FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1936, GENERAL, BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, VOLUME I Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936 Volume I General, British Commonwealth United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. General, British Commonwealth (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, Volume I) Contents Preface List of Papers General: The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Geneva: 1936 phase (Documents 1-14) London Naval Conference, 1935: Second phase, January 6–March 25, 1936 (Documents 15-94) Efforts to relate other powers to the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936, by accession or by separate bilateral treaties (Documents 95-116) Rejection by the United States of British proposal for renewal of article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, February 6, 1922 (Documents 117-120) Retention of naval tonnage by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan under articles 17 and 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 (Documents 121-145) Signature of procès-verbal, November 6, 1936, relating to part IV (rules of submarine warfare), London Naval Treaty, signed April 22, 1930 (Documents 146-153) Views of the Department of State with respect to neutrality legislation (Documents 154-165) Analyses and reports by American diplomatic missions regarding European political developments affecting the preservation of peace (Documents 166-300) The German-Japanese Accord of November 25, 1936, against the Communist International (Documents 301-317) Negotiations for the suppression of liquor smuggling into the United States: Belgium (Documents 318-334) Canada (Documents 335-337) Cuba (Documents 338-338) France (Documents 339-348) Mexico (Documents 349-350) Netherlands (Documents 351-354) Norway (Documents 355-367) Interest of the United States in the efforts of the League of Nations to promote international economic cooperation (Documents 368-405) Principles underlying the policy of the United States for restoration of international commerce and finance (Documents 406-412) Interest of the United States in liberalizing the policy of the International Rubber Committee with respect to the world supply of rubber (Documents 413-429) Preliminary discussions with respect to an international conference on production and marketing of sugar (Documents 430-439) Tripartite financial stabilization agreement by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, set forth in simultaneous statements, September 25, 1936 (Documents 440-463) Status of intergovernmental debts owed the United States by reason of the First World War Position of the Department of State with respect to the treatment of foreign war debts (Documents 464-467) France (Documents 468-476) Italy (Documents 477-488) Rumania (Documents 489-489) Opposition of the Department of State to proposals to increase tariff rates on imports from countries in default on war-debt payments (Documents 490-491) Views of the Department of State on bill providing for acquisition of essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods (Documents 492-493) Representations by foreign governments against proposed legislation restricting tourist cruises from American ports to American ships (Documents 494-503) Representations of certain foreign governments against proposed legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships (Documents 504-511) Participation by the United States in the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, June 8–26, 1936 Participation by the United States in the international conference for the standardization of the keeping and operation of herdbooks, Rome, October 12–14, 1936 (Documents 512-512) Extradition treaties signed between the United States and certain other countries The British Commonwealth of Nations: United Kingdom: Efforts of the Secretary of State to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program; preliminary discussions respecting a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom (Documents 513-555) Informal discussions regarding proposed restriction of trade between Australia and New Zealand to British shipping (Documents 556-562) Supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property, signed May 27, 1936 (Documents 563-566) Reciprocal arrangements effected by the United States with the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for trans-Atlantic air service (Documents 567-572) Refusal of the British Government to recognize the right of the United States to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying the British flag, except as provided by treaty (Documents 573-573) Informal representations against proposed preferential tariff rates in certain British West African colonies favoring Empire trade (Documents 574-577) Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (Documents 578-581) Australia: Unsatisfactory trade relations between the United States and Australia (Documents 582-616) Informal arrangements between the United States and Australia respecting the importation of American aircraft and aircraft parts into Australia (Documents 617-624) Canada: Informal discussions between officials of the United States and Canada with respect to trade relations (Documents 625-626) Convention between the United States and Canada respecting income taxation, signed December 30, 1936 (Documents 627-630) Protests of the Canadian Government against certain provisions of the liquor tax bill; settlement of United States claims against Canadian distillers (Documents 631-657) Negotiations respecting the revision of the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (Documents 658-663) Proposed negotiation of a new treaty to deal with the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin as a whole, including the Niagara Falls (Documents 664-671) Irish Free State: Disinclination of the United States to enter into a trade agreement with the Irish Free State (Documents 672-673) New Zealand: Representations regarding discrimination against American commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa (Documents 674-674) Union of South Africa: Efforts to meet complaints from South Africa that American import regulations unduly restricted South African exports to the United States (Documents 675-691) Index List of Papers List of Papers (Unless otherwise specified, the correspondence is from or to officials in the Department of State.) GENERAL THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS, GENEVA: 1936 PHASE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Aug. 17 (1815 Pol.) From the Consul at Geneva Observations on preparatory work in connection with the possible resumption of the Disarmament Conference, as set forth in memoranda (texts printed) by officers of the League of Nations Secretariat. 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Sept. 9 (1830 Pol.) From the Consul at Geneva Transmittal of draft statement, prepared by the Disarmament Section of the League Secretariat for delivery in case the disarmament matter is raised in the forthcoming Assembly meeting, and of a memorandum dealing with the attitudes of the various governments. 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Sept. 25 (1067) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) French desire that the Council consider calling the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference, and hope that the 1935 committees considering traffic in and manufacture of arms, and budgetary publicity, will resume work. 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Sept. 26 (1069) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Speculation as to French position in forthcoming Conference Bureau meeting, and request for instructions if Department wishes energetic support for reopening of disarmament discussions. 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Sept. 28 (511) To the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Department’s position relative to reopening subject of disarmament and desire for further information on present prospects of a positive result; instructions for Minister to attend Bureau session if called. 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Sept. 29 (1070) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Advice of move of Scandinavian and Netherland delegations to have disarmament question taken up by the Assembly Third Committee, and inquiry as to whether the British and French should be approached formally to ascertain their positions on the subject. 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Sept. 29 (512) To the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Reason for view that formal approach to the British and French would be inadvisable. 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] Oct. 1 (1071) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Information that the Third Committee was set up by the Assembly; and that France would support reexamination of budgetary publicity, control of manufacture and traffic in arms, and limitation of air forces. 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] Oct. 2 (1073) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Election of Lange of Norway as President of the Third Committee, and his attitude that its work would be a useful preface for the meeting of the Bureau. 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Oct. 4 (1074) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) British attitude toward budgetary publicity, and toward general disarmament discussions at this time. 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Oct. 5 (1075) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Decision of Third Committee to support French move for convocation of the Bureau; reiteration of their positions by the French and British. 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] Oct. 7 (1078) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Approval by Third Committee of a report to the Assembly favoring an early meeting of the Bureau. 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] Oct. 10 (1079) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Council’s authorization to its President to set date of meeting of Bureau, and its decision to communicate information of actions taken, relative to disarmament, to members of the Bureau, and to states represented at the Conference. 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] Dec. 24 (4735 L. N. No. 3484) From the Minister in Switzerland Communication from Council’s President (text printed) stating that he has decided to refer the question of the date of meeting of the Bureau to the Council itself in January. 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 14 ] LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935: SECOND PHASE, JANUARY 6–MARCH 25, 1936 Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 7 To President Roosevelt Transmittal of draft telegram for the President’s consideration (text infra ). (Footnote: President’s approval of communication.) 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] Jan. 7 (8) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Advisability of securing clear-cut statement as to whether Japan would be willing to reach agreement on other phases of the naval question in the absence of agreement to a “common upper level”; Department’s view on continuance of discussions. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] Jan. 8 (38) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Account of conversations with British Foreign Office officials, who disagreed as to securing an early termination of conversations with the Japanese. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 17 ] Jan. 9 (39) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Agreement of Foreign Secretary Eden with U. S. desire for early determination of Japanese position on the matter of a common upper limit; his doubts as to even a consultative pact with the Japanese. 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Jan. 9 (10) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Comments relative to conversations reported in No. 38, of January 8. 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Jan. 10 (41) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information from Eden regarding Japanese concern when he told them the British were ready to discuss and come to a decision relative to the common upper limit; practical agreement of French and Italians to join in rejecting common upper limit. 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 20 ] Jan. 10 (43) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Request for Department’s views as to Japan’s continuation in naval negotiations in capacity of observer if she withdraws from active participation in consequence of rejection of common upper limit. 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] Jan. 10 (12) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Department’s inability to see any basis for objection to presence of Japanese observer or observers. 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , and Doc. 24 ] Jan. 11 (45) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Request that delegation be kept fully informed of conflicting views between Foreign Office and the Navy in Tokyo. 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , and Doc. 24 ] Jan. 11 (14) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Advice that U. S. Ambassador in Japan has been informed of request in No. 45 of January 11. 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , and Doc. 24 ] Jan. 12 (9) From the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Advice of reports indicating disagreement on Naval Conference between the Navy and the Foreign Office which desires to avoid blame for complete rupture; belief that disagreement is on methods and tactics and not on objectives. 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] Jan. 13 (11) From the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Foreign Minister’s confirmation that he had won out in contest with Navy over immediate withdrawal of delegation from London. 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , and Doc. 27 ] Jan. 14 (46) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Further developments in relation to Japanese participation in the Conference; comment of Nagai, one of the Japanese delegates, that what Japan wants is to leave in most friendly spirit. 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , and Doc. 27 ] Jan. 14 (47) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Discussion with British of entire situation, including their unwillingness to accede to Japan’s desire that other matters be taken up before the subject of parity; observations relative to British views on qualitative agreement. (Footnote: Citation to text of Japanese withdrawal announcement of January 15.) 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Jan. 16 (55) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Observations disagreeing with reported statement of Senator Key Pittman to the effect that future efforts to limit naval armament are futile, and that Japan withdrew to institute a naval race. 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] Jan. 16 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Analysis of the effects of Japanese withdrawal, in which issue is taken with observations made in No. 55 of January 16. 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 30 ] Jan. 18 (20) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Explanation that Japanese withdrawal has considerably lessened U. S. interest in the Conference, and that initiative in the Conference should be left to European powers. (Footnote: Citation to text of statement of Chairman Davis of January 15.) 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Jan. 20 (23) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) President Roosevelt’s opinion that Department should still seek an agreement, within the tonnage limits in existing treaties, with an escape clause in event Japan exceeds limitations. 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Jan. 21 (62) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Importance of agreement among European naval powers to U. S.-British agreement; difficulties connected with quantitative and qualitative disarmament. 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Jan. 23 (64) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Résumé of conversations indicating the general French attitude toward continuation of the Conference, and French opposition to inviting Germany to participate at this time. 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 34 ] Jan. 23 (66) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Development of U. S.-British disagreement as to status of previous informal understanding on gun caliber and tonnage of capital ships; contention of U. S. delegation that understanding was contingent on agreements which were not consummated; desire to avoid evidence of difference of opinion. 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Jan. 24 (67) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Detailed résumé of conversations with the British relating to gun caliber and tonnage of vessels, and request for Department’s views on British compromise proposals. 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Jan. 26 (72) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Further explanation of British proposals, with indication of escape clauses. 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] Jan. 29 (28) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Inquiry as to whether there was any discussion on question of scrapping. 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] Jan. 29 (29) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Department’s position relative to British proposals discussed in telegrams from Chairman Davis. (Footnote: Marginal notation that Department’s telegram was read and approved by Admiral Taussig, and one specified part by President Roosevelt.) 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 39 ] Jan. 30 (76) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Doubt as to meaning of portion of Department’s No. 29 of January 29; further explanation of status of conversations, and opinion as to what should be accepted. 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Jan. 30 (77) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Hope that the President, the Department, and the Navy will approve delegation’s recommendations on cruisers; acknowledgment that qualitative limitation would have definite advantages and would be better than no agreement. 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] Jan. 31 (31) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Memorandum of the Navy General Board suggesting changes in proposals as set forth by the delegation, and requesting further information. 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Feb. 1 (81) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information requested by the General Board. 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Feb. 3 (82) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) British intentions in regard to scrapping. 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Feb. 3 (83) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Reasons why the British are unable to give any definite assurance as to ultimate tonnage of the light surface category, and observations as to probable future British construction capacity. 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Feb. 4 (92) From the Consul General at Beirut, Temporarily at Paris Conversation with an official of the Foreign Office relative to German participation in international disarmament discussions. 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Feb. 6 (33) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Instructions as to basis of discussions; and information relative to President Roosevelt’s approval, with the request that implications of agreement on that basis be noted. 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Feb. 12 (94) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Account of conversations with the French, who are considering probable political consequences of German participation, and wish, before acquiescing therein, to come to an agreement with the British concerning possible future violation of the Rhineland. 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Feb. 14 (96) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information from Eden of his conversation with a French delegate who was told that a naval agreement, essential to the British, necessitated German participation. Eden’s willingness to assure French that the British would stand by Locarno. 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Feb. 17 (123) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Discussion of present situation in naval negotiations with the Minister of Marine, who explained French acquiescence in German participation in a naval treaty upon agreement to later conversations on air and land forces. 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Feb. 18 (97) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Conversation with French delegate, who conveyed French willingness to initial treaty to go into effect when certain “general political questions” were solved, and was informed by Chairman Davis that the United States could not sign an agreement contingent on a European political settlement. 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Feb. 19 (99) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Conversation with another French delegate to whom Chairman Davis intimated his displeasure at attempt of French Government to secure U. S. position on capital ships through the French Ambassador in Washington, and reiterated his position as stated in No. 97 of February 18. 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 52 ] Feb. 20 (58) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Information indirectly from the Japanese Ambassador that in a Council of State at Tokyo the ranking Admiral advocated Japanese withdrawal from the Conference, but gave assurances that Japan had no intention of building in competition with British or U. S. navies. 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Feb. 20 To President Roosevelt Information of French Ambassador’s representations regarding capital ships. Request for approval of indicated method of steering negotiations back to London. 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] Feb. 20 (40) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Account of French Ambassador’s representations regarding capital ships, and U. S. reply indicating hope that the French would take up matter at the Conference. 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] Feb. 20 (41) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Observations as to Department’s position on tonnage of capital ships and caliber of guns. 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Feb. 21 (102) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) British position on the importance of a naval agreement to which Germany would be a party, agreement with U. S. position against acceptance of treaty contingent upon a political agreement, and plan for representations to the French. 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 57 ] Feb. 21 (43) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Approval of position Davis has taken relative to avoiding an agreement dependent upon political developments or settlements. 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Feb. 21 (103) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Observations as to uncertainty of the Italian position regarding a naval agreement and relative to possible influence of the Abyssinian question on that position. 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Feb. 25 (44) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Department’s objection to the anomalous position of having to wait for signing of treaty pending settlement of European political questions; request for advice on suggestion to speed final agreement. 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Feb. 25 (105) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Account of conversation with officials of the Foreign Office, in which Davis proposed that the naval treaty, as contemplated, be drawn up and initialed by Britain and the United States, and left open for adherence by other powers. 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 61 ] Feb. 25 (46) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Counter suggestion of a memorandum indicating type of treaty the United States would be willing to sign before end of year. 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Feb. 25 (106) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information from the British as to French proposal for the conclusion of a four-power treaty with a later bilateral British supplementary treaty with Germany, and as to the German and Italian positions. 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Feb. 25 (107) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Advice of attempt to speed reaching of conclusions, and of Eden’s opposition to further dillydallying. 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66 ] Feb. 26 (47) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Nonobjection to French proposal, but instructions to indicate that the United States will take no part in the bilateral agreements with Germany. 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66 ] Feb. 26 (108) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information that negotiations are still going on, but that delegates have had idea suggested in No. 46, February 25 in mind, in case something more satisfactory cannot be reached. 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66 ] Feb. 26 (109) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information from Italian Delegate Grandi that Italy would not sign agreement at present, but might adhere in the future. 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Feb. 27 (110) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Presentation of three alternatives of action contingent on specific developments. 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Feb. 27 (48) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Comment on alternatives, including statement of willingness to enter an agreement with England and France with appropriate safeguard clauses. (Footnote: Indication of President’s approval of telegram.) 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Feb. 28 (112) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Explanation by Italian delegates that they wished to remain in the Conference although for political reasons they would not sign a treaty at the present time; that they would, however, indicate it was for technical reasons; and that Italy hoped to adhere later. 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Feb. 28 (50) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information from Italian Ambassador that Italy is unable at this time to enter into a naval treaty, with reasons therefor. 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Feb. 28 (51) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Suggestion for consideration of a gentleman’s agreement between Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, and, through England with Germany, for notification of every decision to lay down vessels of over 100 tons. (Footnote: Information that this instruction embodied substance of a memorandum from the President.) 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Feb. 28 (113) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) For the President and the Secretary: Detailed analysis of situations which are making agreement difficult, and suggestion of two possible lines of procedure which might prevent the termination of the Conference without concrete results. 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Feb. 29 (114) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) For the President and the Secretary: Suggestion as to action in case none of the other powers, except Britain and the United States, are prepared to sign. 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Feb. 29 (54) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Comments on analysis and suggestions of the delegation. 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Mar. 3 (119) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Understanding of condition under which the United States can agree to reduce the gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches; recommendation that delegation not insist upon condition. 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Mar. 4 (120) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Advice of French formula pertaining to capital ships, and modification suggested by the delegation for Department’s approval. 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Mar. 5 (58) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Approval of modifications of French formula. Position that further discussions relative to reduction in tonnage or gun caliber of capital ships might better take place in 1941, with arrangement to take effect as from January 1, 1942. (Footnote: Approval of telegram by Navy officials.) 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Mar. 9 (64) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Request for opinion as to possibility of expediting discussion of any pending technical questions, and as to early return of the delegation, in view of entirely new turn of events brought about by German action in the Rhineland. 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Mar. 9 (129) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Information that treaty completion will take ten days longer, and question as to Senate ratification in time for treaty to come into force January 1, 1937; importance of having it effective on that day. 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Mar. 10 (132) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Hope of concluding treaty with France and England in ten days; probable effects of German Rhineland matter on negotiations. 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Mar. 11 (68) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Discussion of ratification of treaty, and conclusion it would be best for Davis to initial draft of treaty at this time and appoint some later time for signature in order not to jeopardize Senate acceptance of treaty. 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83 ] Mar. 13 (137) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) For the President and the Secretary: Request for definite information as to whether it is proposed to obtain ratification before the end of the year and reasons for request, with a general résumé of the situation as seen from London. 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83 ] Mar. 14 (138) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) For the President and the Secretary: Further information relative to ratification, and suggestion of signing and withholding treaty from Senate pending clarification of international situation. 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Mar. 14 (72) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Further views on ratification, and advice of President’s views on submission of the treaty to the Senate instructions as to further steps in connection with initialing or signing. 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Mar. 16 (141) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Conversation with an official of the Foreign Office, who indicated the British decision to go ahead with the naval treaties, while Davis explained the U. S. position on ratification. 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 86 ] Mar. 19 (146) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Suggestion that, since the new treaty does not provide for quantitative agreement, a statement including idea of parity be agreed to; British sympathy with idea. 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Mar. 19 (147) From the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Explanation of safeguarding clauses found in articles 24 and 25 of the draft treaty. 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] Mar. 21 Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State Desire for clarification in treaty relative to building vessels during interim period before treaty becomes effective. 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] Mar. 23 (80) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Confirmation of telephone conversation conveying President’s thought that the affirmation of the parity principle be incorporated in an exchange of private notes with Eden which need not be made public. 97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Mar. 23 (83) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Expression of thanks for work of delegation leading to the conclusion of the treaty. 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] Mar. 23 (84) To the Chairman of the American Delegation ( tel. ) Suggestion of oral exchange relative to the parity principle, with an exchange of memorandums of the conversation instead of letters. 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] Mar. 28 To the Secretary of the Navy Information of the notes exchanged (text printed) between Davis and Foreign Secretary Eden regarding the maintenance of parity between the navies of the United States and the British Commonwealth. 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] Mar. 30 To President Roosevelt Advice that interests of the United States relative to building in the interim period before the treaty becomes effective are fully protected. 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 94 ] (Note: Citation to text of Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed March 25, and of Protocol of June 30, 1938. List of signatories and dates of deposit at London of instruments of ratification of the Treaty.) 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 94 ] EFFORTS TO RELATE OTHER POWERS TO THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF MARCH 25, 1936, BY ACCESSION OR BY SEPARATE BILATERAL TREATIES Date and number Subject Page 1936 May 28 (287) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice of British bilateral conversations relative to adherence to 1936 Naval treaty with the Poles, who seek explanation of the situation, and with the Soviets, who desire to make reservations before signing. Scandinavian inclination toward general treaty. 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] July 2 (333) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Deposit of instruments of ratification of Treaty of March 25; readiness of Russians to accept treaty with reservations; continuance of British conversations with Germans and French. 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] July 9 (A 5678/4/45) From the British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom Advice of Japanese communication, in reply to British advances, indicating that Japan has no intention of adhering to the London Treaty under present conditions. 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] July 25 (280) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to ascertain British view as to present status of 14-inch gun provision of treaty, which was made contingent on its acceptance not later than April 1, 1937, by Washington Treaty powers. 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] July 31 (385) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British view that Japanese cannot be presumed to have refused to accept 14-inch limit unless they make declaration to that effect before April 1, 1937; British intention to seek views of their Ambassador in Japan. 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Aug. 1 (101) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Explanation of situation with respect to 14-inch guns. 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] Aug. 27 (172) From the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Agreement with British colleague that inquiry as to Japan’s position on the 14-inch question should be put point-blank eventually, and comments as to Japan’s probable stand on question. 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] Sept. 29 (392) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Reasons for Italy’s refusal to sign the London Treaty, and her readiness to work with the Locarno powers. 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] Oct. 2 (128) From the Minister in Switzerland Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with British Admiral Bellairs, who recounted British conversations aimed to secure adherence of continental powers to the London Treaty. 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Oct. 9 (408) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Belief of British Ambassador that Italy’s real objection to signing was unwillingness to cooperate in naval matters until a more definite program of European cooperation was agreed to. 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Nov. 16 (1141) To the Chargé in Japan Instructions to consider the advisability of making formal inquiry as to Japan’s position on the 14-inch gun matter, with a detailed presentation of background material on the matter. 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Dec. 2 (151) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Further instructions as to urgency of action upon receipt of instruction No. 1141 of November 16. 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] Dec. 3 (249) From the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Suggestion of possibility of handling gun matter through the Naval Attaché in Tokyo, in line with a suggestion made to the British by Ambassador Yoshida at London. 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] Dec. 3 To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( circ. tel. ) Information that President ratified London Naval Treaty, drafted to come into effect on January 1, 1937, on May 28; request for information as to intentions of Government to which Ambassador is accredited. (Footnote: Sent also to Embassies in France and Italy.) 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] Dec. 3 (434) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Review of background of attempt to secure Japanese view on question of 14-inch guns, and instructions to ascertain present status of question as between the British and Japanese. 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] Dec. 7 (599) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Reluctance of the Foreign Office to proceed on matter of 14-inch guns until negotiations with Soviets and Germans relative to signature of Treaty have been concluded. 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] Dec. 10 (157) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Advice that conversations are now going on between the British Foreign Office and the Japanese Ambassador at London relative to gun calibers, and that Department will not broach matter before end of December. 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Dec. 12 (447) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information as to probable early ratification of the London Treaty by France and Italy, and instructions for representations indicating Department would deem it unfortunate if a lapse in naval limitation were to occur. 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Dec. 14 (609) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Position of France, Great Britain, and Italy on ratification. 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] Dec. 18 (262) From the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Detailed report on Japan’s position on naval disarmament, and on the precarious situation of the Government. 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] Dec. 22 (340) From the Minister in Norway Information from Bureau Chief of the Foreign Office of a recent meeting leading to an agreement in principle between Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Finnish officials to accept British invitation to participate in London Naval Treaty. 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Dec. 30 (1304) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Desire of French to put off ratification of Naval Treaty until conclusion of present discussions with Germany; plan to ratify some time in January. 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR RENEWAL OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY, FEBRUARY 6, 1922 Date and number Subject Page 1936 Sept. 11 Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs British Chargé’s proposal to renew article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, providing for nonfortification of certain insular possessions in the Pacific, with change permitting modernization and extension of existing fortifications. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 117 ] Sept. 16 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs Analysis by representatives of the State, Navy, and War Departments of the British proposal to renew article 19 of the Washington Treaty, and decision not to discuss renewal with the British. 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 118 ] Sept. 25 (347) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Oral reply made to the British Chargé (text printed) indicating U. S. reasons for not joining Great Britain and Japan in the renewal of article 19. 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 119 ] Oct. 14 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Explanation of what appeared to be an inconsistency in British position relative to Hong Kong fortifications by indication of radical change in British attitude toward rearmament. 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] RETENTION OF NAVAL TONNAGE BY THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND JAPAN UNDER ARTICLES 17 AND 21 OF THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930 Date and number Subject Page 1936 Apr. 30 (1223) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Request for information on British and Japanese plans on scrapping tonnage in excess of amounts indicated in article 16 of the London Treaty of 1930, or on possible invocation of article 21, the escalator clause. 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 121 ] May 15 To the Secretary of the Navy Reply to inquiries relating to British and Japanese position in the matter of excess tonnage. 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] June 4 (191) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Notification of forwarding of copy of memorandum acknowledging receipt of British memoranda relative to destroyer excess tonnage. 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] July 15 (348) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British invocation of article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 with view to retaining 40,000 tons of overage destroyer tonnage in excess of allowance in article 16. 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] Aug. 14 (105) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Memorandum for presentation to Japan (text printed) indicating British action, and containing an announcement of U. S. intention to exercise right under article 21 in view of British action. (Footnote: Transmittal to Embassy in the United Kingdom of a memorandum similar in substance for communication to British Government.) 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] Sept. 3 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Receipt of memorandum from Japanese Ambassador indicating Japan’s intentions in view of the British action on destroyers. 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] Sept. 7 (421) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice from Foreign Office of receipt of Japanese note of August 31 indicating decision to retain excess tonnage in destroyers and submarines; British alarm at retention of submarine tonnage. 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] Sept. 10 (114) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) U. S. position that there is no legal warrant for Japanese retention of submarine tonnage, in lieu of adequate destroyer tonnage, without recourse to article 21. 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Sept. 25 (445) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Conversation with Craigie, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who gave an outline (text printed) of the British position on Japanese retention of excess submarine tonnage and indicated British desire to retain five “C” class destroyers. 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 129 ] Sept. 29 (1442) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Tentative decisions, in meeting of officials of the State and Navy Departments with the Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, pertaining to problems connected with certain categories of vessels, and with the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement. 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Oct. 27 Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Ambassador Résumé of long conversation with Craigie on various naval problems, including those on which tentative conclusions had been reached in the Washington meeting. 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Oct. 28 (385) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) U. S. attitude toward British retention of cruisers beyond tonnage allowed by Treaty of 1930; instructions to inform Craigie that the United States is obliged to insist on strict application of article 21. 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 132 ] Nov. 5 (139) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Instructions to present to the Japanese Government a memorandum stating that U. S. Government has decided to retain 19,000 tons of destroyers under article 17. 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] Nov. 21 (413) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to hand to Craigie a memorandum (text printed) relative to U. S. position on the application of article 21 to the British retention of excess cruiser tonnage. 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] Dec. 15 (448) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Request for information as to status of British and Japanese projected action under article 21, in view of scrapping complications. 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Dec. 16 (618) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice that Japan is giving favorable attention to British proposals relative to “C” class cruisers, and to application of escalator clause to retain submarines. 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Dec. 17 Memorandum by Messrs. William T. Turner and Eugene H. Dooman, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Conversation with an official of the Japanese Embassy who desired approval of two points in connection with formal notification of invocation of article 21 in connection with submarines; informal statement (text printed) on the two points. 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Dec. 17 (450) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information relative to Japanese invocation of article 21, in order to retain submarine tonnage. 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Dec. 24 (624) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British notification of invocation of article 21 relative to retention of cruiser tonnage. 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] Dec. 28 (284) From the Japanese Ambassador Notification of retention of 15,598 tons of submarines in excess of tonnage permitted under article 18, and of invocation of article 21. 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] Dec. 29 (458) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to present note (text printed) acknowledging receipt of British notification of invocation of article 21 and indicating U. S. intention to increase by proportionate amount its cruiser tonnage. 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Dec. 29 (291) From the Japanese Ambassador Notification that, in response to British invocation of article 21, Japan has decided to retain the subcategory cruiser Tsushima. 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Dec. 30 (166) To the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Information of Japanese note and Department’s reply ( infra ) indicating U. S. intention to retain proportionate amount of submarine tonnage. (Footnote: The same to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.) 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] Dec. 30 To the Japanese Ambassador Acknowledgment of Japanese note and statement of U. S. intention to retain proportionate amount of submarine tonnage. 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] Dec. 30 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Reiteration to Counselor of the British Embassy of U. S. position in favor of a reduction of armaments, and regret that it has been found necessary to increase naval armament by invocation of article 21. 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] SIGNATURE OF PROCÈS-VERBAL, NOVEMBER 6, 1936, RELATING TO PART IV (RULES OF SUBMARINE WARFARE), LONDON NAVAL TREATY, SIGNED APRIL 22, 1930 Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 10 (130) From the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( tel. ) British plan for reconfirming commitment to part IV of the London Treaty of 1930 pertaining to submarines. 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Mar. 20 To President Roosevelt Explanation of attempt of London Naval Conference to obtain wider adherence to rules of submarine warfare as set forth in 1930, by authorizing the British to invite other countries to sign a procès-verbal. Request for authority for American delegation at Conference to sign. (Footnote: Authority given as requested.) 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Mar. 20 (76) To the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( tel. ) Advice of President’s authorization of signature of procès-verbal. (Footnote: Department’s receipt of information that Japanese would not have instructions in time to sign the procès-verbal before the following week.) 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] Mar. 28 (104) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) For the Ambassador or Atherton: Authority to sign procès-verbal in view of departure of American delegates to the Conference. 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] Aug. 15 (399) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British efforts to secure favorable replies from France and Italy in respect to procès-verbal. 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] Oct. 6 (462) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice from Foreign Office of Italian readiness to sign, and of arrangements for early signature of instrument; request as to full power for signature. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] Oct. 8 (367) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Authorization to sign procès-verbal and advice of dispatch of full power signed by President. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] Nov. 6 (515) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice of signature of procès-verbal. 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 153 ] (Note: Citation to text of procès-verbal, and Department’s statement.) 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 153 ] VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH RESPECT TO NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION Date and number Subject Page 1935 Dec. 28 (507) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) List of suggestions, made by various persons, with respect to permanent neutrality legislation; request for comment thereon. Instructions to repeat to London, Berlin, and Bern. 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Dec. 31 (257) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Question as to desirability of any permanent neutrality legislation in sense of “mandatory” legislation; belief that the Executive should have as complete discretion as possible. 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] 1936 Jan. 2 (1) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Inclination in support of allowing belligerent to buy any materials in “normal volume,” as being in substantial compliance with treaty obligations and consonant with neutrality. 166 [ Pg. 166 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Jan. 2 (2) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Reference to his previously expressed views; indication that President should be given latitude to specify what commodities should be embargoed and to whom as an aggressor the embargo should apply. 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Jan. 2 (3) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Belief that neutrality legislation should be in general terms and that, by implication, sales might be permitted to nations on a cash and carry basis; indication of varying views of Embassy staff. 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Jan. 3 (362) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Comments on the various alternatives in No. 507 of December 28, and indication of strong feeling that any legislation beyond that affecting arms and implements of war should be left to the discretion of the President. 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 159 ] Jan. 9 Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control Explanation of the passport provisions of the neutrality bills, at the request of the Counselor of the Italian Embassy. 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Jan. 22 From the Secretary of War Suggestion that, due to its special status, the Panama Canal Zone be specifically excluded from the neutrality bills before Congress. 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Feb. 1 (32) To the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( tel. ) Request for Chairman’s comments on possibility of international consideration of the use of neutral ports by armed merchant vessels instead of inclusion of subject in U. S. neutrality bill. 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Feb. 4 (84) From the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( tel. ) Tentative comments including belief that only possible method of approach between the naval powers would be as corollary to part IV of the London Treaty. 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Feb. 28 To the Secretary of War Discussion of neutrality measures before Congress and promise to keep matter of Panama Canal Zone in mind in connection with any future legislation on neutrality. 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] Dec. 15 Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control Explanation, in reply to questions of the Turkish Ambassador, of U. S. position on export of certain bombers for which Turkey has contracted. 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] ANALYSES AND REPORTS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS REGARDING EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 3 (1) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Account of French Ambassador’s conversation with Hitler in which the Italian-Ethiopian situation and the Franco-Soviet agreement were discussed; concern of French Embassy over possible effect of agreement on demilitarized zone. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] Jan. 19 (373) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Conversation with Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in which the recent visit of the Austrian Chancellor was discussed, including its economic and political significance. 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Jan. 27 From the Minister in Switzerland Detailed résumé of activity of the ninetieth session of the Council of the League of Nations, with special attention to its position on the Ethiopian question and on sanctions in connection therewith. 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Feb. 6 (40) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Résumé of Embassy Counselor’s conversation with a Foreign Ministry official, who stated that Germany was building up to announced 36 divisions, but would reduce armaments if others did so. 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 169 ] Feb. 8 (2651) From the Ambassador in Germany Analysis of German situation; conclusion that time is ripe for discussion with Germany on armament limitation and related questions; opinion regarding efficacy of threat of encirclement. 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Feb. 12 (46) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Further remarks on encirclement idea; information from British Ambassador that his Government is absolutely committed to great armament. 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Feb. 13 (58) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Explanation of trend of British policy toward temporization. 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Feb. 15 (48) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) German position that Franco-Soviet pact is a breach of Locarno, and concern over “spirit” which may develop in the two countries; hint of possible army influence toward improvement of Soviet-German relations. 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Feb. 17 (49) From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( tel. ) Survey of international relations, including information from Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and from Polish Foreign Minister Beck. 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 174 ] Feb. 21 (2563) From the Ambassador in France Conversation with new Prime Minister Sarrant on the broader aspect of world problems, including Sarrant’s suggestion of an international conference to consider the question of securing for each nation raw materials, markets, and outlets for surplus population. 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Feb. 22 (62) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Evaluation of Italian foreign policy following a long talk with Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Suvich, who gave assurance that there are no negotiations in process for military or political cooperation with Germany. 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Mar. 7 (168) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Unconfirmed press report that small detachment of German Army has entered Cologne; French view of violation of Locarno treaty. 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Mar. 7 (67) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Instructions to keep Department closely informed of developments arising out of German action. (Footnote: Sent also to Embassies in the United Kingdom and Germany.) 207 [ Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] Mar. 7 (60) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Memorandum sent by Germany to the Locarno powers (excerpt printed); Foreign Office comments on memorandum and assurance that entry of troops into demilitarized zone was devoid of military significance. 207 [ Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] Mar. 7 (76) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Detailed résumé of Suvich’s explanation of the Italian view of the German action and its probable effects. 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 180 ] Mar. 7 (79) From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( tel. ) Attitude of various members of the diplomatic corps and of Litvinov toward the German action. 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 181 ] Mar. 8 (89) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice of British general view of German action, and of Foreign Secretary Eden’s conferences with representatives of the Locarno powers, and with the Prime Minister. 213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] [Mar. 8] (61) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Discussion of content and reception of Hitler’s Reichstag speech, and information of Military Attachés estimate that about 45,000 soldiers are being moved into the Rhineland. 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Mar. 8 (175) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Minister’s observations relative to the situation created by the German action; and his request, in view of British vacillation, that President Roosevelt or the Secretary condemn on moral grounds any unilateral repudiation of a treaty. 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Mar. 9 To President Roosevelt Transmittal of a memorandum relative to German action, with indication that the action appears to be a violation of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno pacts, but not of the U. S.-German treaty of August 25, 1921. 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Mar. 9 (66) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Advice of favorable attitude of the Foreign Office toward a League invitation to attend a Council meeting to discuss the German action. 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Mar. 9 From the Ambassador in Mexico ( tel. ) Hope that opportunity may offer itself for a tender of good offices by the President to avert war in Europe. 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] Mar. 9 Memorandum by the Minister in Austria Discussion of background and meaning to Europe of German violation of Locarno Pact, and probable consequence to Europe if England and France permit Germany to get away with this fait accompli. 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] Undated (Rec’d Apr. 1) Memorandum by the American Minister in Rumania of a Conversation With the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 9, 1936 Conversation with Foreign Minister Titulescu, who was critical of the mild course of France, and indicated readiness of Rumania to join in sanctions against Germany if the League voted them. 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Mar. 10 (70) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Advice that Department does not feel that it could appropriately make the statement requested in No. 175 of March 8, in view of procedure provided for application to present situation. 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] Mar. 10 (184) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) French demands in connection with the German situation as set forth in a meeting of the Locarno signatories. 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] Mar. 10 (100) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Cabinet decision that Hitler’s proposal (made in his Reichstag speech) should be considered; critical views of pro-French element in official quarters. 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Mar. 11 (89) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Summary of trends relative to the German situation, including remarks on the improbability of the adoption of sanctions, uncertainty of Balkan representatives as to views of their Governments, and fear of involvement by some countries. 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 193 ] Mar. 11 (102) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Trends prior to meeting of Locarno powers in London, including a stiffening of the French position, British unwillingness to perpetuate promise of temporary support to France and Belgium, and Soviet opposition to negotiations with Germany. 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Mar. 11 (69) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Advice of German plan for demilitarization of Franco-German frontier, and of German belief that French are not in any mood for discussions. 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Mar. 11 (197) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Minister Flandin’s disappointment that the United States could not give support requested for French thesis, and his satisfaction over Belgian support of sanctions with its probable effect in Great Britain. (Footnote: Reference to despatch setting forth Belgian position relative to demands for sanctions against Germany.) 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] Mar. 11 (71) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Information that Mussolini is sending two army divisions to the Brenner Pass zone, and that U. S. attitudes are closely watched by all powers. 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] Mar. 12 (108) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Report on deadlocked negotiations, including: British attempt to seek basis for French-German agreement, pressure on France by Soviet Union and the Little Entente, British view of Belgian position, and Italy’s cynical onlooker’s attitude. 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] Mar. 12 (51) To the Ambassador in Mexico ( tel. ) Advice of President’s appreciation of message relating to good offices, and of his hope that necessity for drastic action will be obviated. 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Mar. 12 (74) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Comments on a German official statement, which includes a discussion of proposals of March 7, and on the German military situation. 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Mar. 12 (113) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information of British-French conversation, and of German position at the London Locarno meetings. 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Mar. 12 (1053) From the Ambassador in Poland Advice of French Ambassador’s views of Hitler’s proposals, and of French intention of satisfying French-Soviet agreement. Foreign Minister Beck’s promise that Poland would remain faithful to Franco-Polish agreement; observations thereon. 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Mar. 13 (115) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) French Ambassador’s assessment of situation to date; British attitude and changes therein, due to a better understanding of the French and Belgian positions. 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Mar. 13 (116) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Report on Belgian plan offered at meeting of the Locarno powers, and on rumors relative to British approach to Hitler. 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Mar. 13 (117) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Question as to attendance as visitor at the League Council meeting. 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] Mar. 13 (80) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Department’s view that he should not attend meeting. 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] Mar. 14 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Explanation of U. S. position in the present European situation in reply to a request from the Turkish Ambassador. 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] Mar. 14 (75) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) German decision not to give way to pressure for some gesture to France in withdrawing part of Rhineland forces, and not to send a representative to the Council meeting at this time; summary of rumors and conjectures. 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Mar. 14 (2) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia ( tel. ) Czech views on German action of March 7, and attitude toward sanctions. 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Mar. 14 (754) From the Ambassador in Belgium Outline of seven points of Belgian position, and information as to probable Belgian aim in efforts to reconcile views of British and French. 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] Mar. 16 (78) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Analysis of German situation including relation thereto of the Ethiopian question and U. S. isolationism, and request that this communication be shown to the President. 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Mar. 16 (79) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Foreign Office comments on reply to invitation to participate in the League Council meeting, with indication that the Government was prepared to accept provided the German proposals would be considered; observations on general situation. 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 212 ] Mar. 17 (11) From the Minister in Yugoslavia ( tel. ) Information from Foreign Minister that in case of failure of peaceful solution of the German problem, Yugoslavia would give France full and unqualified support. 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] Mar. 17 (80) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) British assurance that German and other proposals would be discussed at Council meeting in due course; German decision to send delegation to London headed by Ribbentrop, Ambassador-at-Large. 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] Mar. 17 (139) From the Minister in Norway Possible effects of Danish Foreign Minister’s refusal to support sanctions in his capacity as representative of the Scandinavian countries at the Council meeting. 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Mar. 18 (20) From the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Information from various sources that the British will propose at intervals a comprehensive peace plan providing inter alia for equality for Germany and security for France and Belgium. 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] Mar. 18 (85) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Considerations relative to London discussions in general, and the French position in particular. 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] Mar. 18 Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland Foreign Minister’s inclination toward British point of view, and against the French, which he thinks too legalistic; his position on sanctions, and on the proper scope of work of the League. 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Mar. 20 (14,593) Report by the Military Attaché in Germany Detailed explanation of the Rhineland occupation as a defensive measure from the German point of view; discussion of points on which Germany will not yield, and of the probable outcome of the crisis. 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 219 ] Mar. 20 (381) From the Minister in the Netherlands Foreign Minister’s view of the European situation, with special attention to the complications deriving from the German struggle for equality, and his belief that Hitler’s peace plan might have good results, but that his country would refrain from joining entangling alliances. 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Mar. 20 (21) From the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Italy’s allegation of inability to participate in any Rhineland patrol scheme which might be adopted by League Council; expected trend of Council meetings. 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Mar. 21 (6) To the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Expression of appreciation of Minister’s No. 20, March 18, and indication of continuing interest in telegrams of type similar to No. 21, March 20. 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] Mar. 21 (88) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Foreign Office opposition to accord adopted in London March 19, but desire to continue negotiations; Hitler’s election campaign appeal. 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] Mar. 23 Memorandum by the Chargé in Belgium Background of accord adopted in London by the Locarno powers, and Van Zeeland’s rôle therein; German astonishment at firm stand taken. 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Mar. 23 (89) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Expression of appreciation of Chargé’s reports on meetings of the Council and the Locarno powers. 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Mar. 24 Memorandum by the Chargé in Lithuania Explanation by a Foreign Ministry official of Lithuanian attitude toward a non-aggression pact with Lithuania mentioned in the German memorandum of March 7. 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 226 ] Mar. 25 (251) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Restatement of French position by an official of the Foreign Ministry, including information concerning opposition in Germany to Hitler’s Rhineland action. (Sent also to London, Rome, Brussels, Berlin, and The Hague.) 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 227 ] Mar. 26 (153) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information from Dieckhoff of the German delegation in London that German official opinion concerning Rhineland action was united, except as to number of troops to be sent. 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Mar. 28 (266) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Minister’s regret that British Government did not take a firm attitude from the beginning of the German Rhineland conflict, since it would have removed, at least for some time, the danger of war. 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Mar. 28 (4319) From the Minister in Switzerland Observations on a London meeting of representatives of the Scandinavian countries and Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, who decided that powers nonsignatories of the Versailles Treaty or Locarno Pact, but members of the League, had no responsibility in the present situation. 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 230 ] Apr. 1 (776) From the Ambassador in Belgium Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with Van Zeeland, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who commented on parliamentary government, the German situation, English sympathy with Germany, Anglo-Belgian military conversations, and the forthcoming Belgian elections. 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Apr. 2 (1078) From the Ambassador in Poland Foreign Minister Beck’s remarks relative to Poland’s position at London, and his gratification at statement of Neville Chamberlain, leader of the Conservative Party, that Great Britain would abide by obligations as a League member to guard Poland against aggressive attack. 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 232 ] Apr. 2 (604 Diplo.) From the Chargé in Estonia Account of conversations with Estonian and Latvian officials relative to the effect on the Baltic countries of the German Rhineland occupation, and the Hitler peace proposals. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Apr. 2 (103) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Analysis of local non-German reaction to German proposals and Hitler’s tendency to talk directly to the people; opinion that Hitler’s bluff for peace should be called since the powers do not seem willing and capable of calling his bluff for war. 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 234 ] Apr. 4 (2747) From the Ambassador in Germany Advice of probability that no action will be taken on Hitler’s proposals until after French elections, and review of German relations with the Danubian countries, Italy, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Poland. 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 235 ] Apr. 6 (25) From the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Information concerning a French plan in respect to the Rhineland, British desire to end Italian-Ethiopian hostilities, pro-German attitude of English people, including high army circles, and forthcoming conclusion of German-Japanese military arrangements. 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] Apr. 7 (1649) From the Consul at Geneva Comprehensive survey of the general European situation from Geneva viewpoint, including the view that how Great Britain reconciles her European and African interests is, next to Germany’s policy and intentions, the great problem in the situation. 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] Apr. 9 (105) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) German receipt of French plan and preliminary official comment thereon; press repudiation of plan in detail and in tone. 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] Apr. 14 (789) From the Ambassador in Belgium Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with Van Zeeland’s Chef de Cabinet , pertaining to the meeting of the Locarno powers, other than Germany, at Geneva, April 10. 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] [Apr. 16] Memorandum by the Minister in Yugoslavia Assistant Foreign Minister’s views on the Austrian establishment of conscript service, possibility of similar Hungarian action, eventual success of Italy in Ethiopia, and views on the French position. 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Apr. 17 (431) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Detailed consideration of Czechoslovak concern relative to possible repercussions of recent developments in Germany, especially in their effect upon the relation of France to the Little Entente and upon Hungary. Prophecy that Germany will attain aims. 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] Apr. 22 (116) From the Chargé in Germany ( tel. ) Résumé of situation as seen from Berlin, including comments on views of Foreign Office as to satisfactory relations with the British, and on French Embassy’s distrust of German intentions in Austria. Belief that situation is focusing on French-German rivalry for European hegemony, and the new element of Italy. 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Apr. 27 (228) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Analysis of British trends, including the passing of the high point of pro-German opinion, the awakening to the possible dangers from Nazi policies, and the awareness of necessity of rearming; opinion of the importance of the time element in four factors of international import. 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] May 1 (807) From the Ambassador in Belgium Evaluation of increasing Belgian tendency of an orientation toward Great Britain rather than toward France, and of economic and other reasons for the change. 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] May 18 Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union Lengthy conversation with German Foreign Minister Von Neurath, who talked, without apparent reserve, about German intentions and relations to other European powers, and gave the impression that Germany will attempt to avoid commitments until her fortifications in the West are completed. 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] May 19 (269) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Résumé of the British situation, with attention to the apprehension in official circles that Hitler does not wish to effect appeasement through negotiation, in view of his attitude toward a British questionnaire and other matters. 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 246 ] May 20 (270) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Foreign Office position that it is in the British interest to reconstruct a front of the Western powers, a step which necessitates the termination of the Anglo-Italian situation and adjustment of Italy’s position in the League. 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] May 20 Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union Conversation with Van Zeeland, who was concerned about the effect of the immense decrease of French prestige and the military weakness of England, and who expressed his views as to desirable changes in the League Covenant. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] May 21 Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union Information from a French Foreign Office official of French Government’s willingness to use force to prevent construction of German fortifications on the French and Belgian frontiers, but his acknowledgment of possible difficulties with public opinion. 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] May 22 (275) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information of Hitler’s opening of indirect discussions with Mussolini. 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] May 26 (2852) From the Chargé in Germany Explanation by Foreign Office official that Germany, by a note of April 1 to the British, feels herself bound not to increase the garrison in the Rhineland for four months, but is not bound as to fortifications; information that fortifications are under way. 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] May 28 (161) From the Chargé in Germany ( tel. ) Account of conversations with British and French Ambassadors and with Dieckhoff on various subjects, including Italo-German relations, Hitler’s economic stabilization plan, resurgence of German military power, and work on German reply to British questionnaire. 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] May 30 (136) From the Minister in Albania Presentation of two U. S. military attachés to King Zog, who gave his views as to when general war, started by Germany, might break out, and suggested its possible prevention by collaboration between the British and Americans. 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] June 16 (691) From the Minister in Egypt Examples of prevailing opinion on the inevitability of a new world war. 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] July 3 (206) From the Chargé in Germany ( tel. ) Belief that a reply to the British questionnaire will soon be made, and that the French are anxious to have Germany participate in the Brussels Locarno discussions. Advice from the French of German fear of a monarchical restoration in Austria at Mussolini’s initiative. 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] July 11 (825) From the Minister in Austria Transmittal of a “sketch” (text printed) of conversations between Chancellor Schuschnigg and the German Minister, which is expected to lead to completion of an agreement in which Germany would recognize Austrian independence and agree to noninterference in Austrian internal affairs. 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] July 13 (345) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information from Foreign Office official on British views relative to the Austro-German agreement, French notification of termination of Mediterranean mutual assistance accord, and on proposed Brussels meeting. (Footnote: Eden’s announcements of mutual assistance agreement lapses.) 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] July 15 (219) From the Chargé in Germany ( tel. ) Analysis of and observations on the possible significance of the Austro-German agreement, including its effect on German relations with Italy and Great Britain; speculations as to Hitler’s next move. 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] July 16 (607) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Office view of Austro-German accord, including observation that the countries that have the most to worry about are Czechoslovakia and Poland. 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] July 23 (508) From the Chargé in Czechoslovakia Foreign Minister Krofta’s fear of growing German power, but belief that Hitler knows he would not be allowed to absorb Czechoslovakia; Krofta’s concern, however, over a possible German offer of a “political and commercial pact.” 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 260 ] July 24 (645) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Views of Vienot, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on results of a London Conference of representatives from Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, July 23, and his belief that Hitler would not answer the British questionnaire until at least after the Olympic games. (Footnote: Information that Germany did not reply to questionnaire.) 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] July 25 (511) From the Chargé in Czechoslovakia Summary of optimistic observations of President Beneš on the general European situation, including his assertion that Czechoslovakia has implicit faith in her allies. 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] July 28 (234) From the Chargé in Germany ( tel. ) German willingness to participate in a five-power Locarno conference in the fall after careful preparation, and views as to possible agenda. (Footnote: Information that conference was not held.) 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] July 29 (236) From the Chargé in Germany ( tel. ) Information from the British Chargé of concern over French position on Eastern European problems, and German failure to reply to questionnaire; from the French Counsellor of concern over German position on Soviet Russia. 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Aug. 5 (650) To the Chargé in Germany Detailed instructions for special study and reports relative to policies and plans of the German Government and leaders in respect to the countries of Eastern Europe. 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Aug. 6 (722) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) Soviet Chargé’s belief that Germany and Italy accepted invitation to projected Locarno conference to conciliate British opinion in respect to Italian aid to Spanish insurgents; and view that Germany would utilize conference to protest against Soviet Russia and Communism. 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Aug. 18 (256) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) View of Schacht, Minister of Economic Affairs, that German cooperation for world peace depended on international guarantee of colonial possessions and room for her increasing population, and his desire that President Roosevelt call a conference to make proper concessions. 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Sept. 3 (3019) From the Ambassador in Germany Analysis of background of present turmoil in Europe and probable future trends, with special attention to Germany’s resurgence, her relation to Italy, and the influence of the Soviet Union and Communism on that relationship. 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Sept. 5 (546) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Detailed summary of Krofta’s comments on the European situation, with emphasis on the relationship of Czechoslovakia to the other countries of Europe. 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 269 ] [Sept. 10] Memorandum by the Minister in Austria Comprehensive analysis of unlimited German objectives and the external and domestic influences determining the rate of their realization. 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Sept. 12 (210) From the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( tel. ) Litvinov’s reasons for denunciation of the Blum government in France; belief of German observers in Moscow that the Kremlin is dissatisfied with the United Front experiment in France. 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Sept. 16 (976) From the Chargé in Belgium Information from a Foreign Office official of the tendency of Italy and Germany to put off the Locarno Conference with the expectation of securing better strategic positions meanwhile. 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Sept. 18 (3047) From the Ambassador in Germany Comprehensive survey of the attitudes of the German people, and conclusion that Hitler for the present at least can count on an overwhelming majority in support of any venture he might undertake. 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Sept. 21 (3052) From the Ambassador in Germany Discussion of the international aspects of the Nuremberg Congress, forming the first of three despatches devoted to that event, and indicating the clarification of foreign policy, especially relative to the Soviet Union and Italy. 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Sept. 22 (906) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) Observations of a Foreign Office official on German foreign policy with special reference to the ulterior motives behind the anti-Soviet campaign, and to the drive for colonies. 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Sept. 28 (294) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Advice of projected increase in German military strength, and of signs of mutual cooperation between Germany and Italy. 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Oct. 2 (7) From the Ambassador in France Conversation with Léger of the Foreign Office, who explained the military promises made during General Rydz-Smigly’s visit, and analyzed German policy in respect to a possible attack on France. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Oct. 8 (978) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Minister’s remarks on removal of trade barriers, desirability of an economic conference, and reason why the agreed on military conversations with the Soviet Union have not taken place. 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Oct. 12 (301) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Information of German action to increase military strength, effective October 11. 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] Oct. 14 (1005) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Views of Beck, Foreign Minister of Poland, on a Locarno agreement, and his opinion that nothing could be done except to meet each situation which arose, in a spirit of moderation and reasonableness. 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] Oct. 19 (561) From the Minister in the Netherlands Netherland approval of declaration of King Leopold of Belgium on October 14, which stated that his country’s efforts must be directed not to preparing for war in a coalition, but toward keeping war away from Belgian territory. 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Oct. 21 (422) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Advice of Italian reply to British proposals relative to a Locarno meeting, indicating a desire to return to original Locarno undertaking. 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Oct. 24 Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in Belgium Information from Le Ghait, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister, that the Belgian reply to the British invitation to a five-power conference was in line with the recent statement by King Leopold on foreign policy. 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Oct. 28 (2037) From the Chargé in the Soviet Union Soviet concern over King Leopold’s statement as a sign of the beginning of the fall of the structure of so-called collective security, and denial that there is a connection between the Belgian shift in policy and the Franco-Soviet pact. 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Nov. 2 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Discussion with the Hungarian Minister as to the consequences of continuing increase in European armaments. 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Nov. 9 (67) Report by the Naval Attaché in Belgium Discussion of meaning and effects of King Leopold’s statement of October 14 recommending an “exclusively and integrally Belgian policy” in order to keep Belgium out of its neighbors’ conflicts. 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Nov. 13 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs Detailed information from the Rumanian Minister relative to the last meeting of the Little Entente Council and the rifts therein, including difference of views on Soviet policy and on the restoration of the Hapsburgs. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Nov. 14 (332) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Assessment of the possible influence of present Italo-German rapprochement upon Central Europe in general and Czechoslovakia in particular. 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Nov. 16 (335) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Advice of Germany’s unilateral denunciation of part XII of the Versailles Treaty relating to German waterways; uncertainty as to reason for the action and timing of denunciation. (Footnote: Information of few mild protests lodged with Foreign Office.) 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Dec. 2 To the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department Comments on a report pertaining to Belgium’s new neutrality policy, forwarded by the Director. 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] Dec. 3 (1080) From the Ambassador in Belgium Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with Le Ghait, who indicated that a favorable reply would be sent to the British suggestion of Belgian participation in a new Western pact. 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] Dec. 7 (609) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Résumé of a discussion with Veverka, presently Czechoslovak Minister in Austria, in which the waning power of Italy in Central Europe was mentioned, but major stress placed on differences with Germany in the Sudeten area. 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Dec. 9 (3179) From the Ambassador in Germany Advice that the German Government has given no formal notification to the United States of the denunciation of part XII of the Versailles Treaty, the rights and advantages of which were given to the United States under the U. S.-German treaty of 1921. 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Dec. 16 (1262) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Information of French and German advances requesting U. S. assistance in reaching a reconciliation; suggestion of possible statement by President Roosevelt after preparation of ground. 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 294 ] Dec. 17 (264) From the Chargé in Latvia Finnish Minister’s observations concerning the relations of his country with the Soviet Union and Germany, and Finland’s hope to remain neutral in case of war in Eastern Europe. 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Dec. 17 (1266) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) French intention of going ahead with conversations with the German Ambassador concerning a Franco-German understanding, despite British opposition to previous conversations in which the matter of colonies was mentioned. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Dec. 18 (1273) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) French pressure on Little Entente to alter mutual obligations for defense against Hungary and Bulgaria into obligations for defense against Germany. 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Dec. 19 (1094) From the Ambassador in Belgium Digests (texts printed) of (1) British note of September 17, proposing a Western pact, (2) replies thereto of Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, and (3) British supplementary note of November 19. 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 298 ] 1937 Jan. 7 (1438) From the Ambassador in Poland Foreign Minister Beck’s optimistic views on European situation, and his satisfaction in Polish relations thereto. 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Jan. 16 (68) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Information of no progress in connection with French offer to enter into pacts of mutual assistance with Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia against attack from any source. 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 300 ] THE GERMAN-JAPANESE ACCORD OF NOVEMBER 25, 1936, AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL Date and number Subject Page 1936 Oct. 27 (2101) From the Chargé in Japan Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with the Belgian Ambassador, who said he believed that an informal German-Japanese military accord has existed for some time, but that a more concrete agreement was being reached. 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 301 ] Nov. 11 (231) From the Chargé in Japan ( tel. ) Local reports of an important diplomatic project having to do with Germany. 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] Nov. 13 (232) From the Chargé in Japan ( tel. ) Japanese ban on foreign press despatches relative to rumored negotiations with Germany; belief in informed sources that any agreement reached will be a declaration opposed to Communism, aligning Japan with Fascist nations. 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] Nov. 17 (279) From the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( tel. ) Information from Litvinov, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, relative to signature of German-Japanese declaration calling for an international campaign against Communism, and his comments thereon. 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] Nov. 17 (468) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Press comments relative to agreement. 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] Nov. 18 (281) From the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( tel. ) Press report relative to agreement. 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Nov. 18 (1126) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Information of the German Foreign Minister’s view as of last May on an agreement with Japan. Soviet Ambassador’s information that agreement had secret clauses making it virtually an alliance against the Soviet Union. 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Nov. 18 (470) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Information from the Japanese Ambassador that he understood an agreement had been initialed in Berlin, that there was no hidden military understanding, and that Berlin had taken the initiative. 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Nov. 20 (343) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Assurance from Foreign Office informant that nothing in the nature of a real agreement exists with Japan; intimation, however, that there may be a Japanese declaration against Communism in the near future. 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Nov. 23 (238) From the Chargé in Japan ( tel. ) Foreign Office official’s summary of proposed anti-Comintern agreement with Germany, explanation of its character, and assurance that it was not directed against any particular power. 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Nov. 25 (294) From the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( tel. ) Information from the Chinese and French Ambassadors and the Japanese Chargé concerning developments in the Far East with special reference to relations between Japan and Germany. 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Nov. 25 (349) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Receipt from Foreign Minister of copy of agreement with Japan, signed November 25 (text printed), and his assurance that it covered the entire agreement, that there were no secret clauses. (Footnote: Citation to text of secret additional agreement signed the same day.) 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Nov. 27 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Polish Ambassador Ambassador’s assertion that Poland is not a party to the German-Japanese Agreement and does not propose to be; his mention of close arrangement with Rumania for self-protection. 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] Nov. 27 (137) From the Chargé in Poland ( tel. ) Information that Poland has not the slightest intention of joining German-Japanese anti-Communist front. 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Nov. 28 (351) From the Ambassador in Germany ( tel. ) Attempt to assess the German situation in the light of the agreement with Japan; feeling that Hitler is proceeding on a clever line which can lead in any one of several directions. 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Dec. 4 (251) From the Ambassador in Japan ( tel. ) Apparent surprise of Foreign Office over adverse reaction to agreement both in Japan and abroad; belief of Diplomatic Corps that secret military understanding accompanied agreement; views of British and Soviet Ambassadors. 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 316 ] Dec. 22 (288) From the Ambassador in China Transmittal of memoranda of conversations with the Foreign Minister and the French and German Ambassadors, indicating various attitudes toward the agreement. 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING INTO THE UNITED STATES Belgium Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 25 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Expression of hope that Belgium would take steps, by the requirement of bonds for the production of landing certificates, to eliminate the smuggling of alcohol into the United States from Belgian ports. 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 318 ] Feb. 7 Memorandum by the Consul General at Antwerp, Temporarily in the United States Belgian Ambassador’s presentation of his Government’s position that it is the duty of the U. S. Government to protect its own coast from smuggling; Consul General’s reiteration of arguments for a regime of landing certificates. 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] Mar. 10 (332) To the Ambassador in Belgium Belief that Belgian Ambassador will send report recommending action on lines desired by the United States, and instructions to facilitate Belgian action. Information of recent Mexican cooperation in smuggling matter. 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Mar. 10 (10) To the Ambassador in Belgium ( tel. ) Advice of Belgian Ambassador’s plan to gain desired action; request that instructions of March 10 be disregarded. 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] May 20 (D. 6738 No. 2129) From the Belgian Embassy Desire of Belgium to collaborate despite the fact that the Belgian laws do not permit imposition of a system of landing certificates; indication of past and possible future means of collaboration. 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] May 20 (28) From the Ambassador in Belgium ( tel. ) Embassy representations to the Foreign Office in attempt to prevent the departure of the Hillfern with a cargo of alcohol; Belgian insistence on inability to prevent departure legally. 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] May 21 From the Consul General at Antwerp ( tel. ) Seizure of Hillfern by Commissioner of the Port, and release by Minister of Marine; finding of purchaser for alcohol at Rotterdam. 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] May 22 (29) From the Ambassador in Belgium ( tel. ) Account of further fruitless representations, and request as to how far the Department wishes to go in the matter. 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 325 ] May 22 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Belgian Chargé to whom a statement (text printed) was read as an oral representation on the Hillfern situation, and indication made of the disastrous effect the matter would have if aired in the press. 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 326 ] May 26 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Belgian Ambassador, who expressed great concern regarding smuggling operations in Antwerp; Department’s reiteration of its serious view of the situation. 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] May 27 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to the Under Secretary of State Information relative to cooperation in the prevention of smuggling by France, Mexico, and the Netherlands, submitted as of possible interest in connection with the Belgian negotiations. 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] May 28 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Belgian Ambassador’s delivery of note verbale ( infra ) relative to the steps taken in regard to the Hillfern , and his request for copies of the U. S. anti-smuggling laws, and for information as to those of the Netherlands. (Footnote: Information from Consul at Rotterdam, telegraphed May 23 and 28, that Hillfern unloaded alcohol at Rotterdam.) 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] May 28 From the Belgian Embassy Explanation of Belgian action in the Hillfern case as being the limit to which the Government could go under present legislation, and information that study of a draft law is being considered. 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] June 1 (18) To the Ambassador in Belgium ( tel. ) Advice of Belgian note of May 28 and instructions to express gratification to the Foreign Office at steps it is proposed to take, and information as to status of Netherland legislation. 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] June 22 (43) From the Chargé in Belgium ( tel. ) Foreign Office assurance of cooperation to stop alcohol smuggling, its hope that legislation might be passed to require landing certificates, and that the U. S. Consul General might assist by attending meeting of experts. (Footnote: Department’s instructions in connection with attendance at meeting.) 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] July 2 (22) To the Chargé in Belgium ( tel. ) Instructions to communicate to the Belgian authorities an excerpt (text printed) from a letter of the Secretary of the Treasury explaining operation of U. S. anti-smuggling laws. 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] July 7 (47) From the Chargé in Belgium ( tel. ) Advice of new regulations providing for the shipment of alcohol from Belgium in barrels too heavy to transship at sea without a crane. 423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Canada Date and number Subject Page 1935 Nov. 22 (138) To the Minister in Canada ( tel. ) Information of loading of vessels with alcohol at Antwerp for delivery to smuggling vessels on the high seas near Canada; instructions to discuss possible willingness of Canada to join in representations to Belgium to require landing certificates. 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] Apr. 3 (564) From the Minister in Canada Advice of willingness of Canada to participate in representations to Belgium, and request for information as to U. S. representations. 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] Aug. 5 (481) To the Minister in Canada Reasons why no action was taken in connection with Canadian participation in representations; and advice of Belgian decree, effective August 1, designed to prevent illicit shipments. 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Cuba Date and number Subject Page 1936 June 13 (950) To the Ambassador in Cuba Hope that Embassy will be successful in its efforts to obtain a continuation of the present system to prevent smuggling of Cuban alcohol into the United States; amendment desired by the Secretary of the Treasury (text printed) if the bill to change the system is considered on the floor of the Senate. (Footnote: Information that bill was voted down in the Senate, after passage by the House, despite pressure by Cuban distillers.) 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 338 ] France Date and number Subject Page 1936 Feb. 20 To the French Embassy Advice of violation of anti-smuggling decree of April 9, 1935, at St. Pierre-Miquelon; and belief that France will wish to take measures against further violations. 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Apr. 16 (123) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Instructions for representations against a new decree proposed to replace that of April 9, 1935. 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] June 26 (1384) To the Ambassador in France Instructions to express appreciation of French action to prevent further smuggling, and hope that the Administrator at St. Pierre-Miquelon will be given assistance in his task of enforcement. (Footnote: Ambassador’s advice that customs forces have been augmented, and a night patrol service inaugurated.) 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Oct. 9 From the Vice Consul at St. Pierre-Miquelon ( tel. ) Advice of proposed decree (text printed) abrogating that of April 9, 1935, except insofar as it concerns foreign alcohols now in warehouses, and of accompanying resolution prohibiting the importation of all foreign alcohols. 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Nov. 10 (453) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Instructions to endeavor to secure assurances that no distillery will be permitted at St. Pierre; and that no French alcohol, known as “trois-six” will be exported from St. Pierre-Miquelon. 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , and Doc. 344 ] Nov. 13 (1105) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Office assurance that measures will be taken to prevent operation of distillery, and explanation that “trois-six” is a “foreign alcohol” and hence will be prohibited. 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , and Doc. 344 ] Nov. 23 (475) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Suggestions of Treasury Department on which favorable French consideration is desired. 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] Dec. 4 (1194) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Foreign Office readiness to make certain suggestions to the Ministry of Colonies in connection with the new decree. 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] Dec. 16 (530) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Comments on Foreign Office suggestions, with indication of changes desired. 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] Dec. 18 (1275) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Consideration by the Foreign Office of changes desired, and indication that no definite action will be taken before consultation between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Colonies. 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] Mexico Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 24 (3238) From the Ambassador in Mexico Information from the Minister of Hacienda that decree will be promulgated shortly, providing that shipments of alcohol out of Mexico must carry a bond for the production of a landing certificate. 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] Feb. 29 (40) From the Ambassador in Mexico ( tel. ) President’s signature of decree on February 29. (Footnote: Promulgation on March 22.) 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] Netherlands Date and number Subject Page 1936 Apr. 18 (403) From the Chargé in the Netherlands Note from the Foreign Minister (text printed) relative to legislation to be submitted shortly to control fraudulent importation into the United States of alcohol originating from the Netherlands. 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] May 21 (9) To the Minister in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Request for information as to status of anti-smuggling legislation, and question as to informing Belgium of contemplated Netherland legislation. 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , and Doc. 353 ] May 22 (20) From the Minister in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Information as requested, and indication that the Foreign Office has no objection to U. S. notification to Belgium of contemplated legislation. 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , and Doc. 353 ] Aug. 3 (26) From the Minister in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Advice that legislation awaits approval of the Minister of Finance before submission to the States General where prompt approval is expected. (Footnote: Information that apparently the legislation was still under consideration when the Government moved to London in 1940.) 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] Norway Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 24 (93) From the Minister in Norway Advice of investigation by Norwegian authorities of the case of the Reidun , which had unloaded alcohol on the high seas, and also of Oslo attorney’s question relative to what action might be taken against the vessel should it enter a U. S. port. 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] Mar. 18 From the Norwegian Minister Representations against the detention of the Reidun in New York, with reservation of rights to claim damages. 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] Mar. 26 (8) To the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Advice of seizure of Reidun and legal basis for the action. 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] Apr. 8 (26) From the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Foreign Minister’s view as to the illegal nature of the Reidun seizure, and possible infringement of Norwegian treaty rights. 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] Apr. 15 (14) To the Minister in Norway ( tel. ) Information that liquor treaty of May 24, 1924, has no application to Reidun since the vessel came voluntarily into U. S. jurisdiction. 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] Apr. 23 To the Norwegian Minister Résumé of events connected with the Reidun case, now pending in the courts, and indication that there is no action which the executive authorities can take in the matter. 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Apr. 27 To the Norwegian Minister Informal observations relative to the note of April 23, expressing belief that the Norwegian Government was not fully advised of the actual situation in connection with the Reidun. 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] May 7 (48) To the Minister in Norway Information that a District Court order for release of the Reidun was suspended to permit the U. S. Government to file an amended libel or to consider advisability of appeal to a higher court. 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] May 27 (187) From the Minister in Norway Observations on the seizure of the Reidun , and on Foreign Office viewpoint; belief that the action of the U. S. authorities was useful in halting use of Norwegian ships in smuggling activities. 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] June 12 (20) To the Chargé in Norway ( tel. ) Dismissal of suit and countersuit in Reidun case. 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] June 13 From the Norwegian Minister Confirmation of conversation with the Assistant Secretary, in which the Minister expressed expectation that Norwegian vessels suspected of having engaged in smuggling should have free access to American ports, and gave assurance of Norway’s continuing efforts against smuggling. 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] June 17 From the Norwegian Minister Advice that Norway has waived any and all claims against the United States in respect to the Reidun case, and reiterated assurance of June 13. 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] June 23 To the Norwegian Chargé Statement by appropriate U. S. authorities that, in view of Norwegian assurances of cooperation to prevent use of Norwegian vessels in smuggling enterprises, the U. S. customs officers will be instructed to permit entry of two specified Norwegian vessels. 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EFFORTS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION Date and number Subject Page 1936 May 26 (195) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Advice from Stoppani, Director of the Economic Relations Section of the League, of the forthcoming meeting of the Economic Committee, with the question of the most-favored-nation clause on the agenda; Stoppani’s suggestion of a possible alternate to J. H. Rogers, American member of the Committee. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 368 ] July 14 (1776 Pol.) From the Consul at Geneva Report on possible trend of discussions on economic questions at forthcoming sessions of League bodies, including consideration of a provisional international accord as envisaged by Stoppani. 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 369 ] Aug. 26 (98) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) For Stoppani from Rogers: Designation of Leo Pasvolsky, an American economist, as his alternate; intention of both to attend meeting of Economic Committee. 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , and Doc. 371 ] Sept. 14 (331) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Report of Rogers and Pasvolsky on Economic Committee meeting, including outline of Committee’s general report. (Footnote: Release of Committee’s full report on September 23.) 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , and Doc. 371 ] Sept. 15 (106) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Comment on Committee report as highly satisfactory support of general program of U. S. Government, and instructions to inform the Secretariat orally of this judgment. 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Sept. 15 (338) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to secure copy of Committee report, and to ascertain from proper officials what instructions will be given as to the disposition of the report by the League Council and Assembly; permission to make known favorable U. S. reaction to the report. (Footnote: Sent also to Paris.) 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] Sept. 18 (885) From the Minister in Switzerland, Temporarily at Paris ( tel. ) Advice of representations made as directed, and transmittal of aide-mémoire (text printed) received from the Foreign Office, indicating that the French on the whole will support the principles of the Committee report. (Sent also to Geneva and London.) 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 374 ] Sept. 25 (444) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British aide-mémoire (text printed) indicating general support of report, but inability, at the moment, to state what the final instructions to British representatives will be. 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Sept. 26 (362) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Information that Secretariat officials are not yet aware of any definite plan for discussions in Second Committee following the announcement of French devaluation. 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Sept. 29 (371) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Speech of Australian representative to the League referring to tripartite stabilization agreement of the United States, France, and Great Britain of September 25, and urging the Assembly to follow this lead. 461 [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] Sept. 30 (373) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) British survey of reaction to a possible resolution for a study of the question of access to raw materials. Stoppani’s statement on the situation (text printed), suggesting multilateral collaboration in economic field similar to that begun in the monetary field. 461 [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] Sept. 30 (374) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Conversation with Saavedra Lamas, Argentine Foreign Minister and President of the League of Nations Assembly, who planned to carry out the Secretary’s wish that he take action to increase internationally the effect of American economic policy, and requested practical suggestions as to accomplishment. 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] Oct. 1 (382) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Conversation with Avenol, Secretary-General of the League, who disclaimed knowledge of a French project; but spoke of his impression of U. S. interest in an international conference, and of interest of the Locarno powers in economic issues. 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] Oct. 1 (113) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Suggestion for Saavedra Lamas that common interests might best be served by emphasizing and dramatizing the Economic Committee’s report insofar as it relates to most-favored-nation policy and exchange stability, and comments relative to Montevideo Conference. 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] Oct. 1 (373) From the Minister in Switzerland ( tel. ) Desire of French Foreign Office official to secure cooperation of Great Britain and United States in a statement on economic matters before the Second Committee; suggestion of possible later U. S. supporting statement. 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Oct. 2 (115) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Statement of U. S. position indicating endorsement and support of conclusions of Economic Committee, and the application of the principles embodied therein; reservation of judgment as to proposal for multilateral conversations, pending further study. 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Oct. 2 (386) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Agreement of Saavedra Lamas to points set forth in Department’s No. 113 of October 1. 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] Oct. 2 (389) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Advice of contemplated French decree relaxing some trade restrictions, and of French intention to inquire as to U. S. willingness to join conversations of French, British, and possibly other countries, on economic subjects. 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] Oct. 3 (118) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Further statement of U. S. position on economic matters; and indication of interest in a conference of European countries, but unwillingness to make any commitments in that connection. 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] Oct. [3] (394) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Further French inquiries relative to U. S. position on participation in an economic conference. 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] Oct. 3 (395) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Information of favorable British attitude toward the French proposal, and British reasons for not wishing to proceed through the League. 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] Oct. 4 (396) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) British denial of a French press item that the French and British have worked out a project to submit to the League. 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Oct. 4 (120) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Instructions to inform French of U. S. preference for direct diplomatic channels instead of a general conference, and hope that governments at Geneva will support report of Economic Committee. 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Oct. 5 (397) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) French intention of approaching the United States through regular diplomatic channels, and of presenting to the Second Committee a resolution of general endorsement of the conclusions of the Economic Committee’s report. 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] Oct. 10 (431) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) French delegate’s plea for removal of trade obstacles made when introducing report and resolutions of Second Committee; their approval by the Assembly. 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] Nov. 23 (146) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Instructions to ascertain latest date for possible suggestion of American for appointment to the Economic Committee. 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] Nov. 24 (478) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Advice that person might be named to Stoppani as late as January 7. 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] Nov. 24 (480) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Stoppani’s summary of factors connected with question of setting up a committee on raw materials; and request to be informally advised respecting U. S. attitude on participation. 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] Dec. 2 (487) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Inquiry by German Consul General as to U. S. attitude toward a committee on raw materials, and his indication of German willingness to participate, especially if meetings took place away from Geneva; German belief that first move should come from Great Britain. 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] Dec. 5 (495) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Tentative list of states proposed as participants in the meetings of the raw materials committee; plan that committee would technically not be composed of government representatives. 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] Dec. 5 (72) From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State ( tel. ) For the Secretary of State and Feis: Advice that the League Assembly requested the Council to appoint a committee on raw materials, summary of related developments, and inquiry as to Secretary’s view of U. S. participation and composition of the committee. 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 398 ] Dec. 10 (604) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British views on composition, function, and scope of proposed committee; also, information that British have no intention of approaching any governments except through League channels. 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Dec. 14 (58) From the Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State ( tel. ) Instructions to inform Consul at Geneva of inclination to participate if committee is to be one of technical inquiry with no direct discussion of European political problems; suggestion that President Bowman of Johns Hopkins University be named U. S. representative. 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Dec. 15 (160) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) U. S. willingness to participate under certain conditions; request that Consul confer with Stoppani and report whether U. S. understanding of plans is correct. 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Dec. 17 (520) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Stoppani’s summary of purpose, membership, and probable scope of discussions of the projected raw materials committee. 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 402 ] Dec. 30 (162) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Department’s consideration of appointment of same person to both Economic and Raw Materials Committees; request for information as to coordination, frequency, dates, and duration of meetings. 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] Dec. 31 (527) From the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Stoppani’s general reply to Department’s inquiry. 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] Dec. 31 (163) To the Consul at Geneva ( tel. ) Suggestion of Henry F. Grady, Dean of the College of Commerce, University of California, as appointee to the Economic Committee, and also possibly to the Raw Materials Committee. 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND FINANCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 11 (1231) To the Ambassador in France Transmittal of memorandum paraphrasing conversations with the British Ambassador relative to the merits of multilateral trade on a basis of equality, and comments thereon; instructions to lose no opportunity to explain policy to responsible officers. 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 406 ] (Note: List of missions to which the same or similar instructions were sent.) 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 406 ] June 17 To the Minister in Austria ( circ. tel. ) Instructions to report on visit of Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and German Minister of Economic Affairs, and to explain to members and officials of the Government the U. S. broad economic program of trade agreements, pointing out ultimate dangers of narrow bilateral agreements. (Instructions to repeat to Budapest, Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia.) 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408 ] June 20 (25) From the Minister in Hungary ( tel. ) Account of Schacht’s visit to Budapest, including information from a high bank official that conversations consisted merely of an exchange of ideas. 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408 ] June 20 (1226) From the Minister in Greece Account of Schacht’s visit to Athens, including Legation’s understanding that it represents a further step in Germany’s economic penetration of the Near East. 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] June 23 (245) From the Minister in Bulgaria Account of Schacht’s visit to Sofia, including comment on Schacht’s remarks of a political nature; information on Bulgarian attitude toward American policy of trade agreements. 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] June 24 (813) From the Minister in Austria Account of Schacht’s visit to Vienna, with a detailed analysis of the economy of Southeastern Europe, and German present and possible future relation thereto, accompanied by due consideration of political currents, and assessment of relation to U. S. economic policy. 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 411 ] June 25 (538) From the Minister in Yugoslavia Analysis of Yugoslav economy in the light of Schacht’s recent visit to Belgrade, with observations on U. S.-Yugoslav trade relations. 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN LIBERALIZING THE POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RUBBER COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE WORLD SUPPLY OF RUBBER Date and number Subject Page 1936 May 1 (423) From the Minister in the Netherlands Information relative to increase in rubber consumption and reduction in stocks; comment on the operation of the rubber producers’ restriction agreement of 1934, in respect to raising of production quota and to use of export duties to restrict native production. 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 413 ] Sept. 16 (26) To the Minister in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Instructions to make representations relative to U. S. concern over the rubber situation, in order to prepare way for forthcoming meeting of the International Rubber Regulation Committee meeting in London; advice of departure of American representatives to the meeting. (Footnote: Substantially same telegram to Ambassador in United Kingdom.) 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Sept. 22 (36) From the Chargé in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Advice that American delegates may not come to The Hague before the opening of London meeting; Netherland position on the rubber situation, and question of deferment of protest in view of that position. 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 415 ] Sept. 23 (548) From the Chargé in the Netherlands Indication that Netherland officials are strongly opposed to British idea of higher rubber prices, and their experts do not feel there is any danger of a world rubber shortage; suggestion of adjustment of U. S. and Committee’s figures on tonnage. 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 416 ] Sept. 24 (27) To the Minister in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Advice relative to figures on tonnage, and instructions to inform authorities of U. S. hope that Netherland representatives at the meeting will support additional increases of 5 to 10 percent. 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Sept. 24 (442) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Conversation with Sir John Campbell, Economic and Financial Adviser to the Colonial Office; impression that Campbell will not favor further quota release at September 29 meeting. 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 418 ] Sept. 26 (348) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Authorization, if no objection is seen, to present to Campbell or other appropriate official certain itemized facts relative to rubber control, supporting suggestions of the American rubber interests. 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] Sept. 28 (448) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice that facts enumerated were covered previously, and that no useful purpose could be served in their repetition. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] Sept. 28 (42) From the Chargé in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Information from Netherland rubber expert indicating agreement with U. S. point of view. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] Sept. 29 (553) From the Chargé in the Netherlands Possibility that altered exchange rate will automatically force the Committee into further releases of rubber. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] Oct. 1 (451) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Opinion of Townsend, one of the American representatives, that Embassy representations had been beneficial, and indication that he expected the October 27 meeting would authorize a further release of rubber. 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] Dec. 5 (438) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice of forthcoming arrival of Townsend to attend Committee meeting of December 7 to represent the American rubber industry; and detailed instructions as to representations to Government officials in behalf of consumers of rubber. (Footnote: Similar telegram sent to the Netherlands.) 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] Dec. 12 (68) From the Chargé in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Arrival of Townsend, who did not consider oral or written representations to the Government necessary. 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] Dec. 15 (612) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) For Butterworth, Embassy official temporarily in Washington: Satisfaction of American representatives with amount of rubber agreed upon for release; resentment of Campbell over interference of U. S. Government, and its effect on American representatives. 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] Dec. 17 (449) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Justification of U. S. official intervention; authorization to discuss with Foreign Office. 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] Dec. 24 (43) To the Minister in the Netherlands ( tel. ) Instructions to indicate to the Netherlands Government the interest of the U. S. Government in the rubber question, its belief that action of Committee on releases is inadequate, and hope that a maximum release will be made from the Netherlands Indies. 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 427 and Doc. 428 ] Dec. 28 (614) From the Chargé in the Netherlands Compliance with Department’s instructions; Foreign Minister’s general assurances. 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF SUGAR Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 3 (4) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Substance of British informal note proposing reconvening of International Sugar Conference, if there is a prospect of its success, outlining a possible basis for it, and inquiring as to U. S. participation and observations on points made. 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] Jan. 10 (8) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to inform Foreign Office of U. S. interest and sympathy, and of reasons for postponement of reply. 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] Feb. 6 (47) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Request for information concerning rumor that invitations to Sugar Conference are delayed on ground of probable inability of the United States to support Conference commitments. 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] Feb. 8 (53) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice that rumor was also current in Great Britain and is believed to have originated in United States; statement of British official that United States has not yet been officially consulted. 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] Apr. 2 Memorandum by the Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom to the Chargé Account of a conversation with the Parliamentary Under Secretary during which he was given a résumé of the status of U. S. sugar legislation and assured that no bar existed to U. S. participation from the standpoint of agriculture. 524 [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] Apr. 20 To the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department Draft of radiogram (text printed) containing information relative to participation in the Sugar Conference, and addressed to the High Commissioner in the Philippines for his use in bringing the matter to the attention of the Philippine Government. (Footnote: Information that telegram was sent to the High Commissioner on April 22.) 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] May 9 (307) From the High Commissioner in the Philippine Islands to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department For the Department of State: Communication (text printed) from Philippine President Quezon to the High Commissioner indicating willingness of his Government to participate and to cooperate with the U. S. delegation, but reserving the right to vote in accordance with its own interests in case of disagreement. 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] May 11 (1236) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Memorandum approved by the President for transmittal to the Foreign Office (text printed) indicating probability of U. S. participation in projected Sugar Conference and describing in detail the far-reaching steps already taken to stabilize the sugar industry. 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 436 and Doc. 437 ] May 19 (168) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Request to inform Foreign Office orally of Philippine intention to participate in the proposed conference. 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] Aug. 10 (2439) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Letter from the Foreign Office (text printed) summarizing replies of various countries to requests for their views, and indicating referral of replies to the International Sugar Committee and Dr. Colijn of the Netherlands. 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439 ] TRIPARTITE FINANCIAL STABILIZATION AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, SET FORTH IN SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 25, 1936 Date and number Subject Page 1936 June 6 (467) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) From Cochran: Discussion, relative to devaluation of the French currency, with Finance Minister Vincent Auriol, who suggested a plan for a monetary truce based on bilateral conversations leading to an announcement of a general agreement. 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 440 ] June 15 Memorandum by the Chargé in the United Kingdom Concern of the Chancellor of the Exchequer lest there develop in Washington a prejudice against British policy and methods, and his explanation of British attitude on trade relations, devaluation of French currency, and the British Equalisation Fund. 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 441 ] June 23 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation between the President and the French Financial Attaché at London, temporarily in Washington, who expressed desire for U. S. and British support in the French program of devaluation; President’s suggestion that matter be approached through London. 539 [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] Sept. 4 (831) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Auriol’s request for advice as to procedure for submission of a prepared draft of a pre-stabilization agreement; understanding as to content of draft. 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] Sept. 4 (337) To the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Advice of preference for simultaneous presentation of draft document to Treasuries of Great Britain and the United States. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] Sept. 8 (843) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) From Cochran: Receipt of draft, and intention to cable English translation September 9. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] Sept. 9 (844) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) From Cochran: Confidential text of proposed French note relative to cooperation with Great Britain and the United States on currency devaluation, and text of proposed pre-stabilization agreement. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] Sept. 9 (342) To the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Text of message to be delivered verbatim to the French Government, containing a statement of the U. S. position, without specific suggestion of revision of French text. 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] Sept. 14 (348) To the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Advice of British note (summary printed), with indication that the position taken in it is similar to that of the United States; instruction to inform French of receipt of British note. 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Sept. 15 (870) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Advice of execution of instructions; comments on the financial situation by an official of the Finance Ministry. 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] Sept. 17 (884) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Proposed text of joint declaration, with French comments thereon, including a declaration of intention to secure the adherences of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium. (Footnote: Citation to text of adherences of the three extra countries.) 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] Sept. 18 (892) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: French willingness to consider U. S. suggestions, including those relative to simultaneous texts and omission of reference to eventual return to the international gold standard. 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] Sept. 19 (893) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: French advice that British also objected to mention of the eventual return to the gold standard and suggested revision in phraseology; and that Auriol still insists upon a simultaneous common declaration. 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] Sept. 19 (359) To the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Restatement of U. S. position, with text of a statement the United States would be prepared to make. 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 453 ] Sept. 23 (908) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Request for reply to two questions, raised by an official of the Bank of France, relating (1) to the exchange of dollars against gold and (2) to the closing of stock and exchange markets for a short period prior to declaration of agreement. 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 453 and Doc. 454 ] Sept. 23 (367) To the Chargé in France ( tel. ) To Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Confidential copy of possible reply (text printed) to the first question; and information that the United States would not close exchanges, but that influence might be used to prevent speculators from taking advantage of the temporary situation. 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] Sept. 24 (920) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Transmittal of a British draft text which the British and French are willing to accept integrally. 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Sept. 25 (370) To the Chargé in France ( tel. ) From Secretary of the Treasury to Cochran: Transmittal of U. S. redraft of proposed simultaneous declaration, with instructions to ascertain views of the French; and advice of similar approach to the British. 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] Sept. 26 (926) From the Chargé in France ( tel. ) From Cochran: Simultaneous release of French declaration with corresponding British and U. S. declarations. 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] Sept. 25 Statement by the Secretary of the Treasury Text of statement made by authority of the President. (Footnote: Information of similar statements issued simultaneously by the United Kingdom and France.) 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 459 ] Sept. 26 Statement by the Secretary of State Issued to the Press Gratification over virtually identical statements of policy issued by the three powers and characterization of them as an advance toward stability. 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] Oct. 6 (970) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Reference to telephone conversation in which the Secretary of the Treasury mentioned a possible statement on gold to be made simultaneously with the British and French; suggestion that only one by the United States is needed, with full reasons for his position. 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 461 ] Oct. 6 (971) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) For the Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Conversation with the Minister of Finance, who expressed gratification over the simultaneous currency declarations, and at their favorable reception by most European countries, Germany being the principal exception. 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 461 and Doc. 462 ] Oct. 8 (393) To the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Transmittal of proposed statement on gold, which, if satisfactory, will be released October 13, with explanation of purpose and meaning. 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 463 ] (Note: Citation to text of statement of October 13, which is the same as that transmitted.) 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 463 ] STATUS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEBTS OWED THE UNITED STATES BY REASON OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR Date and number Subject Page 1936 (Note: Citation to summary of intergovernmental debts and correspondence connected therewith.) 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of General: ] POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN WAR DEBTS Date and number Subject Page 1936 Apr. 14 Memorandum by the Legal Adviser Review of legislation providing for loans to foreign countries during World War I and of Congressional authorizations toward settlement; conclusion that the Secretary of State would not be warranted in entering into negotiations for their readjustment without prior Congressional authorization. 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 464 ] May 11 Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser Analysis of procedures and agencies involved in connection with the attempt to collect the war debts, and consideration of probable difficulties in the way of future attempts at settlement. 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] June 19 Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser Notation that in the course of a conversation on another subject the Secretary of State told the Secretary of the Treasury that the latter’s Department had full jurisdiction in war debt matters. 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] Dec. 29 Memorandum by Mr. John H. Spencer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Analysis of textual changes in replies of Italy, Great Britain, and France to debt statements, and attempt at evaluation of their possible import. 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] France Date and number Subject Page 1936 Apr. 17 (2693) From the Ambassador in France Excerpts from an election speech by former Premier Herriot, in which his references to the debt to the United States seemed to indicate a certain interest in the reconsideration of the debt by the leftist parties. 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] May 14 (410) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Information from French sources that Socialist Party leader Blum will, upon assuming Premiership, present to Parliament a foreign policy statement including reference to the advisability of settling the war debt to United States. 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] May 19 (2768) From the Ambassador in France Advice of Blum’s personal statement before the American Club indicating intention of reopening debt issue when he becomes Premier on June 3; background of statement, and discussion of press comments. 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 470 ] May 23 From the Ambassador in France to President Roosevelt Advice of press intimation that the Secretary of the Treasury plans conferences linking currency stabilization and war debts; references to Ambassador’s previous suggestion, and to present French interest in debt settlement. (Footnote: Informal referral of letter to the Department of State.) 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] Undated Suggested Draft of a Letter for the Signature of President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France Nonintention of linking war debts to stabilization, or too closely to American purchases of foreign goods and services. (Footnote: No record in the files that the letter was sent.) 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] Dec. 1 (1176) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Conversation with Blum, who was informed of U. S. determination to stay out of European wars and involvements and, also, that French reconsideration of debts would not cause the United States to take the position it took in 1917. 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] Dec. 1 (1177) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Continuation of résumé of conversation with Blum relative to war debts in which Blum was told that “war stocks” could not be separated from a general debt agreement. 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] Dec. 10 (1225) From the Ambassador in France ( tel. ) Discussion of debts with Blum and Auriol, during which the latter explained French desire to announce their intention to work out a debt settlement, and suggested method of raising funds. 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] Dec. 31 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs for the Acting Secretary of State French Ambassador’s account of a conversation with the President, who thought the time inopportune for discussions of French war debts. 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 476 ] Italy Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 31 From the Ambassador in Italy to President Roosevelt Suggestion that U. S. purchase of present Embassy could be applied against Italian war debt; balance of which could then be completely liquidated by the Italian Government. 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] Feb. 27 (17) To the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Instructions to ascertain definitely if settlement can be arranged and the Embassy secured as part payment, in accordance with the Ambassador’s suggestion of January 31. 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , and Doc. 479 ] Mar. 2 (66) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Foreign Minister Suvich’s interest in arrangement. 