances confirms its statement of Tang’s attitude. Headquarters is convinced Chiang would agree if he knew the military situation. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman.” 3. Sent to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo. Atcheson The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11564: Telegram [Document 880] The Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , December 10, 1937—midnight. [Received December 10—3:15 p.m.] 1032. International Committee requests that following be communicated as soon as possible to Japanese Embassy: “International Committee, Nanking, for sake of 200,000 civilians, seeks prompt and favorable reply to yesterday’s telegram regarding armistice and withdrawal of Chinese troops from walled city of Nanking. (Signed) Rabe, Chairman”. 2. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Peiping, Hankow. Nanking please repeat to Tokyo with request that Embassy there communicate to Foreign Office. Atcheson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Manchuria/1486 [Document 881] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2691 Tokyo , December 10, 1937. [Received December 27.] Sir : I have the honor to report that, by way of implementing the recent adherence of Italy to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact 97 (Embassy’s despatch No. 2660, November 13, 1937 98 ), and as a logical consequence of this step, Italy extended formal recognition to “Manchukuo” on November 29. 99 It is understood that this will be followed by the conclusion of a commercial treaty which will include “Manchukuo” in the scope of the commercial treaty which is being negotiated between Italy and Japan; furthermore “Manchukuo” is expected to make formal recognition of Italy’s sovereignty over Ethiopia. Thus the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis is beginning to revolve smoothly in the Far East with this application of a welcome lubricant on the part of Italy. The next application of lubricant would naturally be made on the part of Germany through her formal recognition of “Manchukuo”; it seems, however, that Berlin is not prepared to act hastily in view of her desire to avoid unnecessary affront to China at the present moment. The impression is strong that Germany will take no action in this direction until the situation in China becomes more clarified; however, if, and when, the present régime of Chiang Kai-shek is eliminated and a Japanese controlled government is set up in its place, then it is reasonable to assume that Germany would be willing to recognize “Manchukuo”. However, the situation is still obscure, despite the approaching fall of Nanking, and Germany’s future interests, hopes, and prospects in China make it imperative for her to move with extreme caution in this part of the world. There can be noted a considerable difference in the manner in which Germany has conducted her policy in the Far East as compared with that of Italy. The former has consistently evinced a rather benevolent and compassionate attitude toward the Nanking régime ever since the outbreak of hostilities, despite the existence of the agreement with Japan, and only a week ago the German Ambassador to China, Mr. Trautmann, is reported, with probably considerable accuracy, to have attempted mediation in an effort to stave off complete Chinese collapse. Furthermore, the German military advisers to Chiang Kai-shek have not been withdrawn during the course of the present hostilities. Italy, on the other hand, after preserving a strictly neutral attitude for the first few months after the outbreak, suddenly abandoned its previous policy and came out strongly in support of Japan, withdrew her aviation support from China, joined the anti-Comintern pact, and recognized “Manchukuo”. In other words, Mussolini has decided to sacrifice whatever benefits might have accrued by a negative policy toward China and has thrown in his lot unreservedly with the Japanese without awaiting the outcome of the Sino-Japanese struggle. Probably as a quid pro quo of Italy’s action, Japan extended formal recognition on December 1 to the Italian supported Franco regime of Spain, and on the following day the Franco régime, in gratitude, recognized “Manchukuo”. 1 Thus Salamanca joins the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo axis and it appears likely that in the event of a future Franco victory in Spain the Franco Government will join the tripartite anti-Comintern pact. A hint of this may be found in the statement given out by the Japanese Foreign Office on the occasion of the extension of recognition to the Franco Government, which said, in part: “It is a matter for sincere congratulation that through the present recognition, friendly relations have been established between our country and the Franco Government, with which we are in agreement regarding the policy to be pursued toward the Comintern”. Again one cannot fail to note that the sum total of all these developments represents a serious threat to British security and interests. If Franco should establish a strong régime in Spain, closely allied with Italy, thus controlling the Mediterranean, and if Japan establishes complete hegemony over North and Central China, including Shanghai, and if, indeed, Japan stops there, the British position will be precarious, to say the least, and Hong Kong will become perhaps more of a liability than an asset. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 97 See vol. i , pp. 605 ff. 98 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 160 . 99 See also telegram No. 493, November 29, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in Italy, p. 943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , and Doc. 1081 ] . 1 See telegram No. 591, December 3, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11578: Telegram [Document 882] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 11, 1937—noon. [Received December 11—7:30 a.m.] 28. Your 1031, December 10, 11 p.m. 1a Copy of message of International Committee has been handed to General Chang Chun and to Minister of Foreign Affairs with a statement that I am transmitting this without commitment in any sense. For your confidential information, this message, I feel, has arrived too late to accomplish any good. It is doubtful whether Chinese here would have accepted it in any case because it meant surrender of city. Humanitarian interests involved, however, are, I think, appreciated and highly commended. Sent to Nanking, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat to Tokyo. Johnson 1a Reference is evidently to No. 1031 from the Second Secretary of Embassy in China, which was sent also to Hankow. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.94/11896 [Document 883] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] December 11, 1937. Dr. Hu Shih, the eminent Chinese philosopher who was received by the Secretary and by the President some weeks ago, called on me this morning at his request. He said that he was very much concerned as to what he should report back to China, on the question whether any new development might be expected in the international situation which would be of benefit to China. He commented at length in regard to this matter and when he asked me for my views I said that I could not undertake to answer his query. I said, however, that so far as the United States was concerned there was nothing new on that subject. Dr. Hu Shih said that in traveling about the United States and discussing the Far Eastern situation with representative Americans, he often was asked the question as to why the American Government either singly or in cooperation with the British Government could not mediate. He said that he replied to such questions by stating that in his opinion there were very real difficulties which the average person did not appreciate; that in any mediation there would almost certainly come up the question of China’s recognition of “Manchukuo” and of other matters not consistent with principles to which the American Government and the American people were committed; that if the American Government undertook to mediate and as a result of that mediation China accepted harsh terms some of which would be repugnant to the concepts and beliefs of the American people, the American people would severely criticize the Government. He said that the foreign powers could adopt a policy of non-recognition in regard to “Manchukuo” and could rest on that declaration of policy. He said that such a course was not possible for China; that China had to deal with Japan in countless ways every day; that as a result of China’s unwillingness to recognize “Manchukuo” there had ensued constant friction between China and Japan, and Japan had made constant incursions of one sort or another into north China. (Comment: In view of this statement by Dr. Hu Shih, the question arises whether the non-recognition doctrine as applied to “Manchukuo” represents a service or a disservice to China.) Dr. Hu Shih said that China had already twice declined offers of mediation put forth by the German Ambassador to China. He said that the first such offer had been made during the early days of the Brussels Conference and the second offer was made during the recent visit of the German Ambassador to Nanking. Dr. Hu Shih referred to a statement made by the American or the British delegate to the Brussels Conference to the effect that a settlement must be reached between China and Japan which would be in accordance with commonly accepted principles of justice among mankind. He asked how that was possible in the present situation. He said that if China could not look for mediation on the part of countries like the United States and Great Britain, what was there left for China to do. I told him that I wished that I could answer his questions but that I could not do so. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) 793.94/11554: Telegram [Document 884] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) Washington , December 11, 1937—1 p.m. Reference Shanghai’s 1125, December 9, 8 p.m., and Ambassador’s 15, December 4, 9 a.m. If you have not already approached the local Chinese authorities on the basis of the Ambassador’s instruction under reference, you should do so now. You should not make any reference to the contents of Shanghai’s telegram above-mentioned. You should promptly inform Shanghai and the Department of the action you have taken in regard to this matter. 2 Hull 2 The Consul General at Shanghai was fully informed in the Department’s telegram No. 637, December 11, 1 p.m., which instructed him that he might inform his Japanese colleague “of the general nature of the instructions” to Tsingtao. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 761.94/1001 [Document 885] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 11, 1937. The Soviet Ambassador came in upon my request. I first inquired about the world situation, and he replied that it was very bad. I then inquired as to what extent his country has the Russian Pacific Coast fortified or prepared for defense, and he replied that they have 400,000 armed troops, or perhaps substantially more by this time, stationed on the Pacific Coast, chiefly for defense against Japan; that they have perhaps 40 or 50 submarines for purely defensive purposes; that they have an excellent aircraft organization; and that the army is well equipped with aircraft, cannon, and other modern equipment. He stated that he did not believe the Japanese would fight the Russians now; that they are engrossed in China at present; and that he did not believe they would undertake to control Outer Mongolia. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11841 [Document 886] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2696 Tokyo , December 11, 1937. [Received December 27.] Sir : In a long conversation my British colleague recently elaborated certain views on the general situation especially as affecting the United States, France, and Great Britain. He feels that the present problems which have arisen in Shanghai have brought about a divergence of views between the Japanese military on the one hand and the civil Government in Tokyo on the other hand. The latter, realizing that good relations with our three countries as well as their financial and economic cooperation will become increasingly important in future, wish to avoid unnecessary antagonisms. The present crisis therefore involves a definite “show down”. If the military succeed in having their way in the customs and other civil problems in China they will interpret as weakness the lack of effective measures on the part of the interested Powers and will become increasingly truculent while the authority of the Foreign Minister and other civil officials in Tokyo will inevitably and commensurately suffer. Craigie believes that the threats of the Japanese military to seize outright the customs in Shanghai is largely bluff and he feels that their bluff should be called. Shanghai’s 1089, December 5, 10 a.m., which I read to him, seemed to him to be another case in point. He knows that General Matsui is markedly anti-British. Sir Robert Craigie furthermore feels that unless the United States now stands shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in opposing Japanese depredations on our legitimate interests the results will be two-fold. First, the current cry that England is trying to push the United States out in front will, if we fall behind, temporarily promote America’s reputation in Japan but in the long run it will injure more than benefit us because ( a ) the Japanese will feel that they can ride rough-shod over our interests with impunity and because ( b ) injury to British interests in the Far East must automatically injure the interests of the other democratic Anglo-Saxon Power. Second, if the United States fails to cooperate with Great Britain it will tend to drive the latter ultimately into the arms of Germany and Italy which in the long run would inevitably prove disadvantageous to America. He feels that we should both be firm but should never take positions or utter threats which we are unable or unwilling to back up. I pointed out to Sir Robert that throughout the present Sino-Japanese hostilities we have adopted a common attitude with Great Britain and that in every case where the interests of both our countries were involved we had, so far as I was aware, proceeded very closely if not actually step by step together, at least along parallel lines. I asked him what sort of action he especially had in mind. He then referred to a particularly secret approach recently made to our Government by the British representative in Washington, 3 the nature of which I shall not herein mention, and expressed the belief that only drastic action can bring the Japanese military to their senses while at the same time, paradoxical as it may seem, affording moral support to the Foreign Minister, the civil Government and the liberal elements in Japan. I said that I doubted very much if the American Government, Congress, and the public would favor such a step as he had in mind but that I was not specifically informed. The foregoing conversation is reported because it summarizes many talks along the same lines which Sir Robert Craigie has had with me since his arrival in Japan, and in reporting his views I feel that I should comment on some of the important points on which he dwelt. ( a ) We have no evidence that there is a divergence between the Japanese civil and military elements on broad national policy. Some westernized Japanese, with foreign business or cultural associations, privately and secretly express disapproval of the direction which Japanese national policy is taking, but with public expressions of thought effectively under control there is no way of determining whether or not there is any substantial dissentient opinion. We do not believe there is. ( b ) I agree with Sir Robert that a great deal of bluffing is being done by the Japanese military with regard to the Chinese customs and other matters of something less than primary importance as we have already had evidence that firm opposition does produce good effects. It is apparent that the Japanese are testing us out to see how far they can safely go in these matters. However, assuming that those in authority in Japan have divided into two camps, as the Ambassador suggests, I believe that the expectation that a threat of coercion by other Powers with regard to the primary problem arising out of Japan’s effort to subjugate China would do anything else but drive the moderates into the other camp would be a complete miscalculation of Japanese psychology. Further, it would have to be realized that if a threat of coercion should not have the effect which Sir Robert so confidently anticipates, the Powers would have either to implement the threat or be prepared to lose completely their prestige in the Far East. ( c ) It is obvious, of course, that prior consultation must be postulated if there is to be the common front of the United States and Great Britain which Sir Robert proposes; and whether that would be a practicable proposition the Department alone is in a position to judge. Without prior consultation we would have to share with the British the consequences of British ineptitudes, both of action and of statement, such as those which have contributed their full measure toward the developing of the feeling of exacerbation now prevailing between Great Britain and Japan. ( d ) I do not altogether share Sir Robert’s views that a lowering of British prestige and influence in the Far East must necessarily injure American interests. The barometer of the prestige and influence of foreign nations in Japan is constantly fluctuating. Today’s friend may, through some incident or development, become detested tomorrow, and vice versa. I feel that our cooperative action with Great Britain during the Sino-Japanese hostilities has been adequate and that our attitude in this respect has been sound and sane. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 3 See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, November 27, p. 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11596: Telegram [Document 887] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 12, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:55 p.m.] 1137. The Japanese naval landing party have informed the American, British and Italian forces “as a matter of courtesy” that beginning December 15 they intend to send detachments of sailors to certain Japanese mill and other property in the American and Italian sectors for the protection of Japanese nationals. 2. Commander in Chief made representations in the matter to the Japanese Admiral while the Commanding Officer United States Marines has made like representations to the Japanese naval landing party pointing out that the proposed action is unnecessary as Japanese nationals and their property in the American sector are already well protected and the introduction of Japanese sailors may lead to complications which should be avoided. 3. I have made like representations to the Japanese Consul General leaving with him a brief memorandum which I have supplemented by a frank and friendly conversation in which I pointed out that by introducing Japanese armed forces into sectors guarded by other foreign troops those sectors may become the legitimate object of Chinese air raid attacks (we have had one or two small Chinese raids over Hongkew recently and there are reports that the Chinese intend to make a last desperate air raid over Shanghai), that until the serious refugee problem is solved by Japanese action to permit Chinese to return to the countryside it is necessary to continue special military measures in support of the police in the foreign sectors, and that it is advisable to postpone the sending of any Japanese armed forces to the Japanese mills in the foreign sectors until the situation has so improved as to permit the foreign forces to suspend their special protection measures. 4. It is anticipated that the Italians will not interpose objection to the entry of the Japanese forces into the mills in their sector since they recently permitted Japanese military gendarmes to station in those mills without objection and without notifying the foreign forces. There are no mills in the British sector involved in the present matter. The British appear lately to be inclined to interpose little or no objection to whatever the Japanese may do. 5. At the same interview with the Japanese Consul General I made urgent representations in connection with reports that American and other foreign property in the Japanese occupied areas north of Soochow Creek, in the Hungjao District and in areas elsewhere adjacent to the Settlement and Concession is being molested, looted and pilfered. I asked that the Japanese forces in such areas take immediate steps for full and effective protection of American property, and in my conversation I suggested in a friendly spirit that the whole situation here might be greatly eased if instead of advancing plans for the introduction of Japanese armed forces into areas guarded by other foreign forces some effort were made to extend to foreign property in the Japanese occupied areas the same effective protection which is being extended to Japanese property in the foreign sectors. 6. I do not know whether the action here will be effective in postponing the introduction of Japanese armed forces into the area south of the Creek. Our objections stand of record, however, and the Japanese must assume any responsibility for the consequences of any unwise action they may take. There will, of course, be no attempt forcibly to prevent the Japanese from carrying out their plan. 4 Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss 4 The Consul General in his telegram No. 1144, December 13, 5 p.m., reported postponement of introduction of Japanese naval forces south of Soochow Creek (793.94/11605). Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 793.94/11897 [Document 888] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] December 13, 1937. On the evening of December 11 the Chinese Embassy called me on the telephone and asked for an appointment for the Ambassador. I made an appointment for yesterday afternoon, Sunday, December 12—so that before seeing the Ambassador I would have reported at the Department. I reported at the Department yesterday morning. When we met yesterday afternoon the Ambassador had with him Dr. Hu Shih. The Ambassador asked for news of the Brussels Conference. 5 I gave a brief account of the Conference and we exchanged some comments—especially on the work of the Chinese Delegation. The Ambassador said that he was very anxious to know what would be henceforth the attitude and what might be the action of the United States. I said that I was unable to make forecasts; that any observer might make his own estimates of possibilities; and that in all probability the Ambassador and Dr. Hu, having been here during recent weeks and having doubtless followed developments very closely, would be able to answer the question which was in the Ambassador’s mind just as accurately as might I—if not more so: courses of action would depend in considerable part upon developments in the Far East and developments here and elsewhere. I then inquired what effect the most recent developments at Nanking would have on the situation in China. The Ambassador replied promptly and emphatically that China would continue to fight. Dr. Hu said that public opinion in this country was developing in a manner more and more sympathetic toward China and indicative of awareness that the situation in China presents a problem of concern to all nations. He cited, in evidence, recent editorial opinion, in particular that of the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor . Dr. Hu then left to go to the train. The Ambassador said that he was very anxious to have some indication of the probable trend of American official action. I said that I could give him nothing on that point, repeating that I could not make forecasts and that each observer could make his own estimates of possibilities. The Ambassador said that he wanted to be able to report to Chiang Kai-shek something of an encouraging nature. I said that it seemed to me that a careful examination of the record of the Brussels Conference, on which I had no doubt but that the Chinese Delegation at that Conference had reported fully, ought to give the Chinese considerable encouragement. I made reference especially to the declarations made by the Conference, in particular the declaration of November 24; 6 and I mentioned the considerate and sympathetic attitude of nearly all of the other delegations toward the Chinese Delegation. The Ambassador said that the Chinese appreciated all those things and that they especially appreciated the attitude of the American Government and the American Delegation. I then took occasion to remind the Ambassador of an observation which I had made to him some weeks ago, to the general effect that the Chinese should formulate their policies and determine their courses of action on the basis of an assumption that no form of positive assistance would be forthcoming from any other country; by doing that they would put themselves on solid ground; if, contrary to that assumption, assistance should prove to be forthcoming from any other country or countries, China would gain just that much thereby; but, if China assumed that assistance would be forthcoming and then the assumption was proven to be unfounded, China would be just that much the worse off for having made and having proceeded upon such an assumption. The Ambassador said that he remembered my having given him that hint. I said that I continued to feel that it would be to China’s advantage to shape her course with such a thought in mind; that, in fact, I felt that every country might to advantage shape its courses on the basis of such a principle. The Ambassador said that if at any time I could give him an indication of this Government’s intentions he would welcome my doing so. I said that in my opinion the only persons who could appropriately give indications of our intentions would be the President and the Secretary of State; but that I might suggest that the Ambassador and his staff watch and study closely the trend of and developments in public opinion. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 5 Dr. Hornbeck had just returned from the Brussels Conference. 6 Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 417 . Chapter VIII: December 13–31, 1937 Chapter VIII: December 13–31, 1937 Anglo-American consultation regarding Japanese bombing attack on American and British vessels near Nanking, December 13; Japanese Emperor’s reported desire to avert crisis with United States and United Kingdom, December 15; nonrecognition of new “puppet” regime at Peiping, December 18; Ambassador Johnson’s indictment of Japanese military policy, December 21; appeal to President Roosevelt by Generalissimo Chiang for assistance in restoring peace, December 24; German Ambassador’s transmission to Chiang of Japanese terms, December 27–28; Japanese naval orders against repetition of attack on American gunboat, December 28 [889] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] December 13, 1937. 394.115 Panay/5½ [890] The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State undated 394.115 Panay/5½ [891] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 13—1 p.m.] 893.01 Provisional/1: Telegram [892] The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) [Shanghai,] December 13, 1937—9:40 p.m. [Received December 13—9:10 a.m.] 793.94/11589: Telegram [893] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] December 13, 1937. 704.9394/1 [894] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) [Washington,] December 14, 1937. 893.0146/607 [895] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 15—1 a.m.] 793.94/11635: Telegram [896] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, December 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 14—12:35 p.m.] 793.94/11631: Telegram [897] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 14, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 14—8:40 a.m.] 893.01 Provisional/5: Telegram [898] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 14—12:25 p.m.] 793.94/11626: Telegram [899] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 14—7:25 a.m.] 893.01 Provisional/6: Telegram [900] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, December 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 14—2:35 p.m.] 741.94/149: Telegram [901] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 15, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 15—9:35 a.m.] 793.94/11650: Telegram [902] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 15, 1937—noon. [Received December 15—7:58 a.m.] 794.00/126½: Telegram [903] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 15, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 15—11:35 a.m.] 893.01 Provisional/7: Telegram [904] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) Washington, December 15, 1937—7 p.m. 893.01 Provisional/6: Telegram [905] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, December 16, 1937—noon. [Received December 16—8:45 a.m.] 793.94/11661: Telegram [906] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 16—10:23 a.m.] 793.94/11664: Telegram [907] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, December 16, 1937—7 p.m. 124.93/406a: Telegram [908] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 16, 1937. 893.01 Provisional/14 [909] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 18, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 19—1:10 a.m.] 793.94/11707: Telegram [910] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, December 18, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 18—12:55 p.m.] 793.94/11717: Telegram [911] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 18, 1937—5 p.m. 793.94/11678: Telegram [912] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , December 18, 1937. 893.01 Provisional/14 [913] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 18, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 19—7:23 a.m.] 793.94/11714: Telegram [914] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 19—4:15 p.m.] 793.94/11722: Telegram [915] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 18, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 18—3:40 p.m.] 124.93/410: Telegram [916] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) Washington, December 19, 1937—3 p.m. 893.0146/598: Telegram [917] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 19—12:40 p.m.] 793.94/11723: Telegram [918] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 19—3 p.m.] 793.94/11721: Telegram [919] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 20, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 20—2:09 p.m.] 893.01 Provisional/13: Telegram [920] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, December 20, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 20—3:30 p.m.] 893.0146/601: Telegram [921] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 21, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 21—8:42 a.m.] 893.01 Provisional/19: Telegram [922] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 21, 1937—noon. [Received December 21—9:40 a.m.] 793.94/11752: Telegram [923] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 21, 1937—noon. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 793.94/11761: Telegram [924] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, December 21, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3:11 p.m.] 793.94/11763: Telegram [925] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, December 21, 1937—5 p.m. 124.93/414: Telegram [926] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 21, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 21—noon.] 793.94/11754: Telegram [927] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, December 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 22—12:25 p.m.] 793.94/11767: Telegram [928] The President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang Kai-shek) to President Roosevelt December 24, 1937. 798.94/12039 [929] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 25, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 26—6:34 p.m.] 793.94/11799: Telegram [930] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 26, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 26—7 a.m.] 124.93/417: Telegram [931] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State London, December 26, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 26—12:40 p.m.] 793.94/11808: Telegram [932] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 26—12:02 p.m.] 124.93/418: Telegram [933] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 27, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 27—12:05 a.m.] 124.93/419: Telegram [934] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 27—1:35 a.m.] 793.94/11812: Telegram [935] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 3:25 p.m.] 793.94/11842: Telegram [936] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 27, 1937—noon. [Received 1:05 p.m.] 893.00/14194: Telegram [937] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 27—6:20 a.m.] 393.1164 Tungchow/24: Telegram [938] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 27, 1937—8 p.m. 124.93/418: Telegram [939] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 27, 1937. 893.01 Provisional/18 [940] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 11:30 a.m.] 124.93/423: Telegram [941] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 28, 1937—noon. [Received December 28—6:52 a.m.] 793.94/11846: Telegram [942] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 28—7:05 a.m.] 793.94/11847: Telegram [943] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 28, 1937—9 p.m. [Received December 28—1:55 p.m.] 793.94/11866: Telegram [944] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 29, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 7:36 p.m.] 793.94/11888: Telegram [945] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 29, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 29—12:50 a.m.] 793.94/11878: Telegram [946] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 29, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 7:44 p.m.] 793.94/11882: Telegram [947] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 29, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 6:38 p.m.] 793.94118/88: Telegram [948] The Vice Consul at Amoy (Altaffer) to the Secretary of State Amoy, December 29, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 31—8:30 a.m.] 793.94/11910: Telegram [949] The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao, December 30, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 31—4 a.m.] 793.94/11914: Telegram [950] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 30, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 30—3:05 p.m.] 893.01 Provisional/21: Telegram [951] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 31, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 2:57 p.m.] 793.94/11922: Telegram [952] The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State Canton, December 31, 1937—5 p.m. [Received January 1, 1938—10:45 a.m.] 793.94/11923: Telegram Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 394.115 Panay/5½ [Document 889] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] December 13, 1937. The British Ambassador called upon me this morning and gave me first a copy of an urgent telegram he had just received from his Government which reads as follows: “You will have seen that Japanese have not only fired on and hit a British man of war but have also actually sunk a United States man of war. They have also made a bombing attack on another British man of war. These acts appear to have been deliberate on the part of those firing and sustained fire can indeed hardly have been anything else though those in higher authority will presumably go through all procedure of diplomatic apology. I mention this to emphasize aggressive state of mind of those who indulge in these provocative acts. It seems clear that some action will have to be taken by both United States Government and His Majesty’s Government to curb this dangerous spirit before it goes to still more intolerable lengths. There is no doubt that this action should be taken jointly otherwise it will fail to achieve an end which will in any case be difficult to attain. But before considering this action in any detail I would like to have urgently views of United States Government.” The Ambassador likewise communicated an expression of deep regret on the part of his Government on the sinking of the U. S. S. Panay . 7 I expressed to the Ambassador my deep appreciation of this friendly message and replied to him that as his Government would doubtless understand, we had not as yet received official reports of the occurrence from the survivors which were necessary before this Government could have a clear and precise understanding of all of the elements involved. I said that of course we were assembling the facts as speedily as possible and hoped to have complete official reports by tonight or by the morning of December 14. I said that it might be even longer than that because of the fact that the survivors from the U. S. S. Panay were along the shores of the Yangtze River, a group of them on both aides I understood, and it might not be possible for them to get in touch with radio communication before some further time had elapsed. I said that at this moment this Government had already received from the Japanese Government, through the Foreign Minister 8 at Tokyo, an expression of regret for the occurrence and assumption of responsibility and an expression of willingness to offer compensation. 9 I said that in addition to these assurances, I believed it very probable that this Government would feel it imperative to demand complete and most satisfactory guarantees that no such occurrences would take place in the future and that we would desire information as to what steps the Japanese Government would take to make a recurrence of such occurrences impossible in the future. I said, furthermore, that there might well be other representations which we would desire to make to the Japanese Government but that until all of the necessary facts had been assembled, it would be premature to discuss these possibilities. I stated, however, that I should appreciate it if he would advise his Government that we should be very glad to communicate to the British Government before any formal representations are made to the Japanese Government what the nature of those representations might be. I made no statement with regard to the British Government’s request for joint action in this regard nor did the British Ambassador press the point at this time. The Ambassador then passed to another matter and reminded me of a conversation which we had recently had in which he had requested clarification of my attitude with regard to possible good offices between Japan and China. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to leave a memorandum with me on that subject, which he did. 10 I asked the Ambassador if he had any reason to believe that the possibility of Japan requesting the good offices of Great Britain and the United States was any more imminent now than it had been ten days ago. He said that he felt this matter had been taken up by Mr. Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador to London, with Mr. Eden 11 on two occasions recently and he had informed the latter that the possibility was “in the air”. I said it seemed to me, if this were true, rather extraordinary that no such intimation had been made by the Foreign Minister in Tokyo to our own Ambassador, Mr. Grew, and that, as the Ambassador knew, Mr. Grew was very definitely of the opinion that no such possibility was now immediately before us. I further called the Ambassador’s attention to the fact that the Japanese special emissary, Viscount Ishii, was presumably now in London and in view of his importance and of his special mission, if there were anything in these reports, it would seem more likely that he would be making such representations to the Government than the Ambassador regularly accredited there. I also reminded the Ambassador that when the British Ambassador in Tokyo had clarified this possibility through the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12 the latter had made it plain that no such possibility was now imminent. Sir Ronald Lindsay said that his Government had been advised that the Chinese Government had definitely refused to discuss peace offers emanating from Japanese sources, brought to the Chinese Government by the German Ambassador to China. He added, however, that his Government believed that General Chiang Kai-shek would very soon fall and that in that event the pro-Japanese who would succeed him in the Chinese Government would undoubtedly accept German mediation. Finally, the British Ambassador said that he had a further instruction to communicate to me, which was that if this Government were prepared to discuss the possibility of secret and confidential staff discussions between Great Britain and the United States, he, the Ambassador, had instructions to arrange for such conversations immediately. The Ambassador added that it was because of his belief that such occurrences as the sinking of the U. S. S. Panay would occur that the British Government had made this suggestion. I told the Ambassador that I had taken careful note of this communication which he made to me, but that I had no response at this moment to make to him with regard thereto. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 7 See vol. iv , pp. 485 ff., and Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 517 ff. 8 Koki Hirota. 9 See telegram No. 622, December 13, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 521 , and memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 13, ibid ., p. 522 . 10 Infra . 11 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 12 K. Horinouchi. The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State 394.115 Panay/5½ [Document 890] The British Ambassador ( Lindsay ) to the Secretary of State 13 undated Our idea had been that our role might be to pass proposals from one party to the other. I note that the State Department consider that such procedure would be unwise as it would involve the transmission of terms inconsistent with the Nine Power Treaty. 14 But I consider that this difficulty might be overcome by making it clear that in acting thus we were in no way endorsing proposals or attempting to press them on other party but that we were struggling in the hope of eliciting counterproposals and thus encouraging an exchange of views which might eventually lead to a settlement. State Department in fact add “some formula must be found which would make it clear that British and United States Governments could not recommend terms of settlement inconsistent with Nine Power Treaty”. I suggest that it would be possible if invited to agree to communicate proposals and counterproposals from one party to the other without assuming any responsibility for them. It might be objected that that would hardly amount to more than direct negotiation but it is probable that if Japan were willing to communicate her terms to us she would frame them more moderately than in a direct approach to the Chinese Government. In the light of the conflicting proposals of the two parties we could then consult as to the possibility or propriety of attempting to bring the sides nearer together. 13 Handed by the British Ambassador to the Under Secretary of State on December 13. 14 Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/1: Telegram [Document 891] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 13, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 13—1 p.m.] 818. Embassy’s 812, December 11, 3 p.m. 15 1. The victory parade planned for Peiping upon the fall of Nanking postponed. 2. Current reports indicate that the Japanese and Chinese authorities concerned intend to form a regime for the control of at least North China at some time during December or early January but that agreement has not yet been reached with regard to the form and the sphere of control of that regime. Indications of the imminence of a new regime are ( a ) orders to the Peiping Local Maintenance Society to prepare for dissolution called for December, ( b ) the forming of a committee of Chinese politicians to arrange for the new regime, ( c ) the despatch by the Tientsin Peace Maintenance Committee of a circular telegram expressing desire for a new government, ( d ) Japanese press reports of “spontaneous” desire of the North China population for a new government, ( e ) increased activity of Chinese politicians. 3. Wu Pei Fu, 16 Tsao Kun 17 and Hsu Shih Chang 18 are mentioned as the most likely persons to head a new regime. Wu Pei Fu is reported, however, to have stated December 11 in the presence of the Embassy’s informant [that] the Administration will not come out until the Japanese realize that they cannot control China by force, that he will not head a puppet regime, but that eventually it will become necessary for him to head a regime which has little Japanese interference. Certain Japanese military are allegedly opposed to Tsao Kun and Hsu because a government under either of them would be so weak that Japanese military would have to participate too extensively in the direction of affairs. General Kita is said to be in favor of a council of some sort for North China as it could be altered subsequently to conform to changing conditions. Kita is reliably reported to have aroused the animosity of a certain Japanese military clique by his comparative moderation. In short, complete agreement seems to be confined at present only to the advisability of forming a regime soon. 4. Information with regard to the military difficulties of the Japanese in Hopei and Shansi continue to be received. An American was delayed several hours December 11 at Hsinlo, north of Shihkiachuang, by an engagement in which a number of Japanese were killed and wounded. This American, who has just come from Shansi, is of the opinion that two-thirds or three-fourths of Shansi are still held by Chinese with the Japanese holding only certain lines of communication and a narrow zone along them. He states that some Japanese troops in Shansi are being withdrawn and that there are reports that the Japanese intend to abandon the province. There are reliable reports that efforts are being made by officers of the Chinese and Communist armies to organize Chinese forces in Hopei. A Chinese from Fangshan, 35 miles southwest of Peiping, claims that there are 30,000 Chinese troops there. Repeated to the Ambassador, by courier to Tokyo. Lockhart 15 Not printed. This telegram reported that Chinese school children in Peiping had been ordered to prepare to participate in a parade to celebrate the fall of Nanking (793.94/11576). 16 Chinese Marshal in retirement since 1926. 17 President of China who resigned in 1926. 18 President of China who retired in 1922. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy) 793.94/11589: Telegram [Document 892] The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet ( Yarnell ) to the Chief of Naval Operations ( Leahy ) 19 [ Shanghai ,] December 13, 1937—9:40 p.m. [Received December 13—9:10 a.m.] 0013. General Matsui’s headquarters announced capture Nanking, Chinese troops surrendering unconditionally. 19 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 704.9394/1 [Document 893] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] December 13, 1937. Participants: Mr. Wilson; 20 The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Chengting T. Wang. Present: Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Wilson asked the Chinese Ambassador to call. Mr. Wilson referred to the question put informally and confidentially by Mr. Tsui 21 on December 10 whether, in the event that it should become necessary for the Chinese Government to withdraw from Japan and Japanese possessions its diplomatic and consular representatives, the American Government would be prepared to instruct its representatives in those areas to assume charge of Chinese interests. Mr. Wilson said that under normal conditions we would of course be glad to undertake such a charge on behalf of the Chinese Government. He said that we had discussed the matter with the Secretary and that there had been raised during that discussion certain practical questions which we thought warranted consideration. Mr. Wilson said that we wished to bring those practical questions to the attention of the Ambassador for the Chinese Government’s consideration. Mr. Wilson continued that in case there should be set up in a part of China a regime which should call itself the government of China and which would be recognized by Japan, what position would the American Government be in should this new regime send diplomatic and consular representatives to Japan. We could of course assume charge of Chinese interests in Japan only with the assent of the Japanese Government. If the Japanese Government should recognize another government as the government of China, there would be raised the awkward but very practical question as to what disposition the American Government should make of Chinese government buildings, archives, monies, etc., which had been turned over to its charge. Mr. Wilson said that we had no precedent in a case of this sort but that it was the opinion of our Legal Adviser 22 that we would have no alternative but to turn the properties and archives entrusted to us over to the Chinese government recognized by Japan. Mr. Wilson said that there were also other practical considerations which presumably would have to be worked out, such as the handling of expenses. In reply to a question the Ambassador said that he did not know how many Chinese nationals there were in the Japanese Empire. During the course of the conversation the Ambassador said that the telegram which the Embassy had received from the Chinese Foreign Minister did not indicate whether a withdrawal by China of its diplomatic and consular representatives from Japan would accompany, would follow, or would precede a declaration of war. He said that he thought that the Chinese Foreign Minister was merely trying to envisage and prepare for all possible contingencies and eventualities and that the Chinese Government might not decide that it should withdraw its diplomatic and consular representatives from Japan. He said that he would refer the questions mentioned by Mr. Wilson to the Chinese Government for its consideration. M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 20 Assistant Secretary of State. 21 Second Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in the United States. 22 Green H. Hackworth. Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 893.0146/607 [Document 894] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] December 14, 1937. In the course of one of my conversations with Sir Alexander Cadogan 23 at London, I referred to an item which had appeared in the London press to the effect that the British were contemplating withdrawal of a part of their landed force at Shanghai. Cadogan said that they had this in contemplation. I inquired whether they were under pressure from any quarter in the British public. Cadogan replied that they are constantly under pressure from various elements in the public and also from the Army. He said that their Army authorities are constantly harping on the inadequacy of their forces in north China to perform any military function and advocating their withdrawal. I said that we have somewhat the same situation here. I went on to say that in the Department we frequently examine the question in the light of existing situations and we have thus far repeatedly felt that considerations in favor of continuing the presence of the forces in north China outweighed considerations against; and that we have regularly and consistently taken the position that, if at any time we come to the conclusion that the time is ripe for withdrawal, we should first confer with other governments, especially the British Government; in fact, I said, we have had an oral and informal understanding between the two foreign offices that we would consult each other and keep each other posted in regard to this question. From Cadogan’s reply, I inferred that he was not aware of that. He said that he thought that it was an excellent idea and that he would have it in mind. (I deduced that, Cadogan being somewhat new to the Foreign Office, this was something of which Orde 24 had never expressly informed him.) We left this subject with a perfectly clear understanding that so far as Cadogan and I were concerned we would try to “play ball” together toward keeping the action of the two Governments parallel or at least toward their keeping each other informed of developments. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 23 British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 24 C. W. Orde, Head of Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11635: Telegram [Document 895] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 15—1 a.m.] 1. With reference to the Department’s telegram of December 11, 1 p.m., I called on the Mayor this morning. I opened the discussion with reference to an article by the Mayor which appeared in a local Chinese newspaper on December 10th, dealing with the control of the retrocession [ city? ] of Tsingtau and its defense. I remarked the spirited nature of the article in which there appears the statement “under no circumstances would a drastic [apparent omission] be made of Tsingtau to anybody.” I emphasized that as he doubtless knew there have been many rumors and reports of the proposed destruction of foreign property, and I desired to be reassured that due protection would be given to such property. I used the term foreign property throughout the discussion. I referred to calls with a similar purpose made by my British and French colleagues. 2. The Mayor replied emphatically “there is no question at all as to the protection of foreign lives and property.” He then added “so far as the Chinese are concerned.” He assured me that shall there be any hostilities every precaution would be taken by the Chinese to avoid danger to American lives and property and he went so far as to state that where American property was contiguous to Japanese property, both would be spared in order to avoid danger to or destruction of American property. This statement would imply that the possible destruction of Japanese property is contemplated under certain circumstances. 3. The Mayor while reiterating his intention to avoid any danger to foreign lives and property, stated that naturally if the Japanese attacked Tsingtau, in view of their indiscriminate destruction of property in the Yangtze Valley, it might be assumed that foreign property in Tsingtau would likely be subject to destruction from Japanese shelling and bombardment. 4. His whole tone was the understanding, so far as the situation could be controlled by the Chinese, there would be no danger to foreign property and certainly he gave the impression that he would [apparent omission] take one which would threaten any property in Tsingtau so long as Japanese take no steps to force the issue in this region. Sent to the Department, Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Sokobin The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11631: Telegram [Document 896] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , December 14, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 14—12:35 p.m.] 294. For the President. The Russian representative here said to me yesterday that all democratic countries wished his country to save China. He added that his Government would do nothing except in cooperation with the United States and England. Today the news from the Far East is worse than ever and I have read your and Secretary Hull’s statements as to Japanese brutality. 25 The Japanese Ambassador here boasted a day or two ago of his country’s having killed 500,000 Chinese people. The facts of today and the statements that have been made show that no positive action is expected on the part of the United States and England. This simply means that the policy of Mussolini and Hitler is expected to be applied to the world and what a sad result that would be. If an opinion may be offered I simply say that the United States needs to apply a boycott to Japan. England should cooperate to save herself. If that did not produce prompt effects the American Navy should move toward the Far East with a few British war vessels. If either of these moves were made Mussolini would threaten England, but I believe the Italian people would refuse to fight with America, Germany might threaten moves for Japan but the German people are so much opposed that war would not be made. I think, therefore, that you and Congress can save modern civilization again. This time even without a great war. But continued delay means the loss of democratic civilization. Dodd 25 A reference to the sinking of the U. S. S. Panay; see vol. iv , pp. 485 ff., and Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 517 ff. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/5: Telegram [Document 897] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 14, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 14—8:40 a.m.] 822. Embassy’s 820, December 14, 11 a.m. 26 The new government is named the “Provisional Government of the Republic of China”. It consists of one Executive Committee under Wang Keh Ming, a Legislative Committee under Tang Erh Ho, and a Judicial Committee under Tung Kang. Under the Executive Committee there are four “Ministries”: Public Safety under Chi Hsieh Yuan, Education and Culture under Tang Erh Ho, Justice under Chu Shen, and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation under Wang Yi Tang. Kao Ling Wei becomes Mayor of Tientsin and Governor of Hopei Province. Chiang Chao Tsung continues as Mayor of Peiping. All but Chiang are old Anfu clique men. 27 Evidently it is the intention of the Provisional Government to create some sort of permanent government for “all China”, after which they will resign. Its members state that the Provisional Government has the de facto recognition of Japan and hopes to obtain the de facto recognition of other governments. Japanese attending the inaugural meeting included Major General Kita, in charge of Japanese special military affairs organ in North China, Colonel Nemoto head of the Peiping special military affairs organ, Major Watanabe of the same office, and Morishima, Counselor of the local government [ Embassy ]. Repeated to the Ambassador, Shanghai and Tokyo. Lockhart 26 Not printed. 27 Retired officials who held office prior to 1928. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11626: Telegram [Document 898] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 14, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 14—12:25 p.m.] 629. Shanghai’s 1137, December 12, 4 p.m. On the basis of the foregoing telegram we approached the Foreign Office orally today and referred to Consul General Gauss’ representations to his Japanese colleague regarding the inadvisability of sending detachments of Japanese troops into the International Settlement and neutral areas to guard Japanese property and reaffirmed the statement made by Gauss to Okamoto. We also called attention to the conditions of disorder prevailing in the areas of the International Settlement which are being guarded by the Japanese forces and to the fact that houses owned by Americans and others were being looted. It was argued that if there were available Japanese troops to guard Japanese property in the neutral areas where orderly conditions prevailed they might be used to better advantage in the guarding of the Japanese areas. The Foreign Office replied that our statements would be taken into consideration in formulating the instructions sent by the Foreign Office to Okamoto. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/6: Telegram [Document 899] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 14—7:25 a.m.] 825. My No. 820, December 14, 11 a.m., 28 No. 822, December 14, 4 p.m. I anticipate that within a few days I shall receive a call from Wang Keh[-min] or some other representative or representatives of the new Provisional Government. I should be greatly obliged if the Department would instruct me specifically as to whether I should receive and return the call. In view of the fact that this Embassy is senior Embassy of protocol [powers?] other diplomatic representatives, judging by the past, may wish to follow the lead of the Embassy in this matter. British representative has already informed me that, unless he is instructed to the contrary, he will follow this Embassy’s lead. Since the new régime claims to be the Provisional Government of China, an important principle of policy, involving recognition, may be involved. Repeated to Ambassador. Lockhart 28 Not printed. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 741.94/149: Telegram [Document 900] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , December 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 14—2:35 p.m.] 775. Viscount Ishii, special Japanese envoy now in London on a propaganda mission, has had conversations with the Prime Minister 29 and Mr. Eden. I was confidentially informed in this connection by the Foreign Office that, from Ishii’s point of view, his mission here could be considered a failure and that he had received some very plain speaking from the Prime Minister. Johnson 29 Neville Chamberlain. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11650: Telegram [Document 901] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 15, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 15—9:35 a.m.] 1732. A number of French statesmen have approached me during the past 2 days with questions regarding our policy in the Far East. Behind their questioning lies a hope that the United States may take action against Japan; but there is also complete recognition that France cannot apply force in the Far East and that it might be injurious to the interests of France in Europe if Great Britain should become heavily engaged in the Far East. This opinion was expressed publicly this morning the 15th by Pertinax in the Echo de Paris as follows: “The worst would be that Great Britain, under the pretext of supporting the United States and of gaining the United States for a permanent cooperation, should let herself go in a dangerous counter-stroke in the China Sea. In the condition of Europe today British forces should not be withdrawn from the principal task, which consists of holding in check the two totalitarian states which are our neighbors. It is not by action in the Far East but by action in Europe that British prestige may be reestablished.” Bullitt The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 794.00/126½: Telegram [Document 902] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 15, 1937—noon. [Received December 15—7:58 a.m.] 634. 1. Yesterday afternoon Dooman 30 was given a highly confidential message to me, on condition that it would not be made a matter of record, from an important personage whose identity I do not consider advisable to disclose in this telegram. The message was as follows: The Emperor that morning sent the Grand Chamberlain to the Prime Minister to say that the Emperor is now prepared to “intervene” in the conduct of foreign relations and will hereafter be guided by the advice of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The Emperor took this action before the President’s message to the Emperor through Saito 31 was known in Tokyo. Dooman barely had time to communicate the message to me when his informant telephoned last evening that the conversation be regarded as not having taken place. He again called on the informant to inquire into the circumstances of this request. Informant stated that the Prime Minister had become much alarmed over the possible consequences of the Emperor taking this unprecedented step and that he had directed the Foreign Minister and the War Minister to confer together to see whether it would not be possible for the Prime Minister to report to the Emperor that there is an identity of policy and views between the military and the civilian elements. Both Cabinet officers were of course present at the conference yesterday between Imperial Headquarters and the Government which lasted during the greater part of the day. We are endeavoring to follow up this matter. 2. I do not wish to exaggerate the significance of this move by the Emperor. Briefly I assume that he will not intervene to modify objectives of Japanese military action in China, but that we can look forward hereafter to methods being so changed as to reduce radically possibilities of grave issues arising with the United States and Great Britain. At the same time the full significance of the Emperor’s action will be appreciated only when it is realized that it is, so far as we know, unprecedented since the establishment of the present form of government in 1890. It may be recalled by some officers in the Department that, during the Manchurian affair, there was a well grounded report that the Emperor contemplated taking this action but was dissuaded by fear of consequences of the gravest character. 3. I cannot too strongly emphasize the importance of restricting the circulation of this telegram. Grew 30 Counselor of Embassy in Japan. 31 See telegram No. 343, December 13, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iv , p. 496 , and memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 13, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 522 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/7: Telegram [Document 903] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 15, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 15—11:35 a.m.] 826. Embassy’s 822, December 14, 4 p.m. 1. Of the six leading figures in the new regime (excluding the Mayors of Peiping and Tientsin) five held Cabinet posts under the Anfu clique government. All are reputedly skillful politicians but without reputations for administrative ability. They can scarcely be expected to administer a government of China efficiently. None brings much lustre to the régime, although Tang Erh Ho and Tung Kang have comparatively good reputations, as far as they go the members probably have more ability than the men in Sung Che Yuan’s recent régime. The new régime will have, however, stricter Japanese supervision. As yet no Japanese advisers have been appointed. It is presumed that the Japanese concerned are trying to find advisers of greater ability than those on duty here in recent months. Or it may be that Kita and his subordinates intend to direct affairs at least until a more precise form of government is evolved. 2. The future of the régime cannot be forecast as it depends on many factors including possible opposition from the Kwantung army and the Japanese military in Central China which may not approve of the new régime and its claims. For example, it is said that the Japanese in control here planned to establish a committee form of government for North China but altered the plan I am informed for some undivulged reason to give the régime the appearance of a more complete government claiming sovereignty over China. The future of the régime also depends in some part on the readiness of the National Government to negotiate at this junction regarding peace terms. At present the new régime’s sphere appears to be confined even nominally to northern Hopei and those narrow zones along the lines of communication in Hopei, Shantung and Shansi controlled by the Japanese military. According to unconfirmed Japanese press reports, the East Hopei régime has been dissolved and that area put under the Peiping régime. 3. What degree of approval the new régime may receive from Chinese of standing is not known. There is a report that Wang Keh Min recently interviewed T. V. Soong in Hong Kong and that some less enthusiastic Kuomintang members are friendly toward the new régime. 4. A parade, including school children, was held this noon the occasion of the fall of Nanking and the establishment of the new régime. Repeated to the Ambassador, Shanghai and Tokyo. Lockhart The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) 893.01 Provisional/6: Telegram [Document 904] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) Washington , December 15, 1937—7 p.m. 400. Your 825, December 14, 6 p.m. 1. You should be guided primarily by the necessity of avoiding action or attitude that might be construed as carrying any degree of official recognition of the new régime. 2. Bearing in mind, however, the possible future practical need of informal dealings with officials of the new régime in the protection of American interests, the Department suggests that you receive any call made upon you by persons representing the new régime and acknowledge such call by sending or if deemed definitely expedient taking in return your personal card with the personal name of your caller written upon it. You should avoid formal relationships and keep your contacts on an informal, personal basis. Hull The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11661: Telegram [Document 905] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , December 16, 1937—noon. [Received December 16—8:45 a.m.] 295. In a talk today with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office it appeared that the German position respecting China and Japan and indeed her attitude toward various phases of the Far Eastern situation, which was described in detail in Embassy’s 202, August 26, 8 p.m., had undergone no substantial change. He states that while Germany’s general interests in China were of the same character as those of the other Western Powers and while she was greatly concerned regarding them, Germany nevertheless possessing no extraterritorial rights and not being parties to the Boxer protocols 32 she was naturally not brought into the exchanges of views taking place between the powers which presumably were based on common special rights and privileges in China. He denied press report (Embassy’s 266, November 5, 8 p.m.) concerning German mediation moves by stating that Germany had not made any move whatsoever in respect of mediation between the two parties. He believed that such rumors had originated because of a conversation which had taken place between the German Ambassador to China and Chiang Kai Shek which had to do, as he understood it, solely with the situation at that time respecting Nanking, the Marshal having suggested to the Ambassador that he take steps with the Japanese to “save the city”. With reference to other accounts that Russia had entered into a “pact of assistance” with China he stated that according to his information this was not true. He felt in any event that such an arrangement would have but little practical value in respect of the furnishing of munitions as due to the physical difficulties involved Russian aid to China in that regard could be but negligible. Dodd 32 Foreign Relations , 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11664: Telegram [Document 906] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 16—10:23 a.m.] 644. Our 595, December 4, 8 p.m. A conference between the Government and Imperial Headquarters which began on the 14th and was continued yesterday and today is reported to be discussing matters of high national policy. It is generally understood that if a consensus of opinion can be reached the Cabinet will tomorrow consider requesting that the Emperor call a conference in the near future. In view of the trend of discussion in the press which is speculative and of certain information brought to me, I am inclined to think that a declaration of war is not imminent. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 124.93/406a: Telegram [Document 907] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , December 16, 1937—7 p.m. 11. The Department has been giving thought to the question whether it might be advisable for you to leave Hankow at this time and proceed in first instance to Shanghai. At present the only practicable means of egress from Hankow would seem to be by rail to Canton and if you should proceed by this route the Japanese should be notified of the fact and of the time of your departure. You would also wish to give appropriate notice to the Chinese Government. There are of course involved a number of considerations among which may be mentioned ( a ) the desirability of remaining near the Government to which you are accredited; ( b ) the reaction of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese people to a move by you from Hankow; ( c ) the question of the likelihood of the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other high Chinese Government officials moving farther inland; and ( d ) the question whether you could move from Hankow now with less of repercussions than would be likely to occur at some future date. It would seem advisable to avoid if possible having you in the position of being isolated at Hankow with the Chinese Government withdrawn farther into the interior. The Department has no fixed opinion in this matter but desires to receive from you at the earliest practicable moment an expression of your views. In reporting, please indicate what governments now have diplomatic representatives at Hankow and state the rank of each government’s senior diplomatic representative there. Should you feel it wise for you to leave Hankow now, would it seem advisable to have part of the Embassy staff remain at Hankow? Hull The British Embassy to the Department of State 893.01 Provisional/14 [Document 908] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire Numerous reports have reached His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom that the Japanese intend almost immediately to recognize the autonomous administration just set up in Peking. If they do, it will presumably be necessary for the non-recognizing governments to withdraw all Diplomatic Officers, leaving two or three Consular Officers to maintain contact with the puppet regime. The Embassy guards may have to withdraw from Peking and the question of their position at Tientsin, which would be under the same puppet government, would require immediate consideration. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn as soon as possible what are the intentions of the United States Government as regards both the Diplomatic Staff and the military contingent maintained in North China. Washington , December 16, 1937. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11707: Telegram [Document 909] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 18, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 19—1:10 a.m.] Last night still another Chinese of high standing reported to me that the Mayor of Tsingtao had again received instructions on Thursday from the Central Government to proceed with the destruction of property belonging to Japanese subjects. Would it be possible for the Embassy to ascertain directly from the Government or from the Generalissimo just what instructions have been issued to the local authorities in respect to the protection of foreign property or the destruction of Japanese holdings. 33 Sokobin 33 The Ambassador in China in telegram No. 85, December 18, 8 p.m., suggested to the Consul at Tsingtao “that you let matter stand with representations which you have already made.” (793.94/11715) The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11717: Telegram [Document 910] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , December 18, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 18—12:55 p.m.] 785. Your 493, December 15, 7 p.m. 34 The Foreign Office has again requested me urgently to inquire of the Department whether they have by this time had a more specific request from China in regard to financial assistance and perhaps the same memorandum, or a similar one, as that received by the Foreign Office from the Chinese Ambassador here on December 6. The Foreign Office states that it would be very interested to know the Department’s reactions to such a memorandum if it has been received or anything that could possibly be said of what the Department’s reactions would be. It was stated that the Foreign Secretary must place this matter before the Cabinet on Wednesday. 34a Johnson 34 Not printed; it summarized the Secretary’s conversation of December 7 with the Chinese Ambassador; for memorandum of conversation, see p. 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] . 34a December 22. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.94/11678: Telegram [Document 911] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 18, 1937—5 p.m. 360. Your 650, December 17, 5 p.m. 35 At the Press Conference on December 15 a correspondent inquired whether there was anything in the nature of a consultation between this Government and the British Government on the Far Eastern situation and whether or not any consideration was being given to a naval demonstration in the Far East by the two Governments either jointly, along parallel lines or independently. The Secretary replied that he could only repeat what he had said so many times since the commencement of the difficulties in the Far East, that is that this country and other countries like Great Britain which have common interests, common purposes and common objectives with this country in the Far East were working along parallel lines, were exchanging information, were collaborating with respect to facts and conditions in the Far East and were acting concurrently. He added that this Government, of course, reserves its own freedom and independence of action, that this has been the policy of this Government from the beginning, and that so far as he knew this represented a course that was not objectionable to other countries. The correspondent inquired if this statement by the Secretary represented a matter of general principle or applied to the question regarding a naval demonstration. The Secretary replied that the only way to avoid confusion was to keep in mind the formula upon which this Government has been operating from the beginning of the Far Eastern conflict and in this connection he referred the correspondents to statements which he had made at an earlier date (see Radio Bulletin No. 161 of July 13 last). A correspondent inquired if the memorandum from the President 36 implied that a reply was expected from the Emperor of Japan. The Secretary replied that, in order to be strictly accurate, he could only let the President’s memorandum stand for itself. He added that he did not know how he could give it interpretation with any particular advantage either to the correspondent or to himself. At the President’s Press Conference on December 14 a correspondent inquired if anything had been received from the Emperor of Japan, to which the President replied in the negative. Asked if his message to the Emperor meant that he desired an answer, the President replied that what has been given out at the State Department speaks for itself. In response to an inquiry as to whether the Panay incident would mean any change in the policy of evacuating our nationals from China, the President replied in the negative. Hull 35 Not printed. This telegram reported press despatches stating that “the Secretary at the press conference on December 15 stated that the American Government is not contemplating any kind of naval move either independently or jointly in the Far East.” 36 See telegram No. 343, December 13, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iv , p. 496 . The Department of State to the British Embassy 893.01 Provisional/14 [Document 912] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The Government of the United States has given attentive consideration to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of December 16 in which reference is made to reports that the Japanese intend to recognize the regime recently set up in Peiping and in which there is raised the question of the possible withdrawal from Peiping by governments not recognizing the new regime of diplomatic officers and of the withdrawal by those governments of their military contingents in north China. The initial reaction of the Government of the United States is that it would be premature to take action in the immediate future along the line indicated in regard either to the maintenance of diplomatic officers at Peiping or to the maintenance of military contingents in north China. Among the reasons in support of this view may be mentioned the following: ( a ) withdrawal of these establishments at this time would be likely to be misconstrued, to the disadvantage of the countries which ally in the light of the recent attacks upon American and British vessels in the Yangtze River; ( b ) continued maintenance of these establishments would serve as indication that the concerned governments are not prepared to give countenance to the creation in China of puppet administrations in consequence of or by Japanese military action; ( c ) the Government of the United States and other governments have in the past not discontinued their diplomatic establishments at Peiping at times when there has been functioning in Peiping a government not recognized by the powers as a de jure government; and ( d ) the legality of the rights accruing under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 to the United States, Great Britain and certain other governments in reference to the establishing of a legation quarter at Peiping and the maintenance of military contingents in north China would not appear to be terminated or in any way qualified by the setting up of a new régime in Peiping which claims to be the government of China. The setting up of a new régime in Peiping represents only one phase in a situation and it would seem inadvisable to make moves of the character under discussion until the situation has unfolded farther. At the same time, the Government of the United States realizes that both of the questions raised in the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire should be kept constantly in mind and that action in regard to one or both may become expedient at some future and perhaps not remote date. It is the desire of the Government of the United States to continue to keep in close touch with the British Government in regard to these matters. The Department of State has just received a telegram from the American Ambassador at Tokyo 37 reporting that on December 17 the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to the British Ambassador categorically that the Japanese Government has no present intention of recognizing the so-called provisional government in north China. Washington , December 18, 1937. 37 No. 654, December 18, 11 a.m., not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11714: Telegram [Document 913] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 18, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 19—7:23 a.m.] 82. 1. A responsible well-informed Chinese official states that all sections of China and several political factions are represented in continual discussions now in progress in Hankow and it would appear that, although there is unanimous acceptance of the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek and of continued resistance to Japan, there are differing views regarding methods, and that argument relates principally to the advisability of admitting the Chinese Communist Party on an open and equal basis into the Government as a means of inducing Russia to begin hostilities against Japan. It is admitted that Moscow feels reluctant to fight at present and that the new Ambassador and Military Attaché, while they are military men trusted by Stalin and Bluecher, 38 have been sent to China mainly to serve Russian interests if Russia decides to fight and not because fighting has already been decided upon. Informant said the Ambassador will wait in West China until this question is decided at an important conference now being held or shortly to occur in Moscow. 2. Another informant, believed reliable, who belongs to the faction which advocates internal reorganization in such a way as to induce Russia to commence hostilities against Japan, admitted recently that the Russian flyers here have been deliberately shirking their duties and said they would undoubtedly refrain from real fighting until the Ambassador arrives with a decision from Moscow, that Russia intends to afford real assistance to China or to commence hostilities on Russia’s own part. Moscow was displeased by the possibility that the recent mediation by the German Ambassador might moderate the resistance policy and one condition of aid from Russia would be elimination from the Government of all advocates of submission or conciliation and the admission of the Chinese Communist Party into the Government not in the hope of communizing China but only to ensure the union of all political factions in determination to continue armed resistance to Japan. This informant, like the first one quoted, was confident that Russia believes war with Japan is inevitable in the near future but before committing itself irrevocably to war desires that conditions in China and in Europe shall be as favorable as possible. Russia wishes to feel positive that a united China will by unremitting resistance effectively engage an important part of the Japanese forces, thus weakening their combative strength and that no danger of attack threatens in Europe. Informant stated Russia had asked its ally France for promise of protection from Germany but France was unable to give any commitment unless assured of the position which Great Britain would take if Germany evidenced intention to attack Russia. (Note: The German Ambassador here recently stated confidentially he was informed that France had strongly advised Russia not to enter the Far Eastern hostilities.) Informant said Great Britain was unwilling to promise any action which would interfere with its present hope of estranging Germany from Italy and that Great Britain moreover would take no positive position in reference to Japan’s imperialist expansion unless given some assurance that the United States would intervene, if at all, on the side of China. Informant thought that Great Britain would be satisfied by a comparatively slight indication of American attitude, such as some action facilitating acquisition by China of military supplies in the United States. He thought, therefore, that the course taken by events would be vitally affected by the attitude of the United States as by inaction or by steps taken of whatever nature. 3. I can see no evidence here of any weakening in the determination to continue resistance to Japanese invasion. Indeed, Japanese cooperation with newly organized governments in North forces such a policy even though there is full realization of the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of reorganizing the forces, obtaining military supplies and conducting the Government in different places in the interior. In other words, while Japanese pressure is intended to produce a Rightist government in North China, Soviet pressure appears to us to be producing a movement to the Left elsewhere. 4. Interviews referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above were held by McHugh 39 —and he requests that substance of this message be communicated to the Navy Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Johnson 38 Marshal K. V. Bluecher, Commander in Chief of the Red Army in the Soviet Far East. 39 Assistant Naval Attaché in China. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11722: Telegram [Document 914] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 18, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 19—4:15 p.m.] 83. Following for War Department from Colonel Stilwell. 40 “General Feng Yu Hsiang stated today that the Chinese are prepared to continue their resistance for at least 6 months, that the munitions supply, while not plentiful, can be made to do, that a total of 120 divisions are available, that 23 divisions have not yet been in action at all, that a line will be formed north and south of the Yangtze extending roughly from Pengpu through Wuhu to Hangchow, and any Japanese advances toward Hankow resisted. He said that while outside help would be welcome, China is prepared to carry on alone, that the country is united as never before, and that he expected increasing trouble for the Japanese on their lines of communication as they penetrated deeper into the country.” Repeated to Peiping. Johnson 40 Military Attaché in China. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/410: Telegram [Document 915] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 18, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 18—3:40 p.m.] 84. Prior to receipt of Department’s 11, December 16, 7 p.m., I had prepared the following: 1. The inauguration of a new government in Peiping claiming to be the government of China and successor to the Government which had its seat at Nanking indicates the line which Japanese policy will follow. This new government will be recognized by Japan and will assume [ take? ] over various functions, political as well as fiscal obligations of the old Government in those areas occupied by the Japanese Army. This will include customs, salt, currency, internal taxes, et cetera. Japan will enter into arrangements with this new government regarding these matters and the powers will be presented with those arrangements as already accomplished. Following the technique used in Manchuria Japan will enter into understandings with the new government, leaving old Government in the position at least vis-à-vis Japan and its protégé of an outlaw. Japanese forces will operate against the soldiers and officials of the old Government and against provincial forces of provinces still loyal to it as against Communists and bandits. 2. It is expected that very shortly the Japanese will proceed against Hankow and against Canton. Opinions differ as to whether this will be done simultaneously or at different times. It is extremely doubtful that the Chinese will be able to prevent the Japanese from occupying Hankow. This means that the Government will have to leave Hankow and retreat further into the interior. Ministry of Finance has made arrangements to proceed to Chungking next week. Part of Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already gone, leaving Minister and Vice Ministers here. In such an eventuality I shall be under the necessity of deciding whether I shall go to Chungking or such other place in the interior as the Government may choose as a retreat, or go elsewhere, either to Hong Kong or to Shanghai. Both Peiping and Nanking seem to me to be out of the picture at least for the present. While Hong Kong remains as a possibility in view of the fact that air connection between Hong Kong and Chungking will be continued, it is objectionable on the grounds that my presence there under the British flag might be misinterpreted. While Shanghai is not a desirable place as it will be entirely cut off from the Government to which I am accredited, it would be preferable in view of the presence there of other Missions. 3. Personally I should be willing and ready to go to Chungking with the Government although it is entirely probable that I would find myself, with the possible exception of the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador—provided he presents his credentials—the only Chief of Mission in residence. 4. Replying to Department’s queries: ( a ) It would be desirable for some member of the Embassy staff to continue contact with the Chinese Government at Chungking. Peck is of the opinion that he, as Counselor and long resident near the Government, should continue here at Hankow and follow Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chungking thus continuing to the end such support as our Government has given the Chinese Government throughout recent years, particularly subsequent to the Washington Conference. While I agree with his point of view it seems necessary to point out that, with the exception of the Soviet Government which has been forced by circumstances to place its Chargé at the seat of the present Chinese Government with every apparent intention of following it to Chungking, other Governments appear to have considered it unnecessary to keep representatives with the Chinese Government of greater rank than a First or Second Secretary. While the German Ambassador accompanied by his Counselor is here, he is in a quandary as to what he shall do under present circumstances and I apprehend that he will leave Hankow at the same time I do although I have not consulted with him in regard to this matter. The British have a Second Secretary here and it is my understanding that he will follow the Government to Chungking. The French have a Consul Adjoint who will also go to Chungking; the Belgians a Second Secretary; Italians a First Secretary who is about to be relieved, as a routine rotation of service, by the Italian Counselor. I should like to have the Department’s instructions as to whether it desires Peck to remain here with one or two members of the staff, or whether we might designate Language Officer Drumright 41 as a Second Secretary with orders to proceed to Chungking leaving Jenkins here to fill his place in the Consulate. ( b ) It is difficult for me to estimate the reactions of the Chinese Government and people to my departure at this time. They will naturally feel that I have joined my British, French, and Italian colleagues in deserting the ship, but I have made no secret of my intention not to go to Chungking. I could explain that important questions required me to proceed to Shanghai. ( c ) The Government intends sooner or later to leave Hankow. I have already mentioned plans of Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. ( d ) It would probably be easier for me to go now than later, for to go when the Japanese are about to arrive at Hankow would accentuate the idea of desertion. Departure by ship may be open for 3 or 4 days longer. H. M. S. Capeshire has just left for Shanghai December 18, 9 p.m. Johnson 41 Everett F. Drumright, Consul at Hankow. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) 893.0146/598: Telegram [Document 916] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) Washington , December 19, 1937—3 p.m. 498. Under date December 10 the Department telegraphed the American Consul at Shanghai as follows: “In response to inquiries made in regard to a press report from Shanghai that the contingent of U. S. Marines from San Diego was to be withdrawn next month on the Chaumont , the Navy Department is stating orally that the Chaumont is going back to Shanghai in the course of its regular schedule; that the Chaumont is due back at Shanghai about the end of January; and that if at that time Admiral Yarnell should consider the situation such as no longer to require the services of the San Diego Marines, the San Diego Marines will be withdrawn.” Please informally inform the Foreign Office of the foregoing and state that we hope that in regard to reductions of armed forces under consideration or contemplated there may be exchanges of views and advance information toward facilitating possibility of parallel action. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11723: Telegram [Document 917] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 19—12:40 p.m.] 88. My 82, December 18, 5 p.m. Report believed to be reliable is that the President of the Control Yuan has demanded the resignation of Kung, Minister of Finance; Wang Ching Wei, Chairman of the Central Political Committee, and of Chen Li Fu, Director of the party Publicity Department and all prominent party leaders. Demand is backed by Chang Fa Kuei and other military leaders regarded as pro-Communist and includes release of political prisoners, withdrawal of all restriction on mass movements and general change in military strategy, although this information was received by Stilwell from the recognized Chinese Communist agent in Hankow who added that the Reds hope to gain control of the party Publicity Department. Please communicate substance to the War Department. Repeated to Peiping for relay to Tokyo. Johnson The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11721: Telegram [Document 918] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 19, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 19—3 p.m.] 1. In Tsingtao itself nothing of special interest has occurred since this morning other than the appearance of several Japanese planes flying at no great height but which were not fired upon by the Chinese. 2. Vice Consul Hawthorne and myself made a tour of the cotton mill district without any molestation. The mills have been completely destroyed. We witnessed an enormous exodus of Chinese on foot but observed no unusual military activity. The Huahsin mill which was transferred to an American corporation last week was not damaged in any way. 3. The Mayor is still in Tsingtao. Curfew will again be observed from 10 p.m. until 6 o’clock Monday morning. 4. In statement appearing in local Chinese newspaper dealing with last night’s destruction of mills, the Mayor referred to “encirclement of Tsingtao and adjacent districts by the enemy, its inclusion within a military zone being compelled by the direct threat from that encirclement.” He “had long ago determined that not an inch of territory would be conceded lightly to anybody.” He would guard the territory and repel the enemy. In other words he would defend Tsingtao against any attack. 5. Everything quiet in Tsinanfu with continued movement of troops southward and frequent visits by Japanese planes for observation purposes only. Repeated to Hankow and Peiping. Sokobin The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/13: Telegram [Document 919] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 20, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 20—2:09 p.m.] 836. Embassy’s 832, December 17, 5 p.m. 42 General Terauchi, in command of Japanese forces in North China, has addressed a statement to “the masses of North China”, in which he described the defeats and the weakened position of the National Government, described the Japanese measures to improve the situation of the Chinese people, praises the men who have established the new regime at Peiping which he states will rejuvenate the Chinese people, states that the Japanese Army will support the new regime, and concludes with certain injunctions, which include the complying with the demand of the Japanese Army, the refraining from obstruction [of] that army, the reporting of the appearance of Chinese soldiers or bandits, the withholding of support from such soldiers or bandits or court the possibility of drastic punishment of the family or village of the person lending support, the forming of an anti-Communist front, and the abandoning of friendship with “far off” countries which have encroached on China’s rights. Repeated to the Ambassador. Lockhart 42 Not printed. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.0146/601: Telegram [Document 920] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , December 20, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 20—3:30 p.m.] 790. Your 498, December 19, 3 p.m., was conveyed to Cadogan this afternoon. He thanked me for the information and said that no moving of British troops in the Shanghai area were contemplated at present. He said further that the Foreign Office would be very glad to exchange views and advance information with respect to any future reduction. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/19: Telegram [Document 921] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 21, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 21—8:42 a.m.] 95. Following statement received in English from the Foreign Office, December 20, 11 p.m. “The National Government issued the following statement today: ‘Having seized large parts of Chinese territory and slaughtered numberless Chinese citizens, Japan has now started to set [up] and control at Peiping, which is under the occupation of Japanese troops, an unlawful regime, self-styled the Provisional Government of the Republic of China. This, it may be noted, is a repetition of what Japan has done in Manchuria and Jehol and East Hopei. Such an organization born of Japan[’s] armed aggression in China is entirely a Japanese puppet and served [ serves? ] but as the tool of her domination over this country. While those individuals who participate in such organization must of necessity be severely punished according to the law of the land, it should be clearly pointed out that Japan alone is responsible for the existence and actions of the organization itself which are thoroughly under Japanese control and which are therefore not of the nature of ail ordinary rebellion within a state. In thus creating and supporting a bogus regime, Japan has clearly violated Chinese [ China’s ] sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity. The National Government of the Republic of China declared [ declares ] that the bogus organization now existing at Peiping or any similar organization that may exist elsewhere is the result of an important move on the part of Japan in the relentless prosecution of her aggressive policy in China and that all acts of such unlawful organization or organizations shall be considered null and void, both internally and externally, both de facto and de jure ’”. Repeated to Shanghai, Peiping, latter repeat to Tokyo by mail. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11752: Telegram [Document 922] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 21, 1937—noon. [Received December 21—9:40 a.m.] 664. Our 616, December 11, 3 p.m., 43 march of Japanese troops through the International Settlement at Shanghai. The Foreign Office after acknowledging receipt of our note of December 11, 1937, states as follows (translation): “With regard thereto, the Foreign Office has the honor to reply that the Japanese Government has, of course, no intention which will impair the administration or the authority of the Municipal Council, and to make the assurance that in the maintenance of peace and order in the International Settlement it is the constant policy of the Japanese Government to cooperate with the International Settlement authorities”. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 43 Not printed; it reported “Action taken” as instructed in Department’s telegram No. 337, December 10, 6 p.m., p. 785 [ Pg. 785 includes portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] . The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11761: Telegram [Document 923] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 21, 1937—noon. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 97. Peiping’s 836, December 20. Exhortation of Terauchi to the Chinese population to cease from friendly relations with distant nations which violated the sovereignty of China is direct incitement to Chinese to hate and molest foreigners. Foreigners in China have long anticipated that the Japanese would endeavor to create sympathy between Chinese and Japanese by appeal to pan-Asian sentiment and by fostering promotion of and hatred of white races. No one doubts but that these methods will be used as part of Japanese effort to eradicate and supplant European and American enterprises and prestige with Japanese. I desire to point out that in the light of statements like this one, the looting of foreign property in the Shanghai area by Japanese, and the repeated attacks on foreign ships, it would be mere credulity to rely on promises to respect American life and property such as were reportedly made by Ambassador Saito in recent radio broadcast. The real policy of Japan in China is planned and executed by the Japanese Army which is guided only by its careful estimate of the military obstacles to be expected and ignores as entirely irrelevant the protests of foreign governments and the promises of Japanese diplomats, neither of which the army believes has any bearing on its purely military problems. The undoubtedly friendly feeling of the Japanese people and Foreign Office for the American people has thus far had no effect on the policy of the Japanese Army in China. It is my considered view that as long as Japanese policy is dictated by the army the representations of foreign governments to Japan on behalf of their respective rights in China will prove of no value unless accompanied by unmistakable evidence of intention to make Japan suffer in some way for violation of such rights. In addition to the effects already described the success of the Japanese Army policy will mean the destruction of those influences which have served to draw China into cultural and emotional sympathy with the liberal democratic countries of the Occident and leave China to fall a prey to the communism of Russia or to the military despotism of Japan. It is of course a matter of opinion whether it is worth while through military and economic sacrifices to endeavor to influence the course of history. These are based on observations [of] the United States representatives in China and are of course offered with due deference to the opinion of Grew. Johnson The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11763: Telegram [Document 924] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , December 21, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3:11 p.m.] 333. The following is a brief summary of statements made to me yesterday in the strictest confidence by the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. 1. I am secretly leaving for China within 2 or 3 days to confer with Chiang Kai Shek and to explain to him the Soviet attitude with respect to China. The journey which is by airplane across central Asia will be hazardous. Before departing I desire to give you to understand something of what I have been encountering during the last year. 2. I came to Moscow as Ambassador in November 1936. Before my appointment I had a reputation of being a firm supporter of Chinese-Soviet friendship. I had been on friendly terms with Soviet officials in China including Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador; had already visited the Soviet Union on several occasions; and had discussions in Moscow regarding difficult Soviet relations with some of the highest Soviet officials. 3. One of the purposes of my mission was to obtain assurances from the Soviet Government that if China pushed Japan so far as to make war inevitable the Soviet Union would support China both with supplies and armed forces. 4. Although while in China Bogomolov had been free in making oral assurances of Soviet readiness to assist China in case of war with Japan, and, in Moscow at the time of my arrival, I was unable to get in touch with him. He did call upon me to say good-bye prior to his return to China some time after my arrival but avoided discussing political problems. I found that Litvinov 44 was also evasive. In response to my overtures he usually replied that he preferred to have important matters involving Soviet-Chinese relations discussed at Nanking. 5. Bogomolov and influential groups in China friendly to the Soviet Union continued during the spring and summer of 1937 to endeavor to make the Chinese Government believe that if it would undertake to offer armed resistance to Japan it could confidently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union. For various reasons I insisted that my Government give serious consideration to no assurances which were not in writing. My insistence was interpreted by pro-Soviet circles in China as implying lack of confidence in Soviet integrity. Now that the Soviet Government has failed to give the assistance which these circles stated it would give, they are contending, instead of conceding that I was right, that my lack of confidence in Soviet oral promises had undermined Chinese-Soviet relations and that I am responsible, therefore, for the failure of the Soviet Government to enter the conflict. 6. The following incident illustrates my difficulties. In October a Chinese Communist visited Stalin and reported to his friends in China, who in turn reported to the Chinese Government, that on a certain date the Soviet Government would join China in its war against Japan. In response to an inquiry from my Government, I replied that my information would indicate that the Soviet Government had no intention of permitting itself to be involved in the hostilities in the Far East in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the friend of the Soviet Union in China insisted that the Communists were in a better position than I to report on Soviet intentions. When upon the date mentioned the Soviet Government made no move towards giving armed assistance to China my Government ordered me to ask why Stalin had failed to keep his promise. Stalin, in reply to my inquiries made to him indirectly, stated that he had never made the promise credited to him. 7. I must state out of fairness that neither Litvinov nor any other high Government official in Moscow has ever given me any promises of Soviet armed support to China against Japan. Nevertheless, they have not taken recommended measures to end the campaign of belligerency carried on by their representatives and friends in China. 8. Bogomolov, upon his return to the Soviet Union several weeks ago, was arrested. It is my understanding that the charges against him are not that he had made unauthorized promises to the Chinese Government but that he was too optimistic in reporting to his Government the ability of the Chinese armed forces to resist Japan. Apparently the Soviet Government had been led by Bogomolov to believe that the Chinese resistance to a Japanese attack would be much more stubborn than it has been effectual, and a feeling is commencing to be manifest in high circles that Japan may be able to emerge from the war much more quickly and in a much better economic and military condition than had been anticipated. It is beginning to fear that the war instead of weakening Japan may result in adding to its strength, prestige and aggressiveness. 9. Although for internal consumption the Chinese Government is endeavoring to assure its people and the world that time is on its side and that if the Chinese armies continue to offer resistance Japan will inevitably become exhausted, nevertheless, there is a growing feeling among informed Chinese circles that Japan by following a ruthless policy of depriving the population of conquered portions of China of even their elementary needs will be able to mobilize supplies in sufficient quantities to permit it to carry on the war for a protracted period. 10. I have talked with the new Soviet Ambassador to China and will tell you in confidence that I am convinced that he is a Smirnov who was replaced recently as Soviet Assistant Commissar for Defense. Henderson 44 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 124.93/414: Telegram [Document 925] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , December 21, 1937—5 p.m. 19. Department’s 18, December 20, 7 p.m. 45 It is desired that you make your plans to remain at Hankow so long as the Chinese Foreign Office remains there and, in the event of the Foreign Office removing to some other point, to proceed thereto in order to continue near to the Government to which you are accredited. In making your plans please give consideration to the question whether you would wish all of the Embassy personnel now at Hankow to accompany you, if and when, to a point further inland. Please radio the Department your views in this regard. If you should desire to take with you only a portion of the Embassy staff at Hankow, might it be advisable for those who would not accompany you to be sent away at this time from Hankow? The Department is inclined to believe that women clerks, including those at the Embassy and at the Consulate General, should not remain at Hankow. Please discuss this point with Josselyn 46 and give the Department by radio the benefit of your views. Hull 45 Not printed. 46 Paul R. Josselyn, Consul General at Hankow. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11754: Telegram [Document 926] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 21, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 21—noon.] 665. 1. We have received in the strictest confidence from an entirely reliable Japanese an indication of the trend of thought at the conferences which began last week between the Government and Imperial Headquarters. The informant stated little that has not previously been said privately to me by Hirota or publicly by other responsible Japanese. However, his statement seems to us of considerable importance at this time because it is the first and only credible indication which we have received of the views predominating at these conferences. ( a ) When the conflict with China began it was the policy of the Japanese Government to avoid aggravating the situation. However, after 5 months the conflict has extended to proportions which were not originally contemplated: the Capital of China has been taken, large parts of China are under Japanese occupation, and—most important of all—a heavy sacrifice in human life has been involved. The return to Japan of the ashes of the soldiers killed at the front has impressed [upon] the Japanese people as nothing else could have done the importance of Japan’s obtaining a final and lasting liquidation of its difficulties with China. Japan cannot therefore agree today to a settlement on the comparatively moderate terms which were offered to China at the beginning of the conflict and which would have been acceptable prior to the fall of Nanking. ( b ) Although Chiang Kai Shek has declared in his most recent public statement that Nanking has lost its strategic importance, it cannot be denied that the loss of Nanking is politically a matter of supreme importance to China. If the Chinese Government fails to appreciate this fact and affirms and demonstrates by action that it will continue the struggle, the Japanese Government cannot further be hampered by effort to keep the situation from being aggravated. ( c ) If the Chinese Government makes good its threat to resort to a war of endurance, whatever further action which may be taken by Japan will have but one objective, that is, to bring the hostilities to an end as quickly as possible. ( d ) No declaration of war against Russia is under contemplation (this statement is directed at speculative estimates in the affirmative made by a number of my colleagues). 2. The foregoing is practically a full verbatim account of the statement of the informant. Although several possible developments such as attack on Canton or declaration of war against China occur to us which fit well within the framework of his presentation of the situation, any estimate which I might make on the basis of the scant information now available would be little more than attempt at prophecy. I feel that I am on safe ground only in expressing the belief that the Yangtze River incidents have brought to the surface a latent disunity of thought among those elements represented at the above mentioned conferences with regard to Japan’s policy after the capture of Nanking. The military mind has we believe begun to realize the dangers inherent in military action in China and may even be prepared to take precautions against involvement with the United States and Great Britain but the information presented in paragraph 1 indicates the probability of there being nevertheless an extension of declared military objectives. Repeated to Shanghai for Hankow. Grew The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11767: Telegram [Document 927] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , December 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 22—12:25 p.m.] 800. Two considerations characterized yesterday’s somewhat redundant debate on foreign affairs, namely: 1. What Churchill 47 termed “the very great measure not merely of underlying but openly expressed unity in the speeches in all parts of the House of Commons”. 2. The almost unanimous awareness of the key position occupied by the United States and the equally unanimous desire to obtain American cooperation which means American support. The significant points on the European and Mediterranean situations were reported in my numbers 796, December 21, 6 p.m., and 797, December 21, 7 p.m. 48 However, it seems desirable to quote below pertinent excerpts from the statements of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on the Far East. Chamberlain said: “What we are now doing is to await proof of the determination and the ability of the Japanese Government to prevent a recurrence of these incidents. From the beginning we have constantly offered our services with a view to trying to find some means of bringing this conflict to an end. We are still anxious to serve the cause of peace by any honorable means that are open to us but it must not be thought that our desire for peace and our patience under repeated provocations means that we are either indifferent to our international obligations or that we are forgetful of our duty to protect British interests. It is now for the Japanese Government to show that they in their turn are not unmindful of the rights and interests of foreigners and that their assurances and apologies mean something more than words”. Eden said: “Does the opposition really think that the League of Nations today with only two great naval powers in it, ourselves and France, have got that overwhelming force? It must be perfectly clear to every one that overwhelming force does not exist. Every nation at Geneva from the beginning of this dispute knows perfectly well that the very thought of action of any kind in the Far East must depend on the cooperation of the nations besides those who are actually members of the League at this time”. In reply to an interruption mentioning the instance of Abyssinia, Eden said “If the Government or a collection of governments have made a mistake, is that a reason for advocating that they should repeat in exactly the same form?” He went on to say: “Our chief preoccupation at this juncture is the situation in the Far East. We are faced with manifold problems of great complexity and gravity. The very gravity of them makes it difficult for me to speak as freely as I would like tonight. We have in the Far East great interests which are certainly not incompatible with those of other nations there and which we shall do our utmost to defend … 49 in the present conditions, there are three principles which I think must guide us in the Far East: the first, that we must do all that we honorably can to secure the restoration of peace; the second, that we must do our full share with others in the fulfillment of our international obligations; and the third, that we must protect our own interests and of course British territory. There is a very important aspect of this Far Eastern situation which is perhaps the only one today that one can view with satisfaction. It is the fact that we are constantly and daily in close consultation with the Government of the United States. Over and over again we have taken either parallel or similar action and that in itself is an indication of the closeness of such collaboration.” Because of the diffuse character of the debate today’s editorials are mainly descriptive. Johnson 47 Winston Churchill. 48 Neither printed. 49 Omission indicated in the original. The President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang Kai-shek) to President Roosevelt 798.94/12039 [Document 928] The President of the Chinese Executive Yuan ( Chiang Kai-shek ) to President Roosevelt 50 Never in her long history has China been confronted with such a grave crisis as she is going through today and never has peace of the Far East been so disastrously disturbed as it is today. In the last five months, China has engaged in a life and death struggle against Japan. Armed with the ultra-modern implements of war and displaying a cruelty characteristic of mediaeval barbarism, the Japanese land, naval and air forces have seized city after city, massacred numberless non-combatants including not a few foreign nationals, and destroyed immense amount of property not even sparing cultural, religious and charitable institutions. In the relentless prosecution of their aggressive campaign, they have disregarded, and even deliberately violated, the rights of third countries with the evident intention of realizing Japan’s long cherished ambition to dominate the whole Pacific region. They are now in unlawful occupation of large parts of North China as well as important cities and towns along the Nanking–Shanghai Railway including the Capital of the Republic. A puppet regime purporting to be “The Provisional Government of the Republic of China” has been set up by the Japanese militarists in Peiping. They are yet further extending their invasion in different directions. According to the present indications, attempts are being made to penetrate Northern Kiangsu, Shantung, The Yangtze Valley and South China. Marshalling all our available forces, we have combatted the Japanese onslaught to the best of our ability. With the firm determination to preserve our national existence we have made supreme sacrifice—sacrifice in man-power, in resources, in commerce and industry. We are shedding blood in the hope that the nation may live in peace and with honor. We are not fighting a war in the ordinary sense of the word. But we are resisting the wanton aggression and repelling the fierce attacks on our own territory. We are fighting for the liberty of the Chinese nation and against the common menace to the mankind. We are not only defending ourselves, but also the principle of the sanctity of treaties especially the Nine Power Treaty, under which the sovereignty, independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China should be respected by Japan and other signatory Powers. We will not surrender to Japan’s brutal force, but will continue our resistance until the Japanese Government abandons its aggressive policy, until our national administrations are restored to us and until the principle of inviolability of the international covenants is vindicated. Throughout the conflict, the Chinese people have been conscious of, and felt grateful for, moral support we have received from the United States. We know that under Your Excellency’s able leadership, the American Government with its proverbial sense of justice and always guided by its traditional policy in the Far East will do its best to uphold all legal and treaty rights and maintain law and order so necessary for the peaceful conduct of international relations. On behalf of the Chinese people, I therefore take liberty at this critical moment of urgently appealing to Your Excellency and, through you, the American people to render such effective assistance to China as will enable the struggle for the cause of world peace and solidarity to be carried on to a successful conclusion at an early date. I am sure that the Chinese people will be forever grateful to Your Excellency for all your efforts towards that end. Chiang Kai-shek December 24, 1937. 50 Handed to President Roosevelt on December 31 by the Chinese Ambassador. The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11799: Telegram [Document 929] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 25, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 26—6:34 p.m.] There is no question that the bridge reported destroyed in my telegram December 25, 4 [ 4:15 ] p.m. 51 was destroyed by an armored train under the orders of General Han, Governor of Shantung, in order to cut off railway transportation of General Yu Hsueh Chung’s troops who were supposed to go west to Tsinan and perhaps then southwards to Hsuchowfu. Under these circumstances it looks more than ever that the Japanese will solve the Shantung problem through the kind offices of General Han. Everything quiet in Tsingtao and [as far as is known] in Tsinan also. Under the conditions now obtaining there is no serious obstacle to any plan of the Japanese to invade Shantung through Tsingtao if they so desire. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Hankow. Sokobin 51 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/417: Telegram [Document 930] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 26, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 26—7 a.m.] 105. Department’s 19, December 21, 5 p.m. I am delighted with Department’s decision. Minister of Foreign Affairs is unable to inform me of exact plans of Government but suggested that I make arrangements for accommodations at Chungking, and I am making inquiries through Standard Oil Company with a view to obtaining the house there. I desire to take with me Peck, Aldridge, Jenkins and Lafoon, for past experience indicates that all of us are necessary for code as well as clerical work incidental to telegraphing. Admiral Marquart is arranging to send us up on one of the up-river gunboats if and when we move. Present indications are that immediate removal is not contemplated as tension here has been somewhat relieved by belief that Japanese will not attack Hankow at once but will direct their attention first to Shantung and next to Canton. As regards the women of the staff, it is my belief that it is not necessary to consider their evacuation from Hankow at the present moment. Their services are much needed here and evacuation by air will be possible. It is my present belief that it would be possible for them to remain here even through any foreseeable crisis. In any event there will be a number of Americans here and their services in the Consulate will be very valuable. I would like to postpone consideration of the question for the time being. Johnson The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11808: Telegram [Document 931] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State London , December 26, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 26—12:40 p.m.] 804. The British Consul General [at] Shanghai has reported to the Foreign Office that early in December Mr. Calder Marshall, Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, on his own initiative had a conversation with Mr. Okazaki 52 regarding possible peace terms, and afterwards asked the British Consul General for permission to use the naval wireless for communicating with Dr. Han Li-wu, a professor at the National Central University and director of the British Boxer Indemnity Trustees’ office, who is at Hankow. The British Consul General gave him no encouragement, and he was later cautioned by the British Chargé d’Affaires 53 to do nothing without consulting him. He was, however, permitted to use the wireless, and on about 15th December Dr. Han asked to have further conversations with Mr. Okazaki. He did so, and Mr. Okazaki then mentioned among other conditions a semi-autonomous government in North China under Japanese domination and a zone of 30–40 miles round Shanghai under Japanese military control. The Foreign Office states that the British Government would regard any such terms as highly objectionable and prejudicial to all foreign interests in China, and it has instructed Mr. Howe to request Mr. Calder Marshall to have nothing further to do with such proposals. Johnson 52 Japanese Consul General on special detail to Shanghai. 53 R. G. Howe. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 124.93/418: Telegram [Document 932] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 26—12:02 p.m.] 1231. Having been told that the Japanese military authorities had refused to permit foreigners including British naval officers to land at Nanking, I deemed it advisable when instructions were received for Allison 54 and his staff to proceed to Nanking to inform the Japanese Consul General and to ask him to notify his military authorities. 2. Japanese Consul General has come to me this evening at the insistence of his military authorities to ask that our officers postpone their departure for Nanking until after the first of January because of the military situation there which is “very dangerous”, the military being engaged in “mopping up” operations which will take some few days, there being, he says, some 20,000 Chinese soldiers mixed in with the civilian population. 3. I told the Japanese Consul General that the staff members were returning to Nanking under instructions from the Department, that the gunboat Oahu is leaving early on December 28th, that they are to go on that ship as there is no other means of transportation, and that I could not issue them instructions to postpone departure. He asked me to refer the matter to Washington. I told him that I would do so but that I did not feel that a proposal to postpone would be well received. 4. As the Japanese military authorities were apparently insistent on action by the Japanese Consul General it may be expected that if the officers arrive at Nanking they may be refused permission to land. I request immediate instructions as the Oahu is to sail early on morning of the 28th. Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Gauss 54 John M. Allison, Third Secretary of Embassy in China. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 124.93/419: Telegram [Document 933] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 27, 1937—9 a.m. [Received December 27—12:05 a.m.] 106. Shanghai’s 1231, December 26, 6 p.m. To comply with Japanese request at this time would be interpreted as assent to military’s right to interfere with our access to our property and archives in Nanking. Oahu’s voyage can be timed to arrive Nanking January 1st. In view of assurances given by Japanese Government in connection with Panay incident I hope Department will inform Tokyo of return of Embassy officers and our expectation that they will not be prevented from reoccupying Embassy buildings Nanking. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11812: Telegram [Document 934] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received December 27—1:35 a.m.] 107. Was informed last night that German Ambassador presented Generalissimo yesterday with a note conveying terms understood to be very drastic from Japanese military. I understand terms will be published by Foreign Office today or tomorrow. Sent to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Johnson The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11842: Telegram [Document 935] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 27, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 3:25 p.m.] The actual situation in the Tsingtao municipal area since Saturday night has been one of quiet, from outward appearance. However, the Mayor has issued a statement from which the following is quoted: “We should not cherish any hope of escape (for Tsingtao). The enemy have completed their encircling plans, thus maneuvering Tsingtao into an impossible position. The enemy will then seize the city at a single stroke. We shall not yield a fraction (of Tsingtao) unless it is absolutely necessary. With disaster so close, with the exception of those on military police and public utility duties, all should withdraw from Tsingtao as soon as possible”. Mayor also refers to those who would try to save themselves and their families at the cost of betraying their own country, “such people are unwittingly committing suicide”; apparently, the Mayor has in mind a group which is probably counselling nonresistance or compromise. The Mayor’s statement is disturbing to many. Furthermore, there is every good reason to believe that all Chinese governmental authorities in Tsingtao, both national as well as municipal, have received instructions from the Central Government to destroy public utilities and property of whatever nature, namely, the telephone central, telegraphic apparatus and railway rights of way. The Consulate is certain that the main waterworks were mined last week ready for destruction at any moment. However, some of the officials will probably refuse to obey instructions in this respect. There is little doubt that all Chinese accept the loss of Tsingtao as inevitable, as may be judged in instruction from General Manager of the Bank of China to the local branch of a foreign bank to ship to Hong Kong 30,000,000 dollars in bank notes which the foreign bank is holding for the Bank of China. Sent to Peiping, Hankow. Sokobin The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.00/14194: Telegram [Document 936] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 27, 1937—noon. [Received 1:05 p.m.] 109. Following from Colonel Stilwell for War Department. Red proposals in conference here still vague. Essence of demands is to mobilize the masses, unify the command, standardize equipment. Concrete methods of accomplishment not stated. Reds claim they will support Chiang Kai Shek and will take part in Government if the Kuomintang so requests. They claim their idea is not to reorganize the Government but simply to strengthen it by mutual assistance development of the Kuomintang and the Communists. They do not want the help of armed forces of foreign powers, but want foreign experts as technical advisers. Nationality not specified. They are suspicious of the present German advisers. Military situation in Yangtze Valley unchanged. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 393.1164 Tungchow/24: Telegram [Document 937] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 27—6:20 a.m.] 849. 1. It is reliably stated that the Tungchow affair of July 28 55 was settled December 24 by the Counselor of the local Japanese Embassy and the head of the East Hopei regime, the latter rendering apologies and promising to pay 1,200,000 yen for Japanese survivors of the affair, families of those killed and property destroyed. An initial payment of 400,000 yen was made at the time of settlement. 2. It appears that the East Hopei regime has not yet been absorbed by the new regime at Peiping but that the matter is still under negotiation. Repeated to the Ambassador. Lockhart 55 Cf. telegram No. 308, July 28, 7 a.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 124.93/418: Telegram [Document 938] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 27, 1937—8 p.m. 379. Department’s 377, December 26, 6 p.m. 56 The Department has telegraphed Shanghai as follows: “Allison and staff should proceed on the Oahu as scheduled but not attempt to land at Nanking until after the first of January.” Allison and staff are returning to Nanking to reoccupy the American Embassy property, to protect and be of assistance to American nationals and their interests and to handle other official business. Please call at the Foreign Office and, referring to the request of the Japanese authorities at Shanghai that our officers postpone their departure until after the first of January, state that Allison and staff are proceeding as scheduled on the Oahu which is leaving Shanghai on the 28th and request that instructions be issued to the appropriate Japanese authorities to the end that, when Allison and staff arrive at Nanking there may be no interference in connection with their landing or functioning at Nanking. 57 Hull 56 Not printed. 57 Action was taken December 28. The British Embassy to the Department of State 893.01 Provisional/18 [Document 939] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire It has been ascertained that the views of the French Government as regards the desirability of maintaining diplomatic representation in Peking substantially agree with those of the United States Government as expressed in the communication which the State Department were so good as to make to His Majesty’s Embassy on the 18th December. The French Government consider that withdrawal of foreign diplomatic staffs from Peking would involve the renunciation of the rights of the Governments concerned under the Boxer Protocol, and might be regarded as a departure from the obligations which each signatory bears towards the others. The French Government hold that the maintenance of diplomatic staffs and Embassy guards would demonstrate support of the Government of China and the recognition still accorded to their rights, while withdrawal might have the appearance of acquiescence in the definite severance of the Northern Provinces, and thus suit the policy of the Japanese authorities as well as allowing their puppet Government to claim that they had achieved what the Kuomintang had tried for years without success to do. In the opinion of the French Government, moreover, the withdrawal of Embassy guards is closely connected with the future of foreign concessions in Tientsin which it might endanger. Thus while they do not exclude the possibility that the position of the great Powers in the Peking-Tientsin area may have to be revised, it has been learnt that the French Government think that if any step is taken in that direction it must be by agreement between the United States, France and Great Britain, and not by a rapid and spontaneous abandonment of existing rights. Having regard to the opinion of the French and United States Governments, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have decided for the present not to withdraw their diplomatic staff or guards from North China. They share the views of the French Government in attaching importance to prior consultation before taking such a step, and in the light of the intimation which the United States Government have been so good as to give of their desire to maintain close touch with His Majesty’s Government in these matters, it is hoped that the United States Government will agree that all three Governments should concert together before any action is taken affecting their Embassies and Embassy guards in the event that this may be called for by subsequent developments in North China. Washington , December 27, 1937. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 124.93/423: Telegram [Document 940] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 28, 1937—9 a.m. [Received 11:30 a.m.] 1238. Reference Department’s 697, December 27, 11 a.m. 58 Allison and staff have sailed on the Oahu . In paragraph 2 of my 1231, December 26, 6 p.m., I said that our officers were asked to postpone departure for Nanking until after 1st of January. Japanese Consul General estimated it would require 3 or 4 days to proceed from Shanghai to Nanking and expected situation at Nanking to be sufficiently cleared after about the 4th of January. Allison understands this. 2. The Oahu may visit Wuhu before proceeding to Nanking. If so Allison will investigate the flag incident mentioned in my No, 1219. 59 3. Allison has been supplied two gray codes and special gray cipher. Espy 60 has the post’s consular rubber stamp seal. Repeated to Hankow and Peiping. Gauss 58 Not printed. 59 December 23, 9 p.m., vol. iv , p. 409 . 60 James Espy, Vice Consul at Shanghai on special detail to Nanking. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11846: Telegram [Document 941] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 28, 1937—noon. [Received December 28—6:52 a.m.] 686. The Naval Attaché reports that the following statements were made to him yesterday by the senior aide to the Navy Minister. “1. He informed me of the orders transmitted to Vice Admiral Hasegawa to prevent a recurrence of any happening similar to the Panay incident. These orders were from the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Minister of the Navy. Lieutenant Layton 61 believes they are worded in a language seldom if ever used before and that Vice Admiral Hasegawa’s reply is noteworthy. Captain Konda is furnishing me with translations. 2. I gave him the letter in regard to the proposed foreign neutral zone in Tsingtao. 62 He said Vice Admiral Hasegawa was the responsible one to act and asked whether our authorities in Shanghai had informed him to which I replied I do not know but that our position in such cases was to transmit information to the Government authorities here with the expectation that they take the proper action. We assumed that our Government authorities in China acted in a similar manner. In this connection he volunteered the information that the navy was not contemplating any action for the present against Tsingtao. When asked about the army, he stated that ‘that was an army matter.’ 3. When asked whether the navy was contemplating operations against South China, the reply was he could not give any information about that.” Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Johnson. Grew 61 Lt. Edwin T. Layton, Assistant Naval Attaché in Japan. 62 See telegram of December 21, 5 p.m., from the Consul at Tsingtao, vol. iv , p. 406 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11847: Telegram [Document 942] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 28—7:05 a.m.] 852. Reference our 732 [ 842 ] December 23, noon. 63 1. The Japanese military at Tientsin announced last evening the occupation of Tsinan by Japanese forces and the severe bombing of Taian, 30 miles south of Tsinan, where Han Fu Chu was reported to be at that time. 2. The Embassy received official notification this morning from the local Japanese Embassy that the Japanese blockade has been extended to include Tsingtao. 3. The press published this morning a letter addressed to General Yen Hsi Shan by the officer in charge of the Japanese special military affairs organ at Taiyuan in which three proposals are made; namely, the guarantee of the safety of Yen and his soldiers; the cessation of resistance and the withdrawal of Yen’s forces to southern areas in preparation for a campaign against Communist forces; and the driving out of Shansi of all troops of General Chiang Kai Shek. The letter concluded with the statement that, unless Yen agrees by December 30th, the Japanese Army will consider him lacking in sincerity and will take whatever action may be necessary. A resident of Shansi has recently reported that Yen is guarded by National Government officers either in the extreme left side Shansi or at Sian. Repeated to the Ambassador. By mail to Tokyo. Lockhart 63 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11866: Telegram [Document 943] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 28, 1937—9 p.m. [Received December 28—1:55 p.m.] 116. Donald has just given me following information regarding Japanese terms communicated to Generalissimo by German Ambassador Saturday evening, December 25. Please treat as strictly confidential. German Ambassador asked to see Generalissimo who was ill and communicated note to Madame Chiang and Kung. He stated that Japanese asked the German Government not to encourage the Chinese to ask for a truce. He said that Berlin had instructed him to present note without comment. Note generally was to the effect that Japan’s attitude toward negotiations had now been changed by military developments, that Japanese Army being successful it was expected that the Chinese would wish to negotiate for peace. Japan was prepared to enter into negotiations if Chinese would send a representative to ask for same to a place to be designated by the Japanese. It was to be understood that there was to be no cessation of hostilities during negotiations. Note expects following four terms to such negotiations, ( a ) China shall fully cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in attacking Comintern activities, ( b ) There shall be special regimes and demilitarized zones wherever necessary, ( c ) Economic cooperation with Japan and Manchukuo, ( d ) Indemnities. Donald states arrangements are being made to give note publicity shortly. I understand above consideration given also to British. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11888: Telegram [Document 944] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 29, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 7:36 p.m.] 117. I concur in following estimate of China military situation prepared by Military Attaché. “1. Without any reliable means of checking and based largely on fragmentary information from varied sources, the following estimate is submitted as an impression of present conditions. The Chinese authorities are loath to make definite statements or more probably are themselves ignorant of conditions. Foreign military observers are not given any opportunity to form a judgment based on observation; even the German advisers may be in the dark. However, certain facts can be accepted which indicate the true state of affairs. 2. The Chinese have had serious losses in planes, guns, tanks, trucks and facilities for their air service and artillery are reduced to a small fraction of their needs. The tank corps was never more than a beginning. The losses in personnel have been large, but the reserve of manpower is enormous; this presents no problem except number of replacements. The force defending Nanking now split and scattered; part is north of the Yangtze, part is in southern Anhui, part is in Chekiang. Cooperation between commanders at best was very poor; it is now worse than ever. What little cohesion existed during the first few months has been shattered. The disintegration of the army has been considerable, and is apparent from the ease of Japanese movements, the inability of the Chinese to establish a front or take any combined action, and the increasing talk of resort to guerilla warfare. Many units are out of hand and simply living on the country. 3. A semblance of control exists which may give orders that issue from the High Command, as for example the designation of commanders for the various fronts, but the mixture of units from neighboring provinces in these several localities makes effective control impossible. The unit commanders do not want replacements supplied by the central authorities; they prefer to recruit their own people. To get order out of this mixture of defeated and depleted units scattered in Kiangsu, Anhui, Chekiang and Kiangsi is probably beyond the power of the Central Government. Instead of attempting to fill up and reorganize the units that have been in action, a new command seems now to be forming new units and concentrating its efforts on the Hankow–Nanchang–Changsha area where they are trying to build up a force while awaiting the developments that events will force on them. 4. I believe the High Command has no other plan beyond further retreat to the west and will most likely in case of attack and that they are pinning their faith on the size of the country, over extension by the Japanese, possible intervention by Russia, possible internal trouble in Japan, and an effective development of the Red campaign against the Japanese communications. It is certain that any offensive by the Chinese is out of the question, and it is very doubtful if a force capable of offering any further serious resistance can be created.” Please furnish copy to the War Department. Sent to Peiping. Johnson The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11878: Telegram [Document 945] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 29, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 29—12:50 a.m.] Tsingtao terminals of the Japanese Tsingtao–Sasebo submarine cable and the former German submarine cables Tsingtao–Chefoo and Tsingtao–Shanghai were severed by explosions last night. Equipment in Tsingtao telegraph office also destroyed and wireless station deserted and closed. Director of the Telephone Administration is reported to have stated that telephone central will not be destroyed unless Mayor so directs. All quiet this morning. Sent to the Embassies, Shanghai. Sokobin The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11882: Telegram [Document 946] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 29, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 7:44 p.m.] 119. A United Press report carried in Navy wireless broadcast under Washington dateline of December 28 reports Ambassador Saito as saying that Japan’s peace terms to China will demonstrate that she has no aggressive designs and will be so moderate that Americans will be surprised. In this connection I invite the Department’s attention to outline of terms reported in my 116, December 28, 9 p.m. These terms while general in outline are broad enough, when coupled with observed activities of Japanese Army in Manchuria, North China and more recently in the lower Yangtze Valley to afford a very clear and complete domination of China which the Japanese military have in mind in their China policy. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94118/88: Telegram [Document 947] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 29, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 6:38 p.m.] 120. Since the commencement of present Sino-Japanese hostilities, Military Attaché and his assistants have been indefatigable in their efforts to maintain friendly contact with the Chinese military command and armed forces in the field. I have done everything possible to assist and to obtain for the Military Attaché and his assistants proper reception of their status and permission for them to visit armed forces in the field for the purpose of obtaining the military information usually available to the military observers of friendly countries under such circumstances. My efforts as well as the efforts made by the Military Attaché and his assistants have failed. We cannot complain on the ground of discrimination as similar treatment has been met by Military Attachés of other governments. The only explanation of this situation that occurs to me is that the Chinese War Ministry really has no connection with armies in the field. In the field itself there is no unity of command except such as existed for a short time under pressure of conditions at Shanghai, the fighting forces consisting of provincial units each controlled by its own commanding officer. I am making this communication in the hope that the Department will make it clear to the War Department that inability of Military Attaché to make and maintain contacts with Chinese Army which would be considered natural and on the whole normal elsewhere are due to local limitations beyond the control of this Embassy and in no wise discriminatory. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping. Johnson The Vice Consul at Amoy (Altaffer) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11910: Telegram [Document 948] The Vice Consul at Amoy ( Altaffer ) to the Secretary of State Amoy , December 29, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 31—8:30 a.m.] The Mayor of Amoy today called on Senior Consul, Amoy, to inquire what Kulangsu authorities would do if the Japanese naval or military forces chose to land on the International Settlement or to anchor on the farther side and shell the City of Amoy over the Settlement. The Senior Consul replied that the authorities could do no more than register a personal protest through the senior naval officer present and take the matter up through diplomatic channels. Altaffer The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11914: Telegram [Document 949] The Consul at Tsingtao ( Sokobin ) to the Secretary of State Tsingtao , December 30, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 31—4 a.m.] Very considerable damage was done to Japanese property during the night by terrific explosions. The dry dock locks and small arsenal nearby are reported destroyed. The electric substations [and?] the large Japanese brewery were also destroyed. Up to date not a single piece of American property has been damaged in any way. It is reported from a reliable source that the Mayor of Tsingtao has already left and actually the municipal administration with the exception of the police appears to have vanished. There is also reason to believe that more destruction will be done to Japanese property today and it is even reported that imposing Tsingtao Municipal Administration Building will be destroyed. This morning a Japanese airplane again visited Tsingtao for observation purposes only. The chief cause for some anxiety on the part of Americans and Occidentals generally is the threat of destruction to the water works. Otherwise I am gratified to report Americans are displaying admirable coolness. Sent to Peiping, Hankow. Sokobin The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Provisional/21: Telegram [Document 950] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 30, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 30—3:05 p.m.] 857. Major General Kita informed foreign press representatives yesterday that the present Provisional Government at Peiping is prepared for the establishment of a permanent national government to succeed the Provisional Government in the near future. He also stated that he is opposed to the inclusion of areas other than those occupied areas under the new “government”. (Heretofore he has expressed himself as regarding the Peiping regime as the government of all China). He further said that South Chahar, North Shansi, and Suiyuan may join the new government. 2. One of the leading officials of the provisional regime has stated in private conversation that the “permanent” government is to be established January 1st. He and other leading officials complain that they are permitted no freedom of administration and that they can do only what the Japanese order them to do. 3. Several unemployed Chinese ex-officials have arrived in Peiping during the last few days, presumably seeking office. They are understood to include Yuan Liang and Yin Tung who were, prior to Sung Che Yuan’s regime, Mayor of Peiping and managing director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, respectively. 4. Masayuki Tani, recently Minister to Austria, has been assigned to the local Japanese Embassy. Some of his subordinates are of the opinion that he will be Minister here. The present Counselor will remain. The Secretaries are being augmented by two new Secretaries Evidently in connection with augmented staff the Embassy office building is being thoroughly renovated. Repeated to Ambassador and Tokyo. Lockhart The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11922: Telegram [Document 951] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 31, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 2:57 p.m.] 128. My 119, December 29, 3 p.m. Donald’s information is that Chinese Ambassador at Washington has informed Generalissimo that President thought Japanese terms very lenient. Donald states that it is his understanding that Japanese terms have been communicated to Chinese Diplomatic Missions abroad for publication abroad; Japanese terms have not been published here, although Donald says that Mrs. Chiang and Kung had advocated publication. Donald expressed personal opinion that non-publication here have fulfilled a hope that certain quarters, unnamed, may be attempting to make a deal with Japanese. Only information Embassy has regarding terms was communicated in my 116, December 28, 9 p.m. 64 Johnson 64 On January 4, 1938, President Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State as follows: “In view of Ambassador Johnson’s 119 [ 128 ], December 31, I think you should tell the Chinese Ambassador here that the President has never given any indications that he thinks the Japanese terms ‘very lenient’. So far as an independent Chinese Republic goes Japanese terms which we have seen are utterly impossible.” The Consul General at Canton (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 793.94/11923: Telegram [Document 952] The Consul General at Canton ( Linnell ) to the Secretary of State Canton , December 31, 1937—5 p.m. [Received January 1, 1938—10:45 a.m.] My December 30, 5 p.m. 65 Yesterday’s raid of Sachuan industrial section of Canton included four bombs on and near site of Union Normal School, an American institution under joint management of American Presbyterian and United Brethren in Christ Mission. School personnel had removed to Toishan 2 months ago and property appeared to be partially occupied by troops, a circumstance which had not been reported to this office. Property damage confined to demolition of one of the school’s less important buildings. One soldier killed, three wounded. Objectives of these and other bombs in same general area [may have been] factories power plant or military concentrations. Reported that military hospital hit and several resultant casualties but no other American damage. Raiding of southern sections of Canton–Hong Kong and Canton–Hankow Railway has continued daily: particularly heavy bombing of Shekling bridges and Pakong on 29th. Telephone telegraphic communications along both lines have been repeatedly cut but damage to tracks not serious. While more intelligent Chinese regard American action in response to Panay incident as reasonably strong, [closure] of the incident has much disappointed many who had [confidently] hoped for immediate concerted positive action against Japan by America and Britain; and vernacular press has reverted to allegation that American policy is still dictated by shortsighted moneyed interests without regard for “Japanese menace” to America and world peace. Such disappointment in the democratic powers together with reports convincing local Chinese that Russia has promised substantial aid is serving to increase leaning toward Russia as the only nation to be counted on for immediate material assistance and apparently to make the public sympathetic to reported impending reorganization of Government on more radical lines. At the same time there have been signs of increasing suspicion and hostility toward Fascist countries and their nationals in this area. There are, however, no indications that these tendencies presage any spread Communist doctrine. Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow. Linnell 65 Not printed. Representations to the Japanese Government with respect to the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and Salt Revenue Administrations Representations to the Japanese Government with respect to the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and Salt Revenue Administrations 66 66 For other correspondence, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 729 ff. [953] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, January 11, 1937—4 p.m. [Received January 11—8:55 a.m.] 693.94244/182: Telegram [954] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , January 22, 1937. 693.94244/188 [955] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 22, 1937—midnight. [Received January 22—2:10 p.m.] 693.94244/187: Telegram [956] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, January 22, 1937—7 p.m. 693.94244/188: Telegram [957] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received January 23—7:18 a.m.] 693.94244/189: Telegram [958] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck), at Nanking Washington, January 23, 1937—1 p.m. 693.94244/187: Telegram [959] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, January 28, 1937—3 p.m. [Received January 28—7 a.m.] 693.94244/190: Telegram [960] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, February 6, 1937—3 p.m. 693.94244/102: Telegram [961] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, February 7, 1937—noon. [Received February 7—6:10 a.m.] 693.94244/193: Telegram [962] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, February 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received February 8—7:15 a.m.] 693.94244/194: Telegram [963] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, May 11, 1937—3 p.m. [Received May 11—9:10 a.m.] 693.94244/229: Telegram [964] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, June 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 7—11:15 a.m.] 693.94244/233: Telegram [965] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, June 30, 1937—1 p.m. [Received June 30—4:40 a.m.] 693.94244/239: Telegram [966] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, July 1, 1937—noon. 693.94244/239: Telegram [967] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] July 10, 1937. 693.002/250 [968] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, August 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 27—10:55 a.m.] 793.94/9728: Telegram [969] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, August 28, 1937—3 p.m. 793.94/9728: Telegram [970] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 31, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 31—1:38 p.m.] 693.092/360: Telegram [971] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, September 3, 1937—9 p.m. 693.002/360: Telegram [972] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, September 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 6:44 p.m.] 693.002/864: Telegram [973] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 8, 1937—5 p.m. [Received September 8—11:35 a.m.] 693.002/366: Telegram [974] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , September 8, 1937. 693.002/365 [975] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, September 10, 1937—1 p.m. 693.002/366: Telegram [976] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3:55 p.m.] 693.002/368: Telegram [977] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 16—11:12 a.m.] 693.002/371: Telegram [978] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 18, 1937—noon. [Received 4:43 p.m.] 693.002/372: Telegram [979] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 18, 1937—3 p.m. 693.002/367: Telegram [980] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, September 18, 1937—4 p.m. 693.002/367: Telegram [981] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , September 18, 1937. 693.002/369 [982] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:06 p.m.] 693.002/373: Telegram [983] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 24—6:30 a.m.] 693.002/374: Telegram [984] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, September 27, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 6:53 p.m.] 693.002/375: Telegram [985] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] October 4, 1937. 793.94/10443 [986] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 6, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 7:50 p.m.] 693.002/379: Telegram [987] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 9, 1937—1 p.m. [Received October 9—10:12 a.m.] 693.002/381: Telegram [988] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, October 12, 1937—4 p.m. 693.002/382: Telegram [989] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 13, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 7:35 p.m.] 693.002/384: Telegram [990] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 14, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 14—9:34 a.m.] 693.002/385: Telegram [991] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Chew) Washington, October 15, 1937—7 p.m. 693.002/385: Telegram [992] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 18, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 18—10:15 a.m.] 693.002/388: Telegram [993] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 19, 1937—11 a.m. [Received October 19—6:30 a.m.] 693.002/390: Telegram [994] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 23—7:12 a.m.] 693.002/391: Telegram [995] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 1, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 1:59 p.m.] 693.002/392: Telegram [996] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 3, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 3—1 p.m.] 693.002/393: Telegram [997] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 19, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 19—2:45 p.m.] 693.002/442: Telegram [998] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 23, 1937—10 a.m. [Received November 23—7 a.m.] 693.002/443: Telegram [999] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 9:14 p.m.] 693.002/444: Telegram [1000] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Chew) Washington, November 24, 1937—7 p.m. 693.002/395b: Telegram [1001] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 26—8:40 a.m.] 693.002/396: Telegram [1002] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , November 26, 1937. 