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , and Doc. 479 ] Mar. 14 (80) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Belief that Italian authorities are considering the debt matter; Suvich’s reference to a U. S. settlement with Greece. 592 [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] Apr. 14 (106) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Continuing interest of the authorities in a settlement. 592 [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] Apr. 20 (107) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Mussolini’s interest in regularizing his position with the United States so that Italy could float a loan there through private bankers. 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] June 1 (185) From the Chargé in Italy ( tel. ) Information from the Finance Minister that Italy wishes U. S. views as to how conversations pertaining to a debt settlement might be initiated and where held. 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] June 3 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury’s approval of draft reply to Rome; its submission to the President. 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] June 5 (56) To the Chargé in Italy ( tel. ) Information that notification of debt payment due, sent to the Italian Ambassador, states that the U. S. Government is fully disposed to discuss through diplomatic channels any proposals the Italian Government may have. 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] June 8 (199) From the Chargé in Italy ( tel. ) Communication of information to the Minister of Finance, who said he would confer with the Chief of the Government. 596 [ Pg. 596 includes portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] Nov. 13 Memorandum of Press Conference Reply, in answer to correspondent’s inquiry, that the Department has heard that the Italians were trying to borrow privately in New York, but that the Department has nothing to do with the matter; comments on the Johnson Act. 596 [ Pg. 596 includes portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] Dec. 2 (503) From the Ambassador in Italy ( tel. ) Advice from a variety of well-informed sources that the Italian Government plans to inaugurate discussions in Washington on its war debts. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] Rumania Date and number Subject Page 1936 Dec. 14 Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in France Inquiry of Rumanian financial representative in Paris as to possibility of negotiating a new settlement of war debts, and reply that U. S. Government is prepared to consider any proposal for submission to Congress; comments relative to French position. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] OPPOSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO PROPOSALS TO INCREASE TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTS FROM COUNTRIES IN DEFAULT ON WAR-DEBT PAYMENTS Date and number Subject Page 1935 Feb. 1 To Representative Robert L. Doughton, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Statement of the case against H. R. 2051, providing for additional tariff on goods from countries in default on debts, including the warning that retaliation begets counter-retaliation—all hurting not only the country against which resentment is directed but also the volume of general trade. 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 490 ] 1936 Apr. 20 To Representative Harry B. Coffee Reply to inquiry relative to a 10 percent ad valorem tariff on all imports from countries in default on debt payments, with a tabulation of trade figures of the principal debtors, and transmittal of a copy of the letter to Doughton. 601 [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON BILL PROVIDING FOR ACQUISITION OF ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES BY CREDITING PURCHASES AS PAYMENTS ON WAR DEBTS AND BY OTHER METHODS Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 19 From the Acting Director of the Budget Request for Secretary’s views on H. R. 11001 providing for the common defense by acquiring essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods. 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] Apr. 6 To the Acting Director of the Budget Department’s agreement with objectives of bill because of U. S. need for the minerals mentioned therein; belief, however, that methods authorized in the bill would raise questions relating to the field of U. S. foreign policy for the answering of which the bill offers no solution. 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] REPRESENTATIONS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED LEGISLATION RESTRICTING TOURIST CRUISES FROM AMERICAN PORTS TO AMERICAN SHIPS Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 17 From the Canadian Legation Canada’s objections to H. R. 112 (Bland Bill) restricting to American ships tourist cruises from American ports, with illustrations of adverse effect on Canadian shipping. 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 494 ] Mar. 17 From the French Ambassador Representations against H. R. 112, including citation of a letter by former Secretary of State Stimson objecting to an identic measure proposed in 1932. 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] Mar. 18 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Information that when the French Ambassador presented his Government’s case against the proposed measure, he pointed out that its passage would invite retaliation. 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] Mar. 19 From the German Embassy Expression of serious objections to H. R. 112 as a restriction of the principle of freedom of navigation, and as being incompatible with the U. S.-German treaty of 1923. 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] Mar. 20 (914) From the Netherland Minister Objections to H. R. 112 which, if enacted, would ruin an important branch of Netherland trade; failure to see how certain voyages, affected by the bill, could possibly be classed as coastwise trade reserved for American ships. 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] Mar. 23 From the Polish Embassy Explanation of effect measure, if passed, would have on Polish shipping; argument that it is in contravention to the U. S.-Polish treaty of 1931; and indication of position of Stimson, former Secretary of State, on an identical proposal of 1932. 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] Mar. 23 To Representative Schuyler O. Bland Information of Swedish objections similar to those made in 1932 against an identical proposed measure, and transmittal of the Swedish note of February 24, 1932. Advice of earlier transmittal of Canadian and Netherland representations. 614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] Mar. 23 To the French Ambassador Receipt of note relative to H. R. 112, and information that it is being transmitted to the appropriate agencies. (Footnote: Similar replies to other countries lodging protests.) 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] Mar. 23 To Representative Schuyler O. Bland Detailed expression of objections to H. R. 112 in reply to a letter from Bland; intention to name representatives to attend hearing as suggested. (Footnote: Names of representatives attending hearing, and citation to text of testimony.) 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] Dec. 22 Memorandum by the Assistant to the Legal Adviser Information, in reply to inquiry of an official from the German Embassy, that no action had been taken by the House Committee on the “Cruises to Nowhere Bill” (H. R. 112). 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] REPRESENTATIONS OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO RADIO FACILITIES ON CARGO SHIPS Date and number Subject Page 1936 May 15 From the British Embassy Objections to S. 4619, introduced by Senator Copeland, requiring certain cargo vessels to carry two radio operators or one operator and an automatic alarm apparatus. 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 504 ] May 18 From the Swedish Legation Protest against the pending safety measure as being in some respects more burdensome for certain foreign vessels than the Convention of 1929, not yet ratified by the United States. 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 505 ] May 25 From the Norwegian Legation Objections to S. 4619 as implying important alterations on a large number of Norwegian ships, and as tending to counteract aim of the Convention of 1929, to provide for safety through similarity of laws in all countries. 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 506 ] May 26 (1713) From the Netherland Chargé Objection to pending legislation as tending to defeat the very object of the Convention of 1929, the promotion of uniformity in safety regulations. 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] June 3 From the Danish Legation Objection to proposed measures raising requirements for vessels over those required by the Convention of 1929. 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] June 8 To Representative Schuyler O. Bland Transmittal of copies of protests against safety measure (S. 4619), passed by the Senate and now in committee in the House; Department’s favorable view of every possible safeguard for life at sea, but fear of retaliatory legislation if measures are applied to foreign vessels. 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] June 10 (2332) From the Belgian Embassy Objection to pending legislation as having provisions which exceed obligations of those of the Convention of 1929. 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] June 11 From Representative Schuyler O. Bland Committee decision to table bill for remainder of the session. (Footnote: Information that interested Embassies and Legations were notified of decision by telephone.) 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONFERENCE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN DANGEROUS DRUGS, GENEVA, JUNE 8–26, 1936 Date and number Subject Page 1936 (Note: Citations to text of proceedings of the Conference, text of Convention signed by all participants except the United States, and U. S. statement setting forth reasons for inability to sign; also citations to other material pertaining to American participation.) 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of General: ] PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE STANDARDIZATION OF THE KEEPING AND OPERATION OF HERDBOOKS, ROME, OCTOBER 12–14, 1936 Date and number Subject Page 1937 [Jan. 13] Memorandum by Mr. John H. Lord of the Division of Protocol and Conferences List of countries represented at the Conference by delegates with full powers to sign a convention, and information that J. Clyde Marquis signed for the United States. 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 512 ] (Note: Explanation of extent of U. S. governmental interest in the convention.) 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 512 ] EXTRADITION TREATIES SIGNED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES Date and number Subject Page 1936 (Note: Citation to texts of supplementary treaties with Denmark, France, and Rumania, and to text of an original treaty with Liechtenstein.) 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS UNITED KINGDOM Efforts of the Secretary of State To Secure the Cooperation of the British Government in His International Trade Program; Preliminary Discussions Respecting a Trade Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 22 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Résumé of a conversation with the British Ambassador in which the fundamentals of the U. S. international trade agreements program were discussed and the importance of world economic rehabilitation was stressed. 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 513 ] Feb. 5 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the British Ambassador in regard to conferences between the United States and Great Britain to bring about British cooperation in a U. S. trade agreements program. 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 514 ] Feb. 13 (1130) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom Memorandum on U. S. international trade policy (text printed), and instructions to open preliminary conversations with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, pointing out that British tendency to force trade into controlled bilateral channels may check U. S. effort to revive general world trade. 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] Feb. 26 (79) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Eden’s agreement with Chargé’s opinion that it is vital for the economic welfare of the world that the two great trading nations agree in principle to work for the abolition of trade barriers; his promise to take up the matter with Government officials. 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517 ] Feb. 28 (81) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Speech by Runciman, President of the Board of Trade (excerpts printed), criticizing U. S. trade policy. 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517 ] Feb. 28 (70) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Request for information as to whether Eden had talked to Runciman on the subject of trade agreements before the speech was made. 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] Feb. 29 (82) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice that Eden had not talked to Runciman before the latter made his speech. 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] Mar. 18 (84) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Inquiry as to whether a copy of Department’s memorandum had been given to the Foreign Office or any other Government official. 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] Mar. 19 (136) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information that the memorandum was read to Eden but that no copy was given to him. 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] Mar. 28 (103) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Memorandum on U. S. general trade policies (text printed), with instructions for bringing the matter to the attention of the British Government. 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] Mar. 30 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Submission of the two memoranda on U. S. general trade policy to the British Ambassador with the assurance that all that was desired at this time was a general declaration of intention and policy. 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] Apr. 1 Memorandum by the Secretary of State British Ambassador’s indication that it might be difficult for the British Government to reverse its present course of restrictive commercial policy and to announce the intention to move in the direction of liberal commercial policy, as proposed by the U. S. Government. 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] Apr. 7 (184) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Submission to Eden of memorandum quoted in Department’s No. 103 of March 28; Eden’s intention to avoid a conflict of trade policy between Great Britain and the United States. Board of Trade official’s view that the Cabinet favored continuance of a policy of economic expediency in view of the European political situation. 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] Apr. 11 (124) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Secretary’s statement at press conference (text printed) in response to questions regarding negotiations for a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Great Britain. 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , and Doc. 527 ] Apr. 11 (125) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Intention to continue efforts to induce the British Government to make a public announcement indicating its plans of lowering trade restrictions and putting trade arrangements on a basis of equality; instructions to present informal memorandum (text printed) to Eden and Runciman. 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , and Doc. 527 ] Apr. 28 (231) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Presentation of memorandum to Eden, who welcomed the opportunity for an exchange of views and referred to the preparation of a British memorandum. 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528 ] Apr. 29 (234) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Presentation of memorandum to Runciman, who maintained that British aims are substantially similar to those of the United States. 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] May 1 (238) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Summary of Runciman’s Chamber of Commerce speech in which he indicated that the British Government would be ready to cooperate with the United States in promoting a freer flow of international trade. 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 529 and Doc. 530 ] May 26 (277) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Receipt of memorandum on British commercial policy from Eden, who was pleased at measure of cooperation from the Board of Trade. 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] May 26 (281) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British memorandum (text printed) explaining reasons for and operation of British commercial policy, and expressing the belief that no real divergence either of interest or of policy exists on the part of the two countries; willingness to restate previous policy announcements regarding the improvement of the international trade position. (Footnote: President Roosevelt’s comment on the British memorandum.) 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] June 17 Memorandum by Mr. William A. Fowler of the Division of Trade Agreements Résumé of a discussion between Department officials and Mr. Chalkley, Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy, regarding the preparation of a tentative list of products on which concessions could be granted, with view to preparing a basis for an Anglo-American trade agreement. 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] June 18 (214) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to present a memorandum (text printed) to the British Government, stating that a declaration along the lines of the British memorandum of May 26 would be of greatest value in furthering the reduction of obstacles to international trade. 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] June 19 (319) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Presentation of memorandum to Eden, who expressed the wish to handle the matter personally after his return from Geneva. 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] June 24 Memorandum by Mr. Richard Eldridge of the Division of Trade Agreements Conversation with Chalkley, who presented a tentative list of commodities for which concessions would be requested and in turn asked for a list of products entering the United Kingdom. 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] June 25 (323) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Presentation of U. S. memorandum of June 18 to Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; conversation with Runciman, who favored a British policy declaration but felt it would be more effective if followed by an announcement of practical achievement. 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] June 26 (326) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Conversation with Chamberlain, who referred to pending trade agreement negotiations, and felt the time not propitious for the contemplated public policy declaration. 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , and Doc. 539 ] July 3 (234) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Secretary’s disappointment at deferment of commercial policy statement, and instructions to leave with Cabinet members a memorandum (text printed), urging courageous leadership in the fight for sane and peaceful trade conditions. 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , and Doc. 539 ] July 9 (341) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Opinion as to inappropriateness of presenting memorandum to other Cabinet Ministers during Eden’s absence; suggestion of changes in memorandum. 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540 ] July 20 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Informal discussion with the British Ambassador of Runciman’s speech in the House of Commons July 15 (extract printed), and expression of disappointment over British lack of action in seeking a liberal commercial policy. 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] July 25 (283) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Advice that, in the light of Runciman’s speech, the memorandum transmitted in Department’s 234, July 3, should not be presented until revised. 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] July 28 (378) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Conversation with Eden, who explained the circumstances of Runciman’s speech. 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] Sept. 3 (324) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to résumé discussions with Eden and Runciman and to leave a memorandum (text printed) with the British Government. 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] Sept. 9 (425) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information that attempt will be made to see Eden as soon as he recovers from an illness. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , and Doc. 546 ] Sept. 19 (439) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Account of a conference with Eden upon presentation of memorandum embodied in Department’s No. 324, September 4. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , and Doc. 546 ] Sept. 21 Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs Conversation with Chalkley, who inquired about the outlook for continuing conversations regarding a trade agreement with the United Kingdom. 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] Sept. 29 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Informal discussion with Chalkley as to the status of studies in regard to trade agreement negotiations. 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 548 ] Oct. 22 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Elaboration, in informal discussion with the British Ambassador, on the advantages of U. S. international trade policy as an alternative program of peace and trade restoration in contrast to British defensive foreign policy. 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] Nov. 3 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Reiteration, in informal discussion with British Ambassador, of scope and nature of U. S. economic program, and stress of the necessity of a joint U. S.-British proclamation of the fundamentals of the program. 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] Nov. 16 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Constant Southworth of the Division of Trade Agreements Exploratory discussion between technical representatives of United States and United Kingdom; informal exchange of tentative concessions (texts printed) likely to be requested by the two countries as possible basis for a trade agreement. 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] Nov. 20 (552) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Résumé of a conversation with Eden, who presented a memorandum (text printed) on trade policy, in reply to U. S. memorandum transmitted in telegram No. 324, September 3. 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 552 ] Undated [Rec’d Jan. 12, 1937] Memorandum by the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom of a Conversation With the President of the British Board of Trade, December 18, 1936 Runciman’s opinion that some of the informally discussed U. S. proposals ran counter to the Ottawa Agreement to which his Government was pledged, but that an agreement along the lines of the U. S.-Canadian agreement might be accomplished. 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] Dec. 19 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State Information from the British Ambassador that his Government was giving close consideration to the matter of a trade agreement with the United States. 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] Dec. 26 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Chalkley’s statement that the British Government definitely wanted to negotiate a trade agreement, but was anxious to find a mutually acceptable basis before starting official negotiations; his promise to submit a detailed statement specifying concessions the British could make. 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] Informal Discussions Regarding Proposed Restriction of Trade Between Australia and New Zealand to British Shipping Date and number Subject Page 1936 Feb. 10 (124) From the Consul General at Sydney Conversation with Prime Minister, who outlined Australian determination to join in principle with New Zealand in taking measures to “preserve British shipping lines on the Pacific”, including the reservation of the Tasman trade. 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] Feb. 24 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter, of the Division of Western European Affairs Conversation between the Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy and a Department official regarding the contemplated legislation in Australia and New Zealand concerning the Tasman trade. 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] Apr. 29 (183) From the Consul General at Sydney Advice of London conference between representatives of Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as to ways and means of enabling British shipping to successfully compete in the Pacific with the Matson Line. 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 557 and Doc. 558 ] Oct. 26 (312) From the Consul General at Sydney Information that the New Zealand Government has introduced enabling legislation to restrict the Tasman trade to British shipping; Australian intention to take parallel action. 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] Oct. 28 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the British Ambassador indicating that British position on the Tasman trade matter, set forth in a note of October 23, may lead to a U. S.-British controversy; suggestion that the interested American and British shipping groups present their complaints to the Shipping Board. 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] Nov. 3 Memorandum by the Secretary of State British willingness to withdraw note of October 23 and to discuss the Australian-New Zealand shipping matter orally. 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 560 and Doc. 561 ] Dec. 3 From the Consul at Sydney ( tel. ) Advice that enabling legislation was introduced in Australian Parliament to exclude American vessels from the Tasman trade. 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] Supplementary Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand Respecting the Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property, Signed May 27, 1936 Date and number Subject Page 1935 Dec. 27 (1888) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Attempt to secure British reply as to the status of a draft convention relating to the disposal of real and personal property, extending the convention signed March 2, 1899, to outlying territories of both countries. 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] 1936 Jan. 27 (1933) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom British reply (text printed) enclosing draft of the proposed supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, but not the Union of South Africa. 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] Feb. 15 (55) To the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Approval of draft convention, and instructions to inquire at the Foreign Office about certain technicalities. 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] Apr. 2 (171) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Information requested on February 15. 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] (Note: Citation to text of supplementary convention signed May 27, 1936.) 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] Reciprocal Arrangements Effected by the United States With the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for Trans-Atlantic Air Service Date and number Subject Page 1936 Apr. 30 (141) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to present a note to the Foreign Office (text printed) relative to the establishment of trans-Atlantic air service, indicating U.S. readiness to approve application of Imperial Airways, Ltd., pending British confirmation of certain points. 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] June 29 (328) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) British reply (text printed) explaining position on U.S. points, and expressing hope that on basis of these explanations the United States will grant permits to Imperial Airways in exchange for British permits to Pan American Airways. 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] July 9 (245) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to communicate two notes to the Foreign Office (texts printed): (1) setting forth consideration of the British position and (2) confirming the acceptability of Pan American Airways for the proposed services. 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Aug. 18 (2464) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Note from the Foreign Office (text printed), with draft permits for Pan American Airways. 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 570 ] Oct. 9 (2569) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Copy of Embassy’s note to the Foreign Office (text printed) indicating U. S. acceptance of British suggestions relative to a permit for Imperial Airways, and suggesting certain changes in the Pan American Airways permit. 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] Dec. 30 (633) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Foreign Office note (text printed) in regard to Pan American Airways permits necessary to the commencement of the trans-Atlantic service. 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573 ] (Note: Information that reciprocal exchanges of permits with the United Kingdom, Irish Free State, and Canada were effected in the spring of 1937.) 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573 ] Refusal of the British Government To Recognize the Right of the United States To Exercise Control Outside Territorial Waters Over Any Vessel Flying the British Flag, Except as Provided by Treaty Date and number Subject Page 1936 Sept. 21 (305) From the British Chargé Reference to a bill approved by Congress on June 22, defining jurisdiction of U. S. coastguards, and advice that the British Government cannot recognize the U. S. right to exercise any powers outside territorial waters over vessels flying the British flag, except as provided for by the Convention of January 23, 1924. (Footnote: Information that U. S. note of September 28 acknowledged receipt of this communication.) 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573 ] Informal Representations Against Proposed Preferential Tariff Rates in Certain British West African Colonies Favoring Empire Trade Date and number Subject Page 1936 Aug. 18 (2466) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Memorandum prepared by the Agricultural Attaché (text printed) regarding possible imposition by Nigeria and the Gold Coast of preferential duties on Empire-grown tobacco, and advisability of early attempt to forestall action. 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 573 and Doc. 574 ] Sept. 21 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs Representations to Chalkley, British Commercial Counselor, against the proposed preferential duty. 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] Oct. 13 (1460) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Transmittal of a memorandum prepared in the Department of Agriculture on West African tobacco trade; instructions to informally express U. S. concern over proposed action. 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] Oct. 23 (379) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions for informal representations against proposed preferential duties as inconsistent with recently expressed policies by leading trading nations, including Great Britain, and detrimental to future trade agreement negotiations. 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] (Note: Assurance by British Foreign Secretary that no steps would be taken without consultation.) 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 577 ] Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a Reciprocal Country Under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 Date and number Subject Page 1935 Dec. 30 (367) From the British Ambassador Advice that the British Secretary of Mines has received applications for oil prospecting licenses from the Anglo-American Oil Company; inquiry whether under the U. S. Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, the United Kingdom is regarded as a reciprocal country. 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] 1936 June 3 To the British Ambassador Attorney General’s opinion (text printed) indicating that under certain conditions Great Britain is to be regarded as a reciprocal country. 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 579 ] July 6 (203 (C. 277)) From the British Ambassador Information that the Secretary of Mines is prepared to grant licenses to the Anglo-American Oil Company if the U. S. Government does in fact regard Great Britain as a reciprocal country. 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] July 20 To the British Ambassador Advice that the Interior Department is prepared to recognize Great Britain as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] AUSTRALIA Unsatisfactory Trade Relations Between the United States and Australia Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 4 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Request by Sir Henry Gullet, Minister in charge of trade treaties, that United States initiate trade negotiations in view of Australian serious trade position. 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 582 ] Mar. 6 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Instructions to inform Gullet of reasons for U. S. disinclination to undertake suggested negotiations at this time; and to enlarge on the ultimate benefits to Australia from the generalization of concessions to other countries. 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] Mar. 16 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Gullet’s disappointment over U. S. decision, and his opinion that the Government may be forced to introduce measures to restrict U. S. trade, in view of the precarious position of Australia’s London funds. 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] Apr. 2 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Gullet’s announcement in Parliament that a special subcommittee had been appointed to explore possibilities of correcting the adverse trade balance; opinion that some formal adverse action is to be expected. 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] Apr. 6 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Probability that Parliament will advocate legislation drastically affecting U. S. trade; suggestions for a letter to the Prime Minister to counteract this trend. 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] Apr. 10 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Communication to Prime Minister (text printed) explaining the aims of the trade agreements program and expressing the hope that Australia’s commerce will indirectly benefit from U. S. program of gradually lowering trade restrictions. 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] Apr. 24 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Impression that drastic action restricting U. S. trade with Australia may be postponed. 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] May 7 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Explanation, in Prime Minister’s reply (extracts printed), to Secretary’s letter that considerations of restrictions against the free flow of imports are dictated by Australia’s economic situation. 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 589 ] May 21 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Indication that the Prime Minister will present an amending tariff schedule to Parliament, designed to correct the adverse trade balance with the United States. 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] May 22 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Imposition of drastic measures by the Government, including higher duties on certain products and prohibiting importation of certain items from countries outside the British Empire except under license issued by the Minister of Customs. 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] May 23 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Analysis of Government’s new trade measures. 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] May 27 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Note for formal delivery to the Government (text printed) protesting against import restrictions on U. S. items to be applied under a tariff measure tabled May 22; U. S. intention to continue concessions extended to Australia as long as it is able to enjoy equal treatment by Australia. 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] May 29 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Information that Parliament is in recess and that the note will be delivered in Melbourne; belief that Government will not be deterred from its discriminatory policy, and request for instructions as to publicity. 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] June 1 To the Consul at Melbourne ( tel. ) For Moffat: Instructions that sense of note may be used in any conversation, but not for publicity at the present time. 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597 ] June 1 From the Consul at Melbourne ( tel. ) From Moffat: Presentation of note (dated May 29) to the Minister for External Affairs, who held out no hope of any modification of Government policy. 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597 ] June 4 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Instructions to inform the Australian Government of the alarm caused among American exporters by Australia’s recent actions; suggestion that Government broadcast sufficient information as to the true implications of its restrictive measures: 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597 ] June 2 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Inadvisability of requesting formal broadcast of information; brief summary of situation insofar as it affects American trade. 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] June 5 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Formal note for Australian Government (text printed) requesting advice as to whether the Customs Collector in Sydney is acting under instructions in refusing applications for U. S. products while licenses for like products of other foreign origin were granted. Contemplated countermeasures in event of unfavorable reply. 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] June 6 From the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the American Consul General at Sydney Reply to note of May 29, explaining reasons for trade measures, and indicating that benefits from the U. S. trade agreements program are more theoretical than real. 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] June 10 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Belief that suspension of trade agreement rates can no longer be postponed if confirmation is obtained that Customs Collector was acting under instructions. 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] June 24 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Request for clear evidence as to actual discrimination against U. S. trade before recommendation of suspension of trade agreement concessions is made to the President. 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] June 25 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Advice that customs collectors are continuing to refuse import licenses for U. S. goods while granting them for like goods of other countries; citation of actual cases of discrimination. 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , and Doc. 604 ] June 27 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Australian reply to note of June 5 (excerpts printed), including the statement that customs collectors, in declining U. S. import permits, were acting in accordance with the policy of the Government. 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , and Doc. 604 ] June 29 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Instructions to inform the Government that the President has directed the suspension of trade agreement concession, effective August 1. 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc. 606 ] Aug. 7 (278) From the Consul General at Sydney Analysis of Australian situation, and outline of possible approach to improve trade relations. 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc. 606 ] Aug. 26 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Résumé of informal conversation with British Chargé and Premier Stevens of New South Wales, during which the Secretary discussed the objectives of U. S. trade agreements program and expressed disappointment over Australian obstruction of the program. 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Oct. 10 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Request for suggestions relative to a contemplated note (draft printed), expressing hope for better trade treatment from Australia, to be handed to Foreign Secretary Eden for transmittal to Australia. 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] Oct. 12 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Suggestions as to text of note, and opinion that note should be handed to Eden only in case of active British support of U. S. thesis. 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 609 ] Oct. 16 (376) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( tel. ) Instructions to call on Eden and to enlist British aid in the appeal to Australia to alter its trade policy. 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] Oct. 27 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Expected approval of Government’s trade diversion policy in Parliament debates November 4 and 5. 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , and Doc. 612 ] Oct. 31 To the Consul General in Sydney ( tel. ) Advice that Eden has promised an early reply in the Australian trade matter; instructions to go ahead with delivery of note, if Eden’s reply does not come soon. 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , and Doc. 612 ] Nov. 5 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Delivery of note, which will be considered at next full Cabinet meeting. 772 [ Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] Nov. 18 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Inquiry as to whether special representations in specific cases would be of avail in securing import permits. 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] Nov. 19 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Extension of tariff measures to December 1, and postponement of debate on trade diversion program. (Footnote: Information in telegram dated December 4 that Australian trade diversion policy was passed by both Houses of Parliament.) 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] Nov. 20 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Opinion that individual representations in regard to import permits would constitute tacit acceptance of Australia’s trade diversion policy and weaken U. S. position in trying to effect a general recommendation. 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] Informal Arrangements Between the United States and Australia Respecting the Importation of American Aircraft and Aircraft Parts Into Australia Date and number Subject Page 1935 Dec. 21 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Summary of a formal note of December 16 from the Minister of External Affairs, outlining conditions under which license permits for import of American aircraft will be issued. 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] 1936 Feb. 1 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Opinion that conditions outlined in Australian note are unreasonable; instructions to endeavor to persuade Australian authorities to accept procedure outlined in the arrangement in force between the United States and Great Britain. 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] Feb. 10 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Doubt that Australia will be willing to exchange notes along lines of the present British-American agreement, but may modify procedure to bring it into line with other countries. 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] Feb. 12 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Australian objection to a reciprocal exchange of notes and insistence on a unilateral proposal of requirements, but willingness to consider U. S. suggestions. 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] Mar. 13 From the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) Australian unwillingness to agree to an informal temporary arrangement to cover planes already ordered, but readiness to make certain modifications in proposals of December 16. 778 [ Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] Mar. 30 To the Consul General at Sydney ( tel. ) U. S. counterproposal, agreeing to furnish the Australian authorities with certain technical data and documents upon receipt of a note that import license has been furnished. 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] July 24 To the Consul General at Sydney Reply to a despatch from the Consul General regarding Australian readiness to enter into an arrangement based on U. S. counterproposal; preference to have arrangement effected by an exchange of notes. 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] 1937 Jan. 5 (345) From the Consul General at Sydney Opinion that it would be wise not to suggest a formal exchange of notes, since the system evolved is working satisfactorily despite the Australian Government’s diversion policy. 781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624 ] CANADA Informal Discussions Between Officials of the United States and Canada With Respect to Trade Relations Date and number Subject Page 1936 June 4 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to the Under Secretary of State Transmittal of two memoranda (one printed) covering conversations with the Canadian Prime Minister in Ottawa with respect to U. S.-Canadian trade relations; elaboration on matters not covered in these memoranda. 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 625 ] Nov. 3 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Canadian Minister and the Counselor of Legation, during which the Secretary summed up the present and prospective status of the reciprocal trade program and its relation to economic welfare and peace. 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Convention Between the United States and Canada Respecting Income Taxation, Signed December 30, 1936 Date and number Subject Page 1936 Oct. 26 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Conversation with the Counselor of the Canadian Legation relative to a treaty on taxation, in which it was agreed to postpone negotiations until November. 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] Undated [Rec’d Nov. 4] From the Canadian Legation Transmittal of draft of a proposed agreement between the United States and Canada to prescribe maximum rates of taxation to be levied by either Government on income paid to individuals and corporations of the other country. 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 628 ] Nov. 28 Memorandum by Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf of the Treaty Division Informal discussion between members of the State and Treasury Departments and Canadian Legation officials regarding the proposed treaty on taxation; acceptance of the Treasury draft (text printed) with few exceptions. 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 629 ] Dec. 14 From the Canadian Legation Transmittal of revised draft of tax convention. 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 630 ] (Note: Citation to text of convention, signed December 30, 1936.) 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 630 ] Protests of the Canadian Government Against Certain Provisions of the Liquor Tax Bill; Settlement of United States Claims Against Canadian Distillers Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 13 To the Secretary of the Treasury Objections by Mr. Wrong, the Canadian Chargé, to section 403 of the Treasury’s proposed liquor tax bill. Letter of Secretary of State to the Attorney General (excerpts printed) expressing doubts as to the effectiveness of the proposed measure. 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 631 ] Jan. 18 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who said that Prime Minister King had made forceful representations against section 403 of the proposed liquor tax bill. 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Jan. 20 From the Secretary of the Treasury Intention to recommend to Congress that provisions of section 403 be modified. 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] Jan. 20 Memorandum by the Economic Adviser Conversation between the Secretary of the Treasury and Wrong, who felt that his Government’s attitude toward the United States might be affected by the liquor tax matter. 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] Mar. 12 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who explained the vigorous opposition in the Canadian Government to the proposed liquor tax bill. 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] Mar. 12 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Explanation to Wrong of Department’s efforts to prevent adoption by the Senate Finance Committee of section 403 of the liquor tax bill. 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , and Doc. 637 ] Mar. 18 To the Assistant Secretary to the President Résumé of the situation in the Canadian liquor matter, including possibility that Canada will denounce the trade agreement with the United States; Wrong’s disappointment in the redrafted version of section 403. 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , and Doc. 637 ] Mar. 19 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with Wrong, who conveyed his Government’s dissatisfaction with redraft of section 403. 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] Mar. 23 From President Roosevelt Suggestions as to minimum requirements for the settlement of U. S. claims against Canadian distillers. 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 638 and Doc. 639 ] Mar. 24 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Discussion with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Wrong in regard to President Roosevelt’s suggestions. 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] Mar. 25 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Instructions telephoned to the Minister in Canada to follow up representations made to Wrong. 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] Mar. 25 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who reported Canadian desire for a conference between the Treasury Department and representatives of Canadian distillers against whom the Treasury Department has claims. 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] Mar. 26 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Record of a conversation between the Under Secretary of State and Wrong, who brought a memorandum (substance printed) expressing desirability of settling claims in a conference between Canadian distillers and the Treasury Department. 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] Mar. 27 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Résumé of a conversation with Wrong, who reviewed the Canadian position. 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 644 ] Mar. 28 From the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Treasury’s willingness to enter into discussions with Canadian distillers provided practical assurances mentioned in President Roosevelt’s note of March 23 are given. 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] Mar. 28 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Transmittal of a message to Wrong, based on a letter from the Treasury to the Department; Wrong’s doubt as to usefulness of contemplated meeting under conditions laid down by the Treasury Department. 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] Mar. 31 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 30, 1936 Inconclusive discussions between representatives of the State and Treasury Departments and Canadian officials and representatives of Canadian liquor interests. 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Apr. 1 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 31, 1936 Continuation of conversations with Canadian distillers who offered a proposal for settlement of the tax matter. 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] Apr. 1 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with Wrong, who presented a memorandum of the discussions prepared by the distillers’ representatives, and inquired about the prospects for continued delay in the Senate. 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] Apr.11 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs U. S. proposal for an amicable settlement of the liquor tax matter (text printed), handed to Wrong by the Under Secretary on April 10. 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] Apr. 15 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with Wrong, who presented the reply by the Canadian distillers to U. S. proposals, indicating acceptance of proposals in substance, but suggesting minor changes. 818 [ Pg. 818 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] Apr. 27 (37) To the Minister in Canada ( tel. ) Concern over lack of progress in Washington talks with Canadian distillers, and instructions to make representations to the Canadian Under Secretary. 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Apr. 27 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Résumé of a conversation with Wrong, who said that the stand of the Treasury and Justice Departments would end in complete disruption of the negotiations. 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 653 ] Apr. 29 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who summarized his conversations with the Prime Minister and Under Secretary and said that the latter seemed to favor the Government’s withdrawal from the negotiations. 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] May 9 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to the Secretary of State Report on the unsatisfactory negotiations of the Treasury and Justice Departments with the Canadian distillers; indication that failure to reach a settlement would be a serious blow to U. S.-Canadian relations. 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] May 12 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Transmittal to Wrong of President’s proposal that U. S. claims be settled for $3,000,000, as a gesture of good will to Canada. (Footnote: Willingness of Canadian distillers to settle for $3,000,000.) 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 656 and Doc. 657 ] May 13 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with Justice Department official concerning desire of one Canadian company for assurances through the State Department and the Canadian Legation in respect to criminal aspects of case; indication that the U. S. Government regards the cases as closed and that State Department will communicate this information to the Canadian Legation. 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 656 and Doc. 657 ] Negotiations Respecting the Revision of the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 5 (267) To the Minister in Canada Advice of a report submitted by the International Fisheries Commission proposing changes in the Halibut Convention now in force between the United States and Canada; instructions to submit a new draft convention (text printed) to the Dominion authorities for their consideration. 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] May 8 (41) To the Minister in Canada ( tel. ) Request for information regarding any changes in draft convention the Canadian Government may desire. 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] May 14 (62) From the Minister in Canada ( tel. ) Canadian Government’s favorable view of U. S. suggestions, and consideration of further alterations of its own. 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661 ] July 21 (466) To the Chargé in Canada Comments on Canadian suggestions for alterations in the draft convention, contained in a Canadian note of June 16. 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661 ] Sept. 28 (967) From the Minister in Canada Canadian note (text printed) indicating views with regard to certain alterations in the draft convention. 832 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 662 ] Nov. 27 (591) To the Minister in Canada Transmittal of revised draft convention, incorporating changes suggested by the Canadian Government; authorization to sign the convention. (Footnote: Information that convention was signed January 29, 1937.) 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] Proposed Negotiation of a New Treaty To Deal With the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin as a Whole, Including the Niagara Falls Date and number Subject Page 1935 Feb. 21 (638) To the Minister in Canada Review of unsuccessful attempts to secure ratification of a 1929 convention between the United States and Canada for the preservation and improvement of Niagara Falls; instructions to present a note to the Canadian Government, requesting consideration of an arrangement for joint construction of the planned remedial works. 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] 1936 Jan. 20 (201) To the Minister in Canada Transmittal of copy of a letter from Representative Andrews of New York to President Roosevelt, indicating continued interest in the preservation of Niagara Falls through construction of remedial works. 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 664 and Doc. 665 ] Feb. 25 (262) To the Minister in Canada President Roosevelt’s proposal to have the St. Lawrence Treaty and Niagara Falls Convention withdrawn from Senate, and to negotiate a new treaty with the Canadian Government, embodying principles of the two conventions. 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] Feb. 26 (441) From the Minister in Canada Account of interview with the Prime Minister, who expressed doubt that the waterways portion of the treaty would be of benefit to Canada at the present time. 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] Mar. 10 (474) From the Minister in Canada Summary of Canadian reaction to the question of reopening the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty matter. 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] Mar. 11 (481) From the Minister in Canada Further report regarding Canadian reaction to the waterways question, and Prime Minister’s opinion that time is not propitious for reopening the matter. 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 668 and Doc. 669 ] May 19 Memorandum by the Minister in Canada Explanation of President Roosevelt’s interest in the suggested new treaty to the Prime Minister, who continued to show little enthusiasm for the project. 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] Dec. 7 (1058) From the Minister in Canada Informal conversations between visiting American and Canadian Government officials, during which the various phases of the waterways question were discussed. 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 671 ] IRISH FREE STATE Disinclination of the United States To Enter Into a Trade Agreement With the Irish Free State Date and number Subject Page 1936 Aug. 3 Memorandum by the Economic Adviser Irish desire to negotiate a commercial agreement with the United States in view of the fact that Irish purchases of U. S. goods greatly exceeded U. S. purchases of Irish goods. 847 [ Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 672 ] Aug. 5 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Conversation between Department officials and the Secretary of the Irish Legation, during which the impediments to negotiation of a trade agreement were considered, the benefits of the U. S. trade agreements program to Irish trade were explained, and continuation of most-favored-nations treatment was suggested. 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 673 ] NEW ZEALAND Representations Regarding Discrimination Against American Commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa Date and number Subject Page 1936 June 5 (2242) From the Chargé in the United Kingdom Foreign Office note (text printed) transmitting New Zealand’s reply to U. S. request for national treatment for U. S. vessels and goods throughout the mandated territory of Western Samoa. 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 674 ] UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA Efforts To Meet Complaints From South Africa That American Import Regulations Unduly Restricted South African Exports to the United States Date and number Subject Page 1936 July 18 To the Consul at Capetown ( tel. ) Instructions to investigate truth of a press report indicating that the South African Wine Growers Association is exhorting its members to buy British goods, in view of its inability to sell South African wines in the United States due to U. S. import regulations. 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] July 20 From the Consul at Capetown ( tel. ) Advice that Association is conducting a violent propaganda campaign against American goods, obtaining support from deciduous fruit growers; request that it be ascertained from Agriculture Department whether revision of Plant Quarantine Order 362 is contemplated. 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] July 22 To the Consul at Capetown ( tel. ) Information from Agriculture Department that BPQ 362 makes provision, under certain specifications, for entry of grapes from countries where the Mediterranean fruit fly exists, and that experiments are under way to devise methods more suitable for South African needs. 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , and Doc. 678 ] July 29 To the Consul at Capetown ( tel. ) Information that an investigation in regard to complaints by the Wine Growers Association has revealed no discrimination against South African wine imports which are subject to the same regulations as similar imports from other countries. 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , and Doc. 678 ] July 30 Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conversation Between the South African Minister and the Assistant Chief of the Division Résumé of unsatisfactory discussion regarding alleged discrimination by the United States against South African products. 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] Aug. 8 To the South African Minister Memorandum (text printed) containing a study made in the interest of finding a mutually satisfactory solution to the difficulties connected with shipments of South African wines and fruits. 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] Aug. 15 To the South African Minister Detailed information regarding regulations for wine and spirits, and expression of hope for an early settlement of the trade difficulties. 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] Aug. 24 From the South African Minister Informal note explaining reasons for the rising tide of South African resentment against the United States, and suggesting changes in U. S. import regulations. 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] Aug. 26 (7) To the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( tel. ) Account of efforts to clear up the wine and fruit matter. 868 [ Pg. 868 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] Sept. 14 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State Résumé of a conversation between the South African Minister and an Agriculture Department official regarding plans of Agriculture Department to admit grapes. 869 [ Pg. 869 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] Sept. 14 Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs Information given to a representative of a group of exporters regarding plans of the Agriculture Department to admit South African fruits. 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Sept. 18 To the South African Minister Information as to encouraging developments in solution of wines and spirits question and grape question. 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] Sept. 19 (8) To the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( tel. ) Advice regarding future changes in regulations and consideration by Agriculture officials for ultimate admission of South African grapes and fruits. 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , and Doc. 688 ] Nov. 13 (10) To the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( tel. ) Instructions to convey to appropriate officials developments leading to the ultimate admission of grapes sterilized outside the United States. 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , and Doc. 688 ] Dec. 19 To the South African Minister Acknowledgment of receipt of two notes concerning the first trial shipment of grapes. 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] 1937 Jan. 12 (1) To the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( tel. ) Explanation for delay in trial shipment due to misunderstanding regarding the inspection of vessels. 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] Jan. 27 (4) From the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( tel. ) Advice that authorities are satisfied with U. S. efforts to assist in the inauguration of shipments. (Footnote: Information regarding departure of two shipments of grapes.) 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] General: General: Contents Belgium (Documents 318-334) Canada (Documents 335-337) Cuba (Documents 338-338) France (Documents 339-348) Mexico (Documents 349-350) Netherlands (Documents 351-354) Norway (Documents 355-367) France (Documents 468-476) Italy (Documents 477-488) Rumania (Documents 489-489) The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Geneva: 1936 phase The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Geneva: 1936 phase 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 1 ff.; see also League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 158, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly … Minutes of the Third Committee ( Reduction of Armaments ), Geneva, 1936. [1] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, August 17, 1936. [Received August 26.] 500.C1113/72 [2] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 9, 1936. [Received September 22.] 500.C1113/74 [3] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 25, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 25—12:35 p.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/488: Telegram [4] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 26, 1936—11 p.m. [Received September 27—12:59 p.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/489: Telegram [5] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) Washington, September 28, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/489: Telegram [6] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 29, 1936—3 p.m. [Received September 29—12:12 p.m.] 500.C111/961: Telegram [7] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) Washington, September 29, 1936—6 p.m. 500.C111/961: Telegram [8] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 1, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/491: Telegram [9] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 2, 1936—7 p.m. [Received October 2—2:48 p.m.] 500.C1113/76: Telegram [10] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 4, 1936—noon. [Received October 4—9:50 a.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/492: Telegram [11] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 5, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 5—6:45 p.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/493: Telegram [12] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 7, 1936—9 p.m. [Received October 7—1:55 p.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/495: Telegram [13] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 10, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 11—10:40 a.m.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/496: Telegram [14] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 24, 1936. [Received January 6, 1937.] 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/501 The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1113/72 [Document 1] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State No. 1815 Political Geneva , August 17, 1936. [Received August 26.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated June 22, 1936, concerning prospects respecting a resumption of disarmament activities of the League of Nations, prepared by Mr. Field of the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat, together with a copy of a covering memorandum by M. Aghnides, Director of the Section, which is addressed to the members of the Section under date of August 4, 1936. These papers were confidentially made available to me and I beg to request that they be considered in that light. From conversations with various members of the Disarmament Section, I am furthermore able to report the following respecting the status of these memoranda and concerning the data embodied therein. M. Aghnides has left Geneva for a leave of absence of approximately one month. He has requested that during his absence the members of his Section make a critical study of the memorandum of June 22 with a view to its possible revision. It appears to be understood in the Section that M. Aghnides’ policy is that the Third Committee of the Assembly be reconstituted during the forthcoming Assembly for the consideration of the situation respecting disarmament. The Department will recall that the Third Committee has not met during recent years. I am told that in discussing this with members of his Section M. Aghnides made clear that the Third Committee was not competent to discuss disarmament per se , which is a function of the General Conference, and that it was envisaged that the Committee would concern itself only with procedure. M. Aghnides emphasized this point by stating that the reason the Third Committee should not impinge on the functions of the Conference was that certain states members of the Conference were not represented on the Committee. Certain members of the Disarmament Section tell me that they believe that M. Aghnides would not have spoken so positively concerning the prospects of a meeting of the Assembly Third Committee had not some political arrangements been worked out to that end. These arrangements are considered as presumably centering in Paris in view of the French Government’s preoccupations concerning an international consideration of the question of private manufacture (see Consulate’s despatch No. 1737 Political, June 17, 1936 2 ). Indeed, this whole effort is seen as primarily a French move. I encounter greatly differing views among the officials of the Disarmament Section respecting the policy for action which the memorandum implies. The French member, for example, speaks favorably respecting the resumption of disarmament activities; while the British member characterizes such an effort as entirely apart from reality. The British member in particular in speaking to me objected to any extension of the London naval discussions in Geneva, an element upon which the memorandum touches. In respect of the views expressed by these officials, it may be presumed that to a rather definite degree they reflect the positions of their respective governments. Among certain other members of the Disarmament Section, grave difficulties are seen in carrying out the projects envisaged in the memorandum as well as serious objections to such attempts. In the first place, possibly more harm than good to the general cause of disarmament is seen to lie in a resumption of disarmament efforts under circumstances which would appear to render a successful issue so questionable. In the second place, in the present delicate posture of European affairs, it is felt that the discussions which might take place in the Third Assembly Committee and in any subsequent meeting of a Conference body might serve only to sharpen European political issues. Indeed the apprehension is felt that certain states might employ such an opportunity as a platform for the advancement of their political aims, which might indeed be directed with disturbing results against such an absentee state as Germany. In view of these differences of opinion, it is very difficult to see at present how these matters may eventuate. As germane to the foregoing and also of more general interest, I desire to report that strong rumors have been current here for some days to the effect that the convocation of the Assembly, now set for September 21, will be adjourned to some date in November. These rumors appear to originate with functionaries of the League Secretariat who assert that correspondence indicating such a postponement has taken place between the Secretary-General and certain governments. I may say that the natural presumption is that such a deferment of the meeting of the Assembly would be in order that the Assembly might take place subsequent to the five-power discussions 3 which, from information here, are now tentatively set for some date in October. The thought in this respect is that the results of such a five-power conference might constitute something tangible to present to the Assembly in respect of a European settlement upon which the project for League reform on the Assembly agenda directly depends. A further view is that a deferment of the Assembly would avoid possibly unfortunate public discussions of certain political questions which might create an atmosphere disturbing to the projected five-power conference. It is alleged here that London is favorable to an Assembly adjournment. In this connection, I refer specifically to the final paragraph of my telegram No. 267, June 20 [ 30 ], 2 p.m. 4 On the other hand, as the Department is aware, such a five-power conference—concerning which the date and even the fact of its meeting I have recently heard questioned—is supposed to be only preliminary to a European conference wider in scope. Thus the whole scheme for conferences of this nature seems not only not to be a settled matter but also that its success or duration can by no means be foretold. With respect to the Assembly, it is almost technically necessary in League affairs for an Assembly to be held each year. Moreover, to omit an Assembly in any one year would doubtless be most injurious to League morale. One would thus be inclined to believe that wisdom will suggest that the Assembly not run the risk of a deferment of date which might not only be fruitless but might lead to greater complications. Those who hold this latter opinion believe that every effort should be made that the Assembly be as short as possible, that it be restricted to the greatest possible degree to technical questions, and above all that contentious political discussions be avoided. In a recent conversation with my German colleague here, he told me that Berlin would be opposed to any postponement of the Assembly to the extent that such a deferment was related to the five-power discussions. He stated that Berlin would resent even the aspect being presented that such discussions were preliminary to, or subject to review by, the League Assembly. I may say that this whole matter may indeed already have been settled among the great power capitals. From Geneva, however, I can only report the currents in the situation which are in evidence here. Respectfully yours, Prentiss B. Gilbert [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations Secretariat ( Aghnides ) To the Members of the Disarmament Section I attach herewith for your comment a memorandum prepared by Mr. Field dealing with the possible resumption of certain activities of the Disarmament Conference. In view of the anticipated early receipt of a communication from the French Government outlining its views with respect to the control of the trade in and manufacture of arms and munitions, the question is likely to become active during the course of the forthcoming session of the Assembly, and I consider it important that the Disarmament Section be prepared to furnish any desirable suggestions to the Secretary-General and to the assembly and to answer any requests for information and material that may be made in the circumstances. I would therefore ask each member of the Section to give some thought to ( a ) the possible procedure by which the disarmament question might be dealt with in the Assembly and ( b ) the substance of the action which the Assembly might be recommended to take. I should particularly like to have your observations on a possible alternative to the procedure outlined by Mr. Field, along the following lines: The President of the Third Committee might convene this Committee with a view to the preparation of an Assembly Resolution requesting the Secretary-General to call a session of the Special Committee on Arms Manufacture and Trade on the following grounds: a . The Conference—in accordance with the Bureau’s decision of November 1934—undertook to embody in separate agreements such questions as might be ripe for solution; b . The Special Committee on Arms Manufacture and Trade consequently prepared certain draft texts which were forwarded to the Governments; c . The French Government has now submitted its observations and suggestions respecting the Special Committee’s drafts; d . This important document represents a further step in the direction of the conclusion of a separate agreement on arms manufacture and traffic, in harmony with the Bureau’s decision of November 1934; e . It makes it possible for the Special Committee charged with the preparation of such an agreement to resume its work in the light of the French Government’s observations and any other observations which may subsequently be received. Aghnides [ Geneva ,] August 4, 1936. [Subenclosure] [ Geneva ,] June 22, 1936. Resumption of the Disarmament Conference A. Present status of the Conference. At its last meeting on November 20th, 1934, 5 the Bureau of the Conference adopted the President’s suggestion that the programme of the Conference, approved at the last meeting of the General Commission on June 8th, 1934, * should be modified in view of the trend of political events by endeavouring, without necessarily awaiting the completion of an entire Convention, to embody in separate agreements such questions as were considered ripe for solution—notably the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, Publicity of National Defence Expenditure, and the Permanent Disarmament Commission. During the following months, meetings took place of the Special Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War (referred to hereafter as the Special Committee), the Technical Committee of the National Defence Expenditure Commission (referred to hereafter as the Technical Committee) and of the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions. The Special Committee, on April 13th, 1935, adopted a report, containing certain draft texts, which was forwarded to the Governments (Conf. D./C. G. 168). The Technical Committee, on January 14th, 1935, issued a complementary report in which it incorporated the final draft of the Convention on Publicity of National Defence Expenditure. This report was also forwarded to Governments (Conf. D./C. G. 160 (1), also Conf. D. 158). Vol. III . † The Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions decided to adjourn the discussion of the Soviet proposal for a Permanent Peace Conference, which the Bureau had referred to it, and assisted the Special Committee in preparing the texts relating to the setting up of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. No meetings of the Bureau, General Commission or other bodies of the Conference have taken place since April 1935. The Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly did not deal with Disarmament. However, in view of the death on October 20th, 1935, of the President of the Conference, the Council, during its ninetieth session, decided (January 22nd, 1936) that circumstances were still unpropitious for the resumption of the work of the Conference, but that as soon as a proposal for the convening of the Conference is made, either by the Council’s Rapporteur on Disarmament questions (M. Buys Guinazú) or by a Member or Members, the Council could empower the Secretary-General to consult the Bureau of the Conference on the question of summoning the Conference, and that the latter would then begin by electing a President and proceed to consider the general situation ‡ (Conf. D. 172). B. Future of the Conference. It would seem that circumstances continue unpropitious for a resumption of the full Conference. It may be, however, that the time has arrived when renewed consideration should be given to the possibility, suggested by Mr. Henderson and approved by the Bureau in November 1934, of the conclusion of separate agreements covering particular aspects of the disarmament problem which may be ripe for solution. In addition to the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, Publicity of National Defense Expenditure and the Permanent Disarmament Commission—already envisaged by Mr. Henderson—a partial solution of the problem of naval armaments appears practicable as a result of the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty of 1936. 6 In view of the limited programme and in order not to arouse exaggerated hopes, it seems preferable not to convene the Plenary Conference or the General Commission until final agreements have been completed. A feasible procedure might be for the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly to reconvene its Third Committee which might note the possibility of achieving progress in certain specified fields and submit a resolution to the Assembly asking the Council to call a meeting of the Bureau within the near future for the purpose of preparing a new programme of work along the lines suggested. The Bureau might then convene ( a ) the Special Committee with instructions to reexamine the texts elaborated in April 1935 in the light of the observations from the Governments and to prepare a final draft Convention; ( b ) the National Defence Expenditure Commission with instructions to consider, in the light of the observations from the Governments, the draft Convention on Publicity of National Defence Expenditure elaborated by the Technical Committee and to prepare a final text; ( c ) the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions with instructions to consider, in the light of the observations from the Governments, Chapter IV of the Draft Texts prepared by the Special Committee (Conf. D. 168, pages 21–31) and to prepare a final text in the form of a separate Convention; ( d ) the Naval Commission, with instructions to consider the London Naval Treaty 1936, in the light of the observations from the Governments, § and prepare a final text of a Convention embodying the principles and provisions of this Treaty. In view of the interrelationship of the subjects to be dealt with, it is desirable that the four Committees and Commissions be in session simultaneously in order that they may co-ordinate their work and mutually assist each other. The reports of these Committees and Commissions would be submitted to the Bureau which would convene the General Commission, either upon receipt of each separate report or upon receipt of all four reports, with a view to the final consideration and adoption of each Convention and the possible preparation of a Protocol of Signature, or Final Act, linking all four Conventions. Thereafter a Plenary session of the Conference could be called for the purpose of signing the instruments adopted by the General Commission. The participation of delegates of States not at present represented in the Conference might be invited at each successive stage, and all States could in any event be invited to attend the final session for the purpose of signing the agreements arrived at. These agreements would presumably remain open to the accession of all non-Signatories. The question of whether some or all of the agreements should be conditioned upon their coming into force simultaneously could be left to the decision of the General Commission. C. Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War . The report (Conf. D. 168) adopted by the Special Committee on April 13th, 1935, and forwarded to the Governments contains: ( a ) texts unanimously adopted; ( b ) texts proposed by the Committee, but subject to reservations or to alternative proposals submitted by certain delegations, and ( c ) alternative texts proposed by these delegations. The Special Committee emphasised that the texts in no way bound the Governments represented in respect to their final attitude and pointed out that the final success of its task depended on the solution of certain questions of principle. In general, the texts unanimously adopted envisage a system of licenses for the manufacture and permits for the export or import of certain categories of arms and implements of war, and a system of publicity through the Permanent Disarmament Commission which would also watch over the execution of the obligations of the Convention. The Committee did not achieve unanimity with regard to the extent of publicity and the degree of control to be exercised through the Permanent Disarmament Commission (see also Section E below). The question of transit was left unsolved in the absence of adequate instructions on the part of some delegations. D. Publicity of National Defence Expenditure. The Conference originally considered budgetary publicity in conjunction with a general scheme of budgetary limitation. Agreement on such limitation having proved impossible, the General Commission, on June 8th, 1933, decided that the first general Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments should contain provisions for the application of the principle of Publicity of National Defence Expenditure, subject to international supervision, and instructed the Technical Committee to prepare the necessary texts (Minutes of the General Commission, page 629). On December 11th, 1933, the Technical Committee unanimously adopted a draft containing a series of articles to be incorporated in the Convention, with five Annexes conveying the necessary instructions. (Conf. D./C. G. 160). The draft was reconsidered by the Technical Committee in the autumn of 1934 in the light of additional documentary material received from the Governments, and a few minor changes were made in the text which was now issued as a final draft Convention (Conf. D./C.G.160 (1)). In the words of the President, “No particular difficulties were encountered in the field of Publicity, and the relevant articles of the draft Convention, with their Annexes, are available for immediate application” (Conf. C. 171, page 158). The final draft provides for a system of publicity, through the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of all national defence expenditure, including draft budgets, budgets, closed accounts, statements of changes, etc. It should be noted that the texts prepared by the Special Committee also include provisions for publicity of expenditure on manufacture and purchase of arms and implements of war (Article 7, C ( b )). E. The Permanent Disarmament Commission. The draft articles relating to the Permanent Disarmament Commission are now included in Chapter IV of the texts prepared by the Special Committee. The functions of the Commission as defined in this chapter relate primarily to the execution of the obligations regarding manufacture of and trade in arms and implements of war. The texts, nevertheless, are capable of adaptation in such manner as to permit of their incorporation in a separate instrument which would cover the functions of the Commission with respect also to such other fields as to which agreement may be attained. Alternatively, the particular functions of the Commission in each field might be dealt with in the respective Conventions, so that the special Convention dealing with the Commission per se could be confined to its setting up, composition, rules of procedure, etc. On certain fundamental questions of principle, especially as to a system of continuous and automatic examination and supervision on the spot—complete agreement has yet to be arrived at. Unanimous approval was, nevertheless, achieved in the Special Committee to the effect that a Permanent Disarmament Commission should be set up at the seat of the League, composed of one representative of each Contracting Party and to be entrusted with the duty of watching over the execution of the Convention; this Commission should meet in ordinary session at least once a year and in extraordinary session in accordance with the requirements of the Convention and whenever its Bureau should so decide either on its own motion or at the request of one of the Contracting Parties or of the Council of the League. It was also unanimously agreed that, in addition to the information specifically called for by the Convention, the Contracting Parties should be required to furnish any supplementary particulars or observations the Commission might request. F. Extension of the principles of the London Naval Treaty 1936. The London Naval Treaty 1936, intended to come into force upon the expiration at the end of the current year—1936—of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 7 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, 8 and to remain in effect for six years until the end of 1942, was signed on behalf of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (with the exception of the Irish Free State and South Africa), by France and by the United States of America, and is open to the accession of Italy and Japan as co-signatories of the London Treaty of 1930. While abandoning quantitative limitation, the Treaty perpetuates, elaborates, and in some instances reduces the qualitative limit of the earlier Treaties, thus eliminating competition in types of ships. It continues in more comprehensive form the exchange of information as to naval construction called for by the older Treaties and adds a new system of advance notification of annual building programmes, thereby removing, in the quantitative field also, those elements of secrecy, uncertainty, and surprise which in the past have recognisedly been important factors in naval competition. A six-year holiday in the building of 8 inch gun cruisers and of cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons has been established. Finally, the continuity of the naval disarmament effort has been assured by providing for consultation in 1940 with a view to a new conference in 1941 and to a possible reduction in unit tonnage and in caliber of guns of capital ships. Negotiations for the extension of the principles of this Treaty to other naval Powers, by means of bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom, 9 have to date been undertaken by the United Kingdom Government with the Governments of Germany, Poland, and the U. S. S. R. Moreover, the Secretary-General, at the suggestion of the President of the London Naval Conference, Mr. Anthony Eden, has invited the non-Signatory Governments (to which he has previously circulated the text of the Treaty and its two Protocols) to communicate, through his agency, any observations they might wish to offer on the text to the United Kingdom Government, which latter would be glad to furnish any explanations it might be in their power to give (Circular letter of May 6th, 1936, C. L. 74.1936.IX). It will be necessary, before reaching a decision as to the inclusion of the naval question in the future programme of the Conference, to determine whether the method now being pursued of bilateral negotiations should be continued, or a general treaty under the auspices of the Disarmament Conference be sought which would incorporate—with such modifications as circumstances might require—the provisions of the London Treaty. The question of whether such general Treaty would be open to the signature of all Powers or only to the States not signatories to the London Naval Treaty 1936, or, alternatively, only to the States not signatories to the London Naval Treaty 1930, would also have to be considered. 2 Not printed. 3 The proposed five-power conference was not held. 4 Vol. iii , p. 174 . 5 See telegram No. 949, November 20, 5 p.m., from the American delegate Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 187 . * This programme, briefly, invited the Bureau “to seek, by whatever means it deems appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a Disarmament Convention, a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference.” While providing for a further technical study of the question of security, air forces and arms manufacture and trade, the General Commission left it to the Bureau “to ensure that when the President convenes the General Commission it will have before it, as far as possible, a complete draft Convention.” ( Minutes of the General Commission , pp. 681–688). [Footnote in the original.] † The Technical Committee held its last meeting on April 16th, 1935, after framing certain principles to be applied in the examination of information received from Governments. [Footnote in the original.] ‡ The question of election of a new President will not be dealt with in this memorandum. [Footnote in the original.] 6 Department of State Treaty Series No. 919, or 50 Stat. 1363. For correspondence concerning negotiations leading to the signing of the treaty on March 25. see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff. § The Secretary-General on May 6th, 1936, suggested that such observations be submitted, through this agency, to the British Government (C.L.74.1936.IX). [Footnote in the original.] 7 Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 247 . 8 Ibid. , 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . 9 See pp 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] ff. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1113/74 [Document 2] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State No. 1830 Political Geneva , September 9, 1936. [Received September 22.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1815 Political of August 17 and to my telegram No. 325 of September 9, 10 a.m., 10 concerning preparatory work in the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat against the possibility of the disarmament question being raised in the forthcoming Assembly. In this regard, there is enclosed a copy of a draft statement 11 prepared in the Disarmament Section for delivery by the President of the Third Committee in case the disarmament matter is raised in the Assembly and referred to the Third Committee. This draft, which is almost entirely historical, follows along the lines of Mr. Field’s memorandum transmitted with my despatch under reference. There is likewise enclosed a copy of a memorandum, in French, submitted by Mr. Friis of the Disarmament Section to Mr. Aghnides, as well as an English translation thereof prepared in the Consulate. 11 In this memorandum Mr. Friis refers to a request that he prepare a draft resolution on disarmament, describes the views of various governments, as expressed in recent communications on League reform, regarding consideration of disarmament in the forthcoming Assembly and advises against attempting to prepare a draft resolution at that time (September 3). I understand, however, that such a resolution has since been prepared, but I have been unable as yet to obtain a copy. In amplification of the information conveyed in my telegram under reference, I understand that Mr. Aghnides favors a controlled and limited discussion of specific subjects (such as arms manufacture and trade); that he regards it as inevitable that the question should come up and wishes the Secretariat to be prepared to give such guidance as it can to keep the discussion on safe and constructive grounds. His view is believed to be based in part on an expectation (possibly acquired during conversations while attending the Montreux Conference 13 as Secretary-General) that the French Government is planning to submit a memorandum containing new suggestions with respect to arms manufacture and trade. I have reason to believe that during a recent visit to Paris Mr. Aghnides further discussed this issue with officials there, and urged them to take account of practical possibilities and not submit another unrealizable all-or-nothing plan designed purely for home effect. Several members of the Disarmament Section, in particular the British member, are understood to question the wisdom of any discussion of armaments at the Assembly. In their view, the Conference has been inactive since April 1935 pending an improvement in the general political situation; there has been no improvement which would justify resumption at this time; on the contrary, a new effort would be bound to lead to failure and still further undermine the League’s prestige. Moreover, it would be difficult to keep the discussion within constructive limits; and embarrassing issues would almost certainly arise, such as the question of German or Russian armaments or that of the rearmament of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The British member is particularly opposed to any intervention of the League with respect to the naval negotiations now being conducted by Great Britain. He is being supported in this by Mr. Field. A new element has been introduced as a result of the replies of several governments, notably those of the Scandinavian states, on the question of League reform. These contain more or less detailed suggestions respecting disarmament; and some League officials believe that the submission of these replies to the Assembly will automatically raise the disarmament question. They feel that the draft prepared by the Disarmament Section is to that extent already superseded. As the Department is aware, disarmament is not included on the published agenda of the Assembly. It would, therefore, have to be raised at a plenary session by one or more delegations before the question of reference to the Third Committee could arise. It is requested that the enclosures to this despatch be treated as strictly confidential. Respectfully yours, Prentiss B. Gilbert 10 Latter not printed. 11 Not printed. 11 Not printed. 13 Held June 22–July 20, 1936; see vol. iii , pp. 503 ff. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/488: Telegram [Document 3] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 25, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 25—12:35 p.m.] 1067. Supplementing my 1066, September 25, 11 a.m., 14 Massigli 15 informs me that the French are sending a note tomorrow to the President of the Council asking the Council to discuss the advisability of calling the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference. Massigli says that his Government hopes to have the commissions that were sitting in February and March 1935 resume work on control of the traffic in and manufacture of arms and budgetary publicity. I am contemplating sending you tomorrow a telegram in greater detail on the subject after discussion with other delegations. How we should treat this problem has raised questions in my mind which I would like to put before you. Wilson 14 Not printed. 15 René Massigli, Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs; assistant delegate to the League of Nations Assembly. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/489: Telegram [Document 4] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 26, 1936—11 p.m. [Received September 27—12:59 p.m.] 1069. My 1068, September 26, 6 p.m. 14 The French are reticent as to exactly what they will propose in the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference. I find the British and other delegations as well as the Secretariat equally unaware in regard to French aims. As near as I can estimate them the French will suggest as a development of the first step of the solution which Delbos 16 proposed that the committees on traffic in and manufacture of arms and budgetary publicity be called again into existence to continue their work. The British tell me that they will be consulted by the French and that they have not changed their attitude as shown in the discussions of February and March 1935. It may be however that the French [intend] to make some offer more capable of acceptance by the British. I must admit that I find widespread skepticism as to positive results developing from the French initiative. Germany and Italy will be absent from the Bureau. I am convinced after numerous attempts that no document completed in Germany’s absence will gain Germany’s adherence. I can conceive of useful work being done under one hypothesis only, namely, that the French will so modify their attitude on the traffic in and manufacture of arms as to gain the acquiescence of the British. In this case a second reading of the text might be undertaken provided that the work were stopped at the end of that second reading so that Germany and Italy could participate in the final preparation of the treaty text. On the other hand it may well develop that [if?] no modification of the positions in respect to traffic and manufacture is apparent, an attempt will be made to gain agreement on budgetary publicity alone. As you remember although the latter draft was satisfactory to the majority of the committees the United States had grave objections and we had reserved our final position. The Bureau will presumably be called in the near future and unless you instruct me to the contrary I shall assume that you desire me to attend. Although the situation is unclear it may be possible to foresee two contingencies. Hypothesis 1: that the French have nothing new to offer other than resumption of the work of the committees. In this event since we were in a large measure responsible for this draft I should be inclined to take the position that the first reading showed such wide divergencies of views that I saw no useful purpose [would] be served in the mere reiteration of these conflicting theses and to ask whether the French or the other delegations could inform me of any change in attitude which would make the work more fruitful now than it was 2 years ago. I make this suggestion because it seems to me that there has developed in the public a certain impatience with repeated fruitless efforts in the field of disarmament. Hypothesis 2: that the French or any other delegation make a constructive suggestion. In this event I should prefer to consult with you before making our attitude clear at a subsequent meeting of the Bureau. If, however, you feel that it is advisable that we should support energetically any attempt whatsoever to reopen the subject of disarmament I would appreciate your instructions. Wilson 14 Not printed. 16 Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs; delegate to the League of Nations Assembly. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/489: Telegram [Document 5] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) Washington , September 28, 1936—6 p.m. 511. Your 1069, September 26, 11 p.m. After considering the facts reported in your telegram in the light of the general situation, we have come to the conclusion that it would be advisable for us to support an attempt to reopen the subject of disarmament, with particular emphasis upon those sections of the work in which a large measure of accord has already been realized. We believe that we should adhere to our position of 1934–1935, that a contractual obligation should be entered into as soon as possible between the nations most concerned with regard to the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms and publicity on Budgetary Expenditure. We are of the view that a Permanent Disarmament Commission might be a most effective instrument for supervising and controlling this obligation. Finally, we believe that this obligation should be entered into without awaiting the realization of a General Disarmament Convention. It would seem necessary to us, however, to obtain in advance a clarification of the present views of the French and British Governments with regard to these specific subjects and with regard to the general disarmament situation in order that we might have some idea of the present prospects of a positive result developing from the renewal of the discussions and possibly from a second reading of the draft text. It would be unfortunate and would merely further exacerbate public opinion if there were to be mere recurrence of the cleavage between the British and French positions which was so apparent in 1935 and which forced an adjournment of the discussions in the hope that the bases of a general accord might be reached. In short, any information regarding the actual situation which may come to you would be appreciated by us. In any event, however, we shall wish you to attend the session of the Bureau, if it is called, and to make clear that our interest in the success of disarmament efforts has not abated and that we wish to contribute to a full extent in efforts which would mean the lessening of anxiety and an increase of confidence in the world. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.C111/961: Telegram [Document 6] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 29, 1936—3 p.m. [Received September 29—12:12 p.m.] 1070. Your 511, September 28, 6 p.m. In yesterday’s meeting of the Assembly the President read a letter translation of which follows: “During the general discussion several speakers have raised the Question of resuming the work on international disarmament. The delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, The Netherlands and Sweden have the honor to support the suggestion which has already been discussed by the general committee of the Assembly that the third committee should be set up to consider the possibility of resuming its work.” I have learned this morning from members of these delegations that the Norwegians and the Danes who are not members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference felt that they desired to make declarations on the disarmament problem. They have no desire to prevent the meeting of the Bureau and indeed hope that their declarations will facilitate the work of the Bureau. Reflecting upon your 511, September 28, 6 p.m., I believe that I cannot learn more than I have at present about the British and French positions unless I take up the matter officially with the chief delegates of those states. I would appreciate your advice as to whether it would be expedient to approach them formally in writing telling them of your interest in a basis of discussions and asking them specifically what they have in mind. Wilson The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) 500.C111/961: Telegram [Document 7] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) Washington , September 29, 1936—6 p.m. 512. Your 1070, September 29, 3 p.m. Referring to last paragraph of the above it would seem inadvisable for us to put ourselves in the position of making a formal approach to the British and the French. We wish you to follow closely the developments in respect of disarmament, reporting any further facts as to the British and French positions as they may come to you but without exposing us to the possibility of being regarded as an intermediary in the present complex stage of disarmament-security negotiations in Europe. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/491: Telegram [Document 8] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 1, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 1071. The Third Commission was set up by the Assembly this morning, the Hungarian delegate declaring that on account of the attitude of other powers towards equality of treatment his delegation would abstain from attending meetings. A talk with Viénot 18 later gives me some further light on the French attitude in disarmament. Viénot said that his delegation would of course attend the Third Commission but that if he spoke at all in the name of France it would be merely to reserve his views for the Bureau which organ was more representative of the great armed powers. He anticipates that the Bureau will meet in the next few days. Requesting me to regard the information as confidential he said that at the Bureau the French representative would state that it [was] believed that the time was ripe for a “reexamination” of the questions of budgetary publicity, control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms and limitations of air forces. The first two the French delegation believed could be undertaken by a second reading [of the] draft conventions already existing. As for the third, they had not worked out the final details of what they hoped to propose. The French delegation would not push the other task to an immediate and decisive answer but would propose a second meeting of the Bureau [after a] certain delay to enable the delegates to consult with their governments. Whether this second meeting should take place before or after the Locarno conversations would be a point to be determined in the Bureau. Following the lines of your 511, September 28, 6 p.m., I spoke of the great interest of the United States in seeing these conventions brought into being but reminded him of the wide divergence of view between the British and French delegations in the last discussions and added that I thought it would be unhappy to see these divergences in public in the present situation. I gained the impression from Viénot that he knew even less about the British attitude than I. He said the French were deeply concerned, that the essential first step was the control of the production of armaments. Limitation might follow but he did not believe that limitation could precede or be simultaneous with the control of production. He admitted that the wiser procedure would be for the French Government to work with the British after the first Bureau meeting and urge them to examine how far they could revise their attitude. Viénot [said that] in its initiative the French was hoping to have not only the approval of the United States but the same vigorous support from that country that had characterized the debates in the last meetings. I replied that my Government was as anxious now as then to see these conventions realized but stated that it seemed to me that the crux of success for a second [reading] in the absence of Germany lay in the British and French ironing out the differences. In replying as I did to Viénot I tried to give him the impression that while we earnestly desired success and would aid enthusiastically if there were any hope, we would be reluctant to waste effort on a gesture condemned to failure at the start. Wilson 18 Pierre Viénot, French Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; delegate (substitute) to the League of Nations Assembly, September 21–October 10, 1936. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.C1113/76: Telegram [Document 9] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 2, 1936—7 p.m. [Received October 2—2:48 p.m.] 1073. The Third Committee of the Assembly met this afternoon for the first time and elected Lange of Norway, President. Lange summarized the work before the Committee as being that of exploration and a useful preface for the meeting of the Bureau. He states that his task would be to review the subject of disarmament with particular reference to the statements made during the general debate of the Assembly and to make possible recommendations for the resumption of useful work on this subject. The meetings of the Third Committee would give the prestige of the Assembly’s sanction to the resumption of work which would actually take place in the Bureau but only limited results can now be expected. Even these, he said, can only be achieved if certain powers are prepared to make concessions from positions taken in which they are more or less isolated. The general discussion will open and [ at ] the next meeting. Wilson The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/492: Telegram [Document 10] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 4, 1936—noon. [Received October 4—9:50 a.m.] 1074. A [statement by?] Cranborne 19 throws light on the British position respecting disarmament. Cranborne feels that the whole subject is considered untimely in England and somewhat harassing. Certain conservative elements in the Government have for years been convinced of the necessity of rearmament, they have struggled hard to carry conviction to the rest of their party and finally, aided by German building, to the rest of the nation. The nation has now for the first time reluctantly but seriously accepted a program of rearmament hence the Government hesitates to welcome anything that even psychologically cuts across this state of mind, unless, Cranborne added, it shows possibility of real reduction in armament throughout the whole of Europe. For a partial measure such as the French seem to have in mind they cannot have any ardent sympathy. We then went more in detail into the subject. The British are willing to accept an agreement for budgetary publicity but in their minds such newspaper publicity is an unilateral act and subject to no control. I know from my conversations with the French that such is not their conception respecting manufacture of and trade in arms. Cranborne deplored the fact that Great Britain had had to oppose France on this subject and again would have to oppose France on it if the French pushed for a formal notice. Cranborne added that no change of attitude on the part of the British Government in this respect could be expected before the Royal Commission sitting on this matter had given its report. He did not know what kind of report the Commission would make. It had been sitting for a year and a half and the testimony was voluminous. He hoped it would give its report soon so that the Government could clarify its attitude. Wilson 19 Viscount Robert A. J. C. Cranborne, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; member (substitute) of the British delegation to the League of Nations. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/493: Telegram [Document 11] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 5, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 5—6:45 p.m.] 1075. At the meeting of the Third Committee this afternoon the five states responsible for its convocation reiterated their belief that work in the disarmament field could usefully be resumed in the Bureau and outlined a limited program which seemed to offer prospect of achievement: namely, a convention to include publicity of budgetary expenditures, control of trade in and manufacture of arms and the establishment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. In this they were in general supported by the other speakers. Paul-Boncour 20 stated that France would not have taken the initiative of requesting the summoning of the Bureau if it had not felt that there were chances of some accomplishment but did not press for its immediate convocation. He reiterated France’s basic conception that any settlement must be founded on the twin principles of publicity and control. He was followed by Malcolm MacDonald for Great Britain who repeated what Eden 21 had said before the Assembly in respect to the possibility of achieving a convention on budgetary publicity. MacDonald also reviewed the British position with respect to the control of arms manufacture and trade in terms similar to those used by the British during the committee meetings of 1935 and stressed the need for a treaty of this nature which would be both practical and possible of general acceptance. The President closed the general discussion and will report to the Assembly that the Third Committee supports the French move for convocation of the Bureau. Wilson 20 Jean Paul-Boncour, permanent French representative on the League of Nations Council. 21 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/495: Telegram [Document 12] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 7, 1936—9 p.m. [Received October 7—1:55 p.m.] 1078. The Third Committee this afternoon approved a report 22 to the Assembly which summarized its deliberations and states that “while the Committee expresses the hope that there will be an early meeting of the Bureau, it nevertheless realizes that the date of convocation and the result of its discussions depend very largely on the important negotiations which are so frequently mentioned at present.” A resolution was also prepared for the Assembly’s approval welcoming the initiative taken by the French with a view to the early convocation of the Bureau. 23 Wilson 22 League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 158, Annex, p. 26. 23 Ibid. , No. 153, p. 19. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/496: Telegram [Document 13] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 10, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 11—10:40 a.m.] 1079. The Council adopted last night a resolution the pertinent part of which follows: “Referring to the Third Committee’s report approved by the Assembly on October 10th, 1936; Authorizes the President of the Council, after consultation with his colleagues, to settle, as soon as circumstances permit and in any case before the end of the year, the date of the meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, and to instruct the Secretary-General to proceed with its convocation; And decides to communicate the report and the minutes of the Third Committee, together with the minutes of the present meeting, to the members of the Bureau and to all the states represented at the Conference.” Wilson The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/501 [Document 14] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State No. 4735 L. N. No. 3484 Bern , December 24, 1936. [Received January 6, 1937.] Sir : I have the honor to quote below a communication (Conf. D.–Bureau–70) by the President of the Council of the League of Nations, dated December 23, 1936, entitled, “Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Bureau of the Conference.” “By a resolution adopted on October 10th, 1936, the Council authorised its President, after consultation with his colleagues, to settle, as soon as circumstances permitted and in any case before the end of the year, the date of the meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and to instruct the Secretary-General to proceed with its convocation. In coming to this decision the Council took into consideration the resolution adopted the same day by the Assembly, in which the latter welcomed the action initiated by the French Government ‘with a view to the early convocation at the most opportune date’ of the Bureau of the Conference. “The President of the Council has just consulted his colleagues in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution of October 10th. “Having regard to all the considerations by which the Assembly and the Council were guided in October last, to the opinion expressed by the members of the Council during the recent consultations and more particularly to the suggestion made by one of them, and also bearing in mind the proximity of the next session of the Council, the President has thought it preferable to refer the question of the date of the meeting of the Bureau of the Conference to the Council itself in January. To this end the Secretary-General has been requested to take the necessary steps.” Respectfully yours, Hugh R. Wilson London Naval Conference, 1935: Second phase, January 6–March 25, 1936 London Naval Conference, 1935: Second phase, January 6–March 25, 1936 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 64 ff., and Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , pp. 277 ff. For other documentation in connection with the Conference, see Department of State Conference Series No. 24: The London Naval Conference, 1935, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America, Text of the London Naval Treaty and Other Documents (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936); and Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1935 (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1936). [15] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, January 7, 1936. 500.A15A5/599 [16] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 7, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/599: Telegram [17] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 8, 1936—10 p.m. [Received January 8—7:12 p.m.] 500.A15A5/601: Telegram [18] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 9, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 9—5:05 p.m.] 500.A15A5/604: Telegram [19] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 9, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/601: Telegram [20] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 10, 1936—2 a.m. [Received January 9—3:34 p.m.] 500.A15A5/606: Telegram [21] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 10, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 10—2:30 p.m.] 500.A15A5/609: Telegram [22] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 10, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/609: Telegram [23] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 11, 1936—11 a.m. [Received January 11—6:08 a.m.] 500.A15A5/610: Telegram [24] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 11, 1936—4 p.m. 500.A15A5/610: Telegram [25] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 12, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 12—10:10 a.m.] 500.A15A5/611: Telegram [26] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 13, 1936—11 p.m. [Received January 13—11:30 a.m.] 500.A15A5/612: Telegram [27] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 14, 1936—1 a.m. [Received January 13—10:45 p.m.] 500.A15A5/615: Telegram [28] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 14—3:47 p.m.] 500.A15A5/617: Telegram [29] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 16, 1936—2 p.m. [Received January 16—9:50 a.m.] 500.A15A5/622: Telegram [30] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] January 16, 1936. 500.A15A5/631 [31] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 18, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A5/628a: Telegram [32] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 20, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A5/628b: Telegram [33] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 21, 1936—2 a.m. [Received January 20—9 p.m.] 500.A15A5/629: Telegram [34] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 23, 1936—3 a.m. [Received January 22—11 p.m.] 500.A15A5/632: Telegram [35] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 23, 1936—10 p.m. [Received January 23—7:24 p.m.] 500.A15A5/634: Telegram [36] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 24, 1936—8 p.m. [Received January 24—8 p.m.] 500.A15A5/635: Telegram [37] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 26, 1936—9 p.m. [Received January 26—6:35 p.m.] 500.A15A5/638: Telegram [38] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 29, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/638a: Telegram [39] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 29, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/638: Telegram [40] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 30, 1936—6 p.m. [Received January 30—2:23 p.m.] 500.A15A5/639: Telegram [41] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 30, 1936—8 p.m. [Received January 30—4:04 p.m.] 500.A15A5/640: Telegram [42] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 31, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/639: Telegram [43] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 1, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 1—4:45 p.m.] 500.A15A5/644: Telegram [44] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 3, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 3—7:12 p.m.] 500.A15A5/646: Telegram [45] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 3, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 3—7:05 p.m.] 500.A15A5/647: Telegram [46] The Consul General at Beirut (Marriner), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State Paris, February 4, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 4—11 a.m.] 500.A15A5/648: Telegram [47] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 6, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A5/647: Telegram [48] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 12, 1936—9 p.m. [Received February 12—5:30 p.m.] 500.A15A5/657: Telegram [49] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 14, 1936—6 p.m. [Received February 14—2:05 p.m.] 500.A15A5/661: Telegram [50] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 17, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 17—12:40 p.m.] 500.A15A5/663: Telegram [51] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 18, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 18—10:25 a.m.] 500.A15A5/665: Telegram [52] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 19, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 19—4:20 p.m.] 500.A15A5/667: Telegram [53] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, February 20, 1936—11 a.m. [Received February 20—9:50 a.m.] 500.A15A5/669: Telegram [54] The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to President Roosevelt Washington, February 20, 1936. 500.A15A5/670 [55] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 20, 1936—3 p.m. 500.A15A5/670: Telegram [56] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 20, 1936—4 p.m. 500.A15A5/670: Telegram [57] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 21, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 21—11:30 a.m.] 500.A15A5/672: Telegram [58] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 21, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/672: Telegram [59] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 21, 1936—6 p.m. [Received February 21—2:25 p.m.] 500.A15A5/673: Telegram [60] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 25, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A5/676: Telegram [61] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 25, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 25—11:35 a.m.] 500.A15A5/677: Telegram [62] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 25, 1936—8 p.m. 500.A15A5/685a: Telegram [63] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 25, 1936—11 p.m. [Received February 25—7:25 p.m.] 500.A15A5/681: Telegram [64] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 25, 1936—midnight. [Received February 25—7:10 p.m.] 500.A15A5/682: Telegram [65] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 26, 1936—8 p.m. 500.A15A5/681: Telegram [66] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 26, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 26—5:50 p.m.] 500.A15A5/688: Telegram [67] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 26, 1936—midnight. [Received February 26—8 p.m.] 500.A15A5/687: Telegram [68] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 27, 1936—noon. [Received February 27—9:05 a.m.] 500.A15A5/689: Telegram [69] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 27, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/689: Telegram [70] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 28, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 28—11:42 a.m.] 500.A15A5/692: Telegram [71] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 28, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/696: Telegram [72] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 28, 1936—8 p.m. 500.A15A5/697: Telegram [73] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 28, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 28—8 p.m.] 500.A15A5/695: Telegram [74] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 29, 1936—noon. [Received February 29—8 a.m.] 500.A15A5/698: Telegram [75] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 29, 1936—4 p.m. 500.A15A5/702: Telegram [76] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 3, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 3—3:03 p.m.] 500.A15A5/703: Telegram [77] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 4, 1936—1 a.m. [Received March 3—9:40 p.m.] 500.A15A5/704: Telegram [78] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 5, 1936—5 p.m. 500.A15A5/705: Telegram [79] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 9, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A5/710a: Telegram [80] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 9, 1936—11 p.m. [Received March 9—8:45 p.m.] 500.A15A5/710: Telegram [81] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 10, 1936—9 p.m. [Received March 10—5:30 p.m.] 500.A15A5/714: Telegram [82] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 11, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/710: Telegram [83] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 13, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 13—3:43 p.m.] 500.A15A5/718: Telegram [84] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 14, 1936—1 a.m. [Received March 13—10:10 p.m.] 500.A15A5/719: Telegram [85] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 14, 1936—3 p.m. 500.A15A5/719: Telegram [86] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 16, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 16—4:15 p.m.] 500.A15A5/722: Telegram [87] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 19, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 19—11:45 a.m.] 500.A15A5/729: Telegram [88] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 19, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 19—12:20 p.m.] 500.A15A5/728: Telegram [89] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) Washington, March 21, 1936. 500.A15A5/760 [90] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 23, 1936—noon. 500.A15A5/729: Telegram [91] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American, Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 23, 1936—4 p.m. 500.A15A5/746b: Telegram [92] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 23, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/729: Telegram [93] The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson) Washington, March 28, 1936. 500.A15A5/747 [94] The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to President Roosevelt Washington, March 30, 1936. 500.A15A5/760 The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 500.A15A5/599 [Document 15] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , January 7, 1936. My Dear Mr. President : It is obvious that the Japanese have no intention of accepting any agreement in London which will not recognize their demand for parity with the American and British navies and it seems perfectly clear to me that there is very little use in continuing the discussions too long in London in the face of this apparently fixed attitude of the Japanese Government. I am attaching hereto, therefore, a draft of a telegram to our Delegation in London 2 which I would like to submit for your consideration. This draft has received the approval of the Secretary of the Navy and the Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and, if you concur in its sense as now drafted, I shall be very glad to send it forward as soon as you may let me know that it meets with your approval. 3 Faithfully yours, Cordell Hull 2 For the telegram as sent, see infra. 3 This letter was returned with the notation: “O. K. F. D. R.” The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/599: Telegram [Document 16] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 7, 1936—6 p.m. 8. We feel firmly convinced that the Japanese have no intention of receding from their insistence upon parity with the British and ourselves and that they have no intention of becoming a party to any agreement on any other phase of the naval situation which does not recognize their demands for a “common upper limit”. It would seem advisable to have a clear-cut decision as early as possible on whether the Japanese would be willing to reach an agreement on any phase of the naval situation in the absence of an agreement which would grant parity to them. If the Japanese are eventually to refuse any agreement which would not include recognition of their right to build to a “common upper limit”, I question the advisability of continuing to discuss ways and means of arriving at an agreement with them as the very fact of continuing to discuss such possibilities will, if continued beyond a reasonably short exploratory period, undoubtedly weaken the position which we must eventually take publicly. If the conference is to end on a note that the Japanese have made and insisted upon a demand which is entirely unacceptable to the British and ourselves, it would seem to be desirable that this should take place early rather than after a too long drawn out series of attempts to arrive at a conclusion which could have become evident in the early stages of the Conference. To continue discussion in such circumstances would only result in confusion in the public mind and may meanwhile offer an opportunity for the militarist element in Japan to use the news from London in a manner tending to justify their own aims and to intensify antagonism on the part of the Japanese people toward the United States. I would suggest, therefore, that you consider the advisability of discussing the situation with the Chairman of the Conference with a view to ascertaining whether the procedure of the Conference may be so formulated as to develop an early definite answer to the question of whether an agreement involving Japan is possible at this time. In the event that such an agreement does not appear to be susceptible of realization, I would also suggest that you study the possibilities of such agreement as may be feasible which would include the other nations present at the Conference and to which Japan might possibly adhere later and, if no agreement seems to be possible of achievement within a reasonably short time, you might discuss with the Chairman the advisability of adjourning the deliberations of the Conference until such time as the prospects for some agreement become more favorable. These suggestions are entirely for your own consideration and discussion with the Chairman of the Conference and not to be put forward at this time as proposals of the American Delegation. I should be very glad to receive a report of your views on the subject. The President has seen and approved this telegram. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/601: Telegram [Document 17] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 8, 1936—10 p.m. [Received January 8—7:12 p.m.] 38. Your 8, January 7, 6 p.m. We entirely concur in the views indicated by you and have been thinking very much along the same lines. Unfortunately, Eden 4 has been so swamped this week in getting installed in his new office and entertained by all the Ambassadors and Ministers that he has not been able to come to grips with the naval matter. He has, however, written me that he wishes to have a good talk with me in the very near future and I think it desirable to discuss fully with him the questions raised before reaching a final decision as to our course. As reported in a separate cable, 5 the Japanese almost brought matters to a head today by refusing even to discuss the British, French and Italian proposals for an exchange of information. 6 After the meeting today Craigie 7 told me he would like to have at once a talk with Phillips 8 and me in which Monsell 9 later joined. Craigie in substance said they were satisfied that the Japanese Admiralty wished to bring the Conference to a head without delay but that the Japanese Foreign Office is still anxious to keep the Conference going and desirous of getting some kind of a so-called political understanding that would enable them in effect to agree to continue the naval status quo . The British would therefore like to discuss further the question they had raised with regard to a pact of nonaggression. We told him frankly that we could not consider such a pact. 10 Craigie then suggested as an alternative a consultation pact which would state in effect that in a desire to cooperate for the promotion of peace in the Far East and to remove sources of misunderstanding, etc., we would consult when necessary. He said that this would really be meaningless but would give the Japanese some justification and help save their pride. We told him it would be difficult to explain to our Senate why we had signed a treaty that had so little meaning and that it would also raise questions as to Russia, China, the Dutch East Indies, and all other powers interested in the Far East. Craigie replied that the Covenant of the League 11 would protect them insofar as these other powers were concerned but we explained that we were not in the same position. I then asked Craigie if Eden were in favor of such a suggestion and he said that so far he had had very little time to discuss it with Eden who has not yet made up his mind. (In this connection before the Conference this afternoon Phillips called on Eden at the latter’s invitation with Ambassador Bingham, Craigie also being present. The two pacts above mentioned were brought up during the course of conversation by Craigie but Phillips got the impression that Eden did not seem to regard them as practicable though he felt a pact of consultation might be worthy of study.) Craigie then said that he could understand our basic objection to such a limited pact of nonaggression but that it was so vitally important to them to get a naval agreement with Japan, if possible, that he hoped we would think over further the possibility of a so-called pact of consultation mainly as a means of helping to save the Japanese face. We told him that while we were glad to do anything reasonable to promote an agreement our reaction was distinctly unfavorable, but that if after thinking it over further we had any possible suggestions to make we would let him know. Monsell and Craigie told us they were going to have a meeting with the Japanese tomorrow at the Foreign Office and tell them that since they know perfectly well that their common upper limit will be rejected the British would like to know if the Japanese wished to have this done immediately and if they are then ready to attempt to get an agreement on any other basis; and if not what they propose doing. The British felt that after this meeting it was very important for us to have a meeting and decide what to do. Monsell then said that they could not consent to having Japan dictate to the Conference what we may discuss and agreed with us that since the Japanese are forcing the issue it is better once and for all to definitely and finally to reject the common upper limit. Craigie evidenced a desire to keep the Japanese on even as observers but Monsell agreed more with our attitude. Monsell said he would rather have the Japanese run out by refusing even to discuss the French, Italian and British proposals for exchanging information as to future construction than on a flat rejection of the common upper limit, he added that if they were to pull out as now seems probable he thought we should go ahead and negotiate a fourpower naval agreement which would have an escape clause and would provide for Japanese adherence later if she so desires. The British now believe France and Italy would be willing to join in such a treaty. Both the latter powers have shown of late a marked interest in a fourpower agreement. Davis 4 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 5 Telegram No. 37, January 8, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation; not printed. 6 See Report of the Delegates of the United States …, pp. 199 ff. 7 Robert L. Craigie, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and adviser to the British delegation. 8 William Phillips, Under Secretary of State of the United States and American delegate. 9 Viscount Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty and British delegate. 10 See telegram No. 34, January 6, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, vol. iv , p. 1 . 11 Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 69 . The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/604: Telegram [Document 18] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 9, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 9—5:05 p.m.] 39. In a talk I had with Eden alone this afternoon I told him that apparently the Conference had reached a stage which made it important for us to determine very carefully what our next move should be and that although I knew he was overwhelmed with the duties of his new office, I hoped very much we could have the benefit of his counsel and cooperation. He replied that he was impressed with the importance of doing this and had, in fact, had a long meeting of the British delegation this morning with a view of bringing himself up to date on the questions at issue and preparatory to the meeting they are to have with the Japanese this afternoon at which he will preside. I then told him that the British and American delegations had been cooperating most harmoniously and satisfactorily but that I was afraid there was a little too much tendency, particularly on the part of Craigie, to avoid coming to an issue on certain fundamentals which had been raised—such as the common upper limit—in the hope that by prolonging the Conference they might ultimately bring Japan into line. I then gave him fully the views expressed in your 8, January 7, 6 p.m., and his reply was that this appealed to him as being very sound. In order, finally, to dispose of the questions which had been raised before, originally by Craigie, as to a pact of nonaggression or of consultation, I explained the fundamental objections and he replied that he had been thinking this over since Craigie brought the matter up to him and had come to the conclusion that a pact of nonaggression was out of the question and that he still had doubts as to the wisdom of even a consultative pact that would not include all of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty 12 plus Russia and to which Japan would probably not be favorable. He then told me he would like to read to me just what he had decided in conference this morning to say to the Japanese this afternoon which was to the following effect—that the British, having taken the responsibility of calling the Conference, were entitled to expect cooperation from all the powers represented and particularly on a question of mere procedure; one power should not attempt to dictate to the other four; that he would like to know if the Japanese wished to discuss the common upper limit and have it finally disposed of and once that was done, which would certainly be unfavorable to them, he would like to know if they were prepared to attempt an agreement on any other phases of the naval problem and if so, on what, and if not, what did they propose to do. He then asked what I thought of the advisability of hinting to the Japanese that if they wished to go home without an agreement the other four powers would probably stay on in an effort to reach a naval agreement to which Japan might later adhere if she so desires. I told him I saw no objection to this. I said, however, that I entirely agreed with the position he proposed to take with the Japanese and felt that if we showed any further tendency to evade the issue on the common upper limit we would begin to appear ridiculous, and therefore the sooner we disposed of this matter the better. He replied that he agreed entirely with me and that his effort would be to work most closely with us. Eden said that he would see me at the official dinner tonight and inform me exactly what happened with the Japanese this afternoon. Davis 12 Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 276 . The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/601: Telegram [Document 19] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 9, 1936—7 p.m. 10. Delegation’s 38, January 8, 10 p.m. I approve the steps taken by the Delegation. Might it not be useful to remind Craigie that the principle and the substance of cooperation and consultation are laid down in the preamble and article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty? The Department, in the expectation that the British themselves will come to the conclusion that neither proposal is practicable, suggests for your consideration that you might care in future discussions with the British to go no further toward definitely disposing adversely of Craigie’s suggestions. Such tactics would tend to safeguard against the development of a situation wherein the British might feel that we are blocking proposals which some of them may feel at this stage offer promise. The Department shares the views expressed by Monsell as reported in the last paragraph of your telegram. The major strategy of the Delegation should continue to conform to the Department’s telegram No. 8, January 7, 6 p.m. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/606: Telegram [Document 20] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 10, 1936—2 a.m. [Received January 9—3:34 p.m.] 41. Referring to my 39, January 9, 7 p.m. After the official dinner tonight Eden and Monsell told me that the former had in the meeting this afternoon told the Japanese exactly what he had informed me this afternoon he would tell them. The Japanese seemed disconcerted. Eden had then told them that if they wished to have the common upper limit or quantitative limitation first discussed and disposed of, the British were quite agreeable to do so and that they would consult the other delegations on this point. The Japanese then asked that the Conference be adjourned over the week end to give them time to consider and communicate with Tokio. Eden told them that in case they would not agree to continue actively in the Conference after the common upper limit had been rejected, the British wished to know if the Japanese would like to continue as observers or otherwise while the other four powers negotiated a naval agreement in which case the Japanese might determine whether or not they desire to become parties to such a treaty. This seemed to disturb them even more. Eden and Monsell then said they thought it important that the British and ourselves make substantially similar statements in rejecting the common upper limit at the next meeting and that we should endeavor to get the French and Italians to come along. Later we talked separately with the French and Italians who practically agreed that they would definitely join in rejecting the common upper limit. The French asked whether if it should be rejected we would be willing to negotiate a four-power naval agreement to which Japan could later adhere. I told them that if the others wished to do so we were agreeable subject to agreement on the agenda. The Japanese told the French tonight that if the common upper limit is rejected they will withdraw from the Conference unless their instructions are altered in the meantime. Eden, Monsell and Chatfield 13 expressed the opinion that the Japanese would not do so. Our information is that the Japanese delegation is divided on the question that their naval people are in favor of withdrawal on rejection of the common upper limit but that the diplomatic members of the delegation wish to continue in the Conference. I might add that Monsell told me that if the four-power conference were able to arrive at an agreement it might be possible later to invite Germany and Russia to join in the deliberations. In this connection it may be interesting to note that the only other government representatives present at the dinner tonight besides those of the five naval powers were the German and Soviet Ambassadors. Davis 13 Sir Ernie Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff; adviser to the British delegation. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/609: Telegram [Document 21] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 10, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 10—2:30 p.m.] 43. Your No. 10, January 9, 7 p.m. 1. I did point out to both Eden and Craigie that the principle and substance of cooperation and consultation as regards China are contained in the Nine Power Treaty and that as regards the Pacific consultation is provided for in the Four Power Pact 14 and that there could be no reason for any additional agreement for cooperation and consultation unless it were for the purpose of extending this to include Russia. 2. In order to keep the record clear as to the issues we have suggested to the British that they report to the committee at the next meeting that the Japanese have refused to proceed with a discussion of the proposals for notification as to building programs and construction and have insisted upon turning to a discussion of the common upper limit. We have not got complete British agreement on this as yet but are to discuss it further on Monday. 3. If the Japanese walk out the delegation has been discussing the pros and cons of Japan’s continuing in the naval negotiations in the capacity of observer. We feel that while there are objections to having the Japanese delegation as a whole remain on and sit in in technical discussions it would be inadvisable for us to object to their having an observer because this would be construed as a desire on our part to eliminate them altogether and concoct something against them. Since the French and Italians sat in at the Geneva conference as observers 15 without a voice and since the League has an observer at the present Conference, we question the advisability of our objection to the Japanese having the same right. The Japanese may settle this matter themselves but please give us your views if possible before the meeting on Monday. Davis 14 Treaty signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 33 . 15 At the three-power conference for the limitation of naval armament, June 20–August 4, 1927; see telegram No. 66, May 17, 1927, from the Ambassador in Italy, Foreign Relations , 1927, vol. i , p. 39 . The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/609: Telegram [Document 22] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 10, 1936—7 p.m. 12. Your 43, January 10, 7 p.m. We see no basis upon which an objection should be made by this Government to the presence of a Japanese observer or observers in the event that the Japanese withdraw from the Conference and the remaining nations proceed to discuss an agreement. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/610: Telegram [Document 23] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 11, 1936—11 a.m. [Received January 11—6:08 a.m.] 45. In view of the most important developments just now it would be very helpful if Grew 16 would keep the delegation as fully informed as possible as to the situation in Tokyo and the trend in conflicting views between the Foreign Office and the Navy. Davis 16 Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador in Japan. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/610: Telegram [Document 24] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 11, 1936—4 p.m. 14. Your 45, January 11, 11 a.m. Department has informed Grew 17 and will relay to you as promptly as possible Grew’s responses. Unnecessary though it be, Department would caution Delegation against any assumption, on the basis of reports or evidence regarding the indicated conflicting views, that a technical victory by the Japanese Foreign Office would imply any change in the fundamental thought and objectives of the Japanese nation and government in regard to Japan’s general program of expansion and matters appertaining thereto. Hull 17 Department’s telegram No. 6, January 11, 4 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan; not printed. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/611: Telegram [Document 25] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , January 12, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 12—10:10 a.m.] 9. For Davis, London. Department’s 6, January 11, 4 p.m. 18 1. Final instructions to Nagano 19 drafted in 6–hour conference between Foreign Office and Navy officials last night and approved by Cabinet this afternoon. I understand that Navy officials were prepared to break up Conference by withdrawal, but that Foreign Office was able to secure Japanese continuance in order to avoid blame for complete rupture. It is reported that Nagano is instructed to make clear Japan’s proposals to provide real reduction, but that Japan cannot enter temporary agreements which would continue inequalities and will not discuss qualitative apart from quantitative reduction. Delegates may, however, remain in effect as observers and may participate in later phase of Conference for discussion submarine warfare and other subsidiary subjects. Definite confirmation of foregoing report is lacking. 2. It is my belief that the Foreign Office, while wishing to avoid forcing a formal vote on quantitative limitation which would oblige Japan to quit the Conference and thus accept the onus for a complete break, will, nevertheless, welcome a definite and final clarification of the parity issue so that this chapter may be closed and some new program involving political agreements set in motion. The Japanese press has recently carried various tentative suggestions along these lines as allegedly emanating from London which I am reliably informed are “kite flying” pure and simple. I am unaware whether there is any basis for the report published here today alleging Eden’s reference in the private Anglo-Japanese conversation on January 9th to the question of the eventual fortification of the Philippines and Hong Kong. 3. The situation here is as usual shrouded in fog owing to the discrepency in views between the Foreign Office and the Navy and the consequent lack of unanimity in the Government not in point of general objective, but regarding methods and tactics. Obviously the Japanese Navy in demanding parity had principally the American Navy in view, but failed to foresee the complications which their attitude would create in Europe. Having burned their bridges, a reconsideration of the parity issue is for them out of the question, and we may now expect to see the Foreign Office exploring the possibility of finding some alternative of a political nature. Grew 18 See telegram No. 14. January 11, 4 p.m. to the Chairman of the American delegation, supra. 19 Admiral Osami Nagano, War Counselor to the Emperor and Japanese delegate to the Naval Conference. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/612: Telegram [Document 26] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , January 13, 1936—11 p.m. [Received January 13—11:30 a.m.] 11. For Davis, London. My 10, January 13, 6 p.m. 20 Hirota 21 tonight confirmed to me personally and definitely that he had won out in his contest with the Navy over immediate withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from London. He said that while Admiral Nagano might return to Tokyo he hoped and expected that Ambassador Nagai 22 would remain in the Conference. Grew 20 Not printed. 21 Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. 22 Matsuzo Nagai, Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom and delegate to the Naval Conference. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/615: Telegram [Document 27] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 14, 1936—1 a.m. [Received January 13—10:45 p.m.] 46. At a 2-hour meeting with the British before dinner tonight, the Japanese told them in substance that they wished to have a further discussion and a decision with regard to the common upper limit. The Japanese asked that the first committee be postponed until Wednesday afternoon at which time they desired to present a fuller explanation of their thesis and stated that upon rejection by the other powers they must leave the Conference. I saw both Eden and Monsell later at a meeting who told me briefly that “the jig was up.” At their request we have arranged to have a further talk with them in the morning. Eden told me that the Japanese had urged them to agree to an immediate adjournment of the Conference until later this year. He said he had told the Japanese definitely that the British would not agree to this and that they would propose that the other powers remain to discuss a naval agreement to which Japan might later adhere if she so desired. Later on Nagai came up to me and said he wished to tell me personally how deeply he regretted their inability to reach an agreement and that this would necessitate their leaving the Conference, I asked him if there would be any hope of their reaching an ultimate agreement or if it would be helpful to them to carry the delegates on for another month or so. He said their situation at home was such that they could not come to any kind of agreement now and their only hope was to bring matters to a head now which might result in such a change in public opinion in Japan as thereby enable a resumption of negotiations later on perhaps this year. Nagai concluded that what Japan wants above all is to leave in a most friendly spirit and that nothing must be done to disturb Japanese-American relations. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/617: Telegram [Document 28] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 14—3:47 p.m.] 47. At the meeting between the British and American delegates at the Foreign Office this morning the British told us of their talk with the Japanese, the substance of which was covered in my 46, January 14, 1 a.m. The Japanese had also said that while they could not reach any naval agreement after the rejection of the common upper limit, they would like beforehand to discuss rules of submarine warfare with a view to perpetuating the terms of part IV of the London Naval Treaty. 23 The British said they would be very glad to dp so after disposing of the common upper limit. The Japanese repeated that under the circumstances they would be unable to remain for any negotiations and again suggested that part IV be taken up first. The British replied that they had done everything possible to meet the Japanese wishes but that they were not willing to depart from the procedure to that extent. The British then told us the Japanese had questioned the legality of continuing the Conference once Japan withdraws 24 since the Conference was called under the Washington Treaty 25 and since the treaty envisages only a conference of the five powers and not a four-power meeting. The British disagreed with this and told them there was no reason why the other powers should not remain to negotiate a naval agreement since such agreement could not become effective until after the expiration of the Washington and London Treaties when without some sort of new agreement there would be chaos. Furthermore, they told the Japanese that in negotiating an agreement, the other powers would have in mind the possibility and hope that Japan might ultimately become a party to it. The British definitely considered that the obligation of article 23 of the Washington Treaty was fulfilled by the convocation of the Conference in December. The British told the Japanese they would have no objection to two or three Japanese observers. After some discussion this morning we agreed that the Japanese should have observers but that they would have no right to sit with expert committees for technical discussions. They could, however, be kept informed of the results. We inquired what the British views were with regard to later invitations to Germany and Russia. They replied that they were keeping both informed of what is taking place but that France and Italy wished to include Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in which case Sweden, Holland and Spain and perhaps the South American countries would also have to be invited. The British said they were of the opinion that if once you go beyond the major naval powers it would be better to include all naval states and that after all this might from a practical and psychological viewpoint be of considerable advantage. If all the other naval powers, with the exception of Japan, were to enter into an agreement the effect would be so overwhelming they believed that Japan would in a short time wish to join. The British recognize, of course, that with Japan out many difficulties would arise but that we should proceed in general on the theory that Japan would ultimately want to come in. In the meantime an adequate escape clause should be provided as a counterpoise to Japan’s freedom. The British who want above all qualitative limitation now state that without Japan the last hope of achieving quantitative limitation has gone except perhaps in so far as it might result from operation of agreed building programs. The British desire for qualitative limitation without quantitative is no doubt partly determined by their wish to bring France and Italy into agreement and their realization that a quantitative agreement between these two countries is now impossible and also by the fact that qualitative limitation would leave the way open for later adherence of other powers. Davis 23 Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . 24 For announcement of withdrawal of the Japanese delegation, January 15, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i , p. 297 , and Report of the Delegates of the United States …, p. 240. 25 Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 247 . The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/622: Telegram [Document 29] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 16, 1936—2 p.m. [Received January 16—9:50 a.m.] 55. It is reported that Senator Pittman 26 has made a statement to the effect that future efforts to limit naval armaments are futile and that it is manifest that Japan is withdrawing in order to institute a naval race. The general consensus here is that Japan is not intending to start a naval race and that aside from the political situation in Japan which forced the Government to take the unreasonable and unwise position it did they seem to have had in mind only the building of relatively small craft such as submarines and destroyers since they realize that they could not possbily keep up in any race in the heavier ships. It also seems clear that they had not envisaged the possibility of the other powers continuing without them and that this is disturbing them very much. I therefore think that in spite of the difficulties of formulating a comprehensive naval treaty for naval reduction or limitation without Japan it is highly important for the other naval powers to show that they can proceed without Japan. If an agreement between them should result it is all the more likely that Japan will react and seek some means for getting in again, that she will be less likely to start a naval race and that if she does it will be easier to cope with it if the other naval powers are acting more or less in agreement as to their respective building programs to counteract what Japan is doing. An escape clause to solve any contingency would of course be provided. I am convinced that this is the best way to deal with the Japanese situation and certainly there is no risk or disadvantage to us in attempting to do so. If you wish I suggest you show this message to Pittman. Davis 26 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) 500.A15A5/631 [Document 30] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbeck ) [ Washington ,] January 16, 1936. Reference, press item attached, from today’s New York Times , 27 and Mr. Davis’ telegram from London, 55, January 16, 2 p.m., copy attached. Of course the Japanese do not intend “to institute a naval race”. But it may be regarded as certain that they intend that the Japanese Navy shall be brought as rapidly as they can make it so to a position, in proportion to the American and the British Navies, which will render Japan invulnerable—and unrestrainable—in the western Pacific. The proposals which they have made at London indicate that they would be willing to see that objective attained by a general reduction of naval armament; but, having failed in that, they will exert themselves to the utmost to attain that objective by adding to the Navy which they already possess. Whether this will mean a “naval race” will depend on the action taken by the United States and Great Britain in response to increases in Japan’s building program. If, as the Japanese build, we increase our building, there will begin a “race”. What the Japanese are hoping is that we will not build. They are already ahead of us on the basis of the 5–5–3 ratio. We are engaged in bringing our naval forces up to the 5–3 point. They are hoping that, as they build above the 3 point, we will not go beyond the 5 point and there will thus come about an altering of the ratio in their favor. That in a real race they could not keep up is of course obvious. But, they can afford to go beyond the present 3 point, and there is every reason for expecting that they will do so. Mr. Davis states “It also seems clear that they had not envisaged the possibility of the other powers continuing without them and that this is disturbing them very much.” I have doubt with regard to the accuracy of this estimate. If and as the other powers continue, and if the other powers make an agreement, the agreement will be for naval limitation. The Japanese desire that there be naval limitation. The fact of there being limitation and of their knowing the limitation to which the other powers agree will be, if and when, of definite value to the Japanese. True, they do not like to be left out of anything that the major powers are doing. But being outside has its compensations: in this case it will enable them to know to what the others are committed without their being themselves committed. Whether they will thereafter “seek some means for getting in again” will depend entirely on their own estimate, at the time, of their interest. An escape clause may or may not “solve any contingency”. The question of national honesty and of national ability to conceal and/or to discover will have a bearing on that question. Mr. Davis concludes with the statement, “I am convinced that this [a conference among the other powers] 28 is the best way to deal with the Japanese situation and certainly there is no risk or disadvantage to us in attempting to do so.” There is room for doubt with regard to the soundness of a part at least of this view. The contemplated conference of the other powers may or may not be “the best way to deal with the Japanese situation”; but the idea that it involves “no risk” is surely open to question. First of all, it is notorious that the United States is more sincerely committed to the concept of limitation of armament than are the other countries which will participate in the conference (with the possible exception of Great Britain); and when the process of bargaining begins, we have the reputation of being more given than are the others to the making of concessions. Second, it may with reason be doubted whether, in the world as it is, multilateral agreements with regard to armament can, unless preceded and connected with agreements with regard to political matters, rest on any sound foundation, and whether, even if associated with political agreements, their net effect is not that of deceiving the peacefully inclined nations into a false sense of security without in any way really placing effective obstacles in the way of aggressively disposed nations. In other words, it may be asked: Should nations rich in resources and desirous of peace limit their right to arm and thereby make easier for nations less rich but aggressively disposed to prepare for and engage in predatory activities? It also may well be asked: Might it not be well to permit the nations to enter upon a period of unrestricted naval competition; might not such a course bring about an approach on Japan’s part asking for naval limitation at a date earlier than such an approach may be expected if the other powers enter into an agreement for reasonable limitation, the terms of which will be immediately and fully known to Japan. There is “risk”. On the one hand, we have the statement of opinion that is attributed to Senator Pittman; on the other hand, the statement of opinion which Mr. Davis makes. It may be well to show Senator Pittman, as suggested by Mr. Davis, Mr. Davis’ telegram. It might be well at the same time to say to Senator Pittman that it is felt in the Department that there is considerable room for middle ground as between the two views. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 27 Not reprinted. 28 Brackets appear in the original. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/628a: Telegram [Document 31] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 18, 1936—2 p.m. 20. I thought it might interest you to have some of my impressions and reflections on the present stage of the Naval Conference. I have been very pleased to see that the Conference is showing every indication of endeavoring to speed up its work and to confine its agenda to at least reasonably important points upon which early agreement may be possible. The general impression here resulting from the situation created by the withdrawal of the Japanese is not unfavorable to our position. Your statement of our position has been well received and to my mind entirely covers the ground as far as the attitude of the United States is concerned. 29 There has been some skepticism expressed with regard to continuing the conference without the Japanese. This I do not share, but I am under the impression that our interest in the Conference has become considerably lessened by the withdrawal of the Japanese, and therefore that the interests concerned from now on will be European and that the questions discussed from now on are of primary importance to the continental nations and Great Britain and particularly the latter. If I am correct in this impression, it follows that, to a corresponding extent, we should not take a leading part in the activities of the Conference, but should rather continue as a friendly and responsive participant without taking the lead and leave the initiative to other powers. I am sure you are fully aware of the sentiment now present in the country against involvement in European affairs and I think it would be well therefore not to take any steps which might be construed as indicating a desire or willingness on the part of our Government to take any unwarranted initiative in European questions. Hull 29 Statement made on January 15 to the Naval Conference; for text see Report of the Delegates of the United States …, p. 222, or Department of State, Press Releases , January 18, 1936, p. 89. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/628b: Telegram [Document 32] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 20, 1936—2 p.m. 23. In a conversation on the naval situation, the President expressed the opinion that as far as any new agreement which may be negotiated at the Conference as now constituted is concerned, we should still seek an agreement in the first instance within the tonnage limits in the existing treaties, with an escape clause in the event Japan exceeds her existing treaty limitations. You should, therefore, endeavor to make that your first principle as the conversations proceed. The question of cruiser tonnage increase, if insisted on, remains as previously outlined. In other words, you should seek compensating decreases in other categories. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/629: Telegram [Document 33] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 21, 1936—2 a.m. [Received January 20—9 p.m.] 62. Your 20, January 18, 2 p.m. I welcome your views as to what our attitude should be in negotiating a naval agreement with European powers. While it is true that Great Britain is particularly interested in getting an agreement among the European naval powers in which we should play only a secondary part it is important from our standpoint as I see it that there should be agreement among such powers because of the bearing which this has upon the agreement between the British and ourselves. Furthermore such an agreement would increase the pressure upon Japan either to come into an agreement ultimately or at least not to start a naval race. I had rather suspected that with Japan out England, France and Italy might wish to take up matters which strictly concerned them such as the Mediterranean but so far there has been no indication whatever of any such intention at least within the Conference itself. With regard to your 23, January 20, 2 p.m. For the reasons however in the last paragraph my 47, January 14, 7 a.m. [ p.m. ] a general quantitative agreement now is out of the question. The only hope I can see now of any quantitative limitation would be through an exchange of building programs. It is evident from our discussions in the last day or so that even with regard to qualitative limitation there are certain difficulties that will have to be concurred in [in] the absence of a quantitative agreement and with regard to adequate escape clauses to provide for such contingencies as may arise in connection with Japan in case she definitely refuses to adhere. We are at present exploring possible solutions of these difficulties and shall cable you our suggestions very shortly. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/632: Telegram [Document 34] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 23, 1936—3 a.m. [Received January 22—11 p.m. 30 ] 64. The French Ambassador came to see me last night to discuss the future procedure of the Conference, particularly with regard to inviting Germany and Russia in at an early date as the British wished to do. He said that while France, until the Anglo-German naval accord, 31 favored bringing Germany into the naval negotiations, conditions had now changed radically. In the first place the political situation in France is now very precarious, and in the second place the British naval agreement with Germany raises serious questions for France. He said that they were now doubtful of the wisdom of making a naval agreement with Germany unless they could get a secondary agreement as to land and air armaments which he admitted was now impossible. Furthermore, he said that sitting in conference with Germany to negotiate a new naval agreement would be construed as a condonement of Germany’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The French consider it desirable to try to reach some agreement temporarily to which we should endeavor to get Japan, Germany and Russia to adhere at a later date, but that unless Japan, at least, were to become a party to the agreement they could not see that it would be of much value. I told him that if such an agreement were only to be made effective on condition that Japan adhere he could be sure that Japan would refuse, but that if provision were made in such treaty for freedom of action on the part of the contracting powers in case of departure from its limits by a noncontracting power the latter would have more incentive to abide by the limits fixed. I added that the question of German participation was primarily one for France and England to determine since we are not a party to the Treaty of Versailles and since we do not wish to mix in European political problems. Monsieur Corbin then asked if there was a possibility of substantial reductions in types which would justify us in going ahead. I told him we could at least agree not to increase any of the types provided for under existing treaties, either as to tonnage or calibre of guns and that I thought we might perhaps agree upon certain reductions which I proceeded to outline. He said that if that was all the reduction we could get it would be a very great disappointment to the French. I replied that although the minor reductions that could now be agreed upon might be disappointing to certain powers it would be infinitely better to agree not to increase existing types than to have no qualitative agreement and an ensuing naval race which in the course of years would make the present types seem small indeed. He remarked that this was an important aspect to consider. In conclusion Monsieur Corbin said that he was waiting for a further reply from his Government in answer to his report of the talks he had had with the British regarding Germany and that as soon as he received a reply be would like to have another talk with me as they were anxious to work out something if now possible. In a conversation with Reber 32 tonight Boncour and Deleuze 33 reiterated what Corbin had said about the impossibility from the political angle for France to agree at this time to include Germany in the conference. No government in France could survive if it agreed to making such advance to Germany. They said that the British who had told them last summer that Germany would agree to whatever qualitative limits were accepted by the five naval powers were now insisting that she must be given an opportunity to express her own views and must therefore be brought into the conference at some future date. The French are convinced that the Anglo-German naval accord is only valid pending the conclusion of a more comprehensive naval agreement and that the British fear that if the wider agreement were to prove unacceptable to Germany the bilateral accord would fall and Germany regain her complete freedom of action. The only solution which Boncour considers might be acceptable to his Government is to have the four powers prepare the best qualitative agreement possible and leave it open until the end of this year for the adherence of Germany and of Japan. If these two powers have not accepted by that time the others are going to again reconvene to discuss the situation. The French add that even in this case England must accept the responsibility of presenting this agreement to Germany. The political situation in France is such, Boncour explained, that if some such solution cannot be found the French feel that it might be better to end the conference now and wait at least until after the elections have taken place in France before resuming negotiations. They add that this delay may also make Japan’s return easier. In order, however, to avoid making the German issue the cause for adjournment they may insist upon lower qualitative limits—which they in any case would prefer—than are acceptable either to England or to ourselves thus precluding any further progress at this time. Boncour leaves for Paris tomorrow to seek final instructions as to the position France will adopt at the next meeting of the First Committee now scheduled for January 29. In a talk with Lord Monsell this evening he told me that while the French were taking a very irreconcilable position just now he was convinced that they would ultimately recede from it and accept a qualitative agreement such as contemplated because it is of vital importance to France that the Anglo-German naval agreement which is a protection to France as well as to England should continue. Moreover, it is most important for the French to have an agreement limiting the number of 8–inch gun cruisers which Germany can build and providing for exchange of information. The British have intimated to us that it is essential that any qualitative agreement shall include Germany. Davis 30 Telegram in two sections. 31 For correspondence concerning accord, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 162 ff. 32 Samuel Reber, technical assistant for the Department of State. 33 Jean Paul-Boncour and Capt. E. E. Deleuze, technical advisers to the French delegation. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/634: Telegram [Document 35] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 23, 1936—10 p.m. [Received January 23—7:24 p.m.] 66. My 62, January 21, 2 a.m., last paragraph. A difference of opinion between the British and ourselves has developed as to the meaning of the informal understanding arrived at in the bilateral conversations last September and October with regard to qualitative restriction for capital ships and cruisers and a limitation upon the number of 10,000-ton cruisers of both subcategories. Our contention is that the tentative agreement as to gun caliber and tonnage of capital ships was conditional on a qualitative agreement to which Japan was a party and that the tentative agreement to build no more category ( a ) cruisers except as replacements and to limit the number of 10,000-ton category ( b ) cruisers was conditional on a quantitative agreement. The British contend that as we have both for some time envisaged the possibility that Japan would pull out and that no quantitative agreement was possible among the remaining powers that we should proceed with qualitative limitation with the understanding that the caliber of capital ships guns be reduced to 14 inches, that no further 8-inch gun cruisers be built except as replacements, and that no further 10,000-ton 6-inch gun cruisers be laid down after January 1, 1937. The British, of course, envisage adequate provision for freedom of action in case Japan fails to abide by the limits imposed. The British point out that as early as last September they recognized the virtual impossibility of getting Japan to agree to the continuance of quantitative limitation or perhaps to enter into any treaty at all. They consequently asked us at that time “whether, if Japan would not join in any agreement, the United States would be willing to consider a pact (to include France and Italy) with a let out clause” (see Embassy’s telegram No. 439 Sept. 12, 8 p.m. 1935 34 ). We informed them that we would be willing to do so and that “it would be advisable under these circumstances that such an agreement be in effect a continuation of existing naval treaties with such modifications as the circumstances may require and that it should be left open for Japanese adherence at any time” (Department’s 261 September 19, 6 p.m. 1935 35 ). In the discussions in London which followed, the American representatives were authorized to state that we concurred in the British suggestions as to the reduction of gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches, subject to British and Japanese concurrence and that “as part of a comprehensive accord on cruisers” we could agree to the nonconstruction of category ( a ) cruisers other than as replacements (Department’s 300 October 14, 1935, 6 p.m. 36 ) In a conversation on December 8, which Mr. Phillips, Admiral Standley and I had with the First Lord, the First Sea Lord, and Craigie (see memorandum enclosure to despatch of Dec. 23 37 ) we informed them after ascertaining, as we then understood, that what they desired was to increase the numbers of their cruisers 60 including 10 overage, that within the limits of this proposition we could agree not to insist upon building any further 10,000-ton ships either in the 8-inch or 6-inch gun class except as replacements, although we would not scrap any of the 10,000-ton ships already laid down. This, of course, was still upon the assumption of a comprehensive agreement. While the American acceptance of these qualitative reductions was made conditional upon a comprehensive agreement, the British contend that throughout the discussions that have taken place since the arrival of the American delegation it has been evident that Japan would not adhere to such an agreement and that quantitative limitation had become impossible. They claim that they were therefore under the impression that we would not make the nonparticipation of Japan an obstacle to continued negotiations along the lines agreed upon last year. The British argue that while it is politically difficult for Japan to make a reasonable naval agreement now, Japan realizes the futility of starting a naval race and a qualitative agreement between us with adequate escape provisions would serve as a powerful deterrent to hold Japan in line. The view which we have repeatedly set forth to the British is that the concessions we were willing to make in the qualitative field were the price we were willing to pay for a comprehensive quantitative agreement. The British are very much disturbed by the possibility of an Anglo-American disagreement now that the subject of qualitative limitation is before the Conference, especially since the other powers, although preferring greater reductions, appear to be willing to accept the limitation reduction involved in restricting future capital ship gun gradations to 14 inches and in the nonconstruction for at least some years of additional 10,000-ton cruisers in both subcategories. Moreover, there is the danger that this difference will become public and be played up as evidence of American unwillingness to participate in any important qualitative reductions in the absence of Japan. There seems to be no difficulty with respect to agreements reached on aircraft carriers, submarines and the nonconstruction zone. I naturally want to avoid, if possible, any evidence of a difference of opinion or to be the one that is blocking a qualitative agreement. The adjournment during these few days has given us time for further conversations with the British in the hope of working out a compromise. I am sending another telegram giving the results to date of these conversations. Davis 34 Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 109 . 35 Ibid. , p. 113 . 36 Ibid. , p. 125 . 37 Ibid. , p. 156 . The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/635: Telegram [Document 36] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 24, 1936—8 p.m. [Received January 24—8 p.m. 38 ] 67. My 66, January 23, 10 p.m. In a recent conversation Monsell and I had agreed that representatives of our navies should meet to discuss a possible compromise between our differences—such compromise to be considered by us and if it gives promise of acceptance to be referred by me to you for approval. Following this understanding Schuirman 39 and Danckwerts 40 met on Wednesday to discuss on purely personal and unofficial basis any possible methods to reconcile American and British views on size of guns of capital ships and on qualitative limits of cruisers and numbers of 10,000-ton cruisers in both subcategories. Schuirman and Danckwerts exchanged suggestions and with these suggestions in mind Admiral Chatfield called on Admiral Standley 41 Thursday for further discussion on these points. Part I. Cruisers. In opening the cruiser discussion Chatfield said they will build 25 or more of smaller type in the next 5 or 6 years. It is of great importance to them that their cruisers should not be individually outmatched by larger vessels. He hoped Japan will not build more 8-inch gun cruisers or more large 6-inch gun cruisers. He said the United States might not want as many small cruisers as Britain but pointed out that there is nothing to prevent the United States from matching the increase in British cruiser tonnage by building other types such as aircraft carriers. Quantitative limitation is gone forever he said. In regard to qualitative limits for cruisers Standley said that it was essential that the new treaty provide for both category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers. Also that we could not agree never to build any more 10,000-ton cruisers as these categories are necessary when replacements become due and to enable us if necessary to reply to Japanese building in those types (we also had in mind excessive cruiser building by Great Britain). The British are apparently ready to [agree to?] retention of these types provided that a 5-or 6-year building holiday commencing January 1, 1937, is agreed to. It should be noted that our agreement to this holiday means consenting to a quantitative limitation on these two types in a treaty which is otherwise purely qualitative. The reason for fixing the length of the building holiday at 6 years instead of a shorter period, say 3 years, was because a nation might delay all cruiser construction for a short period in order subsequently to build the larger types, whereas if it were for 6 years every nation would have to undertake some cruiser construction and would therefore become committed to the smaller type. Also unless this were done nations might start replacements of 8-inch gun cruisers ahead of the time when they were normally due and before the British had completed their program of smaller cruisers. The first category A replacement cruiser in any navy is due to be laid down by Japan in 1943. The British suggest that the termination of the 10,000-ton cruiser building holiday in both subcategories might therefore logically be fixed as January 1, 1943. Admiral Standley suggested that we must consider a building holiday in big cruisers as provided in the British plan until January 1, 1942. Chatfield also stated that the British intend to lay down two 9,000-ton 6-inch cruisers this year which the London Treaty permits; that would give them [fifteen] category A and ten category B cruisers over 8,000 tons against our eighteen category A and nine 10,000-ton category B cruisers. Chatfield made the point that their ten 9,000-ton cruisers would be a tonnage balance against our nine 10,000-ton cruisers. (We do not know whether or not Great Britain intend to invoke the escalator clause to retain any or all of the Hawkins class but we will endeavor to ascertain their intentions.) Admiral Standley stated that we had indicated our willingness to refrain from building large cruisers over a certain period of time. We could not agree to no more big cruisers for all time. If the British cruiser fleet became no larger than 60 we might match in cruiser tonnage their increase but with their program unlimited we could not agree to such an undertaking. If the British have 70 cruisers we would not want to match them all in cruiser tonnage. From what Chatfield said the conclusion is inescapable that the British position on qualitative limits is inextricably bound up with the details of the European situation generally and their naval agreement with Germany particularly. We agreed that their problem was much more complicated than ours and pointed out that that fact made it more difficult for us to deal with them, as any compromise on our part had to be such as would enable the British to fit it into their agreement with Germany and the consequent effects of this agreement on France and Italy and still satisfy the British position vis-à-vis Japan. We pointed out that the proposed compromise between the United States and Great Britain to limit category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers for a period of years was a delicately balanced one to meet a particular situation between those two nations and that when it emerged from the First Committee after discussion by France and Italy it might bear but slight resemblance to the original. It should be noted that the expressed British intention to build 25 or more cruisers in the next 6 years will result in a large increase over the present allowed cruiser tonnage and, if overage cruisers are retained, will result in at least 70 cruisers and not 60 as we understood on December 8 (see memorandum, enclosure despatch of Dec. 23 42 ). Summarizing as to cruisers, the British proposal is an agreement for all powers after January 1, 1937, not to build for a period of 6 years any more 8-inch gun cruisers nor any more 6-inch gun cruisers over 8,000 tons. They propose to group all combatant ships under 8,000 and over 100 tons with a gun not larger than a 6.1 in a category to be known as “light service [ surface ] vessels”. Having in mind that the British proposal, although apparently only qualitative, involves limitation on the number of cruisers of categories A and B for a period of years and that it provides no other limit of total tonnage in other categories, an expression of the Department’s views as to the acceptability of the British proposal is desired. Part II—Capital Ships. In presenting our views as to the capital ships, Standley emphasized the fact that in this as in other matters we had done everything we could to foster and support a closer Anglo-American accord. He also pointed out that the 16-inch gun was a superior weapon for our needs and that with Japan free, American public opinion would not understand and would not support an agreement which in effect weakened our relative strength as compared with Japan. He stated that in his opinion our position would be best sustained by accepting the existing limits of the Washington Treaty, i. e. 35,000 tons with 16-inch guns with a proviso that if all signatories to the Washington Treaty would prior to January 1, 1937, so agree to the size of the guns would be limited to 14 inches for the life of the treaty or for a definite period. The British counterproposal was to rephrase our proposal to read that the limit would be 35,000 tons with 14-inch guns and if Japan or any other principal naval power refrained from coming into this agreement by January 1, 1937, the permitted gun calibre would revert to the Washington Treaty limits. Chatfield in presenting their view said in substance that all Europe wants smaller ships but the British do not feel as strongly about that as they did. They have no intention of pressing their limits but for public consumption they may lead off in the Conference by repeating their desire for smaller ships. There would be considerable moral advantage from a disarmament point of view if we could agree on 14-inch guns. The British will lay down two ships next year. Whatever happens they state these ships will have to be 14-inch gun ships and will have to be fast ships to meet the building of fast ships in Europe. They believe a 14-inch, 35,000-ton ship is better balanced than one with 15-inch or 16-inch guns. Chatfield stated that phrasing the treaty their way is more likely to appeal to the world and would be more likely to exert moral pressure on Japanese authorities. He said the result is the same but it is a matter of tactics. Chatfield told us that the British want the 14-inch gun because they cannot build both a [fast?] ship and a 16-inch gun ship on 35,000 tons. In addition, their design has proceeded to the point where a change to a 16-inch gun, if made, would involve a delay in laying down their first two battle cruisers which they intend to do early in 1937. Obviously, the difference as regards capital ships is one of approach. As Chatfield stated the results will be the same in either case. The Department’s views on the proposed conditional reduction to the 14-inch gun are requested. Davis 38 Telegram in four sections. 39 Commander R. E. Schuirman, U. S. N., technical adviser for the Navy Department. 40 Capt. V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., Admiralty adviser to the British delegation. 41 Admiral William H. Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. N., and American delegate. 42 Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 156 . The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/638: Telegram [Document 37] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 26, 1936—9 p.m. [Received January 26—6:35 p.m.] 72. Further study of my 67, January 24, 8 p.m. leads me to fear it may be confusing. The facts are that the proposed cruiser compromise was offered by the British and was discussed by our naval advisers on the understanding that it was purely tentative and subject to approval by Washington. Standley believes it acceptable in view of our present status in 10,000-ton cruisers but desired the views of Washington before definitely committing us. I fully concur in Standby’s views as to the acceptability of the cruiser compromise. In substance this proposal provides within the framework of a qualitative treaty what is in effect a quantitative restriction on 10,000-ton cruisers until 1942 but without quantitative restrictions on smaller cruisers or any other types. This would be subject, however, to two escape clauses. 1. To provide that in case any high contracting power felt itself menaced by excessive building in any category by any power, it would be free of the restriction on numbers of 10,000-ton cruisers. This clause would be invoked by us in case Japan should exceed her present ratios in 10,000-ton cruisers or in case of excessive cruiser building by Great Britain—say beyond 70. 2. A general escape clause in case any power did not abide by the qualitative limits to be fixed in the new treaty. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/638a: Telegram [Document 38] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 29, 1936—6 p.m. 28. Has there been any discussion on the question of the scrapping called for under the present treaties? Hull The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/638: Telegram [Document 39] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) 43 Washington , January 29, 1936—7 p.m. 29. Your 72 and previous telegrams on subjects of capital ships and cruisers. The following is our position with regard to the proposals discussed in your telegrams: A. Limitation of capital ship guns to 14 inches in caliber subject to adherence by all other principal naval powers prior to January 1, 1937. It seems to the Navy and State Departments that it is preferable to maintain as a starting point the status quo , namely, the 16-inch gun limitation, and to develop a formula of agreement that during this year no signatory would lay down any ship with over 14-inch gun caliber, but that if Japan does not adhere all will be free at the end of the year. We feel that the Japanese are not likely to subscribe and that it would be better strategy to stand by the existing limitation while making an offer of a concession rather than to move away from this, the 16-inch gun, limitation and then have to take an initiative and action in order to move back to it. We should prefer, if possible, to avoid the risk of being maneuvered into a position a year hence where we might have to take the primary responsibility, in view of Great Britain’s apparent decision in any case to use 14-inch guns in their new construction, for moving again to the 16-inch limit with the attendant possibility of creating an apparently direct issue between the Japanese and ourselves. If the Japanese accept the offer of a concession to a 14-inch gun limitation, the British and our own purposes would be served and the Japanese could share with the British and us the credit for having made possible this lowering of the limitation on gun caliber, and thus the all-around psychological effect would be to the advantage of all three countries and of relations among them. B. Proposed holiday from January 1, 1937 until January 1, 1943 in the building of cruisers of category ( a ) and of cruisers of category ( b ) over 8,000 tons. C. The proposed setting up of a quantitatively unlimited category of “light surface vessels” with displacement limits of 8,000 to 100 tons and guns of not more than 6.1 inches in caliber. Proposals B and C deal generally with cruisers and must be considered together. The Navy and State Departments concur in the view that existing qualitative definitions of categories should, if possible, be maintained, certainly not enlarged, and that a reduction rather than an extension of quantitative limits in categories is desirable. We still favor granting to the contracting powers the option of meeting their own individual needs through a limited system of transfers between established categories. The proposals in B and C have the effect of maintaining the status quo in 8-inch gun cruisers and large 6-inch gun cruisers, which is in itself a quantitative limitation while permitting, by means of a proposed new category with certain wide qualitative limits and no quantitative limits, the possibility of new unrestricted building. If it is desired to discuss further the proposal for this new broad category, we would wish to have more detailed information as to the reasons for establishing this suggested new classification and also as to the ultimate tonnage contemplated and whether the destroyer and exempt classes will be merged therein. Hull 43 Marginal notation: “This telegram was read and approved by Admiral Taussig and the first paragraph after (A) was approved by the President, J[ames] C[lement] D[unn].” The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/639: Telegram [Document 40] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 30, 1936—6 p.m. [Received January 30—2:23 p.m.] 76. Your 29, January 29, 7 p.m. We understand your decision regarding proposal A but remain in doubt as to your views on the cruiser question. In particular we do not understand the phrase “reduction rather than an extension of quantitative limits in categories is desirable”. We have stated, see our 47, January 14, 7 p.m., last paragraph and 62, January 21, 2 p.m. [ a.m. ] that except for the proposed holiday in the construction of 8-inch gun cruisers and 10,000-ton 6-inch gun cruisers there will be no quantitative features whatever in the new treaty. It will be qualitative solely. Under these conditions there will be no possibility of limiting any category quantitatively either by the number of ships or the total tonnage in the category or globally. There will be no purpose in providing for transfers between categories since there will be no figure to which or from which transfers can be made. While the British would probably agree to quantitative limitation in all categories provided France and Italy would agree it is impossible to get these two powers to do so because it raises between them the unsoluble question of ratio or parity which they have tacitly agreed to leave undetermined. Furthermore, the failure of Japan to agree on quantitative limitation on a basis acceptable to either Great Britain or ourselves makes such limitation all the more impracticable. It is very clear the new broad category of 8000 tons and under with guns not exceeding 6.1 inch is the inability of the European powers particularly France and Italy to agree upon any distinction between small cruisers, destroyers or other small surface craft. Since there will be no quantitative limitation in this broad category it is their opinion that a division into subcategories would serve no useful purpose. In any event the proposed exchange of information will give details as to the characteristics of every ship to be built. There will be unrestricted building in this broad category as stated in your 29; there will also be unrestricted building in every other category except category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers. The existing exempt and special vessels would either fall within this new broad category or would be provided for in the new treaty by new exempt and special classes similar to those of the London Treaty. There is no information regarding ultimate tonnage except the recent British statement of their intention to have a total of 70 cruisers including 10 overage and their statement last year of a desire [to] retain 50,000 tons of overage destroyers. These intentions will of course not appear in the new treaty. We are of the opinion that we should accept (1), a building holiday in category A and 10,000-ton category B cruisers; (2), a category of light surface vessels comprising combatant vessels from 100 tons to 8000 tons mounting a gun not in excess of 6.1 inch. Admiral Standley would like to feel assured that the General Board concurs in this opinion. Unless instructed to the contrary we shall proceed on the assumption that in the light of the additional explanation contained in this [telegram] these proposals are acceptable to the State and Navy Departments and to the President. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/640: Telegram [Document 41] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , January 30, 1936—8 p.m. [Received January 30—4:04 p.m.] 77. Personal and confidential for Phillips. 44 After my telephone conversation with you yesterday I gained the impression that there was no difficulty about the cruiser proposals and expected that our cable of instructions would approve. My interpretation, however, of your January 29, 7 p.m., is that it neither approves nor disapproves of the cruiser proposals recommended by us. I hope that my 76, January 30, 6 p.m., will clear up the situation satisfactorily and will meet with the full concurrence of the President, the Department and the Navy. If, however, there is not concurrence in any particular please advise as soon as possible for we have reached the stage where we must either proceed with formulating agreement or try to back off from an agreement which in my opinion would vary only slightly in essence from what we have been discussing with the British since last September to which I consider that with an adequate escape clause we are in a way committed. As you are aware we were specifically authorized to negotiate a qualitative agreement and the British have repeatedly stated since the beginning of negotiations last September that a quantitative agreement with the possible but improbable exception of building programs seemed most unlikely. Furthermore it seems clear to me that although a quantitative reduction and limitation would be more desirable a qualitative limitation would have definite advantages for us and be decidedly better than no agreement. Davis 44 William Phillips, Under Secretary of State. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/639: Telegram [Document 42] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , January 31, 1936—7 p.m. 31. Your 76, January 30, 6 p.m. The General Board has drawn up the following memorandum with regard to the cruiser question: “1. Referring to American Delegation despatch number 76 of 30 January 1936, the General Board requests that information be obtained from our delegates as to why the new proposed category of light surface vessels does not include all of previous category ( b ). If not included, is it the intention to retain 10,000-ton 6.1-inch cruisers in a separate category? In connection with a possible agreement to refrain for a period from further building of 10,000-ton cruisers, the General Board suggests that this be so phrased as not to imply a discontinuance of these types but as a natural result of adherence to the pertinent clauses of the London Treaty. 2. The General Board questions the advisability of making commitments as to delay in building cruisers until definite assurance is given by the British concerning the ultimate limits of British cruiser and destroyer classes, including overage tonnage if such retention is desired. The definite restriction on 10,000-ton 8-inch and 6.1-inch types seems inconsistent in a treaty in which all other types will be unrestricted.” As we understand it, their position is that the formula for providing for a holiday in the building of 10,000-ton cruisers should be so phrased that there will be no abandonment of the types in which a holiday is agreed to and that there will be no question at the end of the holiday period of the right to build those types, nor will there be any question of the right to build such types in the event of the holiday being terminated by reason of the action of other naval powers. Also, there appears to be a range between 8,000 and 10,000 tons which is not clearly covered. We suggest it might be well to submit a draft of a possible formula to cover the proposed holiday. As far as concerns paragraph 2 of the memorandum the General Board desire further information and assurance, if possible, regarding the British intentions concerning the ultimate limits of the new proposed light surface category. We hope you will be able to give us sufficient information on which a decision can be reached. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/644: Telegram [Document 43] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 1, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 1—4:45 p.m.] 81. Your No. 31, January 31, 7 p.m. Replying to paragraph 1 General Board memorandum as to why the new proposed category light surface vessels (mentioned in our 76, January 30, 6 p.m.) does not include all of previous category B cruisers, British yesterday circulated a paper containing their proposals for new definitions. In this paper the former proposed definition (see also our 67, January 24, 8 p.m.) of “light surface vessels” has been changed to read as follows: “Surface vessels of war other than aircraft carriers or exempt vessels, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) and which do not carry a gun above 8 inches (203 mm. calibre). The category of light surface vessels is divided into two subcategories as follows: ( a ) Vessels carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre. ( b ) Vessels not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.” It will be noted that 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns and 10,000-ton cruisers with 6-inch guns are now included in the definition of light surface vessels. The delegation will insist that the treaty be so phrased that 10,000-ton cruisers of both subcategories are still recognized as permissible types and that there is no agreement either expressed or implied to abolish these types or to continue the building holiday in these types beyond the date agreed upon. However, the British proposal with which we are in accord will defer further building of 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns and 6-inch gun cruisers above 8,000 tons for a definite period of years. We are alive to the necessity for adequate escape clauses to cover every contingency, see our 72, January 26, 9 p.m. Replying to paragraph 2, it must be realized that in the absence of any limitation on the total tonnage of the light surface vessel category it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain definite assurances as to the tonnage of this category. However, we will endeavor to ascertain from the British what, if any, definite information can be given as to their program and will further advise the Department on Monday. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/646: Telegram [Document 44] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 3, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 3—7:12 p.m.] 82. Your 28. 44a Admiral Standley met Chatfield today and learned the present British intentions in regard to scrapping are as follows: 1. To scrap all cruisers in excess of the 339,000 tons permitted by treaty by December 31, 1936. 2. To convert three of the Hawkins class to cruisers mounting a gun less than 6 inches in calibre for use as anti-aircraft ships and to demilitarize the other in accordance with annex II, section V, art. ( b ), par. 2, of the London Treaty, for use as a training ship. That is three of the Hawkins class would be retained as category B cruisers in lieu of an equal tonnage of “D” class cruisers. By the above means they would comply with the terms of the London Treaty both as to the number and tonnage of category A cruisers and as to the tonnage of category B cruisers. To sum up the British completed cruiser tonnage on December 31, 1936, would be approximately as follows: (1) Fifteen cruisers A of approximately 146,000 tons. (2) Thirty-two cruisers category B composed of the following vessels: three Hawkins 29,600 tons; sixteen “C” and “D” class 72,480 tons; two Emeralds 15,130 tons; eight Leanders 55,940 tons; and three Arethusas 15,640 tons. The British intend to invoke the escalator clause in order to retain 40,000 tons of destroyers which would otherwise have to be scrapped. They plan to maintain 150,000 tons of underage and 40,000 tons of overage destroyers in the future. Davis 44a January 29, 6 p.m., p. 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] . The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/647: Telegram [Document 45] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 3, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 3—7:05 p.m.] 83. Referring to your 29, January 29, 7 p.m. and my 81, February 1, 7 p.m. The British are unable to give any definite assurance as to the ultimate tonnage of the light surface category for the reasons outlined below: France refuses now to commit herself as to the ratio she intends to maintain relative to Germany. Italy’s construction will depend on that of France. British building will in turn be influenced by French and Italian as well as by Japanese building. Under the Anglo-German agreement giving Germany a 35 per cent ratio with the British fleet, any increase in the latter would permit an increase in the German fleet and thus again affect French and Italian construction. This vicious circle makes it impossible for the British to bind themselves in advance with respect to their cruiser building especially as the French and Italians refuse to announce their programs for a period of more than 1 year. Again, the present Government can no more bind Parliament for a period of years without its consenting in some way, such as by ratification of a treaty, than our Government can bind Congress without its consent. Also, a Cabinet Committee is now sitting on the question of land, sea, and air defense of the Empire and no decision has been reached even as to what naval construction will be included in the budget for the financial year commencing next April. Even if definite information and assurance could be obtained as to the amount of British construction, we believe it would be unwise to base a decision on such assurance unless it were in contractual form as this undoubtedly would lead to difficulties when the treaty was presented to the Senate and might cause future misunderstanding if the British found it necessary to exceed whatever program they may now contemplate. However, it is apparent that, unless emergency measures are resorted to, the expansion of naval forces which can take place by January 1942 is naturally limited by available building facilities, the problem of personnel increase, et cetera, and finance. Chatfield stated today that although he could not commit the British Government, the present intention of the Admiralty is to have 60 underage cruisers as soon as possible after 1942. The last of the cruisers necessary to attain 60 underage would be laid down in 1940 and completed in 1943. In addition they intend to retain 10 overage cruisers so that in 1943 they would have 60 underage and 10 overage cruisers. The majority but not all of the cruisers laid down would be of 8,000 tons, the remainder would be somewhere around 5,000 tons displacement. We estimate that the resultant increase in British underage cruiser tonnage will be between 125,000 and 150,000 tons and in addition 10 overage cruisers of about 50,000 tons will be retained, so that the total increase over the cruiser tonnage allowed by present treaties will be between 175,000 and 200,000 tons. The British intend to maintain 150,000 tons of underage and 40,000 tons of overage destroyers, a total of 190,000 tons. (See my 82, February 3, 8 p.m.) In this connection, it should be borne in mind that even on the basis of the 50 cruisers which the British were able to retain under the London Naval Treaty they would have to increase their total tonnage beyond the 339,000 provided by that treaty, because the replacement of their small wartime cruisers by larger units would add approximately 70,000 tons to their present treaty strength. (See Craigie memorandum of July 25, 1934.) 45 The large increase in underage tonnage now forecast by the British is, therefore, not entirely due to an increase in numbers but is in part accounted for by the replacement of small cruisers built for special service in World War. The question at issue is whether or not a treaty for qualitative limitation is of sufficient value to the United States for it to accept a building holiday in category A and 10,000-ton category B cruisers for a period of years. A decision on this question must be reached without definite assurance from the British either as to the ultimate tonnage of the light surface vessel category or as to the ultimate tonnage of any other category. Admiral Standley and I agree that in view of the fact that we have eighteen category A and nine 10,000-ton category B cruisers built or building, we can afford to forego further construction of those two types for a period of 5 or 6 years with the treaty reservations of course that there is no agreement expressed or implied either to abolish these types or to continue the holiday beyond 5 or 6 years—and we have been proceeding upon the assumption that a qualitative agreement upon these terms is advantageous. Davis 45 Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 300 . The Consul General at Beirut (Marriner), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/648: Telegram [Document 46] The Consul General at Beirut ( Marriner ), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State Paris , February 4, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 4—11 a.m.] 92. This morning I talked with Massigli 46 and asked him if he thought any progress was being made in getting Germany into the naval discussions in London. He said that the British were most anxious to do so as they had not been satisfied with the appeasement arising out of their naval agreement with Germany last year. He said that it appeared that the Germans were willing to make further concessions in order to come into any international discussion on armaments but that the French felt that they must profit by this to obtain discussion on other arms, notably on air. I said that in my opinion France had many times missed an opportunity to obtain some real measure of disarmament in certain arms by a continued insistence on obtaining reduction or limitation of all of them at once. Massigli said that he realized the danger of missing the present opportunity and felt that in time something could be done to take advantage of the desires of Germany to enter into discussion on the naval question and perhaps a formula could be found by which an agreement could be concluded and ratification of it postponed awaiting the fulfillment of certain other conditions or at least sufficient delays intervene to give time for progress toward limitation or reduction in the other arms. Marriner 46 René Massigli, Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/647: Telegram [Document 47] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 6, 1936—2 p.m. 33. Your 81, February 1, 7 p.m. and 83, February 3, 10 p.m. Upon the basis of the information and conditions contained in the above two telegrams, the Navy and State Departments agree that you may proceed with the discussion of a holiday for a period of 5 or 6 years in building Category A and 10,000-ton Category B cruisers with the reservation that there is no agreement, express or implied, either to abolish these types or continue the holiday period beyond 5 or 6 years. On the basis of the information there is no objection to the reclassification of light surface vessels proposed by the British as reported in your 81, February 1, 7 p.m. We are very anxious to receive even proposed tentative drafts of phraseology of provisions for a holiday as well as any other draft proposals as soon as they may be available. When the foregoing was brought to the attention of the President he approved it. However he asked that your attention and that of Admiral Standley should be called to the fact that by this agreement we would revert in new cruiser construction to 6-inch gun cruisers of less than 8,000 tons displacement. He does not object if the Navy approves reverting to the smaller tonnage type of cruiser, but he points out that any large increase of such type by Great Britain or other powers would have to be matched by us and the total cost of a large number of such ships will be very high in the United States. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/657: Telegram [Document 48] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 12, 1936—9 p.m. [Received February 12—5:30 p.m.] 94. I learn very confidentially from the French Delegation that their delay in coming to agreement is due to the fact that the French Government is considering the political consequences of the participation of Germany or adherence in some form to the naval agreement. The French Cabinet feels that since French acquiescence in German participation would, in a measure, condone the violation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it would be disastrous to the French Government if this were followed by a step over which the French are very apprehensive, namely, a further violation of the treaty through the military occupation of the Rhineland. 47 The French, therefore, desire, before acquiescing in German participation, to iron out with the British the attitude which the latter will take in the event of such violation. The French assure me that they are prepared to make a four-power treaty regardless of Germany. Since, however, the British are insistent upon bringing Germany in, and the French themselves admit that this is most desirable, the French believe they can work out a satisfactory method for German participation if the Rhineland question between England and themselves can be satisfactorily adjusted. The French urge us in the meantime to be patient and not press them too much for immediate decisions on technical questions. The French like the proposal for a protocol as they would like to have the four powers reach an agreement now and defer the actual signing of the treaty with Germany until after the French election. In spite of the French preoccupation about the political aspects and consequences, I am satisfied that while they desire eventually to get the Germans into an agreement for exchange of information and qualitative limitation, they want us to trade on the British desire and need for German participation. They also seem to have an idea that for some reason Germany will be willing to pay something to get into the agreement which I somewhat question. The French understand perfectly well, as I told them, we would have nothing whatever to do with any extra treaty adjustments between ourselves and the British but that we have no objections to their trying to clear up questions as between themselves that would facilitate a naval agreement so long as this does not affect the naval agreement itself and does not unduly delay the termination of our work. The French intimate that once they have cleared up the Rhineland question with the British, which they seem to think they can soon do, they will meet us on the question of battleships which is the chief unsettled question regarding qualitative limitation. In case there should be any leak and press despatches about any political discussions between the European powers, you may, of course, if occasion arises, state that we are in no way participating in them. Davis 47 See pp. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] ff. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/661: Telegram [Document 49] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 14, 1936—6 p.m. [Received February 14—2:05 p.m.] 96. At luncheon with Eden today he told me in strict confidence of a conversation he had this morning with Corbin, the French Ambassador, which was in substance as follows: Corbin reiterated the French objections from a technical and political standpoint to agreeing upon a battleship of the characteristics upon which we are insisting. Eden explained that notwithstanding their objections in which the British partially share it was advisable to acquiesce and necessary to do so in order to get an agreement and that an agreement would outweigh any of the objections. Corbin then raised the question of French objection to binding themselves to sign at a fixed date a naval agreement to which Germany would be an original signatory. Eden told him that Great Britain considered it of vital importance to get a naval agreement and that in order to get it it was essential that Germany should be brought in and to do this it was necessary that she be given the opportunity to become an original signatory; furthermore, that Great Britain had done very much in many ways to meet the French views and that in this particular case they must ask the French to do something as a favor to them which after all was distinctly to the advantage of France herself. He also told Corbin that it was important to get this agreement without much delay and not try to bring in extraneous questions. Corbin told him he would go to Paris this afternoon to talk the matter over fully with Flandin 48 and would see him again, and also me, on Monday. I told Eden just what I told the French, that if it is necessary to clarify certain questions between themselves precedent to a naval agreement it is important that they do so without delay and that it should not affect the naval agreement itself in which alone we are interested and concerned. He said he understood this perfectly and that if the French should attempt further to bring in extraneous European political questions he was going to tell them frankly that he would be prepared to take up such questions with them after the Naval Conference but that it was not fair to the United States or wise to use the Naval Conference as a means of bringing up questions that had nothing to do with the naval question itself. And for that reason Eden said that if the French insist on further commitments he would tell them that Great Britain would stand by Locarno but would refuse to make more precise the provisions of that pact 49 and particularly in such a way as to alienate Germany and close the door to any possible appeasement with Germany. Davis 48 Pierre Etienne Flandin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 49 See pp. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] ff. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/663: Telegram [Document 50] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , February 17, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 17—12:40 p.m.] 123. Referring to the Embassy’s No. 120, February 15, noon, 50 Pietri, Minister of Marine, came to the Chancery by appointment at 10:30 this morning to discuss the present situation of naval negotiations in London. He said that technically he found no objection to the decision arrived at by Great Britain and the United States regarding the upper limit of unit tonnage but that politically it would be difficult for France to accept such an upper limitation and that he would be very anxious to secure some modification thereof. He said that he would be willing to agree on some other limit, say 32,000 tons, and that he hoped that modification to that end could be accomplished. I advised him to go to London himself and talk with Norman Davis whom he knows very well; that I was sure that Mr. Davis would be very glad to get his views; and that I was convinced that he could present his views much better in person; that it was curious that he, the head of the naval delegation, had not gone to London, and that now as the Conference was approaching its termination it would seem highly advisable for him to have direct contact. I judged from his immediate acquiescence in the suggestion that it was what he had come in to seek, perhaps for the purpose of using it as an argument with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister who perhaps were opposed to his visit. Pietri, in reply to my question, stated that the French are now prepared to sign a naval accord, without regard to an accord on air and land armaments, on condition that it should be agreed that subsequent to the naval accord there should be a conference on air and possibly also on land but stating, however, that land was a very much more difficult question to solve. He stated that the French are perfectly agreeable to an endeavor to get Germany to agree to a naval treaty provided Germany would agree to enter into later conversations as to air and land forces. Repeated to Davis and Geneva. Straus 50 Not printed. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/665: Telegram [Document 51] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 18, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 18—10:25 a.m. 51 ] 97. Captain Deleuze who returned from Paris last night showed me this morning a copy of an instruction which the French Government sent yesterday to de Laboulaye 52 requesting him to approach you and if possible the President to ascertain whether the position we have taken as to battleships is the last word and also to explain how important the French consider it to get a reduction which they suggest should lie between 35,000 and 28,000 in tonnage. I repeated to Deleuze our position with regard to the battleship. First, that we are just as desirous as any one to save money by reduction as long as we can do so without a sacrifice of efficiency and need. Second, that not having built any battleships for so many years we could not determine to what extent if any it will be possible to get any reduction until we have actually constructed two or three or four battleships; that with Japan out of the treaty it was unreasonable for France to expect us to make our needs conform to theirs but that after we have gained some experience through construction we would be prepared to consider the possibility and desirability of any reduction thereafter in tonnage but that the promise to exchange views should not be construed as any commitment for a reduction. I told him, however, that after all it was somewhat unrealistic to lay so much stress on the question of battleships when that is not the chief obstacle as yet in the way of French agreement. I asked him point-blank whether if he got a solution on the capital ship France would sign at once. Deleuze replied that they would be willing to sign tomorrow but it would be subject to general reserves. He stated that Massigli was now working on a formula under which the states here present would initial the treaty with the proviso that when certain “general political questions” were solved the treaty would go into effect. I told Deleuze we could not sign any naval agreement that was conditional upon a European political settlement, that from a purely practical standpoint I thought France had always made the mistake of trying to get an all-embracing settlement of every question with the result that they had destroyed the possibility again and again of making any progress towards agreement with Germany and with the result of constant German rearmament. I said I also thought it was a mistake even if we were disposed to do so to try to inject European political questions into this naval conference. Deleuze then inquired how I envisaged the signing of an agreement. I told him that my idea was that a real obligation as to signature should be taken by the four powers here and now. In the event that these powers considered the American ratification to this agreement necessary before January next the signature could only be delayed a very short time. If, however, they did not consider such immediate ratification essential we had no objections to delaying some months the putting into effect of the treaty or its actual signature. They might feel that an undertaking by the President to abide by the term of the treaty until the Senate could consider it would be sufficient for their needs. Deleuze indicated that the French would consider this sufficient and gave the impression that he was favorably disposed toward a solution such as I envisaged. We further discussed how such an undertaking should be made in respect to signature and agreed that it was advantageous for Japan, Germany, and Russia to be “original signatories” to the treaty and that other naval powers might be invited subsequently to adhere. Davis 51 Telegram in three sections. 52 André de Laboulaye, French Ambassador in the United States. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/667: Telegram [Document 52] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 19, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 19—4:20 p.m.] 99. Corbin, who returned from Paris last night, came to see me this afternoon. He first told me he did not know until afterwards that his Government had communicated directly to de Laboulaye about the battleship and he was sorry it had gotten into the press which they had expected to avoid. I told him I was glad in a way to have them find out direct if they wished that the position taken here had been in conformity with your views but I felt it was rather unusual for Monsieur Pietri not to have come here first to discuss these questions directly at the Conference which had been called for dealing with such matters at least before making an appeal direct to Washington. Aside from the question of procedure, however, I particularly deplored the fact that the Havas Agency had learned about it and published a dispatch with the result that our newspapermen here were today all excited about it but that I had endeavored to make little of it. Corbin said that while he could not say his trip to Paris had been a success he felt that he had made headway in getting his Government to realize the importance of reaching a naval agreement and the bad effect which would result from a failure to do so. His Government, while now recognizing this, is considering ways and means or conditions upon which Germany might be brought into the agreement or how best to explain to the French people the reasons for making an agreement with Germany on naval questions without getting an agreement on other matters of concern to them. He said that although they did not want to inject us into any extraneous arrangements which he knew would be objectionable he wondered if it would not be possible to make their ultimate ratification of the naval agreement conditional upon a prior settlement of other matters. I told him I felt this would be particularly objectionable to us and that it would be difficult for us to justify entering a naval agreement that was conditional upon some European settlements even though we should in no way be a party to such agreements. I told him that aside from our own position with regard to this it seemed to me that from their own standpoint it would be advisable and more practicable to make clean-cut naval agreement and to have Germany made a party to it hoping that this would help create a better atmosphere whereby they might later take up other matters which they wished to get settled with Germany. Corbin said he personally felt that there was much to be said for this. He will talk with Eden in a day or so as soon as he hears further from his Government and that while there might be a few days’ delay he was hopeful that they would find a satisfactory way of working out a solution and agreement. Davis The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/669: Telegram [Document 53] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , February 20, 1936—11 a.m. [Received February 20—9:50 a.m.] 58. Last evening I had a short talk with Drummond. 53 He said that he had recently talked to Sugimura, the Japanese Ambassador here. He and Sugimura are very warm friends having known each other for years at Geneva. Drummond said that Sugimura had told him that there had been held in Tokyo a Council of State under the presidency of the Emperor in which there was discussed the question of naval armament and the policy of the Japanese Government in respect to building and tonnage. The ranking Admiral was present and had advocated the withdrawal of Japan from the Naval Conference and the resumption of her full freedom of action. Ishii 54 or one of the other counsellors of state had asked for assurances that the resumption of freedom would not mean an enormous building program and consequent heavy costs to the Government. The Admiral had given such assurances and had stated that Japan had no intention of building in competition with the United States or with England. Drummond felt that this assurance given in the presence of the Emperor was a very solemn undertaking and expressed himself as being satisfied that Sugimura, who is not of the military clique in Japan, had told him of the incident because of their long and intimate acquaintance and without any ulterior motive. Drummond said he had advised his Government. Drummond himself saw Mussolini night before last to discuss the Italian naval point of view vis-à-vis the Naval Conference program in London. He discussed that subject only. No reference was made to the political situation developing out of Geneva or Abyssinia. 55 Acting Naval Attaché requests Navy be notified. Repeated to American delegation London. Long 53 Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador in Italy. 54 Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Japanese Privy Councilor. 55 In connection with the Ethiopian-Italian conflict; for correspondence concerning this subject, see vol. iii , pp. 34 ff. The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to President Roosevelt 500.A15A5/670 [Document 54] The Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) to President Roosevelt Washington , February 20, 1936. Dear Mr. President : Under instructions the French Ambassador called upon us to make an appeal with regard to a reduction in tonnage of capital ships. His instructions, moreover, authorized him to take the matter up with you personally, which, however, he does not feel it necessary to do. Our suggestion is contained in the accompanying instruction to Davis, 56 which, with your approval, I would like to read to de Laboulaye. In this way we would be steering the negotiations away from Washington and back to London, where they belong. Faithfully yours, William Phillips 56 Telegram No. 40, February 20, 3 p.m., infra. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/670: Telegram [Document 55] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 20, 1936—3 p.m. 40. The French Ambassador called at the Department on the 18th instant under instructions which he said were of a very “insistent” character to ask if this Government could not find it possible to agree to a reduction in the unit tonnage and gun caliber of capital ships. The substance of his representations was as follows: The French Government observes that the desire to reduce tonnage of ships and gun caliber is a world-wide tendency at the present time and will be found in all international efforts; the difficulties with regard to the reduction of tonnage of battleships and the size of their guns are so serious that the French Ambassador had been instructed in the most “insistent” way to bring the views of the French Government to the attention of the Department and, possibly, of the President; all the naval delegations in London except that of the United States have agreed to a reduction from 35,000 to 28,000 tons and from 16-inch gun caliber to 12-inch; the French Government would regret to see the conference ended by a decision which in practice maintains the status quo in the capital ships category; for itself, the French Government does not feel, in the absence of any real progress in this category, that the signature of the agreement would offer to them any real technical interest. The French “insist”, though with the utmost cordiality, in seeing whether something can be done in this matter. It would be regrettable, the French maintain, if a convention were signed to take the place of the Washington and London treaties, if there were no reduction in capital ship tonnage or gun caliber, especially when the governments having heavy financial obligations to assure their own national defense could in this way be relieved partially without compromising their own security. M. Flandin asks whether it would not be possible for the American Navy to make an effort in this direction and agree to some tonnage reduction between the 35,000 and 28,000 tonnage. The French Government will not take a definite attitude on this subject before having the American answer. Before leaving, the Ambassador offered his own opinion that a slight reduction in capital ship tonnage might even make it possible for them to accept the agreement; otherwise he felt that it would be dangerous for the French Government to risk the unfavorable public reaction to what might be regarded as the recognition of a change in the Versailles Treaty. 57 We have today informed the Ambassador that we felt that too much stress should not be laid upon a slight tonnage reduction in one type of naval vessel when there appears to be a real possibility of a general acceptance of the other points now before the Conference; and that we feel an earnest effort should be made to reach an agreement on battleships along the lines of the British basis of discussion and that we hoped that this and other phases before the Conference would be taken up directly by the French Delegation at the Conference. Hull 57 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 55 . The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/670: Telegram [Document 56] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 20, 1936—4 p.m. 41. Our 40, February 20, 3 p.m. For your information, we are giving you our observations on the subject of the French desire for reduction in unit tonnage of capital ships, as follows: We are deeply sympathetic with any desire to effect economy in naval construction. As far as concerns effecting a saving by a reduction of the size of capital ships, however, there would appear to be no assurance of a saving by such a reduction in one category in the absence of quantitative limitation in this and all other categories. Furthermore, the inadvisability of arbitrarily and radically reducing the characteristics of one type of vessel that has reached its present stage after a long period of gradual development will readily be recognized. As you recall, the Navy Department has made very exhaustive studies of the possibility of a reduction in the unit tonnage of capital ships and in a reduction of the caliber of guns mounted thereon. We have already agreed to accept a reduction in gun caliber to 14 inches provided such a limitation is accepted by the principal naval powers. We consider this reduction of gun caliber as a possible first step in the reduction of the size of capital ships and after we have had an opportunity to test out new construction methods and design we would be willing to consider any possibilities of reduction in unit tonnage which might appear feasible, having in mind the characteristics necessary for our defensive needs. It might be pointed out that if no agreement for reduction of gun caliber below 16-inch is entered into generally, capital ships constructed to carry 16-inch guns and to incorporate the characteristics considered necessary for defense under modern conditions would very likely materially exceed 35,000 tons. This Government maintains its position that economies could most equitably be accomplished by a reduction in total tonnage proportionately applied to all categories and not by radically changing the type of ship in any single category. Public impression has been created through the press here that any reluctance on the part of France to sign a treaty containing agreement upon the qualitative characteristics of vessels along the lines generally of the proposed British bases of discussion would not be primarily by reason of an inability to accept these limitations for the comparatively short period covered by the agreement. According to the press reports, the hesitancy of the French Government to accept the agreement is based rather upon their reluctance to enter into a naval treaty to which Germany would be a cosignatory. Such a reluctance on the part of the French Government would very likely appear to the American public to be based upon political reasons outside of the scope of the naval conference and outside of the agenda of the conference which the United States understood to be the basis of discussion when the invitation to the meeting at London was accepted. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/672: Telegram [Document 57] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 21, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 21—11:30 a.m.] 102. In a talk with Eden last evening he told me in substance the following: Their Ambassador in Paris had under instructions made representations to Flandin to the effect that a naval agreement is vitally important to both Great Britain and to France. That if such an agreement is to be satisfactory and effective it is essential that Germany be a party. Hence the British Government must ask the French Government as an act of friendship to aid in bringing about such agreement. Furthermore the Ambassador informed Flandin that it is essential for Anglo-French cooperation that France give this concrete evidence of her desire to cooperate in the proper spirit and that if the French should block a naval agreement it would have a very serious reaction on public opinion in England. Eden said he was somewhat hopeful as French were now showing more of an inclination to fall into line. I told Eden that Corbin had indicated to me (see my 99, February 19, 8 p.m.) the idea of making a naval agreement dependent upon general political development and what my reply had been. Eden said he thought I was quite correct in refusing to have a naval agreement dependent upon political developments or settlements; that while the British would be glad to have an air agreement they were opposed to making such an agreement dependent upon a naval agreement or vice versa. He will make it clear to the French that the best preparation for a subsequent air agreement would be an unconditional naval agreement with Germany as a party to it. He will furthermore point out that if an attempt were made to get an air and a naval agreement at the same time the result would be not to get either one. I suggest for your consideration that if de Laboulaye approaches you again, or if there is an opportunity to do so, it would be helpful if you take a similar line while explaining, of course, that what the French and British do as between themselves is of no concern of ours except as it affects a general naval agreement. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/672: Telegram [Document 58] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 21, 1936—6 p.m. 43. Your 102, February 21, 2 p.m., and previous telegrams on the subject. The Department entirely approves of the position you have taken in avoiding having the naval agreement become in any way dependent upon political developments or settlements. We are pleased that you are keeping the position of this Government entirely clear in this regard. For your own information: Of course there is, as you know, always a possibility of press reports of political questions entering into the general atmosphere of the Conference producing an unfavorable reaction in this country. We realize fully, however, from your own communications and from the press reports concerning the Conference, that you are entirely aware of this situation. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/673: Telegram [Document 59] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 21, 1936—6 p.m. [Received February 21—2:25 p.m.] 103. In a brief talk with Grandi 58 after a luncheon today he told me he doubted if in the last analysis Mussolini would agree to sign a naval agreement now. I expressed some surprise and said that since the Italians had been cooperating satisfactorily without raising any serious difficulties I had assumed they would of course be in favor of an agreement. He said that while a naval agreement was not of any particular advantage to Italy they had thought it better to have one than not. Mussolini had expected that before the Naval Conference reached a climax there would have been a settlement of the Abyssinian question. Since, however, there has been no such settlement and the British fleet was still in the Mediterranean he suspected that under the circumstances Mussolini would find it difficult to justify a naval agreement which offered no advantages to Italy to which he could point. I cannot of course tell whether the Italians are taking this tack to help instigate another move for the Abyssinian settlement. Eden told me yesterday that Drummond had just had a talk with Mussolini on the naval question which led him to believe the Italians would offer no difficulties as to a naval agreement but intimated that they might hold aloof from any European questions such as an air agreement until the question of sanctions is disposed of. My guess is that if and when France is ready to close a naval agreement she will persuade Italy to do so, too. Davis 58 Dino Grandi, Italian Ambassador in the United Kingdom and delegate to the Naval Conference. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/676: Telegram [Document 60] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 25, 1936—2 p.m. 44. In view of Rome’s 62, February 22, 8 p.m., 59 which in Section 2 reports the Italian Under Secretary of State as indicating doubt as to whether Italy will sign naval treaty and in view of the uncertainty as to whether the French Government will engage itself now to sign a naval treaty to which the Germans might be cosignatories, there is a possibility of our being put in an anomalous position by having to wait in London for the initialing or signing of a treaty or agreements until certain political conditions in Europe are settled to the satisfaction of some of the governments participating in the Conference. We would not want to be at all precipitous in judging this situation from here, but we would like your comment on the advisability of perhaps arranging, in the event the Conference cannot terminate its labors within a short time, to indicate in a friendly way to the Chairman of the Conference that in order not to lose any of the support we now have in this country for the objectives of the Conference, it would be best for our Delegation to indicate the general extent and form which we would be willing to accept with regard to the naval agreements before the Conference, and our willingness to authorize an initialing or signing of such agreements at any future date agreeable to the members of the Conference. We are putting forward this suggestion merely for your comment and advice at this time. Hull 59 Not printed; see telegram No. 103, February 21, 6 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, supra. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/677: Telegram [Document 61] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 25, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 25—11:35 a.m.] 105. Monsell and Craigie told me last evening of their talk with the Italians yesterday and with the French Friday and Saturday. In substance the Italians indicated that they would find it difficult to justify signing a naval agreement so long as sanctions are being applied against Italy unless they could at least show that something has been gained by such agreement such as even a slight reduction in the tonnage of capital ships. They did not, however, definitely refuse to do so and it is believed they are trying to use this as a means of bringing pressure to bear for initiating a move for the future peaceful settlement of the Abyssinian question. The French said that as far as capital ships were concerned they wished to defer their decision until they received a reply from Washington. (Apparently Corbin had not been informed of your reply of last Thursday 60 ). As regards a general agreement the French took the position that they would either sign a protocol providing for Germany’s participation as an original party to the initialed treaty conditional upon the settlement prior to the date of signature of other questions such as an air agreement or sign at a fixed date a four-power treaty which would not be conditional upon German adherence but which would permit the subsequent adherence of other powers including Germany. The British rejected the first alternative but stated that they would take up the second alternative with Germany in order to ascertain whether Germany would later join in an agreement without specific provision being made beforehand since the British are unwilling to conclude a four-power treaty without the assurance that Germany will come in. Monsell doubts if Germany would come along on these conditions but Craigie felt confident they would. Monsell then asked whether if France and Italy continue to impose so many conditions and to put an impossible price on their adherence we would be disposed to enter into a naval agreement with Great Britain and Germany to which the other powers would be invited to adhere and which he believed would bring the others in very quickly. I told him this was a matter we would have to consider very carefully but I was inclined to think there might be serious objections to this. The British suggested that if we objected to entering into an American-Anglo-German treaty to which other powers would be invited to adhere we might sign an Anglo-American agreement and then England could enter into a bilateral agreement with Germany if feasible [ in conformity with ] this and likewise with France. Then the two of us might be able to bring Japan into such an agreement later. I told them that while I realized it might be possible to work this out through a series of bilateral agreements my first thought on the matter was that it would be better to have one treaty to which every one would be invited to adhere instead of a series of bilateral agreements. I suggest that we might consider the possibility of going ahead and drafting a naval treaty as contemplated to be initialed by Great Britain and ourselves and then by an exchange of notes agree that we would invite the other naval powers to adhere. We might also agree to exchange information as between ourselves and to adhere to the principles of the treaty so much as the other powers did not depart therefrom. I told them I was not prepared to commit us in any way to such ends but that if it appealed to them we would think it over further and consult Washington. The British replied that the idea appealed to them very much as it would have the advantage of avoiding complications because of the susceptibilities of the French and the Germans and would perhaps be the most practical and likely way of bringing them and all the other naval powers into line during the course of the year. For our guidance I should very much appreciate the views of the President and yourself as to these various suggestions. Davis 60 February 20; see Department’s telegram No. 40, p. 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] . The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/685a: Telegram [Document 62] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 25, 1936—8 p.m. 46. Your 105, February 25, 2 p.m. We suggest for your consideration a line of action somewhat as follows: That we offer to leave with the British Government as the inviting power to the conference, a memorandum indicating the type of a treaty, on the lines of the British basis of discussion, which we could accept provided it is accepted by the principal naval powers. At the same time we could signify our willingness to sign such a treaty at any time before the end of this year with, of course, the appropriate escape clauses if it has not been accepted by all the naval powers. Of course, the date and time of acceptance does not appear to us to be a matter of urgency and we could therefore leave to the British, as the inviting power to this conference, the order and the manner in which the acceptance of the other naval powers might be obtained. The memorandum of the type Treaty should however be referred to the President before initialing. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/681: Telegram [Document 63] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 25, 1936—11 p.m. [Received February 25—7:25 p.m.] 106. Craigie telephoned me tonight that the French had suggested today that the best way to deal with the difficulty and embarrassment with regard to Germany would be for the four powers here to make a treaty and for England to enter into a bilateral supplementary treaty with Germany incorporating the provisions of the four-power treaty. Craigie told the French that he was not certain whether this would be acceptable to Germany or the other powers but that they would take the matter under consideration. We see no objections from our standpoint to such an arrangement and if you have any contrary views please advise at once for my guidance in case the matter is definitely submitted to us. Craigie also told me that he had had a long conference today with the German Naval Attaché discussing the proposed agreement in detail. His impression was that the Germans have no objections to the proposed technical provisions but that they expect a definite reply from the German Government tomorrow. He said that he had not yet broached the more delicate question of the manner in which Germany would be brought into the treaty itself. Craigie told me that the Italians had informed him today that notwithstanding the political difficulties which had been raised with regard to their signing a naval agreement now, they would be disposed to do so anyhow if they could clarify certain technical questions and get more definite assurance as to the eventual reduction of battleship unit tonnage. Craigie said the Italians were suspicious that the suggestion that in 3 or 4 years and after experience gained by construction consideration would be given to the possibility of a reduction of 2,000 or 3,000 tons was “eyewash.” He thought, therefore, that it would be helpful for Admiral Standley and me to talk with Grandi and Admiral Raineri-Biscia 61 to remove their apprehension and to assure them of our good faith. I will arrange such a meeting. Davis 61 Italian deputy delegate. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/682: Telegram [Document 64] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 25, 1936—midnight. [Received February 25—7:10 p.m.] 107. Your 44, February 25, 2 p.m. Sharing your preoccupation as to the anomalous position in which we would be placed if we were to hang on in London for any undue length of time waiting for a consummation of our labors until European powers can adjust certain political questions, I have already indicated to the Chairman of the Conference the difficulties which this might raise for us and have endeavored to impress upon all of them the importance of reaching conclusions without undue delay. Eden said he quite understood the situation and was opposed to further dillydallying on the naval question. As indicated in my 105, February 25, 2 p.m. and my 106, February 25, 11 p.m., the negotiations are reaching a stage where the Conference must soon come to a head. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/681: Telegram [Document 65] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 26, 1936—8 p.m. 47. Your 106, February 25, 11 p.m. We offer no objection to the French suggestion that four powers now in conference enter into a treaty and for British to enter into bilateral treaty with Germany. You should make it clear, however, that the purpose of the American mission is to extend existing Washington and London treaties which included five original powers and that the United States takes no part in a British, French, Italian arrangement by which a bilateral treaty would be made to include Germany—this being essentially a European problem. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/688: Telegram [Document 66] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 26, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 26—5:50 p.m.] 108. Your 46, February 25, 8 p.m. We have had in mind recommending a line of action such as that suggested by you in case it is not possible to achieve something more definite and satisfactory. I have felt, however, that it would be unwise to let up in our efforts until we have exhausted every possibility of agreement because if we once give up and leave the situation becomes even more confused and uncertain as to the future. We are still negotiating on naval questions and Italy and France are not making much headway with the British in their efforts to inject political issues. As long as this remains true I think we shall not become too impatient. Also, there seems to be a growing feeling among the other delegations that we must soon conclude the work here. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/687: Telegram [Document 67] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 26, 1936—midnight. [Received February 26—8 p.m.] 109. Grandi, who came to see me this afternoon, said that he expected to see Eden tomorrow or Friday and inform him of the Italian position, but that he felt he should tell me in confidence that Italy would be unable to commit itself now to a naval agreement. The difficulties are both political and technical and his instructions received last Friday are to refuse to sign now on political or technical grounds, or both, as he sees fit His desire is to refuse in the least harmful way, having in mind an ultimate agreement. He said that Mussolini had been most desirous of joining in a naval treaty, but as long as Italy was at war and sanctions are being applied against her with the threat of military measures, it was not possible to find any way to do so which would not have a harmful effect on public opinion. From a technical standpoint, the navy would like a reduction in battleship unit tonnage, but that [ sic ] its chief objection to the proposed agreement is the zone of no construction between 10,000 and 20,000 tons particularly as long as there is no assurance that Italy is going to be at peace with England. If it were not for the political hurdle he said that Mussolini could concede on the technical questions. I asked Grandi whether Italy could initial a four-power agreement without a definite commitment to sign but with the understanding that she may subsequently sign at a given date if conditions then justify it. He said that to initial a treaty would be construed in Italy as a definite commitment. He then asked if it would not be possible for England, France and the United States to make an agreement now which would be left open for subsequent Italian adherence. He advanced this for transmission without authority, but he felt that if we should decide to take this course he could persuade his Government to approve. I told him I did not know how France would feel about that since France is still making difficulties even to a four-power agreement. Insofar as concerns us, I would think the matter over, but my present impression was that it might be the best thing to do under the circumstances particularly if Germany is also a party to such a treaty. He then told me that Eden’s recent speech had been very helpful. He was hopeful it would now be possible for England and Italy to begin direct discussion looking to a settlement of the Abyssinian war to be worked out by and through the League. He said Italy was particularly anxious to maintain its traditional friendly relationship with England and indicated that Rome was becoming more disposed now to seek a settlement than heretofore. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/689: Telegram [Document 68] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 27, 1936—noon. [Received February 27—9:05 a.m.] 110. Supplementing my 109, February 26, midnight, Grandi suggested that we might keep the Naval Conference going a few weeks as there was a possibility that the Abyssinian question might be settled or reach a stage which would enable Italy to proceed with the consummation of a naval agreement. I told him such a delay on political grounds would be unacceptable to us. Since it seems definite that the Italians will not now join in a naval agreement three possible alternatives remain. 1. An agreement to be signed by England, France and the United States. In this case it would be necessary to determine whether Germany shall be brought in as a party now or later and Germany be brought in through an Anglo-German treaty which would conform to the provisions of the multilateral treaty. Please give me as soon as possible your views as to this alternative. The second alternative to be considered in case France should refuse to come along now would be for Great Britain and ourselves to initial a treaty to which all the naval powers would be invited to adhere before a given time as indicated in my number 105, February 25, 2 p.m. I should also like your views on this. The third alternative would be to adopt as a last resort the suggestion contained in your number 47 [ 46 ] February 26 [ 25 ], 8 p.m. We shall be careful in any event to avoid having any agreement we might make mixed with European political questions. In fact the British themselves seem definitely opposed to tieing the naval agreement in any way to other questions. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/689: Telegram [Document 69] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) 62 Washington , February 27, 1936—6 p.m. 48. Your 110, February 27, noon. With regard to your alternatives based on the possibility that the Italians will not now join in a naval agreement, our views would be as follows: Your first alternative. We would be willing to enter into an agreement with England and France with the appropriate safeguard clauses. As far as the manner of German adherence is concerned, we refer you to our 47, February 26, 8 p.m. Your second alternative. We prefer to follow the procedure outlined in our 46, February 25, 8 p.m. It might be misunderstood here if we assumed the position of joint inviting power with the British for obtaining the adherences of other countries to the naval treaty, particularly in view of the political atmosphere now prevailing on the continent. Hull 62 Marginal notation: “O. K. F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt]”. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/692: Telegram [Document 70] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 28, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 28—11:42 a.m.] 112. The Italian delegation called on Admiral Standley and me this morning to elucidate the position taken by them in their meeting with the British yesterday. They explained that while the fundamental reason for their inability to commit themselves now on a naval agreement is political they decided after full consideration that if they refused on the ground that they could not agree to limit their naval armaments as long as sanctions are being applied against Italy with the threat of military force it might appear that Italy was trying to blackmail the sanctionist powers either to withdraw sanctions or to negotiate a settlement. Accordingly they felt it advisable to state that for technical and other difficulties they were not for the moment ready to sign a treaty. They said that while they were in favor of a reduction in battleship displacement after a certain number of battleships are built and were in favor of limiting the nonconstruction zone between 10,000 and 17,000 tons they would be able to concede these points were it not for the political difficulties. They, therefore, wished to assure us categorically that once the political situation has so ameliorated that Italy can join in a naval agreement they will raise no objections on technical grounds. They wish to remain in the Conference and collaborate in the preparation of a text for a treaty with the understanding, however, that they are not expected to commit themselves at present but are aiding in the formulation of a draft which they would hope later to accept. Such reservations as they would have to make now with regard to the battleship and the zone of nonconstruction would not be done in such a manner as to make it difficult for them to accept subsequently. They expressed the hope that Great Britain, France and ourselves would thus be able to complete and sign a treaty now along the lines we had been negotiating leaving it open for subsequent Italian adherence and that by having continued to participate with us in the work it would be easier for Italy to adhere. They said they had not put this up to their home government yet but believed it would be acceptable. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/696: Telegram [Document 71] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 28, 1936—7 p.m. 50. The Italian Ambassador called at the Department this morning and stated that he had received a telegram from his Foreign Office indicating that the Italian Government was unable at this time to enter into a naval treaty. The Ambassador mentioned that the Italian Government felt that before it could accept a naval agreement certain questions in addition to technical details had to be settled, namely, the sanctions now pending against Italy and the unsatisfactory reply of the British Government to the Italian representations regarding mutual assistance against Italy by Great Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece. 63 Hull 63 See British Cmd. 5072, Ethiopia No. 2 (1936): Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/697: Telegram [Document 72] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) 64 Washington , February 28, 1936—8 p.m. 51. We suggest for your consideration the obtaining of a gentleman’s agreement as between Great Britain, France, Italy and ourselves, and through England from Germany, whereby each nation would agree to notify the others of every decision to lay down naval vessels of any size over 100 tons. These four or five powers could, if such a gentleman’s agreement were obtained, then jointly or severally invite Japan to do the same thing. Hull 64 This instruction embodied the substance of a memorandum of February 28, 1936, from President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/695: Telegram [Document 73] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 28, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 28—8 p.m. 65 ] 113. For the President and the Secretary. Your 48, Feb. 27, 6 p.m. As I interpret your 46, Feb. 25, 8 p.m., the only substantial difference in the procedure suggested by you and the second alternative outlined in my 110, Feb. 27, noon, is with regard to inviting other powers to adhere to the draft treaty. I concur entirely in your view that the British, who have taken the initiative, should keep it and do the inviting. Eden told me today that since our last talk he had had two long conversations with the German Ambassador and that he was still encountering some difficulties with Germany due to the unfortunate publicity with regard to the questions raised by the French as to the method of Germany’s being brought into the naval treaty. The Germans apparently have no objection to the technical provisions of the proposed treaty but object to run[ning] the risk of being put into a position of committing themselves to sign a treaty if and when the French navy permit. Eden thinks he may be able to obviate this difficulty through a supplementary bilateral treaty with Germany but, as he has explained to the Germans, he will do this only in case of necessity and as a preliminary step towards bringing Germany ultimately into a multilateral treaty. Eden says that the French are becoming more nearly disposed to reach agreement but have not yet given definite assurances to that effect. If this is not done before Monday, he will take the matter up direct with Flandin in Geneva. He is very hopeful that the French will come alone [ along ] on a three-power agreement although they claim that Italy, in refusing to join in an agreement partly on technical grounds, makes it more difficult for France to make the necessary concessions to meet the British and ourselves. He thinks that if the Italians will give the same assurance to the French that they gave to us today it would be most helpful (see my 112 Feb. 28, 2 p.m.). Eden expressed the opinion that while we should not let up in our efforts to get France to agree to a draft treaty which the three of us may at least initial, it would be a tragic thing in the situation that exists in the world today if we should terminate our efforts here without any concrete accomplishments and that the United States and Great Britain should consider what agreement or measure of accord they can reach and what steps they may best take to bring about an ultimate general agreement. In case it is not possible to get France to come along, the British think this may be the only way to break the political deadlock which has been injected into the Conference and which now prevents a four-power naval agreement and may prevent France from reaching a three-power agreement despite the fact that there are no insuperable technical difficulties. Eden stated in effect that the United States and Great Britain should make every possible effort to prevent other naval powers from injecting extraneous questions and thereby to stymie both of us completely in an effort to work out a solution of the naval problem. Furthermore, that Great Britain was prepared to cooperate with the United States to the fullest extent compatible with the limitation of our policy. In view of the extremely critical situation now existing and particularly the recent developments in Japan, 66 we share Eden’s opinion that it is highly important that at least Great Britain and the United States as the two principal naval powers should show that they are in some measure of agreement and that it would be most unfortunate for the Conference to terminate without putting on record any definite accomplishment. We recognize, of course, the objections to signing a bilateral naval treaty. We, nevertheless, think that something could be worked out in accord with the suggestions in your 46 and which would be acceptable to the British. In order to be sure that our views are in complete harmony with yours, I may say that what we have in mind is to complete a draft treaty, incorporating into it the technical agreements already reached and the remaining one as to battleships, doing so in collaboration with the British and such of the other delegations as are willing to cooperate. This draft would be left open by a recorded decision of the Conference or by a memorandum of such delegations as may agree for subsequent signature on a date prior to December 31, 1936, to be determined. The British Government, as the inviting power, would submit the draft to the other powers and, on the basis of the replies received, determine the time and method of signature. We have thought of two lines of procedure. One would be for such powers as are in agreement to initial the draft treaty or, two, signify through a memorandum their willingness to sign the treaty at the time fixed, provided in the meantime the other principal naval powers agree to sign or to do so with the appropriate escape clauses if any of the other naval powers refuse. In case Great Britain and the United States should be the only ones now prepared to initial the draft or to signify their willingness to sign such a treaty, we must determine whether or not subsequent signature of the treaty shall be conditional upon it being signed by one or more of the naval powers. If at least three of the Washington Treaty powers sign the proposed treaty no difficulty will arise for us provided adequate escape clauses are included. On the other hand, there are two other contingencies which may possibly arise and which we feel should be considered. One is that only Great Britain and ourselves may be ready to sign upon any fixed date. While the President expressed himself as willing to reach an understanding with the British as to naval policy, he was opposed to negotiating solely an Anglo-American naval treaty. He may feel, however, that the objection he had in mind would not hold if the two of us are the only ones to enter a treaty to which all of the naval powers had been previously invited to adhere and which continues to remain open to them. If, notwithstanding this, the President’s objection still holds, we could agree with the British that in case no other principal power agrees to sign the proposed treaty, we may then determine through an exchange of views whether the draft may serve as a basis for a naval understanding between our two Governments either through simultaneous declaration on an exchange of notes or just what action we shall take. The other contingency is that Germany might not care to be the only other power besides Great Britain and ourselves to agree in the end to sign the proposed treaty. If you think this possibility might raise political difficulties for us it could be obviated by a provision to the effect that in order that such a treaty be effective it must be signed and ratified by say at least three of the Washington Treaty powers. Davis 65 Telegram in two sections. 66 For correspondence concerning political developments in Japan, see vol. iv , pp. 706 ff. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/698: Telegram [Document 74] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 29, 1936—noon. [Received February 29—8 a.m.] 114. For the President and the Secretary. Supplementing our 113, February 28, 10 p.m., it is of course unlikely that all of the principal naval powers will decline to come into a treaty. If, however, in such an unlikely event you should deem it inadvisable to sign alone with Great Britain or to commit yourself in advance to do so I suggest that we do not go on record specifically to that effect at the present but that we stipulate in a memorandum that in case none of the other Washington Treaty powers or any other principal naval power as the case may be except the United States and Great Britain are prepared to sign the proposed treaty the United States and Great Britain will then exchange views and determine what action they shall take under the circumstances with a view of at least preventing a naval race as between themselves and of promoting an ultimate general limitation and reduction in naval armaments. My reason for this suggestion is that other naval powers will be more likely to sign if they are kept guessing as to what the United States and Great Britain will do in the event that all or some of them do not adhere and they will have less incentive to try to bargain or dictate conditions upon which this [ they? ] will come along. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/702: Telegram [Document 75] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , February 29, 1936—4 p.m. 54. Your 113, February 28, 10 p.m., and 114, February 29, noon. We agree with your view that it would be appropriate to complete a draft treaty to be left open either by a recorded decision of the Conference or by a memorandum given by each delegation to agree to sign the treaty later. The time for signing might be postponed to a date which would give the British Government, as the inviting power, time to submit the draft to the other powers and to determine the method of signature and the limit of time for signing or adhering. Whether we initial the draft, or signify by a memorandum our willingness to sign later, seems to us immaterial provided our agreement to enter into the treaty is subject to the final adherence of the other principal naval powers, and provided the treaty has appropriate escape clauses in case all the principal naval powers do not come in. I do not see any difficulty in our signifying our willingness now to enter into the treaty at a later time even if Great Britain and ourselves are the only ones who might be prepared at this time to signify such acceptance. In this case, I think it would be preferable for us not to initial the treaty with Great Britain, but to signify our willingness by depositing a memorandum to that effect with the British Government. I consider it advisable to defer at this time any decision as to the action we might take in the event the British and ourselves are the only ones who are ready to sign the treaty at the end of the limit of time for which it would be left open for signature. We could, it seems to me, assure the British, but not formally, that we would be glad to confer at the end of the time limit as to the procedure to be adopted in the event that our two countries are the only ones ready to enter into a treaty. As far as Germany is concerned, an American-Anglo-German Treaty seems inadvisable. I suggest the British be informed that in view of the essentially European aspects of the German Navy and the fact that the German Navy even under the proposed Treaty would not exceed more than approximately a third of the total British naval force, the United States would greatly prefer a bilateral British-German arrangement if based essentially on their ratios as at present agreed on. A way of avoiding a three-power treaty including only ourselves, Great Britain and Germany, would be to adopt the provision you suggest to the effect that in order that the new treaty be effective it must be signed and ratified by at least three of the Washington treaty powers. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/703: Telegram [Document 76] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 3, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 3—3:03 p.m.] 119. Your 29, January 29, 7 p.m. One of the conditions on which we can agree to reduce the gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches is “that during this year no signatory would lay down any ships with over 14-inch guns.” The United States, British Empire and Japan are prohibited by the London Treaty from laying down any capital ships this year. France and Italy have never ratified any part of the London Treaty and therefore retain their right under the Washington Treaty to lay down this year capital ships mounting guns not in excess of 16 inches. Italy does not contemplate laying down any capital ship this year. France intends to lay down shortly a 15-inch gun ship which will give her two such ships to balance the two 15-inch gun ships now building by Italy. It is understood the design of this ship is completed and to change the gun caliber to 14 inches will delay the ship for a considerable time and it is extremely unlikely that France will consent to the restriction “that during this year, et cetera.” Summarizing, the United States is protected under the London Treaty against the laying down of any capital ship during this year by Japan or Great Britain. The question of the laying down this year of a capital ship carrying guns in excess of 14 inches by France, Italy, Germany or Soviet Russia is mainly a European question. In view of the above Admiral Standley and I recommend that we do not insist upon the condition mentioned in [paragraph] one of this despatch. Please advise immediately if you do not agree. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/704: Telegram [Document 77] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 4, 1936—1 a.m. [Received March 3—9:40 p.m. 67 ] 120. After several days discussion within the French Government, in which the final outcome hung in the balance, the French delegation today received instructions to abandon its insistence on reducing the unit tonnage of capital ships and to accept a continuance of the Washington Treaty standard of 35,000 tons, subject to the following two conditions: ( a ) That in 1940 the high contracting parties would exchange views through diplomatic channels to determine whether in the light of circumstances then prevailing and on the experience gained in the interval in the construction of capital ships, it is possible to agree to any reduction in the tonnage or gun calibre of capital ships to be laid down after January 1, 1941; ( b ) that the gun calibre of capital ships be provisionally fixed at 14 inches but might return to 16 inches if by January 1, 1937, all of the Washington Treaty powers have not undertaken to respect these limits as to tonnage and gun calibre of capital ships. The first condition is in line with what you have authorized us to agree to (your 41, February 20, 4 p.m.) and we therefore propose to accept it subject to agreement as to actual wording. The second condition, as now worded, is in conflict with the position taken by the Department in its 29, Jan. 29, 7 p.m. and is open to the serious objection that it would require a positive act on the part of an individual high contracting party to return to the 16-inch gun in the event that Japan should not adhere. We have endeavored to persuade the French to accept our formula for a 16-inch gun to be reduced to 14 inches if accepted by the five Washington powers. After telephoning Paris this afternoon they have been instructed to refuse this and to insist upon the 14-inch limitation but are authorized, in order to meet our views, to insert a provision to the effect that the 14-inch gun is regulation upon acceptance prior to January 1, 1937, by the Washington powers. The French declare that a formula along these lines suggested by them would have a much more favorable reaction in France and, since they have met us in every other respect, insist that we should meet them to this extent. While we cannot, of course, accept the wording of the French formula as presented to us and which is quoted in section two of this cable, we believe that it is capable of a rewording acceptable to them and which would meet our preoccupations by automatically establishing a 16-inch gun in the event of Japanese nonadherence prior to January 1, 1937. In section three, we are cabling you a possible compromise draft which we think the French might be prepared to accept and on which we should like to have your instructions without delay. The French formula for the limits of capital ships follows: “1. None of the high contracting parties will lay down or acquire a capital ship of standard displacement above 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) or carrying a gun with a calibre in excess of 14 inches (356 milimeters). 2. If prior to January 1, 1937, all powers signatory to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 have not undertaken to respect the limits fixed in paragraph 1 above for the characteristics of capital ships or if prior to December 31, 1936, any power lays down a capital ship carrying a gun of a calibre in excess of 14 inches (356 milimeters), the high contracting parties will be authorized to return to the maximum characteristics fixed by the above-mentioned Washington Treaty. These provisions are without prejudice to the rights that France and Italy have under the treaty for the limitations of armaments signed at Washington on February 6, 1922.” We are submitting to you the following compromise formula which should be read in connection with article 1, annex 1 of the draft incorporated in our 104, February 22, 1 p.m., 68 and if you approve, we will endeavor to get the French to accept: (A) No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement. (B) No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 14 inches (356 milimeters) provided, however, that, if any of the Washington Treaty powers should fail to undertake to conform to this provision prior to January 1, 1937, the maximum calibre for guns carried by capital ships shall be 16 inches (406 milimeters). Davis 67 Telegram in three sections. 68 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/705: Telegram [Document 78] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) 69 Washington , March 5, 1936—5 p.m. 58. Your 119, March 3, 8 p.m. We agree with you that it would not seem appropriate for us to insist upon the condition in agreeing to the reduction of gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches “that during this year no signatory would lay down any ship with over 14-inch guns.” Your 120, March 4, 1 a.m., and 122 March 5, 1 p.m. 70 Your draft formula, as contained in Section 3 of the above telegram is acceptable to us provided that in the language of (B) the word “undertake” is changed to “enter into an agreement.” With regard to the arrangements for an exchange of views through diplomatic channels in order to determine whether it might be possible to accomplish a reduction in the unit tonnage limitation of capital ships, we could not be sure that we would be ready to discuss a reduction in the tonnage or gun caliber of capital ships to be laid down from January 1, 1941. It might be that a delay in our ship construction program or delays in shipbuilding might prevent our having completed and tried out a new capital ship in time to enter into discussions for an agreement which would take effect January 1, 1941. We would suggest that the discussions might better take place during 1941 with a view to having any arrangement arrived at take effect as from January 1, 1942. Hull 69 Marginal notation: “All matters in this telegram discussed with and approved by the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Admiral Andrews), Admiral Taussig and Admiral Greenslade. J[ames] C[lement] D[unn] March 5, 1936.” 70 Latter not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/710a: Telegram [Document 79] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , March 9, 1936—2 p.m. 64. As a result of the entirely new turn of events brought about by the German action in the Rhineland, 71 there will no doubt be many exaggerated reports and rumors which, though they may have no foundation in fact, will undoubtedly be disturbing in their effects. In the course of these developments there is, of course, a possibility that there may be rumors or news stories tending to connect up this country with some of the developments. In any event we are unquestionably entering into a period of increasing tenseness in European affairs. What do you think of informally discussing with the Chairman of the Conference the possibility of expediting the discussion of any of the technical questions now pending in order that the delegation may have arrived at a substantial clarification of the important parts of the proposed treaty, so that as soon as possible the delegation might be in a position to plan to return on the assumption that the majority of the technical questions before the conference will be clarified probably in time for the delegation to sail before the end of this month? I would be glad to have your comment on this suggestion in the light of the new situation which has arisen in Europe. Hull 71 i. e., the military reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7; see pp. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] ff. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/710: Telegram [Document 80] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 9, 1936—11 p.m. [Received March 9—8:45 p.m.] 129. Under present prospects, it will probably take approximately 10 days more to complete the naval treaty and we will, therefore, not be able to get a signed text into your hands before the end of the month. This raises the question as to whether it will be possible to obtain ratification of the treaty during the present session of Congress. We consider it of the greatest importance that the treaty be ratified so that it come into effect on January 1, 1937. As you are aware certain important provisions of the treaty as now drafted depend upon its coming into force not later than the end of this year. The Washington and London Treaties, moreover, will come to an end on December 31, and it would be most unfortunate if there were to be an interval of perhaps several months in which no naval treaty whatsoever would be in effect. At any rate, I believe it would have a very undesirable effect if the coming into force of the treaty were to be held up through a delay in ratification on the part of the United States. In particular, it would tend to discourage the adherence of Japan which is unlikely to sign the treaty before it has been ratified by us. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the agreement as to 14-inch guns on capital ships is conditional on Japan’s entering into a similar undertaking prior to January 1. I do not know when Congress is expected to adjourn or whether you consider it possible to obtain ratification during the present session but I suggest that the President may, in the circumstances, wish to examine the possibility of asking the Congress not to adjourn until the Senate has taken final action on the treaty, or alternatively, the amendment calling a special session of Congress as in the case of the 1930 treaty. I should appreciate receiving an early estimate of the prospects, since if it is regarded as unlikely that ratification can be obtained before the end of the year, we shall have to explore ways and means of meeting this difficulty as far as possible. This situation has been envisaged and the reports, both of the Qualitative Limitation Subcommittee and its Categories Subcommittee, point out that “the draft text has been drawn up to meet the situation should the treaty come into force on January 1, 1937. Should the treaty come into force on any other date alterations will be necessary to the text now proposed to meet the situation then arising and some transitional arrangements will be necessary to bring into force for the year 1937 provisions for advance notifications and exchange of information.” I cannot too strongly urge the desirability of our ratifying the treaty before the end of the year. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/714: Telegram [Document 81] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 10, 1936—9 p.m. [Received March 10—5:30 p.m.] 132. Your 64, March 9, 2 p.m. I entirely agree with you that in view of the tenseness and uncertainty which will result from the German action in the Rhineland, it is most important to expedite a conclusion of the work of the Naval Conference and we are accordingly pressing matters as rapidly as possible. We have in fact now disposed of all the technical questions and, with the exception of the escape clauses upon which we hope to reach agreement in the next few days, we are all ready to draw up a final treaty. I had thought that the German action might make France and England more hesitant about finally committing themselves on a naval treaty. The French, however, expressed themselves as eager to expedite and complete the naval agreement. Although Craigie told me today he thought we could be ready to sign within 10 days, I suspect that the British are feeling some qualms about the advisability just at this moment of signing a supplementary bilateral treaty with Germany. Craigie also told me the Germans had insisted that England should also get Russia bound by a bilateral treaty and that the Russians had offered no objection. He had received no definite reply and was fearful that there would be some delay on this because the Russians act very slowly. At any rate, I see no reason why we cannot get the draft of a treaty agreed upon in another 10 days or so, and if France or England for any reason is not then prepared actually to sign the treaty, I do not think we should wait any longer. We now see no reason why we should not sail on March 26 and are planning to do so. Davis The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/710: Telegram [Document 82] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , March 11, 1936—7 p.m. 68. Your 129, March 9, 11 p.m. I have discussed with the President the question of the ratification of the new treaty. As the session is now so far advanced, we had not thought that the question of ratification would arise because we have been under the impression that, owing to the difficulty of the nations other than Great Britain and ourselves to sign the treaty at this time, it would probably be only initialed now with a time fixed for signing later in the year. The situation here is becoming more complicated day by day, due to the innumerable cross currents arising in Congress as the legislative program progresses, and the uncertainties of ratification may make it entirely inadvisable purely in the interest of obtaining our agreement to the contemplated naval accord to present the treaty for consideration and ratification at this session. For it to be presented and fail of ratification at this late stage of the session would be worse than the other course proposed. In the light of this situation you should therefore arrange to initial the draft treaty at this time and appoint some time later in the year for affixing our signature. This whole matter has been given careful consideration and we have come to the conclusion that a postponement of signature is advisable in order not to commit ourselves to presentation to the Senate at this session and thus possibly jeopardize the acceptance of the new treaty. Hull The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/718: Telegram [Document 83] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 13, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 13—3:43 p.m.] 137. For the President and Secretary. Your 68, March 11, 7 p.m. We appreciate that in the present international situation as well as the legislative situation at home it may be undesirable to sign a treaty that would have to be presented now for ratification. The idea of initialing a treaty to be signed at a later date to be fixed originated in an effort to overcome certain political difficulties the details and sequence of which have all been reported in our previous despatches. We have stated our willingness to go along with this or any other plan which would result in a satisfactory accord but have in every case persistently insisted upon some positive action which would result in something definite, always visualizing a treaty which would come into effect on January 1, 1937, thus leaving no interim between the termination of the Washington and London Treaties and the new treaty. It was realized that if there were much delay in signing the treaty there would be less probability that it would be signed and ratified before the end of this year. In compliance with our instructions we have pressed for a treaty to be signed by Great Britain, France and ourselves which would be left open for the signature of the other two Washington powers. We have also taken the position that it is immaterial to us whether Great Britain signs a supplementary bilateral naval treaty with Germany except insofar as it may affect the attitude of Great Britain and France in entering into a satisfactory naval agreement with us. If at this late date we should have to take the initiative in proposing a delay in the signing of such a treaty the reasons for our sudden reversal of attitude would be somewhat difficult to explain. However, it is very possible that on account of recent developments Great Britain and perhaps France may decide that it is inadvisable to sign a treaty now. At present there is a difference of opinion among the British with regard to this. One point of view is that it would be inadvisable for the British Government to sign a new naval treaty in the present disturbed situation. The other point of view is that if advantage is not taken of this opportunity to complete a general naval agreement the chances are that there will be no treaty at all. It is nevertheless impossible in the present tense situation to forecast developments and we must be prepared for the contingency that we may have to propose a delay and if so we should like the reasons on which you think it best to base such a proposal. The fundamental question is not whether we shall sign or whether we shall initial a treaty now but whether the treaty whether signed or initialed now is to be presented to the Senate for ratification before the end of this year. The drafting committee is now drawing up the treaty on the assumption that it will come into effect on January 1, 1937. If it is not our intention to have it ratified by that date the treaty must be considerably redrafted. For example the reduction to 14-inch guns is contingent on Japan’s entering into an agreement before [January] 1, 1937, to such reduction. Numerous other alterations would have to be made including provision for the interval between the expiration of present treaties and the coming into force of the new treaty and there is danger that in redrafting the balance between the various provisions may be upset. Whether we sign or whether we initial the other powers who subscribe to this [draft] will do so in the belief that every effort will be made to put it into effect by January 1, 1937, and if we make no attempt to obtain ratification by that date we will be open to a charge of bad faith. The initialing of a treaty by Great Britain and France would as we understand constitute for them an engagement which would be practically equivalent to our signing a treaty. If it is not possible to submit a treaty at the present session we wonder whether it might not be possible to do so at a special session called in November. While we cannot, of course, judge from here we have thought that the new treaty would not encounter in the Senate so much opposition as did the London Treaty because the Naval General Board is in accord with the present treaty whereas it was opposed to the London Treaty. Admiral Standley is of the opinion that there will be no serious opposition from any naval source. We must have definite information as to whether it is proposed to obtain ratification before the end of this year as the drafting committee is working on the assumption that the treaty will come into effect on January 1, 1937. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/719: Telegram [Document 84] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 14, 1936—1 a.m. [Received March 13—10:10 p.m.] 138. Personal for the President and the Secretary. Supplementing my 137, March 13, 6 p.m. There is a division of opinion among the British as to the advisability of signing a treaty now. It is generally believed that a three-power naval treaty must be paralleled by a supplementary bilateral treaty with Germany. One group, however, wishes to delay signature of the three-power treaty because they feel that to sign a new treaty with Germany now in the face of Germany’s denunciation of the Locarno Pact and before the crisis created thereby has passed would be politically impossible or at least dangerous. The other group holds that the treaty should be signed now but that signature of the bilateral treaty to which Germany has consented should be postponed until a more propitious time. This latter group also contends that if we do not sign a three-power treaty now there is little chance of its being ratified before the end of this year which they feel is most important and that if it is not possible before the end of the year to sign a treaty with Germany it will mean that the situation will have so deteriorated that no treaty of any sort has any prospect of coming into force. While the outcome is uncertain it is more probable that the opinion of the first group will prevail. If England and France should decide that it is advisable to initial a draft treaty now to be signed at a later fixed date there will be no difficulty or embarrassment. On the other hand if they should advocate signing now and we should propose that the treaty be initialed and signature postponed it seems to me that it would be difficult to explain at home and here why we were willing to initial a treaty which we were not willing to sign. It might in such event cause less trouble if we were to sign and then, if you do not think it advisable, to present it now, to withhold it on the ground that you wish to study it further and to await the clarification of the international situation before determining whether or not to present the treaty to the Senate for ratification. If Congress is to adjourn by May 1, it would seem to me that in view of the shortness of the time which they would have in which to pass on it you would be justified in withholding it. Davis The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/719: Telegram [Document 85] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , March 14, 1936—3 p.m. 72. Your 137, March 13, 6 p.m., and 138, March 14, 1 a.m. In view of the lateness of the session of Congress, the President considers it extremely inadvisable to commit himself to the presentation of the treaty for ratification at this session. It may be that either the French or the British, or both, will be reluctant to sign a treaty at this time, in which case the resort to the memorandum method of leaving on record the type of treaty we would be willing to accept would serve our purpose and obviate the question of ratification at this session arising. Such a contingency would of course require that the date on which the treaty would become effective be changed from January 1, 1937, until either the 1st of April or the 1st of May, 1937, (thus leaving a gap between the expiration of the old treaties and the beginning of the new) or, if the constitutional requirements of any of the signatory or adhering powers make necessary a ratification by a legislative body, 8 weeks after the treaty has been presented in such legislative body with a view to ratification, such date in no case to be later than April 1st or May 1st, 1937. The same condition should also apply to such agreements as that on 14-inch guns or similar provisos. This gap could very well be taken care of by a declaration of intention on the part of each of the conference powers and others who might signify their adherence to the treaty to inform the other parties or adherents of any or all construction which might be undertaken in the interval between the treaties. We do not believe that if the treaties are acceptable to the signatory powers or adherents there would be any building by them during the interval between the treaties which would not come within the restrictions provided for in the new treaty. If you find no reluctance or hesitancy on the part of the remaining conference powers to sign or initial a treaty at this time, you should explain that in order not to jeopardize the ratification of this Government’s signature to the treaty it would be distinctly preferable so to arrange the time of signing that it will not be necessary for the President to submit the treaty for ratification at this advanced stage of the session when the Executive legislative program has been completed. Your 138 seems to indicate that the British and French might themselves consider it advisable to avoid signing now, in which case there would appear to be no difficulty in arranging for signature at a later date in view of the existing European situation. I would suggest that at a convenient time you canvass the situation in order that the positions may be clarified with regard to signing or initialing the treaty. It is also possible that you would find there would be no objection on the part of the French and the British to our initialing or signing the treaty on the understanding that as this Government may not consider it advisable to add the treaty to its legislative program at this stage, the President would not be under any obligation to do so if he thought it best to withhold it. Phillips The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/722: Telegram [Document 86] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 16, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 16—4:15 p.m.] 141. Craigie has just told me he was authorized to inform me in the strictest confidence at a meeting of the British Cabinet this morning it was decided to sign when necessary the supplemental naval treaty with Germany. He also told me they see no reason now why Great Britain, France, and the United States should not proceed to sign the proposed treaty which we should have ready by the end of this week or the early part of next week. He said there might be some necessary delay in signing the treaty with Germany, since Germany has so far insisted that Russia be bound to the limitations of the general treaty through an Anglo-Russian treaty and that Russia has not yet given a definite reply but that if for this or any other reason they were unable to sign with Germany now, he thought we should sign the three-power treaty anyhow and provide therein for an escape in case the supplemental treaty with Germany is not signed during this year and before ratification. I explained to Craigie that while we are prepared to sign or initial a treaty now, it must be with the understanding that we cannot give any promise or hold out any hope that it will be ratified this year; because of the advanced stage of the present legislative program and the short remaining time before the adjournment of Congress, the President would not feel justified to commit himself in any way to submit the treaty for ratification during the present session or to get it ratified before the end of this year. Craigie said they had realized that the longer the delay in getting the treaty signed the less probable would it be that it could be ratified by us now and he regretted there had been so much delay. Although they quite understood that on account of the difficulties indicated our ratification this year could not be counted upon, they thought it would be most advisable if we could possibly get it ratified before January which must be done because of the effect it would have upon Japan. He, nevertheless, accepted our position gracefully and we then discussed what modifications or additions in the treaty would be required to cover the gap from January 1 to April 1, 1937, in case of a delay in ratification. Craigie also told me in confidence that the Irish Free State had just decided not to sign the naval treaty, not because of any objections to the treaty itself but because Ireland is an independent state which at present has no navy whatever and that the Union of South Africa might for the same reason refrain from signing. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have, nevertheless, approved and will sign. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/729: Telegram [Document 87] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 19, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 19—11:45 a.m.] 146. For the President and Secretary. In view of the fact that the new naval treaty does not provide for quantitative limitation and hence does not establish parity as between the British Empire and the United States, we all believe it would be wise to guard against any possible embarrassment or misunderstanding with regard to this in the future and furthermore that it would have a good effect to reiterate a principle which has now become embodied in the consciousness of the peoples of the two nations. I have told the British that personally I was inclined to think it might be wise to reiterate our adherence to this principle and that if they thought it advisable I would be glad to ascertain the views of our Government. The British have now informed me that they are quite sympathetic with the idea and suggest that instead of making a public declaration which at this time might possibly have an adverse effect on the Japanese the best way to deal with it would be for the two to have a final meeting together of which minutes would be kept and which could be used at any time that might be necessary. It has occurred to me that when the treaty comes up for ratification that this question might possibly be raised in the Senate and that it would be well to be prepared for it in which case the minutes of the proposed meeting could be used if necessary. My idea is to make of record a declaration to be agreed upon beforehand, something along the following lines: Notwithstanding the fact that some of the principal naval powers have not as yet agreed to become parties to the new naval treaty which has been executed now to replace the Washington and London Treaties which expire on December 31, 1936, and which treaty does not provide for a continuance of quantitative limitation as provided in the two former treaties, it is the intention of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America to avoid at least as between ourselves any competition in naval construction. Parity as between the fleets of the British Empire and the United States of America has become an established principle acceptable to both Governments and peoples thereof. Furthermore the conditions and the circumstances which determine their respective naval requirements are such that the principle of parity should continue to be the governing factor in the naval policies of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America and it is believed that adherence to this principle will contribute to the furtherance of friendly relations between the two Governments and to world peace. Please inform me as soon as possible if you approve of doing something along the lines indicated. Davis The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/728: Telegram [Document 88] The Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , March 19, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 19—12:20 p.m.] 147. Your special attention is called to the safeguarding clauses found in articles 24 and 25 of the draft treaty and in particular the provision for consultation and 3 months’ delay before a departure from the provisions of the treaty may be made and if possible for agreement as to extent of such departure. This provision was inserted with a view to making it less easy to depart from the treaty hastily and without justification. However, a failure to reach agreement does not prevent departure from the treaty. The provisions concerning agreement, therefore, do not stipulate that such agreement must be “duly made in accordance with the constitutional method of the respective powers” as does article 22 of the Treaty of Washington of 1922. The two cases, however, are not similar. Article 22 of the Washington Treaty provides for the amending of a treaty which obviously would require senatorial approval whereas in the present treaty it is a question which involves a departure in the carrying out of certain executory provisions of a treaty as to which agreement is desirable but not necessary. It seems to us sufficient therefore to leave open for determination when the question arises whether our acquiescence in the extent to which another party to the treaty has announced its intention to depart would require the advice and consent of the Senate or could be made by Executive action alone. Davis Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 500.A15A5/760 [Document 89] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) Washington , March 21, 1936. In the Naval Treaty I hope one point is perfectly clear: If, for example, the Treaty should be ratified by July 1, 1937, and if during the intervening period Great Britain or another power should actually lay down a number of light cruisers, and if during the same period our Congress did not authorize or appropriate for a similar number of cruisers—in such an event, would we later on—say in 1938—have the right to authorize or appropriate for the number of cruisers we had fallen behind during this coming interim period? In other words, the United States should have the right at any future date to make up for deficiencies occurring during the interim period. F[ ranklin ] D. R[ oosevelt ] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/729: Telegram [Document 90] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , March 23, 1936—noon. 80. For the Delegates. Your 146, March 19, 4 p.m. Confirming telephone conversation of March 20 for your record, it was the President’s thought to have you both write a letter to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs between now and your departure from London thanking him for the courtesies extended to the Delegation by the British Government and expressing the pleasure and satisfaction you have had in your association with the British Delegation during the conference. You could incidentally mention the fact that although the new treaty does not provide quantitative limitations such as provided in the former naval treaties, it is the intention of this Government to avoid, at least as between the British and ourselves, any competition in naval construction; that parity as between the fleets of the British Empire and the United States has become a well-recognized and established principle acceptable to both Governments and that the conditions and circumstances which determine their respective naval requirements are such that the naval policies of the two Governments should continue to be based on the principle of parity and that it is believed that adherence to this principle will contribute to the furtherance of friendly relations between the two Governments and to world peace. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs could reply to your letter embodying expressions similar to those regarding competition in naval construction and parity. In this manner the exchange of communications would be contained in private correspondence which there would be no call to make public and the reference to these subjects would be incidental in your letter of appreciation to the British Secretary and his reply. Hull The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American, Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/746b: Telegram [Document 91] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American, Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , March 23, 1936—4 p.m. 83. I wish to express on behalf of the President and myself our sincere appreciation of the splendid work which you, and Admiral Standley and the entire staff of the delegation, have done in carrying out the aims of this Government in the conclusion of the naval treaty you are signing on Wednesday. 72 We realize the great difficulties with which you have been faced and commend you all most highly for your patience and efficiency in overcoming them. Hull 72 See bracketed note, p. 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 94 ] . The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 500.A15A5/729: Telegram [Document 92] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis ) Washington , March 23, 1936—6 p.m. 84. With reference to the proposed exchange of letters, after further consideration here it is suggested that the substance of the exchange might be contained in a conversation between you and Admiral Standley and the Chief of the British Delegation, of which both delegations would afterward make a memorandum record. In this way there would be no documents to be withheld from publication and, therefore, no embarrassment in connection with the subject matter. For your own information, there have already been intimations in the American press that there was some sort of secret understanding between the British and American delegations as to the cooperation of our two navies, a report which has already been denied by the Department. Hull The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson) 500.A15A5/747 [Document 93] The Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of the Navy ( Swanson ) Washington , March 28, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : On March 25, 1936, at London, the Honorable Norman H. Davis, Head of the American Delegation, and the Eight Honorable Anthony Eden, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, exchanged communications regarding the maintenance of parity between the navies of the United States and the British Commonwealth. In order that the records between our two Departments may be kept clear, I am transmitting to you the following texts of the American communication and the British reply thereto, as transmitted to the Department of State on March 24, 1936, by Mr. Norman Davis over the telephone: “My Dear Foreign Secretary: On the eve of completion of the work of the naval conference and our departure from London I desire to express in behalf of the entire American Delegation our appreciation of the many courtesies extended to us during our stay here. “I also want to record our appreciation of the patience and the untiring efforts of the United Kingdom Delegation and their contribution to the success of the conference in reaching the various agreements which have been incorporated in the treaty we are about to sign. “There is one thing further I should like to mention. “In view of the fact that the new treaty does not provide for continuance of quantitative limitation as established by the Washington and London treaties, which expire at the end of this year, Admiral Standley and I had, as you will recall, some discussion with the United Kingdom Delegation during the course of the conference with regard to maintaining the principle of naval parity as between the fleets of the members of the British Commonwealth and the United States which was fixed by those treaties and which now have become a well established principle acceptable to the peoples as well as the governments of our respective countries. “As a result of the conversations on this subject it is our understanding that we are in agreement that there shall be no competitive naval building as between ourselves and that the principle of parity as between the fleets of members of the British Commonwealth and the United States shall continue unchanged.” “Honorable Norman Davis, Chairman American Delegation: “The First Lord and I very much appreciate the kind references which you make in your letter of March 23 to the efforts of the United Kingdom Delegation to bring about naval agreement. “I can assure you that the friendly relations which prevail between the United States and the United Kingdom Delegations have been a source of pleasure to all of us and we are greatly indebted to yourself, Admiral Standley and the other members of your Delegation for the wholehearted co-operation throughout the difficult period of negotiation which now lies behind us. “I am glad to be able to confirm the correctness of your understanding with regard to the maintenance of the principle of parity. We are in full agreement that there must be no competitive building between our two countries and that neither country should question the right of the other to maintain parity in any category of ship. “I can, indeed, go further than this and say that in estimating our naval requirements we have never taken the strength of the United States Navy into account.” Sincerely yours, William Phillips The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to President Roosevelt 500.A15A5/760 [Document 94] The Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) to President Roosevelt Washington , March 30, 1936. My Dear Mr. President : In your memorandum of March 21, 1936, you raise the question as to whether, if prior to ratification of the Naval Treaty, another Power should engage in a large amount of building, the United States would have the right to make up for any deficiencies at a future date. An examination of the terms of the Treaty shows that the interests of the United States in this respect are fully protected. Inasmuch as the Treaty contains no quantitative limitation whatsoever—aside from the holiday in the construction of cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons—,the United States will be free, even after the Treaty has gone into effect, to build any amount of vessels it desires in any category other than cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons. As regards the cruiser holiday, you will recall that we agreed to this provision on the understanding—made explicit in a statement before the Conference by Mr. Davis—that we would be free to invoke the “escape clause” in the Article relating to the cruiser holiday in the event that Great Britain should engage in an amount of cruiser construction in excess of that foreshadowed in the recent White Paper on British defense policy. Since it is a physical impossibility for Great Britain to exceed her announced program within the period allotted for ratification of the Treaty, no difficulty will arise under this head. In any case, paragraph (1) of the Protocol of Signature—which I quote below—serves as a protection against any excessive building in the period before the Treaty goes into effect: “If, before the coming into force of the above-mentioned treaty, the naval construction of any Power or any change of circumstances should appear likely to render undesirable the coming into force of the treaty in its present form, the Governments of the countries on behalf of which the treaty has been signed shall consult as to whether it is desirable to modify any of its terms to meet the situation thus presented.” Faithfully yours, William Phillips [The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament was signed at London, March 25, 1936; for text, see Department of State, Treaty Series No. 919; 50 Stat. 1363; or Report of the Delegates of the United States …, page 27. The signatory states which ratified the treaty, together with the date of deposit at London of the instruments of ratification were as follows: United States of America, July 2, 1936 (treaty ratified by the President, May 28, 1936); France, June 24, 1937; United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India, July 29, 1937. A protocol signed on June 30, 1938, at London by the signatories to the treaty of 1936 gave formal approval to the fixing of a new limitation of 45,000 tons to the tonnage of capital ships; see Department of State, Press Releases , July 2, 1938, page 10; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 127, and 53 Stat. 1921.] Efforts to relate other powers to the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936, by accession or by separate bilateral treaties Efforts to relate other powers to the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936, by accession or by separate bilateral treaties [95] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, May 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 28—2 p.m.] 500.A15A3/1782: Telegram [96] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, July 2, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 2—12:50 p.m.] 500.A15A5/798: Telegram [97] The British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Craigie) to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Johnson) London, 9 July, 1936. 500.A15A5/806 [98] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 25, 1936—1 p.m. 500.A15A5/809a: Telegram [99] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 31, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 31—11:20 a.m.] 500.A15A5/812: Telegram [100] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 1, 1936—3 p.m. 500.A15A5/815a: Telegram [101] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 27, 1936—11 a.m. [Received August 27—9:15 a.m.] 500.A15A5/821: Telegram [102] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, September 29, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 29—3:50 p.m.] 500.A15A5/829: Telegram [103] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 2, 1936. [Received October 9.] 500.A15A5/831 [104] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, October 9, 1936—1 p.m. [Received October 9—9 a.m.] 500.A15A5/830: Telegram [105] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Dickover) Washington, November 16, 1936. 500.A15A5/837a [106] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 2, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/839: Telegram [107] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 3, 1936—4 p.m. [Received December 3—9:20 a.m.] 500.A15A5/841: Telegram [108] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 3, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A5/841b: Circular telegram [109] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 3, 1936—8 p.m. 500.A15A5/841a: Telegram [110] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 7, 1936—8 p.m. [Received December 7—3:22 p.m.] 500.A15A5/842: Telegram [111] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 10, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A5/841: Telegram [112] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 12, 1936—3 p.m. 500.A15A5/842: Telegram [113] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 14, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 14—12:45 p.m.] 500.A15A5/845: Telegram [114] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 18, 1936—noon. [Received December 18—9:35 a.m.] 500.A15A5/846: Telegram [115] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, December 22, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] 500.A15A5/849 [116] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 30, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 30—9:30 a.m.] 500.A15A5/848: Telegram The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1782: Telegram [Document 95] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] London , May 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 28—2 p.m.] 287. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bilateral conversations 1 with the Poles took place yesterday and will be continued next week. Poles so far are only seeking for explanation of present situation. Bilateral conversations with the Soviet will continue next week. So far Soviets are adamant that there must be two reservations in any bilateral agreement made with England: (1) that any European agreement must be dependent on Germany completing its bilateral agreement and (2) that the question of the Soviets’ fleet in the Far East must be reserved until such time as Japan likewise negotiates a similar treaty. Soviets frankly stated they were most anxious to conclude with the Japanese at the same time with the naval agreement a political treaty including a pact of nonaggression with military and air provisions. Diplomatic conversations indicate Scandinavian countries more prepared to enter into a general naval agreement than bilateral one. Atherton 1 On the part of the British Government. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/798: Telegram [Document 96] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , July 2, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 2—12:50 p.m.] 333. I deposited today the President’s instrument of ratifications of the Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936. 2 Certified copy of protocol of deposit will be forwarded by mail as soon as received from the Foreign Office. As regards the Russian naval negotiations Craigie 3 stated Soviets were [at?] present [ready?] to accept the London Naval Treaty under certain reservations, that is: 1. They would abide by the treaty as long as Japan also restricted herself within those limits. Even should Japan not conform Russia would be prepared to continue the exchange of information, et cetera as regards that portion of her fleet intended for European waters, but would not be bound by restrictions for vessels intended for Asiatic waters. 2. The Soviets’ first demand was for 16-inch [gun] battleships but Craigie feels negotiations have practically reached a point where they will be satisfied with the construction of two 15-inch gun battleships. 3. The Russians point out the difficulty, since all Soviet vessels are state-owned, of supplying lists of auxiliary vessels laid down under the treaty. Foreign Office inclined to waive this for the present with the understanding that should all other interested nations adhere and desire this information from Russia, Soviets would agree. 4. Russia desires to build 8,000-ton cruisers with 7.1-inch guns (from Soviet sources I learn they desire to lay down nine new ships of this type, four for Far Eastern waters and five for European). British have pointed out however that any such extended construction will enlarge the German demands for five cruisers (see my confidential letter to Dunn of June 5th 4 ) and consequently the French and the Italians and probably the Japanese would likewise start increased cruiser construction which would mean an end of the cruiser holiday. This point is still under negotiation between the Foreign Office and the Soviets. As regards Germany the British are continuing technical discussions on the June 1935 Anglo-German agreement 5 now that the qualitative limitations are defined. The French Government have proposed a new procedure for the submarine protocol, details of which go forward by pouch today. Early next week Ambassador Bingham will be handed at the Foreign Office a formal notice by Great Britain of her intention to escalate (see your 191, June 4, noon 6 ). At the same time an oral inquiry will be addressed to the Ambassador with specific reference to the American memorandum whether, if the proposed conversion of the four Hawkins class cruisers is undertaken by the British, any objection would be entered either formally or informally by the American Government. I venture to urge that instructions on this point be telegraphed to enable the Ambassador to make an oral reply. Atherton 2 For correspondence concerning negotiations leading to the signature of the London Naval Treaty on March 25, see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff. 3 Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 4 Letter to James Clement Dunn, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, not found in Department files. 5 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 162 ff. 6 Post , p. 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] . The British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Craigie) to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Johnson) 500.A15A5/806 [Document 97] The British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Craigie ) to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) 7 No. A 5678/4/45 London , 9 July, 1936. Dear Johnson : In order that your Government may be kept informed of developments in regard to our naval conversations with other Powers I am writing to let you know that on 3rd April last a Communication was addressed by us to the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires stating that in the event of the Japanese Government wishing to offer any observations on the text of the London Naval Treaty 1936 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would be glad to receive them and furnish any explanations which it might be in their power to give. At the same time the hope was expressed that after careful reflection the Japanese Government might be able to see their way to accede to the Treaty. On June 29th Mr. Fujii communicated to the Foreign Office a written reply to our note of 3rd April to the effect that under the present conditions the Japanese Government had no intention of acceding to the London Naval Treaty 1936. He was informed that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would naturally receive this communication with regret and earnestly hoped that a change of conditions would permit of Japanese accession in the future. It was explained that His Majesty’s Government fully understood the particular difficulties of the Japanese Government in this matter and had no desire to press them unduly. Yours sincerely, R. L. Craigie 7 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 2335, July 10; received July 22. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A5/809a: Telegram [Document 98] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 25, 1936—1 p.m. 280. In view of the refusal of the Japanese Government to adhere to the London Naval Treaty 1936, notified to us in a communication from Craigie dated July 9, 1936, enclosed in your despatch No. 2335, July 10, 1936, 8 you are requested to inquire informally of Craigie what, in his Government’s view, is the present status of the stipulations of the Treaty limiting the calibre of guns on capital ships at 14 inches. You will recall that this limitation was contingent on its being accepted not later than April 1, 1937, by all the Powers signatory to the Washington Treaty, otherwise the maximum calibre of guns would remain at 16 inches. For your information the Navy Department is most anxious to complete the plans for the two capital ships which will be laid down early next year. From a technical standpoint much depends on whether these ships are to be armed with 14 or 16 inch guns. If the Japanese action in refusing to adhere to the Treaty is to be interpreted as a refusal to accept the qualitative stipulations of the Treaty the Navy will wish to complete its plans at once to arm the new ships with the higher calibre guns. You will readily appreciate therefore that an immediate informal expression of the views of the British Government is urgently necessary. Hull 8 See footnote 7, p. 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/812: Telegram [Document 99] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 31, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 31—11:20 a.m.] 385. Your 280, July 25, 1 p.m. In an oral statement yesterday of his Government’s view regarding your inquiry Craigie stated: (1) That the British Government do not regard the Japanese action in refusing to adhere to the treaty as necessarily carrying with it refusal to accept the qualitative stipulations of the treaty (article 4, paragraph 2) with respect to the calibre of guns on capital ships. The British feel that the Japanese cannot be presumed to have refused to accept the 14-inch limit unless they make declaration to that effect and this they are not obliged to do before April 1, 1937. The Japanese note to the Foreign Office conveying their refusal to adhere to the London Naval Treaty 1936 contained the expression that the Japanese Government had no intention of acceding to the treaty “under the present conditions”. Craigie said that in a recent conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject the latter pointed out and emphasized the words “under the present conditions”. Craigie did not, however, give the impression that the British hope for eventual Japanese adherence to the treaty. (2) Regarding the problem of ascertaining in fact what are the Japanese intentions in regard to the calibre of guns on capital ships, the British feel that, with so much time yet to elapse within which the Japanese may [agree] to the limit stipulated in article 4, paragraph 2, of the treaty, they are reluctant to press them now for an immediate declaration. On the other hand, if the Japanese have already decided to exceed the 14-inch limit it obviously is highly important for the signatories of the treaty to be appraised of this fact. The British, therefore, have requested their Ambassador at Tokyo for an expression of his views on the matter and he will probably be instructed to consult with the American Ambassador. The British Ambassador’s reply will be immediately communicated to the other signatories of the 1936 treaty. Bingham The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A5/815a: Telegram [Document 100] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 1, 1936—3 p.m. 101. The British Ambassador will consult with you shortly regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government in respect of the provision of Part II, Article 4 (2) of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, which would limit to 14 inches in caliber the guns of capital ships. For your information, we recently made informal inquiries of the British Government with regard to this matter through the Embassy at London and the Embassy has replied that the British do not regard the Japanese action in refusing to adhere to the Treaty as necessarily carrying with it a refusal to accept the qualitative stipulation relating to the caliber of guns on capital ships. The British feel that the Japanese cannot be presumed to have refused to accept the 14 inch gun limit unless they make declaration to that effect any time between the present and April 1, 1937, but in view of the importance of a knowledge of the Japanese attitude to the signatories of the Treaty they have requested an expression of his views from their Ambassador at Tokyo who will be instructed to discuss the matter with you. Hull The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/821: Telegram [Document 101] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , August 27, 1936—11 a.m. [Received August 27—9:15 a.m.] 172. Department’s 101, August 1, 3 p.m. 1. The British Ambassador on coming down to Tokyo from his summer residence called on me yesterday and discussed the situation outlined in the Department’s telegram. 2. Sir Robert Clive and his Naval Attaché think it doubtful if the Japanese Navy has yet come to a decision concerning the future building of capital ships or the caliber of future guns. The Vice Minister of the navy stated yesterday to our Naval Attaché that the navy was “investigating” and that no decision had yet been reached. The Minister of the Navy recently said to Captain Rogers that the navy had much to do but very little money with which to do it. On the one hand it may be said that the tremendous outlay already envisaged in the budget for the armed forces of the nation would seem to dictate economy in this direction. On the other hand, it was Japan who first adopted the use of 16-inch guns; amour propre is a powerful force in Japan and a feeling of inferiority must exist owing to the fact that the United States and Great Britain together at present have the marked superiority of six ships with 16-inch guns as against Japan’s two. 3. My British colleague and I believe that the only practical method of obtaining information concerning Japan’s plans in connection with the caliber of guns would be eventually to ask the question point-blank and officially although it is impossible to forsee whether a frank answer would be given. Fairly strong reasons could be adduced why it would be in Japan’s own interest to communicate the desired information. Indirect approach would be futile. 4. From the local angle there seems to be no reason for haste in making the [inquiry]. At present the reply would almost certainly be that no decision had yet been reached. If our own Government should desire that the question be broached it might be well to take the action in my initial talk with the Foreign Minister after my return from the United States in the middle of November on the basis of direct conferences in Washington. 5. In this general connection the Vice Minister of the Navy recently said to the Naval Attaché that owing to unsettled conditions in Japan and in the world at large, especially in Europe, it would be out of the question for Japan to enter any naval limitation treaty for probably the next 10 years. Grew The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/829: Telegram [Document 102] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , September 29, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 29—3:50 p.m.] 392. In the course of an informal after-dinner conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday I said that as one of the three American delegates to the London Naval Conference I was much interested in this subject and had always hoped that the Italian Government could see its way to signing the treaty. I mentioned the vivid interest of the American people in any step taken towards the limitation of armament and said that Italy’s signature to this treaty would make a splendid impression throughout the United States. The Minister explained that in view of the present European situation and notably the recent developments at Geneva the Italian Government was not in a position to sign the treaty. Italy could not in view of the seating of the Ethiopian delegation make any gesture at this time towards the European collaboration required by the treaty. He mentioned other reasons which made Italian collaboration difficult such as the eastern European tour of King Edward and the assembling of more British ships in the Mediterranean. I said that it seemed to me a pity that such a far-reaching movement as that which inspired the treaty should be crippled by something which had happened in Geneva affecting Italy only at the present session of the Assembly. Count Ciano replied that it remained to be seen whether the seating of the Ethiopian delegation was confined to this session of the Assembly. I asked him whether that meant that Italy could not consider the signing of the treaty until the next session of the Assembly to which he did not answer. I understand that Ciano recently informed a chief of mission here that the events in Geneva had not altered the Italian attitude towards the proposed meeting of the Locarno powers 9 and that the Italian Government was ready to collaborate in preliminary preparation for the conference in conformity with its previous declaration on the matter, see Embassy’s 381, September 21, 5 p.m., 376, September 16, 7 p.m., 10 and previous. Phillips 9 Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, signatories of the treaty of Locarno, October 16, 1925. For comment on the proposed discussions in October 1936 among these powers, in connection with matters affecting the status of the treaty subsequent to the occupation of the Rhineland, March 7, 1936, by Germany, see pp. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] ff. 10 Neither printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/831 [Document 103] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State No. 128 Geneva , October 2, 1936. [Received October 9.] Sir : I have the honor to report that Admiral Bellairs, 11 who accompanied the British Delegation to the Assembly, called on me today to give me an account of the British conversations with the Continental Naval Powers in respect to aligning those Powers with the British naval strength, with the ultimate expectation of gaining general agreement to the London 1936 Naval Treaty. I append hereto a memorandum of the conversation prepared by Mr. Reber. 12 Respectfully yours, Hugh R. Wilson [Enclosure] Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of a Conversation Between the Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) and Admiral Bellairs, October 2, 1936 Admiral Bellairs called to explain recent developments in the British bi-lateral naval conversations with Russia, Germany and the Scandinavian Powers. He stated that the principal technical difficulty which had arisen in connection with the Russian agreement, a copy of which had been furnished Washington, 13 related to the construction of cruisers carrying guns of more than 6 inches in calibre. The Russians had designs and material for the construction of ten 7.1-inch cruisers. Should they complete this number of heavily armed cruisers, the Germans would not be content to keep their total of large cruisers down to three, but would revert to their previous demand for five of these vessels. This in turn would cause the French to insist upon the construction of new cruisers above their present total of seven, thus destroying the efficacy of any holiday in the construction of these vessels. Following the Montreux conversations, 14 the Russians, however seemed disposed to accept a limitation of seven large cruisers and the British have reason to believe that this will be acceptable to the Germans, who will not therefore demand more than three 8-inch cruisers. He hoped therefore that the French would be content with seven under these conditions. Bellairs added that of course this information should be regarded as purely tentative and confidential, as no final agreement had been reached. He was, however, hopeful as to the possibilities of shortly concluding a definite accord on these terms. The other remaining technical difficulty as regards the Russians was in connection with the construction of two capital ships of 15-inch guns, but he felt that this would not give rise to any serious complication. The conversations held with representatives of the Scandinavian Powers had been most satisfactory but no agreement had been concluded, as their representatives had returned to their respective countries for consultation with their governments. The only issue still remaining unsettled was the question of the construction of one or two coast defense vessels by Sweden which might fall within the “zone of non-construction.” Bellairs said that his Government was convinced however that this could be arranged, possibly by an exchange of notes between the Naval Powers. Conversations have also been going on with the Poles who have indicated their general acceptance of the principles of the London Naval Treaty of 1936. Thus the two principal naval questions still unsolved were those of Italy and Japan. Bellairs said that every effort would be made during the Locarno conversations to persuade the Italians to adhere to the London Naval Treaty of 1936. He reiterated the British understanding that the Italian objections were entirely political and not technical and might be met in these discussions. In so far as the Japanese were concerned, Bellairs had no information regarding their attitude save what was generally made public during the summer. He wondered whether it would be possible to obtain any prior assurances from the Japanese as to their intentions concerning the calibre of guns to be placed on future capital ships. Bellairs continued that the British were turning over in their minds how these various bi-lateral agreements could be co-ordinated into a whole, but stated that until the technical questions had all been solved they had no specific ideas on this subject. Samuel Reber 11 Rear Adm. R. M. Bellairs, British naval representative on the Permanent Advisory Committee of the League of Nations. 12 Samuel Reber, Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Italy, temporarily at Geneva; Mr. Reber had been technical assistant for the Department of State at the Naval Conference. 13 See passage numbered 5, of instruction No. 1442, September 29, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] . 14 See vol. iii , pp. 503 ff. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/830: Telegram [Document 104] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , October 9, 1936—1 p.m. [Received October 9—9 a.m.] 408. I discussed with the British Ambassador 15 the matter of the signature of the Naval Treaty by Italy and he expressed the opinion that once the Locarno powers had agreed definitely to meet on a given program the Italians would no longer hold out against signing the treaty. He did not think the real objection to signing was as they stated, see my 392, September 29, 6 p.m., but rather their unwillingness to cooperate in naval matters until a more definite program of general European cooperation had been agreed upon. I told the British Ambassador of my conversation with Count Ciano and the hope that I had expressed to him that Italy having been one of the negotiators of the treaty might find her way to become a signatory at an early date. Phillips 15 Sir Eric Drummond. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Dickover) 500.A15A5/837a [Document 105] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan ( Dickover ) [Extract] No. 1141 Washington , November 16, 1936. Sir : You are requested to consider, in the light of the general political situation in Japan, the advisability of approaching the Japanese Government with a formal inquiry as to whether it proposes to proceed in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, which provides: “No capital ship shall carry a gun with a caliber exceeding 14 inches (356 MM); providing, however, that if any of the Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington the 6th of February, 1922, 16 should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision prior to the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, but in any case, not later than the 1st April, 1937, the maximum caliber of guns carried by capital ships shall be 16 inches (406 MM).” In a communication, dated July 9, 1936, 17 the British Government notified us of the Japanese Government’s refusal to adhere to the London Naval Treaty, 1936. This raises the question whether Japan’s refusal to adhere to the 1936 Naval Treaty includes a refusal to accept the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2, quoted above. For us a prompt reply to this question is imperative in view of the fact that the Navy Department is now completing the plans for the two capital ships which will be laid down early next year and much depends, from the technical standpoint, on whether these ships are to be armed with 14 or 16-inch guns. You will readily appreciate, therefore, that a clarification of the views of the Japanese Government in respect of the 14-inch guns is urgently necessary. We would wish you, however, before taking any action, to inform us of your conclusions so that we might consult with the British Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On October 15, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Washington informed us orally that he had received a telegram from his Government stating that Ambassador Clive, in reply to the question which had been put to him whether the time was opportune for making a formal inquiry of the Japanese Government in respect of the action it intended to take with regard to the limitation on caliber of guns on capital ships, had informed his Government that, in his opinion, the time was not opportune to place this matter before the Japanese Government. Nevertheless, the British Government had decided, in view of the fact that there was no evidence that the situation between China and Japan 18 would improve in the immediate future, that it could no longer put off the presentation of this matter to the Japanese Government. The British wished, however, to ascertain beforehand whether this Government would concur in their addressing this inquiry to the Japanese Government, namely, whether the Japanese were prepared to conform to a 14-inch caliber limit on guns to be mounted on capital ships to be completed after the expiration of the present Naval Treaties on December 31 of this year. That same day we replied to the British Chargé d’Affaires that we were agreeable in principle to the stand of the British Foreign Office to put the question in respect of gun calibers on capital ships to the Japanese Government but in the name of the British Government alone, not in the name of both Governments. We stressed, moreover, that the question should be considered of the effect the action of putting this question to the Japanese Government at this time would have and, further, what effect the causing of the Japanese Government to formulate a reply would have on the internal domestic political situation in Japan. We expressed our belief that, as far as these considerations were concerned, the man on the spot would be in the best position to decide. There seems to be a struggle at present between various elements in Japan as to the formulation of major policies and we would desire to avoid having any action taken which might have an adverse effect on the development of major policies in Japan. Finally, on October 27, 1936, Sir Robert Craigie informed Mr. Atherton 19 that some time in the previous week he had asked the Japanese Ambassador in London what he considered was the position of his Government in regard to the caliber of guns on capital ships. Ambassador Yoshida replied, according to Craigie, that he felt certain that his Government wanted the 14-inch gun but could not bind itself to this in view of public opinion and the fact that Japan had in the current year withdrawn from the Naval negotiations. Craigie felt, however, from what the Japanese Ambassador said, that his Government might be prepared to give an official assurance in writing that Japan would limit itself to 14-inch gun construction, with a face-saving device technically permitting it to notify interested Governments if it should decide to the contrary. It is desired that the Embassy give careful thought to the facts above set forth and determine at its earliest convenience whether, in the light of the existing political situation in Japan and of other related circumstances, an approach to the Japanese Government similar to that contemplated by the British Government should be made by this Government. It is requested that you inform the Department by telegraph of your conclusions and that, in the event of your arriving at the conclusion that such an approach should be made, you take no action in the matter pending the receipt of appropriate instructions. Very truly yours, R. Walton Moore 16 Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 247 . 17 Ante , p. 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] . 18 See vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. 19 See memorandum dated October 27, by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom, p. 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A5/839: Telegram [Document 106] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 2, 1936—6 p.m. 151. An instruction, No. 1141 of November 16, 1936, was sent to you with regard to 14–16 inch guns. In view of publicity regarding new capital ships here it has become most urgent for the Navy Department to have this matter clarified at the earliest possible moment. Please, therefore, telegraph your conclusions as soon as possible after receipt of above-mentioned instruction so that the Department may determine the course which should be followed. You should, however, take no action in the matter pending the receipt of instructions. Moore The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/841: Telegram [Document 107] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 3, 1936—4 p.m. [Received December 3—9:20 a.m.] 249. Department’s 151, December 2, 6 p.m. My British colleague informed his Foreign Office in August of our belief that only a direct approach on the subject of 14- or 16-inch guns might elicit a definite statement as to Japanese intentions and that such an approach might appropriately be made after my return from leave of absence in November. The British Foreign Office replied that they felt the matter should be taken up more promptly whereupon Clive recommended that the subject be broached in London rather than in Tokyo. Accordingly the British Government approached Ambassador Yoshida on November 11th with a view to arriving at an understanding on the question of gun calibers. Yoshida replied that he thought it unwise to take up the subject with Tokyo himself because an impression that the British Government was exerting diplomatic pressure might thereby be conveyed and such an impression might impede rather than facilitate a favorable result. Yoshida recommended that it would be better for the British Admiralty to discuss the question directly with his Naval Attaché as a purely technical matter. Clive apparently does not know whether this has yet been done. As Yoshida understands the psychology of his own naval authorities the Department may wish to consider whether similar procedure would be preferable to an approach through diplomatic channels provided that the Department’s instruction No. 1141 envisages such action. Should an approach through naval channels be considered logical I would suggest that it be made by our Naval Attaché here rather than through the Japanese Naval Attaché in Washington. The former enjoys friendly relations with the Navy Ministry here and would be in a favorable position to make at least a provisional and technical inquiry concerning Japanese intentions with regard to gun calibers. Grew The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A5/841b: Circular telegram [Document 108] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) 20 Washington , December 3, 1936—6 p.m. The President ratified the London Naval Treaty, 1936, on May 28. So far no other Government has ratified although the Treaty was drafted to come into effect on January 1, 1937. Any information which may come to you with regard to the intentions of the Government to which you are accredited in respect of ratification of the Treaty should be promptly reported. Moore 20 The same telegram was sent to the Embassies in France and Italy. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A5/841a: Telegram [Document 109] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , December 3, 1936—8 p.m. 434. 1. In view of publicity here regarding the new capital ships and the short time remaining for the completion of final plans for these ships, it has become most urgent for the Navy Department to have the matter clarified of Japan’s position with regard to Article 4, Paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, relating to the calibre of guns on capital ships. 2. You will recall that in August Clive informed British Foreign Office that only a direct approach on this subject might elicit a definite statement as to the Japanese intentions 21 and that such an approach might appropriately be made after Grew’s return from leave of absence in November. The Foreign Office replied that in their view the matter should be taken up more promptly. Whereupon we understand Clive recommended that the subject be broached not in Tokyo but in London. 3. The Foreign Office then, on October 15, 22 requested the British Embassy at Washington to obtain an expression of our views. We replied that we were agreeable in principle to their putting the question to the Japanese, that, however, it should be put in the name of the British alone, that, in view of the internal domestic situation in Japan, the man on the spot would be in the best position to decide since we would wish to avoid any action which might have an adverse effect on the development of major policies in Japan. 4. In your despatch No. 2613 of October 27, 1936, 23 you reported Craigie as stating that he had discussed this matter with Yoshida 24 who had indicated Japanese might be prepared to give an official assurance in writing that they would bind themselves to 14 inches, with a face-saving clause. Now Grew telegraphs that Clive has been informed Craigie had second conversation with Yoshida on November 11 in which Yoshida said it would be unwise for him to take the subject up with Tokyo himself and recommended that the Admiralty discuss the question directly with his Naval Attaché. Clive, however, has no information indicating whether the Admiralty actually did make the approach to the Naval Attaché. 5. Before considering taking any action ourselves we wish to ascertain precisely where the question lies as between the British and the Japanese, whether Craigie actually agreed with Yoshida that the Admiralty should approach the Japanese Naval Attaché and whether this approach has been made. Please investigate and report by telegraph. Moore 21 See paragraph 3, telegram No. 172, August 27, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] . 22 See instruction No. 1141, November 16, to the Chargé in Japan, p. 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] . 23 Not printed. 24 Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/842: Telegram [Document 110] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 7, 1936—8 p.m. [Received December 7—3:22 p.m.] 599. Department’s December 3, 6 p.m. Foreign Office informs me they are reluctant to proceed until British negotiations with the Soviets and Germans have been completed. 25 Foreign Office understands the same applies to Paris as well. The Soviet and German negotiations are now practically only concerned with the Russian reservation for the placement of 16-inch guns on the two first capital ships to be constructed. British Government can ratify the contract since no Parliamentary sanction is necessary, but regretful as the Foreign Office would be to have a lapse it seems possible British ratification may not take place until early next year. Foreign Office point out the outcome of the Russian reservation regarding 16-inch guns referred to above also has bearing on the position of Japan, referred to in Department’s telegraphic instruction 434 December 3, 8 p.m. This matter was discussed by Craigie and Yoshida on Friday last and the Japanese have been told that the British must have an answer before the end of the year. As regards paragraph 4 of the Department’s instruction last above referred to, Craigie now talks of a Japanese “semiofficial” assurance which might read that the Japanese Government have no plans for the construction of ships carrying guns larger than 14 inch and agree not to undertake any steps preparatory to the construction of vessels carrying guns of larger caliber without previous notification to the British Government. As regards the second part of paragraph 4 Craigie says there is a misunderstanding in that Yoshida was entirely willing to take up the matter with Tokyo himself and that the proposed technical discussions between the British Naval Attaché in Tokyo and the Japanese Admiralty supplementing Yoshida’s reports have been negatived. I stressed to Craigie the importance of this caliber question to the United States and he again urged a tolerant attitude towards Japan in this connection at least through the remaining days of this month. Bingham 25 Bilateral naval agreements on the part of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union and Germany were concluded on July 17, 1937; see British Cmd. 5518 and 5519, respectively. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A5/841: Telegram [Document 111] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , December 10, 1936—7 p.m. 157. Your 249, December 3, 4 p.m. Bingham now reports that the British are discussing the matter of 14 or 16-inch guns directly with the Japanese, that the conversations between the Japanese Admiralty and the British Naval Attaché in Tokyo have been voided, that Craigie is dealing directly with Yoshida and that the basis of the conversation is the possibility of the Japanese giving a “semi-official” assurance to the effect that they have no plans for the construction of ships carrying guns larger than 14 inches and will not take any steps preparatory to the construction of vessels carrying guns of larger caliber without previous notification to the British Government. The British request a tolerant attitude on our part towards the Japanese in this matter at least through this month. In view of the circumstances above mentioned, consideration is not being given to the question of an approach before the end of December by this Government to the Japanese Government. However, we would appreciate your giving continued thought to the matter and telegraphing any conclusion you may reach in the light of our recent instruction. Moore The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A5/842: Telegram [Document 112] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , December 12, 1936—3 p.m. 447. Your 599, December 7, 8 p.m. We have now heard from Paris and Rome with regard to ratification of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. Bullitt 26 reports that a bill will be introduced shortly in the French Parliament authorizing ratification of the Treaty, that the Government expects no debate or difficulties and that ratification should take place before January 1. Phillips quotes Drummond as expressing confidence, on the basis of his recent conversations with Ciano, that the Italian Government is disposed to ratify as soon as it is advised that the three principal signatories of the Treaty have completed ratification. While we would not wish to appear to press Craigie unduly in his negotiations with the Germans and Russians we would consider it most unfortunate if a lapse were to occur in the naval limitation system and hope that this matter of ratification may be completed before the close of this year. If you deem it wise, in the light of your knowledge of the most recent developments in the Russian and German naval negotiations, you may mention our views informally to Craigie. Moore 26 William Bullitt, Ambassador in France. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/845: Telegram [Document 113] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 14, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 14—12:45 p.m.] 609. Department’s 447, December 12, 3 p.m. Foreign Office confirmed again today its understanding that the French Government desires to be in a position to ratify if and when negotiations with Germany are concluded. However, both the French and British Governments are desirous of avoiding a lapse. Ciano has informed Drummond it would be difficult for the Italian Government to sign the treaty until it has been ratified by the original signatories. Bingham The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/846: Telegram [Document 114] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 18, 1936—noon. [Received December 18—9:35 a.m.] 262. Department’s 157, December 10, 7 p.m. 1. The vernacular press reports the following statements made by the Navy Minister December 15 while explaining the naval budget at a meeting of representatives of political parties: the new armament scheme is not aimed at obtaining quantitative parity. It seeks to build up a fleet suitable for the national circumstances and national traits at minimum cost. Our objections to participation in the London agreement are that it does not provide for the entire national defense plans of each signatory to be disclosed to the others. Third replenishment program for 1937–1938 and subsequent fiscal years is a continuous expenditure. The Navy intends to preserve its secrets concerning naval construction. Publication of its defense plans for future years would impair security of national defense and entail dragging Japanese Government into naval competition, thus bringing about a financially deplorable situation. 2. Opinion prevails among Naval Attachés here that Japan will not revert to the 14-inch gun, that construction of one or more battleships as large as 50,000 tons with adequate protection against bombs, torpedoes and shell fire and mounting 16-inch or their equivalent in larger calibers is possible on the theory that such type might render obsolete the present types thus giving qualitative parity. Furthermore, analysis of the budget figures indicates that approximately 130 million yen will be allocated during the next fiscal year for the third replenishment program. 3. My British colleague has revealed to me in personal and confidential conversation that his Government possesses information to the effect that the Japanese Navy is now testing not only 16 but also 18-inch guns probably according to the British Naval Attaché on specially constructed monitors. 4. Our Naval Attaché has no direct information concerning the foregoing statement but concurs in the opinion that the construction of 16-inch gun types is being contemplated. 5. The British Ambassador believes that the Japanese will try to obtain some kind of a naval agreement next year but he feels that nothing can be done at present to ascertain their plans concerning calibers. If his information concerning the present testing of 16 and 18-inch guns is correct it would appear doubtful if the Japanese Navy is yet ready to formulate any agreement or that any concrete reply would be given to an inquiry concerning their intentions. Nevertheless the Japanese Navy can hardly fail to realize that if they intend to limit their gun calibers to 14 inches it is obviously to their interest that our own navy should be given timely information of that intention and that mutual and adequate guarantees should be afforded. When therefore the Department on the basis of its contacts in London feels that the time is ripe for an approach on our part we believe that nothing is to be lost and that something might be gained by frankly asking the Japanese what they intend to do so that we may be guided in our own naval plans for the future. 6. So far as the psychological moment for such an approach is concerned it may be said that the Japanese Government is at present in a politically precarious position. The Government has played its cards badly through inviting public censure over the agreement with Germany 27 which has led to the impasse with Soviet Russia on the fisheries treaty. 28 The Government is likewise incurring serious public criticism as a result of the failure of the negotiations with China. Its natural reaction in this situation is to seek closer relations with the United States and Great Britain but on the other hand to avoid any step which might incite further public criticism of its diplomacy. Any implication that the Government was yielding to foreign diplomatic pressure in matters affecting the Japanese Navy would have to be carefully avoided. There is no reason to believe that this status of affairs will alter appreciably in the near future. 7. From an informal casual conversation during the first official call of our Naval Attaché on the new Vice Minister of the Navy the Naval Attaché is now of the opinion that it is doubtful whether the navy officials will divulge any information relating to the building program. We therefore now feel that the only satisfactory method of obtaining information from the Japanese Government as to whether it proposes to proceed in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, is by formal and direct inquiry through diplomatic channels whenever the Department may find such an approach desirable. 8. The Naval Attaché has read and concurs in the contents of this telegram. Grew 27 German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement, signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations , Japan 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 153 . 28 Protocol signed at Moscow, December 28, 1936, to regulate leasing of fishing grounds for one year; see despatch No. 2203, December 30, 1936, from the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iv , p. 451 . The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/849 [Document 115] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State No. 340 Oslo , December 22, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the attached copy 29 of a translation of an article which appeared on December 21st in Tidens Tegn , concerning a meeting on December 19 and 20 in Stockholm between Commander Bull and Bureau Chief Skylstad of the Norwegian Foreign Office, representing Norway, and Swedish, Danish, and Finnish naval officers and members of their respective Foreign Offices. In conversation with Bureau Chief Skylstad today, he informed me that the above-described meeting resulted in an agreement in principle between the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Finnish officials to accept the recent invitation on the part of Great Britain to participate in the Naval Treaty of London of March, 1936. Mr. Skylstad considered this a constructive step in view of the confused political situation throughout Europe. This was, furthermore, an added step towards solidifying the Scandinavian front. In describing reactions of the Scandinavian representatives at the Stockholm meeting, Mr. Skylstad said that the clause in the treaty agreement having regard to the exchange of data relative to naval programs drew especially favorable attention. Such an exchange tended to eliminate the element of surprise and was a practical basis for consultation. As regards Norway’s participation, Mr. Skylstad had been assigned the task of seeking the legal means whereby his Government could enjoy membership either directly or indirectly. He was confident he could determine a course. He was equally confident his Government would approve the proposed participation. Respectfully yours, A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 29 Not printed. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5/848: Telegram [Document 116] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 30, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 30—9:30 a.m.] 1304. Embassy’s 1211, December 8, 4 p.m. 30 The Foreign Office now states that the British Government does not desire to ratify the Naval Treaty until after the conclusion of the discussions at present going on with the Germans regarding naval questions which will probably be after the middle of next month. In view of this and of the fact that the French Parliament has more than a full calendar because of the effort to pass the budget before the end of the year the French Government plans to ratify the Naval Treaty some time in January. Bullitt 30 Not printed. Rejection by the United States of British proposal for renewal of article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, February 6, 1922 Rejection by the United States of British proposal for renewal of article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, February 6, 1922 [117] Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) [Washington,] September 11, 1936. 500.A4B/695 [118] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] September 16, 1936. 500.A4B/695a [119] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, September 25, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A4B/695: Telegram [120] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbech) [Washington,] October 14, 1936. 500.A4B/702 Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) 500.A4B/695 [Document 117] Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) [Extract] [ Washington ,] September 11, 1936. Mr. Mallet 1 called to discuss “naval matters”. After reviewing in a general way the recent Japanese note with regard to the retention of submarines 2 and asking about Secretary of the Navy Swanson’s press conference, Mr. Mallet said that the real object of his visit was with reference to Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, which reads as follows: [Here follows the text of article XIX, Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations , 1922, volume I, pages 247 , 252 .] Mr. Mallet then recalled that on February 18 last, Mr. Fujii, the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires in London, informed the British Government that the Japanese Government was prepared to consider the renewal of Article XIX of the Washington Treaty of 1922, 3 dealing with the non-fortification of certain insular possessions in the Pacific. The British took note of this desire on the part of the Japanese to renew Article XIX and communicated the information to the American Embassy in London. Since that time the British Government has been giving careful consideration to the question of a renewal of Article XIX and, after a careful review of all the circumstances, it has come to the conclusion that this Article should be renewed in a separate instrument. The British Government believes, however, that it might be a good thing to make a change in one particular, namely, that there should be provision for bringing up to date and extending existing fortifications. Mr. Mallet emphasized “existing fortifications” and pointed out that the extension of these fortifications could only have the effect of increasing the defensive capacity of the territories involved and would remedy a somewhat anomalous situation in which out of date defenses have to be maintained without their being any very clear idea of the extent to which they can be modernized without infringing the Treaty. Mr. Mallet added that from every standpoint, psychological, political, as a deterrent to the race in armaments, and in the general interest of peace, it would be well to preserve Article XIX, and his Government was most anxious to have it preserved. Mr. Mallet said that this was to be regarded as an oral message. His Government was most anxious to know the views of the Government of the United States with regard to this proposal and was making a similar communication through the Embassy in Tokyo to the Japanese Government. If the principle of the renewal of Article XIX were accepted by the Government of the United States of America his Government would submit a detailed text incorporating its views. Next Mr. Mallet stated that he had a very confidential communication to make upon instructions from his Government—a communication which was not being made to the Japanese Government. First, he repeated with emphasis that his Government would view with grave concern the lapsing of Article XIX which it considered it was vital to maintain. He then said that the provision specifying that there should be more liberty to bring up to date and extend existing fortifications was included in order to enable his Government to modernize the fortifications at Hongkong. He said that his Government felt that it was most imperative to bring these fortifications up to date and that in accepting the renewal of Article XIX in a separate instrument it should have this in mind. He said, moreover, that his Government was convinced that the renewal of Article XIX could not be regarded as a bargaining factor in general or naval negotiations, that it must be considered as a unit in itself. Mr. Hickerson remarked that this Article had been agreed upon in 1922 as part of a general bargain and asked Mr. Mallet if his “oral message” was the consequence of some new move by the Japanese. Mr. Mallet replied that he did not know. He thought, however, that it was merely the natural outcome of the Japanese communication of February 18. In conclusion, Mr. Hickerson assured Mr. Mallet that the proposal of the British Government would be accorded careful consideration and a reply would be communicated in due course. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J[ ohn ] D. H[ ickerson ] 1 Victor A. L. Mallet, British Chargé d’Affaires. 2 See telegram No. 114, September 10, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] . 3 The Japanese Government denounced the treaty on December 29, 1934; see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 405 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs 500.A4B/695a [Document 118] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] September 16, 1936. There were present: Mr. Norman H. Davis. For the State Department: Mr. Dunn, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Dooman, Mr. Pell. For the War Department: Major General Stanley Embick, Brig. General Walter Krueger. For the Navy Department: Admiral W. H. Standley, Captain Ingersoll, Commander Schuirmann. Mr. Davis said that the meeting was called to discuss the reply which should be made to the British oral proposal to renew Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, as a separate instrument. He asked for comment. Admiral Standley observed that before replying we must have it clear in our own minds what our position is with regard to fortifications in the Pacific. Fortifications are of very little value without a base. We certainly are not going to fortify Manila and Corregidor and there is nothing else. General Embick said that in the opinion of the Army the Philippines are indefensible. Mr. Davis remarked that the first question to consider was whether or not it is in our interest to fortify. If we propose to fortify we had better let the Treaty go by the board and free our hands. By renewing the Treaty we would not have the freedom to do what we might wish to do. Mr. Davis recalled his first two meetings with Sir Robert Craigie 4 last winter. After the Admiralty had given a hint that they were indifferent to the renewal of Article 19 but thought that it might serve as a trading point, Craigie had pointed out to him that it seemed important to his Government to renew the Article since, if it were not renewed, there would be great pressure in England to fortify Hongkong. This would be a red flag to Japan and would serve as a pretext for the Japanese to fortify Formosa. Mr. Davis replied on that occasion that when Japan left the Naval Conference 5 the question of Article 19 went off the agenda because the fortifications provision was merely a link in a chain. Japan had broken the chain in three or four places. To take an isolated link on the morrow of Japan’s departure from the Conference and keep it was illogical. If we should decide to keep it, it would have to be related to something else. In any event, Mr. Davis refused to be drawn into a discussion of this Article at that time. Craigie, at a second meeting, said that his Government would take the matter under consideration and perhaps discuss it with the other Governments involved later on. Looking at the present situation Mr. Davis said that it was his belief that if we allow ourselves to be drawn into a negotiation we will soon have presented for our consideration a pact of non-aggression including the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The purpose of such a pact would be to tie the hands of Britain and the United States, leaving Japan a free rein in dealings with the U.S.S.R. The British might go into a pact of this nature in return for concessions in respect of China. Admiral Standley said that he agreed with the observations just made by Mr. Davis. The United States had held the Philippines for 38 years and had failed to fortify them. It was absurd to talk of fortifying them now. General Embick said that in the event of war with Japan the Philippines would be a detriment from the military standpoint. Admiral Standley here inquired as to exactly what the British might mean by “modernization” of existing fortifications. Would it not enable us to send our guns out to the Philippines? General Embick said that this would serve no purpose. Corregidor was merely a refuge, a place where the flag might be kept flying. Moreover, General Embick questioned the good faith of the Statement made by the British that their purpose in renewing Article 19 with the proposed amendments was to enable them to fortify Hongkong. It looked more like an effort on their part to draw us into a negotiation and leave us holding the bag. Hongkong was of questionable military value. It would be a hostage in Japanese hands. Its defense from a military standpoint would require tremendous preparation. Hongkong was exposed to attack from the mainland and to hold it the defending force would have to control an enormous stretch of the mainland. Mr. Davis remarked that what worried him was the inconsistency of the two statements by the British. Craigie, in February, said that his Government wished to renew Article 19 in order to resist pressure to fortify Hongkong. Now his Government wished to renew Article 19 with an amendment in order to be able to fortify Hongkong. Mr. Davis said that in his opinion the first question to settle was, Should we go into this negotiation at all. What could the possible advantages be? It might be advantageous for us to encourage the British to strengthen their position in the Far East by fortifying Hongkong. Mr. Davis did not believe that the British were going to give in to Japan any more and for reasons of general policy we might wish to go along with the British to this extent. Looking at the problem from the other angle, if we should refuse to agree to a renewal of Article 19 the Japanese might interpret it as evidence of hostility on our part. On the other hand, Article 19 was accepted by us as part of a general settlement. There would be no rhyme or reason for us to enter into an agreement on this specific point with Japan immediately after Japan had refused to enter into a naval agreement with us. Mr. Davis then requested the views of the others present. Admiral Standley said that he was in complete agreement with Mr. Davis’ concluding statement. General Embick agreed. Mr. Dunn agreed. Mr. Dooman agreed. Mr. Davis remarked that once we begin discussing the proposal of the British with them the fat is in the fire. The pact of non-aggression would bob right up. Admiral Standley observed that Japan was still holding out for the recognition of parity. He did not believe that while the Japanese were in this state of mind we should stick our necks out. Mr. Dunn said that he could see no good reason why we should ignore the fact that the Japanese have refused to come into the Naval Treaty. General Embick stressed his belief that we should not discuss a renewal of Article 19. Mr. Dooman observed that not only was the naval situation in a state of flux; the political situation in the Far East was also in a state of flux. Until that situation had become more stabilized it would be highly dangerous to lift out one factor in the situation and crystallize it. Mr. Davis remarked that at Washington we had agreed to surrender our position of superiority in the Pacific in consideration of a pledge of political stability. Instead, we have had a condition of extreme political instability. Here Mr. Hickerson observed that in his conversation with Mr. Mallet, the British Chargé d’Affaires, 6 he had asked him if the Japanese had recently made fresh inquiries with regard to the renewal of this Article. Mr. Mallet had replied that he did not know. Mr. Davis said that he believed the British had probably let the matter rest until Ambassador Yoshida’s arrival in London. Yoshida was seeking a general agreement with the British and this matter had probably come up in connection with this fresh effort on the part of the Japanese. Mr. Dooman said that just before the meeting he had made a search of the unpublished Minutes of the Washington Conference with regard to the manner in which the provision relating to the status quo on fortifications in the Pacific had come into the Washington Naval Treaty. He then read the following: On December 1, 1921, Mr. Balfour had a private conversation with Admiral Baron Kato, Chief of the Japanese delegation, in the course of which Baron Kato had suggested that there be a cessation of fortification in the Pacific. 7 The minutes of that conversation are not, unfortunately, available, but I shall go back to the minutes of a conversation which took place on the following day between Mr. Hughes, Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato, 8 underlying the views upon which that suggestion was based (quoted from the minutes): … The ratio of 10–10–7 which the Japanese experts had supported had, as a matter of fact, been worked out some time ago in Tokio. Moreover, these views were supported by the Japanese Government and Parliament. On the present occasion, however, he had no desire to argue the question on technical issues, as such a controversy was likely to lead to no result. He would only say that he himself believed that Japan was entitled to a ratio of 70 per cent in capital ships. As an instance he also referred to the question of the Mutsu . He recalled that this ship had been practically completed some months ago; that she had steamed 500 miles under her own steam; and, finally, that she had been put in commission two days ago, and was about to join the active fleet. To put her on the scrap heap would be most difficult for him to justify, and very unwelcome to public opinion in Japan. In these circumstances he had had to ask himself, supposing we were willing to concede the 60 per cent, by what arguments could he justify it to his own people? Unless he could completely satisfy them, the concession to the American point of view in regard to the 60 per cent ratio in capital ships and the Mutsu would rankle in the minds of the Japanese people and leave public opinion in a state which was contrary to that good feeling between the two peoples which was an essential part of a real settlement and which he himself so warmly desired. He had pondered deeply over these matters during the last few days, with the result that he felt in a condition of the utmost difficulty and doubt. He would like to be helped by suggestions as to how he could justify himself to his own people. It was in these circumstances that he had had his conversation with Mr. Balfour. Baron Kato admitted that the conclusion of the proposed quadruple agreement in regard to the Pacific would be of great assistance to him. Yet another thought had occurred to him which might help matters. He had noticed that whenever news was received in Japan of the erection of fortifications in the American Islands in the Pacific it had caused a feeling of alarm and apprehension. It would therefore be of great assistance if an agreement could be reached to maintain the status quo in the Pacific in regard to the fortification and the creation of naval bases. What would help him would be if the United States of America could agree not to increase the fortifications or the naval bases at Guam, the Philippine Islands and Hawaii. If this could be conceded, Japan on her part would agree not to fortify the four islands named to Mr. Balfour. (The islands named to Mr. Balfour by Baron Kato were:—Formosa, the Pescadores and Oshima). Even if this were granted, however, Baron Kato said he would have considerable difficulty in accepting the 60 per cent. Going back to the meeting on December 1, Mr. Hughes averted to the fact that Baron Kato had emphasized that there would be strong naval and military opposition to the proposal for naval limitation put forward by the American delegation. Mr. Hughes said that in the United States also naval and military opinion had a way of becoming reflected in Congress and in the press. He went on to say (quoted from the minutes): … The American people would probably refuse to fetter themselves in regard to their right to fortify their own possessions. In this connection, Mr. Hughes differentiated between the establishment of a base which might be regarded as an offensive work, and the mere fortification for defensive purposes. He then proceeded to outline a plan of his own, explaining that it was a purely personal idea, which he had not laid before his colleagues or the President. This plan was that America and Japan should reciprocally agree that if either one or the other were to desire to erect fortifications in the Pacific, the opposite party should be notified, and should then have the right to terminate the whole of the naval agreement. If, for example, the American public were to insist upon the fortification of Guam, Japan should have the right to denounce the whole arrangement and would be free to build ships. 9 Following the statement made by Admiral Kato which is outlined in the minutes first quoted above, Mr. Hughes gave a very comprehensive discussion of the entire position of the United States with regard to the problem of naval limitation. He said that the Japanese proposal with regard to the status quo of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific could not be given consideration except as part of the acceptance by the Japanese of a comprehensive agreement including the Four Power Treaty 10 in the Pacific and the American proposal on naval limitation. He stressed the point that it would be impossible, after having made the important concessions involved in the American naval proposal, for the United States to continue to make further concessions. Mr. Hughes then said that the American delegation might be willing to consider some such proposal as that put forward by the Japanese, provided that the limitation on fortifications would be undertaken mutually and reciprocally by all the parties to the Four Power Treaty. It is entirely clear from the records that the status quo on fortifications was a matter which the Japanese earnestly desired, and that it was agreed to by the United States largely by way of concession to Japan. Whether or not fortifications in the Pacific are today as important a factor as they were in 1922 is, of course, a purely technical question. However, the desire expressed by the Japanese for continuance of the status quo would seem to indicate that the question of fortifications is still today an important matter, at least to the Japanese. It is equally clear from the records that an agreement was reached with regard to this question in the course of an agreement being reached of the most comprehensive character, involving naval construction, matters of policy and matters of international relations. During the course of the making of the latter arrangement there were involved a number of concessions and counter-concessions. In my opinion it would be unwise to separate a factor in the making of an agreement—moreover, a factor which was a concession made by the United States—, and set it up as an independent agreement without the giving by the other parties to the agreement of a compensating concession. Important changes are today taking place in the Far East. The situation in that area is confused, it is changing, and finally it is changing under the application of force. The interests of the United States in the Far East are also changing, and approximately ten years hence there is likelihood that the United States will have to consider a totally new situation. It would be, in my opinion, most unwise to tie down during that period of change any factor so important as the maintenance of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific area. In conclusion, Mr. Davis said that, in his view we should reply to the British that unless there is more in this matter than we can see from the information that has been furnished us, we cannot discuss it. Admiral Standley said that he agreed with this conclusion, that very evidently the Japanese were merely trying to work up a trade. Mr. Dooman remarked that the Embassy at Tokyo had cautiously suggested that the possibilities of an Anglo-Japanese alliance were worth watching. In his opinion however, an arrangement of this sort would have to be based on the possibility of each side protecting its economic interests. The British would want the situation stabilized in China. The Japanese would want the British to keep open British controlled markets for Japanese goods. However, these markets were more important to the British than their interests in China. The reply should be made to the British that we do not propose to join in an initiative of this nature. We must keep our hands free. Mr. Dunn said that an oral reply would be made on the basis of prepared notes. 4 British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 5 For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference, see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff. 6 See memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, September 11, supra . 7 See note dated December 1, 1921, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 74 . 8 Ibid. , p. 75 . 9 Note dated December 1, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 74 . 10 Signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, ibid. , p. 33 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A4B/695: Telegram [Document 119] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , September 25, 1936—6 p.m. 347. Department’s 336, September 11, 7 p.m. 11 Referring to the British “oral message” asking the agreement of this Government to the renewal of Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, the following oral reply was made to the British Chargé d’Affaires September 24, based on notes which were handed to him: “Careful consideration has been given to the proposal, orally communicated to this Government by you, to join with the British and Japanese Governments in renewing Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, in a separate instrument, with a change in one particular, namely, that there should be provision for bringing up to date and extending existing fortifications. We have come to the conclusion that, unless reasons can be adduced for renewing Article 19 other than those which have been thus far communicated to us, we cannot see our way clear to accept the proposal to join with the British and Japanese Governments in negotiating a renewal of this Article. Article 19, it will be recalled, was accepted by this Government in 1922, by way of concession to Japan, as one part only of an agreement of the most comprehensive character, including the Naval Limitations Treaty, the Four Power Treaty in the Pacific, matters of policy and complex factors in the relations of the United States to other countries. In order to reach agreement concessions and counter-concessions were made and ultimately a general bargain was completed which was intended to promote peace and stability in the Pacific and in the Far East. This comprehensive agreement reached at Washington has not, however, survived the vicissitudes of 14 years. Without referring to the various departures from the political status quo , it need only be recalled that the Japanese Government, after denouncing the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, last year, and after withdrawing from the London Naval Conference, 1935, has recently signified its refusal to adhere to the London Naval Treaty, 1936. Moreover, important changes are regularly taking place in the Far East. There is a condition of political flux and, in the circumstances, it appears unwise to this Government to crystallize one aspect of the situation while other aspects are left unsettled and in suspense. However, in communicating its decision not to join with the British and Japanese Governments in a renewal of Article 19, this Government wishes it to be clearly understood that it has no desire to alter, and has no present intention of altering, the status quo in fortifications in the Pacific. It wishes to emphasize, moreover, that, although on the basis of the information which has come to it this Government cannot see that any benefits would accrue to the United States from a renewal of Article 19, it is prepared to receive, and to give the most careful consideration to, any further arguments which the British Government may wish to transmit.” Hull 11 Not printed. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbech) 500.A4B/702 [Document 120] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( Hornbech ) [ Washington ,] October 14, 1936. In the memorandum of a meeting held in the Department on September 18 [ 16 ] to discuss this question, at the bottom of page 4, there appears this statement: “Mr. Davis remarked that what worried him was the inconsistency of the two statements by the British. Craigie, in February, said that his Government wished to renew Article 19 in order to resist pressure to fortify Hong Kong. Now his Government wished to renew Article 19 with an amendment in order to be able to fortify Hong Kong.” With regard to this apparent “inconsistency,” a statement made to me last evening by Lord Lothian 12 may throw some light. In giving an outline of the current situation in Europe, Lothian said that British opinion with regard to British needs had undergone a great transition during the past few months; British leaders had become convinced that hope of security through instrumentality of the League of Nations was entirely illusory; Great Britain must rely upon her own strength and therefore must rearm, whereas in June (or July) the Labor elements had refused to approve budget estimates for rearmament, those elements had within the past two weeks adopted resolutions thoroughly approving of the Government’s program; now, the British Government is bending every effort to the strengthening of its military equipment and positions. In the light of these facts, the British Government’s reasoning and objectives as of February last and that Government’s reasoning and objectives as of September last may be reasonably understood to be—without inconsistency—two quite different things. S[ tanley ] K. H[ ornbeck ] 12 Philip Henry Kerr, Marquess of Lothian, Liberal Party leader in the House of Lords, and subsequently British Ambassador in the United States (August 30, 1939–December 12, 1940). Retention of naval tonnage by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan under articles 17 and 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 Retention of naval tonnage by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan under articles 17 and 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 [121] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, April 30, 1936. 500.A15A3/1776 [122] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson) Washington, May 15, 1936. 500.A15A3/1777 [123] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, June 4, 1936—noon. 500.A15A3/1777: Telegram [124] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 15, 1936—7 p.m. [Received July 15—2:35 p.m.] 500.A15A3/1798: Telegram [125] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 14, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A3/1802: Telegram [126] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 3, 1936. 500.A15A3/1816 [127] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 7, 1936—7 p.m. [Received September 7—2:02 p.m.] 500.A15A3/1817: Telegram [128] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, September 10, 1936—1 p.m. 500.A15A3/1819a: Telegram [129] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 25, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 25—2:45 p.m.] 500.A15A3/1824: Telegram [130] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, September 29, 1936. 500.A15A3/1832a [131] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Ambassador (Bingham) London , October 27, 1936. 500.A15A3/1836 [132] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, October 28, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A3/1833a: Telegram [133] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, November 5, 1936—4 p.m. 500.A15A3/1886a: Telegram [134] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, November 21, 1936—noon. 500.A15A3/1842: Telegram [135] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 15, 1936—6 p.m. 500.A15A3/1852a: Telegram [136] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 16, 1936—8 p.m. [Received December 16—4:17 p.m.] 500.A15A3/1854: Telegram [137] Memorandum by Messrs. William T. Turner and Eugene H. Dooman, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [Washington,] December 17, 1936. 500.A15A3/1857 [138] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 17, 1936—7 p.m. 500.A15A3/1854: Telegram [139] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 24, 1936—11 a.m. [Received December 24—8:30 a.m.] 500.A15A3/1859: Telegram [140] The Japanese Ambassador (Saito) to the Secretary of State Washington, December 28, 1936. 500.A15A3/1861 [141] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 29, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A3/1859: Telegram [142] The Japanese Ambassador (Saito) to the Secretary of State Washington, December 29, 1936. 500.A15A3/1864 [143] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 30, 1936—2 p.m. 500.A15A3/1864: Telegram [144] The Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Saito) Washington, December 30, 1936. 500.A15A3/1861 [145] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) [Washington,] December 30, 1936. 500.A15A3/1868 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1776 [Document 121] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) No. 1223 Washington , April 30, 1936. Sir : As you are aware, Article 16 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 1 provides that vessels which cause the total tonnage in any category to exceed the figures shown in the table forming part of the said Article shall be disposed of prior to December 31, 1936. The United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan now have completed tonnage in certain categories which will be required to be scrapped in accordance with this obligation unless the so-called “escalator clause”, Article 21 of the Treaty, is invoked. Should any of the three powers signatory to this part of the Treaty invoke this clause in respect to any category, the other parties shall be entitled to make proportionate increases in the same category and shall consult together as to the situation thus presented. All three countries have an excess in the destroyer category. The United States and Japan have an excess in submarines. The British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan have an excess in one or the other of the cruiser sub-categories. The Navy Department now points out that the date on which this excess tonnage must be disposed of is drawing near and that plans and arrangements for scrapping must soon be completed. In order to determine, however, the amount of tonnage in the submarine and destroyer categories that the United States must scrap, it is necessary to know the intentions of Great Britain and Japan in respect to possible invocation of Article 21. During the course of the recent Naval Conference, 2 Captain Danckwerts of the British Delegation handed Captain Ingersoll, Technical Adviser to the American Delegation, a memorandum dated February 14, 1936, 3 which made clear the manner in which the British Government intends to adhere to the cruiser tonnage figures laid down in the London Naval Treaty of 1930. A copy of this memorandum was given to the Naval Attaché for the files of the Embassy. Captain Danckwerts stated that this memorandum did not constitute official notification but that the information contained therein had been embodied in a note to the Japanese Government and that similar information would later be formally transmitted to the United States. The American Delegation was also unofficially informed by the British Delegation that the latter’s Government intended to invoke the “escalator clause” in order to retain 40,000 tons of overage destroyers. No information either official or unofficial appears to have been received regarding the Japanese attitude toward invocation of this clause in respect to any category. The Secretary of the Navy has requested that notes be sent to the British and Japanese Governments to inquire whether they intend to invoke the provisions of Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 in regard to any category and in the event that they propose to do so how much excess tonnage they contemplate retaining in any category or categories. Prior to sending such communications, the Department would prefer that you endeavor to ascertain informally through the Foreign Office if and when the British Government will make the formal notification forecast in the Danckwerts memorandum and in respect of the 40,000 tons of overage destroyers. You should also ask if any indication has been received from the Japanese Government in reply to the note said to have been sent to it on this subject. You are requested to obtain this information as soon as possible as the Navy Department is desirous of proceeding with its plans for scrapping without delay. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: William Phillips 1 Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . 2 For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference, see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff. 3 Not found in Department files. The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson) 500.A15A3/1777 [Document 122] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy ( Swanson ) Washington , May 15, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : With reference to the Acting Secretary’s communication of April 25, 1936, 4 requesting that it be ascertained if the British Government intends to invoke Article 21 of the London Treaty in regard to any category or categories of ships, and, if so, how much excess tonnage it contemplates retaining in any category or categories, and specifically that inquiry be made as to: (1) when the British Government will make formal notification with respect to the action it contemplates in order that the amount of completed tonnage in the cruiser category which may be retained, under Article 16 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations on December 31, 1936, may not be exceeded; (2) if indication has been received from the Japanese Government in reply to a note said to have been sent to it on this subject; and (3) if the British Government proposes to invoke Article 2 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to retain an additional 40,000 tons of destroyers, I desire to enclose copies of a despatch, dated May 2, 1936, and a telegram of May 11, 1936, 5 from the Embassy at London, giving the replies to questions (1) and (2). No word has so far been received with regard to question (3), destroyers. In reply to (1), the Embassy transmits a memorandum from the British Government 5a which, after referring to the proposal to convert three Hawkins class cruisers from (A) to (B), London Treaty, 1930, cruisers and scrap five (B) class cruisers, leaving the total cruiser strength of the British Commonwealth of Nations under 339,000 tons, inquires whether the United States Government has objection to the conversion of a fourth Hawkins class cruiser into a training ship as prescribed in Annex 2, Section V ( b ) 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, that is by the removal of one-half the guns; retaining four guns of main calibre; the removal of all torpedo tubes; the removal of all aviation facilities and accessories; and the removal of one-half of the boilers. In reply to (2), the Embassy in its telegram of May 11, reports that no Japanese reply has as yet been received by the British Government. The Japanese were given official notice at the same time the memoranda were handed to the American Embassy. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 4 Letter from Admiral William H. Standley, Acting Secretary of the Navy, not printed. 5 Neither printed. 5a Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1777: Telegram [Document 123] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , June 4, 1936—noon. 191. Our Memorandum in reply to the British Memoranda of May 2 and 6, 6 dealing with increases in the London Treaty 1930 cruiser and destroyer categories was forwarded to you today. 6a The Memorandum notes, without specific objection or approval, that the British Government proposes to convert a Hawkins class cruiser to training ship, although this is not provided for in the Treaty. It expresses appreciation of the spirit which prompts the British Government to wish to arrange the destroyer excess by friendly negotiation but indicates that it would be preferable to invoke Article 21 of the Treaty and reserves our right in that event to retain a proportionate amount of excess destroyer tonnage. Hull 6 None printed. 6a In instruction No. 1262, June 4; the memorandum to the British Government was delivered on June 11. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1798: Telegram [Document 124] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 15, 1936—7 p.m. [Received July 15—2:35 p.m.] 348. An official note 7 was handed to me this afternoon at the Foreign Office in which the British Government in the United Kingdom invoked article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 with a view to the retention of an additional 40,000 tons of overage destroyer tonnage over and above that specified in article 16, clause 1, as not to be exceeded on the 31st December, 1936. In conclusion the communication takes note of the statement in the American memorandum of June 11 8 that in the event of the British Government invoking article 21 the United States Government would reserve the right deriving from this article to retain a proportionate amount of excess tonnage in the destroyer class. Copy by pouch tomorrow. Bingham 7 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 2360, July 16; not printed. 8 Not printed; see telegram No. 191, supra . The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A3/1802: Telegram [Document 125] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , August 14, 1936—6 p.m. 105. By note dated July 15, 1936, 9 the British Government informed this Government that, in order to prevent a disequilibrium between destroyer and submarine tonnage, it had decided to retain, under Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, an additional 40,000 tons of overage destroyer tonnage over and above that specified in Article 16, Clause 1, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936. In order to keep the legal position clear, you are requested to transmit to the Japanese Government the following Memorandum: (1) The Government of the United States of America was informed by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom by note, dated July 15, 1936, that His Majesty’s Government had found itself obliged, in order to prevent a serious disequilibrium between destroyer and submarine tonnage, to retain under Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, an additional 40,000 tons of overage destroyer tonnage over and above that specified in Article 16, Clause 1 as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936. (2) In view of this decision of His Majesty’s Government, this Government has found itself reluctantly obliged to exercise its right under Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to make a proportionate increase in the destroyer category by retaining 40,000 tons of overage destroyer tonnage over and above that specified in Article 16, Clause 1, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936. 10 Phillips 9 Not printed; see telegram No. 348, supra . 10 A memorandum similar in substance was transmitted to the Embassy in the United Kingdom for communication to the British Government; Department’s telegram No. 306, August 14, 7 p.m., not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1816 [Document 126] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] September 3, 1936. The Japanese Ambassador came in and handed me the attached Memorandum, 11 with explanatory statements including naval figures, which I stated I assumed was similar to a communication presented to the British Government on yesterday, in the light of London publications of today. The Ambassador said that he understood the same communication had gone forward to London. In his oral conversation, the Ambassador frankly said that the Government of Japan realized it did not have the authority under the Treaty of 1930 to take up an entirely different category, as in the case of submarines instead of submarine destroyers. Nor does the individual paper handed me by the Ambassador itself in the slightest degree undertake to controvert this position. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 11 Not printed; see telegram No. 114, September 10, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1817: Telegram [Document 127] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , September 7, 1936—7 p.m. [Received September 7—2:02 p.m.] 421. Craigie 12 stated this afternoon that a copy of the Japanese note of August 31, relating to their decision to retain excess tonnage in destroyers and submarines was communicated to the Department by the British Embassy in Washington on September 4. 13 Craigie said that the British Government had not yet fully made up its mind just what action to take but that they were not disposed to view the practical consequences of Japanese retention of 15,598 tons of old submarines as very alarming. The Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to have the Japanese Naval Attaché confer with the Admiralty and give the full technical details as to how the Japanese arrived at their figures, which Craigie says are not clear to the British. He said that they would appreciate an expression of our views as soon as the Department might care to indicate them. Bingham 12 Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 13 A summary of the Japanese note of August 31 was received on September 8 from the British Embassy. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A3/1819a: Telegram [Document 128] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , September 10, 1936—1 p.m. 114. 1. On September 3 the Japanese Ambassador delivered a memorandum 14 in which there was expressed the intention of the Japanese Government to retain an excess of 26,657 tons of destroyers and submarines, of which 15,598 tons are to be of submarines, in view of the British action in invoking Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, in order to retain 40,000 tons of over-age destroyer tonnage. 2. On September 5 we replied. 15 We took the view that there is no legal warrant for the retention by the Japanese of 15,598 tons of submarines without recourse to Article 21. We did not question the right of the Japanese to make a proportionate increase in the destroyer category. We could not, however, follow the reasoning that because the Japanese do not possess sufficient tonnage in the destroyer category they should compensate by retaining excess submarine tonnage. We did not, however, question their right to retain submarines if they consider the requirements of their national security affected by new construction by any Power other than those which had joined in Part III of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, but we held that the only method provided for raising tonnage limits was through recourse to Article 21. We concluded by stating that should the Japanese invoke Article 21 to retain excess submarines we would reserve the right to make a proportionate increase in the submarine category. Hull 14 Not printed; a similar Japanese note was presented on August 31, 1936 to the British Government. 15 Memorandum not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1824: Telegram [Document 129] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , September 25, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 25—2:45 p.m.] 445. From Atherton. 16 By his request I called on Craigie this morning. He opened a somewhat lengthy discussion by informing me: 1. Embassy’s 421, September 7, 7 p.m., Foreign Office has discussed with appropriate Japanese authorities here destroyer tonnage figures and ascertains that 11,099 is the maximum overage destroyer tonnage (over and above their treaty figure). 2. Foreign Office doubts whether it would be equitable to attempt to solve this question on too legalistic a basis, particularly as article 21 of the London Naval Treaty was drafted with a view to construction of new tonnage by escalator power rather than retention of overage tonnage. 3. As far as the Foreign Office is concerned, it would not see any objection, from naval or political viewpoint, to retention of 15,500 tons of old submarine tonnage by Japan, particularly as both United States and this country are retaining additional destroyer tonnage. 4. There may be political objections to invoking escalator clause by Japan in the present circumstances (in particular invoking it against Soviet) but this is a matter primarily for Japan, and as a first step Foreign Office proposes to ask Japanese Government whether they are prepared to adopt United States suggestion. Should Japanese Government give negative reply, Foreign Office hopes it may be possible for the United States to agree to a settlement on the lines proposed by Japan; the United States retaining additional overage destroyers and submarine tonnage should the United States see fit. 5. In reply to a query regarding the Hawkins class cruisers, I outlined my personal impressions after my talk in Washington 17 (Department’s 317, August 25, 6 p.m. 18 ) and Craigie expressed his appreciation of the explanation of my understanding of the American attitude. Craigie then said that he was speaking to me in the strictest confidence, and then discussed the case for the detention of five “C” class cruisers, stressing that he hoped we would consider his remarks from the point of view of general policy and naval equity rather than from a legalistic point of view, and we agreed upon the following text as outlining his remarks, made to me in an attempt privately and unofficially to consult the United States Government: “1. The general political situation has deteriorated in recent years more seriously than it was possible to predict in 1930 and the process has been further expedited since the question whether the escalator clause could be used to retain these cruisers was considered by His Majesty’s Government in the spring of the year. There has, in fact, been a complete change in the whole aspect of international affairs and a considerable general move throughout the world towards rearmament. It must be obvious to any thinking person, not only here but in the United States, that a situation is fast arising in which the scrapping of any serviceable ship becomes a serious matter for this country. 2. Since the matter was considered last spring, it has been ascertained that Japan will only be obliged to dispose of three very old ships, the Tsushima , the Hirado and the Yahagi , instead of seven ships (including some of much more recent date) as had previously been believed. This has upset the argument which was used in Parliament, that we should lose more than we should gain by retaining our overage cruisers on the basis of Japan being allowed to do the same. (This situation has arisen because the Japanese will not have completed two new vessels—the Suzuya and the Kumano —which they had been expected to complete before the end of 1936.) Thus the mutual scrapping of overage cruisers with a view to reaching treaty limits can, as things stand, only react to Japan’s advantage. 3. The 1930 Naval Treaty was drafted on the assumption, which at that time seemed reasonable, that it would be succeeded by another quantitative naval treaty in 1936; that there is now no hope of continuing the quantitative limitation of naval armament after December 31st next, is a fact which seems to justify as wide an interpretation as possible of article 22 [ 21 ] of the 1930 Treaty. 4. It is becoming increasingly difficult to explain to public opinion in this country why, in view particularly of the United States of Europe, 18a it should be necessary to scrap five reasonably serviceable cruisers at a time when it is the avowed policy of His Majesty’s Government to increase their cruiser strength up to 70 cruisers—a figure which has long since been notified to the United States Government. If we have to scrap the five “C” class cruisers, the number of our completed cruisers will by December 31st next, have dropped to 48 (including 13 overage), and this at a time of increasing tension. 5. It is, therefore, desired to consult the United States Government privately and unofficially as to whether some way round this difficulty cannot be found without detriment to the interests of other countries. We are reluctant to attempt to invoke the escalator clause in this matter because, on a narrow interpretation of article 21, we must first be able to affirm that the ‘new construction’ by other powers is of a character materially to affect our national security. Whether our security has been so affected is a point on which there might, for certain technical reasons, be a divergence of view, and, pending any understanding on this matter with their cosignatories, His Majesty’s Government consider it of great importance to take no action which might conceivably be held to strain the obligations assumed by this country under the treaty. 6. Looking at the matter from the political and naval rather than from the legal standpoint, it is suggested that the United States would suffer no disadvantage if these five old cruisers were to be retained by His Majesty’s Government on the following understanding: ( a ) Vessels would be retained for a maximum of 5 years. ( b ) They would be used not as cruisers but as antiaircraft ships, which would involve the substitution of a lighter armament. ( c ) If the Japanese Government were to ask for a quid pro quo , it is suggested that this should be limited to the retention of the three old vessels mentioned in paragraph 2 above. ( d ) It would, of course, be open to the United States Government to retain additional overage destroyer or submarine tonnage should they think fit, seeing that the United States has no overage cruisers due to be scrapped under the London Naval Treaty. 7. Should the United States Government see no obection in principle to an arrangement of this kind, it would remain to decide what would be the best method of carrying it into effect. We should prefer a friendly agreement, reached quite independently of the escalator clause. Should this method prove unacceptable to the United States Government, the matter might perhaps be settled by adopting, after consultation with the United States and Japanese Governments, an interpretation of the escalator clause which would take into consideration the factors mentioned in paragraph 1, 3 and 4 above. In pursuance of this interpretation His Majesty’s Government would then formally notify the Governments of the United States and Japan that they consider themselves justified in retaining the five old cruisers.” In agreeing to transmit the above I took great pains to point out to Craigie that we lacked power to modify any agreement which had been ratified by the Senate, which he said he realized, but that his Government hoped we should consider all the suggestions outlined herein, with, in view of my interpolation, particular reference to paragraph 7. Under paragraph 4 Craigie stated for my confidential information that, because of recent experiences, by the end of this year certain existing cruisers would be in process of rearmament against airplane attack and the number of available cruisers would drop to something around 40. [Atherton.] Bingham 16 Ray Atherton, Counselor of Embassy. 17 See Department’s instruction No. 1442, September 29, infra . 18 Not printed. 18a According to note No. LS 15/8 from the British Foreign Office, May 29, 1951, this phrase should read “in view particularly of the state of Europe.” (023.1/6–151) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1832a [Document 130] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) No. 1442 Washington , September 29, 1936. Sir : From time to time in recent months questions have arisen relating to the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as well as other aspects of the general Naval problem, and these have been reported and discussed in various telegrams and despatches to and from the Embassy and the Department. In order to consider this problem as a whole officers of the State and Navy Departments, also Mr. Ray Atherton, met informally on August 25, 1936, in the Office of the Acting Secretary of the Navy and reached certain tentative decisions with regard to the attitude of this Government toward the problems relating to the various categories of naval vessels and the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement, 19 as follows: 1. Submarines . It is the view of this Government that it would be desirable that no tonnage be retained by any Power signatory of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, in the submarine category over and above that specified in the Treaty as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936. It is the further view of this Government that should a Power signatory of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, wish to retain tonnage in the submarine category over and above that specified in the Treaty as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, it must, as the only legal means available, have recourse to Article 21 of that Treaty. In the event that a Power signatory of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, should have recourse to Article 21 in order to retain tonnage in the submarine category over and above that specified in the Treaty as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, the United States would be reluctantly obliged to exercise the right under Article 21 to retain a proportionate amount of tonnage in the submarine category. This was the position taken by this Government in the Memorandum, dated September 5, 1936, in reply to the Japanese Memorandum of September 3, 1936, 20 in which the Japanese Government announced its intention of retaining 15,598 tons of excess submarines in order to compensate for Japan’s lack of over-age destroyers. This remains the position of this Government in respect of submarines. 2. Destroyers . Article 17 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, states: “A transfer not exceeding 10% of the allowed total tonnage of the category or sub-category into which the transfer is to be made shall be permitted between cruisers of sub-category ( b ) and destroyers”. On December 31, 1936, the United States will have only 75,900 tons of completed cruisers of sub-category ( b ), that is to say, 67,600 tons less than the tonnage which is permitted under the terms of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, in this sub-category. As a consequence, this Government will exercise its right under Article 17 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, and retain an additional 19,000 tons in the destroyer category. A Memorandum to this effect should be handed to the appropriate British authorities. 3. Cruisers of Sub-category ( b ). In a confidential Aide-Mémoire , dated July 18, 1936, 21 Sir Robert Craigie stated that the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1935, had agreed to the British proposals in connection with the disposal of four Hawkins Class cruisers and that this agreement had been notified to the British Delegation by Captain Ingersoll of the American Delegation. This Government cannot accept the view that agreement to the conversion of four Hawkins Class cruisers was expressed by the American Delegation during the period of the London Naval Conference, 1935, and it wishes to place on the record a categorical denial that any meeting took place at the Admiralty in which Captain Ingersoll discussed with anyone the disposal of the Hawkins Class cruisers, or that Captain Ingersoll, or that any other member of the American Delegation, ever agreed on behalf of the Delegation as to the method by which the retention of the Hawkins Class was to be legalized. The American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1935, could not commit the United States Government to an amendment of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, unless the amendment were included in the new London Naval Treaty of 1936, for ratification by the United States Senate. Moreover, no commitment to an amendment of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, could be given in the absence of one of the signatories, namely, Japan. Evidently then, no definitive agreement as to the method of disposal of the four Hawkins cruisers could have been given by the American Delegation, and none was given. At the same time this Government has no objection to the proposed demilitarization of a Hawkins Class cruiser for use as a training ship and the conversion of three cruisers of sub-category ( a ) to cruisers of sub-category ( b ) in so far as it affects the American naval position in respect of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This Government deems it highly important, however, that such conversion, if made, should be effected in strict accordance with the terms of the Treaty. While this Government does not wish to suggest to the British Government what course it should adopt in order to effect legally the conversion of the four Hawkins cruisers, it expresses the hope that the conversion shall be effected in such a manner that this Government will not feel called upon to make formal objection in accordance with the informal statement of position which you gave to Sir Robert Craigie in the course of an interview on July 15. 4. Capital Ships . In the matter of the Japanese attitude toward the stipulation of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, which would limit the caliber of guns on capital ships to 14 inches, it is thought wiser to do nothing at present or at least until after Ambassador Grew has had an opportunity to confer in Washington during his period of leave. Then it may become necessary to make formal inquiry of the Japanese Government, but before taking action, this Government will exchange views with the British Government. 5. Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement . Careful consideration has been accorded the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement (reference Embassy’s 382, July 30, 8 p.m. 22 ), and this Government has no direct comment to make. It is our understanding, however, that this Bilateral Naval Agreement with the Soviet Government is of a tentative nature pending the adherence of the principal Naval Powers to the London Naval Treaty, 1936. With regard to the three reservations and two amendments to the Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement, the following are our confidential views: ( a ) The first reservation deals with the situation in Far Eastern waters. The Soviet Government “reserves the right not to consider itself bound by the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, regarding qualitative limitation and the exchange of information as far as all its Far Eastern Naval forces are concerned, so long as there shall not be concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan a special agreement on this subject”. It is noted that the British Government is prepared to accept this reservation on the understanding that the Soviet Government will not take the initiative in constructing any ships outside the limits of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, unless there is construction by any Power or Powers outside Treaty limits. In that event, the Soviet Government will resume liberty of action and will notify the British Government of such intentions without, however, giving any particulars in regard to the contemplated construction and without recourse to the procedure of consultation and three months advance notification as set out in Article 25 of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. A simple notification to the British Government will free the hands of the Soviet Government to build in the European part of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Far East any type of ship which it may require for employment in the Far East, although the qualitative limits as regards ships to be used in European waters will not be modified. It is noted, moreover, that the British Government is in agreement with regard to the provisions relating to exchange of information that, subject to the provision that full particulars shall be furnished at all times in respect of all vessels built in the European part of the Soviet Union and also in respect of any vessels transferred from the Far Eastern to the European fleet, no information should be given by the Soviet Government of their Naval forces in the Far East, while the British Government for its part, should undertake to furnish the Soviet Government with complete information regarding its naval construction. It is assumed that this reservation, which is made contingent upon a Soviet-Japan naval agreement, is based on the assumption that Japan will not become a party to the London Naval Treaty, 1936. If this is so, we assume that the Soviet Government would have no objection to making a categorical statement to this effect. It is our understanding, moreover, that the stipulation for the exchange of information will apply only as between the British and Soviet Governments and that the British Government will not transmit to the Soviet Government confidential information regarding American naval construction which it will receive from this Government in accordance with the terms of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. An expression of the views with regard to this point of the British Government should be requested. ( b ) The Soviet Government makes a specific reservation with regard to Germany, to the effect that it “shall consider itself bound by the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, only to the extent to which Germany will take upon itself similar obligations.” Regarding this reservation we have no comment to make. ( c ) The Soviet Government makes a specific reservation in regard to the provision of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, for notification of minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, for the reason that all Soviet ships are State owned. This Government notes, and agrees with, the British position that in the event of a general international naval treaty the Soviet Government would be obliged to enter into an undertaking to furnish the required particulars. ( d ) The Soviet Government proposes an amendment by the terms of which it would reserve for itself the right to construct, prior to January 1, 1943, “such a number of capital ships”—in actual fact, two—with guns not exceeding 16 inches. It is noted that the British Government is prepared to accept this amendment, conditional upon its acceptance by the other Governments signatories of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. This Government does not desire to assume the onus of opposing this amendment. It is clearly the responsibility of the British Government as negotiator of the Bilateral Agreement with the Soviet Government to accept or reject the amendment in respect of capital ships. This Government has no direct interest in the type of construction which might be undertaken by Soviet Russia. Indirectly, however, it has the interest that the construction by the Soviet Government of certain types of ships may affect the amount and kind of construction of capital ships by other Powers. ( e ) A second amendment proposed by the Soviet Government relates to A Class cruisers, specifically that the Soviet Government shall not construct light surface vessels with guns of a caliber exceeding 7.1 inches prior to January 1, 1943, in excess of the number of light surface vessels carrying 8-inch guns of the Power a party to the London Naval Treaty, 1936, possessing the smallest number of vessels. It is noted that the British have concurred in the construction by the Soviet Government of seven 8,000 ton cruisers carrying a gun of 7.1 inches. In the view of this Government the British, in agreeing to this amendment, have countenanced naval construction which is not in conformity with the cruiser holiday restriction of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. It is not our intention, however, to register any formal objection or to comment on this or other specific angles of the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement, or either formally or informally to acquiesce in or reject its terms. It was our understanding that the British Government would proceed to negotiate bilateral naval agreements with Germany, with the Soviet Union and with other naval Powers, in conformity with the principles and provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, with a view of bringing these Powers into the framework of that Treaty pending their adherence to it. Insofar as any such bilateral agreement departs from the principles and provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, it would seem to complicate rather than facilitate a general solution of the naval problem. In any event, the receipt should be acknowledged of the “Unsigned summary of the results of the conversations”, dated July 30, 1936, with the Soviet Government, communicated to us by the British Government. No comment, however, should be made. Except as otherwise stated, the conclusions enumerated above are communicated to you for your guidance. In view of the fact that Mr. Atherton was a member of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1935, and the further fact that he was present at the informal meeting in which these matters were considered, it is suggested that you instruct him to proceed as indicated above in informal discussion with the appropriate officials of the British Government. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull 19 Naval discussions between representatives of the British and Soviet Governments had taken place in London, May 14–July 29, 1936. The Anglo-Soviet naval agreement was signed on July 17, 1937; British Cmd. 5518. 20 Neither printed; see telegram No. 114, September 10, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] . 21 Transmitted to the Department in telegram No. 358, July 20, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom; not printed. 22 Not printed. Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Ambassador (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1836 [Document 131] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Ambassador ( Bingham ) 24 I called on Sir Robert Craigie this morning in accordance with your instructions. We first discussed certain questions arising out of Mr. Dunn’s 25 confidential letter to me of October 6, 1936. 26 Sir Robert Craigie informed me that about a week ago he had asked the Japanese Ambassador in London what he considered the position of his Government in regard to 16-inch guns. Mr. Yoshida replied that he felt certain that Japan wanted a 14-inch gun but could not bind herself to this in view of public opinion at home and the fact that Japan had in the current year withdrawn from the recent naval treaty negotiations. Sir Robert Craigie, however, felt that from what Mr. Yoshida said his Government might be prepared to give an official assurance in writing that Japan would limit herself to 14-inch gun construction, with a face saving device, technically permitting Japan to notify interested Governments to the contrary. Sir Robert Craigie said that one reason the British contemplate the Japanese might favor a 16-inch gun was that, due to restricted quarters in which it was possible to house Japanese crews as compared with those demanded in British and American navies, the Japanese might fit their ships for 16-inch guns to better advantage than the British and American navies. Sir Robert Craigie hoped that in all naval dealings with the Japanese both the British and American Governments would not be too legalistic and bear in mind the possibility that Japan might still be prepared to conform to the terms of the treaty. And indeed he said he had had intimations that the Japanese might want to undertake fresh conversations with the British and Americans some time after January 1, 1937. In reply to this intimation Sir Robert Craigie had stressed the fact that no discussions were possible on a quantitative basis. Craigie gave as his personal opinion that naval architects would find it extremely difficult to construct 35,000-ton capital ships with 16-inch guns and that shortly the experts would be seeking a 40,000-ton ship. I was then informed in strict confidence that the British had decided to put 14-inch guns on their first two capital ships which were to be laid down early in the coming year. The Japanese Government, however, had not been informed of this and I was asked to keep it strictly confidential. Sir Robert Craigie admitted their decision was influenced by European conversations, especially since the Russians and Germans were already showing a tendency to seek increasing sizes. With the arrival of Ambassador Ribbentrop 27 here this week, Sir Robert Craigie expected an early resumption of Anglo-German naval negotiations and stated that about a fortnight ago the Germans had informed the British of modifications they had in mind which were practically identical with the Soviet reservations (forwarded by this Embassy to the Department of State in a confidential aide-mémoire dated July 18, 1936 28 ). Also specifically Germany objected to Russia having its first ship under construction carry 15-inch guns. Sir Robert Craigie hoped the Russian and German negotiations might be completed this year, and added that when the final texts were concluded with Germany 29 and Russia, the British Government would want a statement from the United States (and France as well) indicating at least that the United States was not raising objections, for otherwise England would be unable to sign. Craigie hoped that the final agreements might be submitted to Parliament and be ratified before the end of the year. Sir Robert Craigie then went on to stress the importance of the retention of the “C” cruisers (see my No. 445, September 25, 5 p.m.). Craigie pointed out that the treaty had been a success for six years but the serious political situation which had recently developed had caused enormous political importance to be attached here to the retention of these cruisers. He personally foresaw that Japan might be in opposition but he hoped the United States Government would not. Craigie stated that he realized the United States could not make a special agreement in this connection but he hoped the United States might intimate privately that they would not protest against a wide interpretation of Article 21 as regards these cruisers. Craigie said the Admiralty were pressing for an answer; that it was important that before the question arose in Parliament, which was probable in the near future, some idea as to the attitude of the American Government should be obtained. Craigie then went on to point out that the fact that quantitative limitation is now about to disappear removes, in his view, the main purpose for the scrapping of over-age tonnage originally inserted in 1930. Craigie went on to add that there was nothing new as regards the Scandinavian negotiations: 30 the real difficulty concerned coast defence vessels (sub-category B capital ships). As regards Italy, Sir Robert Craigie said that Ciano 31 had informed the British in September that once Italy’s attitude vis-à-vis the League 32 was settled Italy would come into the Naval Treaty. In view, however, of the decision in September that the Abyssinian Delegation should remain in Geneva the Italians said subsequently they were not able to act as they had hoped. Craigie added, for my confidential information, that at one time recently Italy had tentatively sought light as to whether England would be prepared to consider in any way limiting its forces in the Mediterranean, the impossibility of which was immediately explained to them. It appears that Turkey has been pressing for the opening of negotiations on naval matters and Craigie contemplates that these may take place in December or January (1937) after completion of the German and Russian negotiations. Craigie informed me that the French had advised him only this morning that France has no present intention of building more 8-inch gun cruisers, dependent on Germany not endeavoring to seek increases. The French further stated that they intend to submit the Naval Treaty for ratification to the French Parliament on November 15. In the course of the conversation certain points taken up in the Department’s confidential instruction No. 1442, September 29, were touched upon. In this connection I may say I reminded Sir Robert of the contents of point (2) and the memorandum furnished thereon. Under point (4) I reminded him that should the American Government make formal inquiry of the Japanese Government it will exchange views with the British Government. In general discussion of point (5), more especially the last paragraph under sub-heading ( a ), Craigie agreed with the understanding therein expressed that the contemplated exchange of information was only between the British and Soviet Governments. Sir Robert, however, went on to say, quite on his own, that if agreements were reached with Germany and Russia he wanted to know whether the United States Government would be disposed to conclude agreements with those two countries for exchange of information pending the conclusion of a general treaty. Sir Robert Craigie had previously asked me a question arising out of point (5) paragraph ( d ), and when I told him my understanding was that my Government did not desire to assume an attitude of opposition to this amendment, Craigie expressed great disappointment since he said the British had been very firm against it and hoped the United States and France would likewise support their opposition point of view. In conclusion, Craigie again stressed the importance to the British Government of the retention of “C” cruisers, partly because of world political deterioration, partly because of home politics considerations, and lastly (as transmitted in the Embassy’s telegram No. 445, September 25, 5 p.m.), the vessels would be retained for a maximum of five years and would not be used as cruisers but as antiaircraft ships which would involve the substitution of a lighter armament for the existing 6-inch gun armament. London , October 27, 1936. 24 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 2613, October 27; received November 3. 25 James Clement Dunn, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs. 26 Not found in Department files. 27 Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador in the United Kingdom. 28 Apparently an error for “July 29, 1936,” the date of the statement of Soviet reservations transmitted to the Department in the Ambassador’s telegram No. 382, July 30, 8 p.m., and in his despatch No. 2398, July 31; neither printed. For the substance of the Soviet statement, see passage numbered 5 of the Department’s instruction No. 1442, September 29, supra . 29 The Anglo-German agreement was signed at London, July 17, 1937; British Cmd. 5519. 30 See enclosure to despatch No. 128, October 2, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] . 31 Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 32 In connection with the Italo-Ethiopian conflict; see vol. iii , pp. 34 ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1833a: Telegram [Document 132] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) 33 Washington , October 28, 1936—7 p.m. 385. Your 445, September 25, 5 p.m., and 485, October 21, 11 a.m. 34 The suggestion of the British that they might now wish to retain five cruisers of “C” class in addition to the four cruisers of the Hawkins class already under discussion has been accorded very careful consideration and the following is a statement of our informal and strictly confidential conclusions: 1. We do not question the viewpoint of the British Government that the political situation has deteriorated to a point which was not envisaged at the time of the negotiation of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, and we must reluctantly admit that there is at present throughout the world a general trend towards rearmament where the scrapping of serviceable ships becomes a matter of serious concern for any country. Indeed we are able to appreciate that the marked change in the international situation might cause the British now to wish to retain the five cruisers of “C” class as well as the four cruisers of the Hawkins class, although this would, as far as the five “C” class cruisers are concerned, constitute a reversal of the position taken in the British Memorandum, dated May 2, 1936. 35 It was stated in that Memorandum that it was the intention of the British Government, after converting four cruisers of the Hawkins class, three to subcategory ( b ) and one to a training ship, to scrap five subcategory ( b ) cruisers of the “C” class, thereby making the total cruiser tonnage of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations remaining on December 31, 1936, less than the sum of 146,800 tons of cruisers of subcategory ( a ) plus the 192,200 tons of cruisers of subcategory ( b ) which may be retained under Article 16 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. 2. We note that the British cite a new factor in the situation, namely, the fact that between the month of May and the present they have ascertained that Japan will be obliged to dispose of only three old ships, the Tsushima , the Hirado , and the Yahagi instead of seven ships, including some of more recent date, as the British had previously believed. Aside from the fact that this Government always believed that the Japanese would dispose only of the three old ships, it must be clear that this argument can have no very great appeal to us for the reason that any increase in cruiser tonnage by the British through the retention of the five “C” class cruisers will merely furnish a pretext to the Japanese to retain overage tonnage in the cruiser class. In view of the fact that this country has no overage tonnage in the cruiser, or in any other category which it may retain, the position of the United States relative to Japan and Great Britain will be adversely affected. 