693.002/411 [1003] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 26, 1937—8 p.m. 693.002/396: Telegram [1004] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 27, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 27—3:45 a.m.] 693.002/397: Telegram [1005] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) [Washington,] November 27, 1937. 693.002/411⅓ [1006] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 27—7:33 a.m.] 693.002/398: Telegram [1007] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 28—7 a.m.] 693.002/403: Telegram [1008] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 27, 1937—9 p.m. [Received November 27—10:45 a.m.] 693.002/400: Telegram [1009] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 27, 1937—2 p.m. 693.002/400: Telegram [1010] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 28, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 29—7 a.m.] 693.002/404: Telegram [1011] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 28—8:50 a.m.] 693.002/402: Telegram [1012] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 28, 1937—11 p.m. [Received November 28—12:55 p.m.] 603.002/401: Telegram [1013] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 29, 1937. 693.002/407 [1014] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 29, 1937—6 p.m. 693.002/401: Telegram [1015] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, November 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 29—2:55 p.m.] 693.002/405: Telegram [1016] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) Washington, November 30, 1937—1 p.m. 693.002/407a: Telegram [1017] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 1, 1937—11 p.m. [Received December 1—3:20 p.m.] 693.002/408: Telegram [1018] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 2, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 2—2:17 p.m.] 693.002/412: Telegram [1019] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 3, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 3—7 a.m.] 693.002/413: Telegram [1020] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 4, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 4—2:57 p.m.] 693.002/415: Telegram [1021] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 4, 1937—10 p.m. 693.002/415: Telegram [1022] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 9, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 5:05 p.m.] 693.002/416: Telegram [1023] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) Washington, December 9, 1937—5 p.m. 693.943/14a: Telegram [1024] The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Tientsin, December 11, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 8:22 p.m.] 693.943/15: Telegram [1025] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 12, 1937—3 p.m. 693.002/416: Telegram [1026] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 13—1:10 a.m.] 693.002/417: Telegram [1027] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 14, 1937—10 p.m. [Received December 14—12:15 p.m.] 693.002/418: Telegram [1028] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 16—12:18 p.m.] 693.002/421: Telegram [1029] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 16, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 16—5:30 p.m.] 693.002/422: Telegram [1030] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 17, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 17—6:30 a.m.] 693.002/424: Telegram [1031] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 17, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 17—9:30 a.m.] 693.002/423: Telegram [1032] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 18, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:30 p.m.] 693.002/427: Telegram [1033] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 21, 1937—6 p.m. 693.002/428a: Telegram [1034] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Washington, December 21, 1937—6 p.m. 693.002/424: Telegram [1035] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 22, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 22—12:14 p.m.] 693.002/428: Telegram [1036] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 25, 1937—2 p.m. 693.002/433: Telegram [1037] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 28, 1937—1 p.m. [Received December 28—12:05 p.m.] 693.002/431: Telegram [1038] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 29, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 29—2:30 a.m.] 693.002/434: Telegram [1039] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 29, 1937—5 p.m. 693.002/430: Telegram [1040] The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Shanghai, December 31, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 31—11:20 a.m.] 693.002/436: Telegram [1041] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 31, 1937—5 p.m. 693.002/431: Telegram [1042] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 31, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 31—2:25 p.m.] 693.002/437: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/182: Telegram [Document 953] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , January 11, 1937—4 p.m. [Received January 11—8:55 a.m.] 17. Embassy’s No. 539, November 12, 3 p.m. 67 The Consul General at Tientsin has reported that according to the customs at Tientsin there are at present about 100,000 bags of smuggled sugar there and about 60,000 bags in Dairen awaiting transportation or en route to Tientsin; that the present price of smuggled sugar at Tientsin is about yuan $16.20 per 200 pounds, an increase of yuan $2.07 over the price of 2 months ago; that there are 2,000 cases of 200 pounds each of smuggled artificial silk yarn in Tientsin, the price of which is $220 per case as compared with $165 some months ago, the increase being attributed to higher prices in Japan; that smuggled kerosene in Tientsin is estimated at about 12,000 units with another 10,000 en route from Dairen, the price now being $6.80 to $7 per unit as compared with a low of $6.20 during early autumn; and that the total customs collections on imports into Tientsin during 1936 were gold units 6,467,002.82 less than during 1935, which loss is directly ascribable to smuggling but does not represent total loss as considerable quantities of such goods brought in through Tientsin found their way into sections which are not tributary to that port. The report adds that, if legally imported, the silk yarn would have paid taxes and dues amounting to $250 per case and sugar at $23.93 per bag. To Tokyo by mail. Lockhart 67 Ibid. , p. 375 . The British Embassy to the Department of State 693.94244/188 [Document 954] The British Embassy to the Department of State His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been impressed by the serious deterioration in the general situation as regards smuggling by Japanese into North China and have accordingly issued instructions to His Majesty’s Ambassador in Tokyo to make representations on this subject to the Japanese Government. His Majesty’s Government are more especially concerned at the situation regarding smuggled kerosene and Sir R. Clive has been instructed to consult the United States Ambassador in Tokyo as to the possibility of making joint representations on this subject. It is felt that from a political point of view it would be valuable if the United States Government could see their way to instruct their Ambassador at Tokyo to make with Sir R. Clive joint protest to the Japanese Government against this smuggling, on the grounds of the damage inflicted thereby upon legitimate United States and British interests. His Majesty’s Government would be grateful if the United States Government would urgently consider this question of joint representations about kerosene, and if they could send early instructions in the matter to Mr. Grew. His Majesty’s Government appreciate that it is not to be expected that any substantial improvement would be likely to result from such representations, but they consider that a joint démarche of this kind might be of value in demonstrating that as a result of a policy of consistently ignoring the well-established interests of other countries, the latter are bing driven to combine in self-defence against such attacks. A table is annexed giving figures for legitimate foreign sales of oil and estimates of smuggled oil, sold in the Tientsin area. Washington , January 22, 1937. [Annex] Legitimate Foreign Sales ( Total Tientsin Area ) Estimated Smuggled Oil . American Gallons ( Tientsin Area. ) Asiatic Petroleum American Companies Total American Gallons April 578,740 1,213,710 1,792,450 178,980 May 437,940 873,560 1,311,500 693,300 June 372,330 653,270 1,025,600 214,940 July 384,690 663,280 1,047,970 246,800 August 471,960 881,070 1,283,030 178,520 September 568,050 963,300 1,531,350 300,270 October 1,962,430 3,008,060 4,970,490 776,632 Total 4,776,140 8,186,250 12,962,390 2,589,442 For the purpose of comparison it was thought advisable to show the legitimate sales in contrast to smuggled oil, as the companies’ imports which are made by tanker fluctuate tremendously in individual months, whereas the smuggled oil comes into the area in smaller quantities and goes almost directly into consumption. As regards the figures for October, it is understood that they were undoubtedly swollen by a speculative turn in the market quite apart from the fact that the winter consumption of kerosene had begun. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/187: Telegram [Document 955] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , January 22, 1937—midnight. [Received January 22—2:10 p.m.] 15. My British colleague informs me that his Government is much upset at the serious increase in smuggling in North China which developed during November and December. He states that sugar and kerosene are the two items which show much the largest increases and since both of these items seriously affect British trade, he is instructed, unless he sees serious objection, again to draw the attention of the Japanese Government to the matter. Before taking action, however, he is directed to consult me and he did so this evening. He believes that Lindsay 68 has informed the Department and that I may receive similar instructions. I have heard nothing about these new developments in China and I told Clive that I could not act unless or until instructed. Repeated to Nanking. Grew 68 Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador in the United States. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.94244/188: Telegram [Document 956] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , January 22, 1937—7 p.m. 12. 1. An officer of the British Embassy brought to the Department this morning a note stating that British Foreign Office has instructed British Ambassador in Tokyo to make representations to the Japanese Government on the subject of smuggling by Japanese into North China, especially smuggling of kerosene, and also has instructed Clive to consult with you regarding the possibility of making joint representations on this subject. They ask that we urgently consider sending you early instructions, it being their feeling that a joint démarche might be of value toward indicating that, as result of Japan’s consistent ignoring of well-established interests of other countries, such countries are being driven to get together in self-defense. To the Department it would seem that the present moment of parliamentary crisis would be a very inopportune time for making such an approach to the Japanese Government; but Department awaits report by you, with comments, upon the approach which Clive is to make to you. 2. Your 15, January 22, midnight, just received. Please add your comments on opportuneness. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/189: Telegram [Document 957] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , January 23, 1937—5 p.m. [Received January 23—7:18 a.m.] 20. Department’s 12, January 22, 7 p.m., smuggling in China. I consider the moment not opportune for an approach to the Japanese Government. Clive concurs. I shall watch situation and advise later. Grew The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck), at Nanking 693.94244/187: Telegram [Document 958] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Peck ), at Nanking Washington , January 23, 1937—1 p.m. 9. Reference Tokyo’s 15, January 22, midnight. 1. In view of the parliamentary crisis in Japan, the Department considers the moment not opportune to approach the Japanese Government in regard to the matter under reference, in which view both Grew and Clive concur. 2. The Department desires that the Embassy prepare a comprehensive summary report on the smuggling situation in North China with particular reference to its effect on American trade. Your survey should give figures, if readily obtainable, showing the extent and trend, particularly since October 1, 1936, of the smuggled trade in kerosene and other items important in American trade principally affected, with pertinent comment thereon. 3. Please report promptly by telegraph and keep Tokyo currently informed. Hull The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/190: Telegram [Document 959] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , January 28, 1937—3 p.m. [Received January 28—7 a.m.] 42. The official in charge of the customs preventive service at Tientsin has informed Consul Berger 69 that he estimates goods to the value of $133,000,000 local currency were smuggled into Hopei during 1936 and that customs revenue which these goods should have paid would have amounted to about $70,000,000 and that smuggled goods represent a very much increased consumption particularly of sugar in Hopei. It is felt that had the customs been able to stop smuggling and forced the payment of the very high duty on smuggled merchandise the result would have been a large reduction of importations since the consumers would not have been able to pay the resulting higher prices. Repeated to Tokyo. Lockhart 69 David C. Berger, Consul at Tientsin. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.94244/102: Telegram [Document 960] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , February 6, 1937—3 p.m. 25. Your 42, February 6, 10 a.m. 70 The Department authorizes you to take up informally and orally with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 71 the question of smuggling into North China. The Department instructed Nanking promptly to furnish the Department and your Embassy information showing the extent and trend since October 1, 1936, of smuggled trade in kerosene and other items important in American trade principally affected, but has not as yet received the information. In the circumstance, the Department suggests that in your discretion you point out that the serious smuggling situation in North China continues to exist, that that situation continues to have a serious adverse effect on American trade in general, mentioning kerosene and dyes as having been particularly affected, and that this situation continues to be of concern to this Government. Hull 70 Not printed. 71 Kensuke Horinouchi. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/193: Telegram [Document 961] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , February 7, 1937—noon. [Received February 7—6:10 a.m.] 65. Following telegram has been sent to Tokyo: “February 7, 11 a.m. Your 15, January 22, midnight to the Department. Tientsin reports that most serious damage caused to American trade by smuggling has been in petroleum products. Figures thus far available to the Embassy indicate that during period covered between September 28, 1936 and January 24, 1937, 127,370 cases of kerosene and 5,203 cases of gasoline were smuggled into the Tientsin area. Complaints have also been made to the American Consulate General at Tientsin by American firms dealing in dyestuffs who estimate that during December quarter some 150,000 pounds sulphur black and large quantities of other low grade dyes obtainable from Japan were smuggled in. Tientsin reports further that during December quarter there were smuggled into that area considerable quantities of goods competitive with American imports but that no complaints have been received and no accurate figures are at present available. Tientsin is preparing written report which will be forwarded. 72 Repeated to the Department.” Johnson 72 Report not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/194: Telegram [Document 962] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , February 8, 1937—4 p.m. [Received February 8—7:15 a.m.] 46. Department’s 25, February 6, 3 p.m. I again took up with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs orally and informally today the question of smuggling into North China, presenting the facts in general and in detail. Mr. Horinouchi’s comment as formerly was that an improvement in this situation may be expected when Chinese customs tariffs are reduced and it is hoped that the negotiations to this end will soon be resumed. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/229: Telegram [Document 963] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , May 11, 1937—3 p.m. [Received May 11—9:10 a.m.] 133. My telegram No. 113, April 9, noon, and 131, May 4, 5 p.m. 73 In a despatch dated May 7 the Consulate General at Tientsin reports 74 that according to information compiled by the three foreign firms dealing in petroleum products in the Tientsin district 28,350 cases of kerosene and 3,505 cases of gasoline were landed in Hopei by the smugglers during April this being a considerable reduction in both items over the previous month. The Commissioner of Customs states that he is quite confident that he will be able to put a stop to large scale smuggling in the near future. According to him a large proportion of the smuggled goods held by Japanese firms in Tientsin has been reported to the customs for duty payment and he believes that negotiation for the registration of smuggled goods held by Chinese firms will be satisfactorily completed within a few days; he is now seeking authorization to permit registration of smuggled goods on payment of only 30% of the duty, the balance to be paid before the goods are moved out of Tientsin or transferred to a purchaser. Authority has been received for customs officers to operate in the East Station yard at Tientsin but the implementing thereof is being postponed pending the clarification of the attitude of the Hopei–Chahar Political Council, its hesitation arising from the fact that it is subsidized to a certain extent by the Peining 75 Railway, while the latter depended considerably for its revenue upon freight charges on smuggled goods brought from East Hopei. He states it seems probable that before the railway can be completely free to cooperate it will be necessary for some arrangement to be made whereby the East Hopei régime and the Political Council can obtain funds from other sources in substitution of the revenues now received from the railway. Lockhart 73 Neither printed. 74 Not printed. 75 Peiping–Liaoning (Mukden). The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/233: Telegram [Document 964] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , June 7, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 7—11:15 a.m.] 160. My telegram No. 133, May 11, 3 p.m. Tientsin’s despatch No. 486, June 4, 1937 76 states that: according to information compiled by foreign oil firms in Tientsin during the month of May, 31,542 cases of kerosene and 5,860 cases of gasoline were landed in Hopei by smugglers. This oil was of the following brands: 75 cases of kerosene, Standard Vacuum Oil Company brands; 4,150 Asiatic Petroleum Company brands; 500 cases kerosene and 750 cases of gasoline Texas Company brands; 26,817 cases of kerosene and 5,110 cases of gasoline Japanese brands. The Commissioner of Customs in Tientsin states that: ( a ) He has practically completed an agreement with the Tientsin Chinese Chamber of Commerce for the registration of smuggled goods held by Tientsin Chinese firms. The Japanese authorities have informed him that they do not object to such registration by Chinese firms of smuggled goods stored in the Japanese concession. This agreement was evidently effective in the British, French and Italian concessions. ( b ) Considerable quantities of smuggled goods which were escorted past Shao Hsi Men customs barriers on the outskirts of Tientsin in motor trucks by Japanese subjects during May were nearly all delivered to canal boats. The customs have subsequently seized these goods and thus frustrated the smugglers’ maneuvers. ( c ) The preventive service is now seizing at least 60% of all smuggled goods sent out of Tientsin into the interior with the result that the smuggling trade is operating at a considerable loss. ( d ) The Peining Railway authorities continue to refuse to cooperate with the customs in seizing smuggled goods at the Tientsin East Station. However, the customs now have access to the railway manifests and other shipping documents, therefore, whenever smuggled goods arrive a written request that these goods be held at the disposal of the customs is presented to the railway authorities by the customs. ( e ) Mr. Chen Uhueh Sheng, the managing director of the railway who is also a member of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, caused that council to instruct the Commissioner to remove the customs representatives at the East Station. The Commissioner, who was first approached, refused to receive the instruction. The Superintendent of Customs was then approached and he refused to transmit it to the Commissioner, both these officials insisting that the matter be taken up at Nanking. ( f ) He has no intention of opposing the smugglers by force but will carefully watch them, report and protest all their activities particularly those of the managing director of the above-mentioned railway. By mail to Tokyo. Johnson 76 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.94244/239: Telegram [Document 965] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , June 30, 1937—1 p.m. [Received June 30—4:40 a.m.] 191. In a despatch dated June 23 Consulate General at Tientsin reports that importation of kerosene and gasoline by smugglers has not appreciably decreased and that American oil companies business continues to suffer. Standard Vacuum Oil Company and Texas Company suggest that customs authorities be requested to establish a preventive office at the Tientsin East Station which would be empowered to seize smuggled cargo or collect regular duty thereon. Notwithstanding Peiping railway authorities have hitherto shown no disposition to cooperate with customs to suppress smuggling, Embassy requests that it be authorized to make informal representations to the Foreign Office at Nanking with a view to establishment of the preventive office as requested by American Oil Company. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 693.94244/239: Telegram [Document 966] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , July 1, 1937—noon. 103. Your 191, June 30, 1 p.m. The Department authorizes the Embassy to make informally appropriate representations to the Chinese Foreign Office in regard to the adverse effects, on the business of the interested American firms, of smuggling into North China of kerosene and gasoline, but feels that the Embassy should avoid making a specific suggestion that a preventive office be established at the Tientsin East Station. However, the Department perceives no objection to the making of such a suggestion by the companies themselves should they desire to do so. Hull Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 693.002/250 [Document 967] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] July 10, 1937. Conversation: Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance; Dr. C. T. Wang, Chinese Ambassador; Mr. Hornbeck; Mr. Hamilton. 78 Present: P. W. Kuo and Dr. Clarence K. Young. 79 During the course of and following a luncheon given by the Chinese Ambassador at his residence at Twin Oaks, the Chinese Minister of Finance, Dr. H. H. Kung, brought up a number of questions (see separate memoranda), after which Mr. Hornbeck said that there were several particular matters which Mr. Hornbeck desired to bring to the attention of Dr. Kung. Mr. Hornbeck said that from various sources there came to his notice observations offered by some individuals that there were only a few Americans in the Chinese Customs Administration and that these Americans did not seem to progress as fast in that Service as did some of their colleagues of other nationalities. Mr. Hornbeck said that, for example, the comment had been made to him that for some years there had been no American on duty at Customs headquarters at Shanghai. He said that he was making no complaint and that he wished only to suggest that sometime when Dr. Kung had an opportunity he be so good as to look into the question of how the Americans in the Chinese Customs Service were faring. (Note: For other matters see memorandum on “Claim of the American Metal Company against the Kwangtung Provincial Government” and memorandum on “Russian issue of the Chinese Government Five Per Cent Reorganization Gold Loan of 1913”. 80 ) S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 78 Maxwell M. Hamilton, Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 79 Advisers to Dr. Kung. 80 Neither printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9728: Telegram [Document 968] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , August 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received August 27—10:55 a.m.] 583. I understand that plans exist for withdrawing Chinese revenue organizations such as the Customs and Salt from the treaty ports to interior points in event of loss of such ports to the Japanese. Such withdrawal, of course, would leave the Japanese free to create their own organization, while if the existing foreign directed organizations remained on the spot, it might be possible so to arrange that they might serve to protect the important foreign trade interests and loan obligations that are involved. Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/9728: Telegram [Document 969] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , August 28, 1937—3 p.m. 190. Shanghai’s 583, August 27, 6 p.m. In the opinion of the Department this is a point which you might if opportunity affords mention casually and orally to high officials of the Chinese Government as one appearing to warrant serious consideration. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.092/360: Telegram [Document 970] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , August 31, 1937—8 p.m. [Received August 31—1:38 p.m.] 576. I learn from British Consul General today that Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin has communicated to Inspectorate General in substance as follows regarding a conversation which he had in Tientsin [with the?] Japanese Consul General. The Japanese Consul General is said to have stated to the Commissioner of Customs that if the Customs Administration would agree after setting the quotas necessary to meet foreign, not domestic, obligations on customs, to deposit balance with designated (Yokohama Specie Bank) bank to be held untouched until disposed of by negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese Governments; and if the customs would not permit entry of arms for Chinese even though covered by permit of Central Government, then the Japanese would undertake not to interfere with the functioning of the Chinese customs within areas occupied by Japanese military. Japanese would also undertake to stop and prevent all smuggling within said areas. It was indicated that these terms applied only to Tientsin and Chinwangtao but that it seemed intended to extend same to Chefoo, Tsingtao and Shanghai. The alternative was that if Chinese refused to accept terms Japanese would take over functions of customs within those areas occupied by Japanese military forces. Commissioner is believed to have recommended acceptance of terms but would prefer deposits to be made in banks other than Japanese. It seems to me that Chinese Government would be wise to accept terms as only way of possibly preserving [customs]. Repeated to Shanghai and Peiping. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 693.002/360: Telegram [Document 971] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , September 3, 1937—9 p.m. 212. Your 576, August 31, 8 p.m., in regard to Chinese Customs. 1. We have a historical interest in the preservation of the administrative integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and a material interest in the safeguarding of the Customs revenues. Our historical interest is derived from the fact that American nationals, with other foreign nationals, have been instrumental in building up the present Chinese Customs administration. Our material interest is based upon the fact that certain obligations of the Chinese Government to the American Government and to American nationals are secured by Customs revenues. 2. While we deplore the circumstances which have given rise to an offer of the “terms” mentioned in your telegram under reference, Ave are inclined to agree that acceptance by the Chinese of those “terms”, under the circumstances and in view of the alternative suggested, would be expedient. The terms offered might, if faithfully carried out, safeguard our financial interest in the Customs revenues, and might also tend to preserve, in a modified form, Chinese control over Customs administration. 3. The following telegram to the American Group from Bennett 82 has just been read to us over long distance telephone from New York: “Japanese threatening to impound customs revenues Tientsin China releasing foreign loan quota only. Customs revenues by end of September probably inadequate Boxer Indemnities and foreign loans. Salt revenues likely to be in similar position. British propose and French agreeable endeavor induce Chinese and Japanese agree deposit all customs and salt funds in Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation as trustee for bondholders Banque de l’Indo Chine and the National City Bank of New York to participate in such deposits as sub-depositaries. If you approve will join British and French in requesting diplomatic assistance for tnis purpose. Charles R. Bennett.” This seems to the Department to warrant consideration. 4. The Department desires that you consult with your interested colleagues in regard to the matter and report the result of such consultation to the Department. Hull 82 Charles R. Bennett, China representative of the American Group at New York under the Consortium Agreement of October 15, 1920; for text of agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1920, vol. i , p. 576 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/864: Telegram [Document 972] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , September 4, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 6:44 p.m.] 650. Charles R. Bennett, representative of American Group, has handed me the following memorandum prepared by Cassels of the British Group: “Under present conditions it is fairly certain that before the end of this month the customs revenues will be insufficient to provide for more than the regular customs loans, that is, the foreign loans and indemnities, and there may even be a reorganization by the Chinese. It is suggested that representations should be made to urge that the whole of the customs revenues should from this date be paid directly to a foreign bank as trustees for bondholders. This, moreover, might have the effect of maintaining the integrity of the customs service should the Japanese propose to interfere. It could further be arranged that any surplus revenue over and above the foreign loans would be held either for the domestic loans and the other self-secured loans (railway loans) of [ or ?] revenues. The question of reserve of loans can perhaps be arranged by the trustees in consultation with the I. G. 83 of Customs. Representations of the above lines might be made to the best advantage by our Ambassadors and representations might also be made in Tokyo, asking the Japanese Government not to endanger the customs service and the loans which are held so widely in many countries. Similar action might be recommended in regard to October salt quotas for loan service.” Bennett states that this memorandum has been presented to the British Ambassador and is also to be presented to the French Ambassador who is due here today. He asks me to present it to you. Bennett is cabling the American Group requesting their authority to agree to the appointment of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation as trustee for the bondholders—both salt and customs loans—the Banque de l’Indo Chine and the National City Bank to participate equally as sub-depositaries and sub-trustees. He states that it is evident that a proposal of more than one main trustee which must then include the Japanese bank would be immediately refused by the Chinese Government. He has added a note that the matter of identity of the trustee in question is open, it having been suggested that Sir Frederick Maze 84 be made trustee. Sent to Nanking, repeated to the Department. Gauss 83 Inspector General. 84 British Inspector General of Customs in China. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/366: Telegram [Document 973] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 8, 1937—5 p.m. [Received September 8—11:35 a.m.] 625. Department’s 212, September 3, 9 p.m. and Shanghai’s 630 [ 650 ], September 4, 3 p.m. British and French Ambassadors, now in Shanghai, are awaiting instructions from home governments. Both favor China accepting proposal emanating from Japanese Consul at Tientsin but are urging home governments to support more ambitious plan outlined in group memorandum recommending Hong Kong and Shanghai bank as trustee bank of deposit. British Embassy states that Inspector General of Customs is urging Chinese Government to accept such a scheme, and that he is being supported in this by Soong. 85 There is a belief that Nanking authorities will be loath to accept any compromise arrangement but there is no definite information regarding Nanking’s attitude as yet. Does the Department wish to take identic or joint action with British and French in support group bank proposal. Johnson 85 T. V. Soong, chairman of the board of directors, Bank of China. The Department of State to the British Embassy 693.002/365 [Document 974] The Department of State to the British Embassy Reference is made to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of September 6, 86 stating that the Chargé d’Aflaires of the British Embassy at Tokyo has been instructed to inform the Japanese Government that the British Government desires to remind the Japanese Government of the substantial British interests in both the Chinese customs and salt administrations and in the revenues which those administrations collect and to add that while the British Government does not doubt that the Japanese Government intends scrupulously to respect the interests in question the British Government would be glad to receive an assurance that that is in fact the intention of the Japanese Government. With reference to the British Government’s inquiry whether or not the American Government is contemplating taking action along similar lines, the American Government has the matter under consideration and on September 3 requested a telegraphic report from the American Ambassador at Nanking with regard to matters affecting the Chinese customs and salt administrations. Upon receipt of a report from the Ambassador, the Department will expect to communicate further with the British Embassy. Washington , September 8, 1937. 86 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 693.002/366: Telegram [Document 975] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , September 10, 1937—1 p.m. 227. Your 625, September 8, 5 p.m., in regard to Chinese revenue administrations. The Department is inclined to view favorably the proposal of the banking groups as quoted in Shanghai’s 650, September 4, 3 p.m. In the absence of adverse comment from you, the Department assumes that you also favor the proposal. You are authorized, therefore, if and when your British and French colleagues receive similar authorization, to support the proposal through an approach, in such manner as you deem appropriate, to the Chinese Government. Please keep the Department promptly and fully informed in regard to this matter. For your information: The British Embassy has handed the Department an aide-mémoire under date September 6 87 which states in substance that the British Embassy at Tokyo has been instructed to inform the Japanese Government that the British Government would be glad to receive an assurance that it is the intention of the Japanese Government to respect British interests in the Chinese customs and salt administrations. In reply to the British Government’s inquiry whether or not the American Government is contemplating taking action along similar lines in Tokyo, the Department has stated that it has the question of Chinese customs and salt administrations under consideration and will expect to communicate further with the British Embassy. It is the Department’s desire to have further and more definitive information with regard to the action that may be taken in Nanking before it considers making an approach in Tokyo similar to that made by the British Government. Hull 87 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/368: Telegram [Document 976] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 13, 1937—2 p.m. [Received 3:55 p.m.] 648. Department’s 227, September 10, 1 p.m. I am informed by British Embassy that British action in Tokyo refers specifically to situation set forth in my 576, August 31, 8 p.m., and to the one behind Japanese communication to Commissioner of Customs. Action was intended to let Japanese know that British knew of proposal and renounce [ sic ], and to obtain from Japanese an assurance that they would respect British interests in revenues of customs and salt. Action did not relate to matters discussed in the Department’s 212, September 3, 9 p.m. and Shanghai’s 650, September 4, 3 p.m. With reference to this latter question it is my belief that Chinese Government will be loath to accede to an arrangement which will deprive them of entire customs revenue in favor of foreign bondholders when they are fighting for their national existence. It is my belief that Chinese will propose a moratorium instead. Neither French nor British Embassies have as yet received instructions. Repeated to Peiping and Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/371: Telegram [Document 977] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 16, 1937—6 p.m. [Received September 16—11:12 a.m.] 668. Department’s 212, September 3, 9 p.m.; and 227, September 10, 1 p.m. In consultation with British Chargé d’Affaires, representative of French Embassy and Hall-Patch, financial adviser to British Embassy, I learn that with reference to Tientsin “terms” referred to in my 576, August 31, 8 p.m., Chinese Government have not as yet issued instructions to Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin. I am, therefore, joining British and French in identic but not joint representations to Ministry of Foreign Affairs urging Chinese Government to give Commissioner of Customs instructions to make best terms he can in interest of preserving integrity of customs. I am at the same time joining same colleagues in identic representations urging Chinese to adopt measures recommended by bankers and reported in Shanghai’s 650, September 4, 3 p.m. Repeated to Shanghai. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/372: Telegram [Document 978] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 18, 1937—noon. [Received 4:43 p.m.] 675. My 576, August 31, 8 p.m. and Department’s 212, September 3, 9 p.m. During a call which Minister for Foreign Affairs 88 made on me this morning I handed to him following aide-mémoire: “The American Embassy has received a report that the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin has approached the Commissioner of Customs at that port in regard to handling of maritime customs revenue in North China and has intimated that if the proposals made by the Consul General are not accepted the Japanese military authorities will take over the customs offices in all areas occupied or controlled by the Japanese forces and will establish a customs administration under Japanese control. It is commonly accepted that China’s credit is largely built on the integrity of the Customs Administration and it seems highly essential to maintain that integrity if it is at all possible. Consequently the American Embassy suggests that it would be highly advisable for the Chinese Government to authorize the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin to make such arrangements with the Japanese military authorities as shall be most in the interest of China and shall at the same time and as far as possible preserve the integrity of the Customs Administration. As matters now stand it is very much to be feared that in the lack of some such arrangement the Customs Administration in North China may be completely destroyed.” British and French Embassies are taking identic action but separately. Dr. Wang stated that he would give matter sympathetic consideration. He stated that Chinese Government in this matter is concerned over possible establishment of a precedent whereby they might later find themselves committed to joint control with Japan over customs surplus, a situation they wish to avoid in order to be free to use customs surplus in their own interest and without dictation from outside. Sent to Department. Repeated to Shanghai, Peiping. Inform Tientsin. Johnson 88 Wang Chung-hui. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/367: Telegram [Document 979] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 18, 1937—3 p.m. 214. On September 6 the Department received an aide-mémoire from the British Embassy 89 stating that the British Embassy at Tokyo had been instructed, with reference to measures which the Japanese contemplate taking with regard to the Chinese Government revenues at Tientsin, to remind the Japanese Government of the substantial British interests in both the Chinese Customs and Salt Administrations and in the revenues therefrom and to request assurances from the Japanese Government that it intends to respect those British interests. In reply to the British Government’s inquiry whether or not the American Government contemplated action along similar lines, we stated that we had the matter under consideration. On September 15 the Department received another British aide-mémoire 89 which stated, with reference to reports that the Chinese Customs house at Taishan, Kwangtung Province, had been captured by the Japanese, that the British Embassy in Tokyo had again been instructed to draw the attention of the Japanese Government to the importance which the British Government attaches to the preservation of the Chinese Customs Administration. In reply to an inquiry with regard to parallel action by the American Government, we have stated that you have been authorized to consult with your British colleague and, in your discretion, to make an approach to the Japanese Government in the matter. The Department suggests that such approach be along the following lines: The American Government has an interest in the preservation of the Chinese Maritime Customs and of the Chinese Salt Administration and has an interest in the safeguarding of the revenues of those administrations. Reports of measures which the Japanese contemplate taking with regard to Chinese Customs and Salt Administrations at Tientsin and reports of Japanese military action directed against Chinese Customs houses on the coast of Kwangtung Province, with particular reference to the attack on the Customs house at Taishan, have come to our attention and we desire to invite the attention of the Japanese Government to those reports. The American Government holds the view that the integrity of the Chinese revenue administrations should be carefully respected and it has confidence that the Japanese Government holds a similar view and will act in conformity therewith. Hull 89 Not printed. 89 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 693.002/367: Telegram [Document 980] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , September 18, 1937—4 p.m. 247. Your 648, September 13, 2 p.m., and 668, September 16, 6 p.m. 1. Our Ambassador at Tokyo has been authorized to consult with his British colleague and, in his discretion, to inform the Japanese Government of the American Government’s interest in the preservation of the administrative integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and of the Chinese Salt Administration and of its interest in the safeguarding of the revenues of those administrations, and in this connection to invite attention to reports of measures which the Japanese contemplate taking with regard to Chinese Customs and Salt Administrations at Tientsin and reports of Japanese military action directed against Chinese Custom houses on the coast of Kwangtung Province, with particular reference to the attack on the Customs house at Taishan. 2. With reference to your expression of belief that the “Chinese Government will be loath to accede to an arrangement which will deprive them of entire customs revenue in favor of foreign bondholders,” the Department desires to point out that in expressing approval of the group banks’ proposal and authorizing you to support that proposal, it was acting on the assumption that the plan proposed offered a practicable (and perhaps the only) means of preserving, in a modified form and against a definite Japanese threat, Chinese control over the Customs and Salt Administrations. The foregoing statement applies also to the special plan with regard to the Tientsin Customs. The Department understood that you held similar views. This government has always sought to avert rather than to cause financial difficulties for the Chinese Government. In expressing an interest in safeguarding American interests in the customs and salt revenues, the Department has primarily in mind the question of the preservation of the Customs and Salt Administrations (a question of considerable importance to the Chinese Government). 3. The Department wishes to emphasize that it is primarily interested in the objective of preservation of Chinese revenue administrations and not on behalf of any particular plan put forward, and it is relying upon you to offer or comment upon practicable methods to attain that end. Hull The Department of State to the British Embassy 693.002/369 [Document 981] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The receipt is acknowledged of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of September 15, 1937, 90 stating, with reference to reports that the principal Chinese Customs house on the border of the Kowloon Leased Territory has been captured by the Japanese, that the British Embassy in Tokyo has again been instructed to draw the attention of the Japanese Government to the importance which the British Government attaches to the preservation of the Chinese Customs Administration. In reply to the British Government’s inquiry contained in the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of September 6, 1937, 90 and in its aide-mémoire under acknowledgment, with regard to parallel action by the American Government, this Government has authorized its Ambassador in Tokyo to consult with his British colleague and, in his discretion, to inform the Japanese Government of the American Government’s interest in the preservation of the administrative integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and of the Chinese Salt Administration and of its interest in the safeguarding of the revenues of those administrations. In making his approach, the American Ambassador is being instructed to invite the attention of the Japanese Government to reports of Japanese military action directed against the Chinese Customs houses on the coast of Kwangtung Province, with special reference to the attack on the Customs house at Taishan, and to reports of measures contemplated by the Japanese with regard to the Customs and Salt administrations at Tientsin. Washington , September 18, 1937. 90 Not printed. 90 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/373: Telegram [Document 982] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 18, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:06 p.m.] 679. Shanghai’s 650, September 4, 3 p.m. and Department’s 227, September 10, 1 p.m. During a call which Minister for Foreign Affairs made upon me this morning I handed to him the following aide-mémoire: “A certain situation disadvantageous to the integrity of the Maritime Customs has arisen at Tientsin and Chinwangtao and it seems desirable to anticipate and, if possible, prevent the possibility of such a situation arising elsewhere in China and with this object in view the suggestion has been made that the Chinese Government instruct the Inspector General of Customs to deposit in the bank of a country not concerned in the present hostilities all the revenue collected at maritime customs stations elsewhere than at Tientsin and Chinwangtao, and that this bank then consult with the Inspector General of Customs with a view to utilizing these funds to meet the service of the foreign and domestic loans secured on the customs revenue, in accordance with their respective rights to priority, and that the remainder of the revenue be disposed of at the discretion of the Chinese Government. It is obvious that if this arrangement were made it would tend to ward off attempts to interfere with the regular administering of the customs and would help immensely to protect the financial credit of the Chinese Government in foreign countries. The American Embassy earnestly suggests that the Chinese Government give careful attention to this proposal. In this connection, it is suggested, likewise, that if such an arrangement is made for the handling of customs revenues, a similar procedure might be taken into consideration in relation to the loan quotas which the various salt revenue districts are now instructed must be deferred toward meeting obligations secured on the revenues of the Salt Administration.” Dr. Wang stated that he would give the above suggestion sympathetic consideration. My British and French colleagues are taking separate but identic action. Repeated to Shanghai and Peiping. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/374: Telegram [Document 983] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , September 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received September 24—6:30 a.m.] 406. Department’s 214, September 18, 3 p.m.—Chinese Customs and Salt Administrations. 1. My British colleague who has sent to me copies of one note and two aide-mémoires on the above-mentioned subject left by the British Embassy at the Foreign Office stated that action by us along the lines suggested by the Department would be very helpful. He explained that with special reference to the Maritime Customs at Tientsin the Japanese proposed that a certain proportion of the customs revenues be set aside for servicing loans secured by customs revenues and that the balance be placed on deposit in the Yokohama Specie Bank until settlement of the present conflict and that the Chinese had agreed to the proposal but on condition that the repository be a neutral bank. That condition is not acceptable, Craigie 91 stated, to the Japanese. 2. This morning Dooman 92 made orally to Yoshizawa 93 a statement along the lines of third paragraph of Department’s telegram under reference. Yoshizawa replied briefly to the effect that the Japanese Government is also solicitous that the integrity of the Customs and Salt Administrations shall be maintained as evidenced by the fact that the director of the customs at Tientsin still is a person appointed by the Chinese Government. He added that a supplementary reply would be made later. Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. Grew 91 Sir Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan. 92 Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan. 93 Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/375: Telegram [Document 984] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , September 27, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 6:53 p.m.] 726. Department’s 247, September 18, 4 p.m. When presenting matter of the customs terms presented by Japanese at Tientsin as well as when presenting [matter of] proposal of bankers on the general question of the customs, I emphasized the fact that our interest was in the preservation of the administration and that these proposals were put forward for that purpose. I understand that Chinese are refusing to accept Japanese plan to place funds in Yokohama Specie Bank and that Tientsin Customs Commissioner is opposing acceptance of this term as only means of preserving administration of customs in Tientsin area. I have heard nothing further from Chinese here. British are taking no further action and I do not propose to take further action unless some new situation arises which I shall refer to the Department. Johnson Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Affairs (Hornbeck) 793.94/10443 [Document 985] Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [Extract] [ Washington ,] October 4, 1937. Conversation: The Secretary of State, The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. C. T. Wang. Present: Mr. Hornbeck. The Secretary opened the conversation with an inquiry after the Ambassador’s family. The Ambassador replied that the members of his family were all well. The question of war news was raised. The Ambassador stated that the Chinese were retreating “a little”—in the north; that the Chinese troops there were provincial troops, whereas the Japanese troops were their best; that the Chinese had better troops on a line behind their present front. The Secretary inquired how large an area the Japanese might try to occupy in the Shanghai theater. The Ambassador replied that he thought they would try to go to Nanking if possible. The Ambassador then said that he had come to speak about the customs revenue. He said that the Japanese were trying to seize the customs at Tientsin and Chinwangtao. He said that a portion of the customs revenue was hypothecated for the service of foreign loans; that the Japanese were trying to seize the revenue; that the Inspector General had submitted a proposal to H. H. Kung; that he, the Ambassador, was not clear with regard to the details, but that he understood that the idea was that all revenue from the customs in the two places named should be held intact, that the loans should be serviced, and that the balance should be kept in a bank; that he understood that this had been endorsed by the foreign ambassadors; that the Japanese were insisting on holding the whole of the revenue. The Secretary said that he had not heard the latter part of this. He inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck knew of this. Mr. Hornbeck stated that it had been his understanding that the Japanese were proposing that the revenue be held in the Yokohama Specie Bank whereas the representatives of the other powers were suggesting some other bank, for instance, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; but that he had not heard of the latest development which the Ambassador mentioned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/379: Telegram [Document 986] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 6, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 7:50 p.m.] 766. My 726, September 27, 3 p.m. British Chargé d’Affaires yesterday acting under instructions of Great Britain [ the British? ] Government left with Minister for [Foreign] Affairs following aide-mémoire: “Mr. Howe has the honor to refer to the oral representations which he made on the 18th September last regarding the proposals for the disposition of the customs revenue at Tientsin made by the Japanese military authorities there, refusal to accept which would entail the taking over of the Customs Administration by those authorities. Mr. Howe understands that the Japanese military authorities at Tientsin are insistent that the customs revenue be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank and are not prepared to accept any alternative. His Majesty’s Consul General at Tientsin, who has been following this question closely, points out that if the funds are so deposited the Commissioner of Customs will retain full control over them and also that no remittances will be possible to the Chinese Government until a final settlement of the present difficulties has been reached. On the other hand it is stated that the Japanese authorities agree to remittances to the Inspector General of Customs for payment of the foreign loan quotas—and to withdrawals for all necessary local current expenditures.” Last night at dinner I referred informally to this matter in conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that our sole interest was to see that whatever arrangement was arrived at would protect the administration of the customs. Dr. Wang stated that difficulty lay in fact that Japanese were insisting that customs revenues be deposited in Japanese bank whereas Chinese insisted that deposits be placed in bank of third power. He asked me whether I thought Japanese would make similar demands in regard to customs at other places, for instance Shanghai. I said that I thought that they would and that the proposal originating with the bankers at Shanghai had been put forward with the thought of forestalling such a situation and protecting the Customs Administration. I understand that French Embassy is making representations similar to those made by British Chargé d’Affaires. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Shanghai, Peiping, [by?] mail to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/381: Telegram [Document 987] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 9, 1937—1 p.m. [Received October 9—10:12 a.m.] 788. My 767, October 6, 4 p.m. 94 The Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon asked the opinion of the British Chargé d’Affaires regarding the following proposal which he explained had just yesterday received the approval of the military authorities: “Central Bank to nominate Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank or other ‘neutral’ bank as custodian bank for all customs revenues. Custodian bank to open an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank in which all customs revenues collected in Tientsin and Chinwangtao will be deposited, the custodian bank undertaking vis-à-vis the Yokohama Specie Bank that this account will be drawn upon by the custodian bank by check for foreign loan quota and current local expenses only, and the balance to remain at the Yokohama Specie Bank pending settlement of present hostilities”. In spite of the asserted unofficial character of this proposal the British Chargé d’Affaires gained the impression that it would be approved by the Chinese Government if accepted by the Japanese Government and has submitted it to the British Foreign Office with the suggestion that it be urged on the Japanese Government by the British Embassy in Tokyo. He stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked that his connection with the proposal should not be disclosed. He has also telegraphed it to the British Consul General in Tientsin with instructions that he attempt through the Japanese Consul General to obtain the approval of the Japanese military authorities there, or at least obtain a postponement of the transfer limit reportedly imposed by the Japanese authorities for the acceptance by the Chinese of the original Japanese [demand?] that the local customs revenues be deposited with a Japanese bank. This demand the Chargé d’Affaires feels (and I concur) the Chinese will never submit to in the form presented. I suggest that the American Ambassador in Tokyo be authorized to make representations parallel to those of the British Ambassador. Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping and to Shanghai for repetition to Tokyo. Johnson 94 Ante , p. 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/382: Telegram [Document 988] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , October 12, 1937—4 p.m. 259. Reference Nanking’s 788, October 9, 1 p.m., in regard to customs revenues, which it is understood was repeated to you by Shanghai. On October 9 the British Embassy handed the Department a statement of the substance of a telegram from the British Government to the British Embassy at Tokyo which reads as follows: “1. His Majesty’s Government regard proposed solution as satisfactory subject to following two points: ( a ) Japanese Consul-General at Tientsin to give written assurances balance to be deposited with Yokohama Specie Bank in Tientsin should not be touched, ( b ) Funds deposited with Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to be in name of Inspector-General of Customs. 2. If Chinese Government are prepared to accept arrangement subject to ( b ) above you should strongly urge Japanese Government to agree. Meanwhile please endeavour to secure that military are restrained from proceeding to seize revenues at Tientsin.” Please consult with your British colleague and, in your discretion, make an appropriate approach to the Japanese Government. In so doing the Department feels that you should take occasion to emphasize that this Government is interested primarily in the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese customs (Department’s 214, September 18, 3 p.m., and your 406, September 24, 4 p.m.). Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/384: Telegram [Document 989] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 13, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 7:35 p.m.] 804. My 788, October 9, 1 p.m. The British Chargé d’Affaires has informed me that the Minister for Foreign Affairs at midnight last night gave him the reply of the Chinese Government both to the Japanese demand in regard to the northern customs revenues and to the foreign bankers’ proposal regarding customs revenues throughout China. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had had great difficulty obtaining the approval of the Chinese Government for this document of which the following is translation made by the British Embassy: “1. The procedure now in force is that all customs revenues are deposited with the Central Bank of China. The Chinese Government is willing to instruct on its own initiative the Central Bank of China to authorize as a provisional measure a bank of a third country as custodian bank to receive such revenues. Details of the arrangement to be fixed by the two banks. 2. The revenues referred to above shall include those of the Tientsin and Chinwangtao customs. 3. The period for which the authentication [ authorization ] is given will only cover the duration of the present hostilities. 4. The custodian bank shall be responsible to the Central Bank of China for the safe custody of all customs revenues so deposited. With regard, however, to the revenues collected by the Tientsin and Chinwangtao customs, the custodian bank is permitted to deposit them with another bank. 5. The custodian bank shall, during the period of authorization mentioned in number 1 above, make the necessary monthly payments as heretofore. As regards, however, the revenues deposited temporarily with the other bank mentioned in number 4 it may draw (by check) on such other bank as they fall due the necessary amounts for the payment of the quotas of foreign loans assigned to Tientsin and Chinwangtao and tor the defraying of the necessary current local expenses of those stations. 6. The custodian bank shall not concern itself with matters other than the arrangements above-mentioned”. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that this formula would be given to the Inspector General of Customs October 13 for transmission to the Commissioner at Tientsin with instructions to negotiate with the Japanese on that part which applies to customs at Tientsin and Chinwangtao. It seems to us that if this scheme were accepted both the Japanese military authorities at Tientsin and the foreign bankers would achieve their principal objectives. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping and to Shanghai for repetition to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/385: Telegram [Document 990] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 14, 1937—4 p.m. [Received October 14—9:34 a.m.] 473. Department’s 259, October 12, 4 p.m. 1. The British Embassy yesterday handed to the Foreign Office a memorandum entitled “Proposed arrangement concerning customs revenues at Tientsin and Chinwangtao”, which was based on a telegram received from the British Embassy at Nanking. As we have no information that the substance of the proposed arrangement, which was said to have originated with the Chinese Government, is known to the Department, we are telegraphing the text of the memorandum: [Here follows text quoted in telegram No. 804, October 13, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, supra. ] 2. The memorandum makes no reference to the use of funds deposited with the Yokohama Specie Bank or to the depositing of funds in the Hong Kong [and] Shanghai Bank in the name of the Inspector General of Customs. The British Embassy informs us that, as the Japanese time limit (see Nanking’s number 788, October 9, 1 p.m.) was to expire today, it had considered it expedient nevertheless to present without delay the proposed arrangement to the Japanese Government and to urge acceptance thereof. 3. This morning we again stated orally to the Foreign Office that the American Government is interested primarily in preserving the integrity of the Chinese Customs. We stated that, as the arrangement proposed by the British Embassy appeared to contribute toward preserving the integrity of the Chinese Customs, we urged the Japanese Government to give it favorable consideration. However, we reserved the right later to comment on or to propose modification of the terms of the proposed arrangement. 4. Yoshizawa stated unofficially and not on behalf of the Foreign Office that the crux of the problem is the question of the disposal of surplus funds in the Yokohama Specie Bank. He stated that, because of abnormal conditions, the “Peace Preservation Committee”, which has assumed responsibility for the administration of the Tientsin area, cannot raise sufficient funds for its needs by local taxes, and that, as the incidence of the customs revenues falls largely upon the people of the Tientsin area, it was felt that the Committee is entitled to the use of the customs revenues for local administrative purposes. 5. He further stated unofficially that the arrangement proposed by the British Embassy was formulated by the Chinese Customs. He made the comment that if absence of any reference in the British Embassy’s memorandum to the question of the disposal of funds in the Yokohama Specie Bank meant that the Chinese Government is now agreeable to such funds being placed at the disposal of the “Peace Preservation Committee” it is likely that a satisfactory solution can be worked out between the Japanese Consul General and the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Chew) 693.002/385: Telegram [Document 991] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Chew ) Washington , October 15, 1937—7 p.m. 262. Your 473, October 14, 4 p.m., and Nanking’s 804, October 13, 3 p.m., in regard to Chinese customs. The suggested provision, mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your 473, that surplus funds deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank would be placed at the disposal of the “Peace Preservation Committee” for local administrative purposes, constitutes the first intimation that we have had that such a provision was under contemplation. If you feel that the Foreign Office entertains any doubt as to our attitude on this point, you should make clear to the Foreign Office that this Government’s concern is that sympathetic consideration be given to the temporary arrangement proposed by the Chinese Government as set forth in Nanking’s 804 (which is the same as the arrangement which forms the subject of the memorandum quoted in your 473), and you may, in your discretion, again express to the Foreign Office the hope that the Japanese Government will give the proposed arrangement sympathetic consideration. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/388: Telegram [Document 992] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 18, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 18—10:15 a.m.] 480. Department’s 262, October 15, 7 p.m. 1. The British Ambassador informs me that he called this morning on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked whether consideration is being given by the Japanese Government to revising the original Japanese proposal to the extent of making available to the “Peace Preservation Committee” surplus funds in the Yokohama Specie Bank. The Vice Minister replied that prior to the present hostilities the surplus customs revenues of North China were being handed over to the Hopei–Chahar Council and that there was a feeling that such surplus funds should now be made available to the new Committee. The Vice Minister said that he would look into the matter further and would discuss it again with Craigie in a day or two. 2. As there is some doubt in Craigie’s mind as to whether or not his Government wishes to have him insist on point ( b ) set forth in telegraphic instructions to him quoted in Department’s 259, October 12, 4 p.m., he requests that I make no further representations until he has talked again with Horinouchi. As we have already urged the Foreign Office to give favorable consideration to the arrangement proposed by the British Embassy and as we have also made it clear that we might propose an additional clause which would secure the surplus funds in the Yokohama Specie Bank we are making no further approach for the time being to the Foreign Office. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/390: Telegram [Document 993] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , October 19, 1937—11 a.m. [Received October 19—6:30 a.m.] 827. My 817, October 16, 1 [ 3 ] p.m. 95 The British Chargé d’Affaires informed me yesterday that the Minister for Foreign Affairs told him confidentially October 16 that he himself regarded preservation of the Customs Administration as the paramount issue and that he would be willing to accept the original Japanese proposal for the Tientsin area if that were the best arrangement possible. He said that he would attempt to obtain the concurrence of his colleagues but he anticipated great difficulty. Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping and Tokyo. Johnson 95 Not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/391: Telegram [Document 994] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 23, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 23—7:12 a.m.] 490. Embassy’s 480, October 18, 5 p.m. The British Embassy states that it has received from Tientsin telegram reporting local settlement of the customs issue in accordance with which funds will be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank and jurisdiction and regulations of the Maritime Customs will be respected. Repeated to Nanking. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/392: Telegram [Document 995] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 1, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 1:59 p.m.] 873. Department’s 334, October 23, 4 [ 7 ] p.m. 96 British Embassy informs me that Commissioner of Customs by arrangement with the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin has begun deposit of customs collections at Tientsin and Chinwangtao with Yokohama Specie Bank leaving question of remittances to future settlement. He says that Commissioner of Customs reports that military at Tientsin are again restive and pressing for taking over customs so that it is doubtful whether arrangement which Commissioner has reached with Japanese Consul General will be continued. He informs me that he has had word from Tokyo that Japanese are considering proposal outlined in my 804 of October 13, 3 p.m., put forward by the Chinese. Situation is much confused. British Chargé d’Affaires believes that Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin exceeded his instructions in making deposits with Japanese bank without previous agreement regarding remittances. He assumes that Commissioner believed that he was accepting the original proposal of the Japanese military. We believe here that there is nothing to be accomplished further here. At the moment customs are functioning at Tientsin and Chinwangtao without interference from the Japanese. Johnson 96 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/393: Telegram [Document 996] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , November 3, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 3—1 p.m.] 884. Department’s 334, October 28, 4 [ 7 ] p.m. 97 Following telegram has been received from Tientsin: “November 2, 3 p.m. Your November 1, 9 a.m. Commissioner of Customs states in strict confidence that negotiations with Japanese are proceeding satisfactorily; that some ships are now discharging cargo without supervision but he is hopeful that with the arrival of 28 additional Japanese employees assigned here he will be able to reestablish complete supervision of trade; that all duty collected since October 22nd has been deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank, Tientsin; that the Commissioner reserves the right to remit this money at his discretion but for the present is not remitting; that he considers that this is the only means by which the integrity of the customs can possibly be maintained.” Johnson 97 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/442: Telegram [Document 997] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 19, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 19—2:45 p.m.] 990. Inspector General of Customs tells me he expects Japanese military will approach the Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai through the Japanese Consul General for an arrangement similar to that made at Tientsin under which the customs continue to function but revenues are deposited [in] Japanese bank subject to withdrawals for cost of collection and indemnity and loan moneys [ quotas ]. An attempt will be made to obtain better arrangement if possible. He expressed the hope that I along with my British and French colleagues would give [such] informal support as possible for a reasonable arrangement. I request instruction. Sent to Department. Repeated to Nanking. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/443: Telegram [Document 998] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 23, 1937—10 a.m. [Received November 23—7 a.m.] 1003. I learn confidentially that as no approach had been made to the customs from the Japanese side and the Japanese Navy were continuing busily to seize customs vessels the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs yesterday went to see the Japanese Consul General who told him that the Japanese being now in occupation of Shanghai require “supervision” of the customs and asked the Commissioner to prepare proposals to that end, saying that no “third parties” are to be concerned in the discussions. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/444: Telegram [Document 999] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 24, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 9:14 p.m.] 1016. Reference my 990, November 19 and 1003, November 23 concerning Shanghai Customs. I was invited to meet with the French Ambassador, the financial adviser of British Embassy, and the Commissioner of Customs this afternoon to discuss matter of the customs. I did so but stated I was without instructions. Commissioner of Customs appears to have had a vague conversation with Japanese Consul General who asked Commissioner’s cooperation in arranging for Japanese supervision of the customs, requested a plan for such supervision, stated that foreign loan and indemnity quotas and foreign personnel would be respected, and added that no third parties would be recognized in the discussions. The Commissioner this afternoon had an outline of his office organization and was prepared to propose Japanese observers in his offices. He was advised to limit his proposal to one to transfer to Shanghai customs house Japanese already in customs service. A Japanese has already been transferred here from Tientsin to serve as Administrative Commissioner which is second ranking position. No mention was made in conversation with Japanese Consul General concerning bank of deposit of revenues. Shall I continue to observe and report as informed or invited to attend discussions. Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Chew) 693.002/395b: Telegram [Document 1000] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Chew ) Washington , November 24, 1937—7 p.m. 316. The Department has received two aide-mémoires from the British Embassy 98 here, in which there are put forth suggestions as to temporary arrangements for handling Chinese Customs funds at Shanghai and possibly at other places under Japanese control. The Department has not completed its study in regard to the details involved in the various British suggestions. You are authorized, however, to discuss the matter with your British colleague and when you are informed that he is prepared to approach the Japanese Government, to make, acting separately, appropriate informal representations to the Japanese Government. In such approach you should express to the Japanese Government this Government’s very real interest in the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Customs and its administrative functions, including the safeguarding of the Customs revenues. You should not support any particular plan or arrangement, but should confine your approach to a broad statement of our position as indicated above. 99 Hull 98 Dated November 19, and November 22; neither printed. 99 Repeated to the Consul General at Shanghai as No. 577, with instructions “to discuss the matter fully with your British colleague and to take action along the lines which the Embassy at Tokyo has been authorized to take.” (693.002/395a) The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/396: Telegram [Document 1001] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 26, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 26—8:40 a.m.] 567. Department’s 316, November 24, 7 p.m. 1. In view of the urgency of the matter as indicated in a report by the British Financial Counsellor at Shanghai to the British Embassy here and of the French Ambassador’s formal representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 23 as well as the British Ambassador’s representations to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 221 called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and left with him an aide-mémoire stating our position with regard to the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Customs Administration in the sense of the Department’s telegram under reference. In view of the instructions contained therein, however, I informed the Minister that my representations were informal. 2. The Minister authorized me to inform you that in the discussions at Shanghai full consideration will be given to foreign interests in the Chinese Customs. He was somewhat at a loss to understand the remark of the Japanese Consul General that no third parties would be recognized in the discussions (Shanghai’s 1016 1 ) because, as he pointed out, the discussions are being carried on with the other interested consular representatives in Shanghai. He assumes that the allusion must refer to unofficial British agents who may be attempting to enter the discussions. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 1 November 24, 4 p.m., p. 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] . The Department of State to the British Embassy 693.002/411 [Document 1002] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The Government of the United States acknowledges herewith the three aides-mémoire of the British Embassy dated November 19, November 22, and November 26 respectively. 2 With reference to the first two aides-mémoire of the British Embassy, the Government of the United States on November 24 despatched telegraphic instructions to Mr. Grew at Tokyo to impress upon the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs this Government’s very real interest in the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Customs and its administrative functions, including the safeguarding of the Customs revenues. Mr. Grew was instructed to confine his approach to a broad statement of our position as indicated above and not to support any particular plan or arrangement. A similar instruction was sent to the American Consul General at Shanghai. When the aide-mémoire of the British Embassy dated November 26 was handed to Mr. Hamilton, 3 he took the occasion to point out to Mr. Vyvyan 4 that an apparent discrepancy existed in the reports on the situation as shown by what Mr. Hirota 5 had told Mr. Grew and what Mr. Hall-Patch had reported to the British Government. This apparent inconsistency raises doubt as to the attitude of the Japanese authorities in respect to discussion with representatives of outside powers about the Shanghai customs situation. The Government of the United States has sent on November 26 telegraphic instructions to both Tokyo and Shanghai in the endeavor to obtain a clarification of the attitude of the Japanese authorities. The Government of the United States thinks it advisable at this time to apprise the British Embassy of the attitude of the Government in respect to the more general aspects of this matter. The Government of the United States attaches the highest importance to keeping alive before the Japanese Government the deep interest of the Government of the United States in the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, both of its functioning and the distribution of its funds. To this end it has instructed and will instruct its representatives both in Tokyo and in Shanghai to keep constantly in touch with the situation, to use their influence for the broad purposes described above, and to object to any arrangement which would appear to contravene these purposes. At the same time the Government of the United States does not feel that it should take a position of insisting upon participation by a representative of this Government in the negotiations which are at present in progress between the authorities of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and the Japanese military. The Government of the United States believes that it should be consulted with regard to these negotiations and it believes that its representatives at Tokyo and particularly at Shanghai might, when consulted, make useful contributions during the course of such negotiations. Washington , November 26, 1937. 2 None printed. 3 Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 4 John Michal Kenneth Vyvyan, British Second Secretary of Embassy at Washington. 5 Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/396: Telegram [Document 1003] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 26, 1937—8 p.m. 317. Your 567, November 26, 6 p.m. 1. Today the British Embassy here has left at the Department a further aide-mémoire 6 in which it is stated that Mr. Okazaki informed Hall-Patch on November 23 that negotiations must be conducted by the Japanese Consul General of Shanghai with Mr. Lawford of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and that the Japanese authorities would brook no interference from any quarter whatsoever. The British informed us that they take strong exception to this attitude of the Japanese authorities at Shanghai and that they intend that the British Ambassador at Tokyo should make strong representations to the Japanese Government. The British Ambassador would be instructed to point out that the Customs Administration and revenues are, as the Japanese Government has recognized, an international concern and that the British Government is unable to admit that any arrangement can properly be reached between the local customs officials (influenced by the threat of military pressure) and the Japanese authorities at Shanghai without reference to them and to the other governments concerned. The British express the hope that we will take parallel action at Tokyo. 2. The statements made in the British aide-mémoire as indicated above do not appear to be in conformity with the statements made to you by Hirota as reported in the penultimate sentence of your telegram under reference. 3. Please endeavor to clarify and inform Department by urgent cable. Repeated to Shanghai. 7 Hull 6 Not printed. 7 As Department’s No. 580, November 26, 8 p.m., with instructions to clarify and report on “the course of events with the customs matter.” The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/397: Telegram [Document 1004] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 27, 1937—11 a.m. [Received November 27—3:45 a.m.] 568. My British colleague has given me in confidence the following draft proposal for the readjustment of the Chinese Customs Administration which he handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon with the statement that “the British Government have reason to believe that the proposal might prove acceptable to the various authorities concerned”: “(1) Creation of an international banker’s commission as trustee for all interests concerned. (2) This commission to comprise one representative of each of the American, British, French and Japanese banks. (3) Customs revenue from all China to be centralized at Shanghai under the control of the commission. (4) Deposits to be divided in four equal shares, one share to banks of each nation. (5) Payments of loans and indemnity in accordance with the principle of priority to be paid out of the net customs revenue in respect of all Chinese Government obligations secured on the customs that were receiving service as of July 1, 1937. (6) The arrangement to be operated by the Inspector General of Customs under the supervision of the commission. (7) The arrangement to obtain during hostilities.” Repeated to Shanghai. Grew Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 693.002/411⅓ [Document 1005] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Welles ) [ Washington ,] November 27, 1937. The British Ambassador called upon me this morning. I discussed first the questions involved in the Japanese negotiations with the authorities of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation of the aide-mémoire given to him last night in reponse to his aide-mémoire to the Department of November 26 on the same subject. 8 He asked clarification of the last two sentences in the Department’s aide-mémoire which I gave him. I stated that the United States Government had made known to the Japanese Government that it possessed an interest in the administration of the Chinese Customs Service and in the collection and allocation of funds obtained thereby and that it believed that it should be consulted with regard to any negotiations taking place between the Japanese military authorities and the customs authorities. I stated that in our belief the position of the British Government with regard to administration of the Customs Service was distinct from ours in that under an existing agreement between Great Britain and China certain officers of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service were British subjects so long as British trade with China maintained a preponderant position and that was a question which concerned Great Britain directly. I said that consequently representations which we might make would not be directed towards any insistence that the Japanese authorities negotiate or advise with this or that particular British official, but would be based upon the legitimate interest of the Government of the United States in the customs and upon our desire to be consulted with regard to such negotiations as might be had. S[ umner ] W[ elles ] 8 Latter not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/398: Telegram [Document 1006] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 27—7:33 a.m.] 573. Department’s 317, November 26, 8 p.m. 1. The Foreign Minister has left the Foreign Office for the day and I have been therefore unable entirely to clear up the discrepancy. However, we are informed by one of the officers of the Foreign Office that no instructions have been sent to Shanghai in the sense of the statement attributed to Okazaki but that so far as is known here the Japanese Consul General has been discussing the maritime customs matter with Lawford only and not with two other foreign governments. 2. Our informant stated that following my conversation yesterday with the Foreign Minister the Japanese Consul General was directed by telegraph to effect a final settlement which would give full consideration to the interests of third countries. 3. I shall telegraph again as soon as additional information is obtained. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/403: Telegram [Document 1007] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 27, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 28—7 a.m.] 1026. At a meeting this morning of the same persons named in my number 1016, November 24, 7 [ 4 ] p.m., the Commissioner of Customs reported that at his second interview with the Japanese Consul General the latter was disposed to regard favorably the proposal to bring to the posts a number of Japanese members of the customs service from other ports but stated that final decision would rest with the higher Japanese authorities. The Commissioner also reported that the Japanese Consul General stated that the Japanese Government is adamant that the customs revenue must be deposited with the Yokohama Specie Bank and gave the Commissioner to understand that the customs classification loan and quotas would have to be negotiated through diplomatic channels. I am advised that at the instance of the French Ambassador and the British Financial Adviser the French and British Consuls General are this afternoon calling separately on the Japanese Consul General and leaving aide-mémoire to the following effect: It is understood that pressure has been brought to bear on the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs to deposit customs revenues in the Yokohama Specie Bank. As the Japanese Consul General is doubtless aware, practically the entire customs collection in China is pledged for the service of foreign obligations. In these circumstances it is very desirable that no change be made in the arrangements for the collection and disbursement of customs revenues in the posts until some agreement is reached of [ by? ] those powers interested in the obligations secured on the revenue. Negotiations on this subject are already taking place in Tokyo. Until the outcome of these negotiations is known the British Consul General would strongly deprecate any precipitate action to alter the existing arrangements for dealing with the customs revenue in this port. 3. [ sic ] I, however, did not feel that I could take identic action but that I would be seeing the Japanese Consul General and would express to him informally and orally the hope that no precipitate action will be taken here in the matter of the customs. I expect to see the Japanese Consul General tomorrow morning. 4. Meanwhile with reference to paragraph 2 of Tokyo’s number 567, November 26, 6 p.m., let me say that there are no discussions going on here between the Japanese and the consular representatives concerning the customs except as reported in the last sentence of my number 1008 of November 23, 8 p.m. 9 Approaches on the subject are usually dismissed with the statement that the matter is being studied. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss 9 Ante , p. 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/400: Telegram [Document 1008] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 27, 1937—9 p.m. [Received November 27—10:45 a.m.] 575. My 573, November 27, 5 p.m. 1. My British colleague has just informed me that it is upon instructions issued to them by General Matsui 10 and not from the Japanese Foreign Office that Japanese civil officials at Shanghai refuse to discuss the customs question with British and other third party representatives. This fact probably explains why the Foreign Office professes to know very little of what is going on at Shanghai. 2. Craigie has been instructed to make to the Foreign Minister formal written representations as soon as the French Ambassador and I are authorized to make “joint representations”. Craigie is to set forth in his note that: ( a ) The British Government takes the strongest possible exception to any Japanese effort to settle the customs question with the local Shanghai customs only because the customs revenues are as recognized by Japan an international interest. The British Government maintains that no proper arrangement can be reached without reference to other interested governments; ( b ) Hall-Patch has been appointed to conduct the negotiations with the Japanese but any arrangement reached would be subject to the approval of the various interested governments given through their representatives at Tokyo. 3. Craigie is very much concerned and I share this feeling lest what happened at Tientsin may happen at Shanghai—the Japanese military may force an objectionable arrangement upon the local customs officials before something can be done to stop it. He feels that only the strongest possible pressure by the interested governments upon the Japanese Foreign Office would induce Hirota to intervene. I informed Craigie that I had recommended to my Government that every practicable means should be used to protect and preserve tangible American interests in China and that it seemed to me that the integrity of the customs and the disposition of its revenues is a definite American interest. 4. It seems both to Craigie and myself that time is of the essence and that action should be taken most urgently. 5. Please instruct as to action and the form of action deemed advisable. I recommended parallel not joint action and a formal signed note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 10 Gen. Iwane Matsui, Japanese Army Commander in Chief in Central China. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/400: Telegram [Document 1009] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 27, 1937—2 p.m. 318. Your 575, November 27, 9 p.m. We concur with the recommendations in your point 5 and suggest the following as a basis for a formal signed note. The Government of the United States shares with the Japanese Government and with other governments a well recognized economic and historic interest in the Chinese Customs administration and, as the Japanese Government is aware, the integrity of the Chinese Customs and the disposition of its revenues constitute a definite American interest. Hence, the events at Shanghai relating to the Customs service must be regarded by the American Government as of high interest and importance. The Government of the United States is particularly concerned lest any action taken should in any way impair the integrity of the Chinese Customs service. Hence the American Government has a specific concern and a specific interest in the details of any scheme, even during the period of hostilities, which affects the administration of and the distribution of the revenues of the Customs service. This Government believes that such being the fact, it has a right to make urgent request that its representatives at Shanghai be consulted in respect to any arrangement made. The Government of the United States is, therefore, instructing its Consul General at Shanghai to hold himself in readiness for such consultation and to be ready to advise, when requested, as to whether any arrangement under contemplation adequately protects both the administration of the service and the American interests therein. 11 Your 568, November 27, 11 a.m. has just come in. We do not believe that it is advantageous for this Government at this time to support any specific plan. Hull 11 The Consul General was instructed in telegram No. 587, November 29, 7 p.m., with regard to informing his Japanese colleague along similar lines (693.002/403). The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/404: Telegram [Document 1010] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 28, 1937—2 p.m. [Received November 29—7 a.m.] 1030. Reference my No. 1026, November 27, 5 p.m., concerning the Shanghai Customs. I had a frank discussion this morning with the Japanese Consul General who while most courteous and friendly, made it very clear that the matter of the Shanghai Customs will be arranged between himself and the Commissioner of Customs and that while foreign interests in the administration and the revenues such as loans and their quotas ought to be [ will be ] respected, he will not consult or discuss with his interested colleagues or any other third parties. Incidentally he stated that the customs revenues must be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank. 2. Hall-Patch, the British Financial Adviser, has endeavored to discuss the customs matter with Okasaki, a Consul General at large acting as liaison with the military authorities, and has been told substantially what the Japanese Consul General told me this morning. 3. The danger in the situation is that the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs will yield to the Japanese pressure. He is not an astute person and his principal concern appears to be to avoid Japanese seizure of the stores. Efforts are being made through his own people to have him delay while negotiations are attempted at Tokyo. 4. While the Japanese Consul General did not discuss foreign pressure in connection with local conditions in reference to the matter of opening up the areas north of the Creek to foreigners he told me that he had about arranged with the military a plan to open up these areas by sections when press reports of discussions in the British Parliament suggested that British Government was bringing pressure to bear on Japan and the Japanese pointedly have refused to go on with the matter as to do so would suggest a yielding to foreign pressure. 5. It is clear that the Japanese here intend to take the position before the Chinese and before foreign interests that they are definitely master of Shanghai and will tolerate no interferences or pressure from any quarters. While they say they will respect foreign interests in taking over at Shanghai they make it plain that they do not propose to consult or discuss with any third parties. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/402: Telegram [Document 1011] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 28, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 28—8:50 a.m.] 576. Department’s 318, November 27, 1 [ 2 ] p.m. 1. In delivering our signed note 12 I talked with the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the Chinese customs for nearly an hour this Sunday afternoon. My British colleague will see him also today and my French colleague tomorrow morning, all presenting signed notes. 2. The salient point of our conversation was Hirota’s admission that he does not know what is going on in the customs talks in Shanghai but he gave me three assurances: ( a ) That no American interests in the Chinese Customs ivill be harmed: ( b ) That if anything occurs in that connection which the American Government does not like I am to come to him and he “will take care of it”; and ( c ) That he will instruct the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai that if our Consul General turns to him for information he is to keep Gauss advised of all developments and to give full consideration to any suggestions which Gauss may make in connection with American interests in the customs. 3. While the foregoing is practically a verbatim statement of Hirota’s assurances as expressed to me, nevertheless I think from the context of his further remarks that we must interpret them as applying to our concrete interest in the customs revenue rather than to a general interest in the inviolability of the Customs Administration. He entered into a long academic discussion of the precise meaning of the term “integrity” which however led nowhere. 4. The Minister’s further remarks may be summarized approximately as follows: He himself is primarily concerned with protecting foreign interests in China; he is making every endeavor to do so; if the Japanese occupation of Shanghai has to extend for a year or two many difficult problems will arise which will complicate this. He therefore earnestly hopes that the occupation may prove to be brief. At present there are no Chinese authorities in Shanghai as there are in Tientsin and the Customs Administration is out of touch with the Nanking Government. He nevertheless referred to the customs arrangement concluded in Tientsin as an “example” leaving me to infer that some similar arrangement may be contemplated in Shanghai but he frankly confessed that “he does not know.” 5. Summarizing briefly the entire conversation: the Foreign Minister made no admission of the principle that no new arrangement affecting the Customs Administration or revenues can properly be made without the approval of the American Government but he is willing that the American Government through Gauss should be kept informed of any new arrangement which may be proposed by the Japanese and that its views would be given full consideration. 6. In presenting our case I orally used every possible argument but felt that they fell on rather barren ground. He said that our representations would require study and that he would reply to our note in due course. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 12 For text of note dated November 28, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 730 . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 603.002/401: Telegram [Document 1012] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 28, 1937—11 p.m. [Received November 28—12:55 p.m.] 577. Our 576, November 28, 4 p.m. 1. In Craigie’s conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs today, Hirota said that he would instruct the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai to give full consideration to any plan proposed by Hall-Patch and gave assurances that no decision would be taken until the latter’s views had been so considered. Report by mail Craigie is advising his Government to limit so far as possible publicity regarding our concerted representations here because he fears that such publicity would tend to make the Japanese military authorities in Shanghai more intransigent. He realizes, however, that the present clamor in Parliament may render publicity unavoidable. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew Memorandum by the Secretary of State 693.002/407 [Document 1013] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 29, 1937. The British Ambassador came in upon my invitation. I proceeded to give him certain information as to what this government is doing in the Far East in certain respects. I said that he would recall that the latter part of last week we sent a message to the Japanese Government insisting on maintaining the integrity of the Chinese customs organization and arrangements. I then said that since that time we have sent a note to the Japanese Government elaborating on our first representation by pointing out that the Chinese customs organization and arrangements are a growth based on agreements, practices, and other considerations which go back over a period of generations in their economic and historic traditions and significance, and that the United States Government reasserts its interest in this customs situation and its right to be conferred with by those who consider any modification or disturbance of the Chinese customs structure and the parties to it. I stated that with regard to the question of whether the Japanese Government or the Japanese military officials are contemplating running wild, so to speak, by disregarding all international law and order and all rights of other governments and their nations, especially with respect to the customs situation, I was not advised of a sufficient number of facts or circumstances as would lead me to conclude that such a step is imminent on the part of the Japanese, either in Shanghai or other areas; that of course it may be possible that such a lawless outbreak will occur at any time, but I simply had not sufficient facts to warrant the belief that such course is imminent. I closed the conversation by expressing the earnest hope that our trade program may be gotten through in a mutually satisfactory way as early as possible and that it might well become the basis upon which a restored world order could rest; that it was my understanding that Germany, instead of being displeased at its prospect, is looking forward with the hope that this Anglo-American trade agreement 13 will form the basis for a solution of the German and other economic difficulties of a major character. The Ambassador concurred in my views. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 13 For correspondence on this subject, see vol. ii , pp. 1 ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/401: Telegram [Document 1014] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 29, 1937—6 p.m. 322. Your 577, November 28, 11 p.m. In view of press reports from London that the British Government had instructed the British Ambassador at Tokyo to make representations in regard to the Chinese Maritime Customs question and that the British Government had approached this Government in the matter, I stated at the press conference on November 27 that you had said to the Government at Tokyo that this Government would naturally be very much concerned if the Customs Service in China should be so dealt with as to affect the present functioning and the distribution of the receipts. I also stated that the Consuls at Shanghai are giving attention to these different questions that have arisen, and we are naturally exchanging information with other Governments which have common interests in both the material and peace situation in the Far East. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/405: Telegram [Document 1015] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , November 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 29—2:55 p.m.] 1037. Commissioner of Customs informs me that at a meeting this afternoon the Japanese Consul General requested that the Commissioner open an account in the Yokohama Specie Bank for practical deposit of the customs revenues and stated that when this is done the Japanese will enter into discussions with the foreign powers. The Commissioner is required to signify his assent within 2 days. 2. Meanwhile Japanese restrictions in which the Commissioner had acquiesced threatened and today [ sic ] to deny reasonable customs facilities in the area north of Soochow Creek and in Pootung. I had one American case which I mentioned yesterday to the Japanese Consul General urging that restrictions be lifted promptly, otherwise a most unfavorable reaction would result. The British Consulate General was today proposing to establish a system of declarations and guarantees on which they intended to sanction cargo movement without reference to the customs. Fortunately arrangements have been made this afternoon between the Commissioner and the Japanese under which more normal customs facilities will be permitted. Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) 693.002/407a: Telegram [Document 1016] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) Washington , November 30, 1937—1 p.m. 384. Press report under Tokyo date line November 29 states that it is reported from Tientsin that the Peace Maintenance Commission there has already reduced tariffs on a long list of articles imported from Japan. Please investigate and report promptly by naval radio. Hull The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/408: Telegram [Document 1017] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 1, 1937—11 p.m. [Received December 1—3:20 p.m.] 1058. Reference to my No. 1047 of November 30, 8 p.m., 14 regarding Shanghai Customs. I saw the Japanese Consul General this afternoon and read to him the note communicated at Tokyo as quoted in the Department’s No. 582. 15 He stated that he could inform me of developments and would consider any suggestions but that he could not undertake that the foreign representatives should be consulted before action is taken. He is now discussing with the Commissioner the question of supervision and he will later consider the question of foreign loan and indemnity quotas. He was not certain that the transfer of Japanese officers from the Chinese Customs Service to the Shanghai Customshouse would be sufficient supervision; something more may be necessary but it has not yet been decided. He did not say so but I surmise that as at Tientsin they may later appoint their own Chinese Superintendent of Customs. He admitted that the Commissioner had been instructed to open accounts in the Yokohama Specie Bank for the deposit of the revenues and said he could not see why there should be objection to this. I frankly pointed out that a similar restraint had been imposed at Tientsin and so far as I am aware there has been no remittance out of the Tientsin Japanese Bank of loan and indemnity quotas. He asked that the Shanghai issue be considered separately from the Tientsin case. I told him that under the circumstances this was rather difficult. He was adamant in his position that no other than a Japanese depository at Shanghai could be named and when I urged the desirability of considering some other arrangement perhaps one involving a group of banks including a Japanese bank he advanced various pointless arguments including one that the deposits in some banks might be used as security for loans to the Chinese Government; a suggestion which I dismissed with emphasis. He finally left me the impression that the military and navy insists upon a Japanese bank. On the question of indemnity and loan quotas he seemed to think we should be satisfied with an assurance that they would be respected. I again pointed to the Tientsin situation and when I stated that I was not informed whether any formal assurance had been given by the Japanese Government he replied that it could be given. I inquired whether the existing tariff would be continued. He hesitated and answered that he thought so. He asked whether I had any suggestions or plan. I told him we were not proposing any particular plan but that it was the feeling that any arrangements made should carefully respect the American and other foreign interest in the integrity of the customs administration and revenues, and if it is the Japanese desire simply to ensure that any customs revenues from ports under Japanese occupation do not reach the Chinese for military purposes some arrangement might be discussed by him with the interested foreign representatives. Such arrangements I pointed out had existed previously. I also stated that in my study of the customs problem I had been interested to examine the extent to which China’s internal indebtedness is secured on the customs revenues and to estimate what effect a failure here to service such indebtedness might have on China’s banking, financial, and currency situation with reference both to China’s later rehabilitation and to the external business relations with foreign interests including the Japanese, and that in this connection I had been much interested and pleased to learn from the New York Times correspondent that General Matsui had disclosed to him yesterday a keen appreciation of this aspect of the problem and a desire that the financial and credit structure of the country should not be seriously affected. The Japanese Consul General said that this problem was being carefully studied. He said that he had talked with Hall-Patch who had come to him with the British Consul General and that Hall-Patch had various plans which he would put forward. Our conversation closed with his statement that we would have a further discussion. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. 16 Gauss 14 Not printed. 15 November 27, 3 p.m.; it repeated Department’s telegram No. 318, November 27, 2 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] . 16 The Department’s telegram No. 606, December 2, 7 p.m., approved the Consul General’s handling of the discussion. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/412: Telegram [Document 1018] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 2, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 2—2:17 p.m.] 1069. Reference my No. 1058, December 1, 11 p.m. Hall-Patch tells me that on November 13 he and British Consul General saw Japanese Consul General who admitted receiving instructions to discuss customs questions but stated he could do so only after an agreement with the Commissioner on the control to be exercised by Japanese. He admitted Commissioner had been told to deposit funds in Japanese bank. The British urged that any such arrangement would prejudice whole question and that it should not be made before discussions took place as to safeguarding interests of powers concerned. Japanese Consul General finally agreed to consult his advisers again, to seek new instructions, and to discuss with Hall-Patch further. He has not yet done so, however. 2. Meanwhile, in view of foregoing, Inspector General of Customs has instructed Commissioner that he is unable to authorize Commissioner at this stage to comply with the request for deposit of funds in Japanese bank and that Commissioner should endeavor to arrange further postponement of conversations on subject in order to give time for a satisfactory modus operandi to be found. Commissioner if pressed may state that pending settlement of the immediate local customs issue none of the revenues will be paid over to the Chinese Government. Sent to [apparent omission] to repeat to Tokyo. Gauss The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 693.002/413: Telegram [Document 1019] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 3, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 3—7 a.m.] 801. Your 384, November 30, 1 p.m. Information contained in your above-mentioned telegram was repeated to Tientsin which has now replied as follows. “December 3, 10 a.m. Your December 1, 6 p.m. Commissioner of Customs states most emphatically that duties, both import and export collected in accordance with the established Chinese customs tariff and the question of reduction of duties on Japanese goods has not been discussed but that all Japanese military supplies enter duty free and without examination by customs. Tins office is unable to obtain any information contrary to this statement. Repeated to Consul General, Hong Kong in reply to his inquiry of December 1, 11 a.m.” Lockhart The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/415: Telegram [Document 1020] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 4, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 4—2:57 p.m.] 594. 1. My British colleague yesterday addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an informal letter dated December 2nd concerning the Chinese Customs as follows: “My Dear Minister, I venture to enclose, for your confidential information, an extract from a telegram which I have just received from Shanghai reporting a conversation which took place on the 30th ultimo between Mr. Okamoto, Mr. Phillips, the British Consul General at Shanghai, and Mr. Hall-Patch, the British Financial Adviser, on the subject of the Shanghai Customs. I should like to draw attention particularly to Mr. Okamoto’s statement that he could only discuss the customs question with representatives of the foreign powers ‘when he had come to an agreement with Mr. Lawford as to the control which Japan wished to exercise’. Mr. Okamoto added ‘he had already told Mr. Lawford to deposit with the Yokohama Specie Bank’. I had understood from my last conversation with Your Excellency that Mr. Okamoto would be instructed to ascertain the views of the British representatives before he reached any agreement with the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs, and it was therefore very disappointing to me to find that on November 30th Mr. Okamoto was still holding the language ascribed to him in this telegram. Possibly revised instructions may have reached him since then, but I can not too strongly urge upon Your Excellency the desirability of taking no action vis-à-vis of the Customs Commissioner until an understanding on this matter has been reached with the representatives of the interested powers. I feel I must take very special exception to Mr. Okamoto’s proposal that the revenues should be deposited with the Yokohama Specie Bank as a condition precedent to any discussion with representatives of the interested powers. The need for the exertion of pressure on the customs officials is all the less apparent in that I understand that the latter are ready to give full guarantees that, pending asettlement no part of the revenue will be allowed to reach any authority of the Chinese Government. As I am anxious not to leave my Government under any misapprehension as to the attitude of the Japanese Government in this matter, I should be very grateful if you would let me know whether Mr. Okamoto has now been instructed that no arrangement should be reached with the customs administration on any form of ‘control’ without full prior consultation with the British, United States and French representatives in Shanghai. Believe me, my dear Minister, yours very sincerely, R. L. Craigie.” 2. Craigie considers the situation critical and fears that such pressure will be brought to bear on Lawford that he will accede to the Japanese demands and that we shall then be faced with a fait accompli as we were at Tientsin. He feels that there would be no serious objection to agreeing to the deposit of the customs funds in the Yokohama Specie Bank provided that the Japanese first guarantee ( a ) control of the funds by an international committee of bankers and ( b ) the service of loans as a first lien on the deposits. He understands that Okamoto is now discussing the matter with Gauss and feels that unless the latter takes a strong stand “we shall lose the game”. 3. Craigie has written me inquiring whether I feel disposed to make supplementary representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the last paragraph of his letter. He feels that unless we continue to act in concert it will be interpreted as weakness here. My representations on November 26 and 28 were as forceful and complete as possible but I see no objection to addressing a further letter to Hirota if the Department considers the step desirable. I have no doubt but that Gauss is taking as strong a stand as his instructions and good judgment warrant. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/415: Telegram [Document 1021] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 4, 1937—10 p.m. 328. Your 594, December 4, 7 p.m., paragraph 3. Department desires that you address a further letter to Hirota and suggests that letter include points as follows: The American Government has noted with gratification that according to reports from the American Consul General at Shanghai (see Shanghai’s 1058, December 1, 11 p.m.) the American Consul General there is having friendly and frank discussions with his Japanese colleague in regard to the customs situation at Shanghai and that the Japanese Consul General during these discussions asked the American Consul General whether he had any suggestions or plan to put forward, in reply to which the American Consul General stated that it was our view that any arrangement under contemplation should adequately protect both the administration of the Customs Service and the American interests therein. In view of our very real interest in this matter and our definite belief that that interest entitles us to be consulted in regard to any arrangement under contemplation and as to whether such arrangement constitutes adequate safeguarding of the interests of the United States, particularly in the preservation of the integrity of the customs, it would be very much appreciated if the Japanese Government would be so good as to ensure that no arrangement will be reached with regard to the Customs Administration without prior consultation with the American Consul General at Shanghai. 17 Hull 17 Repeated as No. 614 to the Consul General at Shanghai. For note of December 5 from the Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 732 . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/416: Telegram [Document 1022] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 9, 1937—3 p.m. [Received 5:05 p.m.] 1120. Referring to my telegram No. 1069, December 2, 7 p.m. concerning Shanghai Customs. At a meeting with Hall-Patch, British Financial Adviser, on evening December 7, the Japanese Consul General stated that his Government would not permit any intervention by foreign powers in his discussion with the Commissioner of Customs but due consideration would be given to their interests and he would carry on informal conversations to ascertain their desiderata while continuing negotiations with the Commissioner. 2. He argued that deposit of revenue in Yokohama Specie Bank would not affect rights of any third parties and stated he proposed to conclude the negotiations with the Commissioner and then to discuss how the rights of third powers could best be secured. 3. Hall-Patch contended that this failed to give consideration to the interests of third powers and put them again in the same unacceptable position as at Tientsin. He stated that all customs revenue except that from Tientsin District is now deposited in Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and arrangements could be made for that bank to hold in a suspense account the surplus if any from ports no longer under Chinese control, or the same objective could be reached by some modification of the proposal for an international bankers commission made at Tokyo by the British Ambassador. 4. Japanese expressed surprise that all customs revenue is now deposited in Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and said Japan was not a party to the arrangements and should have been consulted. Japanese Consul General could not agree to any bank except Yokohama Specie Bank without reference to Tokyo. He would reconsider question and discuss it with Hall-Patch again in a few days. The latter urged that meanwhile the Commissioner of Customs be not pressed but the Japanese Consul General could not agree and commented that the Commissioner appeared now to be more uncompromising than heretofore. 5. I saw Japanese Consul General briefly yesterday and asked him to fix an appointment to continue our discussion. He asked for postponement for a few days. 6. I am of the opinion that we shall have to yield on the question of a Japanese bank so far as concerns the Shanghai revenues. Japanese Counsul General admitted to me at my previous discussion that it is a matter of face. Before agreeing, however, we should have adequate assurances, preferably at Tokyo or at least with confirmation at Tokyo, for the prompt release of foreign loan and indemnity quotas as well as customs expenses, and it would be desirable to have an assurance if possible that the surplus revenue if any will at least be earmarked for service of domestic loans. There should also be assurances of continuance of existing tariffs and procedure, continued control of personnel by Inspector General, and return to customs custody and use of harbor craft seized by naval and military authorities so as to permit proper functioning. 7. Frankly, it would be of considerable assistance in whatever discussions I must have if I could know the American desiderata. 8. I learn that Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin reports that withdrawals from Japanese bank there depend largely upon the arrangement finally reached at Shanghai. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) 693.943/14a: Telegram [Document 1023] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) Washington , December 9, 1937—5 p.m. 103. The Department of Agriculture has received a telegram from its Commissioner in Shanghai quoting information received from the Consulate General at Tientsin which reads in part as follows: “Large quantity of Japanese milled flour has been imported into North China through Tientsin. It is estimated during October about 700,000 bags were imported and total amount imported since July approximately 1,500,000 bags. Importation of other foreign flour is at present impossible as Japanese flour is exempt from regular import custom duty.” Please telegraph whether or not the statement regarding Japanese exemption from customs duty applies to commercial shipments (as distinct from military supplies) and also whether commercial shipments of other Japanese products are being exempted from ordinary customs duties. Hull The Consul General at Tientsin (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 693.943/15: Telegram [Document 1024] The Consul General at Tientsin ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Tientsin , December 11, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 8:22 p.m.] 88. Department’s December 9, 5 p.m. Statement in question appeared in a letter to Arnold 18 from this office dated November 22 on page 2 of which it was stated that “the importation of Japanese flour has been facilitated by the waiving of customs formalities at Tientsin. No customs duties have been levied and, as stated by Japanese authorities, the wheat flour is imported as ‘military supplies and provisions, not only for the Japanese troops but for the native population [’].” This condition still prevails. Articles entered as military supplies but used for native population are ostensibly for relief of those destitute. This exemption may cover not only wheat flour but also other articles formerly smuggled in, but this cannot be ascertained definitely at present as military supplies enter without examination by the customs. Commissioner of Customs states that no articles are exempt from duty except so-called military supplies; that import and export duties are being collected in accordance with the established Chinese customs tariff and that question of reduction of duties on Japanese goods has not been discussed. Imports of flour from Japan during July and entered at the customs total 1,040 bags, August imports entered at customs nil and September imports 988 bags which indicates majority of flour imports are entered as military supplies. Total imports Japan flour entered at customs for first 9 months this year total about 15,000 bags. Caldwell 18 Julean Arnold, Commercial Attaché in China. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/416: Telegram [Document 1025] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 12, 1937—3 p.m. 339. Reference Shanghai’s 1120, December 9, 3 p.m., particularly paragraph 6. The Department concurs in general with the opinion expressed by Gauss with regard to the desirability, in connection with any agreement reached for the temporary functioning of the Customs at Shanghai, of obtaining adequate assurances from the Japanese, the purpose of which would be the preservation of the administrative integrity of the Customs at Shanghai and the safeguarding of the customs revenues. We feel that it is important to seek assurance that there shall be prompt release of foreign loan and indemnity quotas as well as customs expenses, and believe that it would be desirable to obtain from the Japanese an additional assurance to the effect that the release of foreign and indemnity quotas shall not now or later be made contingent upon possible future developments, with the understanding that the Japanese will not support or countenance any subsequent arrangement which might render ineffectual such an assurance. We also agree that an effort should be made to obtain assurances with regard to the continuance of existing tariffs and procedure, continued control of personnel by Inspector General, and return to customs custody and use of harbor craft. Although we appreciate the reasons which would make desirable the earmarking of customs surpluses for the service of domestic loans, we question the advisability from a practical standpoint of endeavoring to obtain an undertaking to that effect from the Japanese, and feel that we should only ask for an assurance that the surpluses will be held in a suspense account. You are authorized to consult with your British colleague and, when you ascertain that he is prepared to take substantially similar action, to inform the Japanese Government that, because of our very real concern that the integrity of the Chinese Customs Administration shall be maintained and the revenues therefrom safeguarded, we would welcome assurances along the lines set forth in the preceding paragraph. Repeated to Shanghai. 19 Hull 19 As No. 640, with instructions to assist in obtaining Japanese assurances “to the end that any settlement reached may accord with our broad position with regard to the customs question.” The Department on December 21 requested repetition of No. 640 to the Ambassador in China at Hankow. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/417: Telegram [Document 1026] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 12, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 13—1:10 a.m.] 1138. I saw Japanese Consul General this morning and after disposing of other matters I asked him when we could resume our conversations on the subject of the customs. He stated that the matter is hopelessly deadlocked over the question of bank deposit, that when he asked the British Financial Adviser for an explanation of his objection to the use of the Yokohama Specie Bank he received a reply that it would upset the existing arrangement and he then learned for the first time that on about October 8 when the Japanese were surrounding Shanghai an arrangement was made to transfer and deposit all customs revenues in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank instead of the Central Bank. He looked upon this as doomed. I pointed out that when the Central Bank withdrew its head office from Shanghai as the Japanese were about to isolate the port, it was, of course, necessary for the customs to use some other bank of deposit but that I had not known until recently that the Hong Kong [and] Shanghai Bank was being used. 2. I then inquired if we might put aside the question of bank of deposit for the moment and discuss quite frankly and informally—unofficially if he wished—the other questions involved. For example, what could he tell me of the intentions of the Japanese Government as to foreign loan and indemnity quotas, what assurance would be given as to their payment, what about the integrity of the Customs Administration and the personnel and the equipment such as harbor boats seized by the Japanese Navy, what about the tariffs and customs procedure, would they remain unchanged at all ports and be uniformly inforced, and what about the loan and indemnity quotas from the Tientsin revenues. He replied that he could not commit his Government but he thought that adequate assurance would be given on most of these points in due course when the question of the bank of deposit had been decided and accounts had been opened by the Commissioner in the Yokohama Specie Bank. He indicated that the question of “face” is involved in the matter of the bank deposit and pointed out that this matter of the customs is receiving wide attention in the press in Japan and there was comment on the discussions in the British Parliament. I pointed out that the points I had mentioned were matters on which definitive assurances should be forthcoming before any decisions were reached and implemented on the question of bank of deposit and that it seemed to me that the question of bank deposit might more readily be disposed of if these other points were settled first and satisfactory assurances given. Perhaps then, I suggested, there might not be such serious objection to the Yokohama Specie Bank as the original depository and some arrangement could be worked out whereby the revenues were distributed periodically from that bank to banks of other interested nationalities; in other words, that some compromise might be worked out that would meet the question of “face” which he mentioned and yet represent an arrangement satisfactory to all concerned. I emphasized that on the American side we were not supporting or proposing any particular plan or arrangement, that our interest is in maintaining the integrity of the customs and the customs revenues, that I was not insisting upon deposit in any particular bank, but that on the other hand I could not say whether my Government would be satisfied with an arrangement designating the Yokohama Specie Bank as the sole depository; it seemed to me that the problem needed to be worked out as a whole at least in principle and an understanding reached and the necessary guarantees or assurances given before any particular point such as bank of deposit should be decided upon and the decision implemented. I again mentioned that I was also interested in the customs revenue which had been allocated for the service of the domestic loans and from the standpoint of maintaining the credit and currency structure of China I would be glad to see some arrangement under which the surplus revenues over and above the foreign indemnity and loan quotas might be earmarked for the service of the domestic obligations secured on the customs. 3. My colleague said he would think over the matter, that he could not commit his Government on any point discussed, and he could not say whether his Government would be agreeable to any scheme under which the Shanghai revenue after deposit in the Yokohama Specie Bank might then be distributed to other banks but this offered some possibility of a solution and if necessary he might have to come to me later to see whether any such compromise could be advanced. 4. I took occasion at this meeting to say that I was also interested in the disposition made of the consolidated tax revenues which together with the flood relief customs surtax are security for the consolidated note of the American wheat and flour loan of 1931 and the cotton and wheat credit of 1933. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/418: Telegram [Document 1027] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 14, 1937—10 p.m. [Received December 14—12:15 p.m.] 632. Department’s 339, December 12, 3 p.m. 1. It is quite clear from Shanghai’s telegrams that the attitude on the customs question of the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai is not responsive to the assurances given me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Consul General would be directed to consult with Gauss and to give consideration to any other suggestions which Gauss may make (see our 576, November 28, 4 p.m., paragraph 2 ( c )). We feel that our efforts here should first be concentrated on getting the Foreign Office to implement that assurance. Accordingly today we again urged on the Foreign Office the importance of there being prior consultation between the representatives at Shanghai of the interested governments in the formulation of any plan for change in the personnel of the customs service or for depositing of customs revenues. We pointed out in urgent terms that only by such consultation could the interests of the various concerned governments be safeguarded. 2. As soon as we have received a reply to today’s representations we will request the Japanese Government to give the assurances mentioned in the Department’s telegram under reference. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/421: Telegram [Document 1028] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 16, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 16—12:18 p.m.] 1166. I met by invitation this morning with the French Ambassador, British Chargé d’Affaires, and the British Financial Adviser to discuss the customs situation. The British are of the opinion based on their conversations and mine with the Japanese Consul General that it is not possible to accomplish anything by negotiations here and that such negotiations should be transferred to Tokyo. The French Ambassador is in accord but comments that he feels that with the setting up of a provisional government for China at Peiping we may soon expect that government with Japanese support to claim jurisdiction over the customs not only in North China but at Shanghai and that the situation with reference to loan and indemnity quotas, et cetera, will become similar to that in Manchuria. He directed attention to a Reuter message from Tokyo dated December 15th saying that the Provisional Government of the Republic of China established in Peiping is reported to be planning to open negotiations shortly with the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin with a view to taking over all customs stations in North China. He is of the opinion which I am inclined to share that the disposition of the Japanese to press the Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai lately may be due to some change of policy under which the new Chinese Government established under Japanese influence will appear in the picture. 2. I am of the opinion that if action is to be taken to protect foreign loan and indemnity interests in the Chinese Customs it should be taken without delay at Tokyo. Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Gauss The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/422: Telegram [Document 1029] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 16, 1937—8 p.m. [Received December 16—5:30 p.m.] 1167. British Chargé d’Affaires has handed me copy of a confidential memorandum sent to him by the Inspector General of Customs who points out that his position is becoming increasingly difficult of late by reason of the fact that he is still in direct communication with the Chinese Minister of Finance to whom he would have to refer for approval or disapproval the attitude which the interested powers may consider it desirable for him to assume in order to endeavor to conserve the integrity of the customs in Shanghai and elsewhere which the Chinese Government themselves are no longer in a position to protect. He envisages a situation in which the interested powers may decide that the Shanghai Commissioner should adopt a certain line of procedure in order to cope with such circumstances as may arise which the Inspector General as the Commissioner’s superior may find himself unable to endorse because the Minister of Finance may conceivably have issued instructions on the subject of a reactionary nature. In order to provide against such an unsatisfactory situation he believes the representatives of the interested powers in touch with the Minister of Finance might consider it desirable to make representations to him to the effect that the interested powers are endeavoring to the best of their ability to safeguard the customs situation and desire to dissuade the Chinese Government from issuing instructions which might possibly conflict with the policy which the interested powers may deem it desirable to adopt in the best interests of China herself. 2. British Chargé d’Affaires is telegraphing his Embassy representative at Hankow to the effect that the British Government feel it desirable that the Chinese Government should be persuaded at least tacitly to acquiesce in any settlement of the customs question which is acceptable to the three principal creditor powers, that he is following closely the course of negotiations between the Japanese and the customs, that every possible diplomatic support is being given to the customs representative to secure the best temporary arrangement possible, that the Embassy representative should make clear the foregoing position both to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance and make every effort to secure that the Inspector General is given discretion to conclude a settlement applicable to Shanghai but possibly also to other ports under Japanese domination which seems to the three powers concerned to be the best solution in the present difficult circumstances emphasizing that this arrangement seems to be the only one which offers a reasonable chance of checking excessive Japanese demands. The British Embassy representative is being instructed that he should if possible act in conjunction with his American and French colleagues. 3. I told the British Chargé d’Affaires that I would inform the American Ambassador of the foregoing. Sent to Department. Repeated to Hankow. Gauss The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/424: Telegram [Document 1030] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 17, 1937—2 p.m. [Received December 17—6:30 a.m.] 75. As I shall doubtless be consulted by British Embassy’s representative here in regard to matter reported in Shanghai’s 1167, December 16, 8 p.m., I would appreciate Department’s instructions. Situation in regard to customs appears to me to be now complicated by statement reported in Peiping’s 828 of December 16, 4 p.m. 21 indicating that new government at Peiping will take over Chinese Customs as the successor to the Nanking Government. It is increasingly evident to me that Japanese intend to ignore Chinese National Government since the fall of Nanking; that Japanese Government will accord recognition to newly formed government at Peiping and will assist it in taking over all of the fiscal and other functions of the Chinese Government at the various ports. Under the circumstances it would seem to me to be unwise for me to endeavor to advise Minister of Finance as to course which he should follow. Johnson 21 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 693.002/423: Telegram [Document 1031] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 17, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 17—9:30 a.m.] 831. Embassy’s 828, December 16, 4 p.m. 21 According to a Japanese press report the customs at Tientsin was taken over yesterday afternoon by the new regime and the five barred flag raised over the customshouse. However, senior member of the Tientsin customs staff is reported as stating that so far as he was aware no change has taken place in regard to jurisdiction over the customs. The Japanese report may be based on Wang Keh Min’s statement contained in the above-mentioned telegram. Repeated to the Ambassador and Tokyo. Lockhart 21 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/427: Telegram [Document 1032] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 18, 1937—10 a.m. [Received 10:30 p.m.] 1176. British Chargé d’Affaires has handed me copy of the report from the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin to the Inspector General of Customs sent through British channels from which it appears that a Japanese named Matsubara, former employee of the customs, who is supported by a considerable group of junior Japanese military officers, has arrived at Tientsin with a large party of Manchukuo Customs employees ready to take over the customs for the new Chinese Government at Peiping which claims control down to Shanghai and Nanking, Shantung being about to throw in its lot now that Nanking has fallen. The report says that the senior Japanese civil and military officials are opposed to Matsubara, and it has been indicated to the Commissioner of Customs that the issue depends on whether he will recognize the new de facto regime in which case Matsubara and his party will be sent back to Manchuria and the present Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin, a British subject, will in due course be appointed Inspector General of Customs after the new government has ordered the present Inspector General to remove to Peiping and it [ he? ] has failed to do so. The Commissioner of Customs atTientsin has expressed the opinion that he can see no alternative to recognition of the new government; otherwise the whole customs service will crash. He considers it will be useless now to try to bargain or temporize. His reply to inquiries as to his attitude has been that it is the policy of the customs as well as his own policy to have the good of China and undivided integrity of the customs service at heart to the exclusion of all else, and to the suggested offer to him of the post of Inspector General that would conflict entirely with his declaration of undivided integrity of the Customs Administration. 2. In a confidential memorandum submitted last night to the Committees, the Inspector General recommended the interested powers should: (1) make representations at Hankow to advise the Ministry of Finance not to oppose a provisional settlement on the lines followed in the past, that is a temporary provisional recognition by the local agent [of] customs of the de facto authorities which would for the time being insure their protection without which the local customs cannot function and at the same time would preserve the integrity of the service, and; (2) make representations at Tokyo that any action regarding the control of the customs should be deferred until such time as the de facto government becomes recognizable as the government of the country. 3. At a meeting with the French Ambassador, British Chargé d’Affaires and myself this morning, however, Inspector General stated that through the Japanese Chief Secretary of the Customs he has ascertained that the Japanese Embassy here is not aware of the details of the move being made in the north and that it is urging Tokyo not to take precipitate action. The Inspector General therefore does not now recommend any action by the interested powers. He stated his apprehension that the Ministry of Finance may instruct him to direct the Commissioner and his staff at Tientsin to withdraw and not recognize or submit to any de facto authority. If such instructions were received and issued the integrity of the customs service would be destroyed. He believes the National Government would be prepared to destroy it rather than take a more reasonable course. Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/428a: Telegram [Document 1033] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 21, 1937—6 p.m. 366. There may now have arisen the situation envisaged in the Department’s telegram No. 339, December 12, 3 p.m., with special reference to the statement that it would be desirable to obtain from the Japanese an additional assurance to the effect that the release of foreign and indemnity quotas shall not now or later be made contingent upon possible future developments, with the understanding that the Japanese will not support or countenance any subsequent arrangement which might render ineffectual such assurance. With reference to the situation which is developing in North China the Department feels that every effort should be made to prevent the development of a situation similar to that existing with respect to the servicing of foreign loans and indemnities from the Manchurian customs revenues. Accordingly the Department desires that you make insistent representations as outlined in the Department’s 339, placing special emphasis on the assurance referred to in the preceding paragraph. The Department has now received and studied Shanghai’s 1176, December 18, 10 a.m., but still inclines to the view that you should follow the course of action outlined above. 23 Repeated to Hankow and Shanghai. Hull 23 See note of December 23 from the Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 733 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 693.002/424: Telegram [Document 1034] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) Washington , December 21, 1937—6 p.m. 20. Your 75, December 17, 2 p.m. The Department feels that you should avoid advising the Chinese Government with respect to specific measures but you may emphasize the urgent and vital considerations involved, bearing in mind the general objectives of the Department’s telegram no. 339, December 12, 3 p.m., to the American Embassy in Tokyo. For your information there is given below the text of a telegram being sent to the American Embassy in Tokyo: [Here follows quotation of Department’s telegram No. 366, December 21, 6 p.m., supra. ] Please repeat to Shanghai. Hull The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 693.002/428: Telegram [Document 1035] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 22, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 22—12:14 p.m.] 99. Shanghai’s 1176, December 18, 10 a.m. Gage, Secretary of British Embassy, has several times lately inquired whether I had been instructed to join in representations to the Minister of Finance. I replied each time that I had received no reply to my telegram No. 75, December 17, 2 p.m. to the Department and was without instructions. This morning he telephoned that pursuant to instructions just received he intended to make representation to the Minister of Finance before noon even without similar action by other Missions. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/433: Telegram [Document 1036] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 25, 1937—2 p.m. 375. Reference Department’s 366, December 21, 6 p.m., and your 675, December 23, 10 p.m. 24 The British Embassy has left at the Department an aide-mémoire under date December 24 25 which (1) refers to reports that the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin has been compelled by the Provisional Government set up by the Japanese Army to accept the authority of the regime at Peiping without as yet severing actually his connection with the Inspector General at Shanghai; (2) mentions the danger that the Japanese military may place customs houses and funds at Tientsin and other ports, including Shanghai, in the possession of the new regime at Peiping; (3) states that a new tariff for North China is also proposed; (4) points out that if the plans for Tientsin are successful they will probably be repeated at other places and that the Japanese Government will probably have to endorse a fait accompli brought about by the military even though it may profess an unwillingness to destroy the integrity of the Chinese Customs; (5) states that the British Ambassador in Tokyo has been instructed to urge upon the Japanese Government that it and the Japanese military authorities refrain from undermining or destroying the authority of the Inspectorate General or disrupting the customs service; and (6) expresses the British Government’s hope that you may be authorized to take similar action. Please consult with your British colleague and, when you ascertain that he is prepared to act, you are authorized to make an approach to the Japanese Government in such manner as you deem appropriate. The Department desires that you urge upon the Japanese Government the importance of action not being taken or countenanced by the Japanese authorities, including the military authorities, which will impair the authority of the present Chinese Customs Administration or disrupt the service. You may also emphasize this Government’s interest in the preservation of the integrity of the Customs and the safeguarding of customs revenue, and again express a desire to receive the assurances listed in Department’s 339, December 12, 3 p.m. Repeated to Hankow for the information of the Ambassador and to Shanghai and Peiping. Hull 24 Latter reported that action had been taken. 25 Not printed. The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/431: Telegram [Document 1037] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 28, 1937—1 p.m. [Received December 28—12:05 p.m.] 1240. A press report from Osaka says that ships from Japan are now free again to carry cargo to Shanghai, that such cargo is classified into three categories: (1) munitions and supplies under army and navy certificates, (2) daily necessities for Japanese raw silk and building supplies and, (3) other cargo, and that goods in categories (1) and (2) are to be free of import duty. 2. I have made quiet inquiry and learn that Japanese ships are not paying tonnage [dues,] file few if any manifests of cargo, and land passengers principally Japanese without examination of baggage which probably includes duties. 3. In the present delicate position of the customs duties little can be said or done about the matter. I have not found the Japanese Consul General disposed to resume conversation on the customs question since my last report. Repeated to Tokyo. Gauss The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/434: Telegram [Document 1038] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 29, 1937—11 a.m. [Received December 29—2:30 a.m.] 695. Department’s 375, December 25, 2 p.m. I called last evening on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, renewed in detail and with emphasis the previous representations made to the Foreign Minister and delivered a further signed note 26 embodying the points mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of the Department’s 375. My British and French colleagues have taken similar action. The Vice Minister said that the matter was being carefully studied. He reiterated the previous general assurances of Hirota that American interests would be given full consideration. I said to the Vice Minister that in my own opinion the integrity of the Chinese Customs certainly represented one of the American interests envisaged in the final paragraph of our Panay note December 14th 27 which should not be subjected to unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatever and that in the light of our acceptance of the Japanese note of December 24th 28 as “responsive” to our desires, it would be deplorable if [interference] with that specific American interest should now occur. Although I said that I had not been instructed to point to this particular connection, it seemed to me that the point gave the Vice Minister food for thought. Repeated to Shanghai. Grew 26 Note No. 853, December 28, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 734 . 27 See Department’s telegram No. 342, December 13, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, ibid ., p. 523 . 28 See telegram No. 679, December 24, 8 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, ibid ., p. 549 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/430: Telegram [Document 1039] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 29, 1937—5 p.m. 383. Tour 681, December 25, 5 p.m. 29 1. It is the Department’s understanding that the “negotiations now taking place at Shanghai” are between the Chinese customs authorities and the Japanese. The British proposal that negotiations be transferred to Tokyo naturally raises the question who or what agency is to represent the Chinese in those negotiations. The Department feels that clarification is desirable in regard to the foregoing specific question and with regard to the general question of the nature of the negotiations which it is proposed be “transferred” to Tokyo; that is, do the British contemplate that a definitive arrangement would be reached at Tokyo or simply that the general principles governing such an arrangement would be agreed upon, and in either case what countries would be the parties thereto? 2. Our position in regard to the negotiations on the Chinese customs has been and is that we bring to bear our influence in Tokyo and in Shanghai to the end that, in any temporary arrangement reached, the integrity of the customs, both with regard to the administration and revenues, shall be respected. We have not felt that it was desirable for us to support any particular plan or arrangement or that we should participate directly in the negotiations at Shanghai. Our telegrams 316, 339, 366, and 375 30 authorize action consistent with the position outlined above. 3. You are authorized to inform your British colleague of our position as outlined in paragraph 2 above and to state that we are prepared to continue our endeavors in Tokyo to forestall the undermining of the Chinese Customs Administration and credit, but that we desire clarification on the questions raised in paragraph 1 above before making reply to the British inquiry with regard to a transfer of negotiations. 4. With regard to your reference to Shanghai’s 1166, December 16, 7 p.m., paragraph 2, the Department is confident that you are making and will continue to make every effort to convince the Japanese Government of the unfortunate consequences to all concerned which would flow from a disruption of the Chinese customs service and inability of the customs to meet foreign loan and indemnity quotas. Repeated to Shanghai and Hankow. Hull 29 Not printed. 30 Dated November 24, 7 p.m.; December 12, 3 p.m.; December 21, 6 p.m.; and December 25, 2 p.m., respectively, pp. 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , and Doc. 1034 ] , and 909 [ Pg. 909 includes portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , and Doc. 1036 ] . The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 693.002/436: Telegram [Document 1040] The Consul General at Shanghai ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Shanghai , December 31, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 31—11:20 a.m.] 1258. Inspector General of Customs informs me that Japanese Consul General called on him yesterday and stated that the Japanese propose to control Shanghai customs, that by control he means having supervisors in the customs house and that the present arrangement under which there are numerous customs employees of Japanese nationality is not satisfactory control. Inspector General pointed out foreign interests in the customs and expressed the view that before any drastic change is made in the administration of the Shanghai Customs the views of the interested foreign powers should be ascertained. Consul General also brought up matter of deposit of revenue in the Yokohama Specie Bank. Inspector General stated in reply that the arrangement at Tientsin had proven unsatisfactory, that the Minister of Finance opposed such a plan, and that he, the Inspector General, was not prepared to say yes or no to the proposition, and that the views of the interested powers on this question should also be sought. Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Gauss The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 693.002/431: Telegram [Document 1041] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 31, 1937—5 p.m. 390. Reference Shanghai’s 1240, December 28, 1 p.m. Although the Department feels that you should not make this development the occasion for a special visit to the Japanese Foreign Office, the Department desires that in future conversations held in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Department’s telegram No. 383, December 29, 5 p.m., in regard to the general question of the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs, you place some emphasis upon the damaging effect upon the Customs administration of disregard of customs requirements for Japanese goods and vessels, particularly as described in paragraph 2 of Shanghai’s No. 1240. Repeated to Shanghai and Hankow. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 693.002/437: Telegram [Document 1042] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 31, 1937—7 p.m. [Received December 31—2:25 p.m.] 699. Department’s 383, December 29, 5 p.m. 1. The matter has been fully discussed with my British colleague. He made it quite clear that the “negotiations” now taking place at Shanghai which he believes should be “transferred” to Tokyo are the discussions that have been taking place between the Japanese Consul General and Gauss and Hall-Patch respectively. 2. Craigie’s replies to the specific questions presented by the Department are: ( a ) The Chinese would not of course be represented in the discussions in Tokyo which have been suggested. Craigie maintains that the Chinese have not thus far participated in any conversations at Shanghai although naturally Lawford has been kept fully informed of developments. ( b ) Formal negotiations at Tokyo are not contemplated. (Craigie pointed out that discussions thus far at Shanghai have been such informal conversations only). ( c ) The British contemplate that only general principles governing an arrangement would be agreed upon, necessarily only between those governments participating in the discussions and the Japanese Government, and that an endeavor would later be made to persuade the Chinese to accept any understanding which might be reached. 3. Craigie stressed the point that a change of venue from Shanghai to Tokyo of the discussions between representatives of the British and the American Governments on the one hand and of the Japanese Government on the other would not alter the present relation of the Chinese Government to these discussions. He said that the Japanese civil authorities at Shanghai are inclined to be uncompromising because they are directly under the influence of the Japanese military and that he believed that if the conversations were carried on in Tokyo the Japanese would display a less intransigeant attitude. 4. The British Ambassador stated in reply to my question as to the general principles contemplated under the British proposals that the British Government was interested as we were in the preservation of the integrity of the Customs Administration and revenues and that they wanted to come to the best arrangement possible with the Japanese to insure the continued payment of the service of foreign loans, the foreign indemnities and customs expenses. He said that he felt it was equally to the interest of the Chinese Government that some such arrangement be made and pointed out that the whole Chinese credit structure is based upon the customs. He said that the British Government would endeavor to persuade the Chinese to accept the arrangement reached. He pointed out that with the establishment of the new Peiping Government further complications might be expected to arise but that they would have to be met as they arose. 