3. We note the British statement to the effect that the 1930 Naval Treaty was drafted on the assumption that it would be succeeded in 1936 by another naval treaty continuing quantitative features, which has not proved to be the case, and that therefore the London Naval Treaty, 1930, should be accorded as wide an interpretation as possible. With reference to this aspect of the situation we must point out that prior to our acceptance of the cruiser holiday which was incorporated in the London Naval Treaty, 1936, we received assurances from the British Delegation that it was the intention of the British Government to scrap down in the cruiser category to a total of 339,000 tons. These assurances facilitated to a great extent the acceptance by us of the principle of the cruiser holiday. 4. Considering the problem as a whole, then, from the political as well as the technical standpoint, we can see no issue to the situation which has been brought about by the request of the British Government to retain the five “C” cruisers (which in May it announced its intention of scrapping), except through recourse to Article 21, the Escalator Clause, of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. This Government does not question the right of the British Government to make the proposed increase in the cruiser category in excess of the tonnage specified in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, nor the right of the British Government to be the sole judge in determining whether its security has been affected to such an extent that the retention of this excess tonnage in the cruiser category becomes a necessity. It does contend, however, that recourse to Article 21 is the only method provided by the Treaty for raising the tonnage limits of the Treaty and that were action to be taken under this Article no question would arise as far as this Government is concerned as to the legality and propriety of the increase in tonnage and the legal position of all Powers Parties to Part III of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, would in consequence be clear. 5. Most attentive consideration is being given by us to the various problems which have arisen from the fact that the London Naval Treaty, 1930, which expires with the close of this year, is not to be renewed. We hope that by continued exchanges of views between the American, Japanese and British Governments these problems may be resolved without departure from the terms of that Treaty to the satisfaction of each and of all the Powers concerned. 6. You are requested to communicate the substance of the above confidentially and informally to Craigie in reply to his oral communication of September 25. 7. In communicating this information to Craigie you are requested to recall that in our reply, dated September 5, 1936, to the Memorandum communicated to us by the Japanese Ambassador on September 3, 36 relating to the intentions of the Japanese Government to retain overage tonnage in the destroyer and submarine categories in view of the action of the British Government in invoking Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to retain excess destroyers, we felt obliged to insist on a strict application of Article 21. We could not very properly therefore agree to a loose interpretation of the 1930 Naval Treaty in considering with the British the matter of the cruisers. Hull 33 A marginal notation states that this telegram was approved by Admiral Standley and Mr. Norman Davis. 34 Latter not printed. 35 Not printed. 36 Neither printed; see telegram No. 114, September 10, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A3/1886a: Telegram [Document 133] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) Washington , November 5, 1936—4 p.m. 139. You are requested to present to the Japanese Government a memorandum stating that this Government has decided to exercise its right under Article 17 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to retain 19,000 tons of destroyers in view of the fact that on December 31, 1936, we will have only 75,900 tons of completed cruisers of sub-category ( b ), that is to say 67,600 less than the tonnage which is permitted under the terms of the 1930 Naval Treaty in this sub-category. Hull The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1842: Telegram [Document 134] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , November 21, 1936—noon. 413. Your 546, November 19, 9 p.m. 37 Referring to the intention of the British to retain five “C” class cruisers by recourse to Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, you are requested to hand to Craigie the following memorandum: “1. Reference is made to the draft note handed by Sir Robert Craigie to me on November 19, 1936, 37 for communication to my Government, which relates to the intention of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to retain five subcategory ( b ) cruisers of the “C” class, namely the Cardiff, Ceres, Caledon, Calypso , and Caradoc , by recourse to Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. 2. It is noted that the retention of these vessels will cause the tonnage for the cruiser category permitted the British commonwealth of Nations under the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to exceed the limit of 339,000 tons by 20,270 tons. 3. It is noted further that the retention of the four vessels of the Hawkins class is merged in the subcategory ( b ) tonnage allowed to the British Commonwealth of Nations under the London Naval Treaty, 1930, through the substitution of 6.1 inch guns for the existing 7.5 inch guns. 4. Finally it is noted that the British Government, in retaining the five “C” class vessels, undertakes that ( a ) these vessels shall be retained for a maximum of 5 years’ peace service and ( b ) they will be used not as cruisers but as anti-aircraft ships which will involve the substitution of a lighter armament than the existing 6 inch gun armament. 5. As was stated in this Government’s communication, dated October 28, 1936, 38 this Government does not question the right of the British Government to make the proposed increase in the cruiser category in excess of the tonnage specified in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, nor the right of the British Government to be the sole judge in determining whether its security has been affected to such an extent that the retention of this excess tonnage in the cruiser category becomes a necessity, on the condition that the British Government has recourse to Article 21 of the Treaty which is the only method provided by the Treaty for raising the tonnage limits of the Treaty.” We wish you to ascertain whether in fact Craigie has communicated a copy of the British draft note to the Japanese Ambassador. Upon receipt from you of information to the effect that he has done so we propose to present to the Japanese Embassy a copy of the above memorandum. 39 It seems to us that this is called for in view of the fact that the Japanese Embassy here has from time to time been obliged to request a clarification of our position in the conversations relating to the retention of tonnage in excess of the limits laid down in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, and has asked for assurances that we have maintained with the British in respect of the cruisers the strictly legal treaty position we have maintained with the Japanese in respect of the retention of excess destroyers and submarines. You may inform Craigie of the above. Moore 37 Not printed. 37 Not printed. 38 Telegram No. 385, 7 p.m., p. 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 132 ] . 39 The British draft note was given to the Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom on November 24; telegram No. 581, November 30, 10 a.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (500.A15A3/1845). The American memorandum was accordingly given to Mr. Yoshizawa, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in the United States, on November 30 (500.A15A3/1849). The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1852a: Telegram [Document 135] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , December 15, 1936—6 p.m. 448. 1. It is our understanding that Craigie is now negotiating with the Japanese for simultaneous recourse by the British and Japanese Governments to Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. We understand the British, if this negotiation succeeds, will retain five “C” class cruisers; the Japanese will retain excess cruisers, destroyers and submarines. 2. From the point of view of maintaining the retention of excess tonnage within strictly legal limits it is desirable that the British Government succeed in this negotiation. 3. At the same time, in order to arrange for the disposition of the 15,000 odd tons of submarines which we have reserved the right to keep in the event that the Japanese retain excess tonnage in the submarine category, we are most anxious to ascertain the present status of the negotiation. We wish you therefore to canvass the situation and report by telegraph on the most recent developments. 4. For your strictly confidential information, the Navy Department is seriously embarrassed to know what action it should take with regard to the 15,000 odd tons it is under contract to scrap before December 31, 1936, but which it is withholding from the contractors in view of the probability that the Japanese will retain excess submarine tonnage. Moore The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1854: Telegram [Document 136] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 16, 1936—8 p.m. [Received December 16—4:17 p.m.] 618. My 617, December 16, 6 p.m. 40 Foreign Office states this afternoon Japanese Ambassador orally informed them that Japanese Government is giving favorable consideration to the two proposals in question; (1), as regards “C” class cruisers, (2), Japanese Government to escalate to retain submarines. Yoshida explained this really meant complete acceptance but before formal Japanese reply can be made it must be passed by Cabinet. Craigie says First Lord 41 will make statement in Parliament tomorrow in this connection stating in substance that exchange of views has taken place with United States and Japan. United States has replied if Britain has recourse to escalator clause they have no objection and British Government has reason to believe Japanese Government’s reply will be favorable. Yoshida has agreed to above. Bingham 40 Not printed. 41 Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the British Admiralty. Memorandum by Messrs. William T. Turner and Eugene H. Dooman, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 500.A15A3/1857 [Document 137] Memorandum by Messrs. William T. Turner and Eugene H. Dooman, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] December 17, 1936. Mr. Kawahara 42 called at 12:30 p.m. and stated that the Embassy had received an urgent telegram from his Government instructing that the Department be informed as follows: In view of the suggestion by the American Government that the Japanese Government invoke Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and in view of the decision of the British Government to invoke Article 21 in connection with the conversion of four Hawkins class cruisers, the Japanese Government is prepared to invoke Article 21 in order to retain excess tonnage in submarine categories. The Japanese Government desires to make sure, before it makes formal notification to the American Government, whether the American Government has any objection to the following two points: (1) The Japanese Government is desirous of retaining excess tonnage in submarine categories for the reason that the requirements of national defense in the present international situation make it necessary to do so. (2) The Japanese Government perceives no reason to change or to withdraw the opinion concerning the retention of excess tonnage in submarine categories which has previously been communicated to the American Government. However, in view of the suggestion of the American Government that Article 21 be invoked and in view of the requirements of national defense, the Japanese Government is now prepared to invoke Article 21. At this point Mr. Dooman entered the room and Mr. Turner explained to him the object of Mr. Kawahara’s call. After consultation with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pell of WE, 43 Mr. Dooman handed Mr. Kawahara an informal statement drafted by Mr. Pell (copy attached). Mr. Dooman also stated that we appreciated the forthcoming action of the Japanese Government in invoking the escalator clause in respect of submarines and thus resolving in a manner satisfactory to all concerned the question of retention of overage submarines. [Annex] Informal Statement [ Washington ,] December 17, 1936. This Government does not question the right of the Japanese Government to make a proposed increase in the submarine category in excess of the tonnage specified in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, nor the right of the Japanese Government to be the sole judge in determining whether its security has been affected to such an extent that the retention of this excess tonnage in the submarine category becomes a necessity, on the condition that the Japanese Government has recourse to Article 21 of the Treaty which is the only method provided by the Treaty for raising the tonnage limits of the Treaty. 42 Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy. 43 Division of Western European Affairs. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1854: Telegram [Document 138] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , December 17, 1936—7 p.m. 450. Your 618, December 16, 8 p.m. The Japanese Embassy in Washington informed us today that the Japanese Cabinet would meet tomorrow to take action with regard to the excess submarines. The Embassy stated that the Japanese Government had not intended to have recourse to Article 21 but in view of the British decision to invoke this Article in order to retain cruisers it was prepared to follow suit, provided, however, that assurances were received from us that if Article 21 should be invoked this Government would not object to the retention by Japan of excess submarine tonnage. We replied orally that we did not question the right of the Japanese to make the proposed increase in the submarine category nor their right to be the sole judge in determining whether their security had been affected to such an extent that the retention of extra submarines had become a necessity, provided, however, that they had recourse to Article 21 which was the only method provided by the 1930 Treaty for raising the tonnage limits of the Treaty. Moore The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1859: Telegram [Document 139] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 24, 1936—11 a.m. [Received December 24—8:30 a.m.] 624. Supplementing statement of First Lord in Parliament on December 17 (see my 618, December 16, 8 p.m.) I received a Foreign Office note yesterday 44 which states the British Government consider the requirements of national security necessitates the retention of five “C” cruisers. “The retention of these vessels will cause the tonnage for the cruiser category permitted under the London Naval Treaty, 1930 (339,000 tons), to be exceeded by 20,270 tons, and His Majesty’s Government accordingly propose to have recourse to article 21 of that treaty in order to keep this excess tonnage” and concludes “I have the honor to add that His Majesty’s Government undertake that ( a ) vessels shall be retained for a maximum of 5 years’ peace service, and ( b ) they will be used not as cruisers but as antiaircraft ships, which will involve the substitution of a lighter armament for the existing 6-inch gun armament.” Bingham 44 The copy of the British note transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 2731, December 23 (not printed) was dated December 22. The Japanese Ambassador (Saito) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1861 [Document 140] The Japanese Ambassador ( Saito ) to the Secretary of State No. 284 Washington , December 28, 1936. Sir : I have the honor, under instructions from my Government, to communicate to you the following: The Government of Japan, perceiving that, in view of the present international situation, the requirements of the national security of Japan has made it necessary to retain 15,598 tons of submarines in excess of the maximum tonnage which is permitted in Article 16, Clause 1 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, has decided to invoke Article 21 of that Treaty to retain the excess tonnage above referred to. Accept [etc.] Hirosi Saito The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A3/1859: Telegram [Document 141] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , December 29, 1936—2 p.m. 458. Your 624, December 24, 11 a.m. You are requested to present the following note to the British Government: 1. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the receipt of the note, dated December 23, 1936, from His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, 45 stating that His Majesty’s Government considers that the requirements of national security necessitate the retention of five cruisers of sub-category ( b ) of the “C” class over and above the total tonnage which may be retained by the British Commonwealth of Nations on December 31, 1936, under the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. 2. This Government notes that the British Government undertakes that ( a ) the five vessels shall be retained for a maximum of 5 years’ peace service and ( b ) they will be used not as cruisers but as antiaircraft ships, which will involve the substitution of a lighter armament for the existing 6 inch gun armament. 3. In view of the decision of the British Government to invoke Article 21, this Government will exercise the right to increase by a proportionate amount its tonnage in the cruiser category over and above the total tonnage which is not to be exceeded in the cruiser category on December 31, 1936, under the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. For your strictly confidential information, we cannot, of course, immediately increase our cruiser tonnage but in the event that it is decided to build more cruisers the existence of our right to increase in this category must be on record before December 31, 1936, in order that the terms of the Vinson Bill 46 may be operative. Moore 45 See footnote 44, p. 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] . 46 Introduced by Carl Vinson, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, approved March 27, 1934; 48 Stat. 503. The Japanese Ambassador (Saito) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1864 [Document 142] The Japanese Ambassador ( Saito ) to the Secretary of State No. 291 Washington , December 29, 1936. Sir : I have the honor, under instructions from my Government, to communicate to you the following:— In response to the invocation of Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 by the British Government to retain five subcategory ( b ) cruisers, namely the Cardiff, Ceres, Caledon, Calypso and Caradoc , the Government of Japan has decided to retain the Tsushima (3,120 tons), one of the subcategory ( b ) cruisers which are, under the Treaty above referred to, to be disposed of before the end of this year. Accept [etc.] Hirosi Saito The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) 500.A15A3/1864: Telegram [Document 143] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) 47 Washington , December 30, 1936—2 p.m. 166. The Japanese Ambassador notified us on December 29 [ 28 ] of the formal invocation by His Government of Article 21 in order to retain 15,598 tons of excess submarines. We have replied by note 48 that we will exercise our right to retain a proportionate amount of tonnage in the submarine category and on December 31, 1936, will have 15,230 tons of excess submarines. Moore 47 The same to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as Department’s telegram No. 461. 48 Infra . The Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Saito) 500.A15A3/1861 [Document 144] The Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador ( Saito ) Washington , December 30, 1936. Excellency : The receipt is acknowledged of Your Excellency’s note, dated December 28, 1936, in which you state that the Government of Japan has decided to invoke Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, in order to retain 15,598 tons of submarines in excess of the maximum tonnage which is permitted in this category under the terms of Article 16, paragraph 1, of the London Naval Treaty, in order to meet the requirements of the national security of Japan. In view of the decision of the Government of Japan to invoke Article 21, this Government will exercise its right under this Article to retain a proportionate amount of tonnage in the submarine category. On December 31, 1936, this Government will have 15,230 tons of submarines in excess of the maximum tonnage which is permitted under the terms of Article 16, paragraph 1, of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. Accept [etc.] R. Walton Moore Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) 500.A15A3/1868 [Document 145] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Dunn ) [ Washington ,] December 30, 1936. I asked Mr. Victor Mallet, Counselor of the British Embassy, to come to the Department this afternoon at three o’clock. When he arrived, I gave him an oral communication as follows: The Government of the United States has noted that the Governments of Great Britain and Japan have found it necessary to invoke Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 for the purpose of retaining tonnage in excess of the limits laid down in that Treaty. While this Government recognizes the right of the signatories of the Treaty to invoke Article 21, we regret that it has been found necessary to provide for this increase in naval armament. 49 I explained to Mr. Mallet that the attitude expressed in this oral communication was the traditional attitude of this Government which is and has been continually in favor of a reduction and limitation in armaments. I called his attention in this connection to the statement contained in a letter from the President to Mr. Norman Davis, 50 which letter was read into the official record of the London Naval Conference of 1936, and recalled also to Mr. Mallet’s attention the speech of Mr. Norman Davis at the termination of that same Conference. 51 Both the President’s letter and Mr. Davis’ speech indicated that this Government did not desire that the limits of tonnage provided for in the Washington Treaty of 1922 52 and the London Treaty of 1930 be exceeded and furthermore that this Government would not take the initiative in exceeding those limits. Mr. Mallet stated that he understood thoroughly the position of this Government in that regard and realized that this was merely a restatement of policy which had been announced continually over a long period. James Clement Dunn 49 An identic statement was given by Mr. Dooman, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy at the Department of State, December 30. 50 Dated October 5, 1934; for text, see Department of State Conference Series No. 24: The London Naval Conference, 1935, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America, Text of the London Naval Treaty and Other Documents (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 52–53. 51 Ibid. , pp. 73–77. 52 Signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 247 . Signature of procès-verbal, November 6, 1936, relating to part IV (rules of submarine warfare), London Naval Treaty, signed April 22, 1930 Signature of procès-verbal, November 6, 1936, relating to part IV (rules of submarine warfare), London Naval Treaty, signed April 22, 1930 [146] The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 10, 1936—noon. [Received March 10—8:50 a.m.] 500.A15A5 Submarines/3: Telegram [147] The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, March 20, 1936. 500.A15A5 Submarines/5 [148] The Acting Secrtary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) Washington, March 20, 1936—8 p.m. 500.A15A5 Submarines/4: Telegram [149] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, March 28, 1936—3 p.m. 500.A15A5 Submarines/11: Telegram [150] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 15, 1936—2 p.m. [Received August 15—9:45 a.m.] 500.A15A5 Submarines/18: Telegram [151] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, October 6, 1936—2 p.m. [Received October 6—9:50 a.m.] 500.A15A5 Submarines/30½: Telegram [152] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, October 8, 1936—8 p.m. 500.A15A5 Submarines/24: Telegram [153] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, November 6, 1936—2 p.m. [Received November 6—11:25 a.m.] 500.A15A3/1838: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5 Submarines/3: Telegram [Document 146] The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] London , March 10, 1936—noon. [Received March 10—8:50 a.m.] 130. We have had some discussion with the British as to the best manner to deal with part IV of the London Treaty 1 with regard to submarines. In view of the fact that the British Commonwealth of Nations, Japan and the United States have committed themselves without limit of time to the provisions of part IV of this treaty the British have devised a plan for reconfirming this commitment on the part of those now bound by it and of getting the commitment of the other naval powers. They have accordingly submitted a draft for a procès-verbal 2 to be signed at this Conference by the nations now committed to part IV and to be submitted by the British Government to France, Italy and all the other powers. I have told the British that we have no objection to their circulating this with the understanding that we are free to offer amendments thereto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Davis 1 Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . 2 Not found in Department files; various revised drafts are not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 500.A15A5 Submarines/5 [Document 147] The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , March 20, 1936. My Dear Mr. President : You will recall that the so-called Part IV of the London Naval Treaty prescribed rules of submarine warfare, as follows: “Article 22 “The following are accepted as established rules of International Law: “(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject. “(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board. “The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the above rules.” You will further recall that under Article 23 of the London Treaty it was stated that, “The present Treaty shall remain in force until the 31st December, 1936, subject to the following exceptions: “(1) Part IV shall remain in force without limit of time. “(2) Etc.” In view of the fact that the French and the Italians never acceded to the London Naval Treaty, the acceptance of the rules as to submarine warfare, as laid down in Part IV of that Treaty, are now applicable only to the United States, Great Britain and Japan as parties to the Treaty. It has always been desired that these rules be subscribed to by other nations, in fact, all of the nations of the world, if possible. At the present naval conference at London, it has been decided that the best way to obtain general adherence to these rules would be to embody them in an instrument separate from the new treaty and endeavor to obtain adherence to this instrument by as many nations as possible. It has now been decided that the nations signatory to the new naval treaty shall in a procès-verbal separate from the treaty itself authorize the British Government to invite all other governments to adhere to a declaration embodying the rules of international law concerning submarine warfare to which the United States, Great Britain and Japan are now expressly committed under the London Naval Treaty of 1930. As there appears to be some question whether the full powers our delegates now have will authorize them to sign such a procès-verbal, I would suggest that you permit us specifically to authorize our delegates to sign a “procès-verbal designed to obtain further accessions to the rules of international law concerning submarine warfare to which the United States as well as the United Kingdom and Japan are now expressly committed under the London Naval Treaty of 1930.” We consider it highly desirable to obtain general express recognition of these important rules and I feel sure that you will agree that it would be most advisable for us to lend our cooperation to obtaining the adherence of other powers to these methods of warfare. 3 Faithfully yours, William Phillips 3 Marginal notation: “W[illiam] P[hillips] OK F[ranklin] B. R[oosevelt]”. The Acting Secrtary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) 500.A15A5 Submarines/4: Telegram [Document 148] The Acting Secrtary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( Davis ) Washington , March 20, 1936—8 p.m. 76. Your 143, March 19, 1 p.m. 4 The President authorizes the American delegates to the London Naval Conference, 1935, to sign a procès-verbal designed to obtain further accessions to the rules of international law concerning submarine warfare to which the United States as well as the United Kingdom and Japan are now expressly committed under the London Naval Treaty of 1930. 5 William Phillips 4 Not printed. 5 The Department was informed by telegram No. 165, March 25, 10 p.m., from Mr. Davis that the Japanese would not receive instructions in time for them to sign the procès-verbal before the following week (500.A15A5 Submarines/11). The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 500.A15A5 Submarines/11: Telegram [Document 149] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , March 28, 1936—3 p.m. 104. For the Ambassador or Atherton. Davis’ 165, March 25, 10 p.m. 6 In view of the departure of the American Delegates to the Naval Conference, you are hereby authorized to sign, at such time as may be determined, the procès-verbal designed to obtain further accessions to the rules of international law concerning submarine warfare to which the United States as well as the United Kingdom and Japan are now expressly committed under the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Hull 6 See footnote 5, above. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5 Submarines/18: Telegram [Document 150] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , August 15, 1936—2 p.m. [Received August 15—9:45 a.m.] 399. My despatch 2423, August 6. 4 The Foreign Office states that the French Government has now arranged to despatch its note in connection with the submarine protocol on the 15th of August to the diplomatic representatives in Paris of the agreements concerned. The date had been postponed from August 10 to August 15 at British suggestion to give the Italian Government further opportunity to express its views on text of the protocol and general procedure. The Italian Government not having replied, the British consider it impossible to press the French to defer any longer the despatch of their note. The Italian Foreign Office has, however, advised the British Embassy in Rome that it hopes shortly to deliver a favorable reply to the British representations in connection with the submarine protocol. Bingham 4 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A5 Submarines/30½: Telegram [Document 151] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , October 6, 1936—2 p.m. [Received October 6—9:50 a.m.] 462. My despatch No. 2526 September 22, 1936. 7 Foreign Office advises that His Majesty’s Embassy at Rome has been informed by the Italian Government that it proposes to ratify part IV of the London Naval Treaty 1930 early in October. The Foreign Office therefore desires to effect arrangements for early signature of the submarine protocol and has prepared the text of the procès-verbal which is in conformity with that previously transmitted to the Department. Am I authorized to sign and in that case when may I expect to receive my full power? Bingham 7 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.A15A5 Submarines/24: Telegram [Document 152] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , October 8, 1936—8 p.m. 367. Your 462, October 6, 2 p.m. You are authorized to sign the procès-verbal designed to obtain further accessions to the rules of international law concerning submarine warfare. Full Power has been signed by the President and is being mailed by pouch today. Should it be desired to sign the procès-verbal before the receipt of the Full Power, it is hoped that the present telegram will be considered sufficient evidence of your authority to sign that instrument. Carr The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1838: Telegram [Document 153] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , November 6, 1936—2 p.m. [Received November 6—11:25 a.m.] 515. Department’s instruction 1454, October 8. 8 I signed submarine procès-verbal at the F[oreign] O[ffice] at noon today. Bingham [Text of the procès-verbal signed at London, November 6, 1936, is printed in Department of State, Treaty Information , Bulletin No. 86, November 30, 1936, page 35, and in British Cmd. 5302; see also statement issued by the Department of State, September 30, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1930, volume I, page 130 .] 8 Not printed; see Department’s telegram No. 367, October 8, 8 p.m., supra . Views of the Department of State with respect to neutrality legislation Views of the Department of State with respect to neutrality legislation 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 316 ff. [154] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) Washington, December 28, 1935—4 p.m. 811.04418/93a: Telegram [155] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, December 31, 1935—noon. [Received December 31—10:05 a.m.] 811.04418/94: Telegram [156] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, January 2, 1936—11 a.m. [Received January 2—11 a.m.] 811.04418/96: Telegram [157] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, January 2, 1936—1 p.m. [Received January 2—10:10 a.m.] 811.04418/95: Telegram [158] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, January 2, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 7:25 p.m.] 811.04418/97: Telegram [159] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Bern, January 3, 1936—1 p.m. [Received 5:30 p.m.] 811.04418/99: Telegram [160] Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (Green) [Washington,] January 9, 1936. 811.04418/119 [161] The Secretary of War (Dern) to the Secretary of State Washington, January 22, 1936. 811.04418/120 [162] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) Washington, February 1, 1936—3 p.m. 500.A15A3/1766a: Telegram [163] The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 4, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 4—4:25 p.m.] 500.A15A3/1767: Telegram [164] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Dern) Washington, February 28, 1936. 811.04418/120 [165] Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (Green) [Washington,] December 15, 1936. 740.00111 Armament Control/1141 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 811.04418/93a: Telegram [Document 154] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) Washington , December 28, 1935—4 p.m. 507. From time to time suggestions have been made by persons in responsible positions, including members of Congress, with respect to permanent neutrality legislation. Among such suggestions are the following: 1. Embargo on all export trade to belligerents. 2. Embargo on the export of all war materials such as oil, steel, iron and copper. 3. Embargo on all articles in the last mentioned category in excess of the normal volume of shipments. Any comment you may possibly care to make regarding the desirability or effect of the enactment of any of these three proposals would be welcomed. Please send copy to Embassies at London, Rome and Berlin and Legation at Bern. Carr The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 811.04418/94: Telegram [Document 155] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , December 31, 1935—noon. [Received December 31—10:05 a.m.] 257. Your 507, December 28 to the American Embassy, Paris, just received. I seriously question the desirability of any permanent detailed neutrality legislation in the sense of “mandatory” legislation. The effort to maintain our independent position and for this purpose to try to prevent another world war in which we might well become involved, requires, in my opinion, that the President and the State Department have the authority and freedom to act with respect to neutrality as the uncertain and dangerous situation in Europe may demand. In other words, I believe the Executive should have as complete a discretion as possible to deal with each set of circumstances as may arise. What may be desirable for the maintenance of our independent position at one moment may be positively dangerous for this purpose in a different set of circumstances. Dodd The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 811.04418/96: Telegram [Document 156] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , January 2, 1936—11 a.m. [Received January 2—11 a.m.] 1. Department’s telegram 507, December 28, 4 p.m., to Paris. I am strongly inclined to support the third proposal—to allow a belligerent to buy any materials in “normal volume”. To deny him during the course of hostilities the right to buy would be unneutral. To allow him to buy in unlimited quantity might be unneutral toward his opponent. To limit purchases to ordinary quantity is substantial compliance with treaty obligations and is consonant with neutrality. I think strict adherence to a policy of neutrality is the surest way to keep out of a European war provided it be coupled with its concomitants, embargo on implements of war, warning of belligerent ships and belligerents to purchase and carry at their own risk. Other factors of the utmost importance are that this policy would bring the least disturbance to American foreign trade and American business and would minimize the danger of excessive war profits. In my opinion, the policy of “normal volume” is far preferable to placing an embargo on the raw materials mentioned in proposal number 2. The latter would not only be (1) inconsistent with the idea of neutrality but, (2) would be practically unnecessary if the “normal volume” policy is adopted for the reason that no government can carry on a war very long on the surplus of those war materials it would buy in ordinary years of peaceful commerce. (3) Furthermore such an embargo would not only be very disturbing to American foreign trade during its life but might antagonize a belligerent and educate him to find materials in another country with a lasting adverse effect on American business. (4) One other reason is that the reciprocity of such a policy might have a harmful effect on the United States in some future war in which we might be a belligerent. While we have many raw materials the world war demonstrated that we lacked certain prime materials which we had to import, among them being nitrates, platinum, rubber and certain vegetable oils necessary for explosives. In that respect our situation is about the same today and I feel we ought not adopt a policy against others we could not respect if leveled against us by neutrals in some future war. To adopt this policy might invite reciprocal action—to our damage. (5) This policy would be particularly difficult to pursue without involving us to some extent in a war or in the rancorous atmosphere accompanying war if its promulgation depended upon the exercise of executive discretion rather than on mandatory law. ( a ) This is so for the reason that if the discretion were exercised the belligerent would necessarily feel he was being discriminated against and punished at executive will and the American Government would be considered to have taken sides against a belligerent. This will always be so in greater or less degree even if not to the marked extent which now exists because of the differences in status and equipment between the two countries presently at war. The effect of the use of discretion would be that we would align ourselves more favorably with one side and would be liable to be drawn into the circle of opposition to the other side and become a partisan to the same extent we had become a factor. ( b ) Furthermore, discretion would be a continuing power and if invoked during the course of hostilities would lay us open to the allegation that we had changed our status during the belligerency. It would operate to the disadvantage of one belligerent and ipso facto complicate our neutral status with the concurrent danger of bringing us into the conflict, ( c ) At the same time, the existence of that unexercised power would complicate the internal political situation by causing various groups to advocate and/or oppose its use during the course of a war. But I am opposed to the embargo on specified war materials policy whether it be imposed as a mandatory measure or by discrimination on four principal grounds: Because it is, (1) inconsistent with neutrality; (2) quite unnecessary if you adopt a “normal volume” policy; (3) seriously disruptive to American trade and industry and; (4) possibly dangerous to the United States in some future war. Again I prefer the “normal volume” policy to the first you mention, i. e., embargo all exports to belligerents. This last policy is open to most of the objections noted above in respect to an embargo on certain materials with special emphasis on the very great damage it would do to American trade and industry. Furthermore, it would be regarded as unneutral if instituted during the course of any hostilities and could only be justified if established in times of peace as a development of the law of neutrality with a view to discouraging war in general. In any event, we would be cutting off our nose to save our face and would suffer irreparable damage. We would be more sufferers than a defeated belligerent—and I understand our purpose to be to do the best we can to help America not only to be protected from the hardships of war but to preserve and increase our substantial internal development. This is all predicated on the belief that it is our general policy to try to prevent the outbreak of hostilities—but once they break out we are to keep out. Any policy will be for universal application and yet will lack something in universality if it is warped by being molded for any particular situation. For that reason I hope the details of the present difficulty will not be the object at which it is directed. Any general policy, I submit, ought to be broad enough to insure our non-entanglement in a European war and should contemplate the Monroe Doctrine and our freedom of action in Latin America under that Doctrine. The effect of the three measures if applied to the present situation would be: Total embargo—disastrous to American trade with Italy as of the present and in the future and provocative of an European war. Embargo on deemed to be war materials—the same. Normal volume—possibly sufficient to encourage the general emplacement of an oil embargo against Italy but probably not sufficient to ensure it; probably acceptable to Italy as consistent with our neutrality, probably not provocative of an European war. Not repeated anywhere. Long The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 811.04418/95: Telegram [Document 157] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , January 2, 1936—1 p.m. [Received January 2—10:10 a.m.] 2. In my conversations with you and the President last summer I had occasion to express so fully and frankly my views it would seem to serve no useful purpose to go over the ground suggested by Department’s 507, December 28, 4 p.m. at this late date. I am no less strongly convinced today than at that time that it would be dangerous if the President were not given latitude (1st) in specifying, under any fresh neutrality legislation, what commodities should be embargoed, and (2d) the party or parties to whom the embargo should apply as an aggressor. Aside from the impossibility of gauging conditions in any future conflict it would be folly to consider putting ourselves in such a position as, for example, in a war between Canada and Japan, to be compelled by legislation to penalize our safety through treating both belligerents drastically and equally. American legislation is being watched very carefully in this country particularly from the point of view of the President’s power to name an aggressor because it is realized that in any future European war America remains a vital source of supply for British needs. If the type of legislation enacted is such as to make clear that irrespective of the origin of the future conflict supplies from the United States will not be available, then a policy of national self-sufficiency preparation must be envisaged in order to render this country as independent as possible of the United States. Such a development, which would extend economic nationalism in this country, would tend to have a similar result in other foreign markets. Bingham The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 811.04418/97: Telegram [Document 158] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Paris , January 2, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 7:25 p.m. 2 ] 3. Department’s 507, December 28, 4 p.m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I interpret our policy as outlined by the President and the Secretary of State to be that of remaining out of controversy and retaining as neutral a position as possible and certainly avoiding any action that might drag us into hostilities. Therefore, it is my personal judgment that our legislation should be framed in most general terms, expressing unwillingness to make any sales to belligerents based on credits. By implication we might permit or at any event not prohibit sales for cash to any nation that sends ships to our ports, makes purchases for cash, and carries these purchases, irrespective of purpose or destination, in its own or foreign chartered bottoms. In view of the divergence of views on this subject among my secretaries now on duty, whom I have consulted, I summarize their opinions as follows. Cochran 3 thinks it highly desirable to limit permanent neutrality legislation to the lines of the temporary legislation which was passed 4 before the present state of conflict between Italy and Ethiopia was recognized. 5 To avoid necessity of administrative interpretation, he recommends an added provision that arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be the only articles the export whereof to belligerents shall be prohibited or curtailed. For us to change legislation during the conflict in such manner as to embarrass or to in fact discriminate against the belligerent, designated by the League as the aggressor, would seem to Cochran to involve us in the controversy as much as would actual participation in the League. Instead of merely cooperating as a League member, we would really be taking the lead for which the most powerful League nation is too apparently waiting. Some of the League nations may desire to see us act positively, but Cochran’s impression is that France will probably be by no means the only one of them desirous that the League should serve as an instrument for conciliation rather than coercion, and that they would be happier to see us maintain the strict position of neutrality called for by the letter of existing law rather than set the precedent of a raw material embargo in the present tense situation. From the practical standpoint no matter how far we go in restricting trade with belligerents, there always remain other factors which might so involve us that we could not escape war. In the present instance it is still entirely doubtful whether sanctions including petroleum and the other war materials mentioned would be effective in stopping the war in Africa. There is, on the other hand, the possibility that extreme sanctions plus a complete embargo on petroleum, et cetera by non-League states might extend the war area. If the number of belligerents should increase, it is to be presumed that our neutrality laws or regulations would of necessity be made applicable to all. By partially waiving claims to freedom of the seas and by other provisions of our present neutrality legislation, Cochran thinks we are already far in advance of the antiwar legislation of any individual nation. Since our legislation is still so recent, he asks would it not be preferable to continue it in its present form with the one additional clarification above mentioned until its virtues and defects can better be judged rather than experiment with new policy which would surely augment the Government’s international political worries and diminish our foreign trade? This would give respite for League of Nations to demonstrate independently their sincerity and unity and opportunity for further steps of conciliation. Clark 6 agrees with Cochran’s reasoning but not his recommendation. Clark thinks the purpose of our Government would best be served by making permanent the present legislation with the following modifications: (1) making it mandatory upon the President to prohibit the exportation to such belligerent of any article whatsoever in excess of the quantity exported to that belligerent during some characteristic period, (2) prohibiting any sales to a belligerent for other than cash, and (3) prohibiting the flotation within the United States of the bonds or other securities of a belligerent during the continuance of hostilities. It might also be announced that all trade with a belligerent would be at the risk of the merchant. Williamson 7 feels that a clear distinction must be drawn in any regulations adopted according to whether the purpose in which they are conceived is merely to minimize the possibility of the United States being drawn into war or is, in addition, to exert pressure on the belligerents to come to peace. If the first premise is that in mind, the measures adopted should impose as little hardship as possible on American commerce and the embargo on sales of American goods should be limited to those categories already defined as war materials. However, authorization might be given to the President in his discretion to extend said list to include such indirect war materials as oil, steel, et cetera, exports thereof to be regulated in accordance with the quota provision foreseen in the Department’s paragraph 3, an opportunity thus being afforded for the Chief Executive to assure himself that we are not quixotically the only nation to sacrifice our trade, since in a future war the other governments may not resort to strict embargoes. On the other hand, if the premise is that our neutrality regulations should likewise be employed to exert pressure on belligerents, Williamson feels that a total embargo on the imports from warring nations would be more efficacious and less costly than extending the embargo to further commodities of our own export trade. English 8 believes that some modification of the present temporary neutrality legislation is probably desirable but that the scope of these modifications should not extend greatly beyond the present limits. English feels that the likelihood of the United States becoming involved in war is not dependent entirely upon trade relations, financial relations, or shipping incidents; that there are other and potent forces which under given circumstances might inflame the American people and precipitate conflict. The present neutrality legislation would appear to go a long way to eliminate the likelihood of war from the causes dealt with and to some extent, but this is probably limited, may be helpful in preventing the spread of the present conflict. The new legislation might well be drafted with a view to smoothing out a few deficiencies which may have become apparent in the brief time this legislation has been in effect, the general spirit of and the scope of the present legislation appearing to be adequate. Straus 2 Telegram in seven sections. 3 H. Merle Cochran, First Secretary of Embassy in France. 4 Joint Resolution approved August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081. 5 Proclamation No. 2141, October 5, 1935, by the President; Department of State, Press Releases , October 5, 1935, p. 251. 6 Lewis Clark, Second Secretary of Embassy in France. 7 Harold L. Williamson, Second Secretary of Embassy in France. 8 Robert English, Third Secretary of Embassy in France. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 811.04418/99: Telegram [Document 159] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Bern , January 3, 1936—1 p.m. [Received 5:30 p.m.] 362. Your 507, December 28, 4 p.m. to Paris. My thoughts expressed in general fashion are set forth in the two drafts enclosed in my letter of November 29 to Dunn. 9 To summarize, I feel strongly that any legislation beyond that affecting arms and implements of war should be subject to the discretionary power of the President. Finite minds cannot conceive all possible developments and/or provide a wise course in advance. Only a measure of suppleness and wisdom on the part of the Executive can guide and interpret public opinion and prevent an explosion that rigidity of law might bring about. More specifically: Point 1. An embargo on all export trade to belligerents would cause undue suffering on the part of our people and if the present conflict were extended might cause a diminution of international trade which would bring about an internal economic crisis and arouse widespread discontent among our people. This danger is peculiarly evident when we contemplate the possibility of 50 odd states of the League involved in hostilities arising out of the application of sanctions with one aggressor. Further, I feel that our economic needs parallel the path of political wisdom and that we should not take a step which, if the conflict were extended, would risk the alienation of our friendly relations with those states with whom we would be unable to maintain such relations. Point 2. What I have set forth in respect to point 1 is applicable, though in lesser degree, to point 2. Respecting point 3, under two conditions I believe the establishment of such legislation would be distinctly helpful. The conditions are ( a ) that it should be discretionary on the part of the President and ( b ) that your studies have shown that such legislation is practicable from an administrative point of view. Although I feel that there is something shocking to the public conscience in making abnormal profits out of war, I see no reason why the existence of a war should necessarily cause losses to American business men. Swollen profits would bring about swollen credits and an inflation of which experience has shown us the danger. The continuance of normal business would not, with few exceptions. The states of the League that undertake sanctions do so under their obligations of the Covenant. We are under no such obligations to suffer losses. Our sole objects are to remain neutral to avoid entanglement and independently to formulate a new method of neutrality consonant with present conditions. I am impressed by a political reason for preventing increases in trade in war key products beyond the normal flow. If we do not do so the states applying sanctions may feel driven to establishing a blockade. In this event they will hold us responsible if bloodshed follows. Certain additional provisions might be advisable if at the discretion of the President: ( a ) An authorization to enlarge the category of “key products” to be held down to normal quantities; ( b ) a prohibition on loans and credits to belligerents; ( c ) a warning that travel on belligerent ships and trade with belligerents is at the risk of the individual. Such provisions would be helpful both in minimizing the danger of our being involved in some form and preventing an abnormal situation of production which would risk a second financial crash. Cipher text to London, Paris, Rome, Berlin. Wilson 9 James C. Dunn, Chief, Division of Western European Affairs; letter not found in Department files. Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (Green) 811.04418/119 [Document 160] Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control ( Green ) [ Washington ,] January 9, 1936. Marquis Rossi Longhi, Counselor of the Italian Embassy, called at my office yesteday. He said that he had come under instructions from his Ambassador to obtain information as to the proper interpretation of the provisions in regard to passports contained in the Pittman-McReynolds and the Nye-Clark Neutrality Bills. He handed me the attached sheet 10 setting forth the questions on which the Ambassador desired enlightenment. Rossi Longhi said that this was a matter of great practical interest to the Italian Government. He said that apparently the effect of the provision of the Nye-Clark Bill if it were enacted would be to expose any American citizen who travelled on an Italian vessel to prosecution and, upon conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both. This, he assumed, would effectively prevent American citizens from travelling on Italian vessels. I replied that I concurred in his interpretation of the language in question and that the effect of the enactment of such a provision would undoubtedly be to keep American citizens from travelling on Italian vessels, if Italy were still at war upon the passage of the bill. Rossi Longhi said that a large Italian liner was due to arrive in New York early in March to begin a cruise of the West Indies. He said that the liner was pretty well booked up with American citizens and that the proposed voyage would have to be cancelled if such a provision were enacted into law. I told Rossi Longhi that I felt that I should consult other officers of the Department before attempting to answer his questions in regard to the provision concerning passports in the Pittman-McReynolds Bill. Rossi Longhi arranged to call on me again today. In the meantime I consulted Judge Moore 11 and Mr. Hackworth 12 and when Rossi Longhi called, I told him that the effect of the language in the Pittman-McReynolds Bill was merely to re-enforce the “own risk” clause which preceded it, and that a citizen carrying a passport which was not valid for travel on a belligerent vessel would not while a passenger on such a vessel be entitled to the protection to which a valid passport would entitle him. Rossi Longhi remarked that although the provision carried no definite penalty, it would probably act as a deterrent to such an extent as to keep American citizens from travelling on belligerent vessels. Before leaving Rossi Longhi set forth at some length his opinion that the application of any restrictions upon travel by American citizens on Italian vessels in the present circumstances was both illogical and unjust. Joseph C. Green 10 Not printed. 11 R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the Department of State. 12 Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser. The Secretary of War (Dern) to the Secretary of State 811.04418/120 [Document 161] The Secretary of War ( Dern ) to the Secretary of State Washington , January 22, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The Governor of The Panama Canal has called my attention to the neutrality bills pending before Congress (S. 3474, S. 3478, H. J. Res. 422 and H. R. 9482), all of which by the definition of the term “United States” extend all of their provisions to the Canal Zone. The status of the Canal Zone as a Government reservation in which no manufacturing operations can be carried on except those carried on by the United States, or its adjunct, the Panama Railroad Company, and in which no business operations are permitted and no person is permitted to reside, except as such business operations and such person have a direct connection with Panama Canal operations, makes it unnecessary to extend thereto all the provisions of the neutrality bills. No arms and ammunition, etc., could be imported into the Canal Zone except for the use of the United States and therefore none could be exported therefrom. Similarly, the status of the Panama Canal as an international highway to be operated in conformity with the provisions of existing treaties seems to make it inadvisable to enact legislation under which some of the provisions of the above-numbered bills in regard to clearing of vessels from United States ports and making exportations might be construed as being applicable to the Canal Zone. It is suggested that the words “Canal Zone” be stricken from the provision defining the term “United States” in the pending bills and that a clause be added to the definition reading “excluding the Canal Zone” so that no question may arise as to whether the Canal Zone is included within the term “possession” of the United States. It seems questionable whether we should exercise at the Panama Canal any police jurisdiction over vessels transiting the Canal other than such as may be necessary to protect the interests of the United States. The status of the Canal Zone is such that general neutrality provisions which are applicable to conditions existing in the United States do not meet the requirements at the Canal Zone. It would seem that, if additional provisions in regard to neutralizing the Panama Canal are required, they should be included in a separate bill, or under a separate title, or in different sections of the pending legislation and made applicable to the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone only. As it is understood from Mr. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of your Department, that this legislation is now being given detailed consideration by committees of Congress, no attempt is made in this letter to outline all the considerations which would seem to justify special consideration of provisions relating to the Panama Canal and Canal Zone. Governor Schley of The Panama Canal is now in Washington and will be available to discuss more fully the questions involved. Sincerely yours, Geo . H. Dern The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) 500.A15A3/1766a: Telegram [Document 162] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference 13 ( Davis ) Washington , February 1, 1936—3 p.m. 32. During the discussions of the neutrality bill there have been at various times proposals to incorporate in the bill a prohibition of the use of American ports to armed merchant vessels during a war. The bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28 contains no reference to armed merchant vessels. Several prominent international lawyers have brought forward the suggested prohibition from time to time and it is very possible that the suggestion will be made before the Senate Committee, whose hearings have not yet terminated. It is the view of the Department that this is a matter which should properly be treated rather in an international convention than by inclusion in our domestic law. As the discussion of part IV of the London Naval Treaty 14 is expected to receive the consideration of an international conference either during or after the meetings of the present London Naval Conference, it has occurred to us that the question of armed merchant vessels might appropriately be considered at the conference on part IV of the 1930 treaty. We would like your personal comment on this possibility only for our own consideration. Hull 13 Held December 9, 1935–March 25, 1936; see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff. 14 Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , p. 107 . For correspondence concerning the signature of a procès-verbal relating to part IV of the treaty, see ante , pp. 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] ff. The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (Davis) to the Secretary of State 500.A15A3/1767: Telegram [Document 163] The Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State London , February 4, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 4—4:25 p.m.] 84. Your 32, February 1, 3 p.m. The question of armed merchant vessels has so many ramifications and brings up so many issues that it is almost impossible to give you a matured opinion at short notice. The following comments are therefore tentative and by no means exhaustive. I agree that it would be more practicable and effective to deal with the question of armed merchant vessels by international convention than by domestic legislation but doubt whether the prohibition of the use of neutral ports by armed vessels affords a feasible approach or solution. As the use of neutral ports by armed merchantmen is a matter which involves all seacoast states, it is a question that would have to be dealt with by all such states rather than by the naval powers alone. The only possible method of approach as I see it between the naval powers would be an agreement prohibiting the arming of merchant vessels as a corollary to part IV of the London Treaty. Inasmuch as an effective closing of neutral ports to armed vessels by international accord would be tantamount in any case to a prohibition upon the arming of merchant vessels, I do not see that an agreement for the latter would be essentially more difficult to achieve than the former. In fact it might be easier because it would involve only the states possessing merchant marines and would not raise the whole question of the rights and duties of neutrals. The members of the League of Nations certainly would not concur in our conception or definition of neutrality. It is doubtful in fact whether any conception of neutrality can now be discussed without raising the issue of differing types of war, its effect on the interests of various nations and the special status of League powers as regards neutrality. Moreover, since the prohibition of the arming of merchant vessels in time of war would deal with questions directly related to naval powers and naval armament it could more logically and easily be brought up in the course of the Naval Conference. A new rule of international law prohibiting the arming of merchantmen could, however, become effective only on certain fundamental conditions. 1. That all powers possessing: submarines should adhere to the provisions of part IV of the London Treaty. 2. That the laws of war relating to air attack should be so altered by universal agreement as to prohibit all air attack on merchant vessels. 3. That the prohibition of the arming of merchant vessels should cease to operate if and when any state should violate the prohibition of submarine or air attack. With respect to 2 above the new factor of air attack upon merchant vessels is one which may entirely change the primary reasoning for arming of merchant vessels and require a complete revision of the earlier concepts of international law relating to attack upon merchant vessels. It seems very doubtful whether any agreement relating to merchant vessels can be concluded without dealing with the laws of war covering bombardment from the air. I think it most unlikely that any power would agree to forego the possibility of antiaircraft defense on merchant ships when, for example, air attack constitutes such an effective retaliation against blockade. In my opinion it will in any case be exceedingly difficult to get all the maritime states to abandon what has in the course of time come to be considered as an immemorial and inherent right of merchantmen to arm themselves for self-defense. I fear in particular that the British reaction to any such proposal would be unfavorable although if we were to suggest to them the conclusion of an agreement to prohibit the bombarding of merchant ships from the air as a prerequisite to an agreement to prohibit the arming of merchant vessels it might induce them to consider favorably acceptance of the latter proposal. If you wish me to do so I might informally sound the British out as to the general idea of a revision of the laws of war along the lines of a simultaneous and concurrent protest against submarine and air attack on merchant vessels and of the arming of merchant vessels. Davis The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Dern) 811.04418/120 [Document 164] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Dern ) Washington , February 28, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I am in receipt of your letter of January 22, 1936, in which you suggest that the Canal Zone be eliminated from the definition of the term “United States” contained in S. 3474, S. 3478, H. J. Res. 422 and H. R. 9482. This Department has been interested only in S. 3474 and H. J. Res. 422, the Pittman and McReynolds bills, respectively. It is understood, however, that there is no likelihood that any of these bills will be given further consideration during the present session of Congress. H. J. Res. 491, extending until May 1, 1937, Section 1 of the Joint Resolution (Public Resolution No. 67, 74th Congress), approved August 31, 1935, and making certain other amendments, has recently been passed by Congress and is now awaiting approval by the President. 15 This Resolution does not contain a definition of the term “United States” and would not seem to present any possible complication insofar as the Canal Zone is concerned. While Section 2 of the Resolution of 1935 contains, in paragraph ( b ), a definition of the term “United States” and includes in the definition the Canal Zone, I do not understand that you have any objections to the definition for the purposes of that Resolution. In any event that section is unaffected by Resolution 491. Should steps later be taken to enact additional legislation on the subject of neutrality (it is not likely that any will be taken during the present session of Congress), the Department will be glad to bear in mind your observations with respect to the Canal Zone. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 15 Approved February 29, 1936; 49 Stat. 1152. Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (Green) 740.00111 Armament Control/1141 [Document 165] Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control ( Green ) [ Washington ,] December 15, 1936. The Turkish Ambassador called at my office by appointment this afternoon. He told me that his Government was on the point of entering into a contract with the Glenn L. Martin Company to purchase 20 bombers of the type 139 W to be delivered next summer. He said that the Company had assured him that this Government had no objection, on the ground of military secrecy, to the exportation of planes of that type, but that he would appreciate receiving confirmation of that statement from me before the contract was closed. I told the Ambassador that the plane known as 139 W was essentially the same as that known as B–10–B; that these planes could be freely exported provided that the armament and other special items of equipment did not involve military secrets of interest to the National Defense; and that I did not suppose that the Glenn L. Martin Company would contract to sell the planes with armament and equipment which had not been released for export. The Ambassador was unable to give me any definite information in regard to the types of bomb racks and machine guns which are to be installed in the planes which his Government proposes to purchase. The Ambassador asked whether he was correct in his understanding that the recent decisions of the President, in regard to restrictions on the exportation of military secrets, did not involve any more stringent restrictions on exports than those which were already in effect. I replied that his understanding was correct. The Ambassador said that the provisions of Section 1 of the Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, as amended by the Neutrality Act of February 29, 1936, caused him considerable anxiety. He said that his Government would be required to make a substantial down payment at the time the contract was signed and, therefore, stood to lose a great deal of money if it were to become a belligerent before the planes were delivered and delivery was prevented by an embargo. He asked whether exceptions could not be made in favor of deliveries pursuant to contracts already entered into. I told the Ambassador that no such exceptions were possible under the law. The Ambassador asked whether I could give him any information as to what new neutrality legislation might be enacted at the forthcoming session of Congress. I replied in the negative. Joseph C. Green Analyses and reports by American diplomatic missions regarding European political developments affecting the preservation of peace Analyses and reports by American diplomatic missions regarding European political developments affecting the preservation of peace 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 170 ff. See also Royal Institute of international Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1936 (London, Oxford University Press, 1937); Documents on International Affairs, 1936 (London, Oxford University Press, 1937); British Cmd. 5175, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936): Correspondence with the German Government regarding the German Proposals for an European Settlement, March 24–May 6, 1936; Cmd. 5149, Miscellaneous No. 4 (1936): Correspondence with the Belgian and French Ambassadors, … London, April 1, 1936; and Cmd. 5118, Germany No. 1 (1936): Memorandum by the German Government respecting the Franco-Soviet Treaty, the Treaty of Locarno and the Demilitarized Zone in the Rhineland, Communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador on March 7, 1936. German reoccupation of the Rhineland; efforts among the Locarno Powers to establish a new accord; Austro-German Agreement of July 11; Belgian neutrality policy; decline of the Little Entente; loss of prestige of the League of Nations; remilitarization of European states [166] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, January 3, 1936—9 a.m. [Received 9:55 a.m.] 751.62/333: Telegram [167] The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State Prague, January 19, 1936. [Received February 6.] 760F.63/68 [168] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Bern, January 27, 1936. 740.00/41½ [169] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, February 6, 1936—11 a.m. [Received 12:27 p.m.] 862.20/1102: Telegram [170] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, February 8, 1936. [Received February 18.] 862.20/1107 [171] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, February 12, 1936—4 p.m. [Received February 12—12:46 p.m.] 751.62/342: Telegram [172] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, February 13, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 13—6:40 p.m.] 862.20/1106: Telegram [173] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, February 15, 1936—6 p.m. [Received February 15—4:20 p.m.] 751.6111/115: Telegram [174] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Moscow, February 17, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 17—5:30 p.m.] 711.61/594: Telegram [175] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 21, 1936. [Received March 3.] 751.62/344 [176] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, February 22, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 24—11:10 a.m.] 762.65/172: Telegram [177] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 7, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 7—11:45 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/364: Telegram [178] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) Washington, March 7, 1936—3 p.m. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/394a: Telegram [179] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 7, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 5:49 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/369: Telegram [180] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, March 7, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 7—7:30 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/371: Telegram [181] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Moscow, March 7, 1936—midnight. [Received March 8—9:55 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/373: Telegram [182] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 8, 1936—noon. [Received March 8—11:55 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/370: Telegram [183] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, [March 8, 1936]. [Received March 8—5:21 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/375: Telegram [184] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 8, 1936—7 p.m. [Received 10:15 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/377: Telegram [185] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, March 9, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/395a [186] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 9, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 9—3:25 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/390: Telegram [187] The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State Vera Cruz, March 9, 1936—11 p.m. [Received March 10—11:20 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/394: Telegram [188] Memorandum by the Minister in Austria (Messersmith) Vienna, March 9, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/512 [189] Memorandum by the American Minister in Rumania (Harrison) of a Conversation With the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Titulescu), March 9, 1936 March 9, 1936 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/549 [190] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) Washington, March 10, 1936—noon. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/377: Telegram [191] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 10, 1936—noon. [Received March 10—9:50 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/393: Telegram [192] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 10, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 10—12:35 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/400: Telegram [193] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 11, 1936—9 a.m. [Received March 12—11:50 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/419: Telegram (part air) [194] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 11, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 11—9:25 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/460: Telegram [195] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 11, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 11—12:40 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/409: Telegram [196] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 11, 1936—2 p.m. [Received March 11—11:45 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/407: Telegram [197] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 11, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 11—1:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/410: Telegram [198] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 12, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 12—3:50 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/422: Telegram [199] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) Washington, March 12, 1936—5 p.m. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/394: Telegram [200] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 12, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 12—7:45 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/425: Telegram [201] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 12, 1936—10 p.m. [Received March 12—6:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/424: Telegram [202] The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State Warsaw, March 12, 1936. [Received March 26.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/520 [203] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 13, 1936—2 p.m. [Received March 13—12:13 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/427: Telegram [204] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 13, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 13—1:40 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/429: Telegram [205] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 13, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 13—2:55 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/431: Telegram [206] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, March 13, 1936—7 p.m. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/431: Telegram [207] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 14, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/480 [208] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 14, 1936—11 a.m. [Received March 14—10:35 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/442: Telegram [209] The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State Praha, March 14, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 4:50 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/448: Telegram [210] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, March 14, 1936. [Received March 26.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/509 [211] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 16, 1936—noon. [Received 2:25 p.m.] 862.00/3579: Telegram [212] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 16, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 16—5:45 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/457: Telegram [213] The Minister in Yugoslavia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Belgrade, March 17, 1936—10 a.m. [Received 11:30 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/460: Telegram [214] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 17, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 17—4:27 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/465: Telegram [215] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, March 17, 1936. [Received April 7.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/576 [216] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, March 18, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 18—12:47 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/471: Telegram [217] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 18, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 18—6:50 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/475: Telegram [218] Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) [Bern,] March 18, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/590 [219] Report by the Military Attaché in Germany (Smith) Berlin, March 20, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/654 [220] The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State The Hague, March 20, 1936. [Received April 2.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/559 [221] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, March 20, 1936—noon. [Received March 20—10:35 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/485: Telegram [222] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) Washington, March 21, 1936—1 p.m. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/471: Telegram [223] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 21, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 21—11:15 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/495: Telegram [224] Memorandum by the Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) [Brussels,] March 23, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/561 [225] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, March 23, 1936—4 p.m. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/496a: Telegram [226] Memorandum by the Chargé in Lithuania (Kuykendall) Kaunas, March 24, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/603 [227] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 25, 1936—noon. [Received March 25—11:50 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/501: Telegram [228] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 26, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 26—3:10 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/516: Telegram [229] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 28, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 28—10:55 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/537: Telegram [230] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 28, 1936. [Received April 10.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/602 [231] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, April 1, 1936. [Received April 9.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/598 [232] The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State Warsaw, April 2, 1936. [Received April 5.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/616 [233] The Chargé in Estonia (Carlson) to the Secretary of State Tallinn, April 2, 1936. [Received April 15.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/617 [234] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, April 2, 1936—8 p.m. [Received April 2—5:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/556: Telegram [235] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, April 4, 1936. [Received April 17.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/625 [236] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, April 6, 1936—4 p.m. [Received April 6—12:55 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/573: Telegram [237] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, April 7, 1936. [Received April 15.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/613 [238] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, April 9, 1936—11 a.m. [Received April 9—9:25 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/587: Telegram [239] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, April 14, 1936. [Received April 22.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/639 [240] Memorandum by the Minister in Yugoslavia (Wilson) [Belgrade, April 16, 1936.] 840.00/440 [241] The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State Prague, April 17, 1936. [Received May 6.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/667 [242] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, April 22, 1936—3 p.m. [Received April 22—1:52 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/642: Telegram [243] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, April 27, 1936—5 p.m. [Received April 27—2:50 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/653: Telegram [244] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, May 1, 1936. [Received May 9.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/675 [245] Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) Berlin , May 18, 1936. 740.00/52 [246] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 19, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 19—4:15 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/688: Telegram [247] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 20, 1936—noon. [Received May 20—8:15 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/690: Telegram [248] Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) Brussels , May 20, 1936. 740.00/47 [249] Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) Paris , May 21, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/708 [250] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 22, 1936—4 p.m. [Received May 22—11:15 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/691: Telegram [251] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, May 26, 1936. [Received June 5.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/702 [252] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, May 28, 1936—4 p.m. [Received May 28—3:30 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/698: Telegram [253] The Minister in Albania (Grant) to the Secretary of State Tirana, May 30, 1936. [Received June 16.] 740.00/45 [254] The Minister in Egypt (Fish) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 16, 1936. [Received July 8.] 740.00/51 [255] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 3, 1936—5 p.m. [Received July 3—3:15 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/721: Telegram [256] The Minister in Austria (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State Vienna, July 11, 1936. [Received July 22.] 863.01/398 [257] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 13, 1936—7 p.m. [Received July 13—3:15 p.m.] 863.01/385: Telegram [258] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 15, 1936—1 p.m. [Received July 16—9:30 a.m.] 863.01/392: Telegram [259] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 16, 1936—4 p.m. [Received July 16—1:40 p.m.] 863.01/393: Telegram [260] The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Benton) to the Secretary of State Prague, July 23, 1936. [Received August 18.] 840.00/441 [261] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 24, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 4:35 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/755: Telegram [262] The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Benton) to the Secretary of State Prague, July 25, 1936. [Received August 18.] 840.00/442 [263] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 28, 1936—5 p.m. [Received July 28—1:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/762: Telegram [264] The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 29, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 29—12:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/767: Telegram [265] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Mayer) Washington, August 5, 1936. 761.62/389a [266] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 6, 1936—1 p.m. [Received August 6—9:15 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/777: Telegram [267] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, August 18, 1936—5 p.m. [Received August 18—3:21 p.m.] 711.62/116: Telegram [268] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, September 3, 1936. [Received September 12.] 740.00/59 [269] The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State Prague, September 5, 1936. [Received September 29.] 740.00/62 [270] Memorandum by the Minister in Austria (Messersmith) undated 740.00/60 [271] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, September 12, 1936—noon. [Received September 12—11:15 a.m.] 852.00/3130: Telegram [272] The Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State Brussels, September 16, 1936. [Received September 26.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/801 [273] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, September 18, 1936. [Received September 29.] 762.00/131 [274] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, September 21, 1936. [Received September 29.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/805 [275] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 22, 1936—7 p.m. [Received 8:11 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/799: Telegram [276] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, September 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 28—2:25 p.m.] 862.20/1129: Telegram [277] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 2, 1936. [Received October 13.] 751.60C/96 [278] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 8, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 5:03 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/815: Telegram [279] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, October 12, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 12—12:05 p.m.] 862.20/1132: Telegram [280] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 14, 1936—10 p.m. [Received October 15—8:50 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/823: Telegram [281] The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State The Hague, October 19, 1936. [Received October 27.] 755.00/36 [282] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, October 21, 1936—noon. [Received October 21—9:15 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/830: Telegram [283] Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in Belgium (Willis) Brussels , October 24, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/843 [284] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, October 28, 1936. [Received November 6.] 755.00/44 [285] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 2, 1936. 740.00/70 [286] Report by the Naval Attaché in Belgium (Gade) [Brussels,] November 9, 1936. 755.00/52 [287] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] November 13, 1936. 770.00/453 [288] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 14, 1936—noon. [Received November 14—9:55 a.m.] 762.65/258: Telegram [289] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 16, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 16—3:02 p.m.] 862.811/42: Telegram [290] The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department (Puleston) Washington, December 2, 1936. 755.00/52 [291] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, December 3, 1936. [Received December 11.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/851 [292] The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State Prague, December 7, 1936. [Received December 24.] 740.00/86 [293] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, December 9, 1936. [Received December 28.] 862.811/63 [294] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 16, 1936—11 p.m. [Received December 17—3:30 p.m.] 751.62/380: Telegram [295] The Chargé in Latvia (Packer) to the Secretary of State Riga, December 17, 1936. [Received December 29.] 760D.61/169 [296] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 17, 1936—2 p.m. [Received 4:34 p.m.] 751.62/381: Telegram [297] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 18, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 18—12:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Balkan)/162: Telegram [298] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, December 19, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/858 [299] The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State Warsaw, January 7, 1937. [Received January 25.] 760C.00/84 [300] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, January 16, 1937—1 p.m. [Received January 16—11:15 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Balkan)/164: Telegram The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 751.62/333: Telegram [Document 166] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , January 3, 1936—9 a.m. [Received 9:55 a.m.] 1. 1. The French Ambassador recently had a long talk with Hitler ostensibly in connection with the death of the German Ambassador at Paris. French Embassy informing us of this conversation stressed Hitler’s friendly attitude at the time. 2. Hitler talked at some length on the Italian-Abyssinian situation 2 which seemed to worry him considerably. He felt Mussolini had been very foolish not to accept immediately the Hoare-Laval proposals. 3 3. The question of the Franco-Soviet agreement 4 was also discussed and I gather somewhat to the disquiet of François-Poncet. While Hitler did not claim that a Franco-Soviet agreement would be in violation of Locarno 5 he did indicate his feeling that such a pact would not be in harmony with it. 4. In discussing this point the French Embassy showed some concern over the possible implications with regard to the demilitarized zone if the Franco-Soviet pact became effective. The French Embassy did not know whether Hitler had as a primary purpose an excuse to rid Germany of the “artificial” situation in the demilitarized zone or of thinking in more general and farsighted fashion with an idea of warning off the French from any agreement with Russia which might draw the French into a conflict if and when Germany pursues its supposed purpose of an attack on Russia. 5. Dieckhoff 6 has gone to Paris to represent the German Government at the funeral services of the late German Ambassador. There is a rumor that he will remain on for a time until a new ambassador is chosen which if so would indicate that important discussions are now in progress. The French Embassy, however, gave the impression that he had gone to Paris solely for courtesy sake and will be returning to Berlin at once. 6. Contrary to certain recent newspaper reports Sir Eric Phipps 7 did not have a second interview with Hitler last month. Both the Foreign Office and the French Embassy have so stated. It is apparently a fact, however, that in his one talk with Sir Eric, Hitler also spoke at great length against a Franco-Soviet alliance. Repeated to Paris, Rome, London, Geneva. Dodd 2 See vol. iii , pp. 34 ff. 3 Communicated jointly by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Pierre Laval, French Premier and Foreign Minister, to Italy on December 11, 1935, and to Ethiopia on December 12. See British Cmd. 5044, Ethiopia No. 1 (1935), pp. 16 ff; see also Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 699 ff. 4 Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed May 2, 1935; French ratification completed by action of the Senate on March 12, 1936; and ratifications exchanged on March 27, 1936. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvii , p. 395. 5 Treaty of Mutual Guaranty Between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, signed October 16, 1925: for text see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 841 , or League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv , p. 289. 6 Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Office. 7 British Ambassador in Germany. The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State 760F.63/68 [Document 167] The Minister in Czechoslovakia ( Wright ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 373 Prague , January 19, 1936. [Received February 6.] Sir : I have the honor to report that on the 18th instant, I improved an opportunity afforded by the discussion with Dr. Krofta, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of other matters, to refer to the recent visit of the Austrian Chancellor. 8 … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As was likewise announced in the press, the matter of increased cooperation between the States of the Danubian region was also the subject of general discussion with some officials and of detailed examination with others, and favorable ground for such conversations was found in the statements made by Dr. Hodza, now Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he was Minister of Agriculture in 1935 (regarding which I reported in my despatch No. 315 of October 31, 1935 9 ). Dr. Krofta said that the field of this discussion would naturally embrace Austria and the States of the Little Entente and, ultimately, Hungary; but that it had been decided to defer discussions with the latter country until initiatory steps had been taken between Austria and the Little Entente nations, thus affording a lead which Hungary would probably be unable to decline to follow, whereas—as he rather naively put it—if discussions had been first begun with Hungary, such divergence of views would have become immediately apparent as would have been difficult to overcome. Dr. Krofta continued by stating that the proposal of the Czech Government was to grant certain preferences to Austria, and ultimately to Hungary or other States within the Danubian agreement, if properly possible; in return for which Czechoslovakia, of course, expected to obtain reciprocal privileges—at which point in the conversation he stated, to my surprise and interest, that this would be a principle in which the United States would be interested and to which we had given our tacit approval by virtue of the preferential provisions of the Modus Vivendi at present governing commercial relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States. 10 As will be seen from memoranda and reports upon this subject, I had already discussed it with Dr. Veverka, Czech Minister to the United States, from which conversations it was apparent that the Government of the United States is now of the opinion that these provisions are far too ample and should be limited and rendered more specific: I did not think it advisable, however, to refer to this phase of the matter in my conversation with Dr. Krofta concerning relations with Austria and therefore merely informed him that I had recently discussed the matter in general with Dr. Veverka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Upon my initiative, the conversation then turned to the more political phase of the visit and Dr. Krofta, with his accustomed freedom of conversation with me, informed me confidentially as follows: The visit did possess considerable political significance, to which, however, no mention was, or could be, made in the official communiqués, and which he therefore requested me to regard as entirely confidential information for my Government and not to be considered as a matter for discussion here (from which I deduced that he obviously would withhold this information from certain of my colleagues) for the obvious reason that knowledge of it in Vienna would not only serve no good purpose but might be fraught with danger. He then said that Italy’s military activities in Africa were, of course, a matter of concern to Austria and that an Italy certainly enfeebled by the drain upon her military and financial resources even at the present stage of the African campaign, and conceivably far more greatly weakened by a failure in that undertaking, could not afford the same measure of guarantee of Austria’s integrity as had formerly been possible or might otherwise be the case. It is therefore but natural that Austria should seek at least to strengthen as far as possible her economic relations with her neighbors, and this consideration entirely offset any possible incongruity that might be considered to exist on account of Austria’s conducting such negotiations with the members of an Entente which was created to restrain her. The object, of course, is to obtain the greatest possible guarantee against Germany and for that reason, even more than the others to which reference has been made above, no public mention of the political nature of the conversations would be made. Austria, therefore, while still desirous of keeping on good terms with Italy in view of the moral and material support rendered by Italy at the time of a more immediate threat against her independence, now feels that this obligation is perhaps not so clearly defined; therefore, without in any way estranging Italian sentiment or, what would be far more dangerous, contributing in any way towards any rapprochement of Italy with Germany, she must seek additional means of protection. This visit, therefore, is an important factor in this cautious but well-determined program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, J. Butler Wright 8 Kurt Schuschnigg, Austrian Federal Chancellor, Minister of Defense and Education. 9 Not printed. 10 Embodied in identic notes dated March 29, 1935; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , p. 145 . The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 740.00/41½ [Document 168] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Bern , January 27, 1936. Dear Mr. Secretary : The Council session 11 has reached a satisfactory termination with creditable work done in certain items of the agenda. However, the most interesting feature of the session was the revelation of an evolution in the concern with which different questions are regarded. Three months ago the thoughts of the statesmen of Europe were concentrated on Africa; the Abyssinian question was paramount. A month ago a phase of that question, namely the military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the focus of all thought. Today a further evolution has fixed the minds of these men on the intensity of the rearmament of Germany, 12 leading to the realization of the implications throughout the whole of Europe of the return of Germany as a first class military power. Representations of Great Britain have brought about undertakings in respect to assistance from the Mediterranean Powers 13 which, together with Britain’s vigorous military effort, have taken the edge off the apprehension with which a number of Britishers regarded the threat to their strategic position in Egypt and the possibility of an assault by Mussolini. They believe now that time is working for them. They believe that however stout an effort the Italians are making from a military point of view, nevertheless this effort is exceedingly costly, and that the sanctions already in effect are rapidly curtailing Italy’s resources and ability to maintain the present effort. Hence they can turn their minds to the question of German rearmament, a question which causes them more profound concern—if not more immediate concern—than a threat by Mussolini. Whether Italy suffers to the extent believed in Geneva from the sanctions now in force, I have no way of knowing. It is stated here that the stock of foreign exchange is rapidly being diminished by enormous purchases of oil from Rumania, etc. and that this foreign exchange cannot be replaced while the sanctions are operative. It is stated that some of the Powers hitherto reluctant to apply economic sanctions now find themselves in the happy position of supplying the goods previously purchased from Italy and are now disposed to carry on the present situation indefinitely. For the foregoing, I cannot vouch. What has struck me, however, has been a change of tone on the part of the Italians here: their suggestion of war at any mention of the oil embargo, if heard at all, is less convincing; they are more inclined to take the position that they have adequate stocks for their present needs. They express openly the hope that a peace can be negotiated, although there is no evidence that they are considering a peace which could be acceptable to the League Powers. In any case we seem for the moment to have passed the danger of hostilities in the Mediterranean, and an unstable situation, if I may use the expression, seems temporarily to have reached a position of stable equilibrium. I cannot conceal from myself the belief that the actual application of an embargo on petroleum by the League States will be dependent largely upon the decision of the United States Congress in respect to the Neutrality legislation. 14 I hope that no step will be taken here which will make the League’s action appear to be openly dependent upon ours. A number of the men influential in this matter are convinced that it would be a mistake to do so. Nevertheless, I doubt whether the embargo will be applied by the League States unless they feel that in some way the supply from the United States will not replace that which they cut off. The reverse also appears true. If the United States curtails its shipments, the States of the League will feel it not only expedient, but morally imperative to put on the embargo. Since sending you my cables Nos. 363 14a and 364, 15 Vasconcellos, the President of the Committee of Eighteen, 16 has come to see me. He believes that while Eden’s methods may seem less aggressive, his determination in respect to sanctions has not diminished. I need not recapitulate the arguments for the necessity of the establishment of the oil sanction. Suffice it to say that in the minds of most of the Delegates, it is the test of strength between the League of Nations and Mussolini and must be established as a precedent for use against Germany, if necessity arises. The extension of the idea of collectivity into a series of military guarantees against the risk involved in the application of sanctions is the most recent step in increasing pressure against the aggressor. It is of the highest importance and cannot fail profoundly to affect the future relationships and political development in Europe. You will remember that Aloisi 17 termed such action a military alliance against Italy in the Mediterranean, and deplored the fact that the League of Nations could be led by England to assume this shape. Germans who have talked to me during this session take an analogous position. They point out that nobody hides the fact that the present action against Italy is in the nature of a rehearsal for action against Germany. They feel convinced that once it has been proved that the League can take the form of a military alliance, the threat of that alliance will be used as a means of coercion against Germany, after this Italian question is liquidated. They recognize that though the phrases used are against Italy, the instrument itself is being forged for eventual use against their own country. Hence the Italians and the Germans are inspired by like apprehension and by like mistrust of what they both deem to be a form of coercion. This in contrast to the League conception, namely, that the military agreements are precautionary only against possible Italian retaliation. As to whether this manifestation of force in regard to Italy, together with the possibility of such a manifestation in respect to Germany will be effective in bringing Germany to a mood of negotiation is a question of psychological appreciation. Certainly Paul Scheffer of the Berliner Tageblatt , a believer in international co-operative action, makes no secret of his conviction that what he calls a threat of force will have results on Germany completely the opposite of what it is designed to effect. The overwhelming opinion of the representatives of other States here is, however, to the contrary and we can only hope that the future will show that they are right. There is indisputable evidence of the magnitude and intensity of the German effort in military preparation. There may be question as to the exact stage of the development of this preparation but there is no doubt that it is on a scale to cause alarm and that it proceeds with a rapidity which none of the democratic States can equal. The ability of a dictator to devote practically the entire resources of his country to armament cannot be matched by democratic countries in times of peace. Rightly or wrongly, the idea is becoming prevalent that German rearmament on this scale and in this tempo can be designed only for the purposes of aggression. I believe that in making this statement I am reflecting the profound conviction of most of the statesmen on this Continent. It seems to be generally believed that there will be no German aggression towards the west. Germany will presumably make every effort not to give Great Britain apprehension as to the Low Countries. Her present policy is predicated on not giving offence to Great Britain. Many French themselves appear to believe that they need fear no attack on their eastern frontier or through Belgium and Holland. If Germany does contemplate aggression, it is generally expected that it will be to the east or down the Danube. In either case the rôle of Poland is of primary importance. It is giving the deepest concern not only to the French but to the British and the Little Entente. It is the great enigma of Europe at the present time. It is an enigma which is the more puzzling because of the baffling personality of Beck, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is hard to see how the hostility between Germany and Russia, even taking into account its fundamental conflict of régime, can reach a point of armed conflict so long as Poland maintains a neutral position. Speculations as to Poland’s position are many and varied. There are those who believe that it may definitely throw in its lot with Germany in an attempt to seize the Ukraine and permit Germany to dominate Central Europe. In discussing with Massigli 18 the Far Eastern situation, he was of the opinion that a Japanese-Russian conflict in Mongolia would not remain a Far Eastern conflict; that the Germans would dazzle the Poles with the idea of the conquest of the Ukraine while the Russian forces were in Siberia and that this might well involve Europe in a conflagration. Others here familiar with the Far East have observed the speed with which Japan is obtaining hegemony over the Mongols and wonder how long Russia can tolerate it. In the event of such a disturbance, France would be faced with a terrible choice. Would French soldiers have to be mobilized to save the existence of the Bolshevik régime? Indeed could such a mobilization take place in the present temper of the French people? I have talked with a member of the French General Staff who thinks it would be a profound mistake for France to attack Germany under such conditions. On the other hand, as will be seen from my memorandum, Titulesco 19 believes that in the final analysis the French would march. The matter is further complicated at the moment by the weakness of French diplomacy, distracted by its internal controversies. I believe that this situation is only ephemeral. History has shown too often that France can pull itself together in a crisis. Nevertheless, the indecision of France at the present time is causing grave concern to those statesmen of Europe within the French orbit. The fact that Great Britain is showing such vigor and determination in Continental matters is a consolation but it is on France, not Great Britain, that many of these States depend for existence. I have gone into this speculation, Mr. Secretary, with no desire to be alarming but because it is a reflection of the type of thought that is occupying the minds of those on the Council. It is the type of thought that has led to a feeling of apprehension which has brought about the conviction that only by an agreement with Germany, both of a political nature and for the limitation of armaments, can a cataclysm be avoided. It is a time in which wisdom and statesmanship are needed on this Continent as never since the end of the War. I am [etc.] Hugh R. Wilson 11 Ninetieth session of the Council of the League of Nations, January 20–24, 1936. 12 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 294 ff. 13 Effected by exchanges of notes, January 22, 1936, between the British Government and the Governments of France, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia; statements were also made by Czechoslovakia and Rumania, January 22, and by Spain, January 24. For texts, see British Cmd. 5072, Ethiopia No. 2 (1936): Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, Correspondence in connexion with the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations , pp. 2–8. 14 See pp. 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] ff. 14a Dated January 23, 8 p.m., vol. iii , p. 97 . 15 Dated January 24, 5 p.m.; not printed. 16 Appointed on October 11–12, 1935, by the Coordination Committee of the League of Nations from its own membership. 17 Baron Pompeo Aloisi, chief Italian delegate to the League of Nations. 18 René Massigli, Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 19 Nicholas Titulescu, Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister reported his conversation with Mr. Titulescu in telegram No. 364, January 24, 5 p.m., not printed; the memorandum to which he refers is not in the Department files. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.20/1102: Telegram [Document 169] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , February 6, 1936—11 a.m. [Received 12:27 p.m.] 40. Mayer 20 had a long talk with Dieckhoff yesterday evening when the latter discussed at length the question of apprehension toward Germany in England, France and elsewhere in Europe as well as the recent discussions in London and Paris. Taking up first the question of German rearmament, Dieckhoff stated that while there was every intention of carrying out the announced program of 36 divisions which he did not feel could be considered excessive for a country of Germany’s size, position and strength there was also every intention of keeping within it; that the German army would not reach 32 divisions until this fall and the full 36 divisions until next year; furthermore, the air armament was still quite behind schedule. It was inevitable that the magnitude and speed of German rearmament, although within the declared limit, should create an impression of super armament. This was unfortunate but could not be helped. Furthermore, those who stated that Germany would have to super arm in order to maintain employment in war industries and war construction did not realize that this had all been planned for and that the slack would be taken up to a great amount by the new requirements of dwelling places and new building construction which the Government was holding in reserve for the time when rearmament would be completed. As announced in Hitler’s speech of May 21 21 Germany was ready to go below the March rearmament program if others would act accordingly. Discussing at some length the groundlessness of alleged British apprehension and mistrust of Germany, Dieckhoff said, “At least King Edward does not distrust us. Neurath 22 had a long talk with him and felt he understood the situation thoroughly.” Dieckhoff then turned to the broader aspects of the question and stated that in the last analysis, and with the best will in the world on Germany’s part, he felt that the whole question reduces itself to the choice of two alternatives. Either Germany was to be treated on terms of real equality as had not been the case except in rare instances where such treatment had proven its success as, for example, the Anglo-German Naval Accord 23 or the nature of events would bring about an explosion which would be disastrous for all concerned. Dieckhoff emphasized the irritation and repugnance aroused by the method of beginning negotiations among several nations with Germany only being invited at the conclusion. Passing to the question of the demilitarized zone, 24 and after giving the usual reasons for Germany’s distaste for this arrangement, he stated firmly, as he had said on previous occasions, that Germany had every intention of keeping to Locarno provided the others did so. Referring to recent rumor on this subject, Dieckhoff said that while the British and French had given most solemn assurances that their recent staff discussions referred only to the Mediterranean, he must state frankly that the value of those assurances was somewhat diminished by the fact that similar assurances given in 1913 and 1914, with regard to staff discussions, had proven valueless. Furthermore, these present assurances were weakened by the rather naive and amazing question Phipps had asked Hitler last December when he requested what would Germany’s attitude be if England established air bases in northern France and Belgium. Finally, at the end of the talk, Mayer recalled Dieckhoff’s statement, based on Hitler’s May 21st speech, that Germany was willing to reduce her armament if others did so and asked point-blank whether if arms limitation were proposed to Germany would she fall in with the idea? Dieckhoff replied most emphatically in the affirmative that Germany would be glad to do so “since she still stood exactly as Hitler had stated in this regard on May 21st”. This appears contradictory to the attitude I have reported previously in my letters. Copies to Paris, London, Geneva, Rome, Davis. 24a Dodd 20 Ferdinand L. Mayer, Counselor of the American Embassy in Germany. 21 Before the Reichstag, May 21, 1935; for extract, see British Cmd. 5143, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1936): Correspondence showing the course of certain Diplomatic Discussions directed toward securing an European Settlement, June 1934 to March 1936 , p. 32. 22 Konstantin von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs. 23 Embodied in an exchange of notes, June 18, 1935; for correspondence concerning the accord, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 162 ff., and for texts of notes, see British Treaty Series No. 22 (1935). 24 See article 180 of the treaty of peace signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 333 . 24a Norman Davis, Chairman of the American delegation to the London Naval Conference. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.20/1107 [Document 170] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State No. 2651 Berlin , February 8, 1936. [Received February 18.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 29 of January 29, 6 p.m., 25 in which I ventured to give certain views and conclusions inspired by Mr. Wilson’s interesting telegram to the Department, No. 363 of January 23, 8 p.m., 26 with regard to the matter of German Armament Limitation which in turn is concerned with the larger problem of a solution of what might be termed “the German Question”. It is my purpose in this despatch to elaborate these views and conclusions somewhat, so that the Department may have in some detail the basis on which they rest. There is no royal road to a solution I fear, nor any hope of attaining an ideal arrangement. It is rather a choice of the lesser of evils. Perhaps even the word “choice” is a mis-nomer, and “chance” the more accurate expression. If advantage is to be taken of this chance, I am convinced that it will only be by the adoption of a most realistic attitude in which the most important factors will have to be faced and the situation appreciated and dealt with accordingly. The two questions raised by Mr. Wilson’s telegram under reference are, briefly, as follows: 1) Is the time ripe for consideration of limitation of armament? 2) If so, is the threat of collective force against Germany the most auspicious method of approach? To understand these questions, the post-bellum years must be recalled, since the difficulties of the moment are to a large extent the result of the mistakes of these years and of past European history. Suspicion and distrust, one move following or blocking another, and so on, ad infinitum, in an endless chain of pros and cons. All this reduces itself in substance to the fact that we are witnessing today the stresses and strains of European readjustment which would normally have begun just after the World War and pursued its way in a natural course. The Versailles Treaty, and the consequent effort to keep Germany down, postponed this normal evolution. We are now feeling the effect of this pent-up situation and the scrambling for position in face of a Germany suddenly recovering her former might. According to information I have recently telegraphed, German rearmament up to the size declared on March 17 [ 16? ] 27 will not be completed until next year. This fact, in juxtaposition to the French attitude described in Mr. Wilson’s telegram would seem to set the limits to the field of practical opportunity for negotiations of arms limitation agreement which would be of any real value to the French. In other words, the chance to keep European armaments within limits which would neither be preponderantly offensive nor ruinously costly is now at hand on account of the new French point of view, but likely is only feasible during that period in which Germany is completing her military program. The question of the Franco-Soviet alliance is of capital importance in relation to the chance of Arms Limitation. The ratification of this alliance by the French, which appears rather imminent, would likely be a serious, if not fatal, obstacle to successful negotiations with Germany for an arms limitation on any reasonable basis. As a well-informed German officer on the General Staff recently said to our Military Attaché, and as I reported in my telegram No. 31, of January 30, 5 p.m., 28 Germany will consider the balance of military power in Western Europe as ipso facto upset in the case that the Franco-Soviet pact is consummated, and Germany will be forced both to expand her present rearmament program and to intensify the speed with which this rearmament is being effected. The speeches and private statements of the civilian German Government officials leave little room for doubt that this is also their opinion. To analyze the situation further, certain economic factors have to be considered. These are so complex and involve such a knowledge of German political-economic policies and statistics not available to us, that comment must of necessity be somewhat speculative. For example, the rearmament here is of such gigantic proportions that it constitutes a tremendous drain on the country whose whole national economy has been placed at the service of this achievement, with the result that normal export and import considerations have been subordinated thereto and even the daily nourishment of the country rationed to satisfy the requirements of rearmament. On the other hand, this work has provided employment and occupation for a great mass of German laborers. It is a question whether and how far the rhythm of rearmament can be slowed down or arrested with safety to the State in such a situation, despite statements here to the effect that housing replacement will largely take up the slack when rearmament is concluded. When a country has embarked with such detail and in such amazing amplitude on rearmament with the military objective not only to plan but actually to initiate a re-distribution of the whole industrial set-up, the problem becomes almost too incalculable to be considered satisfactorily from the point of view of whether negotiations may hope to halt such a tremendous undertaking. At this juncture it is pertinent to inquire what form of armament limitation the British and others in Europe may have in mind vis-à-vis Germany. After many years of discussion of disarmament, I believe that general international opinion now holds that quantitative limitation is not feasible; that this form of perpendicular restraint of national action in regard to a matter as vital as national defense and so close to national prestige is impracticable. The Disarmament Conference turned down the best quantitative plan, namely, the so-called Hoover Plan. 29 However, the idea of qualitative limitation was thought possible, given the proper circumstances, since this form of limitation was horizontal, so-to-say, demanding the same material restraints from all states, regardless of their size or importance. Furthermore, it was felt that, indirectly and to an appreciable extent, not only would qualitative limitation be a great saving in expense and diminish the aggressive character of armies, but by its very nature would so alter military organization as in effect to tend toward, if not actually achieve gradually, a considerable quantitative reduction in armed forces. I may say, therefore, that from my observation, it would be going over the same unhappy field of unsuccessful negotiations at the expense of much time and further embroilment, if efforts towards arms limitation were not confined strictly to a qualitative aspect. Proceeding on this plane, it seems that there are certain natural factors advantageous to Germany which might lead her to look with favor on qualitative limitation. I refer to those advantages of superior industrial and chemical technique and equipment which the Germans would always have, no doubt, over the other European countries and which would give them an advantage in matériel within the scope of any limitation. Indeed, we have had an example of this in another respect in the Reichswehr as constituted by the Versailles Treaty. This army of 100,000 men with long-term enlistment was considered sufficient to protect Germany internally, and was expected to be innocuous as a military force externally. After some ten years the Germans had so developed this small force as practically to change European ideas of military strategy and tactics, having evolved perhaps as perfect an organization of its kind as has ever existed. This genius for making a great deal out of an opportunity, and by industry and planning to turn a bad situation into a good one, hearkening back to Napoleonic days, is a factor on which I am sure the Germans would count in considering qualitative limitation, since in this manner they would still have a certain superiority over their neighbors. Likewise and collateral to the above, it would seem certain, as the Military Attaché’s office has frequently informed us, that starting from “scratch” the Germans have more modern matériel than any of their real rivals in Europe, which is another favorable factor as regards the possible willingness on the part of Germany to fall in with the idea of arms limitation. The reverse of this picture is also favorable, namely, that starting from “scratch” the Germans need great quantities of reserve material so that, even under a qualitative limitation agreement, their industry would have a great deal to do for a long period of time, which would occasion much-needed employment even if steps were taken towards a limitation of armament. I am attempting to give the picture only from the German side. The favorable factors involved may mean too great a sacrifice for others, and so be unacceptable. I feel, however, that a survey of the considerations I have outlined in the preceding pages is timely, and that they support the conclusion that the time is ripe for discussion with Germany toward limitation of armament and related questions, such as colonies, treaty revision, League revision, etc. The second question raised by Mr. Wilson’s telegram No. 363, under reference, is whether this would be aided by a threat of encirclement. There are a number of ways of testing the wisdom of such a policy. The first and critical question is whether the British and those with whom they would be associated in an attitude of encirclement of Germany would be willing to fight for the end in view. If they are, it is one thing, and might be effective without any actual hostilities taking place; in other words, the Germans might acknowledge a defeat right off if they felt that England, France, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium—all were prepared to annihilate Germany if she should not accede to an intimation or an ultimatum to halt her rearmament. But let us assume for a moment that such a businesslike encirclement were possible and that Germany knuckled under and agreed to the terms. We would only be back again at 1918. There would be increased bitterness of feeling, the victors would probably muddle the whole show as badly as was the case at Versailles, and the weary, tragic days of the past would have to be relived again. Suppose, on the other hand, that Germany resisted even such a coalition—as might be the case in a dictatorship—but was eventually defeated. It would probably be at the cost of some millions of lives and Europe would be pretty much in ruins and a prey to Bolshevism, which would be the only gainer of such a situation. In the third place, and as most probably would happen judging by past performances, if the so-called “Encirclement Powers” were not prepared to fight, I am fearful that the unsupported threat would only make the Germans expand their armament program, hasten its completion, and develop further the peculiarly Teutonic complex of “martyrdom” and “sacrifice” which has to such a large extent been the origin and the mainstay of the present Nazi regime. In other words, an idle threat would only be to the advantage of the extremist element in Germany and in an eventual show-down would only further “inflate” Germany towards a more adventurous attitude and a contemptuous feeling towards the other European States. Looking at this question from a slightly different angle, I am inclined to believe that it is correct to say that, while European psychology in general recoils from the thought of war except in the case of a direct attack, German psychology does not so recoil despite the thousands of cultivated Germans and many of the older men who fought in the last war and who now shudder at the thought. It is largely a question, as I see it, of this difference in psychology which led me, as indicated in my telegram No. 29, of January 29, 6 p.m., to the only policy toward Germany which I can view with any hope. I refer to a policy of “deflation” which would relieve the tension so long existing in this country and in Europe, and would tend to cut the ground from under the “martyr” complex to which I referred above. When an engineer is faced with steam pressure of a dangerous nature, he does not advise a further clamping down of the lid, but rather an exhaust-pipe to diminish the strain. German energy and the German dynamic spirit in this central part of Europe is undoubtedly a danger to European peace, if not indeed to the peace of the world. Of this there is no doubt in my mind. But the only hope of avoiding a disaster appears to me to lie in an effort to canalize it, to help direct it into as constructive a direction as can be devised. This, however, would be at a price. It will cost something which the “Possession Powers” must pay if they feel it is worth it, and the longer the delay, the higher the price. As was said to me the other day, a policy which makes definite and clear-cut concessions to Germany now would relieve much of the artificially created and artificially maintained tension here which overshadows the whole of Europe, and would give time for the operation of modifying natural laws of equilibrium which pertain not only to politics but to economics as well. A golden opportunity was presented to Europe in general and to France and England in particular, just after the War, when almost ideal conditions, and those which some years previously could scarcely have been dreamed of, prevailed—by the disappearance of the Hohenzollern rule and the substitution for it of a social-democratic regime in Germany. Such a government in a Germany, war-weary, desperately unhappy, poorly nourished, feeling the awful effect of disillusionment and defeat, with all their gods thrown down—such a government presented an opportunity to have shown magnanimity, to have taken Germany into the picture on this new footing and to try to see if there was not a chance of developing the finer attributes of the people, away from thoughts of aggression and of military grandeur. It might not have been successful. The chances were against it. But it was the only chance I am afraid. This was bungled. We need not go into the details or assess the blame which is difficult to estimate fairly at such close perspective, since the German people themselves were to a very real extent at fault. Now, the old military spirit, the development of the army and the recent throwing off of restraints of these past 17 years, have brought matters back to a place where Germany is even more dangerous to the world than in 1914. Perhaps it is too late, perhaps it would never have been successful, but at least for a brief period there appears to be an opportunity to take Hitler’s May 21st speech at its face value and explore that other policy which was not tried in 1918 and in the ensuing years. This will be at considerable cost, as I have said, and could only be successful if supported by a strong England and France. I venture to say at the conclusion of this report, in which I have tried to assemble a number of ideas and factors involved in the present European situation, that it is written with a dispassionate mind, not as argument but as exposition, since fortunately, for the moment at least, there is no decision demanded of us in the premises. I have purposely confined myself to the German aspect of the matter, since it is with this that I am most closely in touch and directly concerned. I am not oblivious, however, to the other side of the shield and to the serious menace felt by France and other neighbor nations with regard to Germany, and now in turn it seems by England herself. There is reason for them to feel most apprehensive and it may be that eventually only extreme and forceful measures will serve. Meanwhile, however, until this eventuality, and in the hope of forestalling it, I cannot but feel that it would be only a part of wisdom at least to explore searchingly another way out. Finally, I submit this report on a subject of so vast a scope and importance, with a certain diffidence, since it is scarcely possible without writing at great length to cover the ground adequately or discuss the principal points comprehensively. I have sought rather to indicate certain lines of thought and the reasons for the desirability of their consideration. Respectfully yours, William E. Dodd 25 Not printed. 26 Vol. iii , p. 97 . 27 See telegram No. 49, March 16, 1935, from the Ambassador in Germany, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , p. 296 . 28 Not printed. 29 See Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , pp. 180 ff. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 751.62/342: Telegram [Document 171] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , February 12, 1936—4 p.m. [Received February 12—12:46 p.m.] 46. Once more attitudes here are non-committal. Everybody is anxious but nobody gives a positive answer to any serious question. The encirclement idea of England, France and Russia is aimed at peace and the formation of a solid front of the Balkan States. But it is to be done by the League, small states like Holland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia more pressing, the greater ones disposed to give Germany a chance to indicate a willingness to regulate armaments. The British Ambassador tells me today that his Government is absolutely committed to great armament because Germany refused twice last autumn even to consider international arrangements as to armies and air forces. He said that the French are apt to delay positive action in encirclement matter till after the spring elections and that England will not make another peace proposal alone here. A day or two ago Goering, 30 most warlike of all the leaders, at French Ambassador’s table patted himself on the chest and said he was to be Hitler’s successor. The German press criticises the English for their armaments measure and especially complain at likely French acceptance of the Russian peace pact. There is real joy at the United States absolute neutrality. The economic situation with Poland is apt to be eased off, the Polish Ambassador saying to me that his country must always remain neutral. Cipher text mailed London, Paris, Moscow, Geneva and Davis. Dodd 30 Hermann Göring, German Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Forces. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 862.20/1106: Telegram [Document 172] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , February 13, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 13—6:40 p.m. 31 ] 58. The conversations in London and in Paris subsequent to the royal funeral, 32 although devoid of concrete result, have nevertheless given a new impetus to European diplomatic maneuverings. While it is still far from clear whither this impetus will lead, at the moment the British sense the drift of Europe away from the League to regional agreements framed in consideration of the menace of German rearmament. At the same time, with the approval of the new financial year beginning March 15, the British have been presented with the occasion for impressing upon the public again the need for extensive rearmament in the face of actual and potential German rearmament. The Government has made it clear beyond question that substantial British expenditure on armament will be made during the next 2 or 3 years, and is satisfied that the press estimate of some pounds 300,000,000 has occasioned no undue adverse comment. Nevertheless it is carefully being pointed out that the only expansion in armament is in the air, that the extensive sums for the navy are largely for replacement and that the military expenditures are for mechanization and matériel. At the same time measures may be taken to make the British public more air-minded, and by such means as mass issuance of gas masks, et cetera to bring home the realization of Britain’s vulnerability to air attack, including the idea that Britain might have to meet an attack alone before the League or France could come to her aid. In the circumstances there is every indication that until this British armament activity has made further progress, particularly with respect to the air arm, British foreign policy will be fundamentally based on the idea of temporization. Furthermore this is a policy which circumstances have rendered appealing to Eden 33 who is anxious to belie Tory criticism of youthful impetuousness and impractical idealism. This concept of temporization, which is directly connected with the German situation (1) and with the Japanese situation (2), is also in a sense applicable to the Italian situation (3). 1. As regards Germany, England is seeking for a means to alleviate tension and prevent the drift towards another 1914 situation. The British continue to favor an approach to Germany whenever it can be determined that a reasonable and promising basis for negotiation has been evolved. In the meantime they will avoid any action which would increase German antagonism and cause her further to withdraw from efforts at international cooperation. Nevertheless the British Government, through its Minister for the Colonies, 34 took occasion to state in the House of Commons last night: “The Government have not considered and are not considering the handing over of any British colonies or territories held under mandate.” In this general connection, in reply to a question concerning the demilitarized zone, the Foreign Secretary added: “The obligations of His Majesty’s Government are specified in the Treaty of Locarno itself. His Majesty’s Government stand by those obligations and, as has been previously stated in this House, intend, should the need arise, faithfully to fulfill them.” At the same time, it is realized here that some concessions to Germany must be made if there is to be any chance of political appeasement in Europe. Also it is with the idea of avoiding a deadlock with Germany in the armament field and in consideration of amour-propre that the British are maneuvering to avoid signing a four-power naval agreement 35 which would merely be put up to Germany for acceptance or rejection. In the British view, if France is wise she will understand that Germany’s inclusion in the naval treaty is as much to her benefit as it is to England’s, that the era of dictation to Germany is past, especially since the French themselves admit they cannot mobilize an army for action outside of France. 2. Since Japan’s position and attitude renders Great Britain very vulnerable in the Far East, England will, through temporization, strive to prevent any issue from arising with Japan so long as the German situation remains unsolved. Indeed, there are influential elements here which continue to advocate the consideration of a policy of rapprochement with Japan. In answer to a question it was stated to me that the present surface friendliness between London and Moscow, born of mutual support for the League must be viewed merely as a feature in the present British policy of temporization, since it tends to ease France’s position in pursuit of her Danubian policy, where England has no commitments of her own outside the League, and also it has a restraining influence in Berlin and Tokyo. It was added that naturally England would welcome an extension of Anglo-Soviet commercial intercourse. 3. As regards the Italian situation, it is felt here that even though Mussolini may act to increase tension in the Mediterranean, nevertheless the zenith of Anglo-Italian hostility is probably well passed. The framework of mutual support in the Mediterranean and the degree to which British defensive preparations have been carried in the Mediterranean area if they have not eliminated the possibility of “a mad dog act” have, it is thought here, greatly reduced the chances of any such development and in any case insured that such an action would be unsuccessfully terminated in a relatively short time, despite the threat of the Italian air force to the British navy. The efficacy of financial and economic sanctions, plus the above absence of substantial Italian military success in Abyssinia, are regarded as marking the inevitable failure of Mussolini’s adventure. In dealing with the Italian situation it becomes therefore, in the British view, not so much a question of placing added impediments in Italy’s path but of awaiting the maturing of events before meeting the difficult question of settlement. I am confidentially informed that recent reports from the British Embassy at Borne express the opinion that Mussolini’s control in Italy is at present sufficiently strong to permit him to accept an unfavorable compromise and still remain in power. This opinion does not, however, attempt to prejudge his decision. In this general connection, a British official remarked “in the past England always looked to the Mediterranean as a waterway to the East and she will not be prepared to give up this waterway, even though probably for years Mussolini, and perhaps for decades the Italian people, will bear a grudge against England.” The foregoing interpretations, evolved in connection with informed sources, represent the trend of British policy, and at the same time indicate its lack of precision for the moment. Copies by mail to Paris, Rome, Berlin. Atherton 31 Telegram in two sections. 32 Of the late King George V, who died January 20. 33 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 34 James H. Thomas. 35 At the London Naval Conference, held December 9, 1935–March 25, 1936; see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 751.6111/115: Telegram [Document 173] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , February 15, 1936—6 p.m. [Received February 15—4:20 p.m.] 48. An important Foreign Office official today commented on ratification of Franco-Soviet pact substantially as follows: The German Government maintains its position that the pact is in contravention of Locarno in that it would alter machinery for assistance provided for in the treaty through operation of Covenant of the League. The German Government, however, is not going to get excited about the matter but wants the record perfectly clear on this point. There had not been and the implication was that there would not be protest. Regarding the demilitarized zone “no one in Germany is thinking of taking action”. Newspaper comment on the ratification has been suppressed to date, but there will likely be such comment after ratification, although not of violent character. While Germany considers Franco-Soviet pact as breach of Locarno, it is less interested in the “letter” of the agreement than in the “spirit” which may develop in France and Russia—and especially the latter—as a result of the pact. Apropos of this, the Foreign Office official also discussed at some length German-Russian relations saying, “the last word has not been said on both sides.” This observation, which was the same he made to us several days ago, gave the impression along with his further comment that he at least favored if not actually was working toward an improvement in German-Russian relations. He added that on both sides the military were well disposed. While his statements in this relation were guarded it seemed evident, between the lines, that army influence was being used to bring about closer Russo-German relations. This confirms statement of Lithuanian Minister 2 weeks ago that the Foreign Office and the army were again bringing pressure to bear on Hitler to change his attitude toward Soviets. Repeated to Paris, London, Geneva, Rome, Moscow. Dodd The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 711.61/594: Telegram [Document 174] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , February 17, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 17—5:30 p.m.] 49. On my return to Moscow yesterday, Litvinov, 36 Marshal Budenny, and an unusually large number of Soviet officers and officials came to my house and showed every evidence of having been directed to cultivate more friendly personal relations with this mission. A member of the Soviet hierarchy, close to the Kremlin, informed me later that Litvinov had made every effort to have Troyanovsky 37 removed from Washington, but that Troyanovsky in the course of three conversations with Stalin had persuaded the dictator that it was Litvinov and not himself (Troyanovsky) who had wrecked Soviet relations with the United States. He asserted that Litvinov had received instructions to adopt a more reasonable attitude toward the United States. In the course of a conversation Litvinov made the following statements to me: 1. He asserted that he was convinced that there was no possibility whatsoever of an early Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. He said, “The Japanese know that if they attack us and Germany does not attack us the war may be long but in the end they will be defeated utterly.” 2. He said that he was equally convinced that there was no possibility of an early German attack on Czechoslovakia or any part of Central Europe or the Soviet Union. 3. He said he believed the French Chamber of Deputies certainly would vote for the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance but was much less certain with regard to the French Senate. 4. He asserted that he had positive information that a council of the superior officers of the German Reichswehr recently had recommended to Hitler that even in case of ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance the German Government should not immediately begin to fortify the Rhineland. He added that technical considerations had played a large part in this decision, that German industry was so fully occupied by war preparations of other sorts that it would be impossible at the moment to begin serious military constructions in the Rhineland. 5. He stated that the German Government had offered again to extend credits of one billion marks to the Soviet Government for purchases in Germany. He added that the Soviet Government had replied that the maximum it would consider utilizing was five hundred million marks. 6. He stated that while his visit to London had improved greatly relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union he had obtained no definite promises of support. He said that he had proposed an Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to the Franco-Soviet pact but that he had really no hope that this proposal would be accepted. He said that Eden personally might be favorable but that the weight of British tradition would be too much for him to overcome. Litvinov added “I believe the British will adhere to the policy they pursued before 1914. They may even make fewer commitments than they then made to the French. But at the last minute faced by the fact of German aggression they will make war”. 7. In connection with the question of German aggression against the Soviet Union, Litvinov reiterated the opinions which the Soviet Ambassador to Poland had expressed to me at great length during the trip from Warsaw to Moscow. Litvinov said that the Soviet Government was certain now that Germany could not attack the Soviet Union except by way of Poland. He asserted that the way to the north by way of Lithuania and Latvia offered insufficient area for the maneuvering of great forces and had been completely closed by Soviet preparations. He asserted that the way to the south via Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania could not be opened except by a German attack on Czechoslovakia and Rumania and even if opened would give a line of communications so long and inadequate that the Russian armies on the Rumanian border would be able to defeat the German armies. He then asserted that he still believed Poland might cooperate with Germany in an attack on the Soviet Union. (I had a rather intimate conversation with Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on my way through Warsaw which reenforced my opinion that there is no possibility whatever of Poland participating with Germany in such an attack on the Soviet Union. Among other strong statements on this subject Beck remarked “our basic policy is never to allow a German or a Bolshevik soldier to set foot on Polish soil. In case of war anywhere in Europe, we shall remain neutral so long as possible.”). The informant, close to the Kremlin, quoted above, also stated to me that outward appearances to the contrary, notwithstanding, Litvinov’s conversation with Flandin had been thoroughly unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Soviet Government and that the Kremlin believed the Franco-Soviet pact would not be ratified by the French Senate. With regard to relations between the Soviet Government and the People’s Republic of Mongolia, the same informant asserted positively that while the Soviet Government had made no written promises to Gendun, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Mongolia, during his recent visit to Moscow, verbal promises had been given that the Soviet Government would accord military assistance appropriate to any situation which might arise, 38 “ending with one hundred per cent military assistance in case the Japanese should approach Urga.