5. Whatever might be the term applied to the discussions between the Japanese authorities and Lawford it is my opinion that they must be suspended if the proposed conversations at Tokyo are to have any value. In my opinion the chances are not great that the Japanese Government will agree to direct its representatives in Shanghai to break off discussions with Lawford as a condition precedent to opening conversations in Tokyo. However, I share my British colleague’s opinion that less intransigeance on the part of the Japanese might be encountered in Tokyo than exists at present in Shanghai. Repeated to Shanghai for Hankow. Grew Developments with respect to “Manchoukuo”; reservation by the United States of American rights threatened by consolidation of Japanese Army control Developments with respect to “Manchoukuo”; reservation by the United States of American rights threatened by consolidation of Japanese Army control 31 31 For other correspondence concerning Manchuria and Jehol, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , pp. 1 – 458 , passim. [1043] The Consul at Mukden (Langdon) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Mukden, March 19, 1937. 793.94/8586 [1044] The Consul at Mukden (Langdon) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Mukden, March 31, 1937. 893.01–Manchuria/1413 [1045] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, April 19, 1937—11 a.m. [Received April 19—12:01 a.m.] 793.94/8585: Telegram [1046] The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Harbin, April 23, 1937. 893.01 Manchuria/1423 [1047] The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Secretary of State Harbin, May 15, 1937. [Received June 16.] 893.01 Manchuria/1431 [1048] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, June 30, 1937—4 p.m. [Received June 30—1:52 p.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/1: Telegram [1049] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 1—8:40 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/4: Telegram [1050] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 1, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 1—8:40 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/3: Telegram [1051] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 1, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 1—1:43 p.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/5: Telegram [1052] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 1, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 1—9:10 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/2: Telegram [1053] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 2, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 2—6:32 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/7: Telegram [1054] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, July 2, 1937—6 p.m. 761.9415 Amur River/7: Telegram [1055] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 2, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 2—3:40 p.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/8: Telegram [1056] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 3, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 3—1:15 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/10: Telegram [1057] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 5—1:26 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/12: Telegram [1058] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 7, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 7—8:53 a.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/14: Telegram [1059] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 9, 1937—10 p.m. [Received 10:30 p.m.] 761.9415 Amur River/15: Telegram [1060] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Peiping, July 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 22—9:05 a.m.] 793.94/8914: Telegram [1061] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, September 4, 1937—10 a.m. [Received September 4—7 a.m.] 793.94/9892: Telegram [1062] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 18, 1937—noon. [Received October 18—7 a.m.] 893.5151 Manchuria/11: Telegram [1063] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping Washington, October 19, 1937—3 p.m. 893.5151 Manchuria/11: Telegram [1064] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) of a Conversation With the French Chargé (Henry) [Washington,] October 19, 1937. 893.5151 Manchuria/14 [1065] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 21, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 21—9:25 a.m.] 893.5151 Manchuria/12: Telegram [1066] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, October 26, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 26—9:15 a.m.] 893.5151 Manchuria/13: Telegram [1067] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, October 30, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 30—8:45 a.m.] 893.5151 Manchuria/15: Telegram [1068] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 4, 1937—noon. [Received November 4—4:56 a.m.] 893.5034 Manchuria/14: Telegram [1069] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 6, 1937—11 p.m. [Received November 6—12:40 p.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/29: Telegram [1070] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 12, 1937—1 p.m. [Received November 12—3:18 a.m.] 893.5151 Manchuria/17: Telegram [1071] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 18, 1937—11 p.m. [Received November 18—10:35 a.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/31: Telegram [1072] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 19, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 19—10:55 a.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/32: Telegram [1073] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 22, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 22—12:54 p.m.] 761.93 Manchuria/97: Telegram [1074] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 25, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 2:15 p.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/33: Telegram [1075] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, November 26, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 26—9:10 a.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [1076] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping Washington, November 26, 1937—2 p.m. 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [1077] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 28, 1937—3 p.m. 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [1078] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping Washington, November 28, 1937—3 p.m. 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [1079] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) [Washington,] November 29, 1937. 793.003 Manchuria/19 [1080] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, November 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 29—3:11 p.m.] 893.01 Manchuria/1471: Telegram [1081] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 29, 1937—midnight. [Received November 29—1:25 p.m.] 893.01 Manchuria/1470: Telegram [1082] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, November 30, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 30—1:27 p.m.] 893.01 Manchuria/1476: Telegram [1083] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 1—1:52 p.m.] 893.5151 Manchuria/23: Telegram [1084] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 3—7 a.m.] 852.01/309: Telegram [1085] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 3—7 a.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/38: Telegram [1086] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Hankow, December 4, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 6:10 p.m.] 893.01 Manchuria/1479: Telegram [1087] The Vice Consul at Mukden (Davies) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) Mukden, December 7, 1937. 893.5151 Manchuria/27 [1088] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 8, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 8—8:15 a.m.] 893.506 Manchuria/36: Telegram [1089] The Navy Department to the Department of State December 9, 1937 793.94/11690 [1090] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 13—6 a.m.] 893.5123 Manchuria/8: Telegram [1091] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 14—10:25 a.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/40: Telegram [1092] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 22, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 22—8:55 a.m.] 694.006/26: Telegram [1093] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping Washington, December 23, 1937—7 p.m. 793.943 Manchuria/40: Telegram [1094] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 24, 1937—noon. [Received December 25—3 p.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/43: Telegram [1095] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 27—6:20 a.m.] 893.5123 Manchuria/9: Telegram [1096] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State Peiping, December 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 27—6:20 a.m.] 793.943 Manchuria/44: Telegram The Consul at Mukden (Langdon) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 793.94/8586 [Document 1043] The Consul at Mukden ( Langdon ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 32 No. 96 Mukden , March 19, 1937. Sir : As perhaps indicating the strength of Japanese troop concentrations and Japanese defense preparations on the “Manchukuo”–U. S. S. R. border, I have the honor to report information confidentially volunteered by a source connected with the Kwantung Army. My informant states that in the Tsitsihar area (presumably the northwestern sector of the border) there are stationed at present two divisions of Japanese troops. * This force, he declares, is to be augmented this spring by the addition of two more divisions, raising the total of Japanese troops in the Tsitsihar zone to 40,000, more or less. The reinforcements, it is said, are to be drawn from South Manchuria and from Japan. Trenches are being dug, my informant declares, along the border. Supplies of food and munitions sufficient for three years of peace-time use are being stored in and behind the line of trenches. This office is unable to pass on the accuracy of the information supplied. It may be said, however, that the report would seem to be in accord with the Kwantung Army’s expressed aim of augmenting its strength to at least one-half † of that of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, now alleged to be over 300,000. The northwestern frontier is an extended and important sector. Viewed within the framework of the Kwantung Army’s expansion program, the claim that some 40,000 Japanese troops are to be concentrated in the Tsitsihar area does not seem extravagant. To what extent this force is and will be equipped with artillery, tanks and aircraft is unknown. No large movements of troops are known to have taken place recently through Mukden. It is quite possible that detachments dispatched from Japan for northern, western and eastern Manchuria land at Seishin or Kashin, Chosen, and proceed to their details by way of Tumen or Tunhua. The report that a system of trenches is being constructed, if true, can perhaps be interpreted by military men. To my mind the statement appears to be inconsistent with the strategic dictates of the “Manchukuo”–Siberian border. Very respectfully yours, William R. Langdon 32 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Mukden in his unnumbered despatch of March 19; received April 19. * Corroborated by another and reliable source. [Footnote in the original.] † Mukden’s Political Review, May, 1936, page 4. [Footnote in the original; review not printed.] The Consul at Mukden (Langdon) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.01–Manchuria/1413 [Document 1044] The Consul at Mukden ( Langdon ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 33 No. 100 Mukden , March 31, 1937. Sir : As an indication of Chinese resistance to the present regime in Manchuria I have the honor to enclose an abbreviated translation 34 made by this office of a public statement issued by Gendarmerie Headquarters of the Kwantung Army concerning the anti-”Manchukuo” and anti-Japanese plot, discovered last August in Antung and Eastern Fengtien Provinces, of the Society for the Protection of the Nation. The Gendarmerie communiqué states that during the past seven months 314 government officials, educators and members of local gentry have been arrested on charges of being members of a Peiping Society for the Protection of the Nation. The organization is claimed to have been directed by Nanking and General Chang Hsueh-liang. 35 The officials of the Society resident in China are named. Of the 314 prisoners, 54 are declared to have been released, 159 to have been sent for trial to the Military Court of the First Army Area, Mukden, as violators of the Provisional Law for Rebels, * and 92 to have been recommended to the same Court for release following examination of the written record in each case. Among the persons tried in Mukden, nine (claimed to have been opium addicts) are said to have died in the course of the trial. The trial in Mukden apparently ended some time ago, as the then Commander of Gendarmerie General Tojo, now Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, said “I caused the conspirators to be tried by the Mukden Military Court and, under the latter’s sentences made in accordance with law, the serious offenders were put to death or otherwise punished according to the nature of their crime”. How many conspirators were executed, who the condemned men were, what the terms of imprisonment or other punishment prescribed for persons not condemned to death were, and similar particulars of the trial are not known for the reason that nothing has been published beyond the enclosed communiqué. On February 26, 1937, I reported † that in Antung there had been mass executions of native school principals and teachers and, from information emanating from a reliable source, I conclude that these executions were connected with this trial. The enclosed communiqué brings out some interesting facts. First of all, it reveals if not the strong latent patriotism at least the active disloyalty to the present regime of the Chinese intelligentsia in Manchuria. Secondly, it makes no attempt to conceal the fact that the Kwantung Army gendarmerie exercises in the first instance the function of protecting the state, since the Kwantung Army not only bans publication of news of conspiracy cases but actually directs the trial of such cases. Thirdly, and this has an important bearing on any examination of the administration of justice in the country, a political crime committed or suspected of having been committed by civilians, regardless of provisions of law to the contrary, is tried in and disposed of by a military court, with the indictment prepared by Japanese gendarmerie on the basis of evidence gathered by its own agents and spies and with the accused obviously denied counsel for defense. In other words, the present case shows clearly that in cases or suspected cases of political crime there is, so to speak, a law above the law. Very respectfully yours, Wm . R. Langdon 33 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Mukden in his unnumbered despatch of March 31; received April 24. 34 Not printed. 35 Former Chinese ruler of Manchuria. * The penalties under this law range from capital punishment to fines and imprisonment. [Footnote in the original.] † My despatch No. 84, “Rehabilitation of Eastern Marches”, February 26, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8585: Telegram [Document 1045] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , April 19, 1937—11 a.m. [Received April 19—12:01 a.m.] 124. The following message has been received from Mukden: “April 17, 11 a.m. My despatch No. 16 [ 96 ], March 19th. Information contained in second and third paragraphs is verified by authoritative French military source which adds that Second and Fourth Divisions are being sent from Japan to Manchuria not as replacements. Repeated to Tokyo.[”] Lockhart The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.01 Manchuria/1423 [Document 1046] The Consul General at Harbin ( Adams ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 36 No. 325 Harbin , April 23, 1937. Sir : I have the honor to inform the Embassy that during the past several days a large number of persons of the Chinese race, almost 400 according to some informants, have been arrested by the gendarmes and police. As was said to be the case in the recently divulged plot in Antung, * there seems to be little doubt that these arrests were caused by the discovery of undercover anti-Japan-“Manchukuo” activities inspired by groups in China. According to such scattered bits of information as are available, for of course nothing has been said by the officials and nothing published regarding the arrests, the subversive activities centered around large commercial establishments operated by merchants from China, chiefly Shanghai; and it is said that the books of several were sequestered when the owners or managers were taken into custody. Unlike the Antung plot, which was carried out by officials and teachers, that in Harbin apparently was engineered by business people, for only a few teachers and one minor official have been apprehended, as far as this office is aware. One report had it that the “traitors” were discovered by the interception of a letter having to do with the election of officers of a “Peoples National Front”, which may or may not be identical with the Paokuohui mentioned in the enclosure 37 to Mukden’s despatch No. 100 of March 31, 1937. It is assumed that a secret military trial, similar to that in Mukden, will shortly be held, and that it will be protracted, for when a British firm inquired how soon an arrested employee would be liberated, the reply was that no encouragement could be given as to his release in the near future. It is only natural to suppose that groups in China and Manchuria have organized anti-Japanese and anti-“Manchukuo” secret societies, and although the press of Manchuria is prone to label all such groups as “communist”, there is little reason to suppose that there is much actual communist agitation among the native population. The more natural assumption is that followers of Chang Hsueh-liang and the old Northeastern Army have formed the nucleus of an insurgent organization, possibly with assistance from Nanking; there may, on the other hand, be several different organizations created by different groups and for different purposes. Some may have connections with Soviet Russia, as has been alleged regarding the well-disciplined and equipped “bandits” who have been raiding far and wide in northeastern Manchuria for the past several months. According to the Harbin Nichi-Nichi of April 8, 1937, translation enclosed, 38 Tsitsihar has likewise been the seat of treason. Eight members of a Buddhist society were sentenced to imprisonment by the “Manchukuo” Third Army Division for their “attempt against the country”. It was said that the accused, under instructions from Peiping, planned to attack various officers of the local government. The Embassy will be kept informed of any further developments which may come to the attention of the Consulate General. Respectfully yours, Walter A. Adams 36 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Harbin in his despatch No. 502, April 23; received June 1. * See Mukden despatch No. 100 of March 31, 1937. [Footnote in the original.] 37 Enclosure not printed. 38 Not printed. The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Manchuria/1431 [Document 1047] The Consul General at Harbin ( Adams ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 510 Harbin , May 15, 1937. [Received June 16.] Sir : As of possible interest I have the honor to offer below some observations with respect to the reorganization of the “Manchukuo” Government, effective on July 1, 1937, according to a special edition of the “Manchukuo” Government Gazette , dated May 8, 1937. A translation of an abridged diagram of the reorganization is attached to this despatch. The most striking change is that of nine departments, those of Foreign Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Mongol Administration will be abolished and set up as bureaux under the Premier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Superficially the suppression of the Foreign and Civil Affairs Departments and the subordination of the other Departments to the Premier give the impression of progress from national independence towards colonial dependence and that impression has been voiced in Harbin. Actually, however, the change only tends to consolidate the position of the Kwantung Army, through increased directness and efficiency of control. As this Consulate General has repeatedly observed, the tendency in “Manchukuo” is towards increased independence of the general structure of the Japanese Government. From the very beginning of its occupation of Manchuria the Japanese army has undeviatingly pursued the policy of cutting Manchuria loose from the authority of the Japanese Government, leaving only that connection which the Army itself affords. This policy has manifested itself consistently regardless of changes in army personnel and has been described in detail in the despatches of this Consul General. The sure safeguard which the Japanese army has established against Japanese Government interference in Manchuria and against the effects in Manchuria of a possible loss of its own power and prestige at home is the fiction of “Manchukuo” sovereignty and the “Emperor”. The elaborately prepared and heralded visit of the “Emperor” to Japan and his reception with royal honors there, the recently passed Imperial Succession Law and the creation of a personal estate for the “Emperor” leave no doubt that the army intends to employ the throne of “Manchukuo” as the permanent emblem of its sole authority in Manchuria. Respectfully yours, Walter A. Adams The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/1: Telegram [Document 1048] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , June 30, 1937—4 p.m. [Received June 30—1:52 p.m.] 140. Referring to authorized press dispatches relative Soviet-Japanese Amur River situation, following supplementary information considered of possible value to Department. Islands involved lie roughly 500 miles northwest of Vladivostok and 80 miles southwest from Blagoveshchensk and are reputedly uninhabited. On June 29 the Moscow Natalda [ Pravda ] ran both a report from Khabarovsk and an editorial complaining of the violation of Soviet territorial waters and islands in this district by Japanese armed vessels and troops. Arguments were cited to support the Soviet claim to the islands and the channels to the north of them. Today’s press contains a communiqué describing conversation which took place on June 29 between Litvinov 39 and the Japanese Ambassador 40 seting forth respective contentions without apparently coming to agreement. For details see American press reports. It is of interest that accounts of conversation circulated from Japanese sources indicate strongly that the Japanese Ambassador took a very threatening tone, that the Soviet action was an extraordinary break-down and that the matter has an importance considerably exceeding that of the ordinary Manchurian border incident. It indicates remarkable change of disposition since March—see my despatch No. 152 of March 26, 1937 41 covering Japanese Ambassador’s statement to me. It is widely assumed among foreigners in Moscow that this action of the Japanese is a reflection of their increased confidence following the shootings of Red Army generals and the rumors (in which I have not yet found reason to place much credence) that Bluecher 42 will not return to his post in the Far East. The main point of contention appears to be whether the main channel of the river which now apparently lies north of most of the islands should be taken as the border line, in which case the islands south of it must be regarded as belonging to “Manchukuo”, or whether the map attached to the Peiping treaty of 1860 43 and other evidence presented by the Soviet side to show that the islands were commonly regarded as Russian before the war, shall be accepted as decisive. Supplementing current press reports it should be noted that for the Soviet Government to admit the principle that the main channel constitutes the border would appear to establish a very dangerous precedent from the Soviet point of view with regard to the island of Haihaitsu near Khabarovsk, the most important Soviet city in the Far East. If the main channel were to be regarded as the border Japanese naval vessels could probably approach to sighting distance of this city. Attention is invited in this connection to the Department’s instruction No. 707 of May 12, 1936. 44 Davies 39 Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 40 Mamoru Shigemitsu. 41 Ante , p. 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] . 42 Marshal commanding the Red Army in the Soviet Far East. 43 For text of treaty signed at Peking, November 2/November 14, 1860, see British and Foreign State Papers , vol. liii , p. 970. 44 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/4: Telegram [Document 1049] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received July 1—8:40 a.m.] 195. 1. A Reuter report from Changchun (Hsinking) published here today reports that the Kwantung army issued yesterday a statement that a Soviet gunboat has been sunk with heavy loss of life by Japanese and Manchukuo forces near Sennufu, an island in the Amur River. The report goes on to say that Sennufu, which is claimed by Manchukuo, was occupied by Soviet troops last week; that Japan protested against this action on June 28; that the gunboat in question was one of three which the Kwantung army alleges opened fire June 30 on Japanese and Manchukuo units guarding the Manchukuo frontier; that the Kwantung army claims it was forced to reply, thereby sinking one vessel, inflicting heavy losses on another, and forcing a third to retire; and that the Manchukuo government has lodged a protest with the Soviet authorities in regard to the incident. 2. An officer of the local Soviet Embassy informed an American correspondent this morning that the vessel in question was a cutter and was not sunk but only damaged and that he does not feel the situation serious because the Soviets in turn captured a Japanese cutter. This official’s information was evidently based on a Tass report. By mail to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/3: Telegram [Document 1050] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Nanking , July 1, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 1—8:40 a.m.] 196. Reference Embassy’s 195, July 1, 3 p.m. Following telegram has been received from the Consul General at Harbin. “July 1, 11 a.m. The Foreign Commissioner confirms press reports that yesterday a Russian gunboat was sunk by gun fire during an engagement following an alleged invasion of Manchukuo waters in the Amur River south of Taheiho.” “The Consulate General feels that the new epidemic of border incidents is inspired by the Japanese Army and indicates that the Japanese Army really believes that the recent executions of military officers in Soviet Russia reveal hitherto unsuspected Soviet military weakness, although Japanese Army officers have published the opinion that the Soviet Army was strengthened by those executions”. By mail to Tokyo. Johnson The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/5: Telegram [Document 1051] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , July 1, 1937—4 p.m. [Received July 1—1:43 p.m.] 141. For the President and Secretary Hull. Japanese-Soviet situation developed most rapidly here after clash of armed forces late yesterday afternoon on the Amur River in locality, subject my cable of yesterday. Tension here very high with diplomatic discussions in the Foreign Office running late into the night. Situation here regarded in diplomatic circles as most serious and critical with marked potentialities. I beg to report that I called on the Japanese Ambassador this morning to procure the facts in the situation and to personally express the hope that the difficulties could be localized so as not to be permitted to spread and develop into possibility of war. This morning I made request for conference with Litvinov and expect see him soon. Japanese Ambassador discussed situation frankly and stated that position his Government was that it stood on established treaty rights which provided for a boundary frontier which afforded a channel in the center of a navigable stream available to both parties and that the equal rights of the parties would be destroyed if the Soviet claimed mainland on one side and islands on the other side of the main channel of the stream inasmuch as this would enable one party to control navigation on the river and would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty. He stated further he was to see Litvinov today and was instructed to insist that status quo ante of islands be immediately projected in order to forefend possibility of additional armed clashes and in order to permit discussions of boundary frontier in peaceful atmosphere looking to amicable settlement thereof. He also expressed the hope that the situation could be localized and stated that he was bending every effort to that end. I assumed to act promptly and personally in view of the speed with which the situation was progressing and the tremendous dangers involved and because of my last talk with the President and his thought then in regard to a possible conference of Grew and myself as to the Far Eastern situation. I made it specifically clear to the Japanese Ambassador that my comments were purely personal and not by direction of my Government. Davies The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/2: Telegram [Document 1052] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 1, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 1—9:10 a.m.] 171. No special importance is attached here to the reported affair on the Amur River which is regarded merely as another “border incident”. According to the Navy Ministry the Soviet gunboats engaged were only launches. The Japanese naval authorities state that the international boundary line prescribed by treaty is in the middle of the channel; that the three islands recently occupied by Soviet forces are on the Manchurian side of this line; that the Soviets attempted to barricade the main channel in order to cause the river traffic to be routed to the southward side of these islands, thus creating a new main channel and thereby giving the Soviets title to the islands. Some 6 Manchukuoan gunboats of 250 tons are said to be mobilized about 10 miles down river from the barricade which is reported to be not effective. Foreign observers here believe that the incident may have been incited by Marshal Bluecher for domestic political reasons and there is no present inclination to attribute to the Japanese military or naval forces any aggressive designs in this affair. Repeated to Peiping. Grew The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/7: Telegram [Document 1053] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 2, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 2—6:32 a.m.] 174. My 171, July 1, 7 p.m. 1. Yoshizawa 45 informed a member of my staff this morning that the Amur River incident of June 30 occurred only a few hours after Litvinoff had assured Shigemitsu that the Russian forces occupying temporary Amur River islands would be withdrawn conditionally upon retirement from that vicinity of Manchukuo-Japanese forces. Yesterday Shigemitsu had lodged a protest with Litvinoff over the incident of June 30 and Litvinoff had replied that the incident had altered the situation arising from the occupation of the islands and that he could not therefore confirm the assurance previously given that Soviet forces would be withdrawn from the Amur River islands. 2. Yoshizawa stated that the feeling in Tokyo is that the Russians probably do not intend to take a strong position but that a “very, very serious situation” would arise if the Russian forces are not withdrawn. 3. The Japanese press while relatively calm and urging the settlement of the incident by negotiation does not advocate compromise. 4. Yoshizawa referred to a press despatch from Moscow reporting that Ambassador Davies had called on Shigemitsu and had expressed his personal hope that the incident would be peacefully adjusted. Yoshizawa’s comment was that he could not believe that Davies could be so indiscreet. Grew 45 Seijiro Yoshizawa, Director of the American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 761.9415 Amur River/7: Telegram [Document 1054] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , July 2, 1937—6 p.m. 104. Your 174, July 2, 2 p.m., paragraph 4. Please in your discretion inform Yoshizawa that Davies reports that he called on the Japanese Ambassador the morning of July 1 to inquire regarding facts and “to personally express the hope that the difficulties could be localized so as not to be permitted to spread and develop into possibility of war” and that he “assumed to act promptly and personally in view of the speed with which the situation was progressing.” State to Yoshizawa that your Government had given Davies no instructions, had made no inquiry, and had expressed no apprehension. Hull The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/8: Telegram [Document 1055] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , July 2, 1937—7 p.m. [Received July 2—3:40 p.m.] 145. For the President and Secretary Hull. Supplementing my cable No. 141 of July 1, 4 p.m. Saw Litvinov today following requested appointment and advised him that on personal initiative entirely, had interviewed Japanese Ambassador to obtain first-hand information on islands dispute and to express personal hope that the situation would be localized and not permitted to develop in such a way as to threaten peace. I stated that again without instructions from my Government I desired to express to him personally the same hope. Litvinov stated he was very glad of the opportunity to explain the Soviet version of the dispute, which he did generally, as set forth in the published Soviet communiqués. He stated further that his concrete proposal to the Japanese Ambassador was that both parties should withdraw armed forces from locality pending discussion of juridical question of boundary line; that Japanese Ambassador refused to acquiesce in agreement of joint withdrawal and insisted upon Soviet withdrawal, leaving matter of Japanese withdrawal to subsequent developments. Litvinov’s attitude was it was clear that neither party desired to admit by implication or otherwise legal rights of other party but that to avoid possibility of military clashes pending discussions the important point to be agreed upon was that armed forces of both sides should withdraw from locality simultaneously. He stated that he had made it plain to the Japanese Ambassador that the Soviet Union could not be bluffed but would cooperate in real effort to adjust matter juridically and while so doing avoid possibility of contact and clashes of armed forces pending discussions. Litvinov stated he had asked Japanese Ambassador to call today; but up to 4:00 o’clock he had not heard from him. Litvinov insisted his every effort was to localize trouble and preserve peace as Soviet-Japanese war would inevitably result in general European war. He also expressed appreciation of my interest manifested in the cause of preserving peace, which he said he felt sure represented the real attitude of the President of the United States and Secretary Hull, even though there was no official authorization for my comments. Davies The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/10: Telegram [Document 1056] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , July 3, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 3—1:15 a.m.] 176. My 174, July 2, 2 p.m. A press dispatch from Moscow reports that Shigemitsu announced on July 2 that the Soviet Government consented to withdraw its forces from the occupied Amur River islands and to return to their stations the Soviet gunboats concentrated in that vicinity. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/12: Telegram [Document 1057] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 5, 1937—11 a.m. [Received July 5—1:26 a.m.] 202. Following from Consul General at Harbin. “10, July 4, noon. The Kwantung army last night expressed the hope that the Russians would strictly carry out the terms of an agreement reached in Moscow involving the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the disputed territory. It is thought that tension has subsided. No further clashes have been reported.” Johnson The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/14: Telegram [Document 1058] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 7, 1937—6 p.m. [Received July 7—8:53 a.m.] 205. The following telegram has been received from Harbin: “July 7, 2 p.m. My telegram No. 10, July 4, noon. 1. Local press reports of a new Japanese-Russian clash near Lake Hanka are causing concern. 2. A reliable Manchukuo official states that the Kwantung spokesmen differs widely from Tokyo regarding the settlement of the Amur affair. 3. It seems possible that the Kwantung army is, by means of inspired incidents, testing the strength of Soviet military resistance following recent executions in Russia and that the extent to which these incidents may develop will depend upon the stiffness of Soviet resistance.[”] Johnson The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State 761.9415 Amur River/15: Telegram [Document 1059] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , July 9, 1937—10 p.m. [Received 10:30 p.m.] 158. Referring to Amur islands incident, on July 6 Litvinov demanded an explanation from Japanese Ambassador for appearance on that day of Japanese-Manchurian military detachment on one of these islands—Bolshoi—according to communiqué issued July 9 from which it further appears that having received no reply Litvinov on July 8 lodged a vigorous protest with Japanese Ambassador to the effect that in spite of the agreement of July 2 to preserve status quo ante and in spite of evacuation of the islands by Soviet forces pursuant thereto these armed Japanese forces had entered upon the island involved. His position was that such action was a direct violation of the agreement of the parties and that the Soviet Government was “awaiting the immediate withdrawal from the island of the Japanese-Manchurian troops stationed there”. The Japanese Ambassador’s explanation based on ownership of the islands and the presence of Soviet cutters in the vicinity was reported as not being acceptable to Litvinov who asked the Ambassador to communicate his protest to the Japanese Government. Litvinov also asked Japanese Ambassador to call the attention of the Japanese Government to frequent instances where lately Japanese troops had crossed on to Soviet territory and Japanese airplanes had flown across the Soviet border et cetera and warned the Ambassador that the Soviet border troops had definite orders under no circumstances to permit the crossing of the border and “in the event of their appearance on Soviet territory to drive them back by all means”. Apparently each side alleges that the border is being violated by the other. It is significant that Litvinov practically served notice that the Soviets would enter waters south of the island claimed to be in Japanese jurisdiction in order to salvage the Soviet cutter which was sunk by artillery fire from the Manchurian bank. The Moscow press of July 7 and 8 gave accounts of border clashes between Soviet and Japanese forces in the Vinokurka mountain district resulting in fatalities on both sides; also between the Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping. Attention is called to July 5 issue of the London Times wherein Tokyo Times correspondent reports under date of July 4 that Soviet forces had evacuated the islands pursuant to the agreement of July 2 and states: “The incident, it is held here, has furnished a revelation of the Soviet’s weakness which cannot fail to affect future events. It has shown it is being said that Soviet diplomacy lacks diplomacy’s last weapon—confidence in the force behind it. Recently frontier questions have been governed by the belief on both sides in the superior strength of the Red Army. Every alleged Japanese encroachment evoked prompt retaliation, whereas Soviet trespasses were met with perfunctory protests. In the latest case the Soviets not only receded from their position but slurred over their loss of 37 men when a gunboat was sunk by Manchurian gunners.” Informed circles here are concerned over whether military forces or civilian government in Tokyo will dominate this situation. Chinese Ambassador probably best informed on Eastern conditions considers the situation as fraught with grave danger. He advised me confidentially today that code cables to him from his Consulate in vicinity of the trouble have been received so badly garbled during last 6 days that they were undecipherable which is practically unique in his experience and significant to him of seriousness of the situation. Davies The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 793.94/8914: Telegram [Document 1060] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , July 22, 1937—2 p.m. [Received July 22—9:05 a.m.] 279. The following telegram has been received from the Consulate General at Harbin. “15, July 21, 3 p.m. Information here is that the Japanese Army in North Manchuria is concentrated in greater strength than are reported on the Soviet border. Russian mechanics in Harbin have been recruited recently in some numbers by the Japanese Army for work near the Russian frontier”. Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking. Johnson The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.94/9892: Telegram [Document 1061] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , September 4, 1937—10 a.m. [Received September 4—7 a.m.] 506. The Consulate General at Mukden reports in despatch No. 144, August 31 that (1) Manchukuo Peace Preservation Corps announced the killing of a Japanese major general August 21 and of a Chinese major general and about 20 other officers and men August 17th when engaging Chinese troops near the Jehol-Chahar border; (2) Well-informed sources claim that several thousand Manchukuo Peace Preservation Corps troops who mutinied about August 20 were responsible for the above-mentioned killings and that the troops subsequently joined Chinese forces; (3) The Consulate General and other foreign observers believe the mutiny actually occurred; (4) About 1,000 men of the same detachment who were still in barracks 7 miles east of Mukden mutinied August 26, reportedly killed their Japanese officers and then decamped; (5) The Consulate General has been informed that Manchukuo troops (less than one brigade) stationed 3 miles north of Mukden mutinied August 28, killed their officers and decamped; [(6?)] A Manchukuo garrison at Weichang between Chengte and Dolonor is reported to have mutinied early in August and gone to Chahar; (7) The mutinies must arouse grave doubts in the minds of the Japanese military as to the utility of native troops which number approximately 150,000; and (8) If the Japanese attempt to disarm them the native troops may be expected in most cases to revolt and if they are permitted to retain their arms they may be expected to mutiny when the Japanese show signs of weakness or preoccupation in a crisis. Lockhart The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.5151 Manchuria/11: Telegram [Document 1062] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 18, 1937—noon. [Received October 18—7 a.m.] 668. The following telegram has been received from the Consulate General at Mukden: “October 15, 5 p.m. On October 8th without warning an immediately effective law was passed revising exchange control law and authorizing Government to forbid or restrict all transactions in foreign exchange and acquire all bullion, foreign exchange or currency and foreign securities held in Manchuria as well as property of residents of Manchuria held abroad. Under this law Economics Department on the same day issued orders confining purchases or sales of foreign exchange to strictly commercial requirements but requiring ministerial permission for each transaction; prohibiting consignment exports, sale of foreign exchange except to banks and accounts, trusts, loans and compensation in foreign currency or foreign currency bonds; requiring sale in Manchuria of maturing foreign currency bonds, dividends or coupons; requiring reports on all existing trust or insurance contracts in foreign currency and on foreign currency or foreign bonds held here; requiring permission for insurance contracts in foreign currency; et cetera. Amounts under 1000 yen generally excluded from scope of orders. In the orders, Japanese yen is stated not to be foreign currency while Japan is stated not to be a foreign country. The effect of this legislation is thus to require ministerial license for every trade, trust or insurance transaction with, every remittance to or from, and every investment in any foreign country other than Japan. Foreign banks, exporters and importers thrown in utmost confusion by the complicated procedure attending every overseas transaction as well as into uncertainty over the Minister’s unlimited powers to disallow exchange for prohibited transactions and disapprove the absolute freedom of exchange transactions with instructions from the Minister of Control and restrictions on such transactions with other countries. This, in my opinion, is the gravest blow dealt thus far by Japan to our commercial interests in Manchuria. It is also the grossest discrimination in favor of her interests put into effect since the occupation of Manchuria and a violation of every obligation she is under and pledge she has given to maintain the Open Door. The text of the legislation has been translated and is being sent by mail”. 47 Sent to the Department, Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 47 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping 893.5151 Manchuria/11: Telegram [Document 1063] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ), at Peiping Washington , October 19, 1937—3 p.m. 333. Your 668, October 18, noon. 1. Please telegraph Consul at Mukden to proceed at an early date to Hsinking and to approach the authorities there with a view to obtaining confirmation of the provisions contained in the orders that Japanese yen is stated not to be a foreign currency and that Japan is stated not to be a foreign country as well as of any other provisions that may be discriminatory. If confirmation is obtained the Department desires that the Consul point out that such measures are clearly inconsistent with pledges given by the authorities in Manchuria to maintain the open door, and he may state that such discrimination has created a very unfavorable impression in the United States. He may in his discretion leave an informal memorandum with the Hsinking authorities. 2. Before proceeding to Hsinking, the Consul should consult with his principally interested colleagues. 3. Instruct Mukden also to keep the Department currently informed by telegraph. 4. Please repeat to Tokyo with the request as from the Department that the Ambassador telegraph his recommendations to the Department as to whether it would be opportune and useful for the Embassy to make representations at Tokyo on this matter at this time. Hull Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) of a Conversation With the French Chargé (Henry) 893.5151 Manchuria/14 [Document 1064] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Ballantine ) of a Conversation With the French Chargé ( Henry ) [ Washington ,] October 19, 1937. On October 18 Mr. Henry told Mr. Ballantine over the telephone that the French Government had been advised that the “Manchukuo” Government has imposed a prohibition upon the import of all foreign goods other than Japanese goods, except under special permission. Mr. Henry asked whether we had received any such information and whether our Government would be disposed to address an appropriate protest to the Japanese Government in regard thereto on the ground that such prohibition was contrary to the principle of the open door. Mr. Ballantine said that, so far as he knew, the Department had received no information on this matter from its representatives in Manchuria, but that he would confirm this and expect to communicate with Mr. Henry later. Later on the same day Mr. Ballantine informed the French Embassy over the telephone of the receipt by the Department of a telegram from our Embassy at Peiping repeating a message from the Consul at Mukden (Peiping’s 668, October 18, noon). Mr. Ballantine informed the Embassy of the substance of the telegram. On October 19 Mr. Ballantine informed Mr. Henry over the telephone that the Department had telegraphed the Embassy at Peiping to instruct the Consul at Mukden to ask the authorities at Hsinking for confirmation of the facts, and if confirmation of the discriminatory features of the “Manchukuo” exchange control regulations was obtained to call attention to the violation of the pledges given by the “Manchukuo” authorities that the principle of the open door would be respected. Mr. Ballantine said that the Embassy at Tokyo had been instructed to inform the Department whether in its opinion it would be opportune and useful to make representations in Tokyo also. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 893.5151 Manchuria/12: Telegram [Document 1065] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , October 21, 1937—5 p.m. [Received October 21—9:25 a.m.] 486. Department’s 333, October 18 [ 19 ], 3 p.m., paragraph 4 to Peiping. Manchukuo foreign exchange control. 1. We understand that following institution of Japanese exchange control in January the Japanese Finance Department has not permitted the export of capital to Manchuria except under rigid safeguards against such capital leaking out of Manchuria to foreign countries. According to press accounts, the primary purpose of the new Manchuria regulation is by enforcing in Manchuria exchange control as drastic as that enforced in Japan to facilitate the flow of capital to Manchuria. 2. Assuming that the representations which might be made at Tokyo would emphasize the inconsistency between the Manchuria exchange measures and Japanese declarations with regard to the maintenance of the open door in Manchuria, the reply of the Japanese Government would probably be that until Manchukuo is recognized “no dispute whatever can be entertained with regard to that country” (see our telegram No. 87, April 16, 7 p.m., 1935 48 ). 3. It is our opinion that from financial as well as from political considerations there is little likelihood of representations, if made, having any useful result. 4. Our representations and the Japanese rejoinder would probably be given publicity in Japan if not in the United States and they would inevitably be interpreted in this country in the light of recent announcements of American attitude with regard to the Far Eastern conflict. We are not, of course, in a position to estimate whether the present objectives of American policy require, in the circumstances indicated, that a caveat be entered. Repeated to Peiping. Grew 48 Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. iii , p. 898 . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 893.5151 Manchuria/13: Telegram [Document 1066] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , October 26, 1937—2 p.m. [Received October 26—9:15 a.m.] 666. Substance of the Department’s 423, October 19, 3 p.m., 49 was communicated informally to the Foreign Office on October 20. The Foreign Office advises me today that instructions in substantially similar terms to those of the Department were telegraphed on October 22 to British representatives at Tokyo and Mukden. Bingham 49 Not printed; it reported the telegraphic exchange October 18–19 with the Embassy in China and instructed the Embassy in the United Kingdom to “take this matter up with the Foreign Office”. (893.5151 Manchuria/11) The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.5151 Manchuria/15: Telegram [Document 1067] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , October 30, 1937—3 p.m. [Received October 30—8:45 a.m.] 713. Department’s 333, October 19, 3 p.m. Following telegram was received October 29 from Mukden. “No. 1, October 26, 7 p.m. Referring to Department’s telegram of October 19, 3 p.m., please telegraph to the Department that I called on Ohashi 50 yesterday and stated to him that the statutory discrimination in favor of Japanese currency, Japanese exchange, and Japan was clearly inconsistent with the numerous pledges to maintain the Open Door which I cited and has created a very unfavorable impression in the United States. I left informal memorandum of my statements. Ohashi expressed doubt as to the existence of discrimination until I showed him discriminatory passages in the acts when he seemed genuinely surprised and disconcerted. He professed he could not understand enactment of discriminatory provisions and his Government’s policy to maintain the Open Door has not changed and promised to look into the question. British Consul General has not yet received instructions to make local representations but he is telegraphing to Hsinking today and intends to call attention to the discriminatory provisions in the course of conversations. I understand that he has suggested to his Government that the question be formally taken up in Tokyo in view of its relation to Japan’s several pertinent treaty commitments.” Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Lockhart 50 Chuichi Ohashi, Japanese Director of the “Manchoukuo” Foreign Office. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 893.5034 Manchuria/14: Telegram [Document 1068] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 4, 1937—noon. [Received November 4—4:56 a.m.] 518. 1. The press reports a huge deal by which the Nippon Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha, chief of the extensive Ayukawa or Nissan interests, will acquire from the South Manchuria Railway Company all its commercial and industrial interests other than railways. A corporation half owned by the “Manchukuo” government and half owned by Nippon Sangyo will be set up with head office in Hsinking capitalized at 450,000,000 yen. 2. Coville 51 has received from a personal friend in the company the following information: the transaction with the South Manchuria Railway Company has been closed; the expectation is that the new company will acquire also other interests and will become the primary agency in the economic development of Manchuria under a monopoly system exceeding in concentration anything thus far attempted even in Manchuria. Operations will commence without delay; assisted by proceeds of the sale the South Manchuria Railway Company will hereafter be free to concentrate on rapid development of North China, which is recognized as an essential part of the program necessary for the solution of the problems both political and economic facing Japan in North China; Matsuoka 52 will become Foreign Minister and as such support his well known policy of exploitation of North China. 3. Nippon Sangyo is the parent company of the interests controlled by Gisuke Ayukawa, able financier who has risen rapidly in recent years in heavy industry, notably iron and steel, coal, copper, gold, automobiles, chemicals, and munitions. He has access to bank credit independent of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, et cetera. 4. The newspapers state that Ayukawa himself will visit the United States, possibly in December, to attract American capital and technique to Manchuria. Grew 51 Cabot Coville, Second Secretary of Embassy in Japan. 52 Yosuke Matsuoka, president of the Soouth Manchuria Railway Company. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/29: Telegram [Document 1069] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 6, 1937—11 p.m. [Received November 6—12:40 p.m.] 733. Following from Mukden: “No. 5, November 5, 9 p.m. A treaty with Japan was signed at Hsinking today ending Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, yielding administrative jurisdiction in the South Manchuria Railway zone, subjecting Japanese subjects to local laws, et cetera. To the treaty which consists of seven articles and goes into effect December 1st are annexed two supplementary agreements, each with an annexed memorandum of reciprocally understood matters. Translation will be forwarded in due course. 53 In the Government manifesto concerning the treaty issued this afternoon appears the following statement: ‘The view and intention of the Government with regard to the status of foreigners other than Japanese in our country was made clear in the Foreign Minister’s declaration of July 1, 1936. 54 The Government takes this occasion to state that it intends to abolish on December 1 the extraterritorial-like treatment heretofore permitted these foreigners as a matter of grace. However, in the application of laws to these foreigners and other dealings with them the Government will strive for justice and harmony, and intelligently to protect their legitimate rights.’ The Foreign Minister made a declaration to the same effect, ending it with the statement that in the treatment of extraterritorial countries the authorities will exercise every care also that these foreigners need not be ‘harassed by needless anxiety’.” Repeated to Nanking. Lockhart 53 Not printed. 54 See telegram No. 333, July 2, 1936, 11 a.m., from the First Secretary of Embassy in China, Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iv , p. 230 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.5151 Manchuria/17: Telegram [Document 1070] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 12, 1937—1 p.m. [Received November 12—3:18 a.m.] 744. Your 361, November 10, 5 p.m. 55 Following from Mukden. “No. 7, November 11, noon. With reference to the Department’s telegram No. 333 to the Embassy at Peiping, 56 I again called on Director of the Foreign Office who assured me that he is taking steps to remedy discriminatory treatment of revised exchange control law.” Mukden has been instructed to keep Embassy fully informed of all developments. Lockhart 55 Not printed; it requested further information (893.5151 Manchuria/15). 56 October 19, 3 p.m., p. 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 1062 and Doc. 1063 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/31: Telegram [Document 1071] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 18, 1937—11 p.m. [Received November 18—10:35 a.m.] 551. The British Consul General in Mukden has been instructed to protest to the Manchukuo authorities against the Japanese unilateral surrender of extraterritoriality and to make clear that Great Britain does not recognize such surrender as applying to British subjects. All treaty rights are reserved. Craigie 57 is to make a similar reservation here. I hope shortly to be able to cable the text or summary of the British note. Grew 57 Sir Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/32: Telegram [Document 1072] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 19, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 19—10:55 a.m.] 553. Department’s 304, November 18, 7 p.m. 58 Craigie when talking to me last evening had not had time to study his instructions but it was my clear impression from what he said that his Government held that the Japanese Government by surrendering Japanese extraterritorial rights should be held responsible for abrogation by Manchukuo of extraterritorial rights of other nations. This impression has been clarified by information received today from the British Embassy as below indicated. The note which the British Embassy intends to present to the Japanese Foreign Office, the substance of which has just been communicated to me, will state that the British Government protest against “this unilateral abrogation of treaty rights.” It is understood that the note will not be delivered until word has been received that representations have been made by the British Consul General in Mukden. The British Embassy’s note will state that the British Consul General at Mukden has been given the following instructions: to inform immediately the authorities at Hsinking that such “unilateral abrogation” cannot be accepted by the British Government; to refer to the undertaking given by the Manchukuo government in its note to the powers of March 12, 1932, 59 to discharge faithfully the obligations incurred by the Republic of China in Manchuria by virtue of treaty stipulations with foreign countries; to state that the British Government does not regard the treaty signed between Japan and Manchukuo on November 5, 1937, or the “official statement” concerning the rights of foreigners made on that date as affecting in any way the extraterritorial rights in Manchuria of British subjects; and to inform the Manchukuo authorities that the future treatment of British subjects under a régime which pretends to ignore their extraterritorial rights will be watched with the greatest concern by the British Government. We are informed by the British Embassy that the “official statement” referred to in the proposed British note is the statement issued on November 5 by the Premier of Manchukuo. According to a Domei despatch from Hsinking, the ultimate paragraph of this statement as follows: “As to the status of the foreigners residing in this country other than the Japanese, the then Foreign Minister of the Manchukuo government manifested the intentions and policies of the Imperial Government in a statement issued on July 1, 1936. 60 Taking the present occasion the Imperial Government has decided to abolish the extraterritorial rights still enjoyed by foreign nationals. In applying the state regulations to foreign residents as well as other measures to deal with them, the Government will not fail to observe a fair and equitable attitude and protect the legitimate interests vested in them.” We have requested Mukden to telegraph us whether any legislative or juridical action has as yet been taken by Manchukuo to implement the decision to abolish the extraterritorial rights still enjoyed by foreign nationals. Grew 58 Not printed; it requested clarification of telegram No. 551, November 18, 11 p.m., supra . (793.943 Manchuria/31.) 59 See telegram of March 12, 1932, from Mr. Hsieh-shih, Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. iii , p. 579 . 60 See telegram No. 333, July 2, 1936, 11 a.m., from the First Secretary of Embassy in China, ibid. , 1936, vol. iv , p. 230 . The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 761.93 Manchuria/97: Telegram [Document 1073] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 22, 1937—6 p.m. [Received November 22—12:54 p.m.] 775. Following from Harbin: “30, November 18, 2 p.m. The Chief of the Russian Section of the Hsinking Foreign Affairs Bureau, a Japanese diplomat, told Benninghoff 61 yesterday that relations between Manchukuo and Soviet Russia were better than they had been for some time and that as a result of negotiations in Harbin culminating October 27, the Russians were permitted to raise and take back their armed launch sunk in the Amur River July 1 by Japanese troops, and a mutual exchange of prisoners was effected. The same informant was of the opinion that both sides were being more conciliatory than heretofore in an effort to avoid serious developments. The same informant confirmed newspaper reports that Mr. Yoshi-suke Ayukawa, President of the Japan Industry Company (see page 19 Mukden’s review for October 62 ) will shortly proceed to the United States to seek capital for the newly created Manchuria Heavy Industries Company. He then said, speaking on a matter appertaining to another Government department, that his colleagues were greatly interested in an apparent “revolution” in policy regarding foreign capital, for they had assumed that the steadfast policy of Manchukuo of denying any foreign control over foreign investments will have to be abandoned. The probable attitude of the American Government was also creating great interest. Repeated to Tokyo, by hand to Mukden”. By hand to Nanking. Lockhart 61 Harry Merrell Benninghoff, Consul at Harbin. 62 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/33: Telegram [Document 1074] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 25, 1937—11 a.m. [Received 2:15 p.m.] 783. Following from Mukden: “11, November 24, 4 p.m. The British Consul General at Mukden informs me that acting under instructions from his Government he called on November 23rd on the Director of the Foreign Office and protested along the following lines concerning Manchukuo’s proposed abolition of the extraterritorial rights of non-Japanese aliens in Manchuria: 1. The British Government cannot assent to any unilateral action on the part of the Manchurian authorities impairing the extraterritorial rights of British subjects; 2. The attention of the Government was invited to its statement of March 12, 1932 assuming in Manchuria treaty obligations incurred by the Chinese Government. The Director replied: firstly, that such statements under international law assume obligation to only property and not personal rights under the pre-war regime; secondly, that the British Government failed to respond to the statement of March 12th and therefore Manchukuo is not bound by it; and thirdly, that to allow British extraterritorial rights to continue would be to discriminate against Japanese subjects. In connection with the discriminatory features of the exchange control law, the Director stated that he is endeavoring to remedy those features by striking out ‘Japan’ in the discriminatory clauses and substituting therefor ‘those countries which recognize Manchukuo’. Tokyo informed.[”] Lockhart The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [Document 1075] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , November 26, 1937—4 p.m. [Received November 26—9:10 a.m.] 784. Embassy’s 733, November 6, 11 p.m. and 783, November 25, 11 p.m. [ a.m. ] Mukden now reports by despatch its belief that Manchukuo will attempt exercise jurisdiction over American citizens and firms as of December 1. Harbin has submitted text recently promulgated “law concerning foreign juridical persons” (presumably effective December 2), primary purpose of which apparently is control activities in Manchuria of large Japanese commercial houses subsequent abolition extraterritoriality December 1, but which may affect other foreign interests in Manchuria as well. Consulate has transmitted copy of letter received by the National City Bank from Hsinking Department of Economics stating that the legislation “naturally” applies to all foreign firms and requesting preparation be made to register and to appoint a representative for Manchukuo in accordance with the law. Law provides for foreign firms operating in Manchuria only though [ through? ] a branch or that are foreign juridical persons. Law extends substantial control of the local authorities over such juridical persons, but it would appear that it is not intended actually to be unduly harsh in application. Such juridical persons are given 6 months from the date when the law goes into effect to fulfill the legal requirements. The Embassy at Tokyo in its despatch No. 2661, November 10, 63 observes that the abolition of extraterritoriality by treaty between Japan and Manchukuo will probably result in due course in the impairment or abolition of like rights enjoyed by third nations, and that the Embassy is considering the advisability of approaching the Foreign Office with the aim of obtaining Japanese Government’s views regarding the future bearing of the treaty on American extraterritorial rights in Manchuria. This would seem to constitute a good initial approach to the present difficulty. Harbin proposes that the two American firms which would be affected by the judicial [ Juridical ] persons law be advised as regards question of taxation (Embassy’s despatch No. 1194, April 20 63a ) that compliance with the new law is a matter for the firms’ decision alone. I concur in Harbin’s suggestion on which the Department’s instructions are respectfully requested, as well as on the general question of extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, on which question the Department may desire to await any investigation which may be undertaken by Tokyo. Instructions are also requested on the question of the attitude which should be assumed by Consulate at Mukden and Harbin in case of arrest of an American citizen on or after December 1. Sent to the Department. Repeated to the Ambassador at Hankow and to Tokyo. Lockhart 63 Not printed. 63a Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [Document 1076] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ), at Peiping Washington , November 26, 1937—2 p.m. 380. Your 733, November 6, 11 p.m. The Department has given consideration to the manifesto of the Manchukuo régime in regard to the intention of that régime to abolish as from December 1, 1937, the extraterritorial rights of foreigners in Manchuria and has reached the conclusion that in view of all the circumstances no action should be taken on the basis of the manifesto in question. However, should our consulates in Manchuria receive notice from the Manchukuo authorities in regard to the termination of extraterritorial privileges or, in the absence of such notice, should a case arise involving the assertion by local authorities of jurisdiction over American nationals or their property, it is desired that the consulates promptly notify the Department thereof in order that consideration may be given to the matter of making appropriate representations. You should communicate the above to the consulates at Harbin and Mukden for their confidential information and in addition to suggesting that they keep in touch with their principally interested colleagues direct them to keep the Embassy and the Department fully informed of developments. Please repeat to Tokyo for Embassy’s information and ask Tokyo to repeat to you Tokyo’s 551, November 18, 11 p.m., and 553, November 19, 5 p.m. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [Document 1077] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 28, 1937—3 p.m. 319. Peiping’s 784, November 26, 4 p.m. and Department’s telegram in reply thereto which Peiping has been instructed to repeat to you. The Department desires that upon receipt by the Embassy of notification from the Consul at Mukden mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of the Department’s telegram to Peiping under reference, you present to the Japanese Foreign Office a note reading substantially as follows: “Reference is made to reports that on November 5 a treaty was signed with Japan ending Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, and that on the same day there was issued a manifesto in regard to the extraterritorial rights of foreigners other than Japanese in Manchuria. It has also been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States that the branch at Harbin of the National City Bank of New York, an American concern, has received a letter from the Department of Economics at Hsinking stating that a recently promulgated ‘law concerning foreign juridical persons’ ‘naturally’ applies to all foreign firms, and requesting that preparation be made to register and to appoint a representative in accordance with the law. The extraterritorial rights of nationals of the United States in Manchuria are granted by treaties between the United States and China and the Government of the United States considers that the law under reference which apparently contemplates the assertion by the authorities in Manchuria of jurisdiction over American juridical persons is inapplicable to American nationals and firms. The Government of the United States therefore is impelled to register emphatic objection to any attempt by the authorities of Manchuria to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals and to make full reservation in regard to the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens. In view of the relationship between the Japanese Government and the authorities in Manchuria, the Government of the United States addresses the Japanese Government on this matter.” 64 Hull 64 The note was sent to the Japanese Foreign Office on December 2. Similar British representations were made November 30. The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping 793.943 Manchuria/34: Telegram [Document 1078] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ), at Peiping Washington , November 28, 1937—3 p.m. 382. Your 784, November 26, 4 p.m. Please instruct the Consul at Mukden to proceed to Hsinking at his earliest convenience and to leave with the appropriate authorities as a record of an oral communication a memorandum reading as follows: “Reference is made to a letter received by the Harbin office of the National City Bank of New York from the Department of Economics at Hsinking, stating that a recently promulgated ‘law concerning foreign juridical persons’ ‘naturally’ applies to all foreign firms, and requesting that preparation be made to register and to appoint a representative in accordance with the law. The Government of the United States considers that this law, which apparently contemplates the assertion by the authorities in Manchuria of jurisdiction over American juridical persons is inapplicable to American nationals and firms in view of the extraterritorial rights of nationals of the United States in Manchuria which are granted by treaties between the United States and China. The Government of the United States therefore is impelled to register emphatic objection to any attempt of the authorities of Manchuria to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals and to make full reservation in regard to the treaty rights of the United States and its nationals.” The Consul at Mukden should be instructed promptly to notify Tokyo by telegram as soon as he leaves for Hsinking to make these representations as the Embassy at Tokyo is being instructed to make representations to the Japanese Foreign Office at the same time. Please repeat to Harbin and Tokyo for their information. Hull Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) 793.003 Manchuria/19 [Document 1079] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hamilton ) [ Washington ,] November 29, 1937. Mr. Henry, of the French Embassy, telephoned on November 27 and inquired whether the American Government contemplated making representations in regard to the announced intent of the authorities in Manchuria to disregard the extraterritorial rights of foreigners. On November 29, Mr. Gaucheron, of the French Embassy, telephoned in regard to the same matter and I informed Mr. Gaucheron that the Department had instructed the Embassy at Tokyo to make representations to the Japanese Government and the Consul at Mukden to make representations to the “Manchukuoan” authorities. Mr. Gaucheron inquired as to our attitude in case the “Manchukuoan” authorities should take an American into custody. I told him that that case had not yet arisen but that there had arisen a case involving an American bank in which it appeared that the “Manchukuoan” authorities contemplated asserting jurisdiction over this American concern. I said that we were registering objection to such an attempt to assert jurisdiction over American nationals; that we were registering objection in this particular case and were also registering a general objection. Mr. Gaucheron thanked me for this information. 65 M[ axwell ] M. H[ amilton ] 65 Mr. Gaucheron on December 7 informed Mr. Hamilton of French representations in Tokyo and Manchuria concerning French extraterritorial rights in Manchuria. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Manchuria/1471: Telegram [Document 1080] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , November 29, 1937—7 p.m. [Received November 29—3:11 p.m.] 493. It is officially announced this afternoon that the Italian Government has today formally recognized Manchukuo and intends to establish a legation at Hsinking. The press publishes a telegram from Ciano 66 to Hirota 67 conveying this information and stating that the Italian Consul General at Mukden has been instructed to communicate it officially to the government of Manchukuo, as well as a telegram addressed to the Foreign Minister of Manchukuo, in which Ciano expresses the cordial greetings of the Italian Government and people and sincere good wishes for the future of Manchukuo. Gayda 68 this evening states that this recognition “confirms the realistic character of Italy’s foreign policy and consecrates not only the new and definite situation created on the Asiatic Continent but also the results of Japanese policy designed to create that situation”. He adds that Italy’s present action clearly and courageously breaks with the hesitancy shown by other nations and sanctions the irrevocably accomplished fact of the independence of Manchukuo which together with Jehol is at Japan’s side a bulwark against communism in Asia. Phillips 66 Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 67 Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. 68 Italian Fascist editor. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Manchuria/1470: Telegram [Document 1081] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 29, 1937—midnight. [Received November 29—1:25 p.m.] 579. I learn late tonight from reliable informant that Italy has today recognized Manchukuo, such recognition having been communicated to the Hsinking authorities through the Italian consular representative. My informant states that the Japanese Government was advised some time ago of Italy’s readiness to take this step but that Italy was requested to delay action; that some 10 days ago the Japanese Government informed the Italian Government that the time was now ripe for recognition. The belief is expressed that both the German Government and General Franco will shortly follow suit, that Italy and Germany will be granted certain economic advantages in Manchuria and that Japan will recognize the Franco regime by way of reciprocity. Confirmation from official Japanese sources is impossible to obtain tonight. 69 Repeated to Peiping for Hankow. Grew 69 Cf. despatch No. 2691, December 10, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] . The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Manchuria/1476: Telegram [Document 1082] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , November 30, 1937—5 p.m. [Received November 30—1:27 p.m.] 494. My 493, November 29, 7 p.m., with regard to the recognition of Manchukuo, I gather from a Foreign Office source that Japan has for months been asking Italy for such recognition and that this Government had finally decided to acquiesce. My informant added that he had no doubt but that Germany would shortly follow Italy’s example and he also expressed the opinion that China itself would do so before long. He said that he knew that China had been ready to extend recognition for a considerable time but had been deterred because of British influence. In conclusion he added that in view of Italy’s action “all other nations could now feel free to recognize Manchukuo”. Phillips The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.5151 Manchuria/23: Telegram [Document 1083] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 1, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 1—1:52 p.m.] 796. Department’s telegram No. 333, October 19, 3 p.m. Harbin reports by despatch that the list of prohibited merchandise has not been published there but that large British importing firm has been informed confidentially by official in Hsinking that the Japanese prohibited list was being used in administering the Manchurian law at present and that some firms [articles for which] foreign exchange and import permits are now being refused might be allowed and vice versa. Efforts to obtain a copy of the prohibitive list for Manchuria from the local administrator of the law have proved unsuccessful. A partial list of merchandise ordinarily imported in at least moderate quantities from the United States and for which exchange and import permits are now being refused includes cotton manufactures, wool and manufactures thereof, silk and manufactures thereof, radio sets and parts, canned goods and groceries, fruits, seeds and vegetables, old newspapers, photographic apparatus and materials, perfumery and cosmetics and rubber goods including motor tires. It is also stated that permits may be refused for other than low-priced motor vehicles. Except for Japanese merchandise, which may be imported without restriction, permits have been refused for merchandise on the prohibited list regardless of the country of origin. Import and foreign exchange permits have been granted for agricultural machinery, implements, and parts from the United States, [un] manufactured leather, cue [ fur ] scrap and leaf tobacco. Harbin also reports that it is evident that if hostilities in China are prolonged the foreign exchange and import regulations in Manchuria will be made more severe and more commodities may be added to the prohibited list. Copy of despatch on which above is based was mailed to Tokyo. By mail to Hankow. Lockhart The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 852.01/309: Telegram [Document 1084] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 3, 1937—3 p.m. [Received December 3—7 a.m.] 591. Our 583, November 30, 8 p.m. 70 It was officially announced yesterday that, following recognition by Japan of the Franco regime, there occurred yesterday at Tokyo an exchange of notes between the Manchukuo Ambassador and the Franco representative mutually extending recognition. Grew 70 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/38: Telegram [Document 1085] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 3, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 3—7 a.m.] 800. Department’s 382, November 28, 3 p.m. The following telegram has been received from Mukden: “No. 13, December 3, 9 a.m. Yesterday I called on the Director of the Foreign Office [and made representations as] set forth in the Embassy’s telegram of November 29, 4 p.m. In reply to my representations the Director stated: (1) To allow American extraterritorial rights to continue would be to discriminate against Japanese nationals; (2) Manchukuo as a successor state does not acknowledge treaty obligations contracted by the previous regime concerning personal rights, in which category he placed extraterritorial rights; (3) The abrogation of extraterritoriality is a fixed national policy; (4) Because the United States does not recognize Manchukuo, the presentation to him of the American Government’s objections to any action taken by his government cannot be expected to exert any influence. Despatch follows. 