[”] Bullitt 36 Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 37 Alexander Antonovich Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador in the United States. 38 For report of military assistance agreement, signed March 13, 1936, see telegram No. 95, April 1, 2 p.m., from the Ambassador In the Soviet Union, vol. iv , p. 94 . The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 751.62/344 [Document 175] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State No. 2563 Paris , February 21, 1936. [Received March 3.] Sir : I paid a courtesy call, by appointment, on M. Sarraut, the new Prime Minister, on Thursday, February 20. The President of the Council, who is also Minister of the Interior, received me in his office at the Ministry of the Interior at the Place Beauvau. I have the honor to report that my conversation with M. Sarraut lasted three-quarters of an hour and concerned itself chiefly with the broader aspects of world problems. He was greatly preoccupied concerning the peace of Europe and in fact world peace, as a world war would, he felt, certainly follow a European war. The Japanese peril, he thought, was one of particular concern due to the domination of the militarists in that country. Western civilization may have brought blessings to Japan from their point of view, but from the European and American points of view the modern development of Japan raised serious problems. The Prime Minister spoke briefly of his own war experiences and of the feeling in France for Germany over a period of years. At the present time there was no great hatred of the Germans among the French population. There was, moreover, an intense desire in France to avoid the recurrence of another such struggle as took place in 1914. He said that he would devote his energy to finding some means of preventing war. The French on the one hand, he personally believed, did not desire to form a military ring around Germany and that, on the other hand, it was unlikely that the Germans had at the moment any warlike intentions, provided something could be done to satisfy her needs for raw materials and some territorial expansion for her excess population. He thought the taking away from Germany by the Versailles Treaty 39 of the German colonies had been a mistake. He believed that England, although loath to give up any of her African possessions, might be persuaded to return to Germany the latter’s pre-war possessions, provided that Germany gave certain guarantees that she would not use these colonies as bases for propaganda directed at the colonial possessions in Africa of other powers. M. Sarraut believed that the first step in securing world-wide security would be the calling of an international conference at which all questions of international relations should be considered. The agenda for this meeting should be carefully prepared beforehand so as not to run the risks of a failure similar to that of the London Economic Conference. 40 On the agenda of this conference should be the question of securing for each nation (1) required raw materials, (2) markets for its products, (3) outlets for surplus population. He reiterated that he doubted that Hitler wanted war. However, there were militaristic elements in the German Government and the doctrine of pan-Germanism was one which might give rise to war in the future if some peaceful solution was not forthcoming. The military group in Germany, he thought, would sooner or later seek the restoration of the Hohenzollerns in the person of the second son of the Crown Prince, whether Hitler liked it or not. I asked the Prime Minister whether he thought that there was any precise arrangement between Germany and Japan. He replied that he had no definite knowledge of any such agreement. He had, however, noted that Germany was according visiting Japanese delegations a warm welcome and he suspected that some sort of an understanding existed. When I asked him whether he believed that there was any Polish-German agreement, he replied that, in his opinion, Pilsudski 41 had mediated between Japan and Germany, motivated by his hatred of the Soviets, and had probably been the intermediary by which some sort of assistance would be given Germany by Japan. His remarks at this point were not entirely clear, but I gained the impression that in the case of trouble between Germany and Russia, Poland would probably take the side of Germany. Turning to internal affairs, M. Sarraut told me that general elections would probably take place at the end of April or beginning of May and that Parliament would adjourn about the middle of March. The elections he ventured to predict, would probably show a decided swing to the Left. Respectfully yours, Jesse Isidor Straus 39 Signed June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 57 . 40 Held June 12–July 27, 1933; see Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. i , pp. 452 ff. 41 Marshal Josef Pilsudski, late Chief of Polish Army Staff and former Premier, who died May 12, 1935. The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 762.65/172: Telegram [Document 176] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , February 22, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 24—11:10 a.m. 42 ] 62. My 60, February 20, 7 p.m. 43 This evening I had a long talk with Suvich. 44 He assured me there is in process no negotiation with Germany for military or political cooperation and stated that the various conversations listed in mine under reference were simply coincidental and had no joint or common significance. He explained them as follows: A. Suvich–Berger-Waldenegg. 45 1. Austria: ( a ) There are no present threats to its independence; ( b ) the Independence Party is increasing in strength and sentiment for independence is in the majority. The new generation up to 25 years of age are all for independence, the Nazis are from 25 to 35; ( c ) there is no change of Italian policy vis-à-vis Austria. 2. Danube: ( a ) They considered that conversation for Danubian pact was now inopportune; ( b ) that Italian cooperation was necessary for the proper solution of the question and nothing could be done without it. B. Mussolini and the Polish Ambassador. The call was a pure courtesy before the departure of the Ambassador on leave. He had not seen Mussolini for more than a year. The conversation had absolutely no relation to Germany. They incidentally discussed (1) the Danubian treaty—to the same effect as with Berger-Waldenegg; (2) the Franco-Russian treaty to which Poland reacts quite similarly to Germany and disapproves in theory but is inactive in regard to it. C. Mussolini–von Hassel 46 –Hitler. Suvich said these conversations had nothing to do with an Italo-German alliance. There was no conversation about such an arrangement for cooperation between the two governments nor any present plan for an alliance. Von Hassel had seen Hitler several weeks ago in Bavaria. Hitler as usual with his head in the clouds and philosophizing about the general welfare of the universe had been so abstract that von Hassel was unable to deduce any concrete understanding and was instructed to return to Italy and proceed to Berlin in two weeks and meet Hitler and von Neurath who is concrete and practical. In the interim in Italy he had twice seen Mussolini and had just returned from his Berlin conversations and was seeing Mussolini again about the time I was with Suvich—thus making his third conversation in two weeks with two visits to Hitler. The subjects discussed in these various conversations were (1) Austria, in regard to which Germany maintained she was not interfering but concerning which Suvich remarked that there was some present Nazi activity due to an influx of German propaganda money, (2) the Locarno Treaty, Germany had asked Italy if Italy would construe the Franco-Russian treaty as incompatible with Locarno. Italy had carefully considered and replied that as a matter of policy she disapproved the Franco-Soviet treaty because it invited communism into Central Europe but as a matter of principle she could not hold the treaty incompatible with Locarno. This question was still being considered by Germany and von Hassel was to express Germany’s latest view to Mussolini today but Suvich had already heard from their Berlin Embassy that Germany has not yet decided what position she would take so the conversation of von Hassel would be practically without point. Italy’s answer has been made and her position taken. He also stated he had just been advised that Laval was now opposed to ratification of the Soviet treaty and believed the French Government were not so enthusiastic about it as to make ratification a question of confidence in the Chamber; that it would pass the Chamber in normal course and might be defeated in the Senate. Assuming the frankness of each of these statements I am still of the opinion that no definite political or military understanding exists between Germany and Italy, that the two Governments are watching developments with their several suspicions but without a common ground of mutual interest, that Italy is not presently willing to desert the European concert to ally herself with Germany and that the policy of opposition to each of these two Governments on the part of England, France, Russia and their allies may and easily can create an artificial base for their collaboration. In this connection I record my sincere belief that Italy does not want an European war and will cooperate to prevent it up to the point where she is faced with a national danger and that she will then react with her entire power. Her attitude toward Locarno is highly important and indicative of her present policy, (1) to continue to cooperate under pre-existing arrangements for the peace of Europe, (2) to continue in the League in spite of existing sanctions, (3) to prosecute her African venture as a “colonial” campaign, (4) to make no new political engagements during sanctions. Concerning point (4) last above her policy at the London Naval Conference is pertinent. Suvich said in this regard that the newspaper report of the Press Bureau, my telegram No. 61, February 21, 7 p.m., 47 was not accurate; that Italian delegates had returned to the Conference; would continue there to consider technical questions but that when these questions were decided and incorporated within a political instrument for signature Italy would consider her policy; the naval treaty was the only “political” question envisaged in the Press Bureau announcement, neither Mediterranean accord nor Ethiopia nor any other political arrangement were intended; that Italy believed Germany should be one of the London conferees but that Russia had no navy and was not entitled to be present. In plain English Italy intends to continue her technical cooperation in London and probably will agree in principle but will not sign nor make this or any other new engagements nor assume any new obligations with any sanctioning government or governments pending the sanctions régime. Repeated to American delegation London, mailed Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Vienna, Geneva Consulate. Long 42 Telegram is two sections. 43 Not printed. 44 Fulvio Suvich, Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 45 Egon Berger-Waldenegg, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 46 Ulrlch von Hassell, German Ambassador in Italy. 47 Not printed. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/364: Telegram [Document 177] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , March 7, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 7—11:45 a.m. 48 ] 168. Marriner 49 saw Massigli this morning who indicated that the Foreign Office while not unprepared for some act of Germany indicating its intention to denounce the Locarno Treaty, had not expected the matter to be brought to a head at this time. He did not think that it was necessarily done in accordance with any agreement with Italy but was merely taking advantage of the situation created by the Italo-Ethiopian difficulties at Geneva. He said that legally Germany had no right to make a unilateral denunciation of the treaty which, in accordance with its terms (article 8), could only be terminated one year after a vote of two thirds of the Council of the League of Nations acting on a three months notification by one of the high contracting parties. This would mean that the treaty would remain in force legally until at least June 1937. Nevertheless, any declaration not to abide by its terms would ruin the effectiveness of the treaty and any conditions made by Germany for continuation of participation would raise endless difficulties with respect to security in Europe as now envisaged. At the moment of the conversation with Massigli, von Neurath was receiving the French Ambassador in Berlin and the German Chargé d’Affaires was at the Foreign Office here. Massigli said that it would now be impossible for Flandin 50 to make the trip to Geneva and that he therefore did not expect to leave himself for the scheduled meeting of the Council of Thirteen on Monday. A meeting of the Cabinet has been called for this afternoon to consider what effect the notification of the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty might bring about. When Marriner left Massigli was about to go into consultation with one of the high officers of the General Staff, perhaps on the basis of an unconfirmed press report now circulating that a small detachment of the German army has just entered Cologne. Ciphers to London, Rome, Berlin, Geneva. Straus 48 Telegram in two sections. 49 Theodore Marriner, Counselor of Embassy in France. 50 Pierre Etienne Flandin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 24–June 4, 1936. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/394a: Telegram [Document 178] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) 51 Washington , March 7, 1936—3 p.m. 67. Please keep us closely informed, hourly if necessary, of all important developments in situation arising out of German action of today. Hull 51 Also sent to the American Embassies in the United Kingdom and Germany as Department’s telegrams Nos. 75 and 20, respectively. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/369: Telegram [Document 179] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 7, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 5:49 p.m. 52 ] 60. Doctor Dieckhoff asked Mayer to come to the Foreign Office this morning in order that the Ambassador and the American Government could be informed of the situation which Hitler would outline in his Reichstag speech today. Dieckhoff gave Mayer for our information copy of a memorandum to the Locarno Powers which Hitler read at the conclusion of his dramatic hour and a half speech. In explanation of the memorandum, comprising part 2 of this message, 53 Dieckhoff underlined the fact that Germany considers the Franco-Soviet pact in effect since not only had it been ratified by the Chamber and recommended for ratification in the Senate but the French Ambassador had informed Hitler on Monday that his Government considered itself bound by the pact. Dieckhoff stated that the return of the demilitarized zone to full German sovereignty as a result of the invalidation of the Locarno pact by France would be by the symbolical act of the entry into the demilitarized zone this noon of several battalions of the regular army. This action, however, was devoid of any military significance and every effort would be made to demonstrate that its character was purely symbolical and in no way an offensive military measure. Mayer inquired of Dieckhoff regarding reports of an Italo-German understanding with respect to the action to be taken today. Dieckhoff categorically denied any such understanding stating that Hitler’s action was as much of a surprise to Italy as to the other powers, that there was no agreement between Germany and Italy whatsoever, that indeed he felt that Italy would be of two minds with respect to today’s statement. On the one hand they would naturally be glad to see world interest shifted to Germany, but on the other hand Italy would doubtless not look with favor on certain aspects of Germany’s step. Dieckhoff stated in strictest confidence that Eden had discussed the question of an air pact with Hoesch 54 last night strongly favoring its negotiation. 55 The greater part of the memorandum is devoted to an historical review of the new situation which Germany considers arises from the Franco-Soviet pact. It states the objections raised by Germany thereto and the conclusion to which Germany has come that the Locarno agreement has lost its intrinsic value and has practically ceased to exist. Furthermore, the situation is considered aggravated by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact has been paralleled by the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement. 56 In the right of self-defense therefore the German Government has restored full and unrestricted sovereignty in the demilitarized zone. In conclusion the memorandum reads as follows: “In order to forestall any misinterpretation of its intentions, however, and to place the purely defensive character of this measure beyond doubt, and also in order to lend expression to its unalterable liberal interpretation [ longing ] for a real pacification of Europe between equal and equally respected states, the German Government declares that it is willing to make new agreements for establishing a system of guaranteeing European peace on the basis of the following proposals: 1. The German Government declares itself ready to enter into negotiations immediately with France and Belgium relative to the formation of a demilitarized zone on both sides and to give its assent in advance to such a proposal in any depth and effect on condition of absolute parity. 2. The German Government proposes for the purpose of guaranteeing the inalienability and inviolability of the boundaries in the west to conclude a nonaggression pact between Germany and France and Belgium the duration of which it is ready to fix at 25 years. 3. The German Government desires to invite England and Italy to sign this treaty as guarantor powers. 4. The German Government agrees [that] in case the Royal Netherlands Government desires it and the other parties to the treaty consider it appropriate the Netherlands be included in this treaty system. 5. The German Government is ready to conclude an air pact for the purpose of further strengthening this security agreement between the western powers which is adapted automatically and effectively to prevent the danger of a sudden air attack. 6. The German Government repeats its offer to conclude nonaggression pacts with the countries bordering on Germany to the east similar to that concluded with Poland. 57 Since the Lithuanian Government has revised its attitude toward the Memel District in the last few months to a certain extent the German Government withdraws the exception it was at one time forced to make with reference to Lithuania 58 and declares that it is ready on condition that the guaranteed autonomy of the Memel district is effectively developed also to sign such a nonaggression pact with Lithuania. 7. Since the attainment at last of Germany’s equality and the restoration of full sovereignty over the entire German Reich territory the German Government regards the main reason for its former withdrawal from the League of Nations as removed. It is therefore ready to enter the League of Nations again. In doing so it expresses the expectation that in due time the question of colonial equality and the question of a separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its Versailles basis will be clarified by means of friendly negotiations.[”] Full text of memorandum in pouch arriving Europa 16th. 59 By telegraph to Geneva, to Rome, to Moscow, by air mail to Brussels, the Hague, London, Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, Paris, Vienna, Belgrade, Riga, Sofia, Constantinople. Dodd 52 Telegram in two sections. 53 For full text, see British Cmd. 5118, Germany No. 1 (1936). 54 Leopold von Hoeseh, German Ambassador in the United Kingdom. 55 See British Cmd. 5143, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1936), p. 72. 56 Treaty of mutual assistance signed May 16, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clix , p. 347. 57 Signed January 26, 1934, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxxxvii , p. 495. 58 See enclosure to despatch No. 113, April 17, 1935, from the Acting Chairman of the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 248 . 59 Despatch No. 2714, March 9; not printed. The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/371: Telegram [Document 180] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , March 7, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 7—7:30 p.m.] 76. In a conversation with Mr. Suvich this afternoon he said that the action of Germany confronted Europe with a situation out of which would come peace during a period of years or war in the immediate future. He felt England to be the deciding factor and was inclined to be optimistic. He thought England would act in a conciliatory capacity, endeavoring to induce France not to march and trying to induce Germany not to send more soldiers into the zone at this time. He thought the act of Germany in actually sending soldiers into the zone was a tactical and psychological error for the same purpose could have been achieved by simply announcing the right to do so and later, little by little, sending soldiers in straggling units. However, Italy would not consider the action taken by Germany as if it had been a weak Locarno. Germany assumes Locarno to have been violated by France by virtue of the Franco-Soviet pact and, consequently, not binding longer upon Germany. Italy accepts this argument of Germany. Italy, accordingly, does not consider Germany’s action to be a flagrant violation or to constitute an unprovoked act of aggression under Locarno such as to involve Italy’s obligations under that treaty. I asked whether Italy would consider it a violation of article 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. He replied that, technically speaking, it probably was and could be so considered but that it was not an abrupt or flagrant violation because it was one of the various steps which Germany had been taking to free herself from the restrictive clauses of the treaty and that this policy on the part of Germany had been condoned by each of the big European powers, Italy included; that Germany was not punished for her assumption of the right to arm; that England had almost immediately approved of her naval building program; that this new step was simply one in the procession and while it constituted a violation of the treaty, the great powers in Western Europe had by their own past acts assumed positions in regard to infractions of the Treaty of Versailles which would seem to make it difficult for them to adopt an aggressive policy in regard to this. He said that the offers by Germany ( a ) to establish a new militarized zone and ( b ) to sign 25-year nonaggression pacts with both its eastern and western neighbors (and he mentioned Lithuania and Czechoslovakia as the neighbors intended and excluded Russia) were so important that the western powers ought to consider them seriously in connection with the German move in the Rhine territory. He emphasized the fact that these conditions were precedent in character to Germany’s return to the League but that her actual return to membership would be absolutely unconditional. This he thought should be a great inducement to consider leniently the German aggression and he felt that the pacts proposed by Germany could have a very great influence upon the maintenance of peace for years to come. However, he felt that in the last analysis the future course lay in the policy which Great Britain would follow. He, personally, believed that England would like to avoid war even though some of her actions had indicated the contrary and that while Mussolini is convinced England really wants a war, Suvich, personally, believes England would desire to align herself with either Germany or France from time to time to preserve an equilibrium and maintain peace. He felt, however, that if England should condone the present German movement in spite of the fact that it was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, England could not follow the same course in the future vis-à-vis Italy which she had pursued in the past because it would be inconsistent to placate Germany on one ground and to oppose Italy on an alleged identical ground. He declared the policy of Italy to be to refrain from making any commitments of any kind vis-à-vis Germany and to wait and see what the developments would be, but he admitted that Italy would not ally herself with France and England in opposition to Germany under the present circumstances—these including sanctions; and further admitted that the positions of Germany and Italy would have many elements in common if England and France assumed an uncompromising attitude toward Germany now. I call your attention to one other effect of this German move. It makes membership in the League of Nations of two of the strongest military powers of Europe—Germany and Italy—contingent upon certain factors. Germany will join if certain conditions precedent are arranged. Italy will withdraw if any additional punitive steps are taken. If Italy goes Switzerland will go and the withdrawal of the latter would be a worse blow to the prestige of the League than most any other. The conditions are in being which make it possible to wreck the League or to continue its existence. If the powers concerned really wish collective security they will have to accept some changes in the situation. If they do not desire to continue collective security it is only necessary for them to be obdurate under the present circumstances. The former course would probably reestablish the basis for peace in Europe for some years to come. The latter will bring on a war. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva. Long The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/373: Telegram [Document 181] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , March 7, 1936—midnight. [Received March 8—9:55 a.m.] 79. Hitler’s speech has caused great excitement in both Soviet and diplomatic circles in Moscow. Litvinov displayed almost violent rage in his comments on Hitler. I asked him if he would not welcome the German-Lithuanian pact of nonaggression proposed by Hitler as it would afford a barrier to German attack on the Soviet Union via the Baltic States. He replied that the promise of a dog, liar, and blackguard like Hitler was worthless to Lithuania or any other country. In this connection the Polish Ambassador, the Lithuanian Minister and Estonian Minister expressed to me the opinion that Lithuania would feel obliged to enter into such a pact with Germany unless Germany’s conditions with regard to Memel should prove to be too onerous. The Estonian Minister stated positively that both his Government and that of Latvia would advise Lithuania strongly to conclude such an agreement with Germany. The Polish Ambassador also stated that his Government would approve such a pact. I asked Litvinov if he hoped that France would march troops into the Rhineland. He replied that he did not as that would mean immediate war. He then expressed the opinion that there was no chance whatsoever that French troops would enter the Rhineland. I asked him what action he thought might be taken. He replied that he believed that Hitler’s declaration definitely put an end to all possibility of sanctions against Italy but hoped that the sanctions which now were being applied against Italy might be applied against Germany. He said that he had received word this evening that there would be a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva on March 10th and added that he would like to attend the meeting but that he would be unable to reach Geneva by March 10th even if he should leave Moscow tomorrow morning. If the meeting should be postponed he would attend. Litvinov said that he was disgusted by the proposal of Hitler to reenter the League of Nations and even more disgusted by the fact that the British would welcome the reentry of Germany. He said “it means the death of the League. The League has no meaning at all unless it stands for collective security. Hitler has made it clear in his address that he intends to carry out a policy of complete hostility against Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. It is impossible to imagine the League functioning in the direction of collective security if Germany is a member of the League.” Litvinov stressed especially the extreme danger in which Hitler’s address placed Czechoslovakia. I had a long conversation on this subject with Marshal Tukhachevsky, Assistant Commissar for Defense. He admitted that at the present moment the Soviet Union would be unable to bring any military aid to Czechoslovakia in case of German attack. Both the Polish Ambassador and the Estonian Minister expressed themselves as not unfavorably impressed by Hitler’s declarations. The Polish Ambassador who has just returned from Warsaw and is one of Beck’s 59a most intimate friends expressed the opinion that Hitler’s next step would be to englobe Austria and predicted that shortly thereafter Beneš 60 would appear in Berlin on his knees. I asked Litvinov if the violence of Hitler’s statements with regard to the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union to break off the negotiations which are now in progress in Berlin for a five hundred million mark credit from the German Government to the Soviet Union. Litvinov replied that in the past Hitler’s violent attacks on the Soviet Union had not hindered trade on credit and that he saw no reason why the credit negotiations should be abandoned. In conclusion Litvinov expressed the opinion that Europe today was much closer to general war than in 1911. Bullitt 59a Józef Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs. 60 Eduard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/370: Telegram [Document 182] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 8, 1936—noon. [Received March 8—11:55 a.m.] 89. Although as reported in my 86, March 6, 9 a.m. [ p.m .] 61 the Cabinet discussed, but I understand, reached no decision on Friday 61a as to England’s action should Germany remilitarize the Rhineland zone, yesterday’s news caused great surprise but little apparent excitement in London. At 11 o’clock the German Ambassador handed the Foreign Secretary a memorandum containing the substance of Hitler’s speech and immediately afterwards Eden invited the French Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and the Belgian Chargé d’Affaires, as representatives of the Locarno Powers, to call at the Foreign Office separately. In his conversation with the French Ambassador he deprecated precipitate action and advised careful restraints of the German proposals. Shortly after these three interviews Eden left for a consultation with the Prime Minister at Chequers and at a late hour last night had not returned. I understand further consultations with the Prime Minister are planned for today, and tomorrow there will be a meeting of the Cabinet. The Foreign Office has been reticent with the press as to any indication of British policy although it has stated the French Ambassador called on the Foreign Secretary this morning to discuss procedure for the Locarno meeting the French desire to call in Paris on Tuesday and the subsequent Geneva meeting. It is reported here that the League of Nations meeting scheduled for Tuesday has been postponed until Thursday. In estimating the situation from London it should be borne in mind that the present Cabinet is weak and that public opinion is strongly for peace, and that even that large element which supports the League of Nations does so in the belief that it offers the best machinery for maintaining peace. Thus the German offers are well framed not to displease the man in the street, since it may be argued that a real offer has been made to replace treaty obligations which events have rendered practically worthless. For the moment official opinion here is conscious that the German proposals are in the main directed to France. Thus there will be no hasty action here and no action until after mature deliberation. England has already apparently urged such a policy on France, conscious that in the last analysis the real answer to Germany’s action must be based on how far England and France can agree to support a common policy. [Here follow excerpts from editorial comment in the British press.] Atherton 61 Not printed. 61a March 3. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/375: Telegram [Document 183] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , [March 8, 1936]. [Received March 8—5:21 p.m.] 61. As Hitler’s speech was sent textually by the Associated Press to be published in full by the New York Times 62 I assumed this would satisfy your requirements in this respect. I shall discuss the speech on this basis. Local diplomatic representatives are naturally reticent awaiting their cue from their respective Foreign Offices although I understand the British and French Ambassadors protested yesterday at the Wilhelmstrasse. It is, however, too soon to give any important local foreign or German reaction. The speech was impressive. Its principal theme purported to express the desire of Germany to contribute toward international cooperation for world peace. Secondly there was the usual severe attack on Bolshevism but apparently there was a desire to divorce this from “Russia.” Thirdly the speech developed to the climax of the final restoration to Germany, by the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone, of her “equality” and the achievement of Hitler’s aim in this regard. There was tremendous cheering by the Reichstag and galleries at Hitler’s dramatic declarations in favor of Germany’s participation in international cooperation for peace. There was equal demonstration following Hitler’s statement respecting the regaining of German equality and the dangers of Bolshevism. Interestingly enough there was also great spontaneous applause for Hitler’s about-face with regard to the League of Nations. The Department will have remarked the contradiction between the position of the German Government as expressed to us and to others a short while ago (see our No. 48, February 15, 6 p.m.) and to the precipitate action taken yesterday. It is too soon to be able definitely to interpret this change of policy. On the one hand there was the evident appeal to world cooperation in Hitler’s speech, his concessions to this end in the memorandum. On the other was the drastic action in reoccupying the demilitarized zone and the belligerent tone of the speech at times. This would seem to indicate a sort of compromise resulting from the efforts of the Foreign Office to have Hitler depart from the policy of “mutism” and so bring Germany back into the European diplomatic arena, i. e., a constructive attitude by Germany and contrariwise the necessity which Hitler is believed to have granted for some form of splitting popular radical feeling here, both as a sop to it and a device for permitting the change of policy respecting the League, etc. Two of the best informed American newspapermen here also feel as we do that the immediate nature of yesterday’s action resulted partly at least from Flandin’s efforts to get the British to guarantee to support France with regard to Germany in return for French support vis-à-vis Italy and the oil sanctions; that Hitler felt it necessary to forestall such an Anglo-French arrangement respecting Locarno by a fait accompli . Incidentally these newspapermen have the same suspicions we have that Hitler’s move may not have been unwelcome to the British particularly as it made such striking concession with regard to international cooperation and the League. So much for the hopeful aspect of the action. On the other side is the belligerent attitude which Hitler occasionally struck at the Reichstag meeting and his references to the Soviet Government and to Czechoslovakia which were interpreted in some quarters as alarming. Furthermore, despite the statement made by Dieckhoff yesterday morning of “several battalions” making a “symbolic entry” into the Rhineland, our Military Attaché 63 states, according to reliable information, that by tomorrow morning, March 9, there will be some forty to forty-five thousand German soldiers in the demilitarized zone, say about three full divisions with appropriate corps troops. This is composed of the Rhineland “police” who are being incorporated into the army amounting to employment of one full division and two regular army divisions from outside the demilitarized zone with artillery etc. for the transformed “police” division. Major Smith believes the following cities have been garrisoned to date: Dusseldorf, Cologne, Aachen, Coblenz, Mainz, Saarbrucken, Trier, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Karlsruhe. He considers that the military reoccupation of the zone has greatly strengthened Germany’s military position in Europe. I received your No. 20, Mar. 7, 3 p.m. 63a and will act accordingly. Repeated by telegraph to Davis, Paris, London, Geneva, Rome, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, Vienna, Budapest, Warsaw, Praha, by air mail to Constantinople, Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade, Riga. Dodd 62 March 8, 1936, p. 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , and Doc. 27 ] . 63 Maj. Truman Smith. 63a See footnote 51, p. 207 [ Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] . The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/377: Telegram [Document 184] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Paris , March 8, 1936—7 p.m. [Received 10:15 p.m. 64 ] 175. The Foreign Minister received me this afternoon. He appeared most willing to outline the views of his Government and handed me the text of the communication to the League which will be delivered tomorrow. 65 … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As a consequence of her unwillingness to take unilateral action he said that France will not mobilize at present and was taking no military measures beyond slightly reinforcing the garrisons of the frontier fortresses. I asked him if he felt that Germany’s intentions were warlike and he replied that he thought that Germany desired to occupy and to fortify the demilitarized zone which could then be held by a minimum force thus enabling the Reich to turn its attention south and eastward toward Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia and that he thought the menace of such ultimate action was very real. I asked him how these events would affect the ratification of the Soviet pact and he replied that it would make it more certain than ever and that one of the reasons he was remaining in Paris until Thursday night was to see that instrument through the Senate. With respect to the attitude of Italy he said that it was most fortunate that she had acquiesced in the request to discuss peace before these events. He added that Italy’s position was most difficult since under the régime of sanctions now applying to that country she had derived the larger portion of her supplies from Germany. It was his impression that under present conditions there could of course be no thought of extending sanctions against Italy and that there might be some possibility of dropping them entirely in view of her attitude shown with respect to the Ethiopian settlement and her desire to retain the benefits of Locarno. He asked me what I thought would be the attitude of the United States in view of the unilateral repudiation of a treaty followed up by military force. He referred to the fact that the United States had recently expressed its interest in world peace by action with respect to shipments of arms to belligerents and restriction [of] shipments of oil to the average quantities previously imported by any nation prior to the outbreak of the war. I pointed out to him that as he was aware the United States was not a member of the League of Nations nor a signatory of Locarno and that the principal desire of our country as recently expressed and frequently reenforced by declarations of the Executive and acts of Congress was to remain neutral. I added that he of course could judge from his own experience in the United States the nature of the feeling there with respect to the régime in Germany. He asked me as personal favor because of England’s vacillation to call the situation to the President’s attention with the request that some statement might be made by him or by the Secretary of State condemning on moral grounds any unilateral repudiation of a treaty. It was his belief that the President’s words would have wide attention and real effect particularly in England. I told him that in view of the state of public opinion in the United States on the question of neutrality I could not comment on his request or on the reception it might encounter but that I would be glad [to] transmit it in the precise terms in which he had outlined it to me. I should naturally be glad to have as urgently as possible any comment you may care to make on M. Flandin’s request. Repeated to London, Berlin, Geneva, Rome, Moscow. Straus 64 Telegram in three sections. 65 Despatched March 8, League of Nations, Official Journal , April 1936, p. 312. The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/395a [Document 185] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , March 9, 1936. My Dear Mr. President : I am transmitting herewith a memorandum 66 giving a brief analysis of the action taken by the German Government in sending troops into that part of the Rhine zone which was demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles and which demilitarization is likewise provided for in the Treaty of Locarno. This memorandum gives the pertinent clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno which are applicable to the German action. 67 It likewise gives the procedure provided for under the Treaty of Locarno in the event of a violation of the restriction against the assembly of armed forces or the maintenance and construction of fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine. It would appear from this brief analysis that the action of the German Government has constituted both a violation of the Versailles and Locarno pacts, but as far as the United States is concerned it does not appear to constitute a violation of our treaty of August 25, 1921 with Germany, 68 as our treaty with Germany does not include Part 3 of the Treaty of Versailles which contains the provisions for the demilitarization of the Rhineland zone. We are continuing to watch closely the developments arising from this German action and I shall keep you currently informed of all the information which becomes available to us in the premises. Faithfully yours, Cordell Hull 66 Not printed. 67 Articles 42, 43, and 44, part III, of the Treaty of Versailles; articles 1, 4, 5, and 8 of the Treaty of Locarno. 68 Foreign Relations , 1921, vol. ii , p. 29 . The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/390: Telegram [Document 186] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 9, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 9—3:25 p.m.] 66. The Foreign Office tells us in strictest confidence that they have received two telegrams from Avenol, Secretary General of the League, one this morning and one at noon advising the German Government of the request by the French and Belgian Governments respectively for a meeting of the Council to discuss the situation and that in each instance Avenol offered the German Government the opportunity of being present at the Council for this discussion. In other words, while Germany has not been embarrassed by a direct invitation requiring a reply, the way is open for her to attend the Council session if she desires. The Foreign Office strongly favors taking advantage of this opportunity. They realize the tremendous significance of Germany’s presence at Geneva on this occasion. It would confirm by action the constructive proposals in Hitler’s speech. It would serve to encourage those states favorable to Germany’s proposals and at the same time render opposition more difficult. The League, however, is in bad odor in many quarters of the Government. Therefore, there is considerable hostility to Germany’s participating at the Council session and it is problematical whether Germany will be present. The matter is now being debated. Repeated by telegraph to London, Paris, Geneva, Rome, Brussels. Dodd The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/394: Telegram [Document 187] The Ambassador in Mexico ( Daniels ) to the Secretary of State Vera Cruz , March 9, 1936—11 p.m. [Received March 10—11:20 a.m.] I venture to express the hope that opportunity may offer for the President to tender good offices to avert war in Europe. If we had acted promptly in August, 1914, that catastrophe might have been averted or its tragedy ended earlier. Daniels Memorandum by the Minister in Austria (Messersmith) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/512 [Document 188] Memorandum by the Minister in Austria ( Messersmith ) 69 Vienna , March 9, 1936. Perhaps the most important single basic factor disturbing Europe today is that facts are not being generally faced and given the interpretation which common sense dictates and met with the action which elementary prudence obviously requires. This applies whether the facts be political, economic or fiscal. The greatest danger and the one which threatens to destroy Europe is not facing the facts with respect to Germany and Italy, particularly with respect to Germany, in which the situation is essentially more dangerous, because of its nature and the potential power of the forces behind it. The facts with respect to Germany are known, but they have not been consistently faced. In some countries there has been an effort through press control, entire or partial, to keep the facts from the people, and Europe is now hampered in facing facts through an unprepared public opinion. Even in some of the best informed foreign offices and in some well informed financial and industrial circles there is a tendency to hold to illusions and to hopes which the facts and any common sense interpretation show are without foundation. The fundamental fact which Europe has to face today is that the National Socialist régime in Germany is based on a program of ruthless force, which program has for its aim, first, the enslavement of the German population to a National Socialist social and political program, and then to use the force of these 67 million people for the extension of German political and economic sovereignty over South-Eastern Europe—thus putting it into a position to dominate Europe completely and to place France and England definitely in the position of secondary powers. From this position of vantage the National Socialist program contemplates that Germany will be able to dictate its policies to the rest of the world. Fantastic as this program may seem, it has been and is the program of National Socialist Germany, and the action of Europe in not facing the facts and meeting them with the necessary decision has so far facilitated the various steps in the German program, which has up to now proceeded according to plan. Anyone familiar with German policy before the war must know that it was always one of getting concessions without giving an equivalent. Whether Germany was responsible for the last war has become an academic question, for whatever the true answer may be, we know now that although she came out of that war defeated and prostrate, ever since the end she has been winning victory after victory. If the present progress of fulfillment of the National Socialist program continues, she will become the most powerful country in Europe and its dictator, without striking a warlike blow. This policy of getting concessions without equivalent has only been accentuated since the end of the world war, and the record since 1919 is one of successive concessions to her, and whatever promises may have been given by her have not been kept. Through monies poured into Germany after the war, the German industrial and military structure have practically been built anew. Step by step the loads which Germany carried as a defeated enemy have been removed. Her being released from reparations was followed by a practical denunciation of or refusal to meet other foreign obligations. In not a single instance have her counter-promises, even when entered into voluntarily, been kept. Now we have the most flagrant violation of all. The Locarno agreement, freely entered into, has been torn up at the moment believed to be opportune. At the same time the final act in the destruction of the Versailles Treaty has been played. With its usual cynicism the National Socialist régime and Hitler tear up the agreement which relieved the Rhineland of foreign occupation before the term set in the Versailles Treaty, as well as the Locarno Treaty, and offer to the partners in that same agreement a new one which starts with the provision for the establishment of a demilitarized zone on both sides of the western boundary—knowing full well that this would involve the destruction of the fortifications so laboriously and expensively built up on the French and to a lesser degree on the Belgian side. To appreciate the cynicism of this offer as well as what lies behind it, it is necessary to know, as some do know, that these fortifications are the major thorn not only in the side of the Nazi party, but of the German Army also. They offer practically an invincible barrier to German attack or advance on the west, and this from the military point of view is one of the greatest hindrances which Germany knows exists to its expansionist plans. The general belief in Germany and elsewhere that the first stages of the next war would be principally in the air does not in any sense lessen the importance which German party and military circles give to the removal of these obstacles to advance in the west. Germany has no intention of taking French territory for the present, not even Alsace and Lorraine. This is something way down in the program, and other things are to be accomplished first. But it knows that behind this line of fortifications France, and perhaps Belgium, are fairly free from German advance, thus giving France a greater freedom of action. The height of cynicism is reached by this offer of Hitler Germany, which must be appraised at what it really is—a step by which the defense of the western powers towards German aggression in all directions is to be weakened. It is known that National Socialist Germany holds as one of its primary doctrines that agreements are only entered into as a means to an end, and that they must be denounced ruthlessly when they have served their purpose. Although this is a fact of which major party leaders themselves have made no concealment in private, the western powers have not accepted it as a fact, and England entered into a naval agreement, on her side in all good faith, and is apparently still interested in an air agreement. France, which knows what the situation is, has been prepared to enter into conversations with Berlin for some time past, as though the agreements arrived at would offer any security. What is the reason for all this? It is the fear which Europe has of war. Europe knows that it lives at a time when war is still an instrument of policy which has to be reckoned with, particularly by Germany. It recognizes this by building up war machines, but when the moments come when the machine so expensively built Up must be used, the fears which dominate Europe prevent action. It is this fear which Europe has of war which National Socialism has been, is and will continue to capitalize. Just as National Socialism is appealing within Germany to all that is most base and at times to what is best in the German character, so without Germany it knows how to play upon the fears of Europe as well as on the better feelings of its people and governments. National Socialist Germany knows that Europe, with the memories of the horrors of the last war, does not want another. It knows that the veterans of the last war in every country, with the horrors of that war still so vivid in their minds, are inclined to listen to and to support peace moves from Germany. It knows that the German population, with an equal horror of war, will support the régime that apparently moves so strongly for peace, although at the same time that régime is feverishly building up a war machine that can only be meant for aggression. National Socialist Germany knows, too, that the military forces of the western powers do not want war, for while it is their job to fight, these forces know too well what fighting means. The policy of National Socialism of a series of faits accomplis towards the gaining of its ends is, therefore, based on this idea that the fear of war outside of Germany will keep off actual war against Germany or definite action against her until Germany herself is ready to strike the crushing blow. In this belief and policy she has had a certain encouragement. It is no secret in Germany that the French had decided to strike should a National Socialist régime come into power in Germany, and they know that when that régime did come, no action was taken. They know that when England saw herself threatened in her communications with the East by Italy, she sent her fleet into the Mediterranean, and the removal of certain units later was as usual misconstrued in Germany as an act of weakness rather than appraised at its real value as an act of British moderation. Every action which National Socialist Germany has taken which could have been used as the basis for determined action against the régime was met by protests. This is what National Socialism is counting on, and that in spite of the lack of a determined stand outside there are still elements in Germany who are against this program is, therefore, all the more astonishing. The external pressure on Germany and the internal pressure of the economic and financial situation as well as certain aspects of the social problem have brought about a position within Germany when another spectacular step was necessary. The internal situation is really bad, and the power of the party among the people really weaker. Just as the reestablishment of obligatory military service, contrary to the provisions of the treaty, was immensely popular in Germany and undoubtedly increased popular morale, so the present disturbed situation in Europe is to be used by the party as a new element to rebuild morale through the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Though this has involved the tearing up of what was left of the Versailles Treaty, as well as the denunciation of Locarno, Germany hopes that the powers will show the same inaction before this fait accompli as when faced by the others, and if she gets away with it, her position internally as well as externally will be correspondingly temporarily strengthened. The disregard which the National Socialist Party has of its acts in a disturbed world is again shown. The fate of the party is the primary consideration, and it is particularly significant in this respect to note that in his Reichstag speech on March 7 Hitler made it clear that whatever happened within Germany and whatever Germany chose to do within Germany concerned her alone. This statement is not in itself so obnoxious, but those who heard the statement realize that its significance lay in the tone and the spirit behind it rather than in the words. It was the arrogant expression of the attitude of the National Socialist Party that it is a law to itself in all matters, and it is this which has made it an international outlaw. The ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact 70 with all that it involves is a real blow to German aspirations in South-Eastern Europe. As a final measure to avoid its effects and to tear away England from France, Germany denounces Locarno, to which both England and France cling, and properly so, and offers to England’s popular opinion an air pact and return to Geneva—knowing that both these offers, vague as they are, will find a response in widely divergent British circles. If Germany gets away with the tearing up of the Locarno agreement, the situation in South-Eastern Europe will gradually become hopeless so far as resistance to Germany is concerned. Versailles and St. Germain were not popular in some parts of South-Eastern Europe in many ways, and the tearing up of the Versailles Treaty could be looked upon in some of these countries with a certain complacence, if not satisfaction. The tearing up of Locarno, however, without adequate reaction by the western powers will be interpreted by South-Eastern Europe to mean that the road through them and to their absorption is open. If England and France permit Germany to get away with this fait accompli , certainly the Austrians will realize that if the next fait accompli is in this direction, England and France will be even less likely to do anything. They will know here that the tearing up of Locarno is a definite and direct threat to England and France and that if this is not met, then certainly a fait accompli in the direction of Austria, which would be a less definite threat to England and France apparently, but which is as real a one in fact, would also not be met. It is difficult to forecast what the effect of the Rhineland occupation and of the tearing up of Locarno will be, but anyone who heard the Hitler speech will realize what it means. To read it is not enough, and it was necessary to hear it to realize what it means. Anyone who heard it and who knows the real temper of the party and of its leader must realize that the words of the peace offer mean nothing and that it was full of veiled threats in every direction. It was a peace speech held in a warlike tone, and there were moments when the enmity and bitterness broke through. Hitler’s references to the need of room for expansion for the German people and the comparison which he made in the speech relative to the amount of territory per person were meant to play upon what has been made a popular desire for colonies. While he deliberately left the inference that the next move would be in the direction of colonies, information from party sources would indicate that the next item on the program is in reality Austria. The remark which Hitler made about having no territorial aspirations did not sound convincing to those who know, and it was one of the few statements which he made on which he did not expand. At least four months ago, it was known what the next German move would be and that it would be the reoccupation of the Rhineland. It was known that this move would be made, and at the first opportune moment. This information came from party sources, and time has shown how correct it was. The same party sources indicated at that time that after the reoccupation of the Rhineland the next step would be the absorption of Austria. If Hitler endeavored to divert attention in his speech from Austria to colonies, it is only one of the characteristic moves of the Hitler régime. The consternation which this move by Germany will cause in South-Eastern Europe will be hidden for the present behind a certain calm, but the consequences are going to be real and may be disastrous. The people throughout South-Eastern Europe have already a deep-seated fear of German military and economic power and a real respect for it. They see National Socialist Germany as the only country in Europe with a definite program, which in spite of great internal difficulties and passive resistance from the outside, it is carrying through point by point. Unwillingly this has earned a certain respect for the power of Germany, no matter how harshly the régime itself may be condemned. If now these countries see Locarno torn up and this recent action met only by words, by conversations with Berlin, and perhaps by more agreements, which they know Germany will tear up just as ruthlessly as those already entered into, the spirits of the people in this part of the world will be prepared for what so many already feel is after all inevitable. The real resistance to German advance which has been built up in Austria and in these other countries will gradually inevitably disappear, leaving the way open for advance and absorption by Germany. The conversations between Berlin and Rome which preceded the Hitler move on March 7 were apparently fruitless. They were fruitless because Italy was not prepared to burn her bridges behind her and hopes to get as a price for non-participation in the tearing up of Locarno the fulfilment of her major aims in Abyssinia. If Italy does get out of this move of Hitler’s satisfaction in Abyssinia and enters into a concert again with France and England, the position in Central Europe will be improved, but the Italian question will not be settled, for she will have won her aims by international blackmail, and this is a precedent and a habit which when once established is not easily eradicated. If, on the other hand, Italy does not get full satisfaction in Abyssinia out of the present disturbed situation, it will undoubtedly come closer to Berlin, but it does not seem likely that any agreement will be made between Rome and Berlin which for the present will endanger the Austrian position. Even if Italy does not get satisfaction in Abyssinia, or full satisfaction, it is not likely that she is yet prepared to sacrifice Austria. As long as Italy sees a chance of holding to its position, it is not likely that she will sacrifice Austria or make a bargain with Berlin at Austria’s expense. The Austrian position is, therefore, not so definitely threatened in the immediate future, and the German advance on Austria is at least for the present held up. This probable respite of some months does not in itself help the Austrian position in the long run, and the uncertain position is bound to have its repercussions within as well as without the country. The National Socialist movement is probably at its lowest ebb in Austria, but unless the German moves of March 7 are met in a way by England and France and the League which will show real determination and vigor, the Nazi element in the country will grow rapidly stronger, and a change of government may come from within which will throw Austria into the lap of Germany without a single aggressive step on the part of Germany. This internal movement will not take place unless definitely influenced by further developments from without, but if there is weakness or indecision in dealing with Germany now by the powers, the resistance within Austria will be tremendously reduced, and the currents against the Government strengthened. No one under these circumstances would be able to say how long Austria can last, and when Austria goes, the rest of the way through South-Eastern Europe will be easy for Germany. What is almost of equal importance is that parallel with the weakening of the situation in Austria there would follow a similar growth of Nazi currents in other countries of South-Eastern Europe, particularly Rumania and Hungary. There is no question but that the situation in Europe has reached a very grave point as a result of the German action on March 7. One of the most important factors to be borne in mind is that Hitler in his Reichstag speech on March 7 repudiated the promises which he gave openly in the Reichstag at the end of last year and to various representatives of foreign states in Berlin since then—all to the effect that he would respect the agreements voluntarily entered into by Germany, including Locarno. Under these circumstances, what value do any future agreements which the present Government of Germany enters into have? Can anything more be needed to show that the often repeated statement that this Government in Germany has no intention to keep any agreements longer than it finds them useful is so absolutely true? This impossibility to treat with the German régime as well as the still uncertain attitude of Italy, which will desire to get out of the present crisis all that it possibly can, greatly complicates the situation. The task for England and France is as difficult as any by which they have ever been confronted. The only solution would seem to lie in their determined and complete common action expressed in such a way that it will be understandable to public opinion in Germany and throughout Europe and most unmistakably to those in control of the Nazi régime in Berlin. There is only one way to deal with the German régime of today, and that is to meet its brutal ruthless action by an equally determined stand. It is the only language which that régime understands, as it is the only language which it can talk. The German Government is by no means sure of its position, and the party within the country is weaker than it has been since it came into power so far as popular support is concerned. Although the reoccupation of the Rhineland will awaken popular approval, the majority of the German people will doubt its wisdom at this time and fear the consequences. If, however, this time the régime gets away with its fait accompli as it has in the past, who can blame an increasing majority of the German people for believing that after all Germany is invincible and has a mission to carry through by the domination of Europe? The majority of the German people still want peace and probably want it as much as the peoples in the rest of Europe. The National Socialist Party, which is deliberately preparing Germany for aggressive war, fears war now just as much as the other governments in Europe fear it, and perhaps even more so. Germany is not prepared for a war, even if it should have Italy on its side, and this is the factor which cannot be left out of the question by the powers in reaching their decision as to how to meet the German action of March 7. Certain factors within Germany are making her weaker, but these continued successes give new life to the party, which feverishly hopes that by these successful steps it may be able to sufficiently lengthen its life until it is able to itself strike the decisive blow. A determined stand by the powers now is almost certain not to lead to war, and it is the only thing which will bring to an end the series of faits accomplis which the German program provides for. It is up to Europe now to decide whether it will face the facts, and there is still time. It is perhaps too much to say that this will be the last chance which Europe has to save itself from the ultimate catastrophe of a great war, but there are many indications that this is the turning point on which the future course towards war or peace will be determined. G. S. Messersmith 69 Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 721, March 9; received March 26. 70 The mutual assistance agreement had been ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies on February 27 and was awaiting action by the Senate; see footnote 4, p. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] . Memorandum by the American Minister in Rumania (Harrison) of a Conversation With the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Titulescu), March 9, 1936 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/549 [Document 189] Memorandum by the American Minister in Rumania ( Harrison ) of a Conversation With the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Titulescu ), March 9, 1936 71 March 9, 1936 A day or so after his return to Bucharest with His Majesty King Carol, I sought an interview with Mr. Titulescu, through his principal secretary, Mr. Racoviceanu. The latter informed me at that time that Mr. Titulescu had taken a bad cold but that he would be glad to arrange a time for me to call as soon as Mr. Titulescu would be able to receive me. After the Hitler speech on March 7th it became evident that Mr. Titulescu would, if his health permitted, leave at once for the meeting of the Council of the League at Geneva. I therefore telephoned Mr. Racoviceanu on Monday morning, March 9th, and reminded him of my request. At five o’clock Mr. Racoviceanu telephoned to say that Mr. Titulescu would be glad to see me for a few minutes before his departure that evening. Mr. Titulescu opened the conversation by stating that in his opinion what the allies needed was a Hitler or a Mussolini. The French, he said, should have immediately mobilized and promptly announced their intention of sending their forces into the demilitarized zone. We would then have seen the British get busy in Berlin to have the German troops withdrawn. As usual, he said, the French had taken a mild course, although he had heard from Paris that they had, in fact, greatly increased their frontier forces. Foolishly, however, they had refrained from making any public announcement to that effect. As regards the possibility of immediate hostilities, Mr. Titulescu replied: “We are now on the way to war—not today, not to-morrow, perhaps—but if the situation is allowed to continue, war is bound to come.” In his opinion the Council of the League will now declare sanctions against Germany. This time, however, it would be a real embargo. It is necessary, he said, to make Germany understand once for all that actions of this character are not permissible. He also informed me, confidentially, that he had received full authority from his government to cut off all trade with Germany if such action should be required of its members by the League. In reply to a question from me, Mr. Titulescu expressed the view that a Danubian arrangement might be reached if it were not for the conflicting aspirations of Germany and Italy in the Danubian Basin. 71 Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 70, March 16; received April 1. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/377: Telegram [Document 190] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) Washington , March 10, 1936—noon. 70. Your 175, March 8, 7 p.m. We understand and appreciate thoroughly the French Government’s desire that we give a public statement with regard to the present situation, but I feel sure that they will also understand that in view of the procedure provided for application to the present situation we do not feel that we could appropriately make any comment at this time. I highly approve of the replies you made to the Minister when he brought up the subject and I wish to commend you also for the timely and informative messages you are sending. Hull The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/393: Telegram [Document 191] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , March 10, 1936—noon. [Received March 10—9:50 a.m.] 184. At the meeting of the Locarno signatories 72 this morning Flandin, after declaring that the question was not one which concerned France and Germany alone but was the concern of all signatories of the Locarno pact, proceeded to set forth the demands of the French Government as follows: 1. That the signatories of Locarno should send what amounts to a virtual ultimatum to Hitler to withdraw his troops from the Rhineland. 2. That the signatories of Locarno should consent to refuse all negotiations with the Reich as long as German troops remain in the Rhineland. 3. That if German troops are withdrawn, negotiations can proceed under article 8 of the Locarno treaty which provides that the Council of the League of Nations can denounce the treaty with the consent of all signatories. 4. If Hitler should refuse to withdraw troops from the Rhineland the Locarno signatories should solidly demand sanctions from the Council of the League of Nations the first of which should be the withdrawal of their ambassadors as a gesture of discontent. Sarraut is now with President Lebrun keeping him informed of the situation. Straus 72 Germany was not included. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/400: Telegram [Document 192] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 10, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 10—12:35 p.m.] 100. The draft statement which Eden prepared on Sunday to make in the House of Commons yesterday 73 was based on the fact that England would not be prepared to negotiate on Hitler’s terms unless these terms should have previously been accepted by France. The Cabinet meeting on Monday morning would not accept this premise and instead put in the clause about standing by France in case of attack and the fact that Hitler’s proposal should be seriously and objectively considered, and further agreed that Lord Halifax should proceed to Paris and Geneva with Eden. The pro-French element in official quarters, however, are seriously disturbed. They claim that Eden’s statement as made not only acquiesces in the repudiation of Locarno but furthermore is a repudiation of England’s recent policy in the Italian-Abyssinian crisis for collective security, and in fact of the very principles of the present League itself. Paris opinion quoted here alleges that the French Ambassador was very much misled by Eden’s conversations over the week end and that France must now put forward the most formidable demands in the hope of extracting something substantial out of the final compromise with England. Atherton 73 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 309 (1935–36), pp. 1808–1813. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/419: Telegram (part air) [Document 193] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , March 11, 1936—9 a.m. [Received March 12—11:50 a.m.] 89. No action has taken place here further than that which I have reported. Geneva is merely attentively watching the attitudes of the governments as revealed in their respective capitals. Viewed from Geneva at present, the implications of what appears to have taken place in its broader aspects seems to me to be substantially as follows: (1) It would appear almost fantastic that the Council be seriously expected to impose sanctions against Germany. The precedent of action against Italy does not, as I have previously suggested, seem to carry any weight. Aside from general political considerations, the probable position of Poland and an almost total disbelief here that Great Britain would support such a measure, in themselves dictate its great improbability. On this score the Ministers of the Balkan Powers inform me that sanctions would be totally impracticable as far as their countries are concerned due to the integration of their commercial existence with Germany. Furthermore the juridicial question which undoubtedly could be invoked respecting such a procedure is so close that should it come to the point a French demand could most probably be denied on legal grounds (Consulate’s despatch 1323 Political, July 12, 1935 74 ). The governing thought here is, no matter what Paris may declare now, that France cannot at least successfully bring such a question of sanctions forward in the Council. (2) In the impasse created by the respective German and Franco-Belgian positions it is generally believed that a compromise must be reached with the French compelled to grant the major concessions. (3) Certain of the Little Entente and Balkan representatives while they have expressed themselves to me as sympathetic toward the general position in which France finds itself and are inclined as are the French to adduce juridical arguments which technically cannot be gainsaid, nevertheless profess themselves to be at a complete loss as to what position their states can or will adopt in various possible exigencies. It is evident that with the prospect before them of far-reaching changes taking place in the European political realm, they feel that their states should not prejudice their cases in advance. (4) The small European neutral powers for the same general reasons with obvious modifications whatever their sentiments may be evidently are undesirous of taking any position. (5) The foregoing decidedly includes the taking of positions in the Council or in the Committee of Thirteen. The radical change which has taken place in the situation in the entire European political field has in reality moved the center of gravity out of the Covenant. Thus the terms employed in the Covenant and the symbols of expression of the League have with startling suddenness lost their accustomed meaning (Consulate’s 80, March 8, 5 p.m., 75 sixth paragraph). Thus their employment, for example, by the French seems already either outworn or as having a purely partisan significance. I do not believe that I can overstate the change in the character of the League in this respect which in my view has already occurred. While this may be a temporary phase I feel that the League procedures which are about to take place should be observed in the light of this concept. Aside from confusions and uncertainties it is primarily this which warns the small League states to be extremely cautious in actively participating in what up to now has been not only normal League action but action which they were under covenantal obligations to support and which was furthermore a most important feature of their respective foreign policies. The foregoing is of course predicated on the immediate question not being in essence avoided by the Council or possibly through a compromise coming before it in a non-controversial form. (6) I find diplomatic opinion here reiterating the general phrase that Germany’s action is not displeasing to London especially in the opportunity which it may present for a reconstruction of the European situation. This extends to the belief in some quarters that London was cognizant in advance of the German program and tacitly welcomed it in principle although probably not in all of its manifestations. In detail an advantage to the British although of secondary importance is that they are tacitly freed to the extent they may desire from certain commitments in Geneva and to certain League states and can reform their policy independent of these trammels. Thoughts along these lines have been sufficiently stated in private on the part of British officials in the past to indicate the undercurrent of their feelings in this respect. In a more general sense a possibility is opened to London and will presumably be pressed to recapture Great Britain’s balance of power position, her relinquishment of which for immediate ends has obviously irked London more than almost any feature of the recent series of situations. Difficulties are naturally perceived in a reconciliation of British aspirations respecting the continent and the threat to the Empire in the Italian position in Africa—to the extent that the concept is true that the latter in reality constitutes such a threat. I believe it may be seen, however, that although Germany’s recent action is of advantage to Rome certainly technically as respects the League and also as a compelling diversion, it is not necessarily to Italy’s fundamental advantage. While London would undoubtedly in view of her two diverse interests wish to handle the German and Italo-African situations independently it does not seem that this would be possible except to a limited degree. Associating these interests it may be believed possible that London can successfully reassure Italy respecting the fundamental German threat in southeastern Europe and obtain in return some concessions respecting Africa. (7) I am still inclined to believe that any European reconstruction program advanced by London would for excellent tactical reasons be based on a project for League reconstruction (Consulate’s 80, final paragraph). A particular difficulty is naturally seen in harmonizing Russia’s membership in the League with Germany’s expressed attitude which situation is obviously complicated by Franco-Russian and Russian Eastern European involvements. In this connection I have learned that certain American organizations are re-constituting their efforts in this respect which includes, although presumably remotely, the bringing of the United States into the picture (Consulate’s despatch No. 1209 Political, March 21, 1935 76 and previous referred to therein). (8) The Argentine and Chilean representatives have called upon me and in the course of a general discussion of the situation have expressed their extreme anxiety over the necessity of their participating in the Council and in the Committee of Thirteen, seeing undesirable involvements flowing from almost any position they might adopt. They tell me that they are as yet without instructions for which they have urgently telegraphed but volunteered to inform me of their nature when they are received. Gilbert 74 Not printed. 75 Not printed. 76 Not printed. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/460: Telegram [Document 194] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 11, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 11—9:25 a.m.] 102. The Cabinet agreed that Eden should go to Paris in response to the summoning of the Locarno signatories merely as a gesture to the French. His instructions were to undertake no binding commitment and to leave Paris by Wednesday. When it became evident that the British and French attitudes were irreconcilable as to the terms under which negotiations could be opened under the Hitler proposals the Cabinet welcomed the changes of venue from Paris and Geneva to London, particularly since this would permit of more direct consultation with the German representative. The French have stiffened in their attitude considerably since the Sunday conversations with Eden for the reasons given in my 100, March 10, 4 p.m., and I understand are now endeavoring to obtain a perpetuation of the promise of temporary support to France and Belgium given by Eden in his Monday’s statement in the House of Commons. In the London view this is an impossible request since it would be equivalent of the formation of a military alliance between Great Britain, France and Belgium. In this connection the Russian Ambassador here, under instructions, yesterday made known his Government’s opposition to negotiations with Germany and Russia’s anxiety in effect to foster the further encirclement of Germany through the “most resolute action” by the League Council. The belief is current here that Germany will send a representative to London, possibly Ribbentrop, 77 but it is still doubtful whether he will be empowered to attend the League Council meeting scheduled here for the week end. Atherton 77 Joachim von Ribbentrop, German special representative for the Chancellor of the Reich; appointed, March 17, 1936, German representative to the 91st League of Nations Council session. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/409: Telegram [Document 195] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 11, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 11—12:40 p.m.] 69. My 66, March 9, 7 p.m. In conversation with Foreign Office official last night it was learned that Neurath and Bülow 78 had been opposing German participation at Friday’s Geneva meeting. We have reason to believe that personal questions enter largely into this attitude, including Neurath’s lack of capacity for such a job and the undesirability of having Ribbentrop finally selected. Our Foreign Office informant who is directly concerned with the present situation said in confidence that they have a practical plan for bilateral demilitarization of the Franco-German frontier which would take into account the present French fortifications. The zone would be of different degrees commencing with an unoccupied strip up to the French fortifications on the French side and of corresponding depth on the German side without any military force or fortifications. Next a second section which could be fortified but not manned and occupied only by pickets and sentries. Then a third section with small detachments and supports but no large garrisons. In this way a zone of any desired depth could be mutually established. My informant stated that the Foreign Office did not consider the French were at present in any mood for discussion and the Foreign Office was holding this plan back in secret awaiting a favorable moment to present itself. Regarding the memorandum, 79 we are told on excellent authority that while the technical phrasing of the seven points was by Gaus, Chief of the Legal Division in the Foreign Office, Hitler himself really prepared the memorandum. Dodd 78 Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 79 See telegram No. 60, March 7, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in Germany, p. 207 [ Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] . The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/407: Telegram [Document 196] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , March 11, 1936—2 p.m. [Received March 11—11:45 a.m.] 197. I called upon Flandin this morning to convey to him the message contained in your 70, March 10, 12 noon, at which he showed some disappointment and expressed the hope that the American press might give some moral support to the French thesis. I told him it was difficult here to know just how it could be effected. I then asked him how he regarded the present outlook and he said somewhat improved. I remarked that the Belgian thesis (see my 190, March 10, 9 p.m. 80 ) which had no doubt been suggested to Van Zeeland 80a by him, an implication which seemed to please him, had seemed adroit. He said that Belgium certainly could not be accused of having broken Locarno and that because of Belgium’s relations with England he hoped that some form of collective security would result that would solve present difficulties. He said that by Belgium’s relations to England he meant that the danger of a German attack on England through Belgium was ever present in the public mind there and that any fears of Belgium were immediately reflected in England. He added that he felt that all over the continent of Europe that Germany’s action had caused great uneasiness and had solidified the desire for collective security. He said that Germany’s continued occupation of the demilitarized zone could not be tolerated. Repeated to London, Berlin, Moscow, Rome, Geneva. Straus 80 Not printed; the pertinent passage reads: “It appears that Van Zeeland, for Belgium, took the lead in the demand for sanctions against Germany pointing out that his country was injured by the occupation of the demilitarized zones and that there was no vestige of excuse for this injury as Belgium had made no pact with Soviet Russia or otherwise given the faintest color to German argument of a breach of Locarno.” (740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/402) 80a Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/410: Telegram [Document 197] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 11, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 11—1:20 p.m.] 71. The German official situation is again most noncommittal. The evidence of collaboration a few days ago with Mussolini is modified today by report that Mussolini is sending two army divisions again to the Brenner Pass zone. The shift of Conference from Paris to London is counted most favorable here. It is clear once more that London and Paris are again trying to manipulate the ticklish situation. Hitler and his advisers were willing to violate the Locarno pact because they knew of the differences and self-interests involved. It is the old story of European balancing of interests and powers, not the sacredness of treaties or League decisions. All powers here watch the United States attitudes closely. They are now convinced that no influence whatever will be applied until after the elections of next autumn. Consequently Mussolini’s thanks to Congress 81 and Hitler’s fairly safe challenges of March 7. If any change begins to appear here I shall try to inform the Department. Dodd 81 See telegram No. 68, March 3, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Italy, vol. iii , p. 191 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/422: Telegram [Document 198] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 12, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 12—3:50 p.m.] 108. Foreign Office has just informed me that at conclusion of the lunch, reported in my 105, March 12, 1 p.m., 82 the situation was at a complete deadlock. The British consider both the Germans and the French are “bluffing”. German action on Saturday 82a was done on the spur of the moment by Goering and Goebbels 83 in direct conflict with Neurath, Blomberg 84 and Schacht; 85 in other words, the radical opposed to the conservative forces in Germany, neither of which want war at this time. The French are aware of this situation and believe the split to be to their advantage. The French, consequently, are insisting that Germany shall withdraw her troops from the Rhineland as a preliminary to any negotiations, even with the unexpressed assumption that German troops may later be permitted to return to the Rhineland thereby the integrity of the treaty being maintained. Although Flandin has denied the following, the British feel eventually the French would accept symbolic withdrawal. The British are inclined to think that theirs is the realistic point of view and that grounds should be found for opening negotiations either by Hitler’s stating that he will voluntarily undertake symbolic withdrawal from the Rhine to facilitate negotiations or by France’s finding a formula which will permit the Locarno Powers to negotiate with Germany. England has pointed out that neither they nor the French desire war, nor indeed does the German Reichswehr. Consequently the French must refrain from attempting a purely legalistic attitude. France, however, is being hard pressed to such an attitude by the Soviets and the Little Entente officials all of whom point out that the occupation of the demilitarized zone by Germany negates the value of French aid to them. It is stated there is no direct contact between Berlin and London and the British do not expect a special German representative to be sent to London now. The Italians are merely adopting a somewhat cynical onlooker’s attitude rather to the chagrin of the French. Britain feels that Belgium has a strong case, particularly in view of her need for the demilitarized zone, and that she is suffering because of the alleged threat of the Franco-Soviet pact. Belgium’s position accordingly is to attempt to be honest broker between the French and British. Foreign Office again confirmed that it will be impossible to hold Council meeting unless Locarno Powers are previously in accord. It was admitted the picture may change any moment but great skepticism was expressed as to whether any concrete advance will be achieved in today’s meeting. Repeated to Paris, Bern, and Rome. Atherton 82 Not printed. 82a March 7. 83 Joseph Goebbels, German Minister for National Enlightenment and Propaganda. 84 Gen. Werner von Blomberg, German Minister of Defense. 85 Hjalmar Schacht, German Minister of Economic Affairs and President of the Reichsbank. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/394: Telegram [Document 199] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico ( Daniels ) Washington , March 12, 1936—5 p.m. 51. Your March 9, 11 p.m. I have conveyed your message to the President and he asks me to express his appreciation for your suggestion and the spirit in which it is offered and to say that we are following the developments closely and are hopeful that the procedure provided for this situation will obviate any necessity for drastic action. Phillips The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/425: Telegram [Document 200] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 12, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 12—7:45 p.m.] 74. An official statement has just been issued through the Deutsches Nachrichtenburo “in response to various press reports and remarks of foreign statesmen”. This long and somewhat rambling statement, repeating various arguments regarding the Locarno treaty and Franco-Soviet pact, would prove in detail French security as abundantly realized through herself and her alliances, defends Germany from giving annexing fear to France and recites and discusses the proposals made last Saturday underlying German desire for European understanding through “sincere negotiations with France and other European powers.” Concluding on this note the statement says: “What the German Government is striving for is not the conclusion of treaties which after all remain outwardly and inwardly unreliable because they would be united with moral burdens for an honor-loving and decent people; it is striving for a real and actual pacification of Europe for the next quarter of a century. This means a pacification which bears the character of an absolute European imperial system built up on the free decisions of equal European nations and states; however, should this conception not receive the approval of the other governments then the German Government will of course withdraw its suggestion and counting on the trustworthiness, the fidelity and the historical spirit of sacrifice and sense of sacrifice of the German people will from now on prefer to elect an honorable isolation than to live as a nation discriminated against in the community of others.” On first impression this document is not so much challenging as querulous and argumentative. It is probably only a part of the diplomatic maneuvers preliminary to the London Council meeting. On the other hand, this statement may evidence a growing impatience on Hitler’s part resulting from rash counsel of his radical associates. While not giving exaggerated importance to these factors yet I am somewhat apprehensive of this sort of polemics in connection with a man of Hitler’s unstable and explosive character on the one hand and on the other hand taking into account the deep feeling of outraged sensibilities and nervous distrust in France. Should this sort of thing continue and the French persist in their refusal to consider the constructive aspects of the Hitler proposals, there might be a rapid development to a point where he and his associates would become convinced that France and her allies were definitely headed for military intervention in Germany or its economic strangulation. Hitler might then decide instantly on action. I have talked over this point with the Military Attaché and he has made the following observations: There need be no mobilization in Germany today in the 1914 sense of the word as all existing German war units are now at war strength and military movements can be executed with almost complete secrecy. The German war plan, based on Poland remaining neutral, is believed to provide for a strategic defensive on the west front, which Major Smith believes the Germans could successfully hold, and a rapid offensive overpowering of Czechoslovakia. The eruption of Germany into Czechoslovakia would be launched instantly and in overwhelming force as the German General Staff would insist on the annihilation of the Czechoslovak “menace”, once it is believed in Berlin that France plans to take military action in the Rhineland. While I do not wish to be alarming and still feel that the chances favor a constructive outcome of the situation, I have felt it necessary to submit the above. Dodd The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/424: Telegram [Document 201] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 12, 1936—10 p.m. [Received March 12—6:20 p.m.] 113. This evening shows no great change although French Embassy states that Eden informed Flandin that if France did not press this Government too hard, he hoped to bring British public opinion to understand French position more clearly. This afternoon the German Ambassador, referring to a conversation that he had at the Foreign Office yesterday, informed Eden that Germany cannot enter into discussions bearing on the nature of sovereignty over German territory but that the present movement of troops into the Rhineland was only symbolical and numbered only 19,000. He went on to say there would be no increase of these numbers nor would they be stationed near the frontiers during the period of negotiation if France and Belgium would give a similar understanding. I understand the communiqué issued at the end of this afternoon’s meeting has been cabled by press. The Locarno Powers will meet again tomorrow morning. There is a noticeable increase in public tension this afternoon. Atherton The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/520 [Document 202] The Ambassador in Poland ( Cudahy ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 1053 Warsaw , March 12, 1936. [Received March 26.] Sir : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On March 10 I called on the French Ambassador, M. Noel, who confirmed the press statement concerning his meeting on March 7, 1936, with Foreign Minister Beck. He said that Colonel Beck had summoned him to this meeting following a conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which he understood the Prime Minister and Inspector-General Rydz-Smigly conferred with the Foreign Minister. He said that Colonel Beck gave him assurance that Poland would adhere to the Franco-Polish alliance and that there would be no wavering in its commitment under that treaty. The Ambassador told me very confidentially that he believed that General Rydz-Smigly had inspired this utterance of the Foreign Office and that how serious it should be taken would be contingent upon how onerous the assistance demanded of Poland in fulfillment of its obligation under the Franco-Polish alliance. He said that the important thing was that the army, which he considered the real power in Poland, had thus gone on record for adherence to the alliance in the present crisis between France and Germany, and that this word of reassurance gave him a limited feeling of confidence. The Ambassador did not attempt to conceal his emotion concerning the turn of events caused by Hitler’s declaration. He said that at the time of the peace negotiations Foch had pointed out to the Allies that the destruction of the German fleet and disarmament meant security from the German menace only for a time and that France would be unprotected in years to come unless provided with a frontier as invulnerable as it was then possible to achieve. Foch had therefore insisted upon a military line delimited by the Rhine. But in this contention he had been overruled and in compromise the demilitarized zones of the Rhineland had been established. France would never have consented, the Ambassador said, to the present frontier had it not felt that the guarantee of the Allies under the Versailles treaty made certain a demilitarized zone. The Ambassador said that his information was that instead of a “symbolic” occupation German troops were now in possession of all Rhineland garrisons in “formidable” numbers. He said that the outstanding feature of the situation was a devastating realization that as far as Germany was concerned diplomacy meant faits accomplis in defiance of sacred international commitments. This conduct, he insisted, was the method of the revolutionary and a travesty on every honorable settlement between nations. It was ridiculous that Hitler dropping from his hands the fragments of two treaties—Versailles and the Locarno—should come into court and express willingness to enter any pact for the security of Europe. The signature of Germany would in the future be meaningless, the Ambassador stated; good faith on the part of that country in all treaty obligations had been effectually destroyed. He went on to say that the German Chancellor’s arguments were childish in their reasoning. Hitler’s pretext that the Franco-Soviet pact violated the Locarno treaty and thus freed Germany from its obligation under Locarno was absolutely unfounded. If Hitler’s contention was honest he had a remedy provided by Article 3 of the Locarno treaty which made obligatory by judicial means the settlement of differences concerning the treaty. Hitler’s argument, the Ambassador said, was a juridical one and afforded no basis whatsoever for his brutal political action. Asked if, under the present circumstances the French Senate would ratify the Franco-Soviet treaty, the Ambassador replied that he was certain ratification would take place at the next meeting of the French Senate on March 12. He said that failure to ratify now would make it appear as if Hitler had dictated by arrogant threat to France and this was an intolerable contemplation. He said that he was very pessimistic and regarded the week ending March 14 as the most critical for Europe since the summer of 1914. He said that public sentiment in France was united back of the Government in dealing unyieldingly with Germany. He expressed the opinion that France was far more united than in 1914 when the Left element was distinctly hostile to the war. Now French Socialists and Communists presented an unbroken front and the sentiment against Hitler was unanimous. On March 111 called on Count Jan Szembek, Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He stated that Foreign Minister Beck had made a solemn promise to Ambassador Noel that Poland would remain faithful to its commitments under the Franco-Polish alliance. He said that the Polish Government did not construe the occupation of the demilitarized zone by German troops as “an aggressive action” against France demanding military assistance from Poland under the alliance, that an actual invasion of French soil would be necessary before Poland would be bound to act. He said that if France were to send troops into the demilitarized zone in an effort to eject German military occupation such action on the part of France would not be regarded as “defensive” under the terms of the Franco-Polish alliance and that Poland did not feel under obligation to render assistance to France under these circumstances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Poland will proceed very cautiously. It is believed that Minister Beck will take advantage of the present crisis to insist before the League of Nations that in return for the participation of Poland in any proposed scheme of security that consideration must be given to the protection of Polish territorial integrity and the inviolability of Polish frontiers as distinguished from the present treaty of Locarno which is regarded as a scheme of security for Western Europe to the exclusion of Polish interests. Every effort, it is believed, will be made by Poland to continue its difficult balancing feat between Russia and Germany; to maintain present highly satisfactory relations with Germany, and at the same time to acknowledge adherence to the Franco-Polish alliance. In the opinion of the Embassy, every attempt will be made to achieve every national advantage and obtain all possible prestige by an avowal of the alliance with France with the hope that no demand will be made for the fulfillment of obligations under the alliance. Respectfully yours, John Cudahy The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/427: Telegram [Document 203] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 13, 1936—2 p.m. [Received March 13—12:13 p.m.] 115. The French Ambassador outlined to me this morning the position to date. In his first talk with Eden on Saturday he impressed upon him the importance of the British press presenting Germany’s act “in its right perspective”. In the French point of view the difference between Italy as an aggressor and Germany as a violator is nil. The basic problem is that both nations are jeopardizing collective security. The French demand some repressive action against Germany as England demanded action against Italy because of Germany’s disregard of the entire system of collective security. On the other hand Britain’s position to date has been more or less to disregard “and to try to solve the present situation by a new rearrangement based on Hitler’s proposals, including further British assurances to France, and League cooperation. 87 However, the English press report on Sunday and Monday did not condemn the German action and the reaction in Germany was buoyant. On Tuesday, due to French efforts in England and, I gather, some of the permanent officials, the press began to take a different attitude which has since increased. Today Baldwin’s speech of last Monday 88 maintaining that the present situation is a Franco-German issue is being supported by a better understanding of the French position. Indeed Eden informed Flandin yesterday that with time English opinion would come to have a better understanding of the true Locarno issue involved. It is evident that in discussions between the French and British that England at the moment is only interested in the question as it concerns England, France and Belgium. Flandin, however, has emphasized that if Germany gets away with this latest act unchecked in any manner the whole group of middle European statesmen who now favor cooperation with the Western Powers, such as Beneš, Titulescu, Prince Paul, 89 et cetera, will in the next 2 years disappear and the youth of certain of those countries whose inclinations are pro-German will control with Germany the destinies of Central Europe. The French have definitely informed the British that there are two issues; one involving the Locarno Powers, and one involving the League Powers, and they are unwilling to consider any postponement of the Council tomorrow if there is not agreement by the Locarno Powers at that time. France recognizes the importance of Belgium in the Locarno conversations since her attitude in the matter is very close to the British position and her case is iron clad. At the last meeting of the Locarno Powers yesterday 90 Flandin put forward the French case very strongly; that is, that Germany has violated a treaty obligation and the collective system, and that some measure of repression must be taken against her. It will not satisfy France that England likewise evades her obligations under Locarno and attempts to create a new situation in which she is endeavoring to find fresh assurances that the French can accept. The British made no reply. Eden then put forward the British Government’s case and the British suggestion for a reexamination of the situation and the negotiation of a fresh agreement, as previously outlined herein. To this the French likewise made no reply and there has been no further exchanges of opinion this morning before the meeting. The French do feel, however, that last night’s communiqué which was issued with particular regard to clarification of the Locarno violation is important not only as showing the trend of the British official mind but in the effect it has had on opinion here today. By air to Paris. Atherton 87 This sentence is apparently garbled. 88 Stanley Baldwin, British Prime Minister, speaking on March 9 in the House of Commons. 89 First Regent of Yugoslavia, for King Peter II. 90 In London, March 12. The Locarno Powers, which, with the exception of Germany, had met in Paris on March 10, resumed their meetings in London, March 12–19. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/429: Telegram [Document 204] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 13, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 13—1:40 p.m.] 116. Foreign Office confirms that the French contentions are being more clearly understood by the British public and that the question for England is being resolved into “war with honor or peace with dishonor”. At this morning’s meeting of the Locarno Powers Van Zeeland presented a formula for discussion. Roughly this demanded a symbolic though limited withdrawal by Germany from the Rhineland, simultaneous to which the conciliation machinery of the Locarno treaty itself be invoked and preparations be undertaken for a conference for a study of the Hitler proposals, et cetera. This Belgian plan also envisaged the fact that the demilitarized Rhineland would be practically totally eliminated, with current loss of security to both France and Belgium and that therefore something in the nature of Eden’s temporary offer of security to France and Belgium made on Monday must be made permanent. This formula is now being studied by a special committee of the Cabinet and Council of Imperial Defence. The French likewise have it under consideration and the Locarno Powers will meet again not earlier than 9 o’clock this evening. Foreign Office states that the League Council will meet tomorrow and after affirming that articles 42 and 43 have been violated will, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, unless the Locarno Powers have reached agreement previously, adjourn until next week. The Foreign Office considers that the fact that all the powers now, including Germany, have a clear idea of each others respective positions is a step towards dissipating yesterday’s tension. Although the Foreign Office avoided a reply to a direct question the rumor persists here in well-informed quarters that Hitler has again been approached asking that he realize the British will be forced into position they are reluctant to assume unless he contributes something beyond the German memorandum reported in my 114, March 13, 1 p.m. 91 The fact that the next Locarno meeting has been postponed until 9 o’clock tonight lends color to this report. Informally advised by a Dominion representative that Canada and South Africa have already indicated to the British that they cannot be counted upon to participate in any extreme measures. Belgian Embassy states Van Zeeland broadcasting to the United States tonight. 92 By air to Paris. Atherton 91 Not printed; the text of the German memorandum transmitted in telegram No. 114 was summarized in the second paragraph of telegram No. 113, March 12, 10 p.m., p. 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] . 92 Reports of the broadcast were carried in the press of March 14. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/431: Telegram [Document 205] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 13, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 13—2:55 p.m.] 117. Aghnides 93 has offered me visitors ticket for Council meeting tomorrow morning to give me the same facilities that Minister Wilson has in Geneva on similar occasions. Are there any objections to my attending? Atherton 93 Thanassis Aghnides, director In the office of the Secretary-General, League of Nations Secretariat. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/431: Telegram [Document 206] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , March 13, 1936—7 p.m. 80. Your 117, March 13, 6 p.m. Considering all the circumstances we think it would be preferable for you not to attend. Phillips Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/480 [Document 207] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 14, 1936. The Turkish Ambassador 94 called upon me this morning, evidently under instructions, to ascertain precisely the position of this Government in the present European situation, and with particular respect to the recent military occupation of the Rhineland by the Hitler Government. The Ambassador said that he had, of course, followed the American press, but he would, nevertheless, like to have a statement from me on the subject. In reply I summarized briefly the attitude of this Government with regard to political European questions; as he well knew, we could not become involved in purely European politics; this did not mean, however, that we were not very much concerned at the present trend of affairs; that we were very much concerned at the present trend of affairs and profoundly hoped that the present problem would find a solution in the discussions which were now taking place in London among the representatives of the Locarno powers and at the meetings of the League Council. I said that the attitude of this Government in keeping “hands off” of European international politics was based on the historical attitude of the American people and did not represent anything new in our foreign policy; the Ambassador was well aware, of course, that we were cooperating very closely with European nations and other nations of the world through the League, disarmament conferences and otherwise, and in humanitarian endeavors, but that these close associations did not include interference with the settlement of European political affairs. In thanking me for my reply the Ambassador said that he had fully anticipated the nature of my reply and merely asked the questions in order to carry out his instructions. William Phillips 94 Mehmet Münir Ertegün. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/442: Telegram [Document 208] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 14, 1936—11 a.m. [Received March 14—10:35 a.m.] 75. So far as could be ascertained from the Foreign Office and otherwise, the only local development yesterday, which doubtless is more fully covered from London, is the pressure being put on Germany to make some gesture to France in withdrawing part of the Rhineland zone forces in order to help the British in their discussions in London. Apparently from long conversations with the French Embassy here this is a matter of real importance and possibly could be the turning point in the situation. When I discussed this with Dieckhoff the impression was gained that the Germans intended to stand pat for the time being following Hoesch’s reply to Eden of Thursday. 95 This for the reason that the Germans do not feel that the critical point in the present stage of the discussions in London will be reached for some time and also because they do not believe that it can result in worse than an impasse. It may be that the Germans are holding in reserve the idea set forth in my 69, March 11, 1 p.m. Regarding representation, Dieckhoff said that they had received nothing further than the formal League notifications; that they were not sending anyone at present and would consider the question if and when they were expressly invited. In addition to the many rumors and conjectures prevalent at this stage of such a situation we found that a number of the most experienced observers were thinking along the lines of our 74, March 12, 8 p.m., considering that the psychological features are perhaps the most important to estimate in so far as practicable. Likewise the question was frequently raised as to just what position the Army would take in the final development of the situation. We found complete agreement in accord with our own ideas that the Army and people would be united behind Hitler if there were an invasion of the Reich or even an ultimatum without a face saving clause. There was disagreement as to what the Army might do if the League or Locarno Powers showed a united front and made some stiff demands constituting a climb down by Germany in the Rhineland which would not be too drastic and showing a desire to discuss the constructive features of Hitler’s memorandum of last Saturday. Repeated Paris, London, Rome, and airmail to Brussels, Geneva. Dodd 95 March 12; see declaration by the German Government, Documents on International Affairs, 1936 (London, Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 81. The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/448: Telegram [Document 209] The Minister in Czechoslovakia ( Wright ) to the Secretary of State Praha , March 14, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 4:50 p.m.] 2. After first impression created by dramatic announcement of last Saturday this country and its officials show increasing calm. Both President and Minister for Foreign Affairs are of the opinion that Germany has gone too far; that her economic situation is far from permitting fulfillment of either of [ the ] threat of military self-sufficiency or economic isolation; that notwithstanding the characteristic psychological blunder which caused her to make a military gesture at an inopportune moment and especially to include a wholly gratuitous gesture of this character toward Belgium, she has actually and probably unwittingly contributed in not inconsiderable measure to the cause of peace by eliminating by her outrageous act a great portion of the intangible and beclouded considerations which have so long obscured the situation and has thus reduced it to its simplest elements. In this opinion my Belgian colleague concurs. If the Council of the League determines upon sanctions Czechoslovakia will cooperate in full accord with the principles of the League, but very reluctantly from a national point-of-view as her commercial relations with Germany forthwith is vital. Neither the President nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that actual application of sanctions will be reached because of increasing signs of Germany’s realization of her weakness, which is evident in her immediate denial of her alleged intention to denounce the agreement for the internationalization of continental rivers 96 and her offers of nonaggression pacts with Austria and Czechoslovakia. In connection with peace, this Government calls attention to its separate arbitration treaty with Germany negotiated at Locarno which it considers has not been invalidated by Germany’s denunciation of the Locarno Pact, which point of view has not been denied either by the German Minister here or by German Foreign Office when Czechoslovakian Minister at Berlin discussed the proposal for a nonaggression pact. This Government does not consider the menace of the Anschluss to be immediate; in fact it considers it more remote. In short, it is officially believed that a profound economic evolution, if not political, is now under way in Germany which this Government compares to that which is taking place in Russia. While alert and as well prepared as its exposed position will permit, this Government is reasonably optimistic as to the eventual outcome. Copies by mail to London, Berlin, Vienna, Geneva. Wright 96 See telegram No. 335, November 16, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Germany, p. 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , reporting the denunciation by Germany of part XII of the Treaty of Versailles. The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/509 [Document 210] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 754 Brussels , March 14, 1936. [Received March 26.] Sir : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Belgian delegation left Brussels for London on Thursday morning, March 12, to take part in preparatory conversations with the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, before the meeting of the League Council on Saturday, March 14. As reported in my telegram No. 15, of March 13, 7 p.m., 97 Mr. van Langenhove, Secretary General of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in reply to an inquiry by the Embassy, outlined and summarized the position taken by the Belgian Prime Minister in the conversations with the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy at Paris and London as follows: (1) Mr. van Zeeland pointed out that Belgium, as a small country with a long frontier bordering on Germany, suffers more than any other country from the denunciation by Germany of the Locarno Pact and the re-occupation of the Rhineland by German troops. (2) Mr. van Zeeland declared that Belgium is not a party to the Franco-Soviet Pact and has always carried out scrupulously its international obligations. (3) Belgium has not advocated and is not advocating sanctions against Germany. (4) Belgium is ready to participate in any collective action taken by the Locarno Powers (other than Germany) and particularly in any action taken by France and Great Britain. (5) Belgium has mediated between France and Great Britain and will continue to attempt to reconcile the British and French points of view so that a common Belgo-Franco-British agreement may be reached. (6) In the case of any new agreement made by the Locarno Powers with Germany, Belgium would insist that the loss suffered by Belgium in the matter of security as a result of the denunciation of the Locarno Pact be compensated. (7) Mr. van Langenhove concluded by saying that although there has been no basic change in the Belgian point of view at Paris and London, the conversations which up to date have taken place between the Locarno Powers have been solely of an exploratory nature. On Saturday morning, March 14, Mr. Leghait, Secretary of Mr. van Langenhove, in reply to an inquiry by the Embassy, stated that Mr. van Langenhove had just received a telephone call from the Belgian delegation in London that at the request of the British and French delegations Mr. van Zeeland had on the previous day undertaken the task of reducing to writing the main points of the British and French positions with a view to reconciling them. See Embassy’s telegram No. 16, of March 14, 1 p.m. 98 The Counselor of the French Embassy told a member of my staff (Mr. Sussdorff) on March 14 that he thought it was quite clear that the Belgian delegation is leaning over toward the British side and putting out such a great effort toward reconciling the British and French views in the hope that it may pull an Anglo-Belgian Genera] Staff agreement out of the fire as a reward for its work. In this connection, he recalled the fact that from about the end of 1920 to 1923, Belgium had endeavored to secure a General Staff agreement with Great Britain along the lines of the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920, 99 but that Great Britain was not willing to accede to the Belgian request at that time. He believes, however, that England might now be willing to enter into such an agreement with Belgium in view of the fact that at the present time Belgium could be useful to England in the matter of air defense. The Belgian press comment concerning Germany’s denunciation of the Locarno Pact and the re-occupation of the Rhineland, which is indicative of sentiment throughout the country, is contained in the Embassy’s despatch No. 755, of March 13, 1936. 1 Respectfully yours, Dave H. Morris 97 Not printed. 98 Not printed. 99 Signed September 7, 1920; for exchange of notes approving the agreement, see British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxiii , p. 939. 1 Not printed. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.00/3579: Telegram [Document 211] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 16, 1936—noon. [Received 2:25 p.m.] 78. Please show to the President. Perhaps brief explanation of situation here may be of some benefit. There are two groups. One of these headed by Goering with Goebbels support in spite of former hostilities. This group has great ambitions and intense hatreds. They have been ready to support Mussolini in the hope of annexing Austria. The other group is headed by Von Neurath a representative of the old régime and supported by Schacht whose economic situation is always dangerous. These men are in accord with the older generals of the Reichswehr. They have favored negotiations about the Rhine zone, colonies and reentrance into the League. Peace is to them, even high army people, the first objective at least for 2 years. Hitler assumes the role of an arbitrator, his attitude always supposed to be taken only after listening to the arguments of both groups. But he has many times denounced the Treaty of Versailles as the worst ever written yet proclaimed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk 2 as admirable. This causes statesmen, if we have such in Europe, to doubt even the most solemn promises of the Chancellor. One sees then how Mussolini’s war upon Ethiopia offered a possibility here. The French had promised the Duce a free hand in January 1935 the English hardly aware that Mussolini’s aim was ultimately to annex Egypt but quite conscious of the Italian aircraft danger. When the issue became acute in September the great majority of the Germans seemed to me hopeful that the hated Italians would fail and the dictatorship there collapse many of them counting on escape here from their own dictatorship. They looked, therefore, to the United States for assistance to League sanctions with great expectations. It would be the first real setback of dictatorships—the avoidance of another European war. Hitler and Germany zealously watched events most anxiously from September to December, conversations here always anxious but hopeful of a better day. Then came the Hoare-Laval performance and the news that the United States washed its hands for good and have nothing at all to do with Europe. The aggressive elements here began to press the Chancellor to profit from the dangers in the Mediterranean and the growing difficulties between England and France. They would denounce the Franco-Soviet pact, have their colonies restored, march again into the Rhine zone and perhaps please England by returning to the declining League. From the middle of December to the first of March the two groups contended here for a decision by the Chancellor, the strength of the Nazi party declining because of religious and economic dangers. The situations offered Hitler a great opportunity. He would make utmost use of the Italian situation, challenge France by sending troops into the Rhine zone, denounce the Russian Peace Pact in violent speech with a probable Japanese understanding, conciliate England by talking about returning to the League and touching some Americans by talking about Woodrow Wilson. The generals yielded, Von Neurath and Schacht surrendered, and German militarism and hatreds were aroused. It was the best time to call for another national mandate in favor of the dictatorship. Nearly everybody fell into line. France and England cannot agree, Mussolini gives out pro-German statements and Poland is afraid to make a move until actual war breaks. It is dictator Europe against Western Europe, the German people offering more of a solid front than at any time since 1914. Hitler means in my judgment to give the appearance of peaceful cooperation for a year or two and then apply the medieval claims to the Danube zone all the way to the Black Sea. If Germany supports Italy’s plan to be another Roman Empire and Italy yields to Germany’s plan to dominate the Balkan zone what can the conference in London do? Dodd 2 Signed March 3, 1918; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1918, Russia, vol. i , p. 442 . The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/457: Telegram [Document 212] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 16, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 16—5:45 p.m.] 79. My 77, March 16, 11 a.m. 3 Dieckhoff has just discussed with Mayer the German reply to the invitation 4 to participate at the Council meeting in London as follows: The German Government was prepared to accept provided its action of March 7 was not split up and only the demilitarized-zone feature dealt with. For this reason the reply was worded as it was. The German Government, however, did not desire to express a peremptory wish or preference with regard to the discussion of its constructive proposals and merely desired to be certain that they would be considered “in normal consequence”, i. e. when the question of the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone had been sufficiently considered, then the German proposals should have their day in court. There had been an unfortunate translation of the German word “alsbald” as “immediately” in the reply’s penultimate sentence which dealt with this point. As explained above, the word was meant rather as in due course. The reference to the British Government in the last sentence of the reply resulted from the fact that the British Ambassador had seen Neurath Saturday evening to express, on the instruction of his Government, the hope that Germany would decide to accept the invitation and participate at the Council meeting. Likewise, Phipps had called on Hitler Sunday on the latter’s return from Munich and had discussed the situation with him in the same sense. These two visits are still confidential, I understand. The German Government was very understanding of the difficulties of the British Government and wished to help them all they could. They felt, however, that it was not practicable to make any gesture of withdrawal of troops as they feel that the present total of 36,000 men in the demilitarized zone should not give offense to the French Government. There had been quite a variety of reactions to the German reply in different countries and circles. Flandin had apparently moderated his first impression. The French Minister had taken the same realistic and constructive view which had characterized Van Zeeland’s speech at the Council meeting. It was too soon to tell how the situation would finally develop but it was hoped that the German position would be understood and that the situation would work out constructively. It was probable that either Neurath or Ribbentrop would be the German representative if Germany participated in the Council meeting. Mayer got the impression that it would likely be Ribbentrop with Dieckhoff as his assistant. Thus far Avenol had merely acknowledged receipt of the German reply which he had communicated to the Council. The Military Attaché who has just been to the German War Ministry says that it has noted nothing disturbing in the military reaction of any neighboring country. He reports further that the British Military Attaché has been in constant and friendly contact with the German War Ministry throughout the entire time. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, Geneva, Brussels. Dodd 3 Not printed. 4 For texts of invitation and of reply, see League of Nations, Official Journal , April 1936, p. 316. The Minister in Yugoslavia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/460: Telegram [Document 213] The Minister in Yugoslavia ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Belgrade , March 17, 1936—10 a.m. [Received 11:30 a.m.] 11. In conversation with Prime Minister he stated that while appreciating extreme gravity of European situation he is optimistic of eventual peaceful solution. Nevertheless in case of failure Yugoslavia like other Little and Balkan Entente countries must give France full and unqualified support. Yugoslav economic life has been seriously disrupted by sanctions against Italy which were adopted most reluctantly and Government is therefore greatly alarmed and opposed to possibility of being forced to adopt similar action against Germany its next most important customer with which its profitable commercial relations have been showing constant improvement. Wilson The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/465: Telegram [Document 214] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 17, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 17—4:27 p.m.] 80. The Foreign Office has just informed us of the receipt of a communication from the British Government 5 assuring it of the British Government’s interest in a peaceful solution of the present situation and stating that any proposals made in London either by the German Government or others should be discussed in due course. The German Government considers this the best that can be expected under the circumstances and has telegraphed Avenol that the German delegation will be in London Thursday morning, Ribbentrop to be the representative. He will be accompanied by Dieckhoff and Woermann of the Foreign Office, the latter being of the Legal Section. These men represent different elements here and Dieckhoff is very able, liberal and well informed. This eases tension here a good deal. The German Government realizes that the first days will not be pleasant and seems prepared to face this with the idea that the German Government will thereafter have the opportunity to present its proposals. Will cable further important news when we are able to get any. Repeated to Paris, Rome, Geneva. Dodd 5 Documents on International Affairs, 1396 , p. 90. The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/576 [Document 215] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 139 Oslo , March 17, 1936. [Received April 7.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 133 of March 10, 1936, 6 in which the Norwegian views regarding the action of Germany in establishing a military occupancy of the Rhineland were set forth. In relation to the statements made on the second page of this communication concerning Scandinavian joint representation, through Denmark, in the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, it seems of interest to record the stated refusal of Dr. Munch, Foreign Minister of Denmark, to commit the Northern States to a policy of sanctions in consequence of Germany’s alleged breach of the Locarno Pact and the Versailles Treaty through the dispatch of troops into the demilitarized zone. According to my information, Dr. Munch, acting on behalf of the other Scandinavian Governments, is basing his attitude on the stand taken last year, when, following the German declaration of intention to introduce general military service (March 16, 1935) 7 those States had declared that, not being signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, they would take no action in the matter. It is my understanding, obtained from a well-informed official source, that Dr. Munch’s announced antagonism to sanctions had, in view of his joint representation of the interests of the Northern nations, come as a veritable “bombshell” into the current deliberations at London. It would, accordingly, seem that, coupled with the firm insistence on the part of the British and Belgian representatives at London that there shall be no war, and in view of their known opposition to the imposition of sanctions against Germany, this additional evidence of European lack of sympathy with extreme measures may serve to temper French intransigence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 6 Not printed. 7 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 294 – 321 , passim . The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/471: Telegram [Document 216] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State Oslo , March 18, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 18—12:47 p.m.] 20. In the belief that the Department may be interested I venture to report consolidation of information received from sources I consider authoritative from which it becomes evident that the British Government will propose at intervals during the next 12 months various portions of a most comprehensive peace plan of realistic character constituting veritable European new deal providing inter alia for equality for Germany and security for France and Belgium. Summary of plan for which Neville Chamberlain 8 is largely responsible follows: Tension now existing as a result of Italo-Ethiopian conflict and Franco-German differences will first be relieved through cessation of African hostilities on realistic basis. Sanctions to be suppressed against Italy and excluded from application to Germany while the Franco-Russian pact is eventually to be referred to Hague Tribunal. Secondly, a series of pacification pacts between Western Europe as suggested by German Chancellor and also a new Locarno providing for international patrol forces in Rhineland. Finally, convocation of a general conference on armament for the purpose of obtaining promise of annual report of changes contemplated by each country in order that element of surprise may be removed from international military situation. Participation of the United States in such a conference believed to be possible. Biddle 8 British Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/475: Telegram [Document 217] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 18, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 18—6:50 p.m.] 85. I submit the following as certain important objectives and considerations at the London discussions as viewed from Berlin: First. French efforts to persuade England, in default of immediate economic or military action against Germany, to make an agreement on the lines of the abortive 1919 Anglo-American-French treaty 9 or of the so-called Geneva protocol of 1924. 10 This is in accord with the constant French pressure on England throughout the post-war period to have such a British guarantee which has, as a matter of fact, come ever closer to realization as England has found it necessary to occupy herself more and more with the continent and in her new position of champion of the League. As opposed to this French thesis, the German view is that France can accomplish the same end by the “new Locarno” and other proposals in Hitler’s memorandum; that this would avoid a return to the policy of pre-war alliances achieving the desired result in the modern cooperative manner. Second. The military reoccupation of the Rhineland zone and especially its fortification which Germany intends is a serious threat to the preponderance of French influence in central and eastern Europe if indeed it does not definitely end it. With the Rhineland zone as provided in the Versailles treaty, the French army constituted a conserved threat against Germany if and when she might undertake a military adventure either against Russia or in the Danubian region. It was this which has given France such dominating influence in central and eastern Europe as much as the weakness of the Germany army under the Versailles treaty. With the demilitarized zone reoccupied and fortified, France and if necessary Belgium also may be contained by a relatively moderate force and thus prevented from creating an effective immediate military diversion in support of the Little Entente or Russia. In brief, a fortified Rhineland zone and the powerful army which Germany proposes to have would seem to spell the end of France’s present position on the continent. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Geneva. Dodd 9 Signed June 28, 1919; for text, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 757 . 10 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, October 2, 1924; for text, see League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 24, Annex 13, p. 107. Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/590 [Document 218] Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) 11 [ Bern ,] March 18, 1936. As to what is taking place in London, Mr. Motta 12 is not better informed than the daily press. He says that events seem to be happening with such rapidity and the scene shifting with such complexity that the Swiss Legation finds it difficult to do more than keep abreast of the general currents as reported in the press. In respect to the general question, Mr. Motta says that whereas, as I knew, he had been inclined to side with the French in the discussions with Great Britain in respect to the Ethiopian question, now he was, on the contrary, inclined to side with the British point of view in respect to the Rhineland invasion. The further he understands the British point of view in respect to this matter, the more clearly he sees that it matches his own. He thinks the French have gone far too far in their legal conceptions. He points out that international affairs cannot be construed on a purely legalistic basis. The matter of Germany’s occupation of the Rhineland, for example, would not be settled by a court decision, unless that court were so constituted that it could pass on equity as well as law. The Latins, Mr. Motta says, go to palpable absurdity in their legalistic conception, witness the conception “the father is he whom the marriage indicates.” This is true in the majority of cases, happily, but there are exceptions, and the law takes no cognizance of such exceptions in the Latin mind. In this present situation in the Rhineland, there is no shadow of a legal doubt in the question, but there is plenty of equity or extenuating circumstances or whatever you like to call it, and these should not be lost sight of, even through Hitler’s brutality. I told him confidentially of a message I had had from Berlin, to the effect that our people believed that the offer was really constructive in the opinion of responsible Germans, and that it was a final offer. Mr. Motta said this checked absolutely with his own impression and that which he had given to the Federal Council yesterday. He then discussed Switzerland’s situation in respect to this matter. There is not a shadow of an obligation, according to him, either legal or moral, resting on those States which signed neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the Locarno Pact, and which are nevertheless members of the League of Nations, to carry out punitive measures in respect to a violation either of the Treaty of Versailles or of the Locarno Pact. He has had a careful study made of this question and this is his definite conclusion and he has so reported to the Federal Council. He has said nothing openly about it as yet, as he sees no reason to take an attitude publicly unless necessity arises. He had a conversation with Mr. Westman (Swedish Minister to Bern) yesterday and found that the Scandinavian states are adopting in this question what Mr. Motta calls a negative attitude. They do not feel, in any case, that they can apply sanctions against Germany. I asked him whether they had reached the same legal conception of their responsibility as Switzerland. He said that Mr. Westman had not so stated to him—that that phase of the matter had not been touched on. This led Mr. Motta into an analysis of what the League of Nations now stood for. He said that if this crisis had happened in exactly the same way before the existence of the League, two or three weeks would have necessarily elapsed before the parties even got together. Those weeks would have been spent discussing whether, where and how they would get together. The strength of the League lies in the automatic obligation to consult, and, added Mr. Motta, there is no other strength in the League, that he could see. He has come to the belief, after the endeavor to apply sanctions to Italy, that little or no distinction can be drawn between economic and military sanctions. Military sanctions mean war, and nobody wants to apply them. Economic sanctions, to be effective, must develop into military sanctions. If they are applied and are not effective, they merely exasperate the situation. Now one comes to a palpable absurdity. A second nation has violated a treaty, and a first violator is called into council not only to condemn the second, but still greater absurdity, it has been suggested that it apply sanctions against the second. Therefore, the use of coercion in the machinery of the League of Nations has, Motta thinks, been ruled out on a sort of reductio ad absurdum . Furthermore, should the League be changed or rather curtailed of its functions to be merely a body for automatic and prompt discussion of danger, it would doubtless attract the entrance of other States, even, perhaps, of the United States. He said that Mr. Westman had said to him, spontaneously, yesterday, that he, personally, had come to the conclusion that one of the inescapable results of the whole story of the past eight months must be the stripping of the League of Nations down to its essentials and the establishment thereby of a League compatible with actualities. Doubtless, Mr. Motta thinks, such an endeavor would be bitterly contested by Russia and perhaps by other states. These states might gain in popular opinion as being the friends of peace through insisting on “collective action.” Nevertheless, men of common sense must learn by experience and it is difficult to see what other lesson we can draw from what has transpired since the League undertook the Ethiopian question. The foregoing should not give the impression that Motta is any the less a League enthusiast than he has been in the past. This would be contrary to the facts. He believes in the League sincerely, but as a clearing house for the ventilation of dangerous situations and not as a means of coercion, either for prevention or for punishment. 11 Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 4303, March 21; received April 9. 12 Giuseppe Motta, Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs. Report by the Military Attaché in Germany (Smith) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/654 [Document 219] Report by the Military Attaché in Germany ( Smith ) 13 No. 14,593 Berlin , March 20, 1936. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To anyone who has studied the German political literature of recent years, there is little mystery connected with Germany’s present move. No nation has ever studied with greater thoroughness the effects of military force on world politics as Germany has done in her last eighteen years of military impotence. She has seen all her own political and diplomatic maneuvers come to naught, for lack of a military basis. Efforts to obtain friends and allies failed repeatedly because Germany could only receive favors and never give them. Rightly or wrongly therefore she has come to the belief that a strong military position is a prerequisite to a successful diplomacy and to an improvement of her position in the world. The rearmament of Germany which began in 1933 and which was announced openly on March 16th, 1935, was a first step towards a strengthening of her international position. The non-attack treaty with Poland 14 was a second step, the importance of which for Germany is now abundantly clear. Together these measures improved her position somewhat, but they still failed to close the weak links of her armor, the open and defenseless western frontier. Just across this wide open gap stood France, the strongest military power of Europe, walled in by impregnable fortifications, but still constantly endeavoring by more and more intricate defensive alliances in Eastern Europe to encircle Germany and nullify her efforts for expansion. This combination of French military alliances, anchored fast to the League of Nations covenant has given France a predominating position on the European continent, not possessed at any time since the early years of Louis XIV’s reign, for Napoleon even in his most victorious years was always challenged by both Russia and England. From 1919 to 1933 there was no challenge to France. It is against this dominating position of France in Europe that Hitler’s Rhine action strikes home. The German General Staff no more thinks of attacking, let alone breaking the wall of France’s fortifications in Alsace and Lorraine, than it dreams of attacking Peoria Illinois. The German soldier knows it would be suicide, both now and as long as France remains even a moderate military power. The German General Staff, however, knows equally well, that its action on the Rhine is a definite challenge to France: not to its security but to its political domination of Europe. The prelude to any German foreign policy whether it be actually military or purely diplomatic must be the erection of a defensive front against France. As long as the danger exists for Germany, that any step by Germany in Eastern Europe can be brought to naught by a mere French threat to occupy the Ruhr and Rhineland, such a step has to be left unmade. A German-Austrian policy or a German-Czechoslovakian policy is unthinkable so long as the open gap of the Rhine remains and France can offer strong and effective military assistance to her Central European allies. Viewed as a politico-military question, Germany’s action becomes clearly understandable and we can see the immense importance of her move for the future history of Europe. The “symbolic” Rhine occupation is the first step towards the erection of a solid defensive front in the west. Whatever course the present negotiations will take, Hitler and Germany will scarcely yield an inch on two essential points: 1) The creation of a one-sided neutral zone in favor of France; 2) Any infringement of Germany’s sovereignty which makes it impossible for her to create a solid defensive front with respect to France. There appear to be four possible outcomes of the present crisis. 1) The crisis may end in a general European pacification. 2) The crisis may peter out with a moral condemnation of Germany’s act but with no actual punitory measures. 3) Punitory measures of a financial and economic nature may be applied by a large group of nations. 4) An aggressive war may be launched by France and her allies upon Germany. In case course 2 (moral condemnation) develops, we may look to see Germany commence immediately the fortification of her western frontier while continuing to strengthen the army. In case course 3 (Punitory Financial Measures) is taken, the same German reaction will occur. The Rhineland will be fortified intensively, economic autarchy pushed and the army continue its expansion. This course is quite likely to result, ultimating in military aggression by Germany in Central Europe perhaps in 1937, perhaps at some later time more suitable to the German General Staff. The danger of a German “explosion” must be faced as an imminent possibility, provided the financial and economic pressure on Germany is severe enough to threaten seriously her position. The outcome of the present crisis if either course 1 or 4 (General pacification or war) is adopted by France and her Allies, is more problematical. A French invasion will be met by a German people fully united behind Hitler, and with a formidable army, which will not easily be overrun and which if France’s allies are not too numerous, might well check the French attack. The effect of course 1 (General Pacification) upon Germany’s position, on the lines proposed by Hitler is even less easy to prognosticate. If either course 2 or 3 (moral condemnation, financial punitory measures) are adopted, Germany’s military position will slowly improve as the army expansion continues and the fortifications of the Rhineland become an actuality. Autarchy is already too advanced in Germany, to permit effective economic or financial sanctions being applied. Suffering and privation there might be and probably would be, but so far as one dares prophesy, these would not be sufficiently serious to warrant the belief that Hitler would fall or Germany change its present course. It seems probable that no other course in the present crisis than war will prevent a marked improvement in Germany’s world position. Let there be any other solution, and we will shortly hear the rattle of the footsteps of the Little Entente climbing off the French and onto the German band wagon. For in one year Germany will be as impregnable to France on the Rhine as France now is to Germany. The Rhine move is far more than a peaceful reentry of garrisons into a few German cities. By a single daring move on the diplomatic chess board, he has cut the military basis from under the whole series of French post war alliances. Come what may, the present crisis represents the end of an historic era. The “World War” is coming to its closing chapters. Versailles is dead. There may possibly be a German catastrophe and a new Versailles, but it will not be the Versailles which has hung like a dark cloud over Europe since 1920. March 7th 1936 is already a historic date in the history of the world. Truman Smith 13 Copy received by the Department from the War Department, April 14. 14 German-Polish nonaggression pact, signed January 26, 1934, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxxxvii , p. 495. The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/559 [Document 220] The Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) to the Secretary of State No. 381 The Hague , March 20, 1936. [Received April 2.] Sir : With reference to my telegram No. 13, of March 19, 11 a.m., 1936, 15 I have the honor to inform the Department that on March 18th I had a talk with Prime Minister Colijn, whom I met at the annual Royal Netherlands Industries Fair held at Utrecht. We talked for some time about the European situation, which was rapidly coming to a head with the meeting of the four Locarno powers, in conjunction with the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, also being held in London on that day. Dr. Colijn, a realist in public affairs as in other relations of life, took a rather serious view of the European political situation looked at from long range, although he thought there was no immediate danger of war. He thought affairs were in the hands of men who could and would control them sufficiently to avert present war but not sufficiently to secure a lasting peace through a new pact. He was of the opinion that the present international crisis would be patched up but not healed. He thought that the two recent unilateral denunciations of treaty obligations by Germany (the denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles about a year ago, when Hitler announced that Germany intended to increase her armed forces to full strength in contravention to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and now the denunciation of the Pact of Locarno, whereby Hitler announces that Germany will occupy the demilitarized zone) were explained, though not justified, by the inequality complex that now obsesses Germany, who is constantly smarting under what she feels is the injustice and inequality imposed on her by the Treaty of Versailles. The average German man-in-the-street today feels that the Treaty of Versailles was the work of the devil and was designed to subjugate and humiliate Germany. Any new agreement, pact or treaty (as was the case to a certain extent with Locarno) that perpetuates and continues any inequality that was imposed on Germany or the Germans by the Versailles Treaty is an anathema and has a right to be denounced, because the poison of Versailles is in it; it makes no difference whether Germany signed it voluntarily,—if it perpetuates any inequality of the Versailles Treaty, which Germany did not sign voluntarily, it must be eradicated before Germany is precluded from denouncing it. It is this demand for equality on the part of the Germans, involving a feeling which in intensity far transcends any scruples they otherwise might have against violating a treaty obligation, that explains their willingness to approve the unilateral denunciation on their part of a new pact or treaty which perpetuates any inequality contained in the Versailles Treaty without consulting the other signatories to it. Dr. Colijn, as well as other prominent Netherland statesmen—men like Jonkheer van Karnebeek and Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland (with both of whom I have spoken within the last six or seven days) felt that some such psychology as I have just outlined explained Germany’s approval of its unilateral denunciation of Locarno. Dr. Colijn did not attempt to justify that frame of mind, but accepted it as a fact and faced the reality that a solution must be found which acknowledged its existence if the wounds under which the European political situation suffers are to be healed and the surface of the European political situation is to be calmed down. But he did not think the French would heal the wounds,—on the contrary, he thought they might favor prolonging the agony and making Germany smart further under the accusation of being a treaty breaker without justification or excuse; in other words, continuing the inequality instead of killing it. He thought Belgium would probably be motivated the same way. He regretted the divergences, and thought it a pity that all hands were not able to get together and agree on a realistic, practical basis, although he did not have entire faith in Germany’s ability to stay put. He was under no illusions about that side of their character. He said that he thought the new peace plan offered by Hitler in the shape of a non-aggression pact might have good results if entered into whole-heartedly by everyone, and tend to maintain peace in Europe for a considerable time but, as stated above, he feared the present situation would only be patched up and not healed and that it would break out again by some positive action on the part of Germany within a few years, perhaps from some other quarter, such as Austria, Hungary or a Balkan State, where the statesmen in control of the situation would not be or could not be so willing or anxious to avert war as they are today. On the whole Dr. Colijn was not optimistic for the future peace of Europe. He thought the proposed Franco-Soviet treaty was unnecessary and impractical and in the long run was bound to produce harm. He pointed to the map of Europe and showed that Russia could only give military assistance to France by the passage of troops through the Carpathian Mountains, where the pass is so narrow and the way so hard that at best she could never give France anything but the most meagre and small military assistance. Of what practical use was such a pact even if it did not violate Locarno. So far as Hitler’s present offer invited Holland to join a general European non-aggression pact, he said that while conditions remained as they are “they will receive a polite but firm no in reply.” He believed in Holland retaining its political and national independence and refraining from joining entangling alliances. Respectfully yours, Grenville T. Emmet 15 Not printed. The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/485: Telegram [Document 221] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State Oslo , March 20, 1936—noon. [Received March 20—10:35 a.m.] 21. My telegram No. 20, March 18, 5 p.m. I have ascertained from confidential source that delegates assembled at London recognize merely formal character of meetings yesterday and today except that Italy’s allegation of inability to participate in any Rhineland patrol scheme pending lifting of sanctions will cause measures to be taken today to lessen Italo-Abyssinian tension with a view to realistic settlement. Negotiations pending German referendum and French elections will probably be characterized by denunciation and recrimination especially by Germans in the interest of political expediency. Nevertheless, France and Great Britain will take no action against Germany and German troops will not be withdrawn from the Rhineland. Subsequent conversation will be lengthy due to the intention to work out constructive program of the nature indicated by my telegram of March 18. Biddle The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/471: Telegram [Document 222] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) Washington , March 21, 1936—1 p.m. 6. We have greatly appreciated your 20, March 18 because of its timeliness, accuracy, and conciseness. Your 21, March 20, has also been read with interest. Further brief, telegraphic reports of this nature would be welcome. Phillips The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/495: Telegram [Document 223] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , March 21, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 21—11:15 a.m.] 88. Foreign Office attitude regarding the Locarno Powers London accord 16 is generally negative. Foreign Office considers that many of the proposals to Germany “smell Flandin” and are entirely unacceptable, particularly the reestablishment of part of the demilitarized zone on a one-sided basis and its occupation by foreign troops. The Foreign Office is now studying the accord. While not yet decided on future moves it was clear that the Germans have no desire or intention of breaking off the negotiations. We gained the impression that there might well be counter proposals. In his speech last night Hitler followed the same general line of his previous campaign speeches dealing largely with the international situation and asking, at a high emotional climax, in which he referred to how hard he has worked to build Germany up to her present position, that the people should now in return show their gratitude in the coming election. Hitler appeared to stress the idea that he would not give way to any London action and of irritation with the attitude of the statesmen of other powers. I am reliably informed that Ribbentrop is returning from London this afternoon presumably for a conference with Hitler. Repeated to London, Paris, Geneva, Rome. Dodd 16 March 19, 1936; for text, see British Cmd. 5134, Germany No. 2: Text of Proposals drawn up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Italy, London, March 19, 1936 , or League of Nations, Official Journal , April 1936, p. 348. Memorandum by the Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/561 [Document 224] Memorandum by the Chargé in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) 17 [ Brussels ,] March 23, 1936. Viscount de Lantsheere 18 who was with Mr. van Zeeland throughout the Paris and London conversations of the four Locarno Powers, furnished the following information in the course of our conversation today: 1. When Germany denounced the Locarno Pact on March 7, 1936, the French Government wanted to take the necessary military measures to redress the situation. With this object in view, they immediately called on the British, Belgian and Italian Governments to furnish military assistance. French insistence on this point was maintained throughout the discussions at Paris and in the London discussions until about Saturday, March 14. 2. The Belgian Government’s policy was that the violation of the Locarno Pact by Germany should be condemned but that there should be no brusque gesture that would close the door to negotiations with Germany on terms later to be agreed upon by the Locarno Powers. The Belgian Government was not willing to resort to military measures or to economic or financial sanctions. The Belgian delegation pointed out to the French representatives that a resort to military measures to redress the situation would mean war with all its attendant consequences, including the bombardment by the German air force of Brussels, Paris, and other Belgian and French towns. The Belgian delegation also pointed out all the juridical and practical difficulties in the matter of the application of sanctions and stated emphatically that in its opinion it was very unlikely that the “neutral” countries which have common frontiers with Germany (such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland) would be willing to cooperate in the matter of sanctions. 3. The points of view of the Belgian and British Governments from the outset were practically the same. But the position of the British Government was more difficult owing to the fact that British public opinion reacted apathetically to Germany’s action. The average Englishman, being at least as well (if not better) disposed toward Germany as toward France, picked up his morning paper and found nothing strange about the Germans moving troops into their own territory. In fact, he rather sympathized with Germany and would have been strongly averse to any military measures devised to prevent what he considered a perfectly justifiable action. In view of this attitude by the British public, it required great courage for the British Government to take the firm stand it took. 4. The Belgian delegation played a strong rôle of mediation between the British and the French delegations. The British and the French, with their usual inability to comprehend each other’s mentality, were finding it impossible to get together. Mr. van Zeeland exerted a maximum effort to bridge over the British and French points of view and really accomplished remarkable results in a task that required great patience and delicacy. 5. The German delegation was astounded at the firm stand taken by the British delegation. The Germans had thought that the British would be fairly complacent and would take an easy-going stand with regard to Germany. Their disillusionment was, therefore, correspondingly great when confronted with the final decision of the four Locarno Powers. The Belgian Government has had no indication as to when the German reply will be given or as to what its tenor will be. 6. Belgium did not ask that an international force should occupy a strip of German territory 20 kilometers in width along the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontier. The insistence on this point came entirely from France. 7. The Italian delegates recognized Italy’s obligations under the Locarno Pact, but with regard to the ways and means in which they would give military or other aid they made full reservations pending reference of the matter to their Government. 17 Transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 769, March 25; received April 2. 18 Chef de Cabinet in the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/496a: Telegram [Document 225] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , March 23, 1936—4 p.m. 89. I wish to express my appreciation of the careful and complete manner in which you have kept us informed of the progress of the meeting in London of the Council and of the Locarno powers. Hull Memorandum by the Chargé in Lithuania (Kuykendall) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/603 [Document 226] Memorandum by the Chargé in Lithuania ( Kuykendall ) 19 Kaunas , March 24, 1936. Inquiry was made of Mr. Bizauskas 20 as to the reason for the failure of the Lithuanian press to express any comment on the action taken by the German Government in denouncing the Locarno Treaty and in sending military forces into the demilitarized Rhineland zone. Mr. Bizauskas stated without hesitation that there was one compelling reason which prevented the expression of comment on the denouncement of the Locarno Treaty and the military reoccupation of the Rhineland. Herr Hitler had stated in the Memorandum handed to the Locarno Powers on March 7, 1936, that Germany was willing to sign a non-aggression pact with Lithuania, provided that Lithuania agreed to respect the autonomy of the Memel Territory. Until an official confirmation of the offer had been received, it was hardly fitting that an expression of opinion should be given. Up to the present time, there had been received by the Lithuanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs no communication extending to the Lithuanian Government an offer of a non-aggression pact in the event that Lithuania would agree to observe the autonomy of the Memel Territory. For this reason, Mr. Bizauskas stated, there had been no comment of any sort relative to the action taken by the German Government on March 7th last. Mr. Bizauskas added that the sympathy of Lithuania would be on the side of the Locarno powers—i. e. Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium—as against Germany. If the German Government saw fit to denounce the original Locarno Treaty, which had been freely entered into, the signature of Germany to any new treaty could hardly give definite assurance that the pact would not be violated whenever found convenient by Germany. Presumably the man in the street, said Mr. Bizauskas, would be attracted by the offer of Germany to enter into non-aggression pacts covering a period of twenty-five years, but any responsible Government would view with great skepticism new agreements which might be concluded with the German Government. Such an agreement would be observed by Germany only so long as it proved advantageous to the German Government. In the opinion of Mr. Bizauskas, Germany might carry out the provisions of such a treaty until her preparations for aggressive action were completed, which—according to Mr. Bizauskas—could hardly be later than 1939. C. P[ orter ] K[ uykendall ] 19 Transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 449 (Diplomatic), March 24; received April 10. 20 Kazys Bizauskas, Director of the Legal and Administrative Department of the Lithuanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/501: Telegram [Document 227] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , March 25, 1936—noon. [Received March 25—11:50 a.m. 21 ] 251. Marriner called by appointment to introduce Wilson 22 to Monsieur Léger 23 last evening who was apparently most desirous of talking on the present situation beginning with the German occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland provinces. His general attitude was one of intense gloom. He seemed to regret that France had not mobilized on the day of the German occupation thus facing England with an accomplished fact which would have prevented any of the shilly shallying that has gone on in London since that time. Up to the time of the conversation Léger had not received any text of the German reply to the proposals for submission of the question to the World Court but was certain that it would be a refusal accompanied by some suggestions for delay. In his opinion France could not make any modification in its attitude since the time had come when for the sake of the future a firm stand against encroachments on contractual obligations would have to be taken. According to French opinion the present Council meeting in London had only one purpose under the terms of the Locarno treaty, namely, to decide that there had been a violation of that treaty after which the problem of action returned to the signatories other than the guilty party. It was the French contention that under no circumstances did the Council have anything further to do with the case until such time as it might be so requested by the signatories after they had themselves decided on steps against the guilty party for which they might properly require the aid and cooperation of the whole membership of the League. Therefore Léger analyzed the situation as standing thus: The Council has given its decision that a violation of Locarno treaties exists. It has adjourned. It is now squarely up to England to cooperate with France, Belgium, and Italy in whatever measures may be decided upon by them in face of this German action or utterly to dishonor her signature. He did not think that France would under any circumstances ask for military sanctions as she did not wish to appear to be waging a preventive war. In fact he said they would request economic ones of a rather mild character not destined in any way to affect the nourishment or health of the German population. He thought that by beginning with a cancellation of all clearing arrangements between Germany and other powers the German economic structure would be so weakened that it could not long stand. He said that he knew that the City in London was opposed to these measures and that was where the center of the opposition probably lay but that if England should refuse to come along on such mild measures as these despite her signature she would have to propose an extremely firm guarantee for France with the appropriate General and Admiralty Staff arrangements. If it came to this latter contingency it would mean an entirely new line-up in Europe since it would mean that all ideas of collective security had been abandoned; that Central and Eastern Europe must look after themselves while the Little Entente would most necessarily turn to Germany as the great power in its region and that future trouble was delayed but not eliminated with a bloc in Western Europe strong enough to resist Germany for some time to come but with all the rest of the Continent delivered to German domination. It seems to be this latter state of affairs that Léger fears very much will be the outcome of the difficulties. All the more he feels that a stiff tone with Germany at this time would be justified and wise since he says that they have the best of information to the effect that both [ sic ] the army, economic interests and the Foreign Office in Germany all opposed Hitler’s decision to take the step of Rhineland occupation at this time. He said that the French had also heard that Hitler did not deny the reasonings on which these three elements based their opposition but merely stated that he had the mystic feeling in which he had not thus far been wrong that there was a complete lack of courage and of union in the foreign opposition to him and that he could probably take advantage of it. Léger said that if Hitler succeeds this time it is “definitely the last, not the next to the last, test” and means giving to the Hitler régime an almost unparalleled position in the European scene and that the Hitlerian dreams of some mystic Carlovingian Empire would have a better chance of coming to pass. Repeated to London, Rome, Brussels, Berlin, The Hague. Straus 21 Telegram in four sections. 22 Edwin C. Wilson, Counselor of the American Embassy in France. 23 Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/516: Telegram [Document 228] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 26, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 26—3:10 p.m.] 153. Referring to the penultimate paragraph of Paris cable 251, March 25, noon, Dieckhoff explained to me earlier this week that Germany’s intention to reoccupy the Rhineland at some date was fully realized by the Government here; that all sections of German official opinion were united in believing that Germany must present a fait accompli to the French since any negotiation on this subject with any French Government was impossible. Dieckhoff then explained that certain elements in Germany favored sending only one or two battalions of troops, merely as a gesture, into the Rhineland on March 7th as opposed to the opinion of another political group who favored sending a substantial armed force, and this latter policy was adopted. Dieckhoff insisted that this was the only substantial divergence of Government opinion in Germany’s recent policy. Atherton The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/537: Telegram [Document 229] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , March 28, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 28—10:55 a.m.] 266. I called on Flandin yesterday afternoon to present Wilson. Flandin said that he expected the definitive German reply to be little if any more satisfactory than the interim reply of March 24th. 24 On the other hand, he found Eden’s speech and the debate in the House of Commons quite satisfactory. The British Government he felt was in advance of British public opinion but if the German reply turns out to be what is now expected British opinion may well move more rapidly towards the position taken by its Government. He expressed the view that “there was a large part of bluff” in Hitler’s coup of March 7th and said that if only the British Government had clearly understood the situation and taken a firmer stand at the side of France—“not much would have been required, no military action”—Germany could have been brought up sharply and obliged to come to some arrangement making the possibility of future war much more remote. But the British Government he said evidently seriously apprehending that a firm attitude would have meant immediate war with Germany and feeling that Britain was entirely unprepared in a military sense was unwilling to adopt the only attitude which would actually have removed at least for some time the danger of armed conflict. In thus speaking of Britain he was not in any sense resentful or critical but seemed merely regretful that a great opportunity to deal properly with the situation had been lost. Repeated to London, Berlin, Geneva. Straus 24 British Cmd. 5175, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936): Correspondence with the German Government regarding the German Proposals for an European Settlement, March 24–May 6, 1936 , p. 1. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/602 [Document 230] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State No. 4319 Bern , March 28, 1936. [Received April 10.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to press reports concerning the meeting which took place in London last week of the representatives of the Scandinavian nations and of Holland, Spain and Switzerland, concerning their position with respect to the situation caused by the military reoccupation of the Rhineland by Germany. This meeting was given considerable publicity, although it really was not so extraordinary, since for some time past at Geneva, during meetings of the League Council, the representatives of these same countries have very often met in order to exchange information and clarify their respective positions with regard to whatever matter might be under discussion. The basic reason for these meetings was that very often the representatives of these smaller countries were not kept informed by the great powers of what the League Council was doing, and also, in order to protect themselves, it was necessary that they form a common front. At the London meeting they decided that those powers which were not signatories of the Versailles Treaty or the Locarno Pacts, but which were members of the League, had no responsibilities in the present situation. I am informed by the Federal Political Department that it instructed the Swiss Minister in London, Mr. Paravicini, that he could attend such meetings as observer, but, in order to protect Swiss neutrality, was not to commit himself in any way. As I reported to the Department in my confidential despatches Nos. 4303 25 and 4304 26 of March 21 last, the position of the Swiss Government is that it is under no legal obligation to take any action in the present situation. I am informed by Mr. Westman, Swedish Minister here, that during one of the private meetings of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1925, when the Locarno Pacts were being discussed, Dr. Beneš, at that time Delegate on the Council for Czechoslovakia, stated that the members of the League, although nonsignatories of the Locarno Pacts, nevertheless also had a certain responsibility under them. The Swedish representative at once made a statement that his Government had no responsibility with regard to the Locarno Pacts, since it was not a signatory of them. As these statements were made in a private meeting of the Council, there is no record of them. However, it is a statement of policy which was enunciated at that time and reaffirmed in the present crisis. Respectfully yours, For the Minister: Stanley Hawks Secretary of Legation 25 See footnote 11, p. 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] . 26 Not printed. The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/598 [Document 231] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 776 Brussels , April 1, 1936. [Received April 9.] Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of an interesting conversation which Commander John A. Gade, Naval Attaché of the Embassy, and I had with Mr. Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce, during the course of a luncheon of the Directors of the C. R. B. (Committee for Relief in Belgium) Educational Foundation, on March 30, 1936.… Respectfully yours, Dave H. Morris [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Naval Attaché in Belgium ( Gade ) [ Brussels ,] March 30, 1936. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. van Zeeland stated his belief that Parliamentary Government, not only in France, but elsewhere, was proving so ineffectual in acting rapidly in a national crisis that constitutional changes would become imperative were Governments successfully to function. One of the first and most difficult questions that would arise if the present crisis is past and a future international working agreement reached will unquestionably be the question of Germany’s former colonies. Both the military party and politicians had all, with the exception of Goebbels and Goering, advised against the re-occupation of the Rhineland. Hitler felt however this must be done so as to have a “fait accompli” prior to the elections. While Schacht had many enemies, his brilliant wit coupled with the real confidence Hitler has in him, enabled him to keep his position. Schacht was not above seeing himself in Hitler’s place. Germany itself looks upon Hitler as an apostle and his speeches intoxicate all classes, though their theme be always one and the same, played in various tones. Had Hitler been wise he would now have merely issued a statement that France had broken the Treaty of Locarno and then awaited his time, say a year, to re-occupy the Rhineland. He would then have had the sympathy and understanding of most of Europe. Hitler selected Mr. von Ribbentrop very wisely. He entirely understands the English and was largely responsible for the British-German Naval Agreement. He was naturally assisted by the first German Foreign Office experts. Older German statesmen had proved themselves incapable. The Prime Minister stated that he was aware of the fact that Germany had already exceeded her building limits according to her Naval agreement with England, particularly in the quantities for small fast craft built for her so-called “mosquito fleet”. In England, Mr. van Zeeland was informed by leading English politicians that three-fourths of the sympathy was with Germany rather than with France. Only a few English like Winston Churchill 27 and similar die-hards still stood up for backing the French contentions through thick and thin. In regard to the Staff conversations, Mr. van Zeeland stated that the British Military Attaché had for two days been in touch with the Chief of General Staff in Brussels, Major General van den Bergen, and that conversations were being held today either in London or Paris between the Belgian Military Attaché and the British Staff on one hand and on the other, between the French and British Staff Officers. While these could scarcely, however, be called Staff conversations, they were arranging certain technical details and the procedure to be followed. For Belgium this was a very preferable course to Staff Officers of the three countries jointly consulting. There is no question from what Mr. van Zeeland said that his sympathies and points of view were decidedly sympathetic to the British ones rather than to the French, and that he will support the former in future negotiations. Owing to the present situation, elections would shortly have to be held in Belgium. The supporters of Degrelle (Rex) 28 would some of them be elected and in drawing a few members from the Catholic and Socialist ranks would still further confuse the balance of power or coalition government. Decision as to the exact date of the elections lay entirely in the King’s hands. The Governments which today had elections behind them, similarly to England and Germany, were unquestionably in a stronger position than France and Belgium who still had them ahead of them. John A. Gade 27 Member of Parliament and Conservative Party leader. 28 Léon Degrelle, leader of the Rexist Party. The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/616 [Document 232] The Ambassador in Poland ( Cudahy ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 1078 Warsaw , April 2, 1936. [Received April 5.] Sir : I have the honor to report that today I called upon Colonel Józef Beck, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and discussed with him the position taken by Poland at the London meeting of the Council of the League of Nations concerned with the alleged violation by Germany of the Locarno Treaty. The Minister expressed gratification with the attitude toward Poland expressed by the delegates of the nations assembled in London. He thought that Great Britain, as well as France, realized more clearly than before the meeting the necessity for the protection of the Polish Western frontier. He said that in his address before the Council of the League 29 (despatch No. 1070, March 28, 1936 30 ) he had not hesitated to express the unfavorable attitude of Poland toward Locarno. This attitude was based upon the belief that the Locarno Treaty in attempting to provide security for Western Europe, entirely neglected Eastern Europe. He said that from the time of the execution of Locarno Poland was convinced that this pact in its operation would weaken the security of Poland. This conviction was fortified by the expressions of Stresemann 31 who made no pretense of concealing his belief that Locarno would not hinder German foreign policy from seeking a revision of its Eastern frontiers. The Minister said that the recent declaration of Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons that the British Government would abide by its obligation as a member of the League of Nations to safeguard Poland against aggressive attack, was very gratifying. This added nothing to the existing duty of the British Government, under the League, the Minister said, but it was a satisfaction at this time of crisis to have this reassurance from a British Cabinet member who asserted that his statement was authorized by the British Government. The Minister said that this utterance of Chamberlain’s was subsequently confirmed by Minister Eden in a meeting between Eden and himself and that Eden afterwards gave to the press a statement to such effect. The Minister said that from the outset Poland had been opposed to the Locarno Treaty on the assumption that it would weaken Poland’s Alliance with France. 32 The Polish representative at Locarno at the time the treaty was concluded, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Aleksander Skrzynski, had insisted that the security of Poland be provided for in the proposed treaty but Austen Chamberlain, the British delegate at the negotiations, refused to extend the guarantee of Great Britain to Poland and stated in unequivocal terms that such guarantee would be confined to the preservation of the status quo regarding the frontiers of Belgium, France and Germany. The Minister said that a more sympathetic attitude toward this contention of Poland had been manifested at the recent London meeting, and that attitude, together with the statement of Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons, and the assurance of Foreign Minister Eden that Great Britain would abide by its commitment under the League of Nations’ Covenant to come to the aid of Poland in the case of an unprovoked attack, he considered as something of value arising from the London negotiations. He said that in his address before the Council of the League he had stressed that the foreign relations of Poland vis-à-vis France and Germany were based upon the Franco-Polish Alliance and the Declaration of January 26, 1934, between Poland and Germany. 33 In response to questions concerning his discussions with Foreign Minister Flandin, Colonel Beck was reticent. He said, replying to an inquiry as to whether or not Flandin had demanded a clear statement concerning the position of Poland in case France attacked Germany in retaliation for occupation of the Rhineland by German military forces, that “it was evident to Flandin from my (Beck’s) address before the Council of the League that Poland would not deviate from its obligation under the Franco-Polish Alliance”. Further questioning regarding his dealings with Flandin was met by similar evasive replies and was abandoned when the Minister commenced to show signs of irritation. He said that after Flandin had left London he carried on negotiations with Paul-Boncour and that these were “entirely satisfactory”, giving the impression that they were more “satisfactory” than those with Flandin. The Minister gave the impression of gratification with the role he had played in London. He spoke of a meeting with King Edward VIII and said the King showed a basic understanding of international affairs. The Minister expressed the opinion that the German reply to the Locarno Powers marked the opening of negotiations which, in his opinion, would continue “for six months at least”. He expressed unwillingness to comment upon the German reply since he had not yet had an opportunity to study it sufficiently. He did express himself as being optimistic concerning the outcome of the prolonged negotiations that he anticipates. He said that Europe was too war weary to enter into a serious state of hostilities and that the memory of the last war, fresh in the minds of those charged with the conduct of foreign affairs in the various responsible chanceries of Europe today, would serve as an effective bar to another conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, John Cudahy 29 League of Nations, Official Journal , April 1936, p. 328. 30 Not printed. 31 Gustav Stresemann, late German Minister for Foreign Affairs, December 1923–October 3, 1929. 32 Signed February 19, 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xviii , p. 11. 33 British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxxxvii , p. 495. The Chargé in Estonia (Carlson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/617 [Document 233] The Chargé in Estonia ( Carlson ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 604 (Diplomatic) Tallinn , April 2, 1936. [Received April 15.] Sir : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Action Taken by the Baltic States Notwithstanding the fact that it is being said that the three Baltic States have adopted an attitude of watchful waiting in respect to the March 7th events in Germany, it is, nevertheless being asserted that the new situation has resulted in the taking of certain steps by these States. Thus, there are persons who state that the visit which Mr. Münters, the Secretary General of the Latvian Foreign Office is now making to Warsaw, is in direct connection with the Hitler action of March 7th. On the other hand it is being stated that, because of the altered foreign political situation, the conference of the Baltic Foreign Ministers which is scheduled to take place in Tallinn in May of this year has been advanced by one month. Furthermore, it is also said that Lithuania has already made guarded inquiries as to the procedure it is to follow in order to avail itself of the German non-aggression pact offer. The foregoing and similar matters have been discussed by the Legation with the Chief of the Political Department of the Estonian Foreign Office, Mr. R. Möllerson, with Mr. B. Dailide, the Lithuanian Minister to Estonia, and with Mr. E. Kreewinsh, the Minister for Latvia at Tallinn. Their remarks on the foregoing topics are received briefly below. All three of these officials insist that the present visit of General Secretary Miinters to Warsaw is strictly a matter of procotol and that it is without political significance. The visit did not represent an attempt on the part of Poland to gain support in the Baltic area for the recent Polish protest against the domination of the League of Nations by the big European nations in their own interest. 34 The three Baltic countries were among the “satisfied” states of Europe and had nothing to gain by associating themselves with a protest of this kind. Furthermore, the visit did not signify that Poland was trying to use Latvia as a means of bringing about a rapprochement between itself and Lithuania, now that the political position of Lithuania had been improved through the removal of the Lithuanian-German estrangement. Poland was always ready to regulate the difficulty with Lithuania, but it felt that the first step had to be taken by Lithuania. For these and other reasons it was hard to assign a political motive for Mr. Miinters visit to Warsaw. Divergency of opinion also exists concerning the reported advancement of the May meeting at Tallinn of the Baltic Foreign Minister[s]. Mr. Möllerson of the Tallinn Foreign Office said that absolutely no consideration had been given to this question. The same opinion was also expressed by Mr. Kreewinsh, the Latvian Minister to Estonia. Mr. Dailide, the Minister for Lithuania at Tallinn stated, however, that the date for the holding of the meeting depended upon Germany’s further steps in regard to the suggested pact of non-aggression with Lithuania. If, for example, a definite non-aggression pact offer were to be made to Lithuania by Germany, the former would request the immediate convocation of the Baltic Foreign Ministers’ conference which is scheduled to be held in May. In regard to Lithuanian action in the matter of the non-aggression pact proffered it by Germany, the Latvian Minister to Tallinn had the following remarks to make. He said that the Lithuanian Government through its diplomatic representatives at Tallinn and at Riga had already endeavored to ascertain the views of the Latvian and Estonian Governments as to the steps which might be taken in order to give the Hitler non-aggression pact overtures a concrete form at as early a date as possible. Mr. Kreewinsh said that Lithuania had been informed by both Latvia and Estonia that this was a matter in which the latter States could not well interfere. At the same time the advisability of the making by Lithuania of guarded inquiries in Berlin as to Germany’s plans for the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression with Lithuania had been suggested. Mr. Dailide, the Lithuanian Minister at Tallinn, was disposed to discount the value of the German non-aggression pact offer to Lithuania. He said that it had been Lithuania’s experience that there was not very much faith to be placed in the signature of Germany when affixed to a treaty. Experience had shown that treaties were respected by Germany only as long as it was to the latter’s interest to do so. Consequently, Lithuania would not be inclined to attach much importance to a pact of non-aggression with Germany, unless the pact were to be guaranteed by a third country. In general Lithuania did not favor bi-lateral security treaties. It placed much greater importance upon a system of collective security and hoped that an arrangement of this kind would be brought about. Mr. Dailide went on to say that, up to the present time, Lithuania had not been approached by Germany on the subject of a non-aggression pact. If such a proposal were to be made in the near future, the Lithuanian Government would ask for the immediate holding of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Baltic States under the terms of the existing Treaty of Understanding and Collaboration between these States. It was not likely that Lithuania would take independent action in a matter of the above kind; it would unquestionably be guided to a great extent by the steps of the other two Baltic States. Conclusion In conclusion the Legation wishes to lay stress upon two statements made to it in the above-mentioned conversation with the Latvian Minister to Estonia of which a summary is attached hereto in the form of a memorandum. 35 The first of these is the Minister’s characterization of the Latvian and Estonian attitude towards recent European events. Thus, the Minister stated that recent European developments had strengthened the status of the States of Eastern Europe, and, in particular, of Latvia and Estonia. He said that the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance had been welcomed by these States from the viewpoint that such a pact was of much greater advantage to the Baltic States than a similar pact between the Soviet Union and Germany would have been. At the same time the Latvian and Estonian Governments also felt that the Hitler European peace plan contained elements which would tend to make their positions more secure. On the other hand, Latvia and Estonia were by no means pleased with the recent White Paper which had been issued in London, 36 the details of which had found very little sympathy either in Riga or in Tallinn. In the second place, it was of special interest to learn from Minister Kreewinsh that protests had been lodged in Riga by the French Government and in Tallinn by the Soviet Government because of the comparatively good press which the Hitler action of March 7, 1936, had had both in Latvia and in Estonia. Respectfully yours, Harry E. Carlson 34 See despatch No. 1078, April 2, from the Ambassador in Poland, p. 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 232 ] . 35 Not printed. 36 Presumably British Cmd. 5134, Germany No. 2 (1936), containing the text of the proposals made on March 19 by the four Locarno Powers. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/556: Telegram [Document 234] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , April 2, 1936—8 p.m. [Received April 2—5:20 p.m.] 103. Interest now centers on British and French reaction to the German proposals. Nevertheless, brief comment from here may be useful. Local non-German opinion thus far canvassed is impressed with Hitler’s apparent effort to talk over the heads of “cabinets” and the governments generally to the people directly. This was presaged in his campaign speeches (see our 95, March 25, 2 p.m. 37 ) and point 16 of the “peace plan” seems to be to this end. Furthermore, this is in line with the tactics he pursued in gaining ascendency in Germany. Secondly, the French were given no satisfaction with regard to fortifications in the Rhineland although military arrangements short of this appear to be covered. Possibly, however, the vital fortification question can be approached on a basis of reciprocity under point 9 of the “peace plan.” This may be leading up to the ideas described in our 69, March 11, 1 p.m. On the other hand, the general tone of the proposals is conciliatory. There is no menace nor any threat of “isolation” if the German plan is not accepted. Furthermore, in point 18, Germany shows a willingness to reenter the League at once. Insofar as words have any meaning the German proposals indicate a desire on the part of its Government to solve by cooperative agreement rather than by force of arms those problems on which a settlement of Europe and its peace depend. Each nation and individual concerned is doubtless trying to estimate Hitler’s sincerity in this. While this is a natural approach to the necessary forming of an opinion with regard to Germany’s position we feel that the decision should rest on a different ground than that of sincerity. We feel that the best present chance is to call Hitler’s bluff for peace, since the powers concerned do not seem willing or capable of calling his bluff for war, to put it that way. If, after negotiation, it appears that Hitler is not bluffing for peace and is working for a harmonious settlement of European problems, then well and good; Europe would be on its way out of its present major difficulties. If, on the other hand, after a few months’ consideration and negotiation in a real spirit of equality, it is found that Hitler’s proposals are a sham and only a facade for conquest then European opinion and indeed world opinion will have a sounder basis for common agreement and doubtless common action and meanwhile little if anything will be lost. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, Geneva, by air mail to Praha, Brussels, Bucharest, Istanbul. Dodd 37 Not printed. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/625 [Document 235] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State No. 2747 Berlin , April 4, 1936. [Received April 17.] Sir : With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the situation created in Europe by Hitler’s proposals of March 7, I have the honor to observe that the general opinion here is that no decisions will likely be taken until after the French elections, ending May 3. This view is subject of course to any upset by some unforeseen circumstance, or more especially by efforts which the French Government may make to press for action by the Locarno Powers before this date, whether in connection with electioneering or otherwise. In any event, it appears to us a suitable moment to submit a brief review of German relations with respect to certain other European Powers. In this connection I beg to suggest that before reading this despatch the Department may find it useful to refer to a large-scale map of Europe in order to recall Germany’s geographical position on the Continent, which, along with the extent of her territory, the mass of her population, the special features of her domestic economy and the configuration of her boundaries, is of the greatest importance in the present analysis. I. The Danubian region: this is mentioned first as constituting the critical area of Germany’s interest, both, it is believed, from the long term and the near future. Especially correlated with Germany’s policy of cultivating nearby markets, for economic, political and strategic reasons, this is the region in Europe seemingly best fitted for German exploitation whether through economic domination alone or in conjunction with some form of political control or suzerainty. Incidentally the present régime does not seem disposed to repeat the ex-Kaiser’s mistake of “Berlin to Bagdad,” thus antagonizing Turkey, but will limit itself, say, to “Berlin to Bulgaria,” varying the form of connection in each of the Danubian states concerned according to the particular possibilities and necessities. II. Italy: Across this picture is Italy whose Danubian policy, whether for protection against Germany or for the development of the Italian position in Europe, or both, competes with Germany’s political as well as economic aims in this area unless a compromise can be effected. The recent Italo-Austro-Hungarian discussions in Rome 38 followed by the announcement of conscription in Austria, 39 which the Foreign Office here somewhat contemptuously describes as “made in Italy,” demonstrate Italy’s continued and increasing interest in this German field of development despite Italy’s activity in Abyssinia and possibly because of her success there which flouts the British Empire, confirms the strength of French dependence on Italy, and supports the imperium romanum idea with which Mussolini seems obsessed. German and Italian lines of closest European interests therefore cross and are in opposition in the Danubian region, with Austria the pivot. III. France: The above analysis throws into relief the importance of the resumption of complete German sovereignty in the Rhineland and the consequent obstacle to continued French supremacy in the Danubian-Balkan area. Germany has no designs on France or Belgium in the present or discernible future. Somewhat naively, Germany only asks of France that she remain on the side-lines and let Germany work out her eastern “necessities” without interference. This implies, however, the substitution of Germany for France as the dominant influence on the Continent, which France must naturally resent from the point of view of prestige and economic position, and must fear politically for the future, if not for the present. While even the French in their press and otherwise recognize frankly the implication of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in the sense described above, and realize clearly the threat to their post-war hegemony, with special reference to the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, the Embassy does not wish to exaggerate this point. Even should France and possibly also Belgium be blocked off by German fortifications in the Rhineland, the French people are too intelligent, courageous and active, as well as too experienced politically, economically and financially, to be excluded from exercising a very great influence in Europe, even under the handicap just described. IV. Great Britain: Germany’s relations with and to Great Britain appear to have increased in importance and to have been complicated by the development of the Italo-Abyssinian affair. When France, on the understandable basis of her conception of her own protection through Italian support against Germany, abandoned collectivity, as marshalled by the British last September at the League, Germany increased in importance to England as a possible checkmate to Italy regarding vital empire lines in Egypt and “Cape to Cairo”, domination of the Mediterranean, and its corollary of the sea route to India. At the same time, Germany has ideas of European settlement closely akin to British thought on this subject. England is therefore in a dilemma. On the one hand she has found her natural geographical ally and closest European associate since 1904, France, one of the principal reasons, if not the principal one, for her loss of prestige and threatened Empire communications and position. Likewise, this same country, France, has proven an obstacle since 1918 to a practical settlement of European problems and the return of a Peace which has existed in name only since the War. On the other hand, the alternative is a virtual abandonment of this old ally and the establishment of a close relationship with Nazi Germany as an European Power which is capable of taking, and in certain circumstances doubtless willing to take, a strong position with Italy both for Germany’s own aims and, for a price, to help the British with respect to Abyssinia. But this would mean the British contributing to establish Germany as the dominant force on the Continent and so in opposition to the old British maxim of a balance of power. From conversations at the Foreign Office here, we have the impression that such ideas are now being given attention in Berlin. No doubt England will try to compromise the dilemma. Disputes even as antagonistic as Anglo-Italian relations today have a way of speedily being arranged. In the past few years we have seen many seemingly insoluble and dangerous problems rapidly elucidated. Therefore it is dangerous to treat anything too categorically in European relations. This sketch of the Anglo-German position is set forth with all this in mind, and more especially to try to indicate the possibilities rather than the certainties. Indeed we recall the statement of two experienced British observers at Geneva in September when the Italo-Abyssinian question was before the League and Great Britain was furiously marshalling the world against Italy’s action in Africa. Quite independently these two Englishmen said, in almost identical colloquial phrases, that, when the smoke blew over and the Abyssinian affair was concluded, it would be found that, despite the brave words of the British Delegation at Geneva, the British Empire would emerge with more territory, i. e., the Lake Tsana district in Abyssinia. V. Russia: Despite considerable talk it is believed that the strain of Russo-German relations is due primarily to the anti-Communist ideas of Hitler and certain of his henchmen and not to practicable plans for conquest, since Poland, the always uncertain quantity, lies in between. The present suspension of Russo-German credit discussions may dampen some of the local emotional ardor against the Soviets and bring a sharper realization of the natural complementary trade situation between Russia and Germany, supported as this is by the pro-Soviet attitude of the Army and of the Foreign Office. VI. Poland: Good relations with Poland are made necessary for Germany by ambitions in the Danubian region. Bearing the unexpected, for example, a sudden marshalling of active encirclement by France against Germany, the Polish-German position should remain about as at present, with the Poles balancing between Germany, Russia and France, really influenced principally by England, and an unstable but important factor in the general European picture. This subject of Germany’s position with regard to certain European Powers could be expanded almost indefinitely. The purpose of the present report, as indicated in the opening paragraph, is merely the assembling, for the Department’s convenience, at this critical moment, the principal features involved, as viewed from Berlin. Respectfully yours, William E. Dodd 38 Meeting of the Austrian, Hungarian, and Italian Ministers for Foreign Affairs, March 21–23, 1936. 39 April 1. The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/573: Telegram [Document 236] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State Oslo , April 6, 1936—4 p.m. [Received April 6—12:55 p.m.] 25. Department’s telegram No. 6, March 21, 1 p.m. Through wellinformed circles I learn following: French plan 40 will emphasize creation permanent international force Rhineland zone. Flandin and associates now admit they must talk with Germans but hope to postpone these conversations until after French elections. Eden is anxious to bring about cessation of Italian-Ethiopian hostilities and believes time element will prove important factor in reaching solution of German problem. Meanwhile England continues as restraining influence. Distinct pro-German attitude evident among English people including high army circles which worries pro-French element in Government, although even Austen Chamberlain admits this growing tendency which will have necessarily a bearing on England’s future treatment of general situation and may necessitate limiting scope of the forthcoming staff talks. Information has just reached high British Government officials to the effect that Germany and Japan are about to conclude more extensive military arrangements. 41 This situation may add elements of uncertainty to French plans by worrying Russia. Biddle 40 Issued on April 8 by the French Government; for text, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 197. 41 See vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/613 [Document 237] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State No. 1649 Geneva , April 7, 1936. [Received April 15.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 89 dated March 11, 9 a.m. in which I set forth the general factors in the European and African situations in their relationship to the League as they appeared to me at that time from the Geneva viewpoint. In their broader aspects, the set of circumstances which I described do not appear to have undergone any marked changes in substance during or since the series of Council meetings in London. Geneva’s attitude during and since those meetings has been an attentive watching of developments; but the results of such attention have chiefly been in the field of speculation with many differing opinions, rather than an emergence of conclusions as to the future course of events or, indeed, as to the precise meaning of what is almost daily taking place. The general reaction is that there is exceeding difficulty in distinguishing between the basic positions of the powers chiefly concerned and positions which they may take for internal or external tactical purposes. It is furthermore felt that this difficulty in formulating judgments will prevail for some time to come. I am by no means certain that this attitude in Geneva is different from that at any other relatively neutral point. I shall, however, describe it as I see it in its broadest terms. Naturally, in this Geneva attitude the relationship of the League to these matters acquires a more pronounced rôle. ( a ) The crux of the entire European problem is seen as Germany’s “intentions” or, more correctly, as the course which Germany may ultimately pursue. The views differ from the belief that when Germany has achieved the complete equality which she demands she will follow a peaceful and constructive policy in line with her present protestations, to the view that Germany will continue to pursue what might be termed a Bismarckian policy of gaining her ultimate ends of expansion point by point even to the extent at an opportune time of striking to regain her “lost provinces” from France. The situation of East Prussia and Danzig and the Polish Corridor and Berlin’s silence on these scores are cited as proofs of the validity of the latter point of view. To me the notable thing about these differing viewpoints respecting Germany, is that even after giving appropriate weight to the influence of nationalistic biases and individual hopes, the expressed opinions of the best informed and customarily objective observers here are diametrically in opposition on this subject. ( b ) Great Britain is seen as having striven for, and successfully achieved at the moment, the middle position, in this instance between France and Germany, which is the traditional basis of her continental policy. The Foreign Office, taking the long view that Germany might become an eventual threat to the British in Europe and also to the Empire, and believing thus that in any European war Great Britain must be against Germany and hence on the side of France, have displayed an urge to orient their policy within this concept. The British public, however, being keenly desirous of peace and roused by a threat of war, have seized strongly on the belief that Hitler’s proposals are sincere proposals of peace. The British Government’s present policy is thus seen as satisfying itself at this juncture with the substantial, although in the minds of many members of the Foreign Office the dangerous, advantage of holding the balance—the reason for it being dangerous is that in effect it favors a possibly threatening Germany. This position is moreover rendered exceedingly complicated for Great Britain by the African situation. The belief now held here, whether correct or not and despite the superficial evidence of such matters as the Maffey report, 42 is that Britain’s efforts against Italy in Geneva have at all times been due to her concept that an Italian controlled Ethiopia would be a threat to the Empire and thus must be countered at all costs. London is nevertheless regarded as at all times having held her cards so closely that her true motivations in this affair have never been clear. How London will reconcile her European and African interests is, next to Germany’s policy and intentions which have been discussed, regarded as the great problem in the situation. ( c ) The position of France seems to me much more clear. Her fear of Germany is basic and unchanging. As a counter to that fear she unswervingly seeks for guarantees of security by collective measures, through arrangements with the Eastern European powers, from Great Britain, from Italy, or wherever they may be found. No less than the British, however, the French public is anxious for peace and it would appear that there is a developing feeling in France, despite the outward positions which Paris may take, that ultimate peace will be found only in a reconciliation with Germany. ( d ) While Italy’s preoccupations by geographical necessity must be primarily European and, to the extent to which Germany constitutes a threat, Germany is definitely a potential threat to Italy, Rome is seen as occupying herself strenuously with the African issue which she regards as necessarily immediate. It is felt here, nevertheless, that Italy is at present bargaining, or hopes shortly to bargain, behind the scenes with Great Britain over her European-African situation. It is presumed that she may be waiting in this for a clearer demonstration of her advantageous military position in Ethiopia. ( e ) There remains in the consciousness of Geneva the recent belief, now attributed to have been chiefly the result of British propaganda, that the Italian forces were in a bad situation in Ethiopia. With this in mind, Geneva is chary, despite accounts of the present Italian successes, of expressing conclusions on the exact military status of the Italo-Ethiopian war. There is furthermore found here but little upon which to base sound estimates in this respect. ( f ) Respecting the League as related to these matters, even the most orthodox of the officials of the League Secretariat perceive the League Covenant as “suspended” in the international field, in the sense that a national constitution may be suspended in a national government. Under these conditions, although the forms of League procedures may continue, in the Geneva view they have lost for the time their accustomed and “textual” meaning. I may say that I consider it as exceedingly important that developments be followed here with this concept clearly in mind. An illustration of this is the attitude of the small Council powers toward the meeting of the Committee of Thirteen in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict which is about to take place. Although the delegates of these powers must take their place in this meeting as representatives of their governments, they express themselves as completely at a loss as to the reason for the meeting being called at this particular juncture or what end it is intended to serve. The reasons governing the decision to hold the meeting are seen as lying so deeply hidden in the policies of the Great Powers that there is left for those on the outside only speculation concerning them. The unreality of their adopting responsible positions is thus most present in the minds of the representatives of the small Council powers and their chief interest seems to be to avoid taking a position which will involve them in unforeseen commitments. Associated with this, there is evidenced a certain resentment that “great power” action taken here be regarded as “League” action. It is thus generally felt that for an indeterminate period the League will in fact be left to one side. It is believed that such procedures as may be followed looking to a solution of the European situation will also physically take place outside of Geneva. On the other hand, it is nevertheless seen that the Great Powers may demand that the League play a rôle and that Geneva may thus be the forum in which will be voiced the results of negotiations taking place elsewhere. Despite the generalities of the foregoing, there remains nevertheless an important element which is of the essence of the very existence of the League. It is the appeal, no matter what the manifest political complexion of any given case, to public opinion in matters which outrage public feelings. It is in part from this background of public feeling that the League has sought and has gained much of its strength. This consideration is illustrated and comes to the fore in certain elements of the immediate situation. There is a difference, in part perhaps emotional, in the reaction in many League states to the admitted German violation of treaty obligations and the Italian war as prosecuted in Africa. In the latter case, actual warfare is in progress, individuals are being killed, and it is believed that the Italians are employing poisonous gases, bombing open towns, and in general indulging in illegal operations. There is thus an urge to take measures against Italy, quite aside from the purely political considerations involved. I think that it may be stated that Great Britain in her attitude against Italy has in this respect the support of wide popular opinion to count upon. It is something which the French Government cannot well gainsay; moreover there is a French public opinion. I feel that this element of the situation should be given due consideration in any observation of developments in the Italo-Ethiopian case before the League, and that it might, if the British are skilful in their leadership, even lead, although this does not seem really probable, to an extension of sanctions. ( g ) A change in the League is forecast. There is much discussion of it here. It is believed that it will ultimately mean a constitutional change. Action taken “within the framework of the Covenant” which has been an oft-repeated expression has not, in the view of Geneva, in truth existed for some time in respect of the major European questions. It is now more strongly realized that this separation of theory and reality cannot indefinitely continue if the League is to continue. It must eventuate that the League will operate within the “framework of the European situation”, whatever that may be. Just as what may come into being in Europe is speculative, so the future form of the League is speculative. For similar reasons discussed under the preceding paragraphs, the small powers are apprehensive, and resentful, of changes which are envisaged. Certain representatives express this feeling as follows: “We entrusted the League to the great powers. They have failed us. Whatever our Governments may desire to do, our people will not be willing for us to follow the great powers again.” By this they mean that the peoples of their countries will not reconcile themselves to a new League which from present indications they believe will be one in which the theory of the equality of the states members will no longer be dominant in its structure. My personal view is, however, should this eventuate, that when the time comes the small states will accept what is offered them rather than turn their backs on the only form in which participation will be open to them. Respectfully yours, Prentiss B. Gilbert 42 In January 1935, the British Government established an interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Colonies (Maffey), for the purpose of estimating British interests in Abyssinia. The Committee reported on June 18, 1935, that there was no important British interest in the area with the exception of Lake Tsana, the waters of the Blue Nile, and certain tribal grazing rights. (Despatch No. 1997, February 25, 1936, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom; not printed.) The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/587: Telegram [Document 238] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , April 9, 1936—11 a.m. [Received April 9—9:25 a.m.] 105. German official comment regarding the French memorandum and plan 43 is limited at present to preliminary consideration of the lengthy documents. Both Bülow and Dieckhoff express themselves as welcoming whatever contribution by any power for the peace of Europe so long as it is constructive and not unnecessarily contentious or accusatory. With the Foreign Office technically closed from tonight until Tuesday and the Easter holidays intervening it is anticipated that the German Government will if practicable avoid any other than such formal reference to the new French memorandum and plan. Regarding the vital question of fortifications the Foreign Office considers generally that it is standing on the firm basis of defensive measures in its own country and certainly gives no evidence of any willingness to concede anything to France on this score. When questioned regarding the essence of the fortifications problem, namely the damage or even danger to French supremacy in Central Europe, the Foreign Office considers this is just too bad but does not see why it should be called upon to underwrite French hegemony in the Danube region by self-denying action at the expense of Germany’s own defensive situation. The morning press repudiates the French plan in its entire conception in detail and in tone. Repeated to Paris, London, Geneva, Rome, Praha, Brussels, Vienna, by mail to Budapest, Bucharest, Istanbul, Warsaw, The Hague. Dodd 43 See footnote 40, p. 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] . The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/639 [Document 239] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 789 Brussels , April 14, 1936. [Received April 22.] Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a conversation which a member of my staff had today with the Viscount de Lantsheere, Chef de Cabinet of the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce, concerning the questions which engaged the attention of the Locarno Powers (other than Germany) at their meeting at Geneva on April 10, 1936. Respectfully yours, Dave H. Morris [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) In the course of a conversation this morning, Viscount de Lantsheere furnished me with the following information regarding the Rhineland and Abyssinian questions: (1) The Belgian Government considers that the communiqué which was issued by the Four Locarno Powers at the conclusion of their meeting at Geneva on April 10, 1936, 44 was the best arrangement that could possibly have been reached under the circumstances. It was a compromise measure and was calculated to bridge over the situation until after the French elections. (2) The French representatives manifested a less intransigent spirit at Geneva than the Belgian and British Governments had expected. (3) The British Government will now approach the German Government and ask for clarifications of certain points raised in the German Government’s last memorandum. In this inquiry, the latest French memorandum will serve as a basis. The Belgian Government considers the French memorandum well drawn up from a juridical point of view. In the new approach to the German Government, the British, French and Belgian Governments have nothing in the nature of a fixed plan. (4) The Belgian Government regards the Abyssinian question as destined to play an important rôle in the next stage of the Rhineland negotiations. This is a connection of circumstances—not a planned connection. The Belgian Government sees no indication of any arrangement between Germany and Italy. On the other hand, the Belgian Government does not see now [ how? ] the Abyssinian and the Rhineland questions can fail to react upon each other—from the very force of developments. The Belgian Government is still fearful of a split between Great Britain and France regarding the question of sanctions against Italy, which might naturally cause a series of untoward developments. (5) In reply to the Italian inquiry as to whether Great Britain, France and Belgium desired Italian collaboration in the Locarno question, 45 Messrs. Flandin and van Zeeland both informed the Italian representative that their Governments were still awaiting the Italian Note of Guarantee. (6) Public opinion in Belgium is coming more and more to demand that Belgium’s position as a guarantor in any security pacts or similar arrangements shall be strictly limited to League obligations. Reacting to this desire by Belgian public opinion, as well as impelled by its own instinct and judgment, the Belgian Government will probably endeavor in concluding any new pact to limit its obligations as a guarantor to agreements to defend its own territory. Belgium does not want to be a guarantor for France. Belgium has no alliances with Eastern European countries (such as Poland or Czechoslovakia) and does not wish to be drawn into struggles originating in Eastern Europe, or in fact in Western Europe either if it can possibly keep out of them. (7) The Belgian Government still feels that all hurried action should be avoided in approaching the Rhineland question, as time tends to cool people’s judgement. Brussels , April 14, 1936. 44 Documents on International Affairs, 1986 , p. 210. 45 Ibid. , p. 211. Memorandum by the Minister in Yugoslavia (Wilson) 840.00/440 [Document 240] Memorandum by the Minister in Yugoslavia ( Wilson ) 46 [ Belgrade , April 16, 1936.] In a conversation yesterday with the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs I found him extremely pessimistic about the European situation. Speaking of Austria, he repeated what has already been reported to the Department; namely, that the recent action of that country in establishing conscript service came as no surprise, as for nearly two years Austria’s preparations for such a step have been known here. He believed that if Austria had approached the other signatory countries of the Treaty of St. Germain for modification of that document, it would probably have been accorded. However, at the instigation of Italy, Austria had decided to violate the terms of the Treaty. He feared similar action by Hungary, for it is well known that that country is making military preparations. Of course, such action on the part of Hungary would cause violent reaction in the Little Entente countries. The Minister believes that Italy will be entirely successful in her present Abyssinian adventure and as a result the prestige of Great Britain will suffer a severe blow. Italy had been able to act as she has because she knew that from a military point of view England was helpless. However, he said England is now aware of her military weakness and is taking measures to remedy it so that when the time is ripe she will be able to take her revenge on Italy. What gave the Minister the greatest concern was the future attitude of France which, he felt, would have serious consequences for the Little and Balkan Entente countries, and especially Yugoslavia. France, he says, has consistently worked for a system of collective security in Europe. This system it now seems possible will fail, and France will therefore be obliged to make bi-lateral treaties of alliance with other countries. Owing to the attitude of England, he believes that France will now turn to Italy and endeavor to form an alliance with that country which, according to him, would weaken if not put an end to the alliance between France and the Little Entente countries and eventually leave Yugoslavia face to face with a militant and well prepared Italy. The French alliance with Russia, he said, had been a necessity for France, as if Russia could not secure an alliance with France she would have eventually made one with Germany, which would have been the end of France as a first-class power. Speaking of the recent request made by Turkey for permission to remilitarize the Dardanelles, 47 he acknowledged that Turkey had adopted the correct method of approaching this question, but that he regretted the action of Turkey which caused Yugoslav concern and placed her in an embarrassing situation as a co-member with Turkey in the Balkan Entente. The Minister appeared also to be very pessimistic about the internal political situation of France. 46 Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 508, April 16; received May 1. 47 See vol. iii , pp. 503 ff. The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/667 [Document 241] The Minister in Czechoslovakia ( Wright ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 431 Prague , April 17, 1936. [Received May 6.] Sir : Nothwithstanding the fact that, as I have previously reported, this Government continues to manifest every external assurance of calmness with regard to international conditions in general and recent developments in Germany in particular, there is no doubt that its principal members are deeply concerned as regards possible repercussions upon this country. Expressions of private opinion in various strata of society vary according to the temperament, inclination and interest of the individual; while it has been interesting to observe that for some weeks the press has been controlled (either by reasons of individual policy or, much more likely, by intimations from on high) in any expressions of opinion—limiting itself to copious extracts from publications in other countries. The two main factors of the present Government’s perturbation are: first, the conviction that if Germany decides to fortify the German portion of the Rhineland, France will be so geographically blocked and militarily engaged that her support of the States of the Little Entente in general, and especially of Czechoslovakia, will be reduced to a shadow of the promises of military protection in the assurance of which the Little Entente was conceived and born; and second, the intransigence of Hungary in her unwavering opposition to any politico-economic rapprochement between the States of the “Danubian Basin”—that hackneyed phrase which has been worn almost threadbare and does not correctly define the region which it is supposed to denote. That is the present situation in a nut-shell and it seems hardly necessary to elaborate thereon—especially when the Department will recall that these two main factors in their varying phases have been discussed in previous despatches from this Legation almost to the point of repetition. Nevertheless the fact that these reasons for concern were yesterday frankly expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to an American newspaper correspondent and confirmed by the Minister to me in a private conversation on the same evening, throws the whole question into such relief as perhaps to justify reiterated exposition. With regard to the first point, it will be recalled that President Beneš, when Minister for Foreign Affairs, repeatedly expressed to me his latent concern lest some such eventuality might arise which would exert a powerful influence upon Czechoslovakia’s policy and render necessary a very careful threading of her way. This attitude may be best summed up in the following phrase: while ever loyal to the principles of the League of Nations and to the fulfillment of all international obligations, and while largely dependent upon the support of France, such leadership will not always be so blindly followed as to produce, for example, a blanket endorsement of the Hoare-Laval Agreement regarding Abyssinia or continued support of a provocative policy on the part of France should such cause Czechoslovakia gratuitously to estrange her powerful German neighbor. Other Czechoslovak statesmen of lesser importance have said the same to me; military men have dismissed with a deprecating shrug of the shoulders any suggestion that this country could really take up arms against Germany; industrialists and agricultural operatives, while admitting the fear of invasion or control, have equally confessed their impotence to withstand it; and members of the Austrian nobility whose roots are planted centuries deep in the soil of Bohemia, are frankly fearful that their beloved land may some day fall within the frontiers of an implacable, disciplined and ambitious nation. Whether such annexation of the major portion of this country will take place and, if so, whether for political, economic or militarily strategic reasons, I have previously reported in some detail. In his discussion of this phase of the matter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs after reiterating his concern as to the inevitable results upon this country of the bottling up of France, observed—rather wistfully—that he did not really think that Germany wanted to fight! I could not escape the impression that his wish was largely father to the thought and I am not aware that he expressed this belief in his conversation with the aforementioned American correspondent, but such a frank expression of his fears, and the reasons therefor, is an unusual procedure on the part of a Minister for Foreign Affairs—unless he desires that this opinion be made public, as it undoubtedly will, but thereby rendered available for German consumption. With regard to the intransigence of Hungary, the reasons and opinions and illustrations supply the fabric for the same old weary story which has been reported upon over and over again ever since the establishment of the Succession States: Austria wishes to cooperate economically with Czechoslovakia and to join with her and the other States of this region in some effort to neutralize the aspirations of Germany, while Hungary, notwithstanding the many injustices from which she has suffered in the economically illogical demarcation of her frontiers, is only too willing to occupy any position—even that of semi-subordination to Germany—which will embarrass the nations which have been given large portions of her former territory and thus render as difficult as possible the position of Jugoslavia which she considers an absurd federation, that of Rumania which she loathes, and that of this country which she detests as a nation of deserters and servants. The Department may recall that in the years between 1927 and 1930 I have written much upon this subject from Budapest. Illustrations always strengthen—or at least enlighten—statements, and I could ask for no better illustration of the present mentality of certain countries involved than that afforded at a recent social gathering in Prague where, in the presence of representatives of France and the United States, the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions of Germany, Poland and Hungary rather ostentatiously withdrew to a smaller room and there discussed with every evidence of pleasure the situation which had arisen as a result of Germany’s latest acts. Increasing evidences of progressive weakening of the Little Entente should not be lost sight of, and I have reason to believe that impressions of this nature will shortly find expression in certain American papers whose correspondents have been recently in Central Europe. Of course, the key-note for this opinion is set by the success of German economic and political propaganda in Jugoslavia, as well as by the disinclination of that country—regarding which I reported at that time—to concur in the opinion of the other two States of the Little Entente that Austria’s disavowal of any intention to permit the restoration of the Hapsburgs can be taken at face value. It seems unnecessary to discuss at this moment the position of Rumania or the value which she may lend in a military sense to Czechoslovakia, but the indisputable fact remains that Czechoslovakia, by far the strongest of the three, is gradually being forced into a more and more desperately isolated position. The attitude of the newly appointed German Minister at Prague 48 is not without interest. A man of keen and alert intelligence and of implacable devotion to the policy of his country, although not necessarily an ardent Nazi in principle, he created upon arrival the impression that he would drive the members of his efficient staff at a high rate of speed and would pay attention to every detail of a busy office. Now that he has been here approximately two months, I find the contrary to be the case: he entrusts more and more detail to his subordinates, has already traveled to a considerable degree through the Northern and Western portions of Bohemia, and in answer to my passing question as to whether he found the duties of his mission arduous, replied, “I am principally busy in keeping in touch with ‘our people’”. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation with me, also referred to the importance of immediate developments in the Ethiopian-Italian dispute, expressing himself as far from convinced that Italy’s alleged military triumphs as reported are as great or as lasting as the Italians might wish them to be; expressed thinly disguised dissatisfaction with sanctions which, although loyally supported by this country, are a constant source of annoyance and economic dislocation; and quite frankly referred to the inevitable weakening of Italy as a result of the Abyssinian campaign and her economic difficulties which would greatly lessen the potency of her resistance against Germany should Austria find it necessary to bespeak the support so often promised by Mussolini. As I also reported at the time, Czechoslovakia joined in the protest against the decision of Austria to adopt conscription and this, of course, is of importance in the present situation, but I cannot escape the impression that although the protest was a pro forma one characterized by the almost impotent feeling expressed to me by Jan Masaryk as regards Germany: “Of course we don’t like it and we have to say so, but what can we really do about it?”, this Government faces the dilemma of welcoming any increase of armed resistance against Germany and of deploring any dislocation which arises from disregard of Treaties and which will impede economic rapprochement with Austria. In this connection, the Minister for Foreign Affairs observed to me that he hopes that “Austria may find it possible, before the meeting of the Little Entente Foreign Ministers early in May, to give us something so as to obviate the necessity of our laying the matter officially before the League of Nations”. He also said that he does not believe that Hungary will follow Austria’s suit in resorting to conscription, as she sees that her best interest consists in taking no such action at the present moment. It would indeed be easy to relapse into either of two moods—one contrary to my customary manner of approach to such matters, and the second almost fatal to one who has long followed the profession of diplomacy: pessimism and prophecy. There is ample reason for the former, not only from the standpoint of whether or not this democratic state will be permitted to—or, indeed, can—live among these eddies of political aspirations and enmities of Central Europe which change almost daily and are so beclouded by regional pacts, treaties of mutual assistance, conventions for non-aggression, perambulations of visiting statesmen, et cetera, as now to have reached a point amply described in a recent article in one of Prague’s foremost newspapers as a “diplomatic labyrinth”. The critics (if not the enemies) of Beneš now assume the attitude of more or less malicious hope that he will find that the conduct of affairs of state from the Presidency in these pregnant moments is a very different affair from that of opportunist negotiation at Geneva; while his friends and supporters believe that if this experience has been of any value it is now to be put to the test and wish that his hands might be strengthened by greater willingness on the part of the electorate to deal in more elastic manner with the German elements of the population. The rigidity of the present ruling class in this regard seems, indeed, to be a mingling of a desire for reprisals and a specious superiority complex arising from a position of inferiority for generations: the inhabitants of the German regions of the country express undisguised exasperation at the efforts of this Government to introduce the Czech language in those districts; while the Czech elements in and about those regions assume the attitude of having been ground under foot and reduced to a subordinate situation by Teutonic influences (both German and Austrian) for several hundred years, they now mean to show who is the master. It does not require a very discerning mind to perceive that these sores into which salt is rubbed almost daily may very easily communicate their inflammation to other parts of the body politic. Should I succumb to the second temptation—that of prophecy—I should be inclined to express the opinion that Germany will go right ahead in getting whatever she wishes, unless the economic situation within that State applies a brake which no other external or internal forces appear able to exert. She has won in the Saar, she has had a moral victory in Memel, she appears to have won in the Rhineland, and the gathering of certain nations at Geneva appears singularly futile in either devising means of control or in supplying the necessary amount of elasticity in the pending negotiations. Admittedly the Franco-German situation is a grave one, but I can only reiterate—even to the exclusion of what used to be known as the “Balkan tinder box”—that the problems of Central Europe and the alignment of the nations composing it are of equal importance. In reply to my inquiry as to what would occur as regards Poland when Germany reaches the point in her program of regaining territorial contiguity with East Prussia, I have been informed from many sources that the quid pro quo for the disappearance of the corridor will be the “granting” of Slovakia to Poland or at least the parcelling of this Province between Hungary and Poland—thus bringing Poland into territorial contiguity with Hungary, capitalizing a friendship which has been an historical fact for centuries, effecting the complete encirclement of the remaining portion of this country, splitting the Little Entente completely apart, and opening a wide front for the “Drang nach Osten” which is as important a factor in Germany’s present policy as it was in the days prior to 1914. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, J. Butler Wright 48 Ernst Eisenlohr. The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/642: Telegram [Document 242] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , April 22, 1936—3 p.m. [Received April 22—1:52 p.m.] 116. The situation here appears quiet during this period of suspense awaiting the French elections and the resumption of Locarno discussions. According to a conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office it expects the English “questions” to be submitted this week and anticipates that they will include the subject of fortifications in the Rhineland. 49 The German attitude is an entire willingness for nonfortifications on both sides of the frontier but a definite stand against any return to unilateral obligation on Germany’s own territory. Since the British are fully aware of this attitude the Foreign Office hopes that they will handle the matter of fortifications accordingly posing their “questions” so that no undesirable complications or tension may result. I gained the impression that Germany is inclined to regard the phrasing of the British “questions” as forecasting British policy in the premises. Regarding the recent collapse of the League of Nations respecting Abyssinia the Foreign Office expressed its regret especially as this greatly affects British prestige. The recent Anglo-German conversations in London were entirely satisfactory, the German officials concerned having found the British as helpful as their treaty commitments could possibly permit. In the present circumstances therefore the Foreign Office could not but deplore the blow to Great Britain from every point of view that the League action Monday 50 must entail. Reference was made to the disadvantage to the British of being tied to the French apron strings. This it was felt worked against British Empire interests, League interests, and the attempt with which England and Germany are both so concerned to bring about better general European relations and conditions. There were clear implications in my conversation with the Foreign Office yesterday of its feeling that sooner or later the British would come to realize the community of Anglo-German interests vis-à-vis Italian imperialism. I also have had a talk with the French Ambassador and Counsellor. They repeated their mistrust of Hitler and German intentions with especial reference to Austria and are quite pessimistic. Poncet said again that the Rhineland situation was not yet liquidated, referring to article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles. As seen from here the European picture is focusing even more sharply upon the fundamentals, namely, the rivalry between France and Germany for European hegemony and the new element of Italy (See Embassy’s 105, April 9, 11 a.m. penultimate paragraph). There is a certain confirmation of the first part of this impression in the sharper tone towards France in the local German press and semiofficial publications during the past week or ten days which departs considerably from the hitherto studied restraint or even complacence in the face of French attacks. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Geneva. Mayer 49 The British “questionnaire,” dated May 6, 1936, was submitted on May 7 to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs; for text, see British Cmd. 5175, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936), p. 12. 50 Draft resolution, Dispute Between Italy and Ethiopia, adopted April 20, 1936, League of Nations, Official Journal , April 1936 (pt. ii ), pp. 392–393. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/653: Telegram [Document 243] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , April 27, 1936—5 p.m. [Received April 27—2:50 p.m.] 228. My 207, April 15, 8 p.m. 51 It is becoming increasingly clear that the high point of pro-German or anti-French feeling in Great Britain is past and that the efforts both public and private that the Government has been making to bring public opinion to the view that strategic considerations, not sentiment, necessitate a close cooperation between France and Great Britain are beginning to have some effect. The Anglo-French staff talks (see Atherton’s letter to Dunn 52 of April 19) have resulted in a further general realization in many quarters here of the vulnerability of England from the air, especially through Belgium and that Anglo-French cooperation is necessary to protect the Low Countries. Chamberlain’s defense budget has also obviously impressed the nation not only with the cost but with the necessity for rearmament. In the recent Anglo-French staff talks the British had to admit that at the moment practically their entire effective air force was concentrated in Egypt. Furthermore, the Government by implication has confirmed the correctness of Winston Churchill’s figures on German rearmament quoted last week in Parliament (eight hundred million pounds sterling spent in 1935; see my 491, October 3, 7 p.m. 53 ). Thus some progress is being made in leading British public opinion to the view that the Nazi concept of international procedure, reinforced by its tremendous armament, present and prospective, is the dominant danger in Europe today. I anticipate that there will gradually emerge in the public mind the realization that such a Nazi policy and military machine is as much a menace to the interests of Great Britain as to those of France, particularly as the question of a possible return to Germany of colonial territory now held by Great Britain comes increasingly to the fore. Incidentally there are many who realize that the Mediterranean may no longer be a safe Empire route in time of war and that the alternative route via the Cape might become likewise untenable should Germany regain her African colonies. Although the British public is beginning to learn, perhaps unconsciously, to view the European situation in its new aspect, the present Government is so much the prisoner of its own words before the bar of public opinion and so lacking in strong and courageous leadership that the process of education may be protracted. Indeed it is the time element which is again seriously disturbing the permanent officials in the Foreign Office and the members of the general staffs of the fighting services. I am informed that their information is that it was seriously debated among the Nazi leaders in March whether to undertake the reoccupation of the Bhineland or an Austrian “ptsch”. This fact, particularly since from both a military and political viewpoint, the reoccupation of the Rhineland was so obviously the best move for Germany to make leads these permanent officials to regard another “irresponsible” action on the part of Germany as almost inevitable after the stimulating effects of the Rhineland occupation have worn off. Hence the importance of the time element as regards: (1) British rearmament; (2) the education of public opinion to the realities of the German menace; (3) the desirability of effecting a return of Italy as a factor against German aggression in the Danubian area before too much of her substance has been wasted in the consequences of the Abyssinian adventure and the attendant penalties to which the British Government remains committed. I am informed by a diplomatic colleague that only recently Cabinet members hoped that by a French withdrawal from a continuation of sanctions against Italy a way out from the Italian impasse might be offered to Great Britain. I understand on reliable authority that beyond a policy of drift ending possibly in only a repetition of previous statements in Geneva, and a possible further adjournment of the Council, the British Cabinet have determined no line of action for the League meeting of May 11th. (4) In disabusing the German mind that England is willing to act as a mediator between France and Germany beyond those marginal questions which do not impinge on the fundamental interests upon which England as well as France and Belgium, and presumably Italy, cannot compromise. Copies by mail to Paris, Berlin, Geneva, Bern and Rome. Bingham 51 Not printed. 52 James C. Dunn, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs; letter not found in Department files. 53 Not printed. The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/675 [Document 244] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 807 Brussels , May 1, 1936. [Received May 9.] Sir : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is interesting to note that throughout the recent crisis growing out of developments in the Rhineland, the foreign policy of Belgium has shown an increasing tendency of an orientation toward Great Britain rather than toward France. In the years immediately following the termination of the World War, the balance of sentiment in Belgium favored a close military working agreement with France. This sentiment was symbolized by the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920 and the partnership between France and Belgium in the occupation of the Ruhr. It was hoped and believed by many people in Belgium at that time that France would extend to Belgium important commercial concessions in the form of a market for Belgian manufactured goods. Despite the attempts made by successive Belgian Governments to obtain commercial advantages from France, the concessions sought were never obtained and there has been an increasing disillusionment in Belgium vis-à-vis its southern neighbor and what the Belgians regard as its selfish commercial policy. The Flemish element in Belgium has always been opposed to the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920, claiming that it bound Belgium to the apron-strings of France. During the last few months, the Flemish extremists have been denouncing this Agreement more and more loudly and insisting that the Agreement was useless and dangerous. The Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920 was in fact modified and defined by an exchange of Notes between the French and Belgian Governments on March 6, 1936, 54 the eve of the German re-militarization of the Rhineland. Although the Flemish extremists have been in the vanguard of those who have been in favor of Belgium’s cutting loose from France, there has been a gradually developing feeling here in political and commercial circles that it was not safe to place too much dependence on French aid. An unwillingness by France to grant any commercial favors to Belgium, the difficulties of Belgian labor in the French frontier zones, and the fear of France engaging in adventures or commitments that might prove embarrassing to Belgium, are the principal reasons that have caused people of moderate views in Belgium to feel that close collaboration with France alone would be dangerous. Flemish leaders have long felt that Belgium would derive great advantages from a closer co-operation with Great Britain. Mr. Franz van Cauwelaert, former Minister of Industry and Agriculture, a leading Flamingant, informed this Embassy two years ago that he favored a commercial orientation toward England. This orientation was in fact to a considerable extent achieved by the devaluation of the belga in March 1935. This financial operation marked the defection of Belgium from the so-called gold-bloc led by France and the establishment of an equilibrium between the purchasing power of the belga and the pound sterling. It, therefore, brought Belgium commercially within the orbit of the sterling group. Since 1920, the Belgian Government had been desirous of concluding a general staff agreement with England to supplement the military accord with France, but until recently the British Government was unwilling to enter into such an agreement. The result of the factors described above has been that since the events of March 7, 1936, there has been a marked orientation on the part of the Belgian Government toward England. The fact that the British Government was willing to enter into General Staff conversations with Belgium has been a source of universal gratification here. The present Belgian orientation toward Great Britain does not, of course, mean anything in the nature of a crude breach with France. The Belgian Government, and the Belgian people in general—with the exception perhaps of a few Flemish extremists—realize that good relations and a good understanding with France are essential to the prosperity and welfare of Belgium. But it is thought that the situation precipitated by the recent events in the Rhineland may well mark the termination of the period of the close dependence of Belgium on France. The Belgian public in general is very liberal in bestowing credit on Mr. Paul van Zeeland for the skill and dignity which he has shown throughout the difficult negotiation of the last three months. Feeling that the British position of “condemn the past: build for the future” was the correct attitude for the Belgian Government to assume in its negotiations with Germany, Mr. van Zeeland has worked hard to induce the French Government to agree not to close the door to the discussions which Great Britain and Belgium thought should be carried on with Germany. The fact that he attained a fair measure of success in this difficult task is regarded here as a diplomatic achievement of importance. Respectfully yours, Dave H. Morris 54 For text of French note of March 6, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 72. Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) 740.00/52 [Document 245] Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Bullitt ) 55 I called on Von Neurath, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on May 18th and had a long talk on the general European situation. Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until “the Rhineland had been digested”. He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. “As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France can not enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,” he said. We then discussed the position of the Little Entente, and Von Neurath said that he could assure me with absolute certainty that Yugoslavia positively would not recognize the Soviet Government. Yugoslavia definitely had refused to join Rumania and Czechoslovakia in forming a bloc under Russian hegemony. He said that Germany’s relations with Yugoslavia had improved greatly. He accompanied the latter statement with something like a wink, which I took to mean that some sort of definite understanding had been reached between Germany and Yugoslavia. In discussing France, he said that he could swear to me that the deepest desire of Hitler was to come to a real understanding with France. He added that I knew from the many conversations we had had on this subject over a long period of years that to establish a Franco-German understanding had always been the core of his personal foreign policy. He then said he regretted that there seemed to him today not the slightest chance of bringing about a reconciliation between France and Germany. He asserted that every attempt he or Hitler had made to draw closer to the French had resulted in either no reply from France or a rebuff. Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached between Germany and Italy and admitted that the demonstrations of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present time he could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time. The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his army mobilized on the Austrian border ready to strike and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse. The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more toward the Nazis and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time. The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany. With regard to England, he said that he regretted greatly that no really friendly contact had been established between the German and British Governments. I asked him if he meant that he did not talk and could not talk with Eden or the British Ambassador in Berlin as simply and directly as he was talking to me. He replied that he absolutely could not and that it was totally impossible. I asked him what he thought would be British policy with regard to Germany. He replied that he had said to Hitler in the course of the previous week that he was expecting a British gesture of friendship toward Germany which would possibly take the form of a statement made privately that England could see no moral objection to the joining of Austrian Germans to the German Republic. He went on to say that he and Hitler were fully prepared for this maneuver; that the real desire of Britain was to embroil Germany with Italy by producing a Nazi coup d’état in Austria. “We have no intention, however,” he said, “of being the cat’s paw for British policy in Europe. Our policy will be a German policy and nothing else.” We discussed relations between Germany and the Soviet Government. Von Neurath said that he considered the hostility between Germany and the Soviet Union absolutely irremovable. He asserted that the Soviet Union believed that Nazi Germany was the one obstacle to the conquest of Europe by Communism. (This incidentally is the view of the Soviet Government.) There could be no end, therefore, to the hostility between the two States. He asserted that recently the German secret police had found that the Soviet Government, through the Comintern, was pushing the Communist movement in Germany with greater intensity than ever before. (The same statement was made to me recently in Moscow by Steiger, the chief agent of the OGPU with the diplomatic corps.) With regard to internal affairs and particularly the appointment of Goering as Schacht’s superior, Neurath made the following assertions: (1) He said that about two months ago Hitler had said to him that it was absolutely necessary to do something to protect Schacht from the attacks of certain Nazi Party institutions and individuals who were in the habit of using foreign exchange in large quantities without Schacht’s permission or control. I asked him what institutions he meant and he said that the worst was the Ministry of Propaganda under Goebbels which had been spending millions on foreign propaganda utterly without result. He asserted that Hitler had said to him he felt it would be desirable to shelter Schacht behind the broad figure of Goering, who had great prestige and power in the country and the Nazi Party. He asserted that the arrangement had been made with the full consent and approval of Doctor Schacht and that it was working very well. He asserted that at major conferences to consider economic affairs Schacht and Goering both presided and that Goering interfered only if certain party chiefs refused to accept Schacht’s authority. He asserted that he expected the present arrangement to give satisfactory results and to last for a considerable period. I suggested to Von Neurath that if, as he had pointed out to me in a previous conversation, those colonies which Germany could hope to reacquire could not provide sufficient raw materials to produce any amelioration in the German economic situation, it seemed most unwise, at a time when it was desirable to have as much British support as possible, to raise the question of colonies needlessly. He replied that he had somewhat revised his views since he had talked to me on this subject and said that there were certain colonies which might be most useful, notably the Cameroons. He seemed to indicate, by further remarks on this subject, that Germany would attempt to obtain the Cameroons but would not push seriously other colonial claims for the present. I asked Von Neurath when he would reply to the British note of inquiry as to the meaning of Hitler’s peace proposals. He answered that the German Government would take its own time about replying, that the reply would certainly not be made in the near future. He went on to say that the entire matter of the British note of inquiry had been mishandled grossly by the British Foreign Office. He said that Sir Eric Phipps had brought him the note with the request to keep its contents absolutely secret and that he had agreed to absolute secrecy as it was impossible to reach any international agreements by debates in the public press. He said that, to his utter astonishment, Sir Eric Phipps had then telephoned to him and said that he regretted greatly to inform him that there had been a leak as to the contents of the note and that it would be essential for the British Government to publish it the following morning. Von Neurath asserted that he had asked Phipps if the leak had been in the French Foreign Office and that Sir Eric had replied that he was extremely sorry to say that the leak had been in London. Von Neurath then went on to say that in view of the fact that it was now proposed to reform the League of Nations entirely and that as one of the proposals of the German Government had been that Germany should enter the League, it was impossible to make a decision or binding statements with regard to foreign policy until it was known what the nature of the new League would be. He discussed this matter at some length and seemed to indicate that the German reply to the British note would be long delayed and would not be specific and would explain the lack of definiteness by the excuse that until the new constitution of the League had been established, it would be impossible to make promises with respect to foreign policy. The entire impression I gathered from Von Neurath was that Germany will attempt to behave in a quiet and inoffensive manner until her fortifications on the French and Belgian frontiers are completed and during that period will attempt to avoid any commitments which might restrict her future activities. With regard to Czechoslovakia, Von Neurath said that although the Czechs were violently anti-German at the present time, he would not be surprised to see an improvement in relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia brought about by the construction of German fortifications on the French frontier. He said that the German Government knew just as well as the Russian that all talk of Russian military assistance to Czechoslovakia at the present moment was nonsense. He said that the Russian troops could not reach Czechoslovakia and that Russian airplanes could not easily fly to Czechoslovakia owing to the inability of the Russians to conduct long flights over such difficult regions as those which lie between Kiev and Prague. William C. Bullitt Berlin , May 18, 1936. 55 The Ambassador was en route to the United States. Apparently this memorandum was brought with him to the Department. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/688: Telegram [Document 246] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , May 19, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 19—4:15 p.m.] 269. It was decided at yesterday’s Cabinet meeting that, although the British Government is prepared to send Lord Halifax to Berlin for a conference with Hitler, in the given circumstances no useful purpose would be served by such a visit now. In his recent conversation with Ambassador Phipps, Hitler, in effect, put [aside?] the British questionnaire with the statement that he was not prepared to set a date for an answer until after the new French Government had taken office and made known its attitude to the Franco-Soviet pact, which date would presumably also be after the next League meeting. Hitler did inform Phipps, however, that he thought the question regarding Germany’s return to the League was futile until England could define to what League Germany was being asked to return, and he referred to Baldwin’s statement of last week that at “the autumn meeting of the League the members of the League will have to consider among other things what, if any, changes are necessary”. This attitude, evaluated in the light of events since 1933, has contributed to apprehension in official circles here that Hitler does not really wish to effect appeasement through negotiation. At the same time Phipps continues to reiterate his view that any deterrent to an aggressor through League collective action is discounted by Hitler and that the only method which would be an effective restraint is a reconstruction of the Stresa Front; 56 English participation in this is realized in Berlin to be dependent on the Mediterranean situation. He emphasizes also the power and forcefulness of that Nazi element within Germany which insisted that rearmament could be undertaken in 1935 without penalty and which again in 1936 insisted that the reoccupation of the Rhineland could be undertaken also without penalty, had its way and proved its point. The time element factor as analyzed in my 228, April 27, 5 p.m., is regarded as increasingly important and the British Cabinet is now face to face with the immediate problem of whether and how Italy can be brought back into the Stresa Front as indicated in item numbered (3) of my telegram under reference. The menace of Germany is not so preeminent in the eyes of British public opinion as to transcend all other considerations and various groups for various different reasons are still antagonistic to an Anglo-Italian rapprochement . Although many doubt it, outstandingly Neville Chamberlain and Simon favor abolition of sanctions, others are at this moment advocating caution or inaction. The question of the British fleet in the Mediterranean is involved and Sir Samuel Hoare has been offered the Admiralty but has made known his unwillingness to do so unless the Cabinet are prepared to give him authority to withdraw in his discretion the home fleet from the Mediterranean. These considerations have an important bearing on the British attitude to a Mediterranean pact (see Gilbert’s 180, May 16, 6 p.m. 57 ) since the pact would involve the Abyssinian question in a larger issue, under cover of which the British might be able to extract themselves from a portion [ from their position? ] vis-à-vis the public and vis-à-vis Italy. Bingham 56 The alignment effected April 11–14, 1935, at Stresa, by France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 57 Vol. iii , p. 138 . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/690: Telegram [Document 247] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , May 20, 1936—noon. [Received May 20—8:15 a.m.] 270. In discussing the present position outlined in my 269, May 19, 8 p.m., with the Foreign Office it was also reiterated that the time element was the all important factor; while it was in England’s interest to reconstruct a front of the Western Powers it was emphasized that it was clearly in Italy’s interest. Such a step, however, involved (1) terminating the Anglo-Italian situation, and (2) effecting an adjustment of Italy’s position with the present League. The Foreign Office felt that British public opinion was bewildered by the proven failure of its ideals but that it was not unreceptive, and if the Cabinet took a strong line such a lead would be welcomed by public opinion. The Foreign Office hoped that such a policy would “with luck” have been found by the Government for the Geneva meeting on June 16, if so things would move quickly thereafter, and that this Government policy would eventually offer a way out of sanctions, to withdraw the home fleet from the Mediterranean and to effect the necessary reestablishment of Italian relations with the present League, in which case important obstacles would be removed from the path of possible League reorganization at the autumn session. However, it was obvious that the Foreign Office feared that if at the end of the June League meeting an Anglo-Italian rapprochement had not been effected the time element factor would have added importance, in that Mussolini might decide that Italy’s interests could be more profitably reconciled with Germany’s than with England’s. In this connection, it should be noted that the Cabinet seems to be incapable of positive public action in matters, either great or small, and that the rot which set in with the Hoare-Laval plan has progressively increased, and its recent set-backs such as in the matter of equal pay for men and women in the civil service and the practical withdrawal of the coal bill this week are further symptoms of its disorganization. Bingham Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) 740.00/47 [Document 248] Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Bullitt ) 58 In the course of a conversation with Mr. Dave Hennen Morris, American Ambassador to Belgium, and myself, Mr. Van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium expressed the following views with regard to the present situation in Europe: He said that he regarded the future most pessimistically. He explained that in his opinion, when Europe was on its way to war, there came a moment when forces and events became stronger than statesmen and human will. He felt that that moment was arriving rapidly. He did not feel that it had yet arrived, however, and he believed that during this summer before the meeting of the League in September, a great effort must be made to bring Europe together in a system which might assure peace. He said that he felt the gravest element in the present situation was the immense decrease in the prestige of France. Whatever one might think about certain French policies, France did stand for the maintenance of the status quo in Europe. At the moment, France was paralyzed by internal political difficulties, by financial difficulties, by the almost complete pacifism of the French people, who were unwilling to fight except if France or Belgium should be invaded. Even more important was the fact that the completion of the fortifications which Germany was building on the French and Belgian frontiers would bar France from further effective interference in Central and Eastern Europe. An additional dangerous element was the military weakness of England. Van Zeeland then alluded to the facts that the British Government could put only one division on the continent of Europe today and that the British air force was small in numbers. He then said that he felt Great Britain today feared Italy far more than she feared Germany, and that she would find it intensely difficult, if not impossible, to collaborate with Italy for the maintenance of peace in Europe. He said that nevertheless he felt certain, and indicated that he had reasons for his statement, that the sanctions on Italy would be lifted at the next meeting in Geneva and said that he hoped this removal of sanctions might be the beginning of a détente between Great Britain and Italy which might make it possible for them to collaborate for the preservation of European peace. Mr. Van Zeeland then expressed at some length his ideas as to the changes which should be made in the Covenant of the League and as to the mechanism to preserve peace which might be developed. He said that in his opinion the great defect of the Covenant had been that it bound all nations to equal obligations in all parts of the world. To do this was to base peace on a pleasant illusion. For example: If France or the Netherlands should be attacked by Germany, Belgium at once would go to war to assist either France or the Netherlands because her vital interests would be involved. But if Brazil should attack Paraguay, Belgium would certainly not go to war with Brazil because she would have no interests whatever involved. In his opinion, the obligations under the Covenant must be made to conform with the real interests of the nations involved. He believed that the house of peace should be one which should have the League of Nations as a roof but should have several stories. All nations in the world should undertake the obligation to impose economic sanctions on a nation declared to be an aggressor by the League. The inefficacy of economic sanctions had been shown by the Italo-Abyssinian war. But in spite of the fact that economic sanctions were not sufficient aid to a nation attacked by another nation, they nevertheless were of some assistance. They made the task of the aggressor nation harder. Economic sanctions should, therefore, be the first floor of the house of the League and all members of the League should undertake the obligation to impose them against the aggressor nation. The next floor, in his opinion, should be one which had never been suggested. Each nation should agree with regard to certain other specific countries in which it had a special interest to assist those nations in time of war actively by the supplying of loans and munitions on long-term credits and all other forms of aid short of actual military assistance. For example, Belgium would be glad to take such an engagement with regard to Switzerland, because the positions of Switzerland and Belgium vis-à-vis Germany was similar. Belgium would not, however, take such obligations vis-à-vis Austria. The final floor of the house of peace should be the floor of full military and economic assistance to the state attacked by the aggressor. Van Zeeland went on to say that he had begun to feel his way toward a realization of these ideas and had found in many countries of Europe considerable response. He said that he believed that under a system of this kind all sorts of regional agreements should be possible. He asked if the contemplated Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires 59 might not establish a pact of mutual assistance for all American countries. I replied that I had no information on this subject. Mr. Van Zeeland then said that he would like to mention a question involving relations between the United States and Belgium which disturbed him. He said that I must be aware that both Mr. Morris and Mr. Wiley 60 believed that he had not done everything that he could to stop the smuggling of alcohol to the United States. 61 He wished me to assure the President that he was doing everything that he could. He could not perform impossible things but he was confident that in the end he would master the difficulties. He said that, contrary to the information of our Embassy in Brussels and our Legation in The Hague, his private information from his “services” was that the Government of the Netherlands had no intention of passing the bill to prevent smuggling from Holland to the United States. He said that he would be criticized severely if he should stop this smuggling traffic from Antwerp merely to transfer it to Rotterdam. In accordance with a previous request from Mr. Morris I said to Mr. Van Zeeland that I hoped he realized this matter was one which the Government of the United States took most seriously, that the President himself had spoken to me about it with intense interest, that the question was not merely one of preventing alcohol smuggling, but of cutting the tap root which nourished the entire criminal world—which was a unit—and was engaged not only in the illegal introduction of alcohol but also in the peddling of dope and in kidnaping. William C. Bullitt Brussels , May 20, 1936. 58 The Ambassador was en route to the United States. Apparently this memorandum was brought with him to the Department. 59 December 1–23, 1936; see vol. v , pp. 3 ff. 60 American Consul General at Antwerp. 61 See pp. 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 318 ] ff. Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/708 [Document 249] Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Bullitt ) 62 In the course of a conversation, I asked Mr. Léger, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, what constructive plan for French foreign policy and the preservation of peace in Europe he had devised. After a long statement which consisted largely of criticisms of the British for unwillingness to support France in resorting to force because of the infractions of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany, Léger said that completion by Germany of the line of fortifications on the French and Belgium frontiers would place a Chinese wall across Europe. France and England would be barred from Central and Eastern Europe and all the states of Central and Eastern Europe would be at the mercy of Germany. He said that the British were cherishing the illusion that by cultivating intimate relations with Greece and Turkey they could prevent Germany from reaching the Mediterranean. He said that he knew Germany was having even more success in cultivating the Turks than England. There could be only one future for Central Europe if the German fortifications should be completed,—domination by Germany. It was, therefore, absolutely essential that those fortifications should not be completed. The Government of France had accepted the occupation of the Rhineland because it knew that the French Army today was so much stronger than the German Army that, even if the Rhine should be occupied by German troops, the way into Germany would not be closed. The matter of the fortifications was so much more serious that it was on a different plane altogether. The French Government had made it clear to the British Government that France would be ready to prevent the construction of the fortifications by force. He said that if the British Government should refuse to cooperate with France in this, the French Army would march alone. I replied that from everything that I knew about French public opinion, it would be totally impossible to persuade the people of France to make war on Germany because of the construction of the fortifications. I asked Léger at what moment he intended to ask for armed intervention, what trench or pill-box would be the straw which would break the camel’s back of peace. Léger replied that he entirely understood this difficulty and, after a long discussion, finally admitted that if the Germans during the period while they were constructing the fortifications should refrain from hostile acts and statements, it would be impossible for the French Foreign Office to arouse the French people to prevent the building of the fortifications. I then asked Mr. Léger what hope he had. He said that he could see no hope except that the Germans would conduct themselves so arrogantly and foolishly that they would arouse the people of France to a realization of the need for armed intervention and also perhaps the people of England. I derived the impression from this conversation with Mr. Léger that the French Foreign Office has in fact no constructive ideas whatsoever. William C. Bullitt Paris , May 21, 1936. Paris , May 21, 1936. 62 The Ambassador was en route to the United States. Apparently this memorandum was brought with him to the Department. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/691: Telegram [Document 250] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , May 22, 1936—4 p.m. [Received May 22—11:15 a.m.] 275. With reference to penultimate paragraph of my 270, May 20, 12 noon, I was informed by a reliable source that information has reached this country during the last day or so that pourparlers have indirectly been opened by Hitler with Mussolini, the former stressing the preeminence of the German minority question in Czechoslovakia and that the friendship of Italy was more important to Germany than Austria. Bingham The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/702 [Document 251] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State No. 2852 Berlin , May 26, 1936. [Received June 5.] Sir : I have the honor to report that recently our Military Attaché spoke to me of an interesting conversation which he had had, respecting military issues pending between France, Great Britain and Germany, with Dr. Dieckhoff, head of the newly organized Political Division of the German Foreign Office. Dr. Dieckhoff indicated to him that the German Government would not give way in the slightest degree with respect to the remilitarization and refortification of the Rhineland. As a result of the German Government’s note to the British, of April 1, the former feels itself bound for four months not to increase the strength of the Rhineland garrison and not to move the garrison any closer to the frontier. Meanwhile, Germany has not offered or bound itself to refrain from fortifying the Rhineland, and has no intention so to bind itself. That, Dr. Dieckhoff said, has been made quite clear to the British Government. It is interesting to note that this four months’ period expires August 1st, i. e., coincident with the Olympics. Should the present diplomatic negotiations between France, Great Britain and Germany fail to produce an agreement on or about August 1st, Germany would doubtless feel freed from any promises made with respect to these negotiations. The Military Attaché considers therefore that Germany may well proceed after that date greatly to strengthen her western garrisons and to regroup these garrisons in the manner best suited for defence against any French attack. The implication from Dr. Dieckhoff’s remarks that fortifications had been begun, or were about to begin in the near future, supports the statement made to me recently by a reliable American newspaper man, to the effect that one of his German acquaintances in the Foreign Office had let slip the fact that the Germans had really begun seriously to fortify the Rhineland. Furthermore, the French Ambassador said to me the other day that he was quite convinced that the Germans had begun to fortify the Rhineland, not in massive proportions such as the Maginot line, but by a succession of strong points. Respectfully yours, Ferdinand Lathrop Mayer The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/698: Telegram [Document 252] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , May 28, 1936—4 p.m. [Received May 28—3:30 p.m.] 161. My 155, May 22, 1 p.m. 63 Have recently had long and interesting conversations with the British and French Ambassadors. During his recent enjoyable visit Ambassador Cudahy 64 had a similar conversation with the Polish Ambassador and was present also at the above discussions. Phipps who was most frank and apparently willing to acquaint us with his views discussed the Italo-German situation in some detail. He felt that the German and Italian interests in the Danube in particular with regard to Austria were in direct opposition. He saw no possibility of compromise unless Germany and Italy were forced together through mistakes on the part of the other powers. He prayed that this would not occur since a united front of Germany and Italy would be disastrous. Regarding the German situation generally Phipps deplored the French attitude which prevented an opportunity fully to explore Hitler’s ideas and “sincerity”. The only thing to do was to have an opportunity to evaluate this matter which to date had been rendered impossible. The French wished neither to fight nor to negotiate which left matters in a pretty difficult state. Phipps felt that a breathing spell, if only for a decade or less, was something worth having in the hope that during the period something positively beneficial might occur. Concerning the prevalent rumors here in regard to the possible announcement by Hitler of a plan for economic, monetary and financial stabilization pursuant to his speech on March 7, Phipps did not seem to think there was much likelihood of this taking place. Its possibility, however, could not be ruled out as Hitler might wish to make such a move for various reasons with reference to British and American public opinion, although not believing greatly in its immediate efficacy. On the whole Phipps was pessimistic concerning conditions in Europe. François-Poncet seemed to have recovered from his bitter attitude after March 7. There was nothing especially novel in the detailed sketch he gave us of the European situation and especially Germany. Several points, however, seem worthy of comment. First, a general impression of his deep pessimism if not indeed resignation. This was in contrast with his rather bellicose attitude of some weeks ago and with the idea which he frankly expressed then that the Rhineland matter was not over and France must not [ now? ] take advantage of this last opportunity. Secondly, and correlated to the above, the French Ambassador seemed to be dominated by the tremendous military development of Germany present and potential speaking in terms of hundreds of divisions of such a power that resistance would be useless and German international policy would have its way without the necessity of hostilities. Thirdly, the impossibility of the French policy being anti-Italian. Italy must be kept friendly, presumably anti-German. Further regarding Italo-German relations, Ambassador Cudahy was told by Lipski that the latter would stake his whole diplomatic reputation that Mussolini and Hitler could not and would not work together. There seemed every reason to think that the Polish Ambassador really believed this. I must say that what we hear confirms this despite what may appear to be the contrary from time to time. Each may play off to the other for this or other immediate advantage in the present poker game. I am inclined to think, however, as Lipski seems to feel that this could only be temporary, although possibly spectacular. According to Dieckhoff, whom I also have seen lately, the German replies to the British questions are being prepared by the Foreign Office but in the absence of Hitler and Neurath there is no immediate likelihood of their being put into final form. Dieckhoff said that some of the questions could be answered quite simply, for example, Germany would not agree to a nonaggression pact with Russia. Repeated to the Embassy at Rome, Paris, Geneva, London. Mayer 63 Not printed. 64 John Cudahy, American Ambassador in Poland. The Minister in Albania (Grant) to the Secretary of State 740.00/45 [Document 253] The Minister in Albania ( Grant ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 136 Tirana , May 30, 1936. [Received June 16.] Sir : I have the honor to inform the Department that His Majesty, King Zog, received me in audience on May 28, 1936 following request that I be permitted to present to His Majesty Colonel Jerome G. Pillow, Military Attaché and Military Attaché for Air, American Embassy, Rome, and Military Attaché, American Legation, Tirana. The King was exceptionally cordial, the conversation continuing for one hour and five minutes. His Majesty manifested considerable interest in the American Army and asked Colonel Pillow a number of questions regarding its organization, administration, wartime strength, etc. Colonel Pillow replied, giving a brief but comprehensive outline of the subject. The King paid high tribute to the United States as a great power, which he said had resulted from organization and through the development of its great financial wealth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Replying to a question propounded by Colonel Pillow as to the prospect of an early major war in Europe the King said he does not look for it because Europe’s military forces are not yet “stabilized”. “As soon as they are stabilized war will come”, His Majesty said. “The Germans are not yet ready, but they are arming and preparing the Rhine Valley for war. When their force is balanced in a few years war will come. Many of the smaller countries will go over to Germany when she is ready.” “I recall”, I interposed, “that Your Majesty said to me several months ago (see my despatch No. 37 of January 25, 1936 65 ) that the next war would be started by Germany. Your Majesty is of the same opinion now?” “Yes”, the King replied, “the same opinion. It cannot be otherwise. Germany has a great population and not sufficient room for it. She wants to expand. When she has balanced her military forces she will blow up. Furthermore, the Germans were not completely defeated in the World War. They did not surrender their arms within German frontiers; they surrendered them within foreign frontiers, and they feel very badly about the Versailles Peace Conference.” “They have an inferiority complex”, I suggested. “Exactly”, His Majesty replied. “The new German generation does not know the suffering of the Great War, it only feels the suffering from the War and the Peace Conference. The generation which realized the actual sufferings of the War is gone.” “When war comes”, the King continued, “it will result in a catastrophe for the whole world. No country will escape. Laws prohibiting the use of poison gas will be useless. Aerial depredations will be general. The soldiers at the front will be in less danger than the women, children and old men far behind the lines. Human suffering will be terrible.” The King then suggested a way out of the difficulty. He declared that whether there is a League of Nations or not, if the United States and Great Britain could reach an understanding and collaborate with regard to commerce and the Far East, they could impose peace upon the rest of the world. Respectfully yours, Hugh G. Grant 65 Not printed. The Minister in Egypt (Fish) to the Secretary of State 740.00/51 [Document 254] The Minister in Egypt ( Fish ) to the Secretary of State No. 691 Cairo , June 16, 1936. [Received July 8.] Sir : I have the honor to quote below, as representative of prevailing opinion in this country regarding the inevitability of a new world war, the concluding paragraph of an editorial which appeared in The Egyptian Mail of June 12, 1936, as follows: [“]The truth of the matter is that no one on earth believes now that war in Europe can be averted. It may come tomorrow, it may come in a couple of years, but come it must and will. Mr. Chamberlain himself knows very well that he wants a heavily armed England, not to keep the peace but to be prepared for war, for ‘we have but a short while to prepare ourselves for eventualities’. The false optimism of politicians has no effect now-a-days on the fierce and profound despair of the common people in every country of the world.” This paragraph speaks so well for itself in mirroring local public opinion on the subject of an inevitable world conflict that there is little for me to add. One of the most general subjects of conversation in Cairo is concerned with speculation regarding the occasion which may give rise to the imminent new world war, whether it will come in 1937 or 1938, the nations which may be first involved, the position of England in such a conflict, whether Germany and Italy may be opposed to one another or associates in the war, and so forth. It would be idle for me to repeat the speculative comments which are voiced or to add my own to their number. My German colleague remains convinced that Great Britain and Italy must eventually come to armed conflict over the supremacy of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea and that Great Britain is only biding its time to find the proper occasion for such a conflict. There are far too many imponderables and the factors which unite and divide the interests of nations are too many and too complex to make it even worth while to reproduce further such speculative comment. The one important fact is that people in Egypt share the opinion generally that the world is being headed in the direction of war by irresponsible governments which are in no way representative of the longing of peoples for peace and security. Respectfully yours, Bert Fish The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/721: Telegram [Document 255] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , July 3, 1936—5 p.m. [Received July 3—3:15 p.m.] 206. British Embassy has recently been urging German Government anew to make some form of reply to questionnaire. General opinion here has again veered toward the likelihood of an early reply either by note or by statements which Hitler may make at party meeting at Weimar tomorrow or the next day. I had a long and most interesting conversation this morning with the French Ambassador and afterwards with the French Counsellor. François-Poncet discussed at some length his own policy, hitherto not accepted by the French Government, which would favor playing with the Germans, endeavoring by every possible means to come to grips with them and discuss the various Franco-German problems with a view either to their satisfactory settlement for which there is probably little chance or in the alternative to confront Germany before the world with its responsibilities. In essence this policy is very similar to that which Phipps has stated to me as his own and which I believe is the policy the British would prefer to follow toward Germany but which has always been thwarted by the French Government. Indeed it is the policy I have always felt was the only possible one to pursue and which I have termed “calling Hitler’s bluff for peace”. François-Poncet was quite frank in saying that his policy has never beeen accepted because no French Government had the courage to face public opinion with such suggestions. From my talk with him this morning and with Arnal, the French Counsellor, I got the impression, however, that both Blum and Delbos 66 were more susceptible to the above ideas and were most anxious to have Germany participate in the so-called Locarno discussions at Brussels. To this end the French may not be too insistent on their former position with respect to the obstacle which the Rhineland reoccupation constituted vis-à-vis Franco-German discussion. Incidentally the French Embassy think that the Germans are quite fearful of imminent possibility of a monarchical restoration in Austria at Mussolini’s initiative. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, Geneva by mail. Mayer 66 Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister in Austria (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State 863.01/398 [Document 256] The Minister in Austria ( Messersmith ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 825 Vienna , July 11, 1936. [Received July 22.] Sir : I have the honor to inform you that on the afternoon of July 10, 1936, the Foreign Office indicated that the Secretary General, Mr. Peter, would be glad to receive me that evening. I called at the Foreign Office, and Secretary General Peter informed me that the conversations which had been going on between Chancellor Schuschnigg and the German Minister for the bettering of the relations between Austria and Germany now gave hope of leading to a favorable positive result. He said that the conversations had reached the point where the German Government had given its agreement to the fundamental conditions laid down by Austria, and that it was, therefore, probable that the agreement might be completed any day. He stated that the Austrian Government had already during the course of the day brought to the attention of the representatives of Italy, France, and England the contents of the document which he was about to read to me and which the Chancellor had requested him to communicate also to me and to the Swiss Minister. He requested me to keep the contents of the document and what he would say to me in the strictest confidence, and said that the same request had been made to the other missions to whom this communication was made, as the definite agreement had not yet been signed. The Secretary General then read to me a document, of which he afterward gave me a copy, a translation of which is transmitted herewith. He requested that this be not given any publicity and that if I transmitted it to my Government that it should be considered as strictly confidential. It will be noted that the document is not an aide-mémoire , but is designated a “Sketch”. After reading this document to me, the Secretary General stated that, familiar as I was with the circumstances which had surrounded these conversations with Mr. von Papen and which had been initiated by him over a year ago, I must realize the difficulties there had been in the way. The Austrian Government had always been prepared to negotiate with the German Government for the improvement of the relations between the two states, but that the negotiations had always shattered through the failure of Germany to observe certain conditions and complete failure to recognize the fundamental conditions which the Austrian Chancellor had always insisted upon. These fundamental conditions, which I have from time to time brought to your attention, the Secretary General said had now been recognized by Germany. The German Minister, he added, had informed the Austrian Chancellor that the German Chancellor and the German Government were now prepared to accept these conditions and that therefore an agreement for the improvement of relations was possible. He added that while it was the Chancellor’s wish that he communicate to me the information in the appended document, he must add that the agreement was not yet completed but that he was now in a position to say that it was ninety per cent certain that the German Government would agree to the Austrian conditions. The final word of the German Government, he indicated, was expected the following morning. With the recognition of the Austrian conditions, the Secretary General expressed the hope that a real relieving of the tension in the relations between the two states might be arrived at, but he added that, unfortunately, such an agreement must be viewed in the light of past experience. Germany had an agreement with the Vatican concerning which there had been much difficulty and which agreement was again in the foreground on account of the failure of the present German Government to meet the agreement which it itself had made. This might be the experience with the present agreement which would probably come into effect between Austria and Germany. Austria, on her side, would loyally observe any engagements which she undertook, but there must always remain the question as to whether the German Government would meet its engagements. The Secretary General while reading the accompanying document to me frequently interrupted the reading to emphasize certain points therein. He made it clear that Austria had not given up any of the conditions upon which she has been insisting and that the recognition of Austria’s independence and separate existence was demanded by the Chancellor and secured as an indispensable preliminary. The principle of non-immixtion by Germany in Austria’s internal affairs was also clearly recognized by Germany. He particularly emphasized that the agreement did not involve any recognition of National Socialism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I expressed my appreciation to the Secretary General for having shown me the great courtesy and consideration to read me this document and to give me a copy thereof. I said that I knew how steadfastly the Austrian Government had striven to improve its relations with all neighbors and that I could only hope that such an understanding with Germany, if it became effective, would have the results which I was sure the Austrian Government so ardently desired and which would be in the interest of economic and political peace in Europe and in the world. I did not ask him why, aside from the Italian, French, and English chiefs of mission, the intentions of the Austrian Government were being made known in this confidential way only to the American and Swiss Ministers. The only explanation that the Secretary General made in this connection was that the Chancellor had expressed the desire that the Swiss Minister and myself should be informed as having always shown an understanding appreciation of the Austrian position. Before leaving the Secretary General I said that one could not but be surprised that the German Government was prepared to make this recognition of Austria’s independence and of the principle of non-immixtion, when, for over a year, it had steadfastly refused to make such recognition. I asked the Secretary General whether he could offer any indications which had influenced the German Government to this change of attitude. He replied that it was undoubtedly the relations of Germany vis-à-vis England and the British memorandum 67 which had forced the German Government to take this action with regard to Austria. Now, he said, the German Government could say to England and France, “Why all this fuss over Austria when we have arranged the matter between ourselves?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, George S. Messersmith [Enclosure] Sketch by the Secretary General of the Austrian Foreign Office ( Peter ) of the Austro-German Agreement, Signed July 11, 1936 68 [ Vienna , July 10, 1936.] The conversations which have been taking place for some time on the initiative of the Minister of the German Reich, von Papen, with the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, in order to bring about more normal relations between Germany and Austria are on the best way toward leading to a positive result. That which Austria has been endeavoring to bring about in these conversations is the natural normalization of the relations between two neighboring states, which, in addition, also speak the same language. The preliminary conditions which Austria has set up for the normalizing of these relations are as follows: 1. The unequivocal and unmistakable recognition of the independence and separate existence of Austria. 