71 Please repeat to Department.” Repeated to Tokyo and Hankow. Lockhart 71 Despatch No. 175, December 3, not printed. The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 893.01 Manchuria/1479: Telegram [Document 1086] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Hankow , December 4, 1937—5 p.m. [Received 6:10 p.m.] 18. Following is the Embassy translation of memorandum December 3 from Foreign Office: [“]The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present its compliments to the American Embassy and has the honor to state that it has received a telegraphic report from the Chinese Embassy at Rome to the effect that the Italian Government of [ on ] November 29 announced its recognition of the false regime of the Three Eastern Provinces and the establishment of a Legation at Changchun. The action of the Italian Government in this regard is clearly in contravention of the Washington Nine Power Treaty of 1922, 72 the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 73 and the principles of the various resolutions of the League of Nations concerning the Sino-Japanese affair. The Chinese Ambassador to Italy has filed a protest with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent a memorandum to the Italian Ambassador to China announcing reservation of the position hitherto adopted by China in the matter. Apart from transmitting copies of the memorandum to the Secretary of the League of Nations for its files and for distribution to the governments of members’ countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to transmit herewith to the American Embassy a copy of the memorandum mentioned above and a translation thereof with the request that they be forwarded to the American Government.” 74 Following is Foreign Office translation of enclosure mentioned above: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Italian Embassy and has the honor to call its attention to a report dated November 29 from the Chinese Embassy at Rome to the effect that the Italian Government has announced on that day as [ its? ] recognition of the so-called ‘Manchukuo’ and the establishment of a legation at Changchun. The action of the Italian Government in this regard is in contravention of the Washington Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922 to which it is a party and inconsistent with the provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the resolutions reputedly adopted by the League in regard to the Sino-Japanese controversy. In view of the traditional friendship between China and Italy, the Chinese Government deeply regrets that such action has been taken. The Italian Embassy is requested to inform its Government of the Chinese Government’s determination to maintain the position hitherto adopted by it in this matter.” Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, latter repeat by mail to Tokyo. Johnson 72 Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . 73 Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 69 . 74 The Secretary General of the League of Nations circulated the Chinese protest on December 4. The Vice Consul at Mukden (Davies) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) 893.5151 Manchuria/27 [Document 1087] The Vice Consul at Mukden ( Davies ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) 75 No. 176 Mukden , December 7, 1937. Sir : I have the honor to report that on December 2, at the same time that I made oral representations to the Director of the Foreign Office concerning proposed infringement of American extraterritorial rights, * the British Consul General at Mukden, Mr. P. D. Butler, protested against the discriminatory features of the recently revised exchange control law. † The Director of the Foreign Office, Mr. Ohashi, admitted that the law in its present form discriminates specifically in favor of Japan and Japanese currency. He then stated that he is seeking to have substituted for the words “Japan” and “Japanese currency” in the clauses objected to by the American and British Governments, some such reading as “those countries which have entered into an agreement with Manchoukuo for the maintenance of their respective currencies at a stable ratio.” Mr. Butler replied that such a revision would not alter his Government’s objection to the clauses in question. The proposed substitution, Mr. Ohashi intimated, is designed to remove the overt discrimination in favor of Japan and Japanese currency, thereby remedying “Manehukuo’s” literal violation of the principle of the Open Door. In any event, it is quite likely that Mr. Ohashi’s recommendation will not be acted upon. The Director’s anxiety over these legal niceties relating to the Open Door is in contrast to his disregard of “Manchukuo’s” pledges concerning extraterritoriality. In the light of Hsinking’s desire for American investments in Manchuria, ‡ however, the Director’s concern over maintaining the fiction of the Open Door is understandable. Respectfully yours, John Davies, Jr . 75 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Vice Consul at Mukden in his unnumbered despatch of December 7; received January 11, 1938. * Despatch No. 175, December 3; Representations Concerning Extraterritorial Rights. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed. See telegram No. 800, December 3, 5 p.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] .] † This office’s action in connection with the revised exchange control law is the subject of despatch No. 158, October 30, 1937; Discriminatory Features of Exchange Control Law. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed. See telegram No. 713, October 30, 3 p.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] .] ‡ Despatch No. 160, November 10, 1937, Visit to Hsinking; No. 168, November 17, 1937, Rumored American Investments in “Manchukuo”; Harbin’s telegram No. 30 to Peiping Embassy, November 18, 2 p.m. [Footnote in the original; neither despatch printed; for text of telegram No. 30, see telegram No. 775, November 22, 6 p.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] .] The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.506 Manchuria/36: Telegram [Document 1088] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 8, 1937—5 p.m. [Received December 8—8:15 a.m.] 808. Department’s 137, July 24, 5 p.m., Mukden’s despatch No. 153, October 7th. 76 Mukden now reports that Tsutsui of the Administrative Office of the Hsinking Foreign Affairs Bureau does not offer any satisfactory information in regard to the probable situation after the enactment of the insurance law and that both Tsutsui and Ohashi are evidently embarrassed by the necessity of defending the insurance and exchange control laws which are in conflict with Open Door policy. Both hold that the two laws are part of national policy. Mukden Consulate General shares belief of Embassy at Tokyo that representations to the Manchukuo and Japanese Governments will probably be ineffectual on the broad basis of principles involved, but this Embassy nevertheless believes that it might be necessary to obtain from time to time by informal local representations particular modifications (or interpretations) of the laws in question which would be beneficial to American interests. It would seem that the above-mentioned laws and the law concerning juridicial persons (Embassy’s 800, December 3, 5 p.m.) fall in the same general category. The Department’s instructions are requested, particularly as to whether new instructions shall be issued to Mukden or the matter be permitted to rest pending new developments. Repeated to Tokyo and the Embassy at Hankow. Lockhart 76 Neither printed. The Navy Department to the Department of State 793.94/11690 [Document 1089] The Navy Department to the Department of State 77 December 9, 1937 The following information has been received from the Naval Attaché at Peiping as of 8:20 p.m., under date of 8 December, 1937: An official of the Nipponese Army in Manchukuo stated himself with emphasis that there is unrest and also bitterness towards the Japanese rule there. He also said that there was no Japanese secret service in Siberia which fact increases their worry. Native troops have been shifted to the south, mostly to the North China area, in order to avoid any possible revolts in the immediate rear border forces. The concentration of 14 divisions of Japanese soldiers about 350,000 in Manchuria the majority east of Harbin plus others sent from the North China area has been confirmed by many reports. The Russian Government is satisfied with the present disposition of their forces on the same front. The Kwantung army leaders openly resent Hasegawa’s 78 Shanghai operations and tear their major objective may be thus compromised. The strength of the Soviets is fully recognized and no longer underestimated consequently any action by Russia is now feared. The Russians are planning to keep on delaying on any fishing agreement with Japan thus making Japan assume the role of an aggressor nation. The Soviets are confident of military success but are anxious for favorable foreign opinion. Note: The Naval Attaché left Peiping for Harbin at 9:30 a.m. on December 9, 1937. 77 Received in the Department December 9. 78 Vice Admiral Kijoshi Hasegawa, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.5123 Manchuria/8: Telegram [Document 1090] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 13, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 13—6 a.m.] 816. The following telegram has been received from Mukden: “15, December 10, 4 p.m. An income tax law has been promulgated, effective January 1, and declared applicable to all residents of Manchukuo. Translation follows”. 79 The Embassy will study the text of the law when received from Mukden. Sent to the Department, repeated to Tokyo and Embassy, Hankow. Lockhart 79 Not printed. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/40: Telegram [Document 1091] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 14, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 14—10:25 a.m.] 824. Embassy’s 800, December 3, 5 p.m. Harbin reports by despatch No. 11 December 4, that there has been promulgated an Imperial Ordinance making the law concerning foreign juridical persons effective as from December 1, 1937. The British Embassy states that the British Consular Agency Mukden has been instructed by the Foreign Office to make representations at Hsinking regarding the above-mentioned law along lines similar to ours. Mukden’s despatch No. 175, December 3, reporting in detail on the representations reported in the Embassy’s 800, indicates that Ohashi in making point number 4 also questioned the legal validity of such representations in the absence of recognition of Manchukuo. Mukden further reports, however, that: “While Mr. Ohashi clearly did not mince his words in formal reply to the representations, he was in subsequent conversation apparently anxious to convey the impression that ‘Manchukuo’ will be temperate in its attempt to assume jurisdiction over American property, nationals the [ and? ] firms. He asked that an explanation of the reasonableness of his Government’s attitude be conveyed to the American Government.” Repeated to Tokyo and Embassy [at] Hankow. Lockhart The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 694.006/26: Telegram [Document 1092] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 22, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 22—8:55 a.m.] 840. Embassy’s 813, December 11, 4 p.m. 80 Text of the law as transmitted by Mukden’s despatch No. 181, December 17, copy of which was sent to the Department, 80 makes it evident that the trade control law is a part of the general program for effecting control over foreign exchange. The law provides for the relinquishment of the former “emergency trade control law”. Mukden observes that the law and the Imperial ordinance of the same date to contain the export and import of certain commodities “manifest a phase of Manchukuo’s cooperation with Japan in emergency period economic control” for the Kwantung army considers trade control to be a necessary “semi-wartime” measure; and “as such, it is no more likely to be relaxed because it transgresses American rights, than were any of the preceding ‘national policy’ laws, beginning with the legislation establishing the petroleum monopoly and extending through the property insurance law, the exchange control law and the foreign juridical persons law” (see Embassy’s 808, December 8, 5 p.m.). Lockhart 80 Not printed. 80 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), at Peiping 793.943 Manchuria/40: Telegram [Document 1093] The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ), at Peiping Washington , December 23, 1937—7 p.m. 405. Your 808, December 8, 5 p.m., and 824, December 14, 6 p.m. The Embassy and the Consuls in Manchuria should bear in mind that the American Government does not assent to these various laws nor has it modified in any way its position with regard to the broad general principles involved. However, when specific cases arise affecting American interests in connection with the application of the exchange and trade control laws, the foreign juridical persons law, and the proposed insurance law, the Consuls in Manchuria should, as a matter of expediency when requested by the representatives of the American interests concerned, intercede with the appropriate authorities in an endeavor to obtain a favorable interpretation of the law or such modification thereof as may be within the discretionary authority of the administrative officials. The Embassy and the Consuls concerned should continue to keep the Department informed regarding further developments in these matters. Please repeat to Tokyo. Hull The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/43: Telegram [Document 1094] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 24, 1937—noon. [Received December 25—3 p.m.] 843. Department’s 382, November 28, 3 p.m. Following from Mukden: “No. 16, December 23, 3 p.m. Reference Department’s No. 380 and 382 to the Embassy November 26, 2 p.m., and November 28, 3 p.m. This Office today received a letter from the Chief of the Political Bureau of the Foreign Office stating that foreign juridical persons established for profit whose object is to do business in Manchuria ‘must’ be established as new juridical persons established and registered under Manchukuo law. There are two such American firms in Mukden. Instructions are requested as to what reply if any is to be made to the Foreign Office.” Repeated to Harbin. Lockhart The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 893.5123 Manchuria/9: Telegram [Document 1095] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 27, 1937—4 p.m. [Received December 27—6:20 a.m.] 848. Embassy’s 816, December 13, 4 p.m. Mukden reports that the income tax is to be collected on practically all earned (non-profit) incomes of yuan 70 or more monthly at rates of 5% to 4%, to which is added a surtax of 50% of the basic rate, effective January 1 next. Employers are made responsible for the collection of the tax, fines provided for failure to submit returns or for the submission of false returns. Mukden states that a separate income tax law affecting liberal professions was promulgated December 6 for enforcement January 1 and that a translation is being prepared. The above measures appear to be intimately connected with the general problem of extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, and Mukden requests instructions in regard to what action if any should be taken in anticipation of the contemplated assertion of jurisdiction over American nationals. It is the Embassy’s belief that this law will have to be dealt with according to the principles laid down in the Department’s 405, December 23, 7 p.m., which was repeated to Mukden and Harbin on December 24, and it proposes so to instruct the Consulates in Manchuria if the Department agrees. 81 Repeated to Tokyo. Lockhart 81 The Department gave approval in telegram No. 413, December 29, 4 p.m. The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State 793.943 Manchuria/44: Telegram [Document 1096] The Counselor of Embassy in China ( Lockhart ) to the Secretary of State Peiping , December 27, 1937—6 p.m. [Received December 27—6:20 a.m.] 850. Embassy’s 843, December 24, noon. Following telegram has been sent to Mukden and Harbin: “December 27, 5 p.m. Your 16, December 23, 3 p.m. The Embassy considers this matter to be covered by the Department’s 405, December 23, 7 p.m., transmitted to you by the Embassy’s December 26, 10 p.m., and you should be governed by the principles therein established. The Embassy believes the matter would best be dealt with orally on the occasion of your next trip to Hsinking” 82 Lockhart 82 The Department approved this telegram in telegram No. 412, December 28, 7 p.m. Consideration of neutralization of islands of the Pacific Ocean or a general Pacific pact of nonaggression Consideration of neutralization of islands of the Pacific Ocean or a general Pacific pact of nonaggression [1097] Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State on the Neutralization of the Islands of the Pacific [Washington,] February 16, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/25½ [1098] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, February 26, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/27a [1099] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State Washington, March 1, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/28 [1100] Mr. Norman H. Davis to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) New York, March 23, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/30 [1101] Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis of a Conversation With the British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Cadogan) London , April 22, 1937. 890.00/47 [1102] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 17, 1937—6 p.m. [Received May 17—9:50 a.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/4: Telegram [1103] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, May 21, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:20 p.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/6: Telegram [1104] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 28, 1937. [Received June 15.] 700.0011 Pacific/15 [1105] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, June 4, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 4—3:40 p.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/8: Telegram [1106] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, June 5, 1937—noon. [Received June 5—10:20 a.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/9: Telegram [1107] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, June 8, 1937—noon. [Received June 8—9:15 a.m.] 700.0011 Pacific/10: Telegram [1108] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] June 11, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/13 [1109] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton) London , June 16, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/18 [1110] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] June 30, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/22 [1111] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 14, 1937. 700.0011 Pacific/18 [1112] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 22, 1937. [Received December 16.] 711B.94/20 Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State on the Neutralization of the Islands of the Pacific 700.0011 Pacific/25½ [Document 1097] Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State on the Neutralization of the Islands of the Pacific 83 [ Washington ,] February 16, 1937. I. Definition and Discussion of Terms The subject for consideration is the question of the advisability of the American Government taking the initiative in action directed toward bringing about by international agreement “neutralization” of the islands of the Pacific. In considering this question there at once arises need of defining and clarifying the terms. Webster’s New International Dictionary defines the word “neutralize” in its international law usage as follows: “To invest with conventional or obligatory neutrality conferring inviolability by belligerents, as in the case of Switzerland.” In the light of the long-standing attitude of the American Government and people, it would seem that there must at the outset be ruled out any proposal which would envisage agreement by the American Government to any sort of international alliance or to any commitment to use force. In this connection it seems pertinent to recall that the United States Senate ratified the Washington Conference Agreement of 1921 84 between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific subject to a reservation as follows: “The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of this Treaty there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense.” Furthermore, the term “neutralize” as used in international law normally envisages an attitude by one power or group of powers toward the territory of another power. One nation cannot unilaterally “neutralize” its own territory. Also, the term “neutralize” usually contemplates an attitude by a strong power or a group of strong powers toward the territory of a comparatively weaker power. Thus, in considering the term “neutralization” for the purposes of this memorandum, there is eliminated any idea of a commitment to use force and there is kept in mind the fact that a government does not normally “neutralize” its own territory. There then remains within the general term “neutralization” the ideas of non-aggression and of the giving of pledges by each nation to respect the rights, the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity and political independence of some other nation or nations. A neutralization project might also provide some practical means for effective and continuous consultation and cooperation, perhaps through the establishing of a permanent consultative committee or board of reference composed of representatives of the high contracting powers. In some circumstances, consideration of the question of neutralizing the islands of the Pacific may raise the question of the non-fortification of such islands. The term “islands of the Pacific” is of course very broad. For purposes of discussion, there will be included all of the principal island groups in the Pacific Ocean except Hawaii. The islands may be listed as follows: [Here follows list of Pacific islands belonging to each country.] The countries possessing islands in the Pacific thus are the United States, Australia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and the Soviet Union. Of these countries Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico possess islands which are small in size and which are located in the eastern Pacific near the American continent. These islands are not of outstanding importance in reference to the general political problems of the Pacific and they are remote in distance from that part of the Pacific area, the western, where today political tensions exist. They might therefore not be included in an international agreement directed toward “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific. On the other hand, however, in view of reports that Japanese interests manifest activity from time to time looking toward gaining a foothold in some of these islands, it might be of some advantage if these islands should be included in any general international agreement which might be negotiated relating to the islands of the Pacific. Portugal has only one insular possession in the Pacific, part of the island of Timor. Timor is located in the Netherland Indies section of the Pacific and thus is in an area of strategic and political importance. With regard to the insular possessions in the Pacific of China and of the Soviet Union, China possesses Hainan Island and the Soviet Union possesses Saghalin (the northern portion) and the Commander (Komandorski) Islands. The insular possessions of these two countries are limited but both countries are so important in any approach to the problems of the Pacific that it is believed to be highly desirable that, if at all practicable, they be included within the scope of an international agreement directed toward “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific. It may be observed that the initiating by the United States of an agreement which would not include China and to which Japan would be a party might be viewed in China (and in Japan) as implying willingness on the part of the United States to accept the results of Japan’s aggressive acts of the past few years. The repercussions in China toward such an agreement would most likely be distinctly unfavorable and have a harmful effect upon American relations with China. The insular possessions of the United States, Australia, France, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand are important and numerous and could not readily be excluded from consideration of a proposal to “neutralize” the islands of the Pacific. II. Discussion of Possible Agreements Within the limits of the definitions given in the preceding section there appear to be four possible types of international agreements which might be concluded providing for “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific. These four types are as follows: A. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific. B. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands. C. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific. D. An agreement containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific. a. an agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific There are given below considerations which may be advanced in favor of or against a proposal that the American Government take the initiative in attempting to conclude an international agreement providing for the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific. Such proposal would place no restriction on the right of each country to erect fortifications in islands possessed or administered by it. The type of proposal placing such restrictions will be discussed in section B, below, of this memorandum. Considerations Pro . 1. The advancing by the American Government of a proposal that there be negotiated an international agreement providing for the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific would afford satisfaction to peace groups in the United States. There is no doubt that the American people sincerely believe in peace and that they would welcome the adoption of such measures as would appear to afford reasonable basis for progress toward that objective, provided such measures would not involve anything more than moral (including diplomatic) support by the United States. 2. In some respects such a proposal would probably be pleasing to Japan. At the present time Japan is the strongest power in eastern Asia. Japan desires to exercise dominant control in that area. The giving of a self-denying pledge by the United States and by other Occidental powers which possess islands in the Pacific would tend to make Japan’s position in that area comparatively stronger and to give indication to Japan that such powers would in the future rely entirely upon pledges for the protection of their territorial rights in their insular possessions or in islands administered by them. Moreover, since Japan embarked in 1931 upon a program of active aggression in China, Japan has signed no political agreement of importance with Occidental powers, except the anti-communist pact with Germany. 85 Probably some elements in Japan would welcome the inclusion of Japan in a political agreement to which the United States, Great Britain and France were also signatories (other elements in Japan, however, would be likely to oppose the signing by Japan of such an agreement. For argument in this sense, see item No. 4 in the section under “Considerations Contra.”). 3. Some Americans favor “withdrawal” by the United States from the Far East. They use the term “withdrawal” with little precision as to meaning, but apparently their thought is that the United States—in view of the facts that Japan has become more powerful, that Japan claims for itself a position of paramountcy in eastern Asia, and that Japan is embarked on a course of active aggression—should liquidate its rights, obligations and interests in the Far East. This group would favor an international agreement “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific if such agreement could be expected to lessen American responsibilities in the Far East. 4. The stabilization in the Pacific effected by the conclusion of the group of treaties signed at the Washington Conference in 1921–22 has been disrupted by Japan’s imperialistic activities in eastern Asia and by Japan’s withdrawal from the treaties providing for limitation of naval armament. Some day an attempt will have to be made to devise some new means directed toward the bringing about of greater stabilization in that area. There are indications that some elements in Japan question the leadership of the military. A move at this time directed toward the conclusion of a political agreement relating to the islands of the Pacific might possibly serve to encourage the moderate elements in Japan and to hasten the day when the Japanese people will no longer support the aggressive program of the Japanese military. (However, see item No. 3 under “Considerations Contra.”) 5. In case the American Government feels that it should now decide, for reasons special to the problem of the Philippine Islands, to abandon, after the date of the complete independence of the Islands, all naval bases in the Islands, the American Government might utilize the fact of such decision—before making the decision known—as a bargaining point toward obtaining agreement by other powers to a general pact covering islands of the Pacific which pact might contribute toward greater political stabilization in the Pacific. Considerations Contra . 1. There are already in existence a number of international agreements which provide for substantially everything that could be incorporated in a treaty containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific. In 1921, the United States, France, Great Britain and Japan signed a treaty at the Washington Conference wherein those powers promised to respect each others’ rights “in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean;” to refer any controversy “arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy” to a conference of the four powers “for consideration and adjustment;” and, in case “the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power,” to “communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.” With the exception of the United States and Japan, all the Governments which would be party to a pact “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific are members of the League of Nations and are obligated by the League Covenant “to respect … the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” 86 The League Covenant also lays down provisions for settlement of disputes. Moreover, the powers holding mandates in islands of the Pacific are obligated by the terms of the mandate not to establish military or naval bases or to erect fortifications in the mandated territory. So far as the Japanese Mandated Islands are concerned (the Carolines, Marshalls and Mariannas), the pledge that those islands shall not be fortified was repeated by Japan in the treaty with the United States, signed February 11, 1922. 87 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 88 to which are signatory all the powers which would logically be party to any agreement “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific, condemns recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and provides for the settlement or solution of international disputes or conflicts by none but pacific means. 2. The advancing by the American Government at this time of a proposal that an international agreement be concluded to “neutralize” the islands of the Pacific would be disadvantageous to the United States from point of view of tactics in dealing with the general situation in the Far East. The equilibrium in that area has been upset, primarily as a result of Japan’s moves. Japan has made impossible the continuance of the 1922 89 and 1930 90 treaties providing for limitation of naval armament. Japan has violated the provisions of the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China; 91 Japan has also violated provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The system of treaties and agreements applicable to the Far East which existed prior to the embarking by Japan in 1931 upon a program of aggression represented a well-integrated plan. Part of that plan has been destroyed or seriously impaired. The situation in the Far East is still in a state of flux. It has not as yet crystallized sufficiently to warrant reasonable hope that there might be concluded at the present time a satisfactory general system of treaties and agreements which would establish an equilibrium in that area. Until that time comes, it is believed that the making by the American Government of any new restrictive commitment in regard to the Far East would tend to tie this Government’s hands in regard to merely one element of the whole situation and thus represent a substantial concession or sacrifice on the part of the United States. 3. Any agreement concluded now would rest on an insecure foundation. Today, important changes are taking place in the Far East. The situation in that area is confused, it is changing, and it is changing under the application of armed force. The political, economic, military and social forces manifesting themselves there are too vigorous to be checked by or to be kept within the bounds of political pledges. During recent years Japan has repeatedly broken treaty pledges. Until the attitude of Japan becomes more sober and more moderate than it is today, it would be hazardous to place reliance on treaty provisions which may very soon be broken. It is believed that the cause of peace and security and stability in international relations is harmed rather than benefited by the conclusion of treaties which do not reasonably represent the national attitudes and objectives of all of the signatory powers. Moderating influences are making themselves felt in Japan, but the military remain the dominant factor; and it is as yet too early to predict with any accuracy whether the military will become more aggressive or less aggressive. 4. There is ground for doubt whether the attitude of some of the other powers would be favorable toward the conclusion at this time of a general “neutralization” agreement. Great Britain, France and the Netherlands might well be hesitant toward entering into a new agreement which would provide for nothing that is not already covered in existing agreements. On the other hand, however, it is conceivable that they might favor an agreement such as is under discussion. They have some apprehension in regard to Japanese aggression against their Far Eastern territories. They realize that Japan is no longer bound by the provisions of the League Covenant. They might welcome an agreement wherein Japan undertook to respect the integrity of their islands. Each of them, however, would approach the question from an angle different from that of the others. Japan would probably object to the exclusion of Hawaii from the scope of the agreement, on the ground that the distance between Hawaii and the United States is greater than the distance between Japan proper and the Japanese islands which would be included in the agreement. Moreover, there is a strong tendency among the Japanese military to dislike the signing of restrictive political agreements with Occidental countries and to approve such agreements only if they promise to strengthen Japan’s position (tend toward giving Japan a “free hand”) in her effort to attain paramountcy in Eastern Asia. Conclusions and Observations . Examination of a proposal that the American Government take the initiative toward concluding an international agreement providing for the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific indicates that the considerations which may be advanced in favor of such proposal are largely idealistic. An agreement of the character under discussion would probably entail no sacrifice by the United States other than the loss of the tactical position which the United States now holds by reason of the fact that so long as it takes no initiative and remains quietly self-reliant any nation which is embarked upon an aggressive course may be restrained to some extent because of the fact that the United States may choose to object. Such an agreement would provide little, if anything, that is not included in existing treaties and inherent as a principle in normal relations among nations. It might possibly have some beneficial results from a psychological point of view. A treaty of this sort would be somewhat along the lines of the treaties which various European powers have during the past few years been concluding among themselves, treaties which in their literal texts seem to contain provisions of little intrinsic weight but which are deemed to have a calming and beneficial psychological effect flowing from the very fact that the nations concerned have at the moment entered into new agreements. The most important question appears to be that of the opportuneness of making such a proposal at this time. The action contemplated in this proposal would not go beyond the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in its island possessions or insular administered territories (mandated islands). It would place no restrictions on the right of each country to fortify or defend its insular possessions and territories. The suggestion may be made therefore that there would seem to be little objection to including the Hawaiian Islands in the scope of such an agreement. Such inclusion would probably serve toward removing one objection by Japan to participation in such an agreement. From point of view of the United States, the question whether the Hawaiian Islands should be included in the scope of any such agreement presents greater difficulty than does the question of including any other major American insular possession in the Pacific. Would it be practicable to choose a meridian in the Pacific and to state that all islands lying east of that meridian would be excluded from the scope of the agreement and all islands lying west would be included? If it be desired that the Hawaiian Islands be excluded, the answer would seem to be in the negative, inasmuch as no meridian which would exclude the Hawaiian Islands would at the same time include all the Aleutian Islands and other important island groups in the southern Pacific. It may be pointed out also that both the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutian Islands are administered as integral parts of the United States and not as outlying possessions, and that there would therefore be no basis for differentiating between the two groups of islands from the point of view of their relationship administratively to the United States. Should the Hawaiian Islands be excluded, would not the Japanese Government be in position to ask with warrant that the Island of Taiwan (Formosa)—which from point of view of population, wealth and strategic importance is perhaps as important to Japan as are the Hawaiian Islands to the United States—likewise be excluded. Such an agreement would not provide for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands as contemplated in the Philippine Independence Act, Section 11. 92 Such neutralization could be effected by a separate agreement, or the Philippine Islands could be afforded an opportunity to adhere, upon attaining complete independence, to such an agreement. The proposal might include only the Philippine Islands and such islands as are within a certain radius of the Philippines; but it would be difficult to establish a radius which would have basis in logic and which would be equitable as regards the scope of the islands included. Formula . A formula for a treaty restricted to mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific might read somewhat as follows: Article I Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to each and to all of the other Parties to respect their rights in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean. Article II The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a continuing board of reference to which there may be referred any question or controversy arising in regard to said rights. b. an agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands Under a broad construction the concept of “neutralization” may comprehend the idea of nonfortification or of limiting the right to fortify (although such is not the fact in the cases of Belgium and Switzerland). There are therefore given below statements of considerations pro and contra in regard to a proposal that the American Government take the initiative in endeavoring to conclude an international agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands. Considerations Pro . 1. The considerations set forth in the previous section apply in general to this proposal and are not repeated here. 2. The advancing of such a proposal would indicate that the American Government has not lost interest in the question of disarmament. As a corollary to their interest in peace, the American people believe in disarmament, provided that the interests of the United States be not sacrificed. They view with disapproval the active program of armament among the countries of the world. They are groping in their thought for some practicable way to reduce the burden of armament not only in the United States but in other countries and to replace the naval disarmament treaties which expired on December 31, 1936. Any measure which would tend to remove the need for armament or to prevent increase of armament would command the support of many of those who favor general disarmament. 3. Such an agreement might result in reducing the cost and burden of armament. (But, there is basis for doubt whether even in the absence of any limiting agreement the United States will exercise the right which it now possesses to increase the fortifications on those islands previously covered by Article 19 of the Washington Conference Treaty.) Considerations Contra . 1. The considerations set forth in the previous section apply in general to this proposal and are not repeated here. 2. The conclusion of an agreement at this time which would limit the right of the United States to erect fortifications in American islands in the Pacific would represent a substantial sacrifice by the United States. It will be recalled that Article 19 of the Washington Conference Treaty relating to naval armament was accepted by the American Government, by way of concession to Japan, as one part only of a group of agreements of the most comprehensive character, and that, in order to reach agreement, concessions and counter-concessions were made and ultimately a collection of interdependent agreements was adopted which was intended to promote peace and stability, particularly in the Far East. The comprehensive system of agreements reached at Washington in 1922 has been disrupted to a considerable extent, largely as the result of action taken by and the attitude of Japan. The question arises: would it be wise to attempt to crystallize one aspect of a previously well-integrated system before there develops an opportunity to reestablish a comprehensive system aimed at stabilizing the situation in general in the Pacific. In relations with Japan, the most powerful diplomatic weapon which the United States possesses today is the fact that, free to do either or both, this country is easily capable of building a Navy greater than any that Japan could possibly afford and of building fortified naval bases on soil over which we possess sovereignty which bases, if built, would be powerful obstacles to Japan’s activities in the field of imperialistic expansion. Surrender by the United States at this time of this powerful diplomatic weapon, a weapon of potential action, by entrance now into a new agreement for non-fortification of American islands in the Pacific would be an act of diplomatic as well as military disarmament on the part of the United States. It would seem advisable that the United States keep this diplomatic weapon in reserve, for it has value ( a ) for its present psychological effect and ( b ) as something which could be used in an offer of concessions-for-concessions at a moment in the future when larger questions (such as questions of disarmament and of general policy) may to advantage be discussed with Japan (i. e., when the Japanese people shall have developed a new and more conciliatory viewpoint and attitude). 3. It is doubted whether Japan would at this time become a party to an agreement identical with or substantially similar in its terms to the insular non-fortification provision of the Washington Conference Treaty. The United States would not be prepared to include Hawaii in any such agreement. There has been some indication that, if the inclusion in such agreement of any part of Japan proper (such as the Kuriles and the Loochoos) were proposed, Japan would contend for the inclusion of Hawaii, on the ground that the distance between Hawaii and the United States is much greater than the distance between Japan proper and the Japanese islands which would be included in the agreement. Conclusions and Observations . Examination of a proposal that the American Government take the initiative toward concluding an international agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands, would seem to indicate that the considerations against such a proposed agreement are stronger than the arguments in favor thereof. It is believed that the conclusion of such an agreement at this time would be largely at the expense of and greatly to the disadvantage of the United States. c. an agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the pacific In considering possible agreements applicable to islands of the Pacific, thought has been given to the question of expanding the scope of such an agreement to include outlying territories, such as French Indo-China and the Federated Malay States (including Singapore), the problems with regard to which are similar to the problems in regard to islands. The considerations pro and contra in regard to such an agreement would be substantially the same as those applicable in regard to a possible agreement of the type discussed under subheading “A”. The scope of the agreement would, however, be somewhat broader and, if such scope could be attained, such an agreement would by virtue of that fact appear to offer greater possibility of producing a stabilizing effect on the Far Eastern situation than would the less comprehensive type of agreement discussed under sub-heading “A”. Formula . A formula for a treaty containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific, might read somewhat as follows: Article I Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to each and to all of the other Parties to respect their rights in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific. Article II The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a continuing board of reference to which there may be referred any question or controversy arising in regard to said rights. d. an agreement containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the pacific At intervals during the past few years the Japanese Government has indicated that it would welcome the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with the United States. Study has been given to this question, and the conclusion has been reached that any such pact, if and when negotiated, should not be restricted to the United States and Japan but should include also the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands—thus making it a pact which would provide a substantial assurance that peace will be maintained in the Far East. Such a pact might be drawn in such a way as to supplement the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Pact. The considerations pro and contra in regard to an agreement of this type are similar to those set forth hereinbefore in regard to agreements of type A or type C. In considering a non-aggression pact among Pacific powers, it needs to be borne in mind that it is doubtful whether Japan would be willing at this time to enter into a general non-aggression agreement with China or with the Soviet Union. It is highly probable that Japan’s aggression in China has not ended and that the Japanese military would oppose any agreement which might serve as an international check upon Japan’s freedom of action in and with regard to China. Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Japanese Government during the past few years has consistently declined to accept Soviet proposals looking toward the conclusion of a bilateral Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. The Japanese Government has affirmed that before it would be in position to conclude such a pact with the Soviet Union, there should be settled questions in dispute between the two countries. A number of such questions have already been adjusted by negotiation, the principal remaining questions being connected with matters relating to boundaries. Although, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, there is doubt whether Japan would at this time enter into a general non-aggression agreement to which China and the Soviet Union would be signatories, it is possible that if the proposal of agreement were restricted in its reference to China to China’s Pacific islands (Hainan) and its reference to the Soviet Union to Soviet Russia’s Pacific islands (Saghalin and the Commander Islands), Japan’s attitude might be favorable. A non-aggression agreement including all or most of the countries mentioned would be broader in scope than any of the types of agreement previously discussed and by virtue of that fact would seem to offer greater promise than do the other types of contributing to a general easing of existing tensions in the Far East and toward ensuring to greater extent than it now is ensured the keeping of the peace in that region. Formula . A formula for a treaty containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific might read somewhat as follows: Article I Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to each and all of the other Parties, in regard to their insular possessions and mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean, and to their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific, to respect the rights of each, to maintain the existing state of peace and friendship, and in no case to use armed force for purposes inconsistent with the principles enunciated in the treaty concluded at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928. Article II The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a continuing board of reference to which there may be referred any question or controversy which in the opinion of any High Contracting Party may involve the provisions of Article I. Article III In case there arises a conflict between any of the Parties to this Treaty, any or all of the High Contracting Parties may hold a Conference, which Conference, if held, shall examine the situation and publish its findings. Article IV The High Contracting Parties, other than those in conflict, may in conference assembled and by unanimous vote declare any party in conflict to have forfeited, insofar as its relations with other signatories to the present treaty are concerned, the benefits * afforded by the treaty denouncing war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928, and the benefits afforded by the present treaty. III. General Conclusions and Recommendations There have been examined the merits of the question of there being concluded an international agreement to “neutralize” the islands of the Pacific. Four possible types of agreement have been discussed. A. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific. B. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands. C. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific. D. An agreement containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific. It is evident that the term “neutralization” does not accurately describe the types of agreements which have been discussed. Use of this term is likely to create confusion and possible misunderstanding. It might, for example, cause Great Britain or Japan to raise questions relating to the “neutrality” legislation of the United States and the applicability of that legislation to American territory covered in the proposed agreement. It is suggested that the term “non-aggression” might be used. Of the four types of possible agreements which have been examined it is believed that type B, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges To Respect The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands In The Pacific, And To Limit Or Refrain From Erecting Fortifications In Such Islands”, would be to the disadvantage of the United States. With regard to type A, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges To Respect The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands in the Pacific”, type C, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges To Respect The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands In The Pacific, And In Their Outlying Dependencies In The Region Of The Pacific”, and type D, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges Of Non-aggression In Regard To The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands In The Pacific, And In Their Outlying Dependencies In The Region Of The Pacific”, it is seriously questioned whether any, if consummated, would be of material advantage to the United States. On the other hand, however, none of these (A, C and D) would appear to offer likelihood of serious disadvantage to the United States. The question whether the American Government should initiate proceedings directed toward the conclusion of one of these three types of agreement would seem to be largely a matter of opinion and to hinge largely upon the matter of timeliness. There has been mentioned the fact that the general situation in the Far East is in a state of flux. Japan is expanding, and the comparatively chauvinistic “immoderates” remain in control in that country. Important changes are occurring in China. British trading interests in the Far East clash with the economic and industrial expansionist activities and aspirations of Japan. During recent years Soviet Russia has increased its military establishments in the Far East and has become an important factor in that area. There is a conflict of interests between Japan and Soviet Russia. The forces—political, military, economic and social—which today are having revolutionary effects in the Far East are still so vigorous and so active as to make uncertain the general situation in the Far East. Japan is moving rapidly toward what may develop into some kind of a political explosion or collapse. It is axiomatic that political agreements, to be successful, should have a basis of reasonably satisfactory economic equilibrium and of mutual confidence and good will. In the light of the present Far Eastern situation, would it not be advisable to defer, during a period of watchful waiting, the making of any proposal the mere making of which might be likely further to disturb an already too much disturbed situation and add to the perplexities of already hard pressed officialdoms (e. g., the high authorities in Japan, China, Great Britain, etc.) responsible for the decisions of statesmanship in the countries concerned? Would the American people be likely at this time to be favorably disposed toward proposal of an agreement along any of the lines outlined? Judging by press and magazine comment, the American people are earnest in their desire for peace and equally earnest in their desire not to become involved in any armed conflict that may develop abroad. They therefore would seem likely to approve proposals along idealistic lines which fall within the general principles of established American foreign policy and which do not involve commitments likely to lead the United States into foreign entanglements or into foreign wars. At the same time, however, are not the majority of Americans averse to the United States becoming party to any international agreement unless that agreement offers a reasonable promise of something substantial being attained thereby? Would not a good many Americans be skeptical, in the light of Japan’s recent record in regard to the keeping of treaty pledges, of the worthwhile-ness of the United States exchanging with Japan political pledges of a character already contained in existing treaties and recently disregarded by Japan? Consideration of the problem which has been made the subject of this memorandum should carry with it consideration of several other problems in the conducting of the relations of the United States with countries of the Far East and countries which have interests there. Among such other problems may be mentioned the problem of extraterritorial rights in China: negotiations were begun in 1929 by China with the American Government (and likewise with the British Government) looking toward a new agreement on that subject; those negotiations have been in a state of suspension since they were interrupted in 1931 by China’s preoccupation with more urgent matters; the moment will come when it will seem opportune to suggest resumption of negotiations looking toward relinquishment by gradual process of the extraterritorial rights involved. Another such problem is the whole question of the program to be adopted toward facilitating achievement by the Philippine Islands of independence, involving such questions as that of future trade relations, retention or abandonment by the United States of naval reservations and fueling stations in the Islands, negotiation for an agreement to provide for perpetual neutralization of the Islands if and when their independence shall have been achieved, etc. Although it does not appear that the making of a proposal by the American Government looking toward an agreement with regard to the islands of the Pacific would be inconsistent with any steps which have been or which appear likely to be taken in reference to these questions, it is believed that, while consideration is being given to the possibility of making such a proposal, examination should also be made, in order to ensure adequate perspective, of these other important and related questions. At present, various agencies of the Government are giving intensive study to questions of policy in relation to the Philippines, and conversations with President Quezon are on the eve of being held. In the course of a few weeks it will be known much better than now where we stand in regard to matters thus under consideration. (Note: On the subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, a memorandum is in course of preparation. There is also in course of preparation a memorandum with regard to another possible step which might be taken by the American Government looking toward improvement of the general situation in the field of our relations with the Far East, which will soon be forthcoming.) If, after a careful weighing of various considerations, it should be decided that the American Government should take action directed toward the proposal of an agreement relating to the islands of the Pacific, it is believed that the Department of State should be authorized to approach the British Government and the Japanese Government, informally and in confidence, to elicit the probable reaction of those governments to such an agreement. Should either of those governments indicate that it would be reluctant formally to discuss the subject, it would seem the part of wisdom not to press the matter at this time. In case both those governments should indicate that they would favor the conclusion of such an agreement, it might be advisable to sound out the French Government. If the French attitude proved to be also favorable, plans might then be made for the calling of a conference, presumably at Washington (or perhaps at Honolulu or some point in the Far East), for the purpose of negotiating such a treaty. The study which has so far been made of this subject, the results of which are set forth in this memorandum is merely preliminary and not exhaustive. In our opinion, before the American Government should proceed toward approaching any other government in reference to any of the proposed agreements outlined in this memorandum, further study would be needed toward defining with greater precision the terms and scope of any such proposed agreement. This study would involve consultation with technical officers of this Department (such as the Geographer and the Legal Adviser), with other interested Divisions of the Department (such as the Office of Philippine Affairs and the Division of Western European Affairs), and perhaps with the War and Navy Departments. 83 In submitting this draft memorandum to the Secretary of State on February 20, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs wrote: “The memorandum is prepared without indication of source, in such form that you might if you wished hand it right on to the President. It is in large part the work of Mr. Hamilton”, the Assistant Chief. 84 Signed December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 33 . 85 Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 153 ; for secret additional agreement, see Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 , series D, vol. i , p. 734, footnote 2 a . 86 Article 10 of the League Covenant, Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 69 , 83 . 87 Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. ii , p. 600 . 88 Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, ibid ., 1928, vol. i , p. 153 . 89 Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, ibid ., 1922, vol. i , p. 247 . 90 Signed at London, April 22, 1930, ibid ., 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . 91 Signed February 6, 1922, ibid ., 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . 92 Approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456, 463. * (Note: This provision is based upon that section of the preamble of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-war Pact which reads as follows: “Convinced … that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty”.) [Footnote in the original.] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 700.0011 Pacific/27a [Document 1098] The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , February 26, 1937. Dear Mr. Grew : I send you herewith a copy of a strictly confidential memorandum prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs under date February 16, 1937, on the subject “Neutralization of the Islands of the Pacific: Pros and Contras.” 93 In the light of the situation created by the termination of the Washington and London Naval Treaties of 1922 and 1930, 94 respectively, the President has been giving thought to the possibility of initiating some move which might reasonably be expected to contribute toward easing the present international situation in the Far East, and the President has put forth to the Secretary as a suggestion the idea of the American Government taking the initiative in action directed toward bringing about by international agreement “neutralization of the islands of the Pacific.” The Secretary asked us to prepare a memorandum setting forth the considerations pro and contra in regard to the subject: hence the memorandum of which a copy is enclosed. It would be helpful to us to have the benefit of your view in regard to the question of the advisability of the American Government at this time taking the initiative in action directed toward concluding an international agreement along the lines of any one of the four types of agreement which are discussed in the memorandum of February 16. We would appreciate also any suggestions that may occur to you with regard to any other type of agreement which would seem to fall within the scope of the problem which has been made the subject of the memorandum. This matter is of course highly confidential, and I therefore request that the memorandum receive the consideration only of yourself and that it be not shown to or the subject matter thereof discussed with any member of your staff. After you have read the memorandum and after you have given the subject your thought for a few days, I suggest that you send me a personal letter—of course through the pouch—setting forth your views and such suggestions as may occur to you. The time element may be important. If your conclusion should be either that you favor the taking of no action of any kind, or that you favor any one of the types of agreement—without modification or qualification—set forth in the memorandum, I would appreciate receiving from you a strictly confidential telegram marked “For Hornbeck”, which would apprize me in as few words as possible of your conclusions. I am sure that you will have the same thought that I have regarding such a telegram, if sent: that it should be “blind”; that it should not mention the subject but should be phrased in such a way that, if the cipher text were “broken”, the text of the message in itself would convey no meaning. I anticipate that any conclusion which you might reach other than those suggested above would necessitate explanation or discussion, and, as secrecy is at present imperative, you will, of course, agree with me that there should be no communication between us by telegraph involving any risk whatever of making a disclosure. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by cable. 95 Sincerely yours, Stanley K. Hornbeck 93 Supra . 94 For texts of treaties, see Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 247 ; 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . For correspondence concerning termination of treaties, see ibid ., 1934, vol. i , pp. 405 ff., and 1936, vol. i , pp. 22 ff. 95 In telegram No. 100, March 30, 7 p.m., the Ambassador in Japan stated: “My judgment is definitely opposed to any action at this time. Letter follows by pouch”. (700.0011 Pacific/31) The gist of the letter dated March 31, is contained in the following sentences: “The ‘arguments contra’ so lucidly expressed in your memorandum coincide so completely with my own views that it appears superfluous to elaborate them. In my judgment they far outweigh the ‘Considerations Pro.’” (700.0011 Pacific/33.) Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/28 [Document 1099] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State Washington , March 1, 1937. This discussion is interesting and inclusive of much information, but may I suggest that it does not fire one’s imagination in favor of neutralization of the islands of the Pacific. It is, for example, captious to object to the word “neutralization” and suggest the word “non-aggression” for the very simple reason that the laymen of all nations would understand what we were doing if we neutralize the islands of the Pacific against war being waged in them or from them by any of the powers owning them. Secondly, I throw out agreement type (A) because it means nothing. “Mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific” means, in the condition of the world today, exactly nil. Agreement (B), if you leave out the mutual pledges of non-aggression nonsense, does get us somewhere; “to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands.” “Why limit or refrain?” Why not agree simply and definitely to erect no fortifications in such islands, and to remove all fortifications, armaments, munitions and implements of war from such islands? That does the trick. Agreement (C) talks about “outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific.” Why not list all islands by name which would come under the agreement? On page #10 the question of possible involvement of the United States is brought up. That can be made perfectly clear by the simple statement that the agreement proposes no enforcement by cooperative action against a violation. On page #13 the question of the League of Nation[s’] obligations is raised. The agreement I had in mind does not run foul of the League provisions so far as we are concerned. Page #14 talks about the equilibrium of the Pacific. My suggestion may run contrary to some theoretical equilibrium but it does not run counter to the existing equilibrium under which Japan has a practically “ de facto ” control in the northwestern Pacific. The suggestion on page #14 is that nothing should be done because the situation in the Far East may change in the future. Pages #15 and #16 raise the question as to whether other nations would have objections to the plan. Of course, they would. Page #17—whoever wrote this does not know anything about military and naval facts. The whole tenor of the argument is that this is not the time to do anything; that the proposal is merely idealistic and that an agreement would not be lived up to anyway. In other words, taking it by and large, this argument all the way through is an argument of defeatism. Being a realist, I wish you would let me have a talk with the author of this. Will you arrange it? F[ ranklin ] D. R[ oosevelt ] Mr. Norman H. Davis to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 700.0011 Pacific/30 [Document 1100] Mr. Norman H. Davis to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) New York , March 23, 1937. Dear Hornbeck : Thanks for your letter of March 18th 96 enclosing confidential memorandum prepared in F. E. 97 on the subject of Neutralization of the Islands in the Pacific, and also copy of the memorandum with regard to the comments of the President, both of which I am returning herewith. 98 I may say that I agree with your views on this subject. For your confidential information, I had a talk with the President by telephone on Friday, before I had read your memorandum, in which this question was raised. His idea as indicated to me, was that all of the islands in the Pacific, exclusive of Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand, should be neutralized, as he calls it, and non fortified. In this he would be willing to include the Aleutian Islands, provided Japan would be willing to make a similar agreement with regard to the islands north and east of Japan. He would also include Formosa and Hongkong. His idea seems to be that the agreement should provide not only for non fortification but a pledge on the part of the nations concerned not to use any of the neutralized islands in case of war. It was not possible, of course, over the telephone to have a very specific or satisfactory discussion of the question. I did tell him, however, that it was all a question of the method and time of approach to the question; and that it might be better first merely to raise the question of the Philippines and then see what the other powers want to put in the bag; and that in any event it would be advisable to have a confidential, informal exchange of views with the British. To this he seemed to acquiesce. It seems to me that the outstanding difficulty as indicated by F. E., is with regard to Japan. Until there is some change or clarification in the Japanese situation it does not seem very logical to enter a new serious agreement with a government that has so flagrantly violated existing treaties and that seems determined to pursue a policy that would be in conflict with a program for insuring peace in the Pacific. One other thing that disturbs me somewhat is how we can sign a piecemeal agreement with Japan without indirectly condoning things she has done, of which we disapprove. If the President refrains from taking any initiative until this can be fully explored with the British it may perhaps develop that the situation can be clarified. With best wishes [etc.] Norman H. Davis 96 Not printed. 97 Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 98 Latter not printed. Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis of a Conversation With the British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Cadogan) 890.00/47 [Document 1101] Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis of a Conversation With the British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Cadogan ) 99 Sir Alexander Cadogan told me today at a luncheon at his home that Eden had suggested that he have a talk with me about the Far East, and that at any time that was convenient to me he would come to see me, or would be glad to have me go to the Foreign Office, if I preferred. I told him I was having a meeting with Mr. MacDonald 1 in the House of Commons at 4:30 that afternoon with regard to sugar, and agreed to stop at the Foreign Office to see him between 5:30 and 6:00 o’clock. Cadogan first told me that Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador, had for some time been urging them to consider some kind of an agreement to remove tension and misunderstanding in the Far East, and particularly, to promote the economic rehabilitation of China. He had intimated very definitely to Yoshida that until Japan takes a different attitude than heretofore about agreements and treaties which she enters into, and until there is more assurance that she is prepared to live up to her agreements and to cooperate for the promotion of peace and progress in the Far East, there is not much incentive to consider new agreements. Yoshida had, however, insisted that the militarists are losing ground in Japan and that it would be very helpful towards getting Japan on the right track if something could be done to induce Japan to revise her policy in China, which had been a failure, and adopt a policy of cooperation which would soon justify itself. Cadogan said that he and his associates in the Foreign Office do not feel that it is practicable to try to settle anything much with Japan so long as the militaristic group is in control, or until the Japanese Government recognizes the error of its ways and wants to cooperate. Nevertheless, there have been some recent indications of a change in attitude, even on the part of the present Government and, at Yoshida’s request, they had finally decided to say that they would be glad to consider any program or concrete suggestions which the Japanese Government might wish to make with regard to cooperation looking towards an improvement of the economic situation in China. He had told Yoshida, however, that Japan was in such bad odor with China that the British were fearful it might have a bad effect in China if they were to make an agreement with Japan, and that they would not consider any agreement that was not entirely acceptable to China and which did not have for its main purpose an improvement of conditions in China. Cadogan said that while Yoshida has the best of intentions, he does not have very much influence and doubts if anything will develop now from this effort on the part of Yoshida to get his Government to make some definite proposals. He said the United States would, nevertheless, be kept fully informed of any developments and if the indications are that something worth while might be done he deemed it essential that the United States should be a party. His view was that if Great Britain and the United States should, in agreement with Japan and China, cooperate in efforts to develop China economically, it would increase trade all around and would help to insure peace and political stability in the Far East. I told Cadogan that until it was possible to get a clearer picture of what the objective and concrete proposals are, it would not be possible to express an opinion as to what might be the attitude of the United States. I asked Cadogan if the Japanese were still talking about a non-aggression pact. He said they had mentioned that some time ago but that it was too impractical and too absurd to consider seriously. He said he thought there were too many non-aggression pacts already and that he could not think of anything more ridiculous than to enter into some new ones. He agreed that the Japanese idea of a non-aggression pact was to tie other peoples’ hands so as to give themselves a free hand. Cadogan said they were still pressing Japan on the naval question 2 with a view of at least getting them to agree to keep us informed as to their intentions, but that they had been unable to get anything definite as yet. We then discussed the question of nonfortification in the Pacific, which the British had raised last summer, and I explained why it had seemed impractical to us. Cadogan gave the impression that he personally concurred in our view. I remarked that if anything were done in that respect it would have to be on a more comprehensive and practical basis. I then told him that a suggestion had been made recently in Washington that an international agreement be negotiated to demilitarize or neutralize all of the islands and possessions in the Pacific, with the exception of Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Japan proper and Hawaii, but including Hongkong. I told him that while it would undoubtedly be desirable if the Pacific could be made a great peace area, I was not at all confident of the feasibility of such a plan, at least under present conditions, and asked him if he thought it was a matter which might be worth considering. He replied that his first reaction was that it was impractical but that he would talk it over with his associates and see if they thought it might have some possibilities. I told him this question had been raised only shortly before I left Washington and that I did not know what conclusions they had arrived at regarding the advisability or practicability of such an undertaking. Cadogan said that at present he did not think it was practical to enter into any such serious agreement with Japan, because so long as Japan is dominated by the militaristic group, which has no regard for its committments and no desire for international cooperation, it is not possible to rely upon any agreement with Japan. Furthermore, the question which arises now in considering any agreement with Japan, is how to do so without putting a tacit stamp of approval on violations of treaties heretofore made by Japan. In substance, he said his idea was that so long as Japan adheres to her present policies it is not worth while trying to make any important agreements with her, and that as soon as they change that policy and adopt one of cooperation for peace, there will not be so much need for neutralization. We then had a brief discussion about the Naval Treaty. I told him of my talk with the heads of the Admiralty. I mentioned the suggestion that we might approach Italy with regard to agreeing to adhere to the Treaty and said I was inclined to think that the time for any approach to Italy would be after the British signed up with Russia and Germany; and that even then it would seem that since the British have taken the initiative all along, it would be better for them to take this up with Italy. I told him, however, that we would naturally desire to help in any way possible. Cadogan said he agreed with my view and, furthermore, he thought there was a possibility that Italy would shortly be willing actually to sign the Treaty. We discussed the question of 14" versus 16" guns and he agreed that as a result of Japan’s action the 16" gun has become the legal gun and that the only way to avoid going to the 16" gun would be through a supplementary agreement on the part of all the naval powers, which would be desirable if possible. Cadogan thought the British rearmament was having a good effect on Japan and that it would also have a further beneficial effect if we should accelerate our own naval building program. We agreed to have a further talk before my departure. 3 London , April 22, 1937. 99 Copy transmitted to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) by Mr. Davis from London, April 27; on May 4 Dr. Hornbeck informed the Secretary of State that “Mr. Davis’ memorandum might almost have been a memorandum of conversation between Davis and the undersigned.” 1 James Ramsay MacDonald, British Lord President of the Council. 2 See vol. i , pp. 618 ff. 3 For a conversation which Mr. Davis also had with Ambassador Yoshida, see memorandum of April 23 by Mr. Davis, p. 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] . The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/4: Telegram [Document 1102] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , May 17, 1937—6 p.m. [Received May 17—9:50 a.m.] 130. The Foreign Office spokesman today told newspapermen that although the Foreign Office lacks official information about the reported speech of last week in London by Premier Lyons of Australia with regard to a nonaggression pact for nations around the Pacific, as a fundamental idea Japan has no objection to participation. The spokesman added that Japan’s attitude cannot be stated until details of the proposal are learned. Grew The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/6: Telegram [Document 1103] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , May 21, 1937—4 p.m. [Received 5:20 p.m.] 98. Today’s Izvestiya carries an editorial by Vigilis commenting favorably on the declaration made by Lyons at the opening of the British Imperial Conference that “the Australian Government would welcome a regional understanding and pact of non-aggression by the countries of the Pacific conceived in the spirit of the principles of the League” and “was prepared to collaborate with all other peoples of the Pacific towards the achievement of such a pact”. This editorial undoubtedly reflects the views of the Kremlin. According to Vigilis, “the proposal of the Australian Government will be of tremendous international political significance particularly if it receives the proper support of the great powers” and “if Japan is presented with the choice of participation in this regional agreement or complete isolation”. The views of Vigilis with respect to the value of such a pact are as follows: “The conclusion of a regional pact in accordance with the Australian project would be in the interests of all Pacific Ocean countries each of which is menaced at the present time. It would be in the interests of Australia and New Zealand, which are always feeling the menace of Japanese aggression; in the interests of China, the very existence of the Government of which is under the Damocles sword of this aggression; in the interests of the western countries, England, France, and Holland, the possessions of which in the Pacific Ocean arouse the growing appetites of Japanese imperialists; in the interests of the United States, the Far Eastern policy of which is based on the principle of the Open Door, the maintenance of the integrity of China, and the territorial status quo in the Pacific Ocean which has been crudely violated by Japan. It would be in the interests of the Soviet Union because these interests are devoted entirely to the maintenance of peace. It would be in the interests finally of Japan itself. The militarists are insolently deceiving the Japanese people in endeavoring to convince them that someone is preparing to encroach upon Japan and the conclusion of a pact which manifestly guarantees the same security to Japan as to other Pacific Ocean countries would put an end to this deceit. There is no need of showing that collective security in the Pacific Ocean area would play an enormous and perhaps decisive role in the maintenance of peace in Europe and would be a powerful factor in preventing the frightful war which the Fascist Powers are preparing for mankind”. The Soviet press of recent date has been emphasizing the view that Japanese policy has undergone no real change and that the conversations with the British represent only a tactical maneuver. This new tactical approach, in the Soviet view, has been forced on the Japanese by fear of isolation and by the growth of evil-minded Japanese feeling in China, and is designed to enlist British support in the partition and subjugation of China. Henderson The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/15 [Document 1104] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2444 Tokyo , May 28, 1937. [Received June 15.] Sir : The statement made by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons of Australia at the opening meeting of the British Empire Conference in London on May 14, that Australia would welcome a non-aggression pact among the countries of the Pacific conceived in the spirit of the League of Nations Covenant, has been received with reticence and suspicion in Japan. In Japanese official circles only the Foreign Office spokesman has commented on the suggestion and then in a non-committal vein, while the press has been unreservedly critical of it. It is indicated that although Japan is not opposed to the idea in principle this country feels that the present is not the appropriate moment to consider such a pact. Besides, it is stated, Japan would be loathe to discuss certain issues of a controversial nature which would undoubtedly come up for discussion in any conference that might be held for the conclusion of a Pacific non-aggression treaty. The idea of a non-aggression pact between two or more of the Powers bordering on the Pacific is not a new one, the question first having been raised over three years ago. For purposes of ready reference, instances known to the Embassy in which the matter has been proposed or publicly discussed, are briefly mentioned, as follows: [Here follows summary of instances.] There are several reasons why a Pacific non-aggression pact would not be feasible from Japan’s point of view. Soviet Russia would undoubtedly have to be included in any general non-aggression pact of the countries bordering on the Pacific and Japan has consistently fought shy of that country’s proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. The question of “Manchukuo” would have to be taken into consideration if efforts were made to conclude such a treaty, and it is well known in Japan that the United States and probably Great Britain do not intend to reverse the position taken by them with regard to the question of “Manchukuo”. Likewise, Japan’s relations with China would undoubtedly come up for discussion, and it is evident that Japan is opposed to round-table discussions of its relations with China. Furthermore, it is very likely that Japan would demand—probably without success—further access to world markets and a redistribution of economic resources. There is enclosed a memorandum of a conversation 4 which Mr. Andrews, Second Secretary of the Embassy, had with Colonel Longfield Lloyd, Australian Trade Commissioner, on May 27. The gist of Colonel Lloyd’s remarks was that in his opinion Prime Minister Lyons’s proposal was not only a friendly but also a generous gesture, and that the Japanese would be making a great mistake if they refused to give it due consideration. He also said that he had received the impression that the Lyons proposition, if made in the terms reported by the press, was a warning signal that Japan must either cooperate with Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand or else be prepared for the erection of economic barriers against Japan, certainly by Australia. There is warrant for entertaining doubt whether pacts of non-aggression serve any useful purpose in the absence of collateral engagements among the concerned nations to limit instruments of aggression to levels calculated to avoid excitation of mutual suspicion. The so-called Locarno Pact 5 is a case in point. That Pact offered a measure of security and was included among those factors making for stability in Europe only so long as Germany’s military establishments remained within limitations imposed upon that country; and without laboring the point it may be suggested that there is an intimate relationship between rearmament during the past few years by virtually all the principal nations of the world and the “realistic” attitude forced upon the League of Nations by Great Britain and France with regard to international disputes laid before the League for adjustment. At the risk of stating the obvious, the primary problems which inhere in limiting armament, especially naval armament, rise in the final analysis out of differences in the basic foreign policies of the concerned nations. It is, for example, entirely illusory to discuss the principle of naval ratio between the United States and Japan on the basis of the extent of their respective coast lines and lines of communication, but on the other hand, when there exists—as there does between the United States and Great Britain—similarity of objective in the field of policy, and a resultant sense of security on the part of one nation against aggression by the other, technical problems of armament limitation lend themselves to solution. From this point of view, it would seem unwise to give consideration to the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression for the Pacific until the policies pursued by each of the nations in that area, especially in the Far East, shall be such as to offer reasonable expectation of there being concluded at the same time an agreement to limit naval armament. When the time comes, if it ever does, for such a pact, it should include all of the interested countries and not be limited to a bi-lateral agreement, in my opinion. But I cannot feel that the time is ripe for any such measure. Machinery already exists to prevent aggression in the Pacific area as everywhere else, notably the Kellogg Pact, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Nine and Four Power Treaties 6 among other instruments. One power has partially wrecked that machinery and it would seem to me premature to write that act of sabotage up to profit and loss and now proceed to erect a new machine until we have more substantial evidence than now exists that there has been a permanent change of heart on the part of the wreckers. We ourselves would scrupulously abide by the terms of such an agreement but it would be a one-sided deal because events have amply proved that the other party would be likely to abide by it only so long as it suited that party’s convenience to do so. “Altered circumstances” have before now been adduced to explain and extenuate breaches of international contracts. Manchuria was suddenly declared the “life line” of Japan. Would it be so very far fetched to believe that some day in future the Philippines might similarly, through “altered circumstances”, be likewise declared another “life line”? Furthermore, it seems to me that the whole structure of international contracts in general and the peace machinery in particular are weakened by constantly planning to erect new machinery when the machinery already existing is ample, if respected. New peace machinery is, in my opinion, dangerous because it invites confidence and reliance. If you can’t find a rock to build your house on, but only sand, it’s much safer not to build a house at all. In this connection I am favorably impressed with Lieutenant Smith-Hutton’s prize essay for 1937 on “Naval Limitations” published in the April issue of United States Naval Institute Proceedings . He sums up his sound, logical and common sense thesis as follows: [Here follows extensive quotation urging security precautions until economic problems of less-favored but determined and aggressive nations are settled.] Another excellent article on Japan entitled “Between Two Worlds Lies Japan” by Nathaniel Peffer appears in the New York Times Sunday supplement of April 25. Mr. Peffer diagnoses Japanese psychology and character with rare insight. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew 4 Not printed. 5 Signed October 16, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv , p. 289. 6 For text of the Four Power treaty signed between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan at Washington, December 13, 1921, see Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 33 . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/8: Telegram [Document 1105] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , June 4, 1937—5 p.m. [Received June 4—3:40 p.m.] 347. I saw the Chinese Ambassador 7 this morning, who told me of his conversation with Lyons and corroborated Lyons’ statement to me in full, so far as the pact in the Pacific was concerned (see my 348, June 4, 4 p.m. 8 ). We went on to say that British and American rearmament and the growing strength of China through its progress towards unification, coupled with high taxation in Japan and the burden of carrying out rigorous military policy of aggression, had strengthened the hand of such liberal element as existed in Japan and had prepared the way, as he believed, for Japanese adherence to a non-aggression pact. His idea of such a pact was along the lines of the Kellogg-Briand Pact especially including a provision for consultation. He told me that he knew the new Chinese Ambassador to Washington 9 had gone there with instructions to take up this subject, but did not know but that he had postponed doing so awaiting the results of the Imperial Conference. He was sure the Washington Ambassador knew now that the Imperial Conference had firmly committed itself to the creation of such a pact. I asked him where he thought the initiative should come and he said he had no doubt it should come from the Imperial Conference itself. He continued to stress the strides he felt his country was making towards unification and said that he himself had never subscribed to the policy of attempting to subdue communism by force. He said that the incidents surrounding the kidnaping of Chiang Kai Shek and his release had educated Chiang to this view and had contributed largely to a union of forces in China for the purpose of resisting Japanese aggression. He mentioned also that the two great southwest provinces, which had always been semi-autonomous, were now in full accord with Nanking and that he believed that if China could have 5 years of relief from Japanese aggression through the pact he advocates, the Chinese people would by that time be so strong through their unification they could not only defend themselves against further Japanese aggression but could play a controlling part in maintaining peace in the Far East. Bingham 7 Quo Tai-chi. 8 Not printed. 9 Chengting T. Wang. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/9: Telegram [Document 1106] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , June 5, 1937—noon. [Received June 5—10:20 a.m.] 737. Dr. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance, last night said that he would like to speak to me about the proposal of Lyons of Australia with regard to a Pacific accord. He stated that he believed the moment to be most propitious for the establishment of genuine peace in the Far East. He had great confidence in the pacific intentions of Prince Konoye 10 and was certain that the Emperor of Japan desired to work out a settlement of relations between China and Japan. He went on to say that the Japanese economic and financial situation was such that Japan would soon be faced by the alternative either of cutting expenditures for the army and navy or facing social upheaval. The Lyons proposal would give Japan a fine opportunity to “save face” while reducing expenditures for the army and navy. He believed that it would be impossible for Japan to reduce these expenditures except in conjunction with some face saving proposal of this kind. He expressed the opinion that China would be glad to enter into agreements not only for a non-aggression pact in the Pacific but also for treaties of mutual assistance. He asked me if I believed the United States would be ready to make similar agreements. I refrained from comment other than saying that I felt certain the United States could not enter into treaties of mutual assistance. Dr. Kung went on to say that he felt the opportunity now presented by the Lyons proposal was an enormous one and that the attitude of the Government of the United States might be decisive. Kung has talked with Blum, 11 Delbos 12 and Léger. 13 He asserted that they were all favorable to the idea of a Pacific pact. I ventured to suggest that at the present moment Blum is so grateful to you for your conversation last Monday with the German Ambassador 14 that he will probably be glad to follow any suggestions you may care to make to him with regard to the Far East. I shall refrain from discussing the situation in the Far East with him until I receive instructions from you. Bullitt 10 Prince Fumimaro Konoye, new Japanese Prime Minister and formerly President of the House of Peers. 11 Leon Blum, President of the French Council of Ministers (Premier). 12 Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 13 Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office. 14 See memorandum of May 31, vol. i , p. 310 . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 700.0011 Pacific/10: Telegram [Document 1107] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , June 8, 1937—noon. [Received June 8—9:15 a.m.] 356. I saw Cadogan late yesterday who referred to his conversation with me, reported in my 292 of May 18, 6 p.m., 15 and said that Lyons’ statement regarding the pact of non-aggression in the Pacific had been reviewed by subcommittee of the Imperial Conference and would be discussed in the conference early this week. Cadogan expected the conference would make a recommendation varying somewhat between a Nine Power Pact of non-aggression in the Pacific outlawing war and containing a consultative provision, and a mere extension of the present Four-Power Treaty (which now could be denounced within 12 months). Cadogan agreed to let me know as soon as possible the decision of the conference and he emphasized that the attitude of the United States was of paramount importance and the British Government would in due course approach Washington on the question. As regards Chinese negotiations for a loan in London, Cadogan said the 2,700,000 pounds Canton-Meishan loan, details of which had already been submitted to the various consortium groups, although still under negotiation in the matter of final security, was virtually settled. Meanwhile Kung’s negotiations with Treasury had gone on (see Embassy’s 341, June 3, 4 p.m.) 16 but were not completed. The Foreign Office understands Kung will visit the United States and return to London about mid-July during which time it is expected the negotiations on this loan particularly in the matter of satisfactory security will continue. Cadogan said that the other loans proposed by the Chinese Minister for Railways were merely remote possibilities and in any case in all these negotiations Kung also held the whip hand since even in the matter of railway loans the question of final security was one which fell within his province. Copy to Paris. Bingham 15 Ante , p. 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] . 16 Not printed. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 700.0011 Pacific/13 [Document 1108] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] June 11, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador, having requested an appointment, called on the Secretary of State this morning. Shortly after the interview began, the Secretary of State called in Mr. Hornbeck. The Secretary said to Mr. Hornbeck that the Ambassador had raised the subject of a non-aggression pact in the Pacific. The Ambassador said that China was greatly interested in the suggestion which has been made at London with regard to the possible concluding of a treaty with regard to matters in the Pacific. He said that China was favorable to the idea in principle. He said that it of course should be understood that the Chinese would not expect such a pact to involve any such thing as a recognition of “what is called ‘Manchukuo’.” He would like to know what was the attitude of the American Government. The Secretary replied that this Government has not as yet had any active part in any deliberations with regard to the suggested pact. We are of course interested in such a subject. The subject has been mentioned at London but we have not been approached with regard to it. The Secretary turned to Mr. Hornbeck and asked whether that was not substantially the whole of the situation. Mr. Hornbeck indicated assent and added that a British Foreign Office official had informed our Ambassador in London that the Empire Conference was giving the matter consideration and the Foreign Office would inform the Ambassador of developments if and as they eventuate. The Secretary said that he of course did not know how this matter would be handled, whether it would be managed by the Australian Government or by the British Government. The Ambassador said that China would like to keep in step with the American Government with regard to the matter. The Secretary said that he would be glad to discuss frankly and in the most friendly manner with the Chinese Government any questions which might come up. The Ambassador then said that there was another matter with regard to which he would like to inquire, namely, a subject in regard to which it was well known that the American Government had for a, long time been interested, the possibility of an economic conference. The Secretary said that there was no reason why we should hesitate to disclose frankly to a friendly power our thought and attitude on that subject. He said that many nations are indulging in practices which tend to discourage international trade and keep it at a minimum. For eighteen years this course and the course of emphasizing national differences and building up armaments have been pursued by some nations. He said that you could not go out and, simply by putting the robes of the Church on a lot of people make of those people Christians; that you have to wait until they have developed a desire to be guided in their conduct by Christian principles. He said that we have been preaching certain doctrines which point the way toward economic salvation and we are watchful for evidences that our preaching has effect. He said that recently there were some signs of improvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 700.0011 Pacific/18 [Document 1109] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) 17 I called on Sir Alexander Cadogan today and asked him what action the Imperial Conference had taken in regard to the question of a Far Eastern pact of non-aggression referred to in my 356 of June 8, 12 noon. He said that the Imperial Conference had passed no resolution on the matter, but had reached a confidential conclusion that “such a pact was a worthy objective to work towards over a period of time, but that the furtherance of the matter and all discussions in connection with it should be left in the hands of the British Government.” Sir Alexander Cadogan then went on to point out to me that the Japanese Ambassador was still insisting in his conversations with the Foreign Office that instructions would be shortly forthcoming from Tokyo to permit him to proceed with Anglo-Japanese conversations. (My 292 of May 18, 6 p.m.) 18 Cadogan was very doubtful, however, whether Yoshida would be in a position to open these discussions at an early date, and felt that perhaps the best approach to the matter of a pact of non-aggression in the Pacific lay in the course of these very Anglo-Japanese discussions which Yoshida contemplated. In other words, that in any pact of non-aggression in the Pacific Japan was the most vital factor, and an indication of her attitude would be most helpful as to whether such a scheme were possible. It was thought more advisable, however, to raise such a question casually with the Japanese as a corollary to other discussions rather than make it a main isolated question. Cadogan went on to tell me that he had vaguely discussed the matter of this pact with the Chinese Ambassador as he had with me (see my telegram first above mentioned) and the Chinese Ambassador had stated the pact would only be of interest to China if the mainland were included, which would seem to bar out the idea of a mere extension of the present Four Power Treaty. Cadogan pointed out to the Chinese Ambassador his attitude would seem, for example, to involve the question of Manchukuo, and Cadogan inquired of the Chinese Ambassador whether, in taking up this position, the question of the future of Manchuria had been considered. The Chinese Ambassador undertook to obtain the further views of his Government in this connection. Cadogan then stated that if Manchukuo was not included in the Pacific pact of non-aggression, then it might be claimed on her behalf at some future date, that any hostile acts of hers were not a violation of the pact. Furthermore, Cadogan went on, the question of North China was involved in the question of the mainland and in this also foreign interests as well as those of Japan and China were involved. Accordingly, Cadogan reiterated the importance he attached to some indication, however, informally arrived at, as to what the attitude of the Japanese Government would be to this proposed pact. Cadogan then said he was equally interested in what the view of the United States would be. I said that in my first conversation with him about this subject (see my 292 of May 18, 6 p.m.) he had informed me that Mr. Lyons’ proposal in the Imperial Conference for such a pact had taken the British Government by surprise, and, indeed, it was generally assumed that Mr. Lyons had made his proposal more with the idea of making political capital in Australia. I did not know how far the views of my Government had crystallized since that conversation, but would raise this question with the Department of State and communicate with him again. In a word, my conversation with Cadogan today impressed me with the fact that the British intended, in the first instance, for the purpose of complying with the conclusions of the Imperial Conference, to proceed with discussions as to the possibility of a pact of non-aggression in the Pacific, but due to the very nature of the allied questions that must be settled before such a pact could be achieved, such as Sino-Japanese questions over Manchuria, North China, etc., etc., it was impossible to anticipate any early progress. It may also be noted that however reluctant the British may appear to be in going ahead with this question, it does offer a convenient method for raising those issues in the Far East which are awaiting settlement. R[ ay ] A[ therton ] London , June 16, 1937. 17 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his covering despatch No. 3134, June 17; received June 25. 18 Ante , p. 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 700.0011 Pacific/22 [Document 1110] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] June 30, 1937. The Chinese Ambassador called on me by appointment. He referred to mention which he had made in his conversation with the Secretary on June 11 of China’s interest in the possibility of a non-aggression pact for the Pacific. He has been informed from London that the Imperial Conference passed a resolution directed toward the formulating by the British Government of some proposal. The Chinese Ambassador in London has promised to send him details, but the intended communication has not yet reached Washington. The Chinese Government believes the idea sound. They are not overlooking the fact that a number of treaties directed toward maintenance of peace are in existence and that these treaties have been shown all too little respect, but they believe in the value of reiteration and of new pledges. They believe that the Japanese Government might be receptive toward the idea. The Japanese Government is “riding a tiger” and is looking for some way to dismount. The Ambassador considers significant the fact of Prince Konoye’s having accepted the premiership: for several years Prince Saionji 19 consistently advised Konoye not to accept a position of responsibility until the time was ripe; it may be assumed that both Saionji and Konoye felt, at the moment when Konoye accepted the premiership, that there was a fair chance of Konoye’s having a successful administration. Konoye’s views that Japan and China should be friends rather than enemies are well known. The making of a non-aggression pact might give the Japanese Government the opportunity which it seeks to retreat from an embarrassing position and to make up with China. The Ambassador therefore wished to know in confidence what is the attitude and position of the Secretary of State with regard to Premier Lyons’ proposal. I said in reply that what the Ambassador had said with regard to the Chinese Government’s views and his own view on the subject of the possibilities of a non-aggression pact interested me greatly. With regard to his inquiry, I could only say that the same inquiry has been made repeatedly by interested Americans, especially the press correspondents, and that the Secretary of State has declined to make any statement indicative of an attitude or position on his part favorable or unfavorable in relation to the Lyons suggestion; the attitude of this Government on the subject of peace and on the subject of political and economic stabilizations is well known; but the Lyons proposal is one which was made in and to the British Imperial Conference, one which British Empire representatives have been considering, one which Mr. Lyons has been discussing informally with diplomats of other countries, and one with regard to which this Government has not been officially approached. Therefore, if reporting to his Government, the Ambassador should go no further than to say that this Government has taken no position with regard to the matter. The Ambassador said that he thought it would be very helpful if the American Government would declare itself favorably disposed. I said that there could be two sides to that question: the British Government has the matter in hand; the British Government and the Japanese Government are discussing various problems and possibilities; there might be advantage in letting those two Governments alone until they have come to their own conclusions without any volunteering by the American Government of views on the subject. I repeated that the American Government has not adopted an attitude or position with regard to the matter. Comment . There may be something to the view advanced by the Chinese Ambassador that Prince Konoye’s acceptance of the premiership in Japan indicates the arrival (or approach) of a state of mind in Japan which might make the Japanese Government receptive to a proposal that a non-aggression pact be considered. However, it does not follow that as a matter of strategy or tactics a move or a declaration of attitude on the part of the American Government in support of the Lyons proposal would be helpful. The British Imperial Conference has left the matter in the hands of the British Government; British statesmen have been talking with Japanese statesmen; they have informed us and have informed the Chinese that they will keep us both posted. It may be assumed that the British Government is sounding out the Japanese Government and that, in so doing, the British Government will find out whether or not the atmosphere in Tokyo is receptive. As stated in a previous memorandum, FE is of the opinion that this proposal will go further and go faster if at this stage we leave the matter in the hands of the British Government (that Government being already in process of conversation with the Japanese) than if we intrude into the situation (at this stage) in any way. It therefore is believed that continued avoidance of any expression of opinion with regard to the proposal is warranted and advisable. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 19 Prince Kimmochi Saionji, former Japanese Prime Minister and surviving Genro (Elder Statesman). The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 700.0011 Pacific/18 [Document 1111] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) No. 1845 Washington , July 14, 1937. Sir : Officers of the Department have read and have given careful consideration to the statements made in the memorandum of Mr. Atherton’s conversation on June 16 with Sir Alexander Cadogan in regard to a non-aggression pact for the Pacific area, forwarded to the Department under cover of the Embassy’s confidential despatch No. 3134 of June 17, 1937. 20 The Department notes that the Imperial Conference passed no resolution on the matter but reached a confidential conclusion that “such a pact was a worthy objective to work towards over a period of time, but that the furtherance of the matter and all discussions in connection with it should be left in the hands of the British Government.” The first paragraph of the Embassy’s telegram No. 356, June 8, noon, outlines the concepts which Sir Alexander Cadogan contemplated would form the basis of the proposed pact of non-aggression. These concepts envisage a provision varying somewhat between a nine-power pact of non-aggression in the Pacific containing a consultative provision and providing for outlawing war, and an extension of the present four-power treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, relating to their insular possessions in the Pacific. In the absence of information to the contrary, the Department assumes that these concepts still form the basis of the pact which the British Government has under consideration. With regard to the statement made by Sir Alexander Cadogan that he was interested in ascertaining what the view of the American Government would be toward such a pact, the Department concurs in the view expressed by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the effect that in reference to any pact of non-aggression in the Pacific the attitude of the Japanese Government constitutes the most vital factor. The Department is therefore of the opinion that inasmuch as the British Government has the matter in hand and inasmuch as the British Government and the Japanese Government are discussing various problems and possibilities, it would seem advantageous to let those two Governments continue their discussions until they shall have come to their own conclusions, without any expression by the American Government of views on the subject. By such a course there would be avoided the giving to the Japanese of an impression that there is any form of collusion between the American Government and the British Government in regard to the matter. The attitude of the American Government on the subject of peace and on the subject of political and economic stabilization is well known, and it seems reasonable to believe that if the idea of concluding at this time a pact such as is under consideration is deemed a practicable and desirable objective, a course of watchful waiting on the part of the American Government, without expression of an opinion either favorable or unfavorable, would be helpful. When the British shall have ascertained from the Japanese what is the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the proposal and shall have informed the Department in regard thereto, the Department will expect to be in position to give the British Government an appropriate indication of its attitude in the matter. You are authorized in such further conversations as you may have with Sir Alexander Cadogan or other appropriate officials of the British Foreign Office to express views in accord with the foregoing statements. You may, in your discretion, point out that the views of the Department as outlined hereinabove are based on a desire not to obstruct and to be as helpful as practicable toward furthering principles of policy in which this Government believes and which we constantly seek to have translated into practice. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull 20 Despatch not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 711B.94/20 [Document 1112] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State No. 2669 Tokyo , November 22, 1937. [Received December 16.] Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum 21 of a conversation between Mr. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray, Chairman of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, which occurred on November 20, when I took Mr. MacMurray to call on Mr. Hirota as the former spent a day in Tokyo on returning from Manila to Washington. It will be noted that Mr. Hirota volunteered the statement that he understood that there was in the Philippine Islands and elsewhere considerable apprehension of aggressive designs on the part of Japan; that there was no basis for any such fear; that Japan had no designs on the Philippines; and that Mr. Hirota would be glad to conclude some sort of an agreement for the purpose of clearing up any such misapprehensions. Neither Mr. MacMurray nor I made any comment on the Minister’s remark. Respectfully yours, Joseph C. Grew [Correspondence on the undeclared war between Japan and China is continued in volume IV .] 21 Not printed. Index Index Abyssinia. See Ethiopia . Agreements. See Treaties, conventions, etc . Airplanes. See Undeclared war : Armaments . Aleutian Islands, 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] American Aviation Co., 671–672 [ Pgs. 671–672 include portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] American Emergency Committee in Shanghai, 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] American Oil Co., 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , and Doc. 966 ] Amur River islands, question of, 920–928 [ Pgs. 920–928 include portions of Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , and Doc. 1060 ] passim , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , and Doc. 1074 ] Anti-Comintern pacts: Rome–Berlin Axis, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] ; Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis, 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 676–677 [ Pgs. 676–677 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] ; German-Japanese agreement ( 1936 ), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 668–671 [ Pgs. 668–671 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] Armaments ( see also under Undeclared war ), Limitation question, 75–76 [ Pgs. 75–76 include portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , and Doc. 1103 ] , 981–982 [ Pgs. 981–982 include portions of Doc. 1104 and Doc. 1105 ] Asiatic Petroleum Co., 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] Australia, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , and Doc. 1103 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1109 and Doc. 1110 ] Austria, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] Aviation. See under China ; Sino-Japanese dispute ; Undeclared war . Ayukawa, Gisuke, 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 1073 and Doc. 1074 ] Banque de l’Indo-Chine, 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] Belgium, 488–489 [ Pgs. 488–489 include portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] Berlin–Rome (–Tokyo) Axis. See Anti-Comintern pacts : Rome–Berlin. Boxer Indemnity funds, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] Boxer Protocol ( 1901 ), 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] British-American Tobacco Co., 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] British Imperial Conference ( May 14 ), 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] , 983–990 [ Pgs. 983–990 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , and Doc. 1111 ] passim Brussels Conference ( Nov. 3–24 ), convened under art. 7 of Nine Power Treaty of 1922: Arms shipments through Indo-China, question of, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , and Doc. 736 ] ; Chinese attitude toward, 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 888 ] ; miscellaneous, 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 762 and Doc. 763 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] ; proposals for, 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 673 ] ; resolutions and declarations, 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 887 and Doc. 888 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 888 ] ; U. S. position in regard to, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 692–696 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] Cavite Radio Station, 303–304 [ Pgs. 303–304 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] Censorship: Japanese, at Peiping, 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 698 and Doc. 699 ] ; Japanese, at Tientsin, 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] ; Chinese censorship in Shanghai, suppression of, 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] Central Bank of China, 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] Chiang Kai-shek: Addresses and policy statements, 121–122 [ Pgs. 121–122 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , and Doc. 314 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441 ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 798 ] Communists, position toward, 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , and Doc. 3 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] Forcible detention in Sian and release, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 90–91 [ Pgs. 90–91 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 101–102 [ Pgs. 101–102 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Japan and, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 216–218 [ Pgs. 216–218 include portions of Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , and Doc. 314 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] Peace negotiations, attitude toward, 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 384–385 [ Pgs. 384–385 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 748–749 [ Pgs. 748–749 include portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 766–767 [ Pgs. 766–767 include portions of Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] Position of, and Chinese internal situation, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 88–89 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , and Doc. 299 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 766–767 [ Pgs. 766–767 include portions of Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] United States, statements and appeals with respect to aid from, 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 256–258 [ Pgs. 256–258 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 460–461 [ Pgs. 460–461 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 832–833 [ Pgs. 832–833 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] War operations, attitude toward, 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 408–409 [ Pgs. 408–409 include portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 798 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] Chile, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] China ( see also Sino-Japanese dispute ; Undeclared war ): Anti-Japanese activities. See under Sino-Japanese dispute . Armaments. See under Undeclared war . Aviation: Air service between China and Japan, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 113–114 [ Pgs. 113–114 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 107 ] ; cooperative air services, possible Japanese demand for, 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] Cabinet changes. See under National Government , infra . Chiang Kai-shek. See Chiang Kai-shek . Chou En-lai, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] Communists, Chinese: Army, Communist: Amalgamation with National Government army, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 712 and Doc. 713 ] ; fight with Japanese, 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude toward, 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , and Doc. 3 ] , 18–20 [ Pgs. 18–20 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] Japanese opposition to and demands for suppression, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 607 ] National Government, relations with, 10–18 [ Pgs. 10–18 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 27–29 [ Pgs. 27–29 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 79–80 [ Pgs. 79–80 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 91–93 [ Pgs. 91–93 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 538–540 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 548–549 [ Pgs. 548–549 include portions of Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] , 837–838 [ Pgs. 837–838 include portions of Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] Soviet Union, relations with and influence on, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 91–93 [ Pgs. 91–93 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 192–193 [ Pgs. 192–193 include portions of Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] Cotton-wheat credit of 1933 , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] Customs problems, 848–915 [ Pgs. 848–915 include portions of Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , and Doc. 1043 ] Foreign loan and indemnity quotas, 858–861 [ Pgs. 858–861 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 1020 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , and Doc. 1034 ] Foreign powers’ steps to preserve integrity of Chinese Customs: Anglo-American consultations, 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , 872–873 [ Pgs. 872–873 include portions of Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , and Doc. 989 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 1000 and Doc. 1001 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] , 883–884 [ Pgs. 883–884 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , and Doc. 1013 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 1020 and Doc. 1021 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 1036 and Doc. 1037 ] ; proposals, 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 864–873 [ Pgs. 864–873 include portions of Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , and Doc. 989 ] passim , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , and Doc. 1005 ] ; representations to China, 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 863–864 [ Pgs. 863–864 include portions of Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 867–868 [ Pgs. 867–868 include portions of Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , and Doc. 983 ] , 870–871 [ Pgs. 870–871 include portions of Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , and Doc. 987 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 1029 ] , 908–909 [ Pgs. 908–909 include portions of Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , and Doc. 1036 ] ; representations to Japan, 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , and Doc. 975 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 989 and Doc. 990 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 992 and Doc. 993 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 1000 and Doc. 1001 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] , 883–887 [ Pgs. 883–887 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , and Doc. 1009 ] passim , 889–890 [ Pgs. 889–890 include portions of Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , and Doc. 1013 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 1020 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 1020 and Doc. 1021 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 1036 and Doc. 1037 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 1038 and Doc. 1039 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 1039 and Doc. 1040 ] ; U. S. views, 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 911–912 [ Pgs. 911–912 include portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] Japan: Assurance of protection of foreign interests, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 1010 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 1011 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , and Doc. 1034 ] ; preferential treatment, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , and Doc. 1020 ] , 899–900 [ Pgs. 899–900 include portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 1036 and Doc. 1037 ] ; proposals, 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , and Doc. 971 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , and Doc. 977 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 868–878 [ Pgs. 868–878 include portions of Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] passim , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ] North China Puppet regime, 904–908 [ Pgs. 904–908 include portions of Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , and Doc. 1034 ] Salt revenues, 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 861–863 [ Pgs. 861–863 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , and Doc. 977 ] , 865–899 [ Pgs. 865–899 include portions of Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] passim Sino-Japanese negotiations and question of consultation of interested foreign powers, 882 [ Pg. 882 includes portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 includes portions of Doc. 1005 and Doc. 1006 ] , 886–888 [ Pgs. 886–888 include portions of Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , and Doc. 1010 ] , 890–898 [ Pgs. 890–898 include portions of Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , and Doc. 1022 ] passim , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] , 912–913 [ Pgs. 912–913 include portions of Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] Tariff questions, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , and Doc. 1020 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 includes portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , and Doc. 1036 ] Economic and financial matters ( see also Customs , supra ): Foreign loans, 102–103 [ Pgs. 102–103 include portions of Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , and Doc. 80 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] General situation, 28–29 [ Pgs. 28–29 include portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 111–112 [ Pgs. 111–112 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 133–134 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 953 and Doc. 954 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 1017 and Doc. 1018 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 1101 ] Missions: American economic mission, unofficial, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] ; Japanese unofficial mission, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 76 ] ; Leith-Ross mission, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Monopolies, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] Reconstruction and development: American economic mission, unofficial, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] ; British attitude, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 1101 ] ; Japanese attitude, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 1101 ] Smuggling. See Smuggling . War, financing of, 461 [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] Extraterritorial rights, question of, 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 712 and Doc. 713 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Foreign interests in: Conflict of Anglo–Japanese, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 371 ] ; damage inflicted by smuggling, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 953 and Doc. 954 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] , 852–857 [ Pgs. 852–857 include portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] passim; question of Japanese respect for, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Foreign policy, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 35–36 [ Pgs. 35–36 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 216–218 [ Pgs. 216–218 include portions of Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] France, relations with. See under France . Germany, relations with. See under Germany . Italy, relations with: Armament supplies, 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] ; general, 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] Japan, relations with. See under Japan . Kidnapping of Europeans, 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] League of Nations, question of appeal to, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 593 ] Leased territories, question of, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 525 ] “Manchoukuo,” relations with. See under Sino-Japanese dispute : “Manchoukuo” . Mao Tse-tung, 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Narcotic drugs, monopolizing of illicit traffic in, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] National Government: Cabinet changes, 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 32–33 [ Pgs. 32–33 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] Communists, Chinese, relations with. See under Communists, Chinese , supra . Kuomintang: Manifesto, 27–29 [ Pgs. 27–29 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] ; Third Plenary Session, 26–29 [ Pgs. 26–29 include portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] Possible changes to meet Soviet desires, 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Puppet regime in North China, attitude toward, 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] Transfer to interior, 680–683 [ Pgs. 680–683 include portions of Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 694–695 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 701–706 [ Pgs. 701–706 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , and Doc. 773 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 771–772 [ Pgs. 771–772 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] War Council, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] National unity, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 87–91 [ Pgs. 87–91 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 1105 and Doc. 1106 ] “Open door” policy, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 930–933 [ Pgs. 930–933 include portions of Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 1087 and Doc. 1088 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] Pacific islands possessions, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Political internal situation, analyses of, 28–29 [ Pgs. 28–29 include portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 87–89 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 766–767 [ Pgs. 766–767 include portions of Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] Puppet regime in North China. See under Undeclared war : North China . Railways: Bombing of. See under Undeclared war : Bombing . Construction, 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Peiping–Liaoning Railway, 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , and Doc. 966 ] Peiping–Mukden Railway, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Shihkiachwang–Tientsin, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] Tientsin–Peiping, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 366 ] Tientsin–Pukow Railway, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Yunnan–Tonkin Railway, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] Sian: Communist situation, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 22–23 [ Pgs. 22–23 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] ; liquidation of revolt, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 90–91 [ Pgs. 90–91 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] Soong, T. V., 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Southwestern revolt, liquidation of, 90–91 [ Pgs. 90–91 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] Sovereignty and territorial integrity problems, 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 712 and Doc. 713 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Soviet Union, relations with. See under Soviet Union . “Spheres of influence” in, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] Taxation of foreign residents, question of, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Trade relations with Germany, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] ; Japan, 899–900 [ Pgs. 899–900 include portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] ; Soviet Union, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 103 ] ; United Kingdom, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] ; United States, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 531–532 [ Pgs. 531–532 include portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] Treaty ports, questions regarding, 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] United Kingdom, relations with. See under United Kingdom . China Foundation, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Collective security, system of, 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] Comintern, 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Commander (Komandorski) Islands, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Communism ( see also China : Communists, Chinese ), Japanese fear of, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 658 ] Conferences: Brussels Conference. See Brussels Conference . Far Eastern Weather Conference ( Jan. 13–21 ), 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Imperial Conference ( May 14 ), 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] , 983–990 [ Pgs. 983–990 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , and Doc. 1111 ] passim Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace ( 1936 ), 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 239 ] Conventions. See Treaties, conventions, etc . Customs. See under China . Czechoslovakia, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] Denmark, 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] Disarmament, question of, 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] du Pont de Nemours, E. I., & Co., 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] Ethiopia, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 927 ] Eurasia Aviation Corp., 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] European situation, effect on Far East, 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] , 818–819 [ Pgs. 818–819 include portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] Far Eastern general situation, analyses of ( see also Pacific non-aggression agreement ), 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 506–508 [ Pgs. 506–508 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 526–530 [ Pgs. 526–530 include portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 538–541 [ Pgs. 538–541 include portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 569–571 [ Pgs. 569–571 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 575–576 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 638 ] , 585–586 [ Pgs. 585–586 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 959–962 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 969–971 [ Pgs. 969–971 include portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] Far Eastern Weather Conference ( Jan. 13–21 ), 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Fascism, 613–615 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] Federated Malay States, 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Formosa, 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] France: China, relations with: Armaments: Prohibition of shipments through Indo-China, question of, 623–624 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 634–636 [ Pgs. 634–636 include portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] ; sales to China, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] Loan requested by China, 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] Foreign policy, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 680 ] Germany, relations with, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] Japan, relations with: Clashes in Tientsin Concession, 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] ; general, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347 ] ; Hainan Island, question of, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] ; Paracels Reef, question of, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 524–525 [ Pgs. 524–525 include portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 634–635 [ Pgs. 634–635 include portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] Neutralization of Pacific islands, possible attitude toward, 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Pacific islands possessions, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Pacific non-aggression agreement, attitude toward, 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] Protection of French nationals and interests, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] Shanghai situation, 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] Sino-Japanese conflict. See under Undeclared war : Foreign powers and Mediation . Soviet Union, relations with, 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 476–477 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] United States, relations with, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] French Indo-China. See Indo-China . Germany ( see also Anti-Comintern pacts ): Anglo-American trade agreement, views on, 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] Brussels Conference, refusal to participate in, 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] China, relations with: Armament sales to China, 482–483 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] ; general, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 482–484 [ Pgs. 482–484 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 625–626 [ Pgs. 625–626 include portions of Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] European policy, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] France, relations with, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] Hitler, Adolf, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] Japan, relations with: General, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 483–484 [ Pgs. 483–484 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 625–626 [ Pgs. 625–626 include portions of Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] ; German-Japanese agreement ( 1936 ), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 668–671 [ Pgs. 668–671 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] passim “Manchoukuo,” recognition of, 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] Sino-Japanese conflict. See under Undeclared war : Foreign powers and Mediation . Soviet Union, relations with, 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] Good offices. See Undeclared war : Mediation . Hainan Island, question of, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Hawaii, 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 961–962 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Hitler, Adolf, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] Hong Kong, 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] ; armament shipments to Chinese through, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] ; neutralization, question of, 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] , 977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 1101 ] Hong Kong Banking Corp., 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] Ho-Umetsu Agreement ( 1935 ), 54–55 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Immigration Act of 1924 , 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] Imperial Conference ( May 14 ), 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] , 983–990 [ Pgs. 983–990 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , and Doc. 1111 ] passim Indo-China: Armament supplies to China through, question of, 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 623–624 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 634–636 [ Pgs. 634–636 include portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] ; contemplated inclusion in possible Pacific neutralization agreement, 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 1097 ] ; protection of, in case of Japanese reprisals, 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] Inner Mongolia, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace ( 1936 ), 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 239 ] International Red Cross Committee, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] Ishii mission, 769–770 [ Pgs. 769–770 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] Italy ( see also Anti-Comintern pacts ): China, relations with: Armament supplies, 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] ; general, 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] Ethiopia, question of, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 927 ] German-Japanese Accord ( 1936 ), adherence to, 668–671 [ Pgs. 668–671 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] Japan, relations with, 7–8 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 612–616 [ Pgs. 612–616 include portions of Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 690 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 788–789 [ Pgs. 788–789 include portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 887 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , and Doc. 1083 ] “Manchoukuo,” recognition of, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 943–944 [ Pgs. 943–944 include portions of Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , and Doc. 1083 ] , 946–947 [ Pgs. 946–947 include portions of Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] Mussolini, Benito, 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 672 and Doc. 673 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 690 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Protection of Italian nationals, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Sino-Japanese conflict See under Undeclared war : Foreign powers and Mediation . Japan ( see also Sino-Japanese dispute ; Undeclared war ): Australia, relations with, 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Cabinet changes, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 1110 and Doc. 1111 ] China, relations with: Chiang Kai-shek, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 216–218 [ Pgs. 216–218 include portions of Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , and Doc. 314 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] Customs problems. See under China . Diplomatic relations, question of, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 893 ] Expansion policy in China ( see also Sino-Japanese dispute : North China : Economic penetration ), 2–5 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] General, 2–5 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 53–55 [ Pgs. 53–55 include portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 66–68 [ Pgs. 66–68 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 97–100 [ Pgs. 97–100 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 221–223 [ Pgs. 221–223 include portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , and Doc. 425 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 486–487 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , and Doc. 927 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Hirota three-point program, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] Japanese conciliatory policy, 50–52 [ Pgs. 50–52 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 96–100 [ Pgs. 96–100 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , and Doc. 77 ] Kuomintang manifesto, 27–28 [ Pgs. 27–28 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25 ] Non-aggression pact, possibilities of, 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 983–984 [ Pgs. 983–984 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , and Doc. 1107 ] Puppet regime in North China, recognition by Japan, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] Withdrawal of recognition of National Government considered, 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] Diet session of July 23 , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , and Doc. 371 ] Economic and financial matters: Boycott, question of, 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 573–575 [ Pgs. 573–575 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 659 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] Conflict with British interests in China, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 371 ] Economic mission to China, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 76 ] Financial questions, 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] Foreign loans, questions regarding, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 759–760 [ Pgs. 759–760 include portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , and Doc. 846 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 785–787 [ Pgs. 785–787 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] General economic situation, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 533–534 [ Pgs. 533–534 include portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 includes portions of Doc. 1064 and Doc. 1065 ] Ishii mission, 769–770 [ Pgs. 769–770 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] Raw materials, need of access to, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] Taxation, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] War expenditures, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 533–534 [ Pgs. 533–534 include portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] Emperor, attitudes and functions of, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] , 809–810 [ Pgs. 809–810 include portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , and Doc. 903 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] Expansion needs in Far East, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 607 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Fisheries problem with Soviet Union, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] Foreign policy: General, 1–10 [ Pgs. 1–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 39–44 [ Pgs. 39–44 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , and Doc. 41 ] , 49–52 [ Pgs. 49–52 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 84–86 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 274–275 [ Pgs. 274–275 include portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] ; Sato’s statements on, 39–41 [ Pgs. 39–41 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 44 ] France, relations with. See under France . Germany, relations with. See under Germany . Hirota, Koki (Foreign Minister): Addresses and statements, 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 506 ] ; position in government, 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] ; reaction to Anglo-American offers of good offices, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] ; three-point program, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] Imperial Headquarters. See under Military elements , infra . Indo-China, French, threats against, 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 692 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] Internal situation: General, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 49–52 [ Pgs. 49–52 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , and Doc. 371 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 793–794 [ Pgs. 793–794 include portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] ; public opinion trends, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 507 ] Konoye, Prince, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 342–343 [ Pgs. 342–343 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 723–724 [ Pgs. 723–724 include portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , and Doc. 797 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 1110 and Doc. 1111 ] League of Nations, position toward, 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] Military elements: Conflicting views of military and civil authorities, 50–52 [ Pgs. 50–52 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Imperial Headquarters: Establishment of, 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 663–664 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] ; consultations with civil government, 764 [ Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , and Doc. 927 ] Interference in North China Puppet regime, 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] Navy, position of, 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] Political influence of, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , and Doc. 39 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 598 and Doc. 599 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 638 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 1101 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] Soviet Union, attitude toward, 564–565 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 567–568 [ Pgs. 567–568 include portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] War objectives and policy in China, 98–99 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 326–327 [ Pgs. 326–327 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 433–434 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 673–674 [ Pgs. 673–674 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , and Doc. 737 ] , 722–723 [ Pgs. 722–723 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , and Doc. 946 ] Netherlands, relations with, 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Netherlands East Indies, relations with, 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 686 ] Neutralization of Pacific islands, question of, 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 1097 ] New Zealand, relations with, 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Pacific islands possessions, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Philippines, relations with, 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 1112 ] Political situation, general, 1–10 [ Pgs. 1–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 49–52 [ Pgs. 49–52 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , and Doc. 371 ] Reciprocity in treatment of nationals abroad, 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis, 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 676–677 [ Pgs. 676–677 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] Sanctions against, question of, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 635 ] Sato, Naotake: Appointment as Foreign Minister, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 48–49 [ Pgs. 48–49 include portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] ; interviews to foreign correspondents, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 84–86 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] ; on Sino-Japanese relations, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] ; statements on foreign policy and commentaries thereon, 40–44 [ Pgs. 40–44 include portions of Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , and Doc. 41 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] Soviet Union, relations with. See under Soviet Union . Spain, relations with, 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] Taxation: Increase of income tax, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] ; effect of prolonged war on, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] Trade relations ( see also Economic and financial matters , supra ): Chinese customs, preferential treatment for Japanese goods, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , and Doc. 1020 ] , 899–900 [ Pgs. 899–900 include portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 1036 and Doc. 1037 ] General, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 533–534 [ Pgs. 533–534 include portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 607 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 759–760 [ Pgs. 759–760 include portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , and Doc. 846 ] Netherlands East Indies, negotiations for commercial treaty with, 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] “Manchoukuo,” preferential status for Japanese in, 930–933 [ Pgs. 930–933 include portions of Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] United Kingdom, 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] United States, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 74–75 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 580–581 [ Pgs. 580–581 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] United Kingdom, relations with. See under United Kingdom . United States, relations with: American aviators enlisting with Chinese, Japanese reaction to question of, 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] American loans, 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , and Doc. 846 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] American protests and representations, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 535–537 [ Pgs. 535–537 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 572–573 [ Pgs. 572–573 include portions of Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , and Doc. 637 ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , and Doc. 669 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , and Doc. 690 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 887 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] Analyses, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 507–508 [ Pgs. 507–508 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 526–529 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 574–576 [ Pgs. 574–576 include portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 692–697 [ Pgs. 692–697 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 886 ] General, 1–2 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 523–524 [ Pgs. 523–524 include portions of Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , and Doc. 690 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Japanese immigration, question of, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] Non-aggression pact, rumors of, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Reaction in Japan to application of Neutrality Act, 438–439 [ Pgs. 438–439 include portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] ; general U.S. policy, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 515–516 [ Pgs. 515–516 include portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 521–522 [ Pgs. 521–522 include portions of Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , and Doc. 586 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 592–593 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 664 and Doc. 665 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] ; Roosevelt’s Chicago speech, 584–586 [ Pgs. 584–586 include portions of Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 690 ] Visit by U.S. naval vessels planned, 242–243 [ Pgs. 242–243 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] Keelung incident, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 64–65 [ Pgs. 64–65 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Kellogg–Briand Pact ( 1928 ), 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Komandorski (Commander) Islands, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Korea, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] League of Nations: Advisory Committee, 544–545 [ Pgs. 544–545 include portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] Chinese appeal, question of, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 593 ] Japanese attitude toward, 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] Role in Sino-Japanese crisis, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] Loans. See Economic and financial matters under China and Japan . Macao, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] Mao Tse-tung, 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Malay States, Federated, 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 1097 ] “Manchoukuo.” See under Sino-Japanese dispute . Mandates in Pacific islands, 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Mexico, 601–602 [ Pgs. 601–602 include portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Mongolia, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , and Doc. 669 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] Mussolini, Benito, 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 672 and Doc. 673 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 690 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Narcotic drugs, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] National City Bank of New York, 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 1074 and Doc. 1075 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 1078 and Doc. 1079 ] Naval armaments question, 1–2 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , and Doc. 1103 ] , 981–982 [ Pgs. 981–982 include portions of Doc. 1104 and Doc. 1105 ] Netherlands, 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Netherlands East Indies, 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 686 ] Neutrality, 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 591 ] ; question of U.S. proclamation, 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 740–741 [ Pgs. 740–741 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] Neutrality Act, extension of May 1 , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 437–439 [ Pgs. 437–439 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] , 515–516 [ Pgs. 515–516 include portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 878 ] ; Chinese reaction to, 437–439 [ Pgs. 437–439 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 614 and Doc. 615 ] ; Japanese reaction to, 438–439 [ Pgs. 438–439 include portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] Neutralization of Pacific islands, agreement considered, 954–965 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 968–978 [ Pgs. 968–978 include portions of Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , and Doc. 1103 ] Comments on, 973–978 [ Pgs. 973–978 include portions of Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , and Doc. 1103 ] Limitation of fortification rights, question of, 961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 963–965 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 976–977 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 1101 ] U.S. initiative, possibility of, 956 [ Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 971–972 [ Pgs. 971–972 include portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] New Zealand, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Nine Power Treaty ( 1922 ) ( see also Brussels Conference ), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 333–334 [ Pgs. 333–334 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , and Doc. 420 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 865 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] Non-aggression pact. See Pacific non-aggression agreement . North China. See under Sino-Japanese dispute ; Undeclared war . Northern Sakhalin, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] “Open door” policy, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 930–933 [ Pgs. 930–933 include portions of Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 1087 and Doc. 1088 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] Outer Mongolia, 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] ; Soviet policy in, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Pacific economic conference, possibility of, 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 1108 and Doc. 1109 ] Pacific islands. See Neutralization . Pacific non-aggression agreement, 978–992 [ Pgs. 978–992 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , Doc. 1111 , and Doc. 1112 ] Lyons proposal at British Imperial Conference, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 978–980 [ Pgs. 978–980 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] , 982–984 [ Pgs. 982–984 include portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , and Doc. 1107 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1109 and Doc. 1110 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1110 ] Proposals for, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 966–967 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 1101 ] U.S. attitude, 984–986 [ Pgs. 984–986 include portions of Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , and Doc. 1109 ] , 988–991 [ Pgs. 988–991 include portions of Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , and Doc. 1111 ] Panay incident, 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] Paracels Reef, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 524–525 [ Pgs. 524–525 include portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 634–635 [ Pgs. 634–635 include portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] Peiping Society for the Protection of the Nation, 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] Petroleum interests, American, damaged by smuggling, 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 856–857 [ Pgs. 856–857 include portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] Philippine Islands, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 1112 ] Poland, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] Portugal, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Pratas Reef, 523–525 [ Pgs. 523–525 include portions of Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] Recognition. See under Sino-Japanese dispute : “Manchoukuo.” Red Cross: American, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 635 ] ; International Red Cross Committee, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D. (President): Chiang Kai-shek, message from, 832–833 [ Pgs. 832–833 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] ; Chicago “Quarantine” speech ( Oct. 5 ), comments on, 584–586 [ Pgs. 584–586 include portions of Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] , 595–596 [ Pgs. 595–596 include portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 659 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 690 ] ; Indo-China, views as to situation in, 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] ; Japanese Emperor, comment on message to, 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] ; Pacific Islands, views on neutralization of, 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] Roosevelt, Theodore, part taken in Russo-Japanese peace negotiations ( 1905 ), 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 761 ] Rome–Berlin (–Tokyo) Axis. See under Anti-Comintern pacts . Sakhalin, Northern, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Securities Act ( 1933 ), 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 878 ] Shanghai. See under Undeclared war . Shanghai Banking Corp., 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] Shanghai Truce Agreement ( 1932 ), 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 126–127 [ Pgs. 126–127 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 507 ] . Siam, 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 691 ] Siberia, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] Singapore, 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Sino-Japanese dispute ( see also Undeclared war ): Anti-Japanese activities and propaganda, 3–4 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] ; Chinese Communists, attitude of, 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] ; Japanese demands to suppress, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] ; “Manchoukuo,” 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 916–918 [ Pgs. 916–918 include portions of Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , and Doc. 1046 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 1061 and Doc. 1062 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] ; Pakhoi, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] ; Shanghai, 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 770 and Doc. 771 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] ; Swatow, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 105–106 [ Pgs. 105–106 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] Autonomy movements. See under North China , infra . Aviation, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 113–114 [ Pgs. 113–114 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 107 ] Chinese attitudes and views ( see also Undeclared war : China ), 27–29 [ Pgs. 27–29 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 68 ] Communists, Chinese. See under China . “Cooperation” between China and Japan ( see also Anti-Japanese activities , supra; Demands , infra ), 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 96–100 [ Pgs. 96–100 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , and Doc. 77 ] ; in economic matters, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 444 ] Demands by Japan ( see also under Undeclared war : Japan ), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 118–119 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] Diplomatic relations between China and Japan, question of, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] Expansion policy of Japan. See Economic penetration under North China , infra; and under Japan : China, relations with . Japanese statements and views ( see also Undeclared war : Japan ), 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] “Manchoukuo:” American and other foreign interests, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 1087 and Doc. 1088 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 1095 and Doc. 1096 ] Anti-Japanese activities, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 916–918 [ Pgs. 916–918 include portions of Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , and Doc. 1046 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 1061 and Doc. 1062 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] Assumption of Chinese treaty obligations, 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 1073 and Doc. 1074 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] China, relations with ( see also Recognition , infra ), 2–3 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1109 ] Chinese population, treatment of, 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 1046 ] Customs revenue situation, 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , and Doc. 1034 ] Economic and financial matters, 176–177 [ Pgs. 176–177 include portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 1073 and Doc. 1074 ] ; exchange control law, 929–933 [ Pgs. 929–933 include portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 1087 and Doc. 1088 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] ; taxation, 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , and Doc. 1096 ] ; trade controls, 944–945 [ Pgs. 944–945 include portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , and Doc. 1084 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] Extraterritorial rights of foreign nations, abolition of, 935–943 [ Pgs. 935–943 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , and Doc. 1081 ] passim , 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] , 948–951 [ Pgs. 948–951 include portions of Doc. 1087 , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 1095 and Doc. 1096 ] Japan, relations with: Japanese position in, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 1061 and Doc. 1062 ] ; military situation, 915–916 [ Pgs. 915–916 include portions of Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , and Doc. 1044 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 1061 and Doc. 1062 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] ; preferential economic treatment, 930–931 [ Pgs. 930–931 include portions of Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , and Doc. 1064 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , and Doc. 1067 ] ; treaty ending Japanese extraterritorial rights ( Nov. 5 ), 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 1069 and Doc. 1070 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] “Open door” policy, violation of, 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 1087 and Doc. 1088 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] Pacific non-aggression pact, proposed, relation to, 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1109 ] Recognition: By China, question of, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 627–628 [ Pgs. 627–628 include portions of Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 712 and Doc. 713 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 790–791 [ Pgs. 790–791 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , and Doc. 1083 ] ; by Germany, 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] ; by Italy, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 943–944 [ Pgs. 943–944 include portions of Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , and Doc. 1083 ] , 946–947 [ Pgs. 946–947 include portions of Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] ; by Spain, 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] ; U.S. representations invalidated by absence of, 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] South Manchuria Railway Co., 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] Soviet Union, relations with. See under Soviet Union . Trade controls, 944–945 [ Pgs. 944–945 include portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , and Doc. 1084 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 115–116 [ Pgs. 115–116 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 938–939 [ Pgs. 938–939 include portions of Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , and Doc. 1075 ] U.S. reservation of rights threatened by consolidation of Japanese army control, 915–953 [ Pgs. 915–953 include portions of Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , and Doc. 1096 ] Negotiations ( see also Japan : China, relations with ; Undeclared war : Mediation and Peace negotiations ), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 98 ] North China ( see also under Undeclared war ): Anti-Japanese propaganda, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] Autonomy movements, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 308–309 [ Pgs. 308–309 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] ; Japanese demands, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] Chinese nationalists, policy and influence in, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] Communism, threat of, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 607 ] Economic penetration and development by Japan, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 67–68 [ Pgs. 67–68 include portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] General situation and analyses, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 54–56 [ Pgs. 54–56 include portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 71–73 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. 466 and Doc. 467 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] Hopei–Chahar (Province): Agreement of July 11. See under Undeclared war . East Hopei Autonomous Government, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] ; abolition of, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] ; Chinese influence in, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] ; smuggling problems, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] Peace Maintenance Societies, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] Political Council, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] ; abolition of, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] Sung Che Yuan, activities of, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 435–436 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] Ho–Umetsu Agreement ( 1935 ), 54–55 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Japanese propaganda, 823–824 [ Pgs. 823–824 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 923 ] Land ownership by Japanese nations, question of, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] Mongol state, establishment of, 47–48 [ Pgs. 47–48 include portions of Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , and Doc. 44 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Political control, Japanese efforts to extend, 54–55 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 127–128 [ Pgs. 127–128 include portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 607 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] “Spheres of influence” in, 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 71 ] Tangku Truce Agreement ( 1933 ), 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 212 ] Smuggling. See Smuggling . United Kingdom, attitude of ( see also under Undeclared war : Foreign powers and Mediation ), 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 163–164 [ Pgs. 163–164 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Smuggling: American petroleum interests, effect on, 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 855–857 [ Pgs. 855–857 include portions of Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] Chinese anti-smuggling measures, 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] Extent of, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] Foreign interests damaged by, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 953 and Doc. 954 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] , 852–857 [ Pgs. 852–857 include portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] passim Japanese activities, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 849–852 [ Pgs. 849–852 include portions of Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] Registration of smuggled goods held by Chinese firms, 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] Representations to Japan by United Kingdom, 850–851 [ Pgs. 850–851 include portions of Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] ; by United States, 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 856–857 [ Pgs. 856–857 include portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] Sino-Japanese relations, effect on, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] South China. See under Undeclared war . South Manchuria Railway Co., 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] Soviet Union: China, relations with ( see also Undeclared war : Armaments : Soviet supplies ): Assistance to China, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 484–485 [ Pgs. 484–485 include portions of Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] , 711–712 [ Pgs. 711–712 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , and Doc. 779 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] Chiang Kai-shek, liberation from Sian detention, 101–102 [ Pgs. 101–102 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Chinese Communists, relations with and influence on, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 91–93 [ Pgs. 91–93 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] Chinese military mission to, 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 639–640 [ Pgs. 639–640 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , and Doc. 694 ] Loan to China, 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty ( Aug. 21 ), 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 492–493 [ Pgs. 492–493 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , and Doc. 554 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 498–499 [ Pgs. 498–499 include portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 519–520 [ Pgs. 519–520 include portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 537–541 [ Pgs. 537–541 include portions of Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , and Doc. 601 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Trade treaty negotiations, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 103 ] Comintern, 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] France, relations with, 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 476–477 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] Germany, relations with, 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] Internal situation, and purges, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 564–565 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 921–922 [ Pgs. 921–922 include portions of Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , and Doc. 1051 ] Japan, relations with: Amur River islands question, 920–928 [ Pgs. 920–928 include portions of Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , and Doc. 1060 ] Fisheries problem, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] General, 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , and Doc. 39 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 59–60 [ Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , and Doc. 53 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 403–404 [ Pgs. 403–404 include portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] , 563–566 [ Pgs. 563–566 include portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 567–568 [ Pgs. 567–568 include portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 664–665 [ Pgs. 664–665 include portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 920–921 [ Pgs. 920–921 include portions of Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , and Doc. 1049 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Raid on Soviet Consulate by Japan, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 350 ] Soviet–Japanese war, possibility of, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 632 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] Soviet protests to, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] “Manchoukuo,” relations with, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] ; border incidents, 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 920–928 [ Pgs. 920–928 include portions of Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , and Doc. 1060 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , and Doc. 1074 ] Military situation: Border measures, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 481–482 [ Pgs. 481–482 include portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 915–916 [ Pgs. 915–916 include portions of Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , and Doc. 1044 ] ; Pacific coastal defense, 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] Outer Mongolia: Border situation, 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ; influence in, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Pacific islands possessions, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Pacific non-aggression agreement, contemplated inclusion in, 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 978–979 [ Pgs. 978–979 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] Sinkiang, penetration into, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 61 ] Sino-Japanese conflict. See under Undeclared war : Foreign powers . Stalin, Joseph, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 58 ] United States, relations with, 569–572 [ Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 1051 and Doc. 1052 ] , 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] Spain, 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] Spanish Civil War, 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] Stalin, Joseph, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , and Doc. 966 ] Taiwan, 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] Tangku Truce Agreement ( 1933 ), 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 212 ] Texas Co., 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , and Doc. 966 ] Timor Island, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Trade agreement, Anglo-American, negotiations for, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] Treaties, conventions, etc.: Anti-Comintern pacts. See Anti-Comintern pacts . Boxer Protocol ( 1901 ), 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] Four-Power Treaty ( 1921 ), 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1109 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 1111 ] Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance ( 1935 ), 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] German-Japanese agreement. See under Anti-Comintern pacts . Ho–Umetsu Agreement ( 1935 ), 54–55 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Italian-Japanese protocol for mutual assistance ( 1936 ), 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] Japanese–“Manchoukuo” treaty ( Nov. 5 ), 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 1069 and Doc. 1070 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] Kellogg–Briand Pact ( 1928 ), 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Locarno Pact ( 1925 ), 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ), 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1936 ), 977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 1101 ] Nine Power Treaty ( 1922 ). See Nine Power Treaty . Pacific non-aggression pact. See Pacific non-aggression agreement . Portsmouth, Treaty of ( 1905 ), 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 761 ] Shanghai Truce Agreement ( 1932 ), 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 126–127 [ Pgs. 126–127 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 507 ] Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty ( Aug. 21 ), 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 492–493 [ Pgs. 492–493 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , and Doc. 554 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 498–499 [ Pgs. 498–499 include portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 519–520 [ Pgs. 519–520 include portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 537–541 [ Pgs. 537–541 include portions of Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , and Doc. 601 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Tangku Truce Agreement ( 1933 ), 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 212 ] Washington treaties of 1921 and 1922 , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Undeclared war between Japan and China ( see also Sino-Japanese dispute ): Advisers, military. See China : Military advisers , infra . Agreements: July 8 , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 132 ] ; July 11 , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 249–250 [ Pgs. 249–250 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , and Doc. 256 ] , 254–255 [ Pgs. 254–255 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 484 ] Air operations. See Bombing , infra; and under Military operations , infra . Amoy, situation in, 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] Anglo-American consultations on policy and advisable steps ( see also under Mediation , infra ): Anglo-American naval power, consideration of use of, 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 724–725 [ Pgs. 724–725 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 815–816 [ Pgs. 815–816 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , and Doc. 912 ] Chinese customs questions, 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , 872–873 [ Pgs. 872–873 include portions of Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , and Doc. 989 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 1000 and Doc. 1001 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] , 883–884 [ Pgs. 883–884 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 890–891 [ Pgs. 890–891 include portions of Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , and Doc. 1014 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 1020 and Doc. 1021 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 1039 and Doc. 1040 ] Far Eastern situation, 401–404 [ Pgs. 401–404 include portions of Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , and Doc. 445 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 541 ] , 509–510 [ Pgs. 509–510 include portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 724–725 [ Pgs. 724–725 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] General, 141–142 [ Pgs. 141–142 include portions of Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 147–148 [ Pgs. 147–148 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 289–290 [ Pgs. 289–290 include portions of Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , and Doc. 300 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 568–569 [ Pgs. 568–569 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 582–583 [ Pgs. 582–583 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 591–593 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 600–602 [ Pgs. 600–602 include portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 608–609 [ Pgs. 608–609 include portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 750–760 [ Pgs. 750–760 include portions of Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , and Doc. 846 ] , 792–794 [ Pgs. 792–794 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] , 798–800 [ Pgs. 798–800 include portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , and Doc. 913 ] Good offices, offers of, 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 696–700 [ Pgs. 696–700 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 775–777 [ Pgs. 775–777 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] Shanghai situation, 464–467 [ Pgs. 464–467 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , and Doc. 629 ] , 568–569 [ Pgs. 568–569 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 572–573 [ Pgs. 572–573 include portions of Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , and Doc. 637 ] , 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 739–740 [ Pgs. 739–740 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , and Doc. 821 ] , 804–805 [ Pgs. 804–805 include portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] Smuggling activities in North China, 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] Armaments: Blockade of Chinese coast, question of, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , and Doc. 625 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] British shipments to Japan, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] Chinese situation, 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 944 ] Embargo, problem of, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] Foreign powers’ shipments to China, question of, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 459–460 [ Pgs. 459–460 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , and Doc. 517 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 482–483 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] ; Japanese measures to stop, 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] French position on shipments through Indo-China, 623–624 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 634–636 [ Pgs. 634–636 include portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] Losses, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 944 ] Soviet supplies to China, 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 481–482 [ Pgs. 481–482 include portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 639–640 [ Pgs. 639–640 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , and Doc. 694 ] ; airplane shipments, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 497–498 [ Pgs. 497–498 include portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , and Doc. 561 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 566–567 [ Pgs. 566–567 include portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 616–617 [ Pgs. 616–617 include portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 639–640 [ Pgs. 639–640 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , and Doc. 694 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] Supplies to Japanese army in China, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] U.S. attitude toward shipments, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 459–460 [ Pgs. 459–460 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , and Doc. 517 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 584 ] , 531–532 [ Pgs. 531–532 include portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 644 ] ; list of arms barred from export, 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 817 ] ; orders to American Aviation Co., 671–672 [ Pgs. 671–672 include portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] Armistice, possibility of, 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 759 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] Blockade of Chinese coast, question of, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , and Doc. 625 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] Bombing, by Japanese: Canton, 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 847–848 [ Pgs. 847–848 include portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] Nanking, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 530–531 [ Pgs. 530–531 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 534–537 [ Pgs. 534–537 include portions of Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc. 606 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , and Doc. 678 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , and Doc. 781 ] Protests by U.S. and other Governments, 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 555–559 [ Pgs. 555–559 include portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , Doc. 625 , and Doc. 626 ] Railways, 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] ; Canton-Hankow Railway, 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] ; Canton–Hong Kong Railway, 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] ; Peiping–Hankow Railway, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , and Doc. 203 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 331–332 [ Pgs. 331–332 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] U.S.S. Panay , 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] Casualties, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 700 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] China: Attitude toward hostilities and charges against Japan, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 466 and Doc. 467 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652 ] , 675–676 [ Pgs. 675–676 include portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 921 and Doc. 922 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] Aviation, American and foreign instructors and fliers, question of, 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , and Doc. 663 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] Declaration of war, formal, question of, 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Determination to resist Japanese aggression, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 138–139 [ Pgs. 138–139 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 195–196 [ Pgs. 195–196 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 217–218 [ Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 832–833 [ Pgs. 832–833 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] Foreign forces, questions regarding, 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 420–421 [ Pgs. 420–421 include portions of Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , and Doc. 471 ] , 804–805 [ Pgs. 804–805 include portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] Military advisers: French, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] ; German, 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] ; Soviet, 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Military situation: General, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 694–695 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] ; proposal for cessation of all troop movements, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 259–260 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 466 and Doc. 467 ] ; 29th Army, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 184–185 [ Pgs. 184–185 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] ; war preparations and troop movements, 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 161–162 [ Pgs. 161–162 include portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] U. S. assistance, Chinese inquiries as to possibility of ( see also Chiang Kai-shek : United States ), 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 773–774 [ Pgs. 773–774 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , and Doc. 863 ] , 796–797 [ Pgs. 796–797 include portions of Doc. 887 and Doc. 888 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , and Doc. 1005 ] War, financing of, 461 [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] Civilian population, protection of ( see also Protection of foreign nationals , infra ): General, 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 584 ] , 530–531 [ Pgs. 530–531 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 598 and Doc. 599 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 614 and Doc. 615 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 737–738 [ Pgs. 737–738 include portions of Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] ; refugee problem, 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 887 ] Collective action by Western nations, question of, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 461–462 [ Pgs. 461–462 include portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , and Doc. 521 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 635 ] Davidson neutral zone plan, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Declaration of war, formal, question of: By China, 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] ; by Japan, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 659–660 [ Pgs. 659–660 include portions of Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] , 722–723 [ Pgs. 722–723 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 758–759 [ Pgs. 758–759 include portions of Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , and Doc. 844 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] Demands by Japan. See under Japan , infra . Diplomatic and consular relations: American officials following Chinese Government to interior, 680–683 [ Pgs. 680–683 include portions of Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 701–702 [ Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 770 and Doc. 771 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 771–772 [ Pgs. 771–772 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 820–821 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 828–829 [ Pgs. 828–829 include portions of Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , and Doc. 926 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , and Doc. 931 ] , 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , and Doc. 934 ] , 838–839 [ Pgs. 838–839 include portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , and Doc. 939 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , and Doc. 941 ] Japanese Consulates closed at Chungking and Ichang, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] ; Hankow, 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 399 ] Japanese Embassy leaving Nanking, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] Sino-Japanese, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] Economic matters, 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 635 ] ; boycott against Japan, question of, 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 573–575 [ Pgs. 573–575 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 659 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] ; Customs and Salt Revenue Administrations, integrity of, 848–915 [ Pgs. 848–915 include portions of Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , and Doc. 1043 ] ; possible Japanese demands, 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] Educational and cultural matters, 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 698 and Doc. 699 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] ; Japanese control in Peiping, 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , and Doc. 393 ] , 500–501 [ Pgs. 500–501 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 575 ] Espionage, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] Foreign powers, policies of ( see also Mediation , infra ): Cooperation, necessity of, 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 160–161 [ Pgs. 160–161 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 485–488 [ Pgs. 485–488 include portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 886 ] France: Arms shipments through Indo-China, 623–624 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 634–636 [ Pgs. 634–636 include portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] ; policies and attitudes, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 211–213 [ Pgs. 211–213 include portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 475–478 [ Pgs. 475–478 include portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , and Doc. 539 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] ; Puppet regime in North China, attitude, 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] ; Shanghai situation, 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 715–717 [ Pgs. 715–717 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , and Doc. 785 ] General, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 459–460 [ Pgs. 459–460 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , and Doc. 517 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] , 792–794 [ Pgs. 792–794 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] Germany: Policies and views, 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , and Doc. 299 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 481–484 [ Pgs. 481–484 include portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , and Doc. 543 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 547–548 [ Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] , 625–626 [ Pgs. 625–626 include portions of Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] , 649–650 [ Pgs. 649–650 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 668–671 [ Pgs. 668–671 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] , 720–721 [ Pgs. 720–721 include portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 788–789 [ Pgs. 788–789 include portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] ; steps taken, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] Italy: Policies and views, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 612–616 [ Pgs. 612–616 include portions of Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 715–717 [ Pgs. 715–717 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , and Doc. 785 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] ; steps taken, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] Soviet Union ( see also under Armaments , supra ): Policies and views, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 287–288 [ Pgs. 287–288 include portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339 ] , 484–485 [ Pgs. 484–485 include portions of Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] ; possible intervention on Chinese side, 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] United Kingdom ( see also Anglo-American consultations , supra; and under Shanghai , infra ): Policies and views, 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 319–320 [ Pgs. 319–320 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 436 and Doc. 437 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 591–593 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 865 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 804–805 [ Pgs. 804–805 include portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 839–840 [ Pgs. 839–840 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , and Doc. 941 ] ; Tsingtao situation, 462–464 [ Pgs. 462–464 include portions of Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] , 465–466 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 525 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] United States ( see also Anglo-American consultations and Armaments , supra; and under Shanghai , infra ): Analyses, general policies and views, 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 255–256 [ Pgs. 255–256 include portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , and Doc. 425 ] , 459–461 [ Pgs. 459–461 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] , 487–488 [ Pgs. 487–488 include portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 490–491 [ Pgs. 490–491 include portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 506–508 [ Pgs. 506–508 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] , 526–530 [ Pgs. 526–530 include portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 544–545 [ Pgs. 544–545 include portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607 ] , 570–572 [ Pgs. 570–572 include portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 644 ] , 585–586 [ Pgs. 585–586 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] ; protests and representations to Japan, 535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 849–851 [ Pgs. 849–851 include portions of Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] Hainan Island, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Hankow, situation in, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 915 ] ; Japanese evacuation from, 334–335 [ Pgs. 334–335 include portions of Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] Incidents ( see also under Shanghai , infra ): Hungjao Aerodrome, 364–366 [ Pgs. 364–366 include portions of Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] Langfang, 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao), 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] Panay , 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] Tungchow affair, 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] Wounding of British Ambassador to China by Japanese plane, 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 542–543 [ Pgs. 542–543 include portions of Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 642 ] Japan: Aide-mémoire of July 17 , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 210–211 [ Pgs. 210–211 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 213–214 [ Pgs. 213–214 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Aims and objectives, analysis of, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 513–514 [ Pgs. 513–514 include portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 579 ] , 545–547 [ Pgs. 545–547 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , and Doc. 608 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] Attitude toward hostilities and charges against China, 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , and Doc. 371 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 585–586 [ Pgs. 585–586 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] Declaration of war, formal, question of, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 659–660 [ Pgs. 659–660 include portions of Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 663–664 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] , 722–723 [ Pgs. 722–723 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 758–759 [ Pgs. 758–759 include portions of Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , and Doc. 844 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] Demands by Japan: Chinese customs, 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , and Doc. 971 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 1017 and Doc. 1018 ] , 912–913 [ Pgs. 912–913 include portions of Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] ; Chinese recognition of “Manchoukuo,” 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 627–628 [ Pgs. 627–628 include portions of Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] ; general, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 436 and Doc. 437 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 632 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 931 and Doc. 932 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , and Doc. 946 ] ; peace terms, 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , and Doc. 934 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] ; Shanghai, 379–380 [ Pgs. 379–380 include portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 715–717 [ Pgs. 715–717 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , and Doc. 785 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] ; ultimatum of July 26 , 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] Japanese nationals and property, protection of, 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 383–384 [ Pgs. 383–384 include portions of Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423 ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , and Doc. 470 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 448–450 [ Pgs. 448–450 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 525 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , and Doc. 561 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 784 ] , 782–783 [ Pgs. 782–783 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , and Doc. 874 ] , 794–796 [ Pgs. 794–796 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , and Doc. 888 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Kwantung Army, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 1058 and Doc. 1059 ] Reenforcements from Japan to North China, 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] War expenditures, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 533–534 [ Pgs. 533–534 include portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] War preparations and troop movements, 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 185–186 [ Pgs. 185–186 include portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] Kwantung Army. See under Japan , supra . Marco Polo Bridge. See under Incidents , supra . Mediation and good offices ( see also Peace negotiations , infra ): Anglo-American, 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , and Doc. 226 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 263–264 [ Pgs. 263–264 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 287–288 [ Pgs. 287–288 include portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 319–320 [ Pgs. 319–320 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 327–329 [ Pgs. 327–329 include portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 340–342 [ Pgs. 340–342 include portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , and Doc. 370 ] , 349–351 [ Pgs. 349–351 include portions of Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , and Doc. 377 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 697–698 [ Pgs. 697–698 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , and Doc. 763 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , and Doc. 767 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] , 799–801 [ Pgs. 799–801 include portions of Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , and Doc. 891 ] Chinese request for, 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 263–264 [ Pgs. 263–264 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] France, 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , and Doc. 137 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Germany, 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 759 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 745–750 [ Pgs. 745–750 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , and Doc. 934 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] Italy, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] Japanese reaction to, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , and Doc. 377 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427 ] , 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 690–697 [ Pgs. 690–697 include portions of Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , and Doc. 767 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] Joint steps by foreign powers, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441 ] , 399–400 [ Pgs. 399–400 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 538 ] United Kingdom, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 158–159 [ Pgs. 158–159 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , and Doc. 147 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 178–179 [ Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , and Doc. 226 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] United States, 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , and Doc. 144 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , and Doc. 147 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 236–238 [ Pgs. 236–238 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 471–472 [ Pgs. 471–472 include portions of Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 604–605 [ Pgs. 604–605 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] , 782–783 [ Pgs. 782–783 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , and Doc. 874 ] , 790–791 [ Pgs. 790–791 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] Military operations ( see also under North China and Shanghai , infra ): Air operations ( see also Bombing , supra ): American and foreign instructors and fliers, question of, 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , and Doc. 663 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] ; general, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , and Doc. 203 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 614 and Doc. 615 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] , 847–848 [ Pgs. 847–848 include portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] ; plane losses, 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] ; South China, 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] ; U.S. weather broadcasts as aid to Japanese air force, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Ground operations, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 261–263 [ Pgs. 261–263 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] Guerrilla warfare, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] Naval operations: Anglo-American naval power, consideration of use of, 724–725 [ Pgs. 724–725 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 815–816 [ Pgs. 815–816 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , and Doc. 912 ] ; foreign shipping affected by, 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , and Doc. 625 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 889 ] ; general, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 209–210 [ Pgs. 209–210 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] Nanking ( see also Bombing , supra ): Fall of, 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , and Doc. 927 ] ; safety zone, question of, 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 720–721 [ Pgs. 720–721 include portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 732–733 [ Pgs. 732–733 include portions of Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 737–738 [ Pgs. 737–738 include portions of Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] , 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] , 757–758 [ Pgs. 757–758 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 781–782 [ Pgs. 781–782 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , and Doc. 873 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] , 787–788 [ Pgs. 787–788 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] ; situation in, 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 798 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 931 and Doc. 932 ] North China ( see also under Sino-Japanese dispute ): American and other foreign forces in, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] Chinese population in occupied areas: Cooperation with Japanese, question of, 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 308–309 [ Pgs. 308–309 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 801–802 [ Pgs. 801–802 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 921 and Doc. 922 ] ; treatment by Japanese, 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 1046 ] Military operations: General, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , and Doc. 521 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 632 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , and Doc. 666 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] ; Peiping–Tientsin area, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 261–263 [ Pgs. 261–263 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , and Doc. 286 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] ; troop movements and Japanese reenforcements, 37–38 [ Pgs. 37–38 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , and Doc. 36 ] , 71–73 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 259–260 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] Peiping: Committees for maintenance of order, 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 700 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] ; general situation in, 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , and Doc. 144 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 280–281 [ Pgs. 280–281 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] ; Japanese occupation of, 298–300 [ Pgs. 298–300 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 326–327 [ Pgs. 326–327 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 335–336 [ Pgs. 335–336 include portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 436–437 [ Pgs. 436–437 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 500–501 [ Pgs. 500–501 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564 ] , 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 700 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] ; Japanese propaganda campaigns in, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 698 and Doc. 699 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 700 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] Puppet regime (“Provisional Government of the Republic of China”): Chinese, collaboration of, 801–802 [ Pgs. 801–802 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 824–825 [ Pgs. 824–825 include portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , and Doc. 922 ] ; Chinese Government charges against, 824–825 [ Pgs. 824–825 include portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , and Doc. 922 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] ; Customs Administration, question of, 904–909 [ Pgs. 904–909 include portions of Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , and Doc. 1036 ] passim; general, 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , and Doc. 572 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] , 641–642 [ Pgs. 641–642 include portions of Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , and Doc. 697 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 801–802 [ Pgs. 801–802 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 810–811 [ Pgs. 810–811 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] ; Japanese policy, 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] ; National Government’s attitude toward, 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 915 ] ; recognition by foreign powers and diplomatic representation, question of, 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , and Doc. 905 ] , 813–817 [ Pgs. 813–817 include portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , and Doc. 913 ] , 839–840 [ Pgs. 839–840 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , and Doc. 941 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 1032 ] Suiyuan, situation in, 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 62 ] Tientsin: General situation in, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 293–294 [ Pgs. 293–294 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] ; smuggling, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 953 and Doc. 954 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] ; Tokyo air mail service, 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , and Doc. 690 ] Panay incident, 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] Peace negotiations and possibilities ( see also Mediation , supra ): General, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 319–320 [ Pgs. 319–320 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 327–329 [ Pgs. 327–329 include portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , and Doc. 368 ] , 348–349 [ Pgs. 348–349 include portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384 ] , 384–385 [ Pgs. 384–385 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 654–655 [ Pgs. 654–655 include portions of Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , and Doc. 713 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] Japanese position on direct Sino-Japanese negotiations without mediation, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 799 ] Possible U.S. role in, 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 692–697 [ Pgs. 692–697 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] Terms violating Nine Power Treaty, possibility of, 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 866 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] Tientsin conversations, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Poison gas, use of, 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] Prisoners, Japanese, release by Chinese, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Protection of foreign nationals and interests: Abolition of extraterritorial rights in “Manchoukuo,” 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 1078 and Doc. 1079 ] American, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 241–242 [ Pgs. 241–242 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 405–406 [ Pgs. 405–406 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 530–531 [ Pgs. 530–531 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 638 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 887 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , and Doc. 931 ] ; in Nanking, 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 536–537 [ Pgs. 536–537 include portions of Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 744–745 [ Pgs. 744–745 include portions of Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] ; in Shanghai, 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] ; in Tsingtao, 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 456–457 [ Pgs. 456–457 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] British, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 798 ] ; wounding of British Ambassador by Japanese plane, 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 542–543 [ Pgs. 542–543 include portions of Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 642 ] French, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] General, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , and Doc. 387 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 584 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] Italian, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Kidnapping of Europeans, 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 575 ] Nanking, 535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 798 ] , 737–738 [ Pgs. 737–738 include portions of Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 931 and Doc. 932 ] Shanghai, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 428 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 785 ] Tsingtao, 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 803 and Doc. 804 ] Refugee problem, 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 887 ] Shanghai: Customs problems, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 784 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 878–898 [ Pgs. 878–898 include portions of Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , and Doc. 1022 ] passim , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] , 904–905 [ Pgs. 904–905 include portions of Doc. 1028 and Doc. 1029 ] Demands by Japan, 379–380 [ Pgs. 379–380 include portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 715–717 [ Pgs. 715–717 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , and Doc. 785 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] Foreign forces, question of withdrawal, 729–731 [ Pgs. 729–731 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] Foreign nations, joint steps and representations by, 244–245 [ Pgs. 244–245 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 360–364 [ Pgs. 360–364 include portions of Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , and Doc. 397 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 416–417 [ Pgs. 416–417 include portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , and Doc. 470 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , and Doc. 851 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] General situation in, 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , and Doc. 743 ] ; mutual charges by Chinese and Japanese, 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , and Doc. 415 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 411–412 [ Pgs. 411–412 include portions of Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , and Doc. 460 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] , 452–453 [ Pgs. 452–453 include portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] Incidents, 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 749–750 [ Pgs. 749–750 include portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , and Doc. 858 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] ; Hungjao Aerodrome, 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 467 ] International Settlement: General situation, 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 716–717 [ Pgs. 716–717 include portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 761–763 [ Pgs. 761–763 include portions of Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , and Doc. 848 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] ; Joint Commission, 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 123–124 [ Pgs. 123–124 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 126–127 [ Pgs. 126–127 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] ; legal status of, 717–718 [ Pgs. 717–718 include portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] ; parade of Japanese troops through, 705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 770 and Doc. 771 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 774 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 784 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , and Doc. 821 ] , 747–750 [ Pgs. 747–750 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] ; protection by foreign powers, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 428 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] ; respect by conflicting forces, question of, 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] , 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , and Doc. 842 ] , 760–763 [ Pgs. 760–763 include portions of Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , and Doc. 848 ] , 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , and Doc. 851 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 779–780 [ Pgs. 779–780 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 includes portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] , 794–796 [ Pgs. 794–796 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , and Doc. 888 ] ; use by Japaanese as base of operations, 320–321 [ Pgs. 320–321 include portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 550–551 [ Pgs. 550–551 include portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , and Doc. 614 ] , 555–556 [ Pgs. 555–556 include portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] , 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , and Doc. 629 ] , 568–569 [ Pgs. 568–569 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 572–573 [ Pgs. 572–573 include portions of Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , and Doc. 637 ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 594–595 [ Pgs. 594–595 include portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , and Doc. 669 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , and Doc. 698 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] Military operations: Air, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463 ] , 416–417 [ Pgs. 416–417 include portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 493–494 [ Pgs. 493–494 include portions of Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , and Doc. 555 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] , 578–579 [ Pgs. 578–579 include portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 657–658 [ Pgs. 657–658 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , and Doc. 717 ] ; Chinese troops in, 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 428 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] ; ground fighting in Shanghai and Shanghai–Yangtze area, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 442–444 [ Pgs. 442–444 include portions of Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 507 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 493–494 [ Pgs. 493–494 include portions of Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , and Doc. 555 ] , 587–588 [ Pgs. 587–588 include portions of Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , and Doc. 650 ] , 643–644 [ Pgs. 643–644 include portions of Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , and Doc. 699 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] , 656–668 [ Pgs. 656–668 include portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , and Doc. 731 ] passim , 673–674 [ Pgs. 673–674 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , and Doc. 737 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] , 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. 761 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 768 ] ; Japanese reenforcements of landing force, 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , and Doc. 842 ] , 760–764 [ Pgs. 760–764 include portions of Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 770–771 [ Pgs. 770–771 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , and Doc. 858 ] ; naval, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , and Doc. 415 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 395–396 [ Pgs. 395–396 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , and Doc. 476 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 452–453 [ Pgs. 452–453 include portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] Municipal Council and police, 244–245 [ Pgs. 244–245 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Neutralization proposals, 321–323 [ Pgs. 321–323 include portions of Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 370–371 [ Pgs. 370–371 include portions of Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , and Doc. 403 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 525 ] , 472–473 [ Pgs. 472–473 include portions of Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 520–521 [ Pgs. 520–521 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] Policing problem, 739–740 [ Pgs. 739–740 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , and Doc. 821 ] , 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , and Doc. 826 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , and Doc. 839 ] , 760–764 [ Pgs. 760–764 include portions of Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] ; Peace Preservation Corps, 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , and Doc. 393 ] , 364–366 [ Pgs. 364–366 include portions of Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 379–380 [ Pgs. 379–380 include portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 428 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] Shanghai Truce Agreement ( 1932 ), 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 126–127 [ Pgs. 126–127 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 507 ] United Kingdom: Proposal for withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese forces and joint responsibility to foreign authorities, 440–441 [ Pgs. 440–441 include portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] , 444–446 [ Pgs. 444–446 include portions of Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 448–450 [ Pgs. 448–450 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 464–467 [ Pgs. 464–467 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530 ] ; steps and consultations, 409–410 [ Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 461 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 426–428 [ Pgs. 426–428 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , and Doc. 479 ] , 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , and Doc. 629 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , and Doc. 669 ] , 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , and Doc. 698 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 762 and Doc. 763 ] , 715–717 [ Pgs. 715–717 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , and Doc. 785 ] , 724–725 [ Pgs. 724–725 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 739–740 [ Pgs. 739–740 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 745–749 [ Pgs. 745–749 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] United States, views of situation and steps taken, 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] , 400–401 [ Pgs. 400–401 include portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] , 411–412 [ Pgs. 411–412 include portions of Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , and Doc. 460 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 461 ] , 421–422 [ Pgs. 421–422 include portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 427–429 [ Pgs. 427–429 include portions of Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , and Doc. 479 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 444–445 [ Pgs. 444–445 include portions of Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , and Doc. 495 ] , 440–450 [ Pgs. 440–450 include portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , and Doc. 821 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] U.S. Marines. See U.S. Marines . Shansi, situation in, 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] Shantung, situation in, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , and Doc. 666 ] , 621–622 [ Pgs. 621–622 include portions of Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , and Doc. 931 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] Shensi, situation in, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] South China: Canton, bombing of, 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 847–848 [ Pgs. 847–848 include portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] ; evacuation of Japanese nationals, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] Foochow and Swatow, Japanese evacuation from, 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Naval operations, 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , and Doc. 476 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] “State of war,” question of existence of ( see also Declaration of war , supra ), 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] , 515–516 [ Pgs. 515–516 include portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 710 ] Transport and communications ( see also China : Railways ): General problems, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 632 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 644 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] Postal, telephone, telegraph, and radio services, 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 784 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , and Doc. 946 ] ; censorship, 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 698 and Doc. 699 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] Tsingtao: General situation, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , and Doc. 495 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , and Doc. 781 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 803 and Doc. 804 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 935 and Doc. 936 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , and Doc. 946 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] ; Japanese nationals and property, 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , and Doc. 561 ] , 782–783 [ Pgs. 782–783 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , and Doc. 874 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] ; neutral zone, question of, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] ; U.S. representations, 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , and Doc. 521 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] U.S. Marines. See U.S. Marines . Weather reports, question of, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 303–304 [ Pgs. 303–304 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] United Kingdom: China, relations with: General, 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 541 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 652 ] ; loan policy, 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] ; trade, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 41 ] General policy in Far East, 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 541 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Germany, relations with, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 731 ] Imperial Conference, 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] , 983–990 [ Pgs. 983–990 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , and Doc. 1111 ] passim Japan, relations with: Anglo-Japanese conversations, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 93–96 [ Pgs. 93–96 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 975–976 [ Pgs. 975–976 include portions of Doc. 1100 and Doc. 1101 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1109 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 1110 and Doc. 1111 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 1111 ] ; influence of Sino-Japanese hostilities, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 240–241 [ Pgs. 240–241 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 344–348 [ Pgs. 344–348 include portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] ; U.S. attitude toward, 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] , 345–348 [ Pgs. 345–348 include portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] Economic relations: Conflict with Japanese interests in China, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 371 ] ; Ishii mission, 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] ; loan policies, 759–760 [ Pgs. 759–760 include portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , and Doc. 846 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] ; trade, 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] General, 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 64–66 [ Pgs. 64–66 include portions of Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , and Doc. 59 ] , 74–75 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 591–593 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 652 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] Good offices, offers of, 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] Protests concerning abolition of extraterritorial rights in “Manchoukuo,” 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] ; loss of life and property, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 541 ] ; occupation of Pratas Reef, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 524–525 [ Pgs. 524–525 include portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] ; wounding of British Ambassador to China, 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 542–543 [ Pgs. 542–543 include portions of Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] U.S. analysis of, 345–348 [ Pgs. 345–348 include portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374 ] , 574–577 [ Pgs. 574–577 include portions of Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , and Doc. 639 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 642 ] Withdrawal of British Ambassador considered, 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] “Manchoukuo,” relations with, 115–116 [ Pgs. 115–116 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 938–939 [ Pgs. 938–939 include portions of Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , and Doc. 1075 ] Naval armament questions, 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 1097 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1104 ] Pacific islands possessions, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] Protection of nationals. See Undeclared war : Protection: British . Sino–Japanese conflict. See under Undeclared war : Foreign powers and Mediation . Soviet Union, relations with, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 58 ] Trade agreement with United States, negotiations for, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] United States, relations with. See Undeclared war : Anglo-American consultations and Mediation : Anglo-American . U.S. Marines at Shanghai, 389–390 [ Pgs. 389–390 include portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 420–422 [ Pgs. 420–422 include portions of Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , and Doc. 471 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 708–709 [ Pgs. 708–709 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 784 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 730–731 [ Pgs. 730–731 include portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] U.S. Pacific islands possessions, 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 1097 ] War between Soviet Union and Japan, possibility of, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 632 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] Weather broadcasts, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 303–304 [ Pgs. 303–304 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] Weather Conference, Far Eastern ( Jan. 13–21 ), 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Yokohama Specie Bank, 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 includes portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 includes portions of Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , and Doc. 985 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] ; deposits with, 877 [ Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 1006 and Doc. 1007 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 1010 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 1020 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 1026 ]