2. The recognition of the fundamental principle of non-interference in Austria’s internal affairs. 3. The unequivocal establishment of the fact that for Austria National Socialism is neither a political factor nor can it come into question as a negotiating partner. 4. The expressed statement that the Rome Protocols of 1934 69 and the Supplementary Protocols of 1936 70 lay down the fundamental principles of Austrian policy, and that in this respect also in the future nothing will be changed. As Mr. von Papen, in the name of his Government, has recognized these principles, there now exist adequate prospects that a gentleman’s agreement between Austrian Federal Government and the German Reich can be concluded that will settle a number of special questions covering the many sided relations between the two states. The above mentioned principles were already in previous years set up on the Austrian side as the unconditional and necessary preliminaries for the relieving of the tension in Austro-German relations and in the return to normal and friendly neighborly relations between the two German neighbor states. If these principles, always maintained by Austria, had been recognized by Germany in the years 1933 and 1934—it is known that the efforts which Austria made repeatedly in this direction shattered on German demands which could only be considered as an interference in Austrian inner political matters—then this normalizing of the relations could have been reached then, and Austria, as well as those European states interested in the independence and separate existence of Austria, would have been spared much unrest and cares. From the point of view of the inner political development of Austria the normalizing of relations with Germany which is being striven for would have the following effect: The principle that on the Austrian side no negotiating with National Socialism comes into question establishes for the inner political Austrian possibilities very clearly defined limits. The frequent widely spread rumors which have appeared in this connection in foreign countries over the bringing into the Austrian Government of representatives of National Socialism and placing them in responsible public positions belong therefore in the realm of fable. There can only be a question that the basis of the government in Austria might be strengthened in the sense that the so-called “national circles” be brought to share in the responsibility of government, in so far as these have not compromised themselves in a National Socialist sense and have declared themselves unequivocally in principle for the law concerning the Vaterländische Front as set up with respect to the Austrian State. In no sense, however, is a reorganization of the individual government organizations in Austria being considered, and there could only be at the most a question that one or more personalities belonging to these circles could come into the present Cabinet, without, however, being given any special position or responsibility. As a further consequence also the Federal Chancellor has considered a political amnesty for those persons who through their activities for the in Austria forbidden National Socialism have come in conflict with the law, but it is expressly understood that from this amnesty would remain excluded all those who have committed common criminal acts. In connection with such an action tending to bring about inner political peace, it must, at the outset, be made clear without any equivocation that any attitude unfriendly to the state or any propaganda unfriendly to the state, from whatever side it may come, will be prosecuted as sharply as before. For the clearest expression of this decision the Federal Government will enact a law for the protection of the state—just as such laws already exist in most of the neighboring states to Austria. This law will make punishable every offense directed against the state. It is self-understood that, for example, also the Anschluss propaganda would fall in the category, as it is contrary to the principle of the independence of Austria and the Constitution of May 1, 1934. Special attention was given during the course of the conversations between Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and Minister von Papen that the commercial relations between the two states, which through the last years had been considerably damaged, and from the German side influenced through party political considerations, must be brought into a form representing the natural needs of the two commercial areas. In the outer political connection the Federal Chancellor allows himself to express the certain hope that the removal of the poison from the already strained relations during the past three and a half years between Austria and the German Reich will contribute in a material way toward lightening the general unrest and nervousness on the European Continent, under which Austria, as a small state, has particularly suffered. It must, however, with all emphasis be pointed out that this action, which may happily lead for Austria and for a good part of the European Continent to a relieving of tension, will be secured without giving up a single one of the fundamental principles of the Austria of today. It would therefore be completely wrong and contrary to the facts if one wished to find in this—as certainly it may be foreseen voices unfriendly to Austria will assert—that there is any giving up of the fundamental principles of an independent Austria or any deviation from the complete policy of Austria laid down in the “Dollfuss Line”. 71 The result will indicate much more the complete putting through of the recognition and ratification of these principles on the side of the neighboring great power to the North. The reciprocal respecting of the entire freedom of action and procedure in both countries will also offer the guarantee that Austria, uninfluenced by other “ideologien”, will be able to follow out and pursue its own political, cultural, social, and commercial policies. 67 i. e., the “questionnaire” of May 6, 1936, British Cmd. 5175, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936), p. 12. 68 For text, see Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 , series D, vol. i , p. 278. 69 Signed March 17, 1934, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cliv , p. 281. 70 Signed March 23, 1936, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxl , p. 333. 71 Policy followed by Engelbert Dollfuss, Austrian Premier, May 20, 1932–July 25, 1934. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 863.01/385: Telegram [Document 257] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 13, 1936—7 p.m. [Received July 13—3:15 p.m.] 345. An official of the Foreign Office in conversation this afternoon laid considerable emphasis on the magnitude of the concessions made by Hitler in reaching an agreement with Austria and said that while it was too early to formulate a clear judgment on the agreement it was obvious Hitler must have received some very substantial quid pro quo , that for this reason in spite of the fact that the agreement on its face would appear to be a highly desirable achievement as a step toward stabilization in Central Europe, the implications which may be imputed to the concessions received by Germany naturally cause concern. Referring to the French notification that their Mediterranean mutual assistance accord 72 will not be in effect after July 15 (Paris telegram 593, July 11, 1 p.m. 73 ) and to the attitude adopted by Italy toward these understandings the Foreign Office emphasized the unilateral nature of the declarations made by Eden in the Commons on June 18, repeated at Geneva on July 1, and observed that the British Government was not yet in the position where it could be dictated to; that the British declarations would be withdrawn by the British Government in its own time. 74 With reference to the proposed meeting at Brussels the Foreign Office observed that Turkish [ Italian? ] authorities for internal political reasons prefer a five-power meeting with Germany attending 74a while the French likewise strongly influenced by internal political considerations prefer a four-power meeting, and that before the Brussels meeting can have any hope of success these differences of view must be ironed out and a great deal of preparatory work accomplished. Copies by mail to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Vienna. Bingham 72 See British Cmd. 5072, Ethiopia No. 2 (1936): Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, Correspondence in connexion with the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, January 1936. 73 Vol. iii , p. 187 . 74 Mr. Eden announced the lapse of the Anglo-French Mediterranean mutual assistance agreement in the House of Commons on July 15 and made a similar announcement on July 27 with respect to Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 74a Invitations to a conference of Locarno Powers, Germany excepted, were issued on July 8 by the Belgian Prime Minister; the conference was not held, Italy objecting to a meeting from which Germany would be absent. The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 863.01/392: Telegram [Document 258] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , July 15, 1936—1 p.m. [Received July 16—9:30 a.m.] 219. Mail despatch No. 2929 of July 7th. 75 Implications of Austro-German Agreement with respect to future German policy and her relations with Austria and Italy are puzzling. At the present juncture it is difficult to determine the final effects and more especially what next may be expected from Germany. To date we feel that the following is the most likely explanation although only the lapse of time can reveal the certainties. Hitler came to the realization that his earlier Austrian policy was untenable and harmful to Germany. To press it further probably meant war with Italy. Uncertainties were disturbing not only to the Danube basin and to Italy but also to England and France and meant a continuing major difficulty in German relations with these two countries and Italy. Under the circumstances it was good statesmanship for Hitler to “sell” it for an improvement in Italo-German relations and a pleasing gesture for the British. With Austrian problem temporarily “isolated”, Hitler’s negotiations with the Western Powers would be greatly assisted both from the general atmosphere created and with the added support of Italy which the Austro-German Agreement would give. Any reason for closer Italo-German relations must also include consideration of the idea of British Ambassador that Franco-British mistakes could lead to this result (see my 161, May 28, 4 p.m. 75 ). On this hypothesis the agreement may not be a point of departure for the immediate creation of Central European bloc under joint German and Italian leaderships in the sense of pre-war alliances. As the German press have been stressing, and as private conversations confirm, the reply to the British questionnaire is still as possible as ever. Furthermore, on Saturday morning the Foreign Office called in the British Chargé d’Affaires and gave him text of agreement, the only foreign representative so treated. This seems to indicate that Austro-German Agreement is not intended to sever Germany from Western relationships, and especially England, but perhaps on the contrary to enable her more successfully to participate therein. Following out this analysis the agreement need not signify a fundamental permanent change in Italo-German relations. These would remain essentially as before, namely, an apparently unsolvable opposition or antagonism for a dominant position in the Danubian region and the Balkans. To the contrary British Chargé d’Affaires is inclined to feel agreement indicates realization on Italy’s part of inability to oppose Germany there, and so spells end of Italo-German antagonism. In any event, there is perhaps a clarification in German and Italian positions in the Danubian region which may conceivably result in a definite form of alleviation of this antagonism. German interest in the Danube region and the Balkans is positive. Germany wishes to create an area of sure economic exploitation throughout this region. Herself and the several countries are complementary from an economic point of view. On the other hand Italy, while likely having imperial aspirations in Central and Southeastern Europe, is rather more interested from a negative or defensive point of view, namely, the Brenner. It is possible that the Austro-German Agreement may be a first step, consciously or otherwise, in the direction of a recognition by the two countries of a difference in their vital interests and from this may result a new and finally unantagonistic situation. Much practical ground is to be covered however and many difficulties are to be allowed in the carrying out of the Austro-German Agreement and otherwise before such a situation could arise. Likewise German distrust and disrespect of Italy is deep and lasting. Germans continually harp on the age old Italian policy of “hot and cold”. On their side Italians probably appreciate the menace of Germany’s power. Meanwhile it seems likely that the opportunistic “parallelism” of Germany and Italy which has been functioning for some time will operate more openly and with greater emphasis. Wherever their mutual interests coincide the two countries may be expected now to adopt a much stronger and constructive attitude. Hitler rose to power in Germany under legalistic cover, a precept which he may desire to follow in his foreign policy. Hitler therefore may wish to cash in soon on the new developments and to cooperate with Italy in an effort to bring about “legal” revision in Europe. Hitler’s speeches of May 21, 1935, and March 7 and 31 this year are of interest in this connection. Many here express caution with regard to Italo-German parallelism believing that neither Germany nor Italy have any intention of sacrificing their “independence”; that each views the other without illusion and foresees the day sooner or later when the advantages of this “parallelism” may cease and other policies may become preferable. While understanding and doubtless appreciating the initiative which Mussolini is believed to have given to the Austro-German accord, (see my 214, July 11, 2 p.m. 77 ) Germany was most careful to confine the discussions to Schuschnigg, Papen and Hitler. I am reliably informed that there was no question of Italy participating in the settlement of a matter as vital to German pride and hegemony as her relations with Austria. On the other side I am reliably and most confidentially informed that recently Germany offered to recognize Italian Abyssinian conquests but that Italy did not accept, saying that the question of recognition would work itself out satisfactorily. The Germans, I am told, feel that this refusal exemplified Italy’s essential feeling of independence as she did not want to take a chance of thus jeopardizing her relations with England and France to whom she may want to return once her present “parallelism” with Germany has helped solve difficulties with these countries. Hitler’s next move is unforeseeable. There is a considerable choice and also the alternative of a longish spell of inactivity. The possibilities include the remilitarization of Hungary, an accord with Czechoslovakia; or, on the contrary, the support of German elements there; activity with regard to Danzig; or finally activity with regard to Memel. There is also the question of colonies. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the furtherance of economic and financial normalization of Europe reputedly desired by Hitler and others of importance in Germany and supposed to have largely actuated Hitler’s proposals of March 7. If this is sufficiently persuasive with Hitler it may be that he would prefer to use the situation arising out of the Austro-German Agreement for a further effort toward “legal revision” in cooperation with Italy and so to bring about a more peaceful and stable Europe rather than to follow up the Austro-German Agreement with another adventure which would only add to the present uncertain and abnormal condition of Europe. By mail to Paris, Rome, London, Geneva, Budapest, Vienna, Riga, Istanbul. Mayer 75 Not printed. 75 Not printed. 77 Not printed. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 863.01/393: Telegram [Document 259] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 16, 1936—4 p.m. [Received July 16—1:40 p.m.] 607. In conversation at the Foreign Office this morning it was said that they do not yet see clearly the exact significance and ultimate implications of the Austro-German accord. At first glance and on the face of it the accord would seem to be a contribution towards peaceful adjustment of European problems but when looked at from a long-term point of view it gives rise to many doubts. From the German viewpoint however it would seem to be a great success: Hitler is in a position to claim credit for making a constructive effort at conciliation in Central Europe while as a practical matter he probably will be found to have given up nothing; on the contrary in the long run he will probably have made enormous gains since German economic and political influence should steadily increase in Austria. From the Italian point of view the advantages of the agreement would seem doubtful: the German recognition of Austria’s independence may prove as indicated above utterly illusory; German and Italian objectives may come into conflict; and furthermore it is felt that the Italian policy of trying to play off one country against another cannot continue much longer to be successful since events in Europe are marching swiftly, the issues are becoming simpler and before long the necessity of making a definite choice as to which side to line up with will be imposed upon Italy by the force of events. Obviously, it was added, the two countries which have the most to worry about as to the possible implications of the Austro-German Agreement are Czechoslovakia and Poland. Regarding the proposed Brussels conference of Locarno Powers, no definite decision has yet been reached. 78 The French point of view is that in accordance with Eden’s letter of April 1st 79 there should now be a meeting of the British with the French and Belgians to consider the situation. Cipher copies to London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Geneva. Straus 78 See footnote 74a, p. 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] . 79 Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 176. The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Benton) to the Secretary of State 840.00/441 [Document 260] The Chargé in Czechoslovakia ( Benton ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 508 Prague , July 23, 1936. [Received August 18.] Sir : As of interest, I have the honor to give below the substance of a conversation with Dr. Kamil Krofta, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the general European political situation. Dr. Krofta, as he is inclined to be, was pessimistic with regard to the future. He fears that the growing power of Germany, the dissatisfaction of Italy, and the inability up to now of England and France to work together, have created a future of great uncertainty. He pointed to the fact that Czechoslovakia is in an exposed position, surrounded as she is on practically all sides by potential enemies; but he believes that the country will be able to maintain her independence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dr. Krofta touched upon Poland, and said that he frankly does not understand the Polish attitude toward present day European problems. He is strongly of the opinion that Poland, as she has so often done before, is playing an “opportunist” game—and a dangerous one he thinks it. He believes that the Danzig question will be amicably settled, for the reason that a settlement would be to the distinct advantage of both Germany and Poland. Referring to Germany, Dr. Krofta observed that since Hitler has taken over the power he had been able at more or less regular intervals to “give the people something”; first, the reestablishment of obligatory military service, 80 then the return of the Saar to German sovereignty, then the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, and lastly the Austro-German Accord. Dr. Krofta does not know what the next German move will be, although he is convinced that Hitler has no designs, at least for the present, on Czechoslovakia, a view which, I may add, is apparently not shared by many thinking Czechs. He is inclined to believe that Germany does not desire the Sudeten provinces, which without the rest of Czechoslovakia would be of little use to her, and that Hitler knows that he would not be allowed to absorb the entire country. Concluding his observations, Dr. Krofta told me in strictest confidence that he has reason to believe that Germany may offer Czechoslovakia a “political and commercial pact”, to be in force for a certain number of years, similar, I take it, to the recently concluded Austro-German Accord. If such an offer does actually materialize he said that Czechoslovakia would be placed in an unsatisfactory position, since to refuse would lay her open to charges of failure to cooperate in the maintenance of European peace, and to accept would tend to separate her from her Little Entente friends. Respectfully yours, J. Webb Benton 80 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 294 ff. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/755: Telegram [Document 261] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , July 24, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 4:35 p.m.] 645. We talked with Vienot, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, this morning regarding the London meeting of the three powers. 81 He said speaking frankly and in confidence that the agreement reached as expressed in the communiqué 82 did not satisfy the French point of view in all respects. However, comparing the text of the final communiqué with that which had been under active discussion among the three powers for several days previously, he felt that it provided a satisfactory solution. Moreover, he had just talked with Delbos by telephone in London who had expressed himself as very satisfied with the meeting and particularly pleased with the atmosphere in which the discussions had taken place and with the friendly understanding of each other’s points of view on the part of the British and French delegations. Vienot said that only after the five-power Locarno meeting has taken place and in the light of what there transpires can it be determined whether the larger conference in which other powers would participate, mentioned in paragraph (5) of the communiqué, could be held. He stated that the French Government had not made prior agreement on holding such a conference a condition for the meeting of the five Locarno powers envisaged in paragraph (3). He expressed the view that the communiqué gives evidence of a broad and liberal spirit on the part of the three Governments and stated that for its part the French Government intended to make every possible effort to work out with the four other Locarno powers the settlement of questions between them which will permit the establishment of peace in Europe on a sound and lasting basis. When his attention was invited to the careful wording of the last part of paragraph (2) of the communiqué relative to the “division apparent or real of Europe into opposing blocs” he smiled and said that this had indeed been carefully drafted but that the sense of this passage that should be retained is that even an apparent division of Europe into opposing camps would constitute a menace to peace which must be avoided at all costs. In reply to an inquiry as to whether the German answer to the British questions was expected soon, he said that while in the past 2 or 3 days it had been reported from Berlin that Hitler would answer soon in the form of a declaration or speech he personally felt that there would be no answer until at least after the Olympic games. 83 He felt that there would now be a “European conspiracy” to keep as much as possible of the month of August relatively quiet in order not to interfere with vacation plans. Cipher copies to London, Brussels, Rome, Berlin, Geneva. Straus 81 Conference on July 23 between representatives of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. 82 Issued on July 23; for text, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 218. The text was communicated to the German and Italian Governments on July 24. 83 The German Government did not reply to the British “questionnaire”. The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Benton) to the Secretary of State 840.00/442 [Document 262] The Chargé in Czechoslovakia ( Benton ) to the Secretary of State No. 511 Prague , July 25, 1936. [Received August 18.] Sir : I have the honor to give below a summary of the observations which the President of the Republic, Dr. Beneš, made to me today, relative to the general European political situation. This despatch should be read in conjunction with my despatch No. 508 of July 23rd last, summarizing a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Krofta, on the same subject. I should observe that Dr. Beneš, in his talk with me, evinced his usual optimism, although certain of his remarks, particularly those dealing with the results that may be expected from the recent Austro-German Accord, left me with the distinct impression that the wish expressed was often father to the thought. In short, he was hopeful but not entirely convincing. The general European situation, according to Dr. Beneš, is most unsatisfactory, but there is no immediate cause for alarm. He scouts the idea of a general European war in the near future, adding that much of the unrest today is due to “revolutionary” processes at work in most European countries, the outcome of which it is impossible to foretell. Referring to the Austro-German Accord, he cited the official Czechoslovak reaction, which I gave in my despatch No. 501 dated July 18, 1936, 84 and said that the Accord will not necessarily bring Austria under the domination of Germany. Schuschnigg, he is convinced, is resolved to maintain Austria’s political and economic independence, and Dr. Beneš is inclined to believe that he will be successful. You will recall that Dr. Beneš has in the past frequently evinced distrust of Italy and of Italian policy, and in conversation with me today this attitude was particularly noticeable. In his opinion, Italy is strong only as long as France and England are weak and divided. The moment the two latter countries are united Italy must, whether she likes it or not, follow their lead. Dr. Beneš believes that the internal situation in France is not really alarming, and that serious trouble in that country is not likely to follow. He is hopeful that England and France may be able to work together so that they can present a united front to the world. If this materializes the peace of Europe is, in his opinion, for the time being assured. Dr. Beneš said that Czechoslovakia has nothing to fear from Germany, and that he does not believe that Germany has designs upon, or will make an attempt to seize, the Sudeten provinces. Czechoslovakia feels absolutely secure, develop as it may the general European situation, and she has implicit faith in her allies—the Little Entente countries, France and Soviet Russia—and he knows that their help can be counted upon when necessary. This point of view, I should observe, is not generally subscribed to by the average thinking Czech, who feels that, in the event of trouble, French assistance is not to be counted upon, and that, in any case, the geographical position of this country would make effective military aid on the part of France difficult, if not impossible. Similarly, Rumania is regarded as a “weak brother”, and the extension of German influence over Yugoslavia is seen as lessening the possibility of assistance from that quarter. With regard to Russia, there is an important element here opposed to the alliance with that country, which sees in it, not a guarantee of effective military assistance in case of need, but a possible means for the Soviets to undermine the democratic structure of Czechoslovakia. Dr. Beneš touched upon the political situation in Germany, and said that in his opinion there is little likelihood of National Socialism losing control in the near future. He realizes that Hitler is personally popular—in contrast to many of his entourage—and that the Reichswehr, which is undoubtedly the strongest factor in Germany today, could not, even should it so desire, throw Hitler over without producing chaos, as there is no system, no outstanding individual, with which to replace him. The present system in Germany may therefore, in his opinion, be expected to continue indefinitely, notwithstanding that the increasingly unsatisfactory state of that country’s finances and economic structure might produce a change when least expected. This, however, he does not believe will be the case. Respectfully yours, J. Webb Benton 84 Not printed. The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/762: Telegram [Document 263] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , July 28, 1936—5 p.m. [Received July 28—1:20 p.m.] 234. My 232, July 25, 1 p.m. 85 In conversation this morning Foreign Office showed attitude favoring acceptance of the invitation of five-power Locarno conference. Neurath is returning today and I understand the German reply to the invitation is ready for his approval. Foreign Office expressed satisfaction with recent three-power talks in London and commented on helpful effect with regard to Italy of Eden’s speech in the House of Commons yesterday. Foreign Office gave the impression that it did not feel that Italy would impose any further conditions to participation in five-power conference, such as recognition of Abyssinia or a scaling down of the British forces in the Mediterranean. Foreign Office emphasized the importance of careful discussion of agenda preliminary to any five-power meeting as well as of a thorough examination of the problems with which the conference would deal. All this would take time. What with the classic British dislike of intensive work in August, the party meeting at Nuremberg in early September and the League meetings somewhat later, Foreign Office doubted whether five-power conference could convene before the middle or end of October. 86 Replying to a question on my part to bring out whether the Germans would enter the five-power conference with an avowed determination not to deal with Eastern questions, I got impression that such was not the case. The opinion was expressed that the conference should concentrate on Western questions in order to avoid an over ambitious program yet when these questions were solved this would constitute a good foundation for taking up Eastern problems. Apparently the Foreign Office thought that a Western air pact should be the first item on the agenda. A well-informed German newspaper source close to Nazis expressed the opinion to me yesterday that the Government here looked favorably on a Locarno meeting provided it were adequately prepared which meant probably October as a time of meeting and further that the colonial question was being given very prominent consideration here at this time and would figure largely in any future German negotiations either [openly?] or under the surface. When questioned on colonial matters this morning the Foreign Office showed a certain reticence but rather confirmed such an attitude. The Foreign Office evidently wants to convey general impression that it is doing everything possible to smooth out the rough places or suspicions in German foreign relations preliminary to a Locarno meeting. For example, the Foreign Office said there were no negotiations at this time contrary to rumors now current here. Conversations leading to a commercial treaty with Lithuania were progressing favorably. Concerning Danzig there had been a satisfactory exchange of notes with the Polish Government as the Foreign Office indicated to me some time ago would be the case. With the communications of this exchange of notes to the League of Nations the so-called Leipzig incident would be closed. 87 Polish-Danzig relations were satisfactory and most important of all German-Polish relations with respect to Danzig were in no way disturbed. The Foreign Office hoped that the Spanish situation which they felt to be serious would not develop in a way to cause international complications and prevent the Locarno meeting. Copies to London, Paris, Rome, Geneva, Praha, Riga. Mayer 85 Not printed. 86 The proposed five-power conference was not held. 87 On the occasion of the visit of the German cruiser Leipzig to Danzig, June 25, 1936, the naval commander was instructed not to call upon the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig. The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/767: Telegram [Document 264] The Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , July 29, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 29—12:20 p.m.] 236. My 234, July 28, 5 p.m. Conversations with British Chargé d’Affaires and French Counsellor yesterday generally confirmed impression that German authorities are favorable to Locarno conference this fall. British Embassy was more concerned than anything with French position with regard to Eastern European problems. Embassy was fearful that the French would feel they must strongly maintain the “indivisibility” of peace and therefore its Eastern pacts simultaneously with Western agreements. British Chargé d’Affaires showed plainly that British could not understand German failure to reply to their questionnaire as well as German refusal of a visit to Berlin of Lord Halifax here which the British proposed some weeks ago. French Counsellor indicated that at recent London conversations his Government had patently shown its desire for an opportunity to get Germany to the conference table and to give real consideration to her ideas. He hoped the German Government appreciated the French concessions. As in the case of the British Chargé, Arnal had some qualms with regard to Germany’s position respecting the Eastern problems. In this general relation the French Counsellor expressed a certain apprehension over the way the German press was seeing the hand of Moscow everywhere such as in France, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Rumania. He feared that possibly the Germans might be whipping an anti-Bolshevik campaign as a prelude to an attack on Russia at Locarno meeting as the world menace and to offering Germany as the candidate for world savior in this connection. Copies to London, Paris, Geneva, Rome. Mayer The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Mayer) 761.62/389a [Document 265] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany ( Mayer ) No. 650 Washington , August 5, 1936. Sir : The Department is greatly interested in determining the attitude, policies and plans of the present Government and leaders in Germany in respect of the countries of Eastern Europe and it, consequently, hopes that the Embassy may find it practicable to devote special attention to this important aspect of Germany’s foreign relations with a view to keeping the Department fully informed of developments pertaining thereto. In particular, it would be appreciated if the Embassy would from time to time forward to the Department, under cover of an appropriate despatch containing such comments as may seem appropriate, statements, published or otherwise, pertaining to the attitude, policies and plans of present day German leaders and the Nazi Government toward the Soviet Union and the communist regime in that country, in particular, and toward the countries of Eastern Europe in general, which emanate from ( a ) the National Socialist German Workers’ Party; ( b ) the most important leaders of that Party, such as Messrs. Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, von Ribbentrop, Frick, Rosenberg, Hess, Schacht, et cetera; ( c ) the German Nazi Government; ( d ) important officials of that Government; ( e ) other important organizations or individuals, such as organizations, press organs, and persons of importance in the industrial, commercial, financial, journalistic and educational fields. With respect to statements which may appear in printed form, it is believed that such statements are likely to be available both in publications intended primarily for consumption abroad, and in publications intended solely for internal consumption and, in particular, for members of the Nazi Party, such, for example, as accounts of the proceedings of Party congresses and other Party meetings. It is suggested that the Embassy endeavor to include within the scope of its examination of published sources in which statements of the nature indicated are likely to appear appropriate official publications of the German Government, including press releases of the office of the Chancellor of the Reich and the Foreign Office and the proceedings and official acts of the Reichstag; publications of the Nazi Party, including reports of the proceedings of, and resolutions adopted by, Party Congresses and other important Party meetings; reliable semiofficial and private press bureau publications; important journals dealing with industrial, commercial, financial, and educational matters and other trustworthy published sources. It may be pointed out in this connection that the Department would be glad to have translations from such sources prepared in the form and manner required by Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States , Chapter XVIII–1, Notes 10 and 12. It is pertinent to state in this connection that the Department has been glad to receive recently from the Embassy translations, accompanied by the original text, of two interviews with Chancellor Hitler in which appear statements of the nature in question. The texts and translations of the interviews referred to were forwarded under cover of the Embassy’s despatches No. 2709 of March 4, 1936 and No. 2745 of April 4, 1936. 88 With respect to statements pertaining to the matters in question which do not appear in printed form, it is believed that such statements may be made in speeches, radio broadcasts, et cetera, and in private conversations. Information with regard thereto may be obtained from a variety of sources, including members of the diplomatic and consular corps, German officials, private persons, et cetera. Statements from such sources may be submitted in memorandum form under cover of an appropriate despatch. In this connection attention is invited to Chapter XVIII–1, Note 13, of the Instructions abovementioned, and, in particular, to the paragraph of that note marked “ Confidential sources ”. The Department would appreciate it if the Embassy, in forwarding from time to time selections of material of the nature indicated, would submit brief interpretative and analytical comment as to the importance and significance of the information forwarded, including comment with respect to ( a ) the general trends of views expressed; ( b ) differences between statements intended for consumption abroad and those intended for internal consumption, and, in particular, for members of the Nazi Party; ( c ) differences in views expressed by Nazi Party leaders before and after the Nazi Party came into power; ( d ) differences in views expressed by the same person when speaking as a Party leader, on the one hand, and as a Government official, on the other; and ( e ) differences in views expressed by the same or by different persons, organizations or press organs. It is requested that your despatches on these matters be forwarded to the Department in quintuplicate, with translations also in quintuplicate and original texts in single copy. It is further requested that copies of your reports and of the translations (but not of the original texts) be forwarded to the American diplomatic missions at Moscow, Riga, and Warsaw, and that appropriate notation of such distribution be made on the original and all copies of such reports. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore 88 Neither printed. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/777: Telegram [Document 266] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , August 6, 1936—1 p.m. [Received August 6—9:15 a.m.] 722. In a conversation with the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires regarding the recent tripartite London meeting he expressed the view that the relatively prompt acceptance by Germany and Italy 89 of the invitation to attend the projected five-power Locarno conference was caused by a desire to conciliate British opinion at the time when the fact of Italian assistance to the Spanish insurgents became known. Referring to the five-power Locarno conference he expressed considerable doubt whether the proceedings may permit the convocation later of a conference to which additional powers including Russia could be invited. He thought in fact that it was likely that Germany would seek to utilize the five-power conference as an opportunity for protest against Russia and communism as the great dangers to peace in Europe. Obviously he said if such should turn out to be the case there would be little hope of holding subsequently an enlarged conference with Russia participating. Cipher copies to London, Rome, Berlin, Moscow. Wilson 89 On July 31; for texts of the official Italian and German communiqués, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , pp. 219 and 220. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 711.62/116: Telegram [Document 267] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , August 18, 1936—5 p.m. [Received August 18—3:21 p.m.] 256. Yesterday I saw Foreign Office officials. Nothing decisive said. Today I talked with Dr. Schacht. He spoke for the first time almost with bitterness about our country and the President’s Chautauqua speech. 90 He insisted on bilateral agreements, said he would buy nothing else from the United States, would not pay interest on debts to the banks of the United States, and was almost violent in his criticism of recent American-Brazil relations. 91 When I asked about possible lowering of trade barriers in order to reduce tendency to war, he said of course another great war would mean economic collapse and world-wide communism. But he then added that Germany had been preparing for war to the limit for 3 years and had paid for everything. He said that the only chance for Germany to cooperate for world peace would be international guarantee of colonial possessions and room for her increasing population; that the United States ought to urge these things upon England, a country which was certainly losing its world position. When I named some things done and said here that alienated American public opinion, Schacht agreed but closed with the wish that next November the President would call an international conference for making proper concessions to Germany. Dodd 90 Delivered on August 14, 1936, Department of State, Press Releases , August 22, 1936, p. 163. 91 see vol. v , pp. 247 ff. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.00/59 [Document 268] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State No. 3019 Berlin , September 3, 1936. [Received September 12.] Sir : I have had the honor previously to indicate our opinion of the principal reason for the uncertainty of European foreign policies. We have felt this to be due essentially to the fact that Germany has suddenly resumed, or is by way of resuming, her normal position of importance in Europe with the logical consequence that the artificial situation in Europe, created by the Treaty of Versailles, has collapsed, and all and sundry European states have been forced to reconsider their alliances, associations, and therewith their foreign policies. This same condition continues today. Consequently there is the same somewhat frenzied stress and strain, of weighing advantages and disadvantages, etc., among the various states looking eventually towards the establishment of definite divisions or groups in Europe. Parenthetically, it is to be regretted that the League of Nations, designed as much as anything else to prevent the formation of such divisions or groups, has really made the contrary inevitable, since under French leadership the League itself became partisan and only emphasized the duration of the dictated Peace of Versailles and divided Europe into opposed camps. Germany’s refusal in March 1935 longer to endure this situation shattered the delicately poised artificiality and thereby, as we have indicated above, all of Europe was thrown into a ferment and a scramble for adjustment. This turmoil of foreign policies, coincident with and possibly dominated by the sociological aspects and influences of the present era, has as we have observed, created a confusion preventing any concrete estimate of present-day European foreign policies or of what may finally eventuate. Nevertheless, it is perhaps desirable occasionally to take stock of conditions in Europe with special reference to Germany, and analyze briefly, and as correctly as may be, the momentary outlook on the Continent. Thinking back to last autumn when European and world idealism appeared possible of realization by British efforts to vitalize the League, we find that Germany has made enormous strides in power and position since the collapse of these efforts and the impotence of the League which followed. Germany’s rapid regaining of her position in Europe is perhaps as much a matter of feeling as of fact. But certain milestones can be noted. After the League’s collapse and more especially England’s suddenly weak position, Germany felt capable of throwing off the last of the Versailles military servitudes and marched into the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. Both from the point of view of prestige and practically as an impediment if not a prevention of any attempt France might make in the future to bring military aid to her eastern allies, this step, materially unopposed by France, tremendously enhanced Germany’s position in Europe. Then the fracas in and over Danzig during the summer, while probably a mistake with regard to German-Polish relations, showed Europe again the powerlessness of the League and of France and England to curb Germany’s outbursts. The German-Austrian agreement coming shortly afterward was a further success for Hitler, if you take the view that, temporarily at least, this meant Italy’s renunciation of a rivalry with Germany for Danubian and Central European hegemony. At the time of the German-Austrian agreement it was rather widely felt, and we believed correctly, that, while German-Italian “parallelism” or coincidental relations were strengthened, the old weak spots of mutual distrust still existed. Too much was not to be augured from this relationship, and therefore it was considered that the creation of a definite Central European block, consisting of Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and possibly Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, was not immediately on the cards. Heretofore the Bolshevik menace in Europe has been typified by the subterranean activities of the Third International rather than by Russian nationalistic militarism. Latterly, however, which may perhaps date from the recent increase in Soviet armed forces and the success of the Soviet hopes if not activities in Spain, there seems to have been a significant and aggressive change in Russian sponsorship of World Revolution. We incline to feel that this may have reached a point where the prospects for this revolution, as far as Europe is concerned, with France the next victim through Spain, simultaneously with the achievement of a certain accomplishment in the enormous armament in Russia, has persuaded Stalin and his advisers of the desirability of coming out into the open and aggressively combining Russian militant imperialism with Russian communism. Through the Franco-Soviet alliance, through the apprehensions felt in many quarters in Europe over Germany’s renaissance, and through Russia’s adroit diplomatic maneuvers the Soviets have been able to pose as the saviour to those states in Europe most fearful of the rebirth of a powerful Germany. By cleverly proceeding with the activities of the Comintern, Soviet Russia has been able to carry forward simultaneously her dual design of communism and imperialism. She can face either way or advance on both fronts at the same time, dependent upon the particular country concerned or the particular circumstance involved. With her military power now realized to a high degree, with the terrible conditions in Spain and the promising field of France for civil disturbance, the Soviets seem now to be adopting a more decisive attitude and thereby becoming a further major disturbing factor in Europe. Curiously enough, the German situation would seem strikingly similar. Apprehensive as they are of communist dangers, which we believe is the case with the leaders in Germany, there is no doubt that her imperial designs, to use that broad term for a multitude of aims and ambitions, have never been lost to view. Just as imperialism and communism have been combined in Russia, partly through accident and partly through design, so it seems that Germany is in a position to face two ways and to create the impression of being the defender of Europe against Bolshevism, which she may well become, while pursuing a path calculated to promote her imperialistic ideas. This generalization brings us back to the question of German-Italian relations and the formation of a Central-European group. We said above that at the time of the German-Austrian agreement in July the prospects of the creation of such group in the immediate future seemed rather unlikely. Now, however, we have the feeling that the contrary is perhaps true. German suspicions of Italy, her fundamental distrust and her lack of respect continue. Italy’s apprehensions of Germany’s power and designs and a certain lack of sympathy have not changed. But since July the Bolshevik menace has brought these two countries closer together. Both the Italian Embassy here and the German Foreign Office have indicated quite clearly to us that they can not contemplate the establishment of a communist Spain, i. e., a communist state in western Europe. For Italy this means the Mediterranean. As a result of the Dardanelles agreement, 92 which incidentally Italy has not yet ratified, the eastern end of the Mediterranean is more open to the Russian fleet. With a communist Spain largely influenced by the Soviets, their power would also perhaps be a vital factor in the western Mediterranean. This jeopardizes Italy’s plans for a mare nostrum and her general Mediterranean development. For Germany a communist Spain would mean a tremendous influence inclining toward radical control in France which in turn must affect Belgium and even, to a certain extent, Switzerland. Communism established in western Europe is clearly something that Germany cannot safely tolerate, especially when the Russian-manned Czechoslovak flying fields and Poland’s everlasting uncertainty are considered. All these things must be having a definite effect on German-Italian relations and in turn on the question of the formation of a so-called anti-Soviet bloc in Central Europe. If it is true, as many believe, that Italy has definitely limited her imperial aspirations, for the time being at least, to the Mediterranean and is willing to see the other Fascist imperialism, Germany, control Central Europe, there would be no reason why these two Powers, under the pressure of the Soviet menace, now sociological as well as political, should not join to press for unity in Central and Southeastern Europe and the creation of a solid defensive position in the middle of the Continent. Such a report as this must of necessity be indefinite in character. It is rather an effort to raise certain ideas and indicate certain lines of thought than to pursue them to their logical conclusion. The picture changes too rapidly in Europe, and the uncertainty of foreign policies, which we have commented upon at the beginning of this despatch, are unfortunately too great to handle questions of this nature otherwise. Respectfully yours, William E. Dodd 92 The Montreux Convention, signed July 20, 1936; for correspondence, see vol. iii , pp. 503 ff. The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State 740.00/62 [Document 269] The Minister in Czechoslovakia ( Wright ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 546 Prague , September 5, 1936. [Received September 29.] Sir : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Upon my return to this country, I find—as I have previously reported—government officials deeply concerned but not openly perturbed concerning the slow but steady accretion of Germany’s power. It will be observed that President Beneš in his incessant trips to the border districts is apparently making every effort to placate the Sudetendeutsch elements and districts, and it has been especially interesting for me to observe that the question of the administration by this government of such districts was referred to in several of his speeches very shortly after the conversation which I had with him upon that subject as reported in my despatch No. 511 of July 25, 1936. A close friend of the President who, in fact, has for many years been one of his principal lawyers, observed to me only a few days ago that there was actually less and less enthusiasm in Czechoslovakia regarding the pact with the Soviets. Upon my pursuing this matter to a degree rendered possible by the friendship which I enjoy with him he finally said that, in the last analysis, he believed his government had been forced into this pact in the absence of anything better—for considerations of security transcended all others in his mind, and he is frankly fearful of Germany’s growing power. I feel confident that, after having read this running comment upon opinions and tendencies in other countries, you will find not without interest the following remarks made to me today by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has always been good enough to discuss matters with me with an almost complete absence of reserve. Dr. Krofta said that one of the primary considerations was the necessity of a strong England—not that Great Britain would necessarily fight if Czechoslovakia were invaded but because of the great moral force which England always exerted in European affairs. He seemed to be under no illusion that Great Britain would resort to arms for the protection of this country, and it is fair to assume that Great Britain’s attitude with regard to any onslaught upon Austria and especially the lamentable “sanctions program” as regards Abyssinia, are the reasons underlying his opinion. With regard to France, he immediately observed that the reason for any disturbances that might occur in that country and for the perturbed state of mind in France, of which everyone is aware, is the civil war and the almost inevitable defeat of the “popular front” in Spain, and the inescapable repercussions upon the “Front Populaire” in France. He added that there was no doubt but that France would resort to arms in the defense of Czechoslovakia, should necessity arise; in fact they were bound to do so. In this connection, opinion has not been lacking in other quarters that France might find it impossible or impolitic to do so but, as is natural, this government bases its entire policy upon the assured support of France. As Mr. Benton 94 has reported in my absence, Dr. Krofta considers that the recent agreement between Germany and Austria is at best superficial, and that it means that Austria is more than ever in the hands of Germany. The repeated references to the Germanic characteristics which they enjoy in common is, in his opinion, an indication to that end and, if the actual “Anschluss” should not take place, Austria will inevitably become a “colony” of Germany. He unreservedly expresses his concern as to the effect that this evolution will have upon this country, which is meanwhile perfecting its army and its defenses in every way possible—the army maneuvers which have just been concluded being a tangible example. With regard to Hungary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Gömbös 95 is really an ill man. In reply to my inquiry as to whether Count Bethlen might reappear as Prime Minister, the Minister observed that such was quite probable and that Bethlen is “more dangerous” than Gömbös because he is more adroit and has had infinitely longer experience. I inquired whether the non-inclusion of Mr. Titulescu in the new Rumanian Cabinet was of immediate import to Czechoslovakia. He replied that his elimination was of course unfortunate for this country because—as President Beneš has so often remarked to me—Titulescu has always been an ardent supporter of the Little Entente and has been one of its most valuable (and voluble) spokesmen at Geneva. The Minister added that his absence will in no way change Rumanian policy which remains faithful to the precepts of its adherence to the Little Entente and to France—adding that Titulescu was by no means politically dead. Turning to Yugoslavia, he stated that the flirtation of that country with Germany was not to be taken too seriously—its main reason having been a demonstration against Italy. He has no fear of any weakening of the Little Entente as a result thereof. The Minister said that it was indisputable that Italy is not as strong as she once was—as could be directly inferred from the fact that the Italian Minister in Prague had said to him that even if the actual “Anschluss” or control of Austria by Germany should eventuate, Italy could do nothing. “What a contrast,” observed the Minister, “to the mobilization of troops upon the Italo-Austrian frontier a short time ago!” Dr. Krofta added that everyone knew that Italy’s financial bill was enormous, that her inevitable expenses in Abyssinia were a constant drain upon her treasury, and that she had been bled nearly white already. Reserving his comments concerning Germany until later, the Minister observed that there was no reason to dissemble the fact that Czechoslovakia frankly fears her and he is convinced that many stages of a well thought out game remain to be played by that country. By an interesting coincidence, the Rumanian Minister in Prague called Dr. Krofta by telephone at that moment and informed him that he had recent information from a most reliable source to the effect that Germany was about to offer Czechoslovakia a treaty of “non-aggression” or of “friendship.” Dr. Krofta, with a smile at me, remarked over the telephone that treaties of this nature are far from identical—adding that his Government had no knowledge of such a proposal and that the German Minister in Prague had only yesterday denied any knowledge thereof. The Rumanian Minister replied that he had great confidence in the source of his information, to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs responded that the matter would be dealt with when the offer was received. Dr. Krofta then said to me that if such an offer were made (and I deduced that he had in mind that the first mention thereof would be made at the “Parteitag” at Nurnberg which begins on the 9th instant), it would be accompanied by many conditions, some of which would be absolutely inacceptable to this country; i. e., that Czechoslovakia denounce its pact with the Soviet and also enter into discussion with Germany regarding the question of minorities. Dr. Krofta did not pursue further the subject of the Soviet pact, although I improved the opportunity afforded by this frank conversation to seek an expression of his opinion by telling him that everyone in other parts of Europe had the Soviet pacts with France and Czechoslovakia very much in mind and were far from enthusiastic about them. Dr. Krofta did say, however, that although a special Convention between Czechoslovakia and Poland permitted discussion of such a minority question as that of Teschen, for example, no such treaty existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany; therefore any discussion of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was absolutely not permissible. He repeated what he and Dr. Beneš have so often said to me before: Czechoslovakia has always sought and will continue to seek an agreement with Germany which, provided it be consistent with the independence and the dignity of this country, will afford her the protection which she desires and which is so essential to the peace of Europe. I then referred to the position of Poland and her present policy. The Minister unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that the visit of Colonel Rydz-Smigly to Paris was of considerable significance—in view of the fact that one of the purposes of General Gamelin’s 96 recent visit to Warsaw was to inquire whether Poland had any agreement with Germany concerning an attack on Czechoslovakia or any territorial exchange of certain districts should the “readjustment” of the Danzig situation become imperative (the old rumor regarding Germany’s assistance to Poland in obtaining Teschen). General Gamelin was assured that nothing of the sort existed and this assurance is to be put in writing by Poland—with the additional statement that Poland will not proceed against Czechoslovakia, even if Germany should for any reason attack this country. I am not at present prepared to draw these conclusions to any one head, for the field covered by the despatch is too diffuse. I trust, however, that—read in conjunction with the reports on the various subjects that may have come from other Missions—you may find it not entirely devoid of interest. Respectfully yours, J. Butler Wright 94 James W. Benton, First Secretary of Legation in Czechoslovakia, and Chargé, July 14–September 1, 1936. 95 Gen. Julius Gömbös, Hungarian Prime Minister. 96 French Army Chief of Staff. Memorandum by the Minister in Austria (Messersmith) 740.00/60 [Document 270] Memorandum by the Minister in Austria ( Messersmith ) 97 undated [Extract] Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As respects foreign policy, comparison between 1914 and today is difficult, for the territorial and other objectives of the present National Socialist Government know no bounds. If in 1914 and before, Germany nourished Pan-German objectives and envisaged economic and political domination of Southeastern Europe, her territorial aspirations were still small as compared with those of the leaders of National Socialism today. It is the aim of the National Socialist Government in Germany to make Germany the strongest country of Europe and the strongest country in the world. National Socialist foreign policy in its many ramifications grows out of this. Germany must be made as self-sustaining as is possible and made independent so far as possible of all overseas supplies. To this end the annexation of a good part of the present Russian Ukraine is a primary objective of policy. Danzig and Memel must be incorporated into the Reich, and the Corridor eliminated. The Silesian frontier with Poland must be corrected so as to bring back the territory there which Poland got under the treaty and the consequent plebiscite. Austria is to be incorporated as a whole into the Reich. The Czechoslovak state is considered as a hybrid and impossible product, and a partition of Czechoslovakia is a definite objective. German economic and political penetration and domination are to be pressed in all of the states of Southeastern Europe to the Dardanelles so that this vast hinterland which Germany considers as peculiarly and solely her own, shall be to all intents and purposes a part of the Reich, although the form of sovereignty of most of these states shall be permitted to remain. In the West the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine is an objective which is to be attained as the program in the East has been carried through. Eupen and Malmedy are to be recovered from Belgium and a separatist movement in Belgium stimulated with the eventual intent of bringing the Flemish provinces with the port of Antwerp into the Reich. Denmark, because of its strategic nature, is to be absorbed into the Reich. The colonial desires of Germany are being rapidly brought to the fore and with growing military power and domination, the Party conviction is that Germany will rapidly have more than her proper share of colonies in Africa and elsewhere. The Party program was well elaborated and carefully planned for both internal and external action. The internal measures were carried through during the first three years of the control of the Party and culminated in the military reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. With that action Germany had thrown off all of the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles, and further action had to be taken beyond the frontiers. The program internally was carried through with a definiteness and with a thoroughness which must arouse certain admiration, but it gives a specious impression of the power of Germany both to the people within Germany and in Europe. Since March 7, 1936, whatever steps Germany may take must be taken beyond her frontiers and the momentum of the German program has definitely slowed down since that date. When Greiser lost his temper at Geneva over Danzig 98 he made a slowing up of the German program in Danzig necessary in order not to provoke England, France, and Poland. The difficult relations with Rome over Austria and the impossibility of Berlin to answer the British memorandum made the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, a necessity and committed Germany publicly to the recognition of Austrian sovereignty and non-immixtion in Austrian internal affairs. The plans for the setting up of an autonomous state in Czechoslovakia leading to the disintegration and partitioning of that state had to be given up for the time being for fear of provoking a conflict for which Germany realized she was not ready. Although German economic expansion in Southeastern Europe is proceeding rapidly in most of the countries in that area, it has not been followed by the degree of political predominance which was anticipated. While Germany has been able to prevent the conclusion of a Danubian Pact, was able to sabotage partly the Austro-Czechoslovak trade treaty early this year, and has succeeded in preventing any measure of economic cooperation in Southeastern Europe from making headway, the Little Entente still remains and is somewhat stronger than it was a few months ago. The German program on the whole in Southeastern Europe has been disappointing to Berlin. In practically every direction therefore German policy since March 7, 1936, has had a setback and as was to be foreseen, the external program cannot make the progress which was made in the internal program as the problem is an entirely different one. Europe was content to permit Germany to take action within her frontiers which she is not yet prepared to permit her to take beyond her frontiers or at least Germany does not yet feel herself strong enough to take action beyond her frontiers which might provoke defensive or aggressive action when she feels that the balance of power would yet be too strongly against her. As the very essence of National Socialism is such that it must maintain its position within the country by constant stimulation of the population, the Party cannot remain static. Internally the Party program against the Churches had already raised considerable silent opposition to the Government and it was recognized that externally the treatment of the Churches and of the Jews and other social measures had made progress towards gaining sympathy in England for Germany difficult. As the Party had to undertake some action, and action on the external program was for the time bound to be difficult and slow, the decision was reached to intensify the so-called struggle against communism which would also serve the purpose of weakening Russia, and indirectly France and England. The attack on communism therefore was launched some weeks before the troubles in Spain started. The communist support in Spain of the Madrid Government and the atrocities committed against the Church and its priests and nuns were immediately utilized by the Party to intensify the anti-communist movement it had set in motion. Evidences now point to an agreement having been reached between the Vatican and Berlin on the basis of which the Vatican will support an anti-communist movement throughout the world and in return Germany will sign a new Concordat which the Church hopes will improve the position of the Catholics in Germany. Through the united action of Berlin and the Vatican this anti-communist movement is likely to assume wide proportions and may have far-reaching political consequences in a disturbed Europe as the movement is aimed in reality not so much against communism as having for its objective the isolation of Russia and the weakening of France and England. German policy within the next months will be directed towards improving the atmosphere for German success in the approaching conversations which are to lead to a new agreement in Western Europe. Emphasis will be laid on the need for German markets if the rearmament program is to be modified in Germany, and while the European powers are prepared to recognize that such markets are necessary, they are not yet prepared to open their markets to Germany when the distinct danger remains that the only result would be the strengthening of the German position without any change in objectives. Germany needs time, markets, and credits and a generally more favorable attitude towards her in order to be able to carry through her external program, but there is no indication that there is any change in German objectives or that the National Socialist Party can change any major aspect of its policy or its objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George S. Messersmith 97 Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 894 September 10; received September 21. 98 See League of Nations, Official Journal , July 1936, pp. 763–764. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 852.00/3130: Telegram [Document 271] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , September 12, 1936—noon. [Received September 12—11:15 a.m.] 210. An American correspondent, who has succeeded in gaining to an extent the confidence of the Soviet Government, told me last night that Litvinov spent most of an hour and a half interview granted him for background purposes in denouncing Blum and the Blum Government. According to this correspondent, Litvinov told him the following: 1. Blum has shown cowardice in facing the Spanish situation. 99 If at the beginning of the uprising he had boldly treated the Spanish Government as a friendly Government entitled to receive assistance in the form of military equipment the rebellion would have been put down in a short time. When Italy gave 10 aeroplanes Blum should have countered by giving 30. Instead he had played into the hands of the Fascists by declaring an embargo upon the shipment of arms to Spain at a time when the Government was more sorely in need of equipment than the rebels and by maneuvering other governments sympathetic to the cause of Spanish Popular Front into such a position that they were practically compelled to do likewise. As a result the rebels are gaining an upper hand. The Fascistization of Spain would give an impetus and perhaps even an eventual victory to the Fascist movement in France. 2. Blum has demagogically endeavored to make the French public believe that he is succeeding where his predecessors have failed in leading Poland back into the French orbit. In reality he has been making overtures and concessions to Poland despite the fact that the Polish position vis-à-vis Germany and Eastern Europe has undergone no change and will not change so long as Beck continues to be Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3. Blum has shown too great a disposition to mollify Germany rather than to demonstrate to the German Government that he will firmly defend French interests. As a result the small countries of Central Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania, are beginning to fear that they cannot depend upon the firm backing of France in case a really critical situation should result from their continued resistance to German influence. 4. Blum is also failing to support with sufficient firmness the Soviet endeavor to render the League of Nations a more effective instrument for collective security. 5. Blum has shown himself to have not the fighting qualities of a Socialist but the compromising and defeatist character of a Menshevik. Even a Laval would be preferable to Blum as the head of the French Government at the present time. A responsible Soviet official told me two days ago that Blum has lost the confidence of the French workers and that his Government was doomed. The above lends support to the feeling prevalent among German observers in Moscow that the Kremlin is dissatisfied with its United Front experiment, at least in so far as France is concerned and that the Communist International section of Franco is under orders to seize the most favorable moment to assist in bringing about the downfall of the Blum Government. It is believed that the Kremlin is particularly anxious that a more strongly nationalistic French Government represent France at the next meeting of the Locarno powers. Soviet officials do not hesitate to say in private conversations that what France needs at the present time is a leader like Herriot. Copies sent by mail to Paris and Berlin. Henderson 99 See vol. ii , pp. 437 ff. The Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/801 [Document 272] The Chargé in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) to the Secretary of State No. 976 Brussels , September 16, 1936. [Received September 26.] Sir : Referring to my despatch No. 935, of August 12, 1936, 1 and to previous dispatches regarding the proposed Five Power Locarno Conference, I have the honor to report that Mr. Le Ghait, Secretary of the Secretary-General of the Belgian Foreign Office, informed me this morning that he does not believe that the Conference can possibly be held before the end of November or the beginning of December—if as soon as that. Referring to the similarity of the recent replies of the German and Italian Governments to the British Government’s suggestion that the Five Power Locarno meeting might be held in the second half of October, 2 Mr. Le Ghait said that the Belgian Government considered it quite possible that the German and Italian Governments were content to go slowly in this matter in order to watch the outcome of the Civil War in Spain—on the theory that a victory by the Spanish insurgents would place the German and Italian Governments in a better strategic position in the Locarno negotiations. Mr. Le Ghait also believes that the general tenor of the speeches made by Nazi officials at the Nuremberg Rally will make it more difficult to get France and Germany together in the same Council Chamber in the near future. Respectfully yours, Louis Sussdorff, Jr. 1 Not printed. 2 See despatch No. 1094, December 19, from the Ambassador in Belgium, p. 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 298 ] . The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 762.00/131 [Document 273] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State No. 3047 Berlin , September 18, 1936. [Received September 29.] Sir : In recent reports we have endeavored to give the Department a contemporary outline of Germany’s position in the complex state of affairs which has enveloped Europe during the past few months, with special reference to the conflict in Spain and the German campaign against Bolshevism. As Germany’s further moves on this checkerboard of events will be governed to some extent by her confidence in her own unity and strength, it may be of interest to the Department to have a few observations on the state of feeling among the German people toward a possible armed conflict. To review oft-repeated questions: What would be the reaction of the German people to a declaration of war by the German Government? Would not the loyalty of the Reichswehr be doubtful? Would not the population, mindful of the horrors and privations of the last war and of Hitler’s frequent pledges of peace, rise up in revolt? Would not the thousands of irreconcilable Communists and Socialists, not to mention the remnants of Röhm’s SA followers and the embittered Nationalists, welcome the opportunity to settle old scores? Might not civil war ensue? Two years ago many observers would have been inclined to answer these queries in the affirmative. The Reichswehr was then in a state of reorganization, and there was strong friction between the militarists of the old school and the strutting S A and other Party groups; the St. Bartholomew of June 30 and the ignominious failure of the Austrian Putsch a scant month later were still fresh in the minds of the people; the reestablishment of universal military service and the remilitarization of the Rhineland were dreams yet to be realized. But the situation has changed since then, and a people so susceptible to the influence of mass suggestion is apt, under the spell of alluring promises held out by clever propagandists, to forget the less pleasant events in its existence. And here the resourcefulness of a marvellously organized Ministry of Propaganda has been of indisputable value. With absolute control of the press, radio, films and theatre, a systematic campaign of propaganda was inaugurated to break down the resistance of “doubting Thomases” and to strengthen the enthusiasm of those already converted to the new order. (We need not mention certain other measures of “persuasion” resorted to by groups not having the subtle facilities of the Propaganda Ministry at their disposal.) The workmen were to be endowed with special blessings; class hatreds were no longer to exist, employers and employees were to become a harmonious brotherhood; wages could not be increased until unemployment was reduced, but the workers were to receive other benefits of a finer nature. And this was done. Under the joint direction of the Labor Front and the Propaganda Ministry, tours and excursions were organized for the workers, whole fleets of ships and omnibuses being maintained by the Kraft Durch Freude organization for this purpose. Thus, workers who never before had set foot upon a vessel more pretentious than the small excursion craft plying the lakes around Berlin, were taken, for a small sum, on voyages to Madeira, Portugal and the Northland Fjords on modern liners with all comforts and conveniences. Special theatres were established for the poorer classes, or tickets made available to them at greatly reduced prices for other theatres or the opera; all-day outings, week-end excursions and other forms of recreation and entertainment were provided. The friction between the Reichswehr and the SA and other semimilitary groups was ironed out by making a drastic reduction of the forces of the latter; the feverish activity of rearmament with the attendant stimulation in many branches of industry, the construction of highways and other Government-financed projects furnished jobs for hundreds of thousands. There returned a semblance of prosperity, however artificial; the people again had money to spend; theatres, cafes and restaurants became crowded, the trains filled as not before in years with vacationists traveling to the seashore or the mountains. For a people who had for years been groping in the dark, uncertain of the future, a new dawn had awakened. This was existence as Hitler had promised it; this was the New Reich that would grow ever stronger and more invincible under the guidance of a Fuehrer who had had the courage to scrap the Treaty of Versailles and to restore to his adopted country the sovereignty which was its due. In all this the Ministry of Propaganda played an important part. With steam-roller effectiveness, its activities reached out into every corner of the Reich, into every walk of life. The German press, radio, films and theatre were placed under its direct control and subjected to its instructions; foreign newspapers, if too literal in their views of German affairs, were immediately banned; foreign films were rigidly censored. The German radio, the Ministry’s most effective medium of propaganda, was taken in hand and so carefully nourished that it now has—according to published statistics—seven million subscribers, as against four million in 1932. This could not fail to have effect. Of course there is still discontent. The price of living has increased, whereas wages have not; periodic scarcities of meats, butter and eggs have brought on grumbling; many small shopkeepers have been forced out of business because of increased taxation and Party levies; and the Communists’ underground work has not been completely stamped out. But this sort of opposition can never become effective as long as it is not organized; and the secret police do not tolerate attempts in this direction. Serious economic disturbances, with increasing sacrifices on the part of the people, would aggravate this discontent and might even lead to attempts at open resistance, such as strikes or plundering of shops. The experience of June 30, 1934, however, causes one to believe that such resistance would be short-lived. In order to sum up the attitude of the German people to a contingency such as that mentioned at the beginning of this despatch, certain additional factors should not be overlooked. 1. The psychology of the German people, which adapts them admirably to organization and, by virtue of the same reason, to follow without hesitation a leader strong enough to dominate them. 2. The vital personality of Hitler, supported by his actual achievements and the halo of mysticism built up around him by Goebbels and other leaders. 3. An inherent love of militarism and the glorification of military deeds, revived by Nazi propagandists and cleverly stimulated by the spectre of foreign invasion. Any doubt of this spirit may be removed by observing a twelve-year-old Hitler Youth issuing commands to his squadron. 4. Room for expansion and need of colonies; dreams of a Mittel Europa . An issue regarded by most Germans as inevitable and justified on the grounds of economic necessity and the invalidity of the Versailles Treaty. We have seen—and the German people have seen—the impotency of the League of Nations or any other force to hinder Japan’s annexation of Manchukuo or Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia. If a conclusion may be based upon these observations, it seems safe to assume that Hitler, for the present at least, can count upon the support of an overwhelming majority of the German people in any venture he might undertake, whether it be one of outright conquest or one cloaked in the guise of repelling an invader. Respectfully yours, William E. Dodd The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/805 [Document 274] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State No. 3052 Berlin , September 21, 1936. [Received September 29.] Sir : Referring to the Embassy’s telegram No. 284 dated September 18, 3 p.m., 3 I have the honor to inform the Department that for the purpose of despatch reporting the pronouncements and activities of the Nuremberg Congress, September 8–14, 1936, as well as such developments as up to this time appear, from the Berlin angle, to have taken place as a result thereof, will be covered by three separate reports, (1) the present one concerning the international aspects, (2) one on internal matters, 4 and, (3) because of the important pronouncements regarding German attitude towards the Soviets and Communism, a third report 5 following the Department’s instruction No. 650 dated August 5, 1936. While most of the important speeches at the Congress were ostensibly concerned with other matters, they overwhelmingly dealt with various aspects of the Nazi attitude towards the Soviets, and as the Department specifically desires that attitude documented, copies and translations thereof are being forwarded with the last mentioned despatch only. Copies and translations of certain other speeches, dealing purely with internal matters or for internal consumption, will be forwarded with the second report listed. The international potentialities of the policy pronouncements of the Congress, while setting forth no new points specifically, are so far-reaching and complex, that the element of time will be necessary properly to categorize them. An important immediate result however, is that Germany’s foreign policy, outwardly rather vague and indefinite in the past few months, now appears to be somewhat clarified and subject to possible canalization along the following general lines: First , and of immediate interest, is Germany’s attitude toward the forthcoming Five-Power conference. Whatever may have been any previous beliefs in this regard, it must now be quite apparent to all concerned that Germany will not be represented at any international conference where Bolshevik representatives are present. Indeed, even though Bolshevik influence, e. g. through Franco-Soviet pact 5a in its present form, is brought within the frame-work of an international agenda, any German representation would be openly given restrictive instructions. Predicated on such an understanding is the exclusion of thought of eastern in connection with western problems, a point which England has insisted upon. To this extent, German foreign policy has been furthered, and the ground has been prepared for the next step regardless of its direction. If Hitler and his government—as they undoubtedly feel able—can thus accomplish something in the way of isolating the Soviets from Europe, what appears to be their correlative activity—the establishment of a Fascist bloc—is facilitated. Second , while not having a public place on the Congress program, closer relations with Italy formed one of the strong undercurrents, and evidences of a growing desire to cooperate in a common cause are now quite apparent. Much has been said concerning the suspicions with which the two leading Fascist powers regard each other. The parallelity of their policies may not be sufficiently strong to bring about a satisfactory settlement of their many differences of opinion, and subsequently a general agreement. But the fact remains that at the moment at least, Germany feels that Italy can discreetly be made useful to the Third Reich in its ominous growth in power, without alienating any affections which England may have for Germany, and it is believed that Italy is not overlooking the advantages of closer cooperation with a powerful Fascist colleague in her Mediterranean aims, as evidenced in what is understood to have been the relations of the two countries in aiding the Spanish military insurgents. Also, the forthcoming Locarno arrangements as proposed by the British, have met with identical action on the part of Mussolini and Hitler, and indications here are that Germany is now endeavoring to persuade Italy to denounce as noxious the Franco-Soviet pact with a view to weakening Blum’s government, the ultimate object being to make England less averse to the anti-Bolshevik and pro-Fascist front. As a further step, and a fear strongly expressed by my Russian colleague, the Eastern European countries could be appealed to on the ground that no further aid could be expected from France and that a Fascist tie-up would now be preferable. Third , while a deep-seated, sincere hatred of Bolshevism has been and is one of the consistencies of Nazism, and there are numerous patent reasons why a sudden and violent outburst against Bolshevism should come at this time, the thought occurs to observers in Berlin that there are other strings to the Nazi bow. For example, is it not possible that Germany has in mind the isolation of the Soviets for the purpose of eventually dictating her own terms in the matter of obtaining the raw materials she needs so badly in the pursuit of her aims and which Russia could supply? Outside of actual measures of aggression, what else could Hitler have meant when he said, as he did in one of his Congress speeches, that he could do wonders if he could command the resources of “the Ural Mountains, with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, Siberia with its vast expanse of forests, and the Ukraine with its huge grain fields?” Schacht is reported to have offered, during his recent visit in Paris, to settle Germany’s quarrel with the Soviets if the Communists would abandon their propaganda program—but the price demanded of the Soviets would probably be higher than that offered. Another thought is that the present anti-Bolshevik crusade simply advantageously covers a “multitude of sins” in the activities connected with the civil strife in Spain, the one to two years increase in military service, the continued oppression of the Jews, et cetera. Fourth , while the Congress tirades naturally brought out strongly protesting reaction in France, they did not seem to interfere with the directly subsequent conversations of the French Minister of Commerce, M. Bastid, in Berlin regarding economic agreement between the two countries. These conversations were probably important only in that they actually arrived at a talking point, but the local press ventured the hope strongly that they might lead to broader understandings. Summing up the immediate international results, as seen in Berlin, it may be said that while this Party Congress brought forth no particularly new developments, it has probably precipitated a situation in Europe which will mean new relations and alignments, and in this sense it may be considered more important than any of the three previous Congresses since the Nazis assumed power. Furthermore, whatever good it may have done for Germany, it has at least given food for thought to the balancing power—England—which apparently at the moment is not quite sure that Fascism in Europe is to be preferred to Bolshevism. It cannot be said that the utterances at Nuremberg should give any particular hope to conscientious seekers of peace in Europe. Hitler sees peace and happiness ahead for Germany and at the same time points with pride at the ominous development of his means of “defense”; the Soviet Commissar for Defense, in answering Nuremberg, says his army is “one of peace” and at the same time warns those who would destroy Communism. Respectfully yours, William E. Dodd 3 Not printed. 4 For extract from political report, transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 3069, September 29, see vol. ii , p. 182 . 5 Despatch No. 3091, October 8; not printed. 5a Signed May 2, 1935; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvii , p. 395. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/799: Telegram [Document 275] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 22, 1936—7 p.m. [Received 8:11 p.m. 6 ] 906. In calling yesterday afternoon with Ambassador Phillips 7 on Léger the latter had some interesting things to say as follows: speaking of the proposed five-power conference he said that the German reply to the British to the effect that October 19 was too early a date in view of the preparatory work required was merely a pretext. Germany did not want the conference to be held until she could see how the ground lay as regards other matters: Hitler’s preoccupations at present regarding foreign questions according to Léger were two: (first) anti-Russian campaign; (second) the drive for colonies. 1. The real objective of the anti-Russian campaign was not Russia at all but Western Europe. Hitler had no intention of attacking Russia at least not for the present realizing that Russia was a morass in which the invader would inevitably lose himself. The purpose of the Russian propaganda was to endeavor to convince opinion in the rest of the world, particularly English opinion and French conservative opinion that Hitler was “their man” in the conflict with Communism and that the German rearmament program should therefore be regarded without apprehension, in other words to weaken England, France and Czechoslovakia by lulling them into a false sense of security. Léger said that the French General Staff knew from the war plans of the Germans and from the disposition being made of the German divisions that Germany was making no plan for a war on Russia but on the contrary was concentrating her military strength in the west. 2. While the situation in Germany looks sound on the surface there were unmistakable signs that all was not well under the surface and the “pure Nazis”—Goering, Goebbels and Hess 8 —were “war men” who were urging Hitler that the way to consolidate and perpetuate the regime was to have a short and successful war in Europe, say next spring when German military strength would be at its height and before the British had completed their armament program or the French recovered from their present internal dissensions. Hitler, however, “who hesitates more than is generally believed,” hesitated to risk everything on a war and preferred to try to achieve the desired result by playing on the fear of war which exists in other European countries. Hitler had therefore launched a drive for colonies feeling that if this were successful he would be able, without resorting to war, to accomplish what was needed in the way of a spectacular success to impress the German people. It was for this reason that Hitler was being evasive regarding the proposed five-power conference and he was now engaged in sounding out British and French opinion in various ways as to the possibility of obtaining colonies. Léger was of the opinion that if Hitler believed that he could accomplish something regarding colonies he would agree to attend to five-power conference later in the year; if he came to believe that he could accomplish nothing regarding colonies then he would continue his dilatory tactics and there would probably not be any five-power conference. Regarding colonies Léger said that this was really a question for the British to decide. He said that he did not believe that Mussolini was supporting Hitler in the latter’s demand for colonies. He spoke of the “parallelism” of German and Italian action in the foreign field but did not believe that there was any “concordance” of objectives. He said that Mussolini’s foreign policy of balancing one power against another was not worthy of his abilities and great achievements in the domestic field, saying that Mussolini was not well-informed on foreign matters that he kept too much in his own hands and could not bear to have any first class minds as collaborators. Léger said that the unwillingness of Portugal to attend the meetings of the London Committee to control the nonintervention policy in Spain was a serious matter and was causing the French Government concern. Blum discussed this with Eden on Sunday here and Eden would press it most strongly on Monteiro 9 at Geneva. Léger said that the French embargo on the exportation of war materials to Spain was being scrupulously lived up to, adding that the French Government realized that any failure to do so would give Germany and Italy an opportunity to denounce the nonintervention understanding. Copies to London, Rome, Berlin, Moscow. Wilson 6 Telegram in four sections. 7 William Phillips, Ambassador in Italy, en route to Rome. 8 Rudolph Hess, personal representative of Adolf Hitler. 9 Armindo Rodrigues Monteiro, Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs and delegate to the 17th session of the League of Nations Assembly. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.20/1129: Telegram [Document 276] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , September 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 28—2:25 p.m.] 294. Official information just received by the Military Attaché is to the effect that on or about October 10 the German army officially expands from 24 to 36 divisions, two new corps headquarters to be established at Hanover and Wiesbaden. Forces in the Rhineland, former demilitarized zone, will be raised to 6 divisions or 70,000 men which is double the garrison established there last March. This may be the basis for certain of Léger’s remarks to Phillips (see Paris telegram No. 906 of September 22, 7 p.m.). However, it is stated here that this increase merely brings the German army strength in the district up to normal as compared with the rest of Germany. As of November 1 the estimated strength of the German army, navy and air corps will be 700,000 with 1,400 first line airplanes according to the Military Attaché. Further information of the Military Attaché and the Embassy in Rome indicates German-Italian military discussions were in progress in Rome, September 1 to 25. The purposes of the discussions are unknown but the composition of the German delegation, including German high officers of the Operations Section (war plans) and Economic Mobilization Bureau, evidencing that these discussions could scarcely have been routine. Kindly inform the War Department. In addition to the above, Minister Frank, 10 youth leader Schirach and 450 Hitler youth recently visited Mussolini in Rome on which occasions speeches were exchanged vaguely referring to mutual cooperation. There is as yet, however, no conclusive evidence of a definite German-Italian tie-up. At any rate Germany not over optimistic regarding Locarno is making every effort to increase her strength not only in the military but in the economic field as well both internally and externally. Copies to London, Rome, Paris. Dodd 10 Hans Frank, German Minister without Portfolio. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 751.60C/96 [Document 277] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 7 Paris , October 2, 1936. [Received October 13.] Sir : I have the honor to report that yesterday I called on M. Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I was accompanied by Mr. Wilson, Counselor of Embassy. In the course of our conversation M. Léger made certain statements which were not without interest. (1) Poland M. Léger said that General Rydz-Smigly’s visit to Paris had produced great improvement in Franco-Polish relations. He said that the French Government had complete confidence in Rydz-Smigly, who was a straightforward, loyal soldier and a man of his word. He added that as soon as it had become evident that Rydz-Smigly would dominate Poland and was, indeed, the true successor of Pilsudski, the French Government had felt that it would be possible to establish satisfactory relations with Poland through him in the same way that satisfactory relations had been established through Pilsudski. M. Léger commented that this method of procedure had its disadvantages inasmuch as the disappearance of the single personality might mean a complete change in relationship. M. Léger then said that Rydz-Smigly had promised the French Government that so long as he continued to hold his position, Poland would refrain from any activity against a country to whose assistance France had gone. M. Léger added that this pledge applied even to the case of the Soviet Union. He then expressed the opinion that it might also be of great importance to Czechoslovakia, and that he anticipated some improvement in the relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia. M. Léger obviously attached great importance to this promise of Rydz-Smigly’s and took it to mean that Poland positively would not cooperate in a German attack on either the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia. M. Léger then went on to say that Rydz-Smigly and the French General Staff had concluded both verbal and written understandings with respect to Franco-Polish cooperation in case of German attack. M. Léger then asserted that the French Government understood and always had understood the necessity for Poland to keep a complete balance in its relations with regard to Germany and the Soviet Union; that the French Government had always advised the Polish Government to maintain cordial relations with Germany; that the French had been delighted that the danger of a German attack on the Polish corridor had been reduced; but that Beck had pursued the policy of balance between Germany and the Soviet Union in such a tortuous manner and with such ill will toward France that he had destroyed real cooperation between France and Poland. He then expressed the hope that, in spite of Beck’s continuance in office, true cooperation might now be established. (2) Germany. In replying to my questions with respect to German policy, M. Léger made the following statements: He said that it was certain that the German Government had no intention whatsoever of attacking the Soviet Union. He said that the entire road-building program, the entire aviation-field program, and other military preparations in Germany made this clear. He asserted that the French General Staff had full information as to German military preparations. He stated that the information had recently been obtained and verified that eight of the ten new divisions recently created by Germany were on the French and Belgian frontiers, two remaining in the interior of Germany. He added that in spite of Germany’s promises three additional divisions had recently been stationed in the Rhineland. I asked M. Léger why he thought Hitler was continuing to talk so violently about the Soviet Union if he had absolutely no intention of attacking the Soviet Union. He replied that in his opinion the answer was clear: that Hitler desired to lull France, Belgium and England into a false sense of security by making them believe that they had nothing to fear from his armaments. He was able to do this by proclaiming himself to be the defender of Europe against Bolshevism. M. Léger then went on to discuss the alternative policies which Germany might follow. He predicted that if Germany should decide to avoid war and move by way of political pressure and agreements as she had recently in the case of Austria, she would proceed by bringing pressure on Czechoslovakia and the small Central European states to the south of her. On the other hand, if Germany should decide to risk war, the attack unquestionably would be directed not against Czechoslovakia or any other state to the south but against France. He said that all the information of the French Foreign Office and the French General Staff agreed on this point; that it was furthermore clear if Germany should defeat France and England the world was hers. So far as Central Europe was concerned Germany would merely have to pick up the pieces. M. Léger expressed the opinion that Germany would be ready for such an attack on France in the course of about a year to a year and a half. I asked M. Léger whether the Germans were pressing their claims for colonies. He said that he felt that Hitler was anxious to have a colonial success. I suggested that the Cameroun would possibly be the immediate object of his interest, as it belonged to France, and the demand for it would not bring Hitler into the conflict with Great Britain which he so ardently desired to avoid. M. Léger said that if there were any colonial concessions to Germany, France might give one-third, but England would have to give two-thirds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, William C. Bullitt The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/815: Telegram [Document 278] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 8, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 5:03 p.m. 11 ] 978. In the course of a conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister Delbos I took occasion to stress the intense interest of both the President and yourself in the removal of barriers to international trade. Delbos replied that like the President and yourself he was convinced that unless present obstacles to international commerce could be removed, it would be hopeless to expect to maintain peace. He added that the recent action of the French Government in removing certain quotas and reducing certain tariffs was an example of the line the French Government expected to follow. I asked him if he had any concrete plan in mind for further action and he replied that he felt it might be highly desirable to have a conference soon on economic matters which, in its initial stages, should be confined to representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France, with the possible addition of Belgium. He said that he personally had the greatest admiration for Prime Minister Van Zeeland and felt that his participation in such a conference would be most desirable. I replied that in my opinion it would be inadvisable to call any conference until the ground had been fully prepared in advance by conversations through established diplomatic channels. I added that we were most interested in freeing international trade 12 but at the same time desired to avoid a repetition of the London Economic Conference. 13 He said that he fully agreed that complete preparation was essential. Delbos said that the French Government still had hopes that the proposed five-power “Locarno conference” might take place within a few weeks. In this connection I referred to the relations of France and the Soviet Union and asked him if the French Government intended to go ahead with the conversations between the French and the Russian General Staffs which were agreed upon at the time of the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance but have never taken place. He replied that the French Government would not permit any such conversations until after the “Locarno conference” had either taken place or until it had become evident that it would not take place. He said that the French Government would not do anything at present which might give Germany a pretext to remain aloof from the proposed “Locarno conference”. Delbos stated that he was still seriously disturbed about the Spanish situation. He said that representatives of the Spanish Government at the moment were very active in pressing charges regarding violations of the nonintervention agreement by Germany and Italy. He felt that some reaction might be expected from the Labor Party in England, Socialist Party in Belgium, and the parties of the Popular Front in France. He stated, however, that there was no question of the French Government abandoning its attitude of strict neutrality and nonintervention. Bullitt 11 Telegram in two sections. 12 See pp. 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 406 ] ff. 13 See Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. i , pp. 452 ff. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.20/1132: Telegram [Document 279] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , October 12, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 12—12:05 p.m.] 301. Embassy’s telegram 294, September 28, 6 p.m. The military action outlined went into effect on October 11th according to the Military Attaché but will not be publicly announced. Copies to London, Rome, Paris. Dodd The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/823: Telegram [Document 280] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 14, 1936—10 p.m. [Received October 15—8:50 a.m.] 1005. In the course of a long conversation this afternoon Foreign Minister Beck of Poland said to me that he had informed Eden at Monte Carlo recently that Poland would not endure another Locarno agreement similar to the agreement of 1925 which would turn the force of German aggression toward the east. He said that Eden had understood his point of view and that he had been invited officially to visit London before any conference of the Locarno powers which might take place. He said that he felt certain that Germany would not conclude any new Locarno agreement unless France should abandon the pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. He added that Poland would continue to follow her policy of adhering to her alliance with France but refusing to be drawn into either the German or Soviet orbit. Beck said that his visit to Paris was for the purpose of proving to the French Government that he and Rydz-Smigly were in absolute accord with respect to Polish policy. He will lunch tomorrow with Delbos and Blum and will attempt to convince them that there is no difference between his policy and Rydz-Smigly. He expressed the opinion that it was likely that Poland might devalue and said that the controlling factor would be the damage which might be produced to the spirit of saving in Poland which had been carefully nurtured by the Government. In the course of a long discussion of means to preserve peace in Europe he said that it was his opinion that there was nothing to be done except to meet each situation which arose in a spirit of moderation and reasonableness. He was confident that no ideal could be presented to Europe today which would be of sufficient force to counter the religious manias of Bolshevism and Fascism and he felt the cause of civilization and peace could best be served by dealing with each situation which might arise with quiet reasonableness and strict avoidance of spectacular proposals. Bullitt The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State 755.00/36 [Document 281] The Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) to the Secretary of State No. 561 The Hague , October 19, 1936. [Received October 27.] Sir : I have the honor to report that the recent declaration of King Leopold of Belgium, 14 made in the Cabinet Council, regarding the future policy of Belgium, has been received with warm approval in this country. His declaration that Belgian military policy, like its foreign policy, which necessarily determines it, must be directed not to preparing a war, more or less victorious as the result of a coalition, but to keeping war away from Belgian territory, evokes a warmly responsive note in the public opinion of the Netherlands, at least as expressed in the Netherlands press. This is scarcely to be wondered at, as the proposed Belgian policy coincides almost precisely with the military and foreign policy of this country. The King’s declaration has excited wide comment in most Western European countries and there seems to be considerable confusion and difference of opinion as to the purport and meaning of it. In the Netherlands, however, it is welcomed as the declaration of a policy which has been pursued successfully here, and which represents the safest position for a comparatively small nation to take in the midst of European ambitions, yearnings and hopes that the larger nations are attempting to express in the present disturbed conditions of Western Europe, and that are continually rising to the surface as the pot underneath simmers before coming to the boiling point. The London Times says that as a declaration of policy to the outer world, the speech must clearly seem irregular, and that there was an agreement between the western Locarno signatories to abstain from unilateral pronouncements of such wide importance during the present discussions. It explains the speech by saying that the Belgian Government was confronted by the urgent necessity of piloting a new defense bill through Parliament, where its passage was not expected to be easy, and goes on to say that a declaration of policy carefully attuned to the prevailing currents of public opinion in Belgium, which includes a marked dislike of foreign entanglements and a consequent suspicion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, seemed to be demanded by the paramount aim, namely, to provide the necessary military means for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the country. The Times holds that King Leopold’s declaration of policy is not to be taken to exclude Belgian participation in a new settlement of Western Europe but on a fair interpretation of the speech it will be a limited participation in a system of mutual bilateral pacts strictly conforming to the Covenant of the League. Such limitation of Belgian commitments might, it is thought, exert some attraction on Holland. In France the speech appears to be regarded as a new and disturbing element in an already uncertain situation. It is questioned whether Belgium can find juridical justification for what appears to be a denunciation of the Locarno Treaty which, the French contend, was not destroyed by unilateral German repudiation. It will be recalled that last spring, when Herr Hitler announced the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, and in many quarters was thought to have completely repudiated the Locarno Treaty, he threw out the suggestion of a future pact to which Belgium would be a party and went on to say that he would consider the question of taking in Holland as a party as well. This statement on the part of the Führer was not taken with good grace or even enthusiasm by this country. (See Legation’s despatch No. 381, of March 20, 1936 15 ). The resolute, independent character of the Dutch was rather affronted by the suggestion that they should become entangled in any alliance of that character, with Hitler and Germany in the forefront of it. While no invitation was, of course, given them at the time and no response made, the position of the Dutch with regard to any such suggestion was pretty well evidenced by their promptly taking steps to appropriate money for the defense of the German frontier and to undertake to strengthen in every way they could their defenses on their eastern border. In a conversation I had at the time or shortly afterwards with Premier Colijn, he scoffed at any acceptance by the Dutch of an invitation to enter into such alliances. (See Legation’s despatch No. 381, of March 20, 1936). The repercussion of the Dutch, therefore, to the recent speech of King Leopold is one of satisfaction that a neighboring and smaller nation is adopting practically the same policy which Holland has pursued. The hope of smaller nations in collective security received a rude shock when the League of Nations failed to save Abyssinia. As M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, said in a speech in Brussels last week: “Remember Abyssinia, which was led to believe that by basing her defense on the policy of collective security she would be saved. Do you want that to happen to us? Collective security and mutual assistance are to be encouraged, but it must be recognized that they are yet fragmentary.” This afternoon I had a talk with Jhr. de Graeff, the Foreign Minister, and he expressed himself in most enthusiastic terms with respect to King Leopold’s statement. He told me confidentially that he had known for some time that some expression on the part of the Belgian King as to Belgium’s military policy was to be forthcoming, but he was gratified immensely that it was so clearly expressed and followed so closely the policy which Holland has always pursued. He said that it was not likely that any similar statement on the part of the Government of the Netherlands would be forthcoming because the military and foreign policy of the Netherlands was well known and has been established so long that it was not necessary to reassert it. As an illustration of Dutch opinion on the recent speech of King Leopold, I append a few extracts from the Netherlands press. 16 Respectfully yours, Grenville T. Emmet 14 On October 14, 1936, Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 223. 15 Not printed. 16 None printed. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/830: Telegram [Document 282] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , October 21, 1936—noon. [Received October 21—9:15 a.m.] 422. My 407, October 9, noon. 16a The Italian reply to the British proposals with regard to a meeting of the Locarno Powers has been handed to the British Ambassador. Its contents have not been made public. In reply to my inquiry of my British colleague Drummond told me that it was couched in friendly language but expressed Italy’s desire for a return to the original Locarno undertaking rather than the adoption of two agreements of mutual guarantees as proposed by his Government. Drummond was of the opinion that the Italian reply would be a disappointment to London. Phillips 16a Not printed. Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in Belgium (Willis) 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/843 [Document 283] Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in Belgium ( Willis ) 17 Mr. Le Ghait ( Chef de Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce) stated that the reply of the Belgian Government to the British note of September 17, 1936, 18 was of course in line with the recent speech of the King on foreign policy. According to Mr. Le Ghait the British note contained proposals for regional pacts rather than the negotiation of new agreements along the lines of the old Locarno pacts; for example there should be a pact of mutual assistance between England, France and Germany, and another between France, Italy and Germany. Mr. Le Ghait stated that England was willing to guarantee Belgium but did not request that Belgium guarantee England in return. Mr. Le Ghait pointed out that in view of the nature of the British proposals there was nothing at variance with Belgium’s newly defined position in regard to foreign policy, and Belgium had answered affirmatively to all the British proposals, but a vague reference had been included concerning the position Belgium wished to establish in her relations with her other neighbors, implying the abandoning of her role as a guarantor. There was nothing in the Belgian reply to the British note to slow down the Locarno negotiations, Mr. Le Ghait said, but he hastened to add that in view of Italy’s reply and what he believed to be the nature of the German reply to the British note progress would probably be difficult. In reply to a direct inquiry, Mr. Le Ghait stated that even if Belgium were to be a guaranteed power this would not enable the guarantors to send troops through Belgium or to fly aeroplanes over Belgian territory unless Belgium specifically requested assistance. Mr. Le Ghait dismissed as ridiculous the report in the press that Belgium had been requested not to undertake staff conversations with Germany pending the conclusion of the Locarno negotiations. F[ rances ] E. W[ illis ] Brussels , October 24, 1936. 17 Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Belgium in his despatch No. 1036, October 26; received November 6. 18 With reference to the proposed five-power conference; see despatch No. 1094, December 19, from the Ambassador in Belgium, p. 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 298 ] . The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 755.00/44 [Document 284] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 2037 Moscow , October 28, 1936. [Received November 6.] Sir : I have the honor to report that the recent announcement by the King of Belgium that it was the intention of Belgium to adopt the position of neutrality in international affairs came apparently as a distinct shock to those Governmental and Party officials charged with the carrying out of Soviet foreign policies. For months the Soviet press has been pointing out that if the French Government continues to follow a vacillating foreign policy the group of small European nations which have looked to her for guidance and support ever since the establishment of the League of Nations will fall away from her one by one and will assume either an attitude of neutrality or will fall under the influence of Germany. The resignation of Titulescu, the former Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been a cause of considerable concern to the Soviet Government; and now the decision of the Belgian Government makes it begin to fear that the foundations are already beginning to fall away from the structure of so-called collective security which it had hoped to build in Europe and with the aid of which it had planned to play a leading role in Europe and particularly to check the growth of German influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In an article published in the Moscow Izvestiya of October 23d, entitled “Little ‘Questionnaires’ and Big Questions”, P. Lapinski (Paul L. Mikhailski), the well known Soviet expert on Western European and American affairs, ascribes the action of Belgium to the following factors: (1) The activity of the reactionary fascist elements within Belgium; (2) The influence of Germany, Italy and Poland. In this connection he intimates that the recent visit of Beck to Belgium may have had some connection with the shift in Belgian foreign policy; and (3) The zig-zags of French and British policy, as well as the numerous refusals of Great Britain to bind itself to France and Belgium. A responsible official of the Belgian Legation has told me that in his opinion one of the major factors responsible for the action of the Belgian Government was the determination of that Government not to be dragged, by virtue of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, into a war involving primarily Germany and the Soviet Union. It appears that similar statements have been made in the British press. Lapinski and other Soviet writers, as well as several Soviet officials with whom I have discussed the matter insist that there can be no connection whatever between the sudden shift in Belgian foreign policy and the Franco-Soviet Pact.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, Loy W. Henderson Memorandum by the Secretary of State 740.00/70 [Document 285] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 2, 1936. The Hungarian Minister 19 called having been absent in Hungary for some three months. He had no business. I requested any comment he might have in the way of impressions or opinions relative to the pertinent prospect of conditions and the situation in Europe. He replied that he had motored considerably over Europe and that, apart from the acute nature of the Spanish situation, he felt that the outlook for quiet in Europe had somewhat improved and appears to be in an improved condition today. I inquired as to what the objective of European Governments is in particular and what he considered the future of the present policy of ever-increasing armaments. He replied that he thought within three or four years armament developments might be such that there would be a chance for the nations to work out adjustments of their economic and other affairs. I inquired whether, in his opinion, it would be possible for the policy of ever-increasing armaments to continue four years without either a military explosion or, in any event, an almost complete sapping of the substance and vitality of the population of Europe by the pursuit of a hopeless, uneconomic policy of unproductive armament and other military supplies. He agreed that this latter condition is gradually becoming a certainty, but made no comment as to militarism. I expressed an opinion that a continuance of armaments on an increasing scale for a period of three or four years would be absolutely fatal in any event; that if the nations ever expect seriously to attempt the pursuit of the opposite course of good will, equality and fair dealing in lieu of threats, discrimination and militarism, steps in that direction by the important nations could not be taken one day too soon. He finally agreed that our program would offer the only way to peace and to the best possible condition of economic security and that no one could foretell the outcome of another three or four years of militarism. I do not know whether he will convey what I said to his Government, or, if so, what if any effect it may have. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 19 John Pelényi. Report by the Naval Attaché in Belgium (Gade) 755.00/52 [Document 286] Report by the Naval Attaché in Belgium ( Gade ) 20 [Extract] No. 67 [ Brussels ,] November 9, 1936. At the meeting of the Belgian Cabinet, on October 14th, the King made a speech on national defence and foreign policy. At the close of the meeting the Prime Minister requested the unusual procedure of publishing it. (Mr. Van Zeeland felt this would greatly facilitate the passing in the Chamber of the Army bill in question, involving in particular, changes in the system of national defence and the extension of the period of military service). By approving the publication of the King’s speech, the Government adopted as its own, the policy advocated by the King. The portions of the King’s speech which deal with foreign affairs recommend an “exclusively and integrally Belgian policy” in order to keep Belgium out of its neighbors’ conflicts, and He further emphasized the great value Belgium had derived from her pre-war neutral status. This was in line with the Foreign Minister’s speech, of some three months ago, the Prime Minister’s speech of two months ago and the desire which has for some time been evident, namely for Belgium to limit her international obligations. The King used as an introduction the statement that Belgium’s foreign policy necessarily determined Belgium’s military policy. He continued: “The re-occupation of the Rhineland, in violating the Locarno agreements, both in the letter and in spirit, has almost placed us in the same international position as before the war.” Possibly the most important point of the King’s speech followed shortly afterwards when He said: “Our geographical situation compels us to maintain a military machine big enough to dissuade anyone of our neighbors from using our territory to attack another State. By fulfilling this mission Belgium contributes eminently to the peace of Europe, and creates for herself ipso facto , a right to the respect and, if need be, the assistance of all States which are interested in that peace. On this basis I believe Belgian opinion is unanimous. But our commitments should not go further.” The King went further and pointing out how valuable Belgium’s pre-war neutrality had been, stated: “Our moral situation would have been incomparably weak abroad and the world would not have shown us the same sympathy, if the invader had been able to argue that there was an alliance on our side with one of the adversaries.” The King’s procedure was very unusual. It is exceptional for Him to intervene in political affairs, and even more so for Him to address His ministers on so controversial a subject as military service is, between the different political parties. Equally out of the ordinary was the fact that the King went out of His way to advise His Ministers, on Foreign Affairs, when the whole question of international commitments and negotiating of new agreements to replace the Locarno pacts was in the balance. The King’s speech undoubtedly marks a definite development in Belgian foreign policy and reflects the desire of a large section of public opinion for a policy of neutrality in fact, if not the guaranteed neutrality of the pre-war period, and for a Belgian foreign policy free from any sort of alliance or obligation extending beyond Belgium’s own frontiers. The King was prompted to make His speech by the change which has slowly but inevitably taken place in the Western European situation. The occupation of the Rhineland and the importance of the Locarno signatories in the matter, France’s accord with Russia, the weakness of the League of Nations (as exhibited in the Abyssinian war) and the Russo-German tension have all greatly changed the situation. Belgium’s political evolution has had to follow pace. Belgium feels that by remaining immune, not neutral, and by having no alliances but becoming militarily strong, she can not only best safeguard her own inviolability but contribute to the greatest extent to the peace of Western Europe. Despite all that was at first concluded by the French and English press the speech implied no repudiation whatsoever of any existing Belgian obligations as existing under the Covenant of the League, the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement and the London agreements of March in connection with the Locarno pacts, nor any attempt to abandon the principle of collective security, nor any scheme of pacts whereby peace could be secured. The speech is an important indication that Belgium does not wish to undertake as a guarantor any new international commitments, but wishes to follow an independent policy “a realistic policy of independence” (such as Holland) and if possible avoid becoming involved in the conflicts of her neighbors. The speech was neither anti-French, nor anti-German, merely advocated an independent Belgian policy, one that becomes impossible unless Belgium has an adequate system of defence and a strong army so that her neighbors would not be tempted to use Belgium territory as a base of operation in their conflicts. An independent policy is necessary if the support of the entire country is to be gained for the national defense policy. Belgium recognizes that its geographic situation is an extremely dangerous one and an alliance with any of its neighbors is a temptation and an excuse for the use of Belgian territory as a base of military operations, for any nation having a quarrel with Belgium’s ally would naturally use Belgian territory in the attack on the ally. She does not wish to be dragged into adventures in which she has no interest. As the League of Nations offers no real protection therefore Belgium must look to its own defence. In conclusion, what Belgium wishes is complete independence and freedom of decision coupled with an armed force, sufficient to make anyone well consider the losses as well as the gains if entering Belgian territory in order to attack France or England or Germany. Belgium has no thought of shirking her international obligations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Copy transmitted to the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, November 24. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) 770.00/453 [Document 287] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] November 13, 1936. The Rumanian Minister called to see me this morning after several months absence from his post and had many interesting observations to make regarding the present political situation in Europe. Of particular interest was Mr. Davila’s reference to the discussions which took place at the last meeting of the Little Entente Council at Bratislava. It appears that a vigorous, but unsuccessful, effort was made at that time by the Czechoslovaks to convert the Little Entente into an alliance for mutual defense against attack from whatsoever quarters. The Little Entente was, as is well known, set up for the primary purpose of blocking the Hungarians in any attempt they might make to regain territories lost to their neighbors as a result of the World War and, secondarily, to nullify any attempt to restore the Hapsburg dynasty. The Czechs are of course at the present time greatly alarmed over developments in Germany and wish to obligate the Yugoslavs and the Rumanians to come to their assistance in case of a German attack. The Bratislava meeting of the Little Entente Council resulted in the complete failure of the Czechs to obtain their end. The Minister stated that the Rumanians are neither willing to undertake any commitments to fight against Germany in case of an attack on Czechoslovakia nor against Italy in case Yugoslavia is attacked. The Bratislava meeting, furthermore, emphasized the difference of viewpoint between the Czechs on the one part and the Rumanians and Yugoslavs on the other part respecting a Hapsburg restoration. While the Czechs are for obvious reasons inalterably opposed to the Anschluss and would much prefer the Hapsburg restoration if no other alternative is afforded, both the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs have become reconciled to the idea of Anschluss but are still bitterly opposed to the idea of a Hapsburg restoration. Further dissension arose among the Little Entente members during the Bratislava meeting with respect to their Russian policy. The Czechs, being now in alliance with Soviet Russia, were bent upon drawing the Yugoslavs and Rumanians into a similar relation. The Yugoslavs have from the beginning been inalterably opposed to any sort of understanding with Russia, and the Rumanians, since the fall of Titulescu, have practically dropped the idea of a Russian alliance along the lines of the Franco-Soviet and Czecho-Soviet alliances. In this connection the Minister stated that the extreme Nationalist groups in his country appeared to be rapidly gaining the overhand and that any idea of an agreement with Soviet Russia entailing military cooperation was anathema to them. The Minister mentioned in passing a recent press report from Bucharest to the effect that these Rightist groups in Rumania had recently threatened the life of the King if he involved the country in any commitments to Soviet Russia. The Minister said he now felt certain the reports were true since all endeavors on his part to obtain a denial from his Government had been unsuccessful. I asked the Minister at this point whether the Soviet-Rumanian understanding which Mr. Titulescu was sponsoring prior to his fall envisaged the passage of Soviet troops across Rumanian territory, and somewhat to my surprise he replied that such was of course the case. He added that he had remonstrated on this subject with Titulescu and had asked him how he would expect to get Russian troops out of Rumania in the eventuality that they were used in a successful war against Nazi Germany. Mr. Titulescu was somewhat vague in his ideas on this point, but persisted in his conviction that there was no other way out for Rumania. Mr. Davila further revealed to me that if Titulescu’s plans for a Soviet-Rumanian alliance had gone through Rumania would have obtained in compensation an explicit recognition of her sovereignty over Bessarabia. He added, however, that Mr. Titulescu had been experiencing great difficulties in his negotiations with the Russians, who pointed out to him their misgivings over the Rumanian trend to extreme Nationalism and the likelihood that any Soviet-Rumanian understanding would be repudiated by the mass of the Rumanian people even if it could be successfully negotiated. The Minister observed somewhat ruefully that in view of recent developments the Russians at that time appeared to be better informed on conditions in Rumania than Mr. Titulescu himself. With regard to Franco-Rumanian relations the Minister said he believed his Government should cling to the French as long as it was humanly possible in the hope that the French would eventually come to realize that they either had to meet the German menace with military force in case Germany attacks Czechoslovakia or else France herself would in the long run fall a victim to over-whelming German power. The Minister said he held this view despite the fact that one hears on all sides in France in speaking to the average Frenchman that they will be willing to go to war for one purpose and one purpose only, namely, to defend the actual frontiers of France. Wallace Murray The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 762.65/258: Telegram [Document 288] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 14, 1936—noon. [Received November 14—9:55 a.m.] 332. Despite the intense diplomatic activity through discussions among the several Chancelleries of Central Europe, Germany and Italy both in combination and individually it is difficult to know at this stage what if anything definite may ultimately result. Especially confusing is the Italo-German “axis” which while undoubtedly meaning close Italo-German cooperation in certain situations does not prevent a fundamental mutual distrust if not indeed an active rivalry in jockeying for position among the Danubian and Balkan states. For the time being these rivalries are cloaked by the present Italo-German rapprochement Indeed the necessities of the times may even result in a real cooperation of such delicate matters as Central European questions. But it is impossible to judge how far Italy’s conversations and negotiations with Austria and Hungary meet with actual German approval. They may be an effort rather on Italy’s part to create an obstacle to overweening German ambitions in the Danubian and Balkan areas. With all the magnetic attraction in Central Europe of such a powerful country as Germany and the pull of the complementary German trade opportunities and trade propaganda as regards the Danubian and Balkan states, there must always be coincidentally an apprehension in these countries of Germany’s gaining too great an ascendancy in that region for their eventual political safety. It would be only natural therefore if Italy were exploiting this to preserve her own position in Central Europe as regards Germany’s constantly increasing influence there. In all these circumstances we believe it is coming to be considered rather generally here among well-informed observers both German and foreign that one result of this somewhat uneasy cooperation between Italy and Germany is the growing isolation of Czechoslovakia. This has become especially noticeable since Titulescu’s removal 21 and the closer rapprochement between Italy and Germany of the last few months. It is not possible at this stage to analyze this clearly. It may be for the purpose of breaking up the Little Entente in general and so bringing pressure on Czechoslovakia to come to terms with Germany and the Danubian states (we were told that an offer was made to her by Germany some 6 months ago). It may be preliminary preparation for an eventual partition of Czechoslovakia in which Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Austria would participate directly and Yugoslavia and Rumania indirectly through a benefit to them of the abandonment of Hungarian revisionist claims regarding these countries in return for satisfaction from Czechoslovakian territory. Then the Polish-German situation with regard to Danzig is puzzling. Once the Poles acquiesced in the defeat of the League of Nations’ supervision we felt the situation would rather rapidly deteriorate and that it was only a question of time when Danzig would be entirely under German control if not administration. There is undoubtedly a readjustment in the offing there but in what form and whether calculated to disturb German-Polish relations it is impossible to state at this time. It is difficult to believe that either Germany or Poland want to quarrel about Danzig now. The explanation of the present press embroglio may lie in the use of Danzig persons by Germany and Poland each for its own ends as part of a maneuver in other fields such as Central Europe or participation of Poland in a new Locarno or for Polish internal politics which seem somewhat unsettled. Hitler is spending most of his time at Berchtesgaden. Frequently this is portentous in the case of this restless personality whose record has been pretty consistent in moving from one fait accompli to another of increasing magnitude and adventure. Public and even diplomatic opinion has usually been taken by surprise in these situations because they are viewing with a normal mind the probable policy of an eccentric and instinctively clever and audacious lawmaker. Nevertheless prophesy is unwise in view of the lack of information caused by the increasing secretiveness of the Foreign Office and other government organs and associates. We do feel however that some move of an important character again may be under consideration here. Czechoslovakia may be the object of this for the reasons mentioned above. Then this is one situation in Central Europe where Italy and Germany could happily combine in a positive policy. Furthermore Czechoslovakia bears an important relationship to the Franco-Soviet pact particularly since France has been blanketed by the military reoccupation of the Rhineland. And finally through Czechoslovakia Germany and Italy could score in a most practical fashion against Soviet Russia. Schmidt, the Austrian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, is scheduled to come here November 18 presumably to inform the German authorities of the Vienna conversations. 22 Possibly we may have more light on the situation after this visit. Cipher text mailed to London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, Praha, Vienna. Dodd 21 Nicholas Titulescu, former Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been excluded from the Rumanian Cabinet formed on August 30, 1936. 22 On November 11–12, between the Austrian, Italian, and Hungarian Foreign Ministers; for text of communiqué issued November 12, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 309. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.811/42: Telegram [Document 289] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 16, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 16—3:02 p.m.] 335. Germany’s action on Saturday (which we did not report as fully covered by American press) in denouncing unilaterally part XII of the Versailles treaty relating to German waterways 23 was not played up in the local press. Curiously enough reports only appeared on interior pages of the newspapers. Rumors of this action have been bruited about for some months and we believe already discounted in Europe. The text of the note 24 delivered to the countries directly concerned is not available here either through the Foreign Office or from the missions. The communiqué issued to the press was confined to a general statement to the effect that provisions regulating German waterways emanating from the Versailles treaty were no longer regarded as binding upon Germany. It was announced that shipping on German waterways remains open to vessels of all states at peace with Germany and no discrimination. The communiqué is vague in that the internationalization of several of the waterways in question existed prior to the war and consequently it is not clear exactly what their status will be in the future. However it is anticipated that this action will be followed by negotiations with the interested states. In this connection Germany may wish to have freedom of action for the purpose of playing favorites with respect to river traffic through Germany. Superficially the reason for the German action is clear as being a further elimination of the restrictions of Versailles treaty. We are puzzled, however, as to what if any significance this denunciation entails since it strikes us as rather odd that the particular moment would be chosen for a move which evidently has no especial internal value as witnessed by the character of the press announcements. Nor would the action appear immediately to jeopardize any international situation. 25 Czechoslovakia is probably the most directly concerned and in certain respects Saturday’s action may tend to confirm paragraph 2 of Embassy’s 332, November 14, noon. We have informally discussed the unilateral denunciation with the Czech Legation who state they also are puzzled as to its real significance if any. They feel it will have little practical effect on them since Germany has confirmed their rights to free port facilities at Hamburg and Stettin. There is the question of payment for Elbe River traffic, however, which was free under the treaty. After investigation this may cause Czechoslovakia to reroute a certain or perhaps large portion of her exports via Trieste. Confidentially the Czechoslovak Legation states that Italy has lately been offering facilities to get this trade away from German transit. Likewise confidentially the Czechoslovak Legation states that they understand Hungary is not pleased with the action since river internationalization fits her book best with regard to the Danube. Cipher text mailed to London, Paris, Praha. Dodd 23 Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 647 . 24 The official German announcement and note were published in Reichs gesetzblatt , pt. II, No. 43, November 26, 1936; for English text, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 283. 25 A few mild protests were lodged with the German Foreign Office, and on November 16 in the House of Commons the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed his regret at Germany’s unilateral action; for text of statement, see United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 317 (1936–1937), pp. 1334–1335. The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department (Puleston) 755.00/52 [Document 290] The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Dunn ) to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department ( Puleston ) Washington , December 2, 1936. Dear Captain Puleston : Thank you very much for your letter of November 24, 1936, enclosing Lieutenant Commander Gade’s report from Brussels. 26 I found the report most interesting as a clear picture of the official Belgian explanation of its new neutrality policy. Let us not forget, however, that Mr. Van Zeeland’s arguments were just as cogent last year or five years ago, but that as long as France held the military supremacy in Europe those arguments were not advanced. I regard Belgium’s action, however, as “realistic” policy. Very sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 26 See footnote 20, p. 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] . The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/851 [Document 291] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 1080 Brussels , December 3, 1936. [Received December 11.] Sir : Referring to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1036, of October 26, 1936, 27 concerning Belgian Foreign Policy and the Locarno negotiations, I have the honor to report that the Belgian Government has received from the British Government two further notes dated November 4, 1936, and November 19, 1936, regarding the question of a new Western Pact. Mr. Le Ghait, Chef de Cabinet of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed a member of the Embassy (Mr. Sussdorff) yesterday that the Belgian Government is now drafting its reply to the last two British notes. Mr. Le Ghait said that it was not possible to give a synopsis of the Belgian reply yet, as the reply will not be ready until next week, but he intimated that it will be entirely favorable and in line with the desires of the British Government. A memorandum of this conversation is enclosed. Respectfully yours, Dave H. Morris [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) Mr. Le Ghait stated that Great Britain’s note of November 4, 1936, collated the replies received from France, Belgium, Germany and Italy to the British note of September 17, 1936, while Great Britain’s note of November 19, 1936, 28 contained new suggestions devised to reconcile the divergent views expressed in the replies and sought to spur the other Governments concerned toward the conclusion of a new Western Pact. In its note of November 19, 1936, the British Government proposed that it should become a Guaranteed State in a new Western Pact as well as a Guarantor—the guarantees to be furnished by France and Germany—and suggested that the Pact of Paris (Kellogg Pact) might be taken as the determining measure of aggression instead of the League Covenant. The latter suggestion is devised to meet German objections. Mr. Le Ghait said that the Belgian Government’s reply to the last two British notes will be ready in about a week, that it is still subject to change, but that he believes that it will be entirely satisfactory to the British Government. Mr. Le Ghait indicated that the Belgian Government is very much pleased with the consideration which the British Government is showing to Belgium in accepting willingly the Belgian desire to restrict its liabilities in any new Western Pact. Mr. Le Ghait said that the British note of November 19, 1936, shows that Great Britain is determined not to let the question of a new Western Pact go to sleep. However, he does not feel that the outlook for rapid progress in the matter of a new Western Pact is bright in view of the divergence of views between the former Locarno Powers. L[ ouis ] S[ ussdorff ] Brussels , December 2, 1936. 27 See footnote 17, p. 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] . 28 Concerning the three British notes under reference, see despatch No. 1004, December 19, from the Ambassador in Belgium, p. 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 298 ] . The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State 740.00/86 [Document 292] The Minister in Czechoslovakia ( Wright ) to the Secretary of State No. 609 Prague , December 7, 1936. [Received December 24.] Sir : In continuation of my previous despatches concerning recent events in Central Europe, I have the honor to report that in a conversation with Dr. Ferdinand Veverka, formerly Czech Minister to the United States and now Czech Minister at Vienna, today, the Minister voluntarily informed me that from his observations from the viewpoint of Vienna, together with the information that the Government had received and his conversations with Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, and even Count Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Vienna, he had formed the opinion that the influence of Italy in Central Europe—as well as her desire to continue to mix therein—was slowly but noticeably waning. He said that he thought that within a relatively short time it would be demonstrated that Italy was now too weakened by obligations elsewhere to continue to play a prominent role in Central European affairs, and that it would soon be found that she was concentrating upon strengthening her position in the Mediterranean and upon the development of Abyssinia. I inquired whether that would not connote that Mussolini’s recent gesture in his speech at Milan 29 in favor of Hungary, was to be taken with a generous pinch of salt (see my telegram No. 56, November 18, 11:00 a.m., 1936 30 ). He said that such was undoubtedly the case and observed that neither the Regent nor the Hungarian Prime Minister had appeared—to him at least—to repose much reliance upon these assurances of Mussolini, while Count Ciano had frankly said to him that “of course, the hopes expressed in speeches frequently fell short of the steps that were possible in reality”. Of course, information of this nature cannot but be music to Czech ears, because if Hungary is thus forced again to return to the solid earth of actualities and not to repeat her mistake of relying upon sentimental assurances which never take tangible form, her campaign of revision will be necessarily modified and postponed—and there will be one less of the immediate problems by which Czechoslovakia is faced. With regard to that phase of the situation which more directly affects Czechoslovakia in its relations with Germany, Dr. Veverka said the time had come when his Government would have to reach some agreement with Germany: the present situation of affairs was not only leading nowhere but afforded constant peril for provocative assertions and for continued unrest, and he intimated that these considerations were very much to the fore in the minds of the Chief Officers of the State, with whom he had apparently conversed within the last few days. At this point and in order that he might be aware of the nature and extent of my information in this regard and of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to me upon this subject, (see my despatch No. 546 of September 5, 1936), I observed that I had understood from Dr. Krofta that the two conditions which Germany would probably attempt to impose upon this country in that connection were the abrogation of the Soviet Pact and the relinquishment of Czechoslovakia’s position concerning minorities such as Teschen. Dr. Veverka said that the Soviet Pact would certainly appear as one of the conditions, but that he believed the second would be more specifically directed to the Sudetendeutsche Districts. We discussed the latter first:—he confirmed the impressions which we had received from other sources that the Sudetendeutsche Party was far from united at present; in fact, he characterized it as a “true coalition”; i. e., a mingling of many interests and blocs within the party which, while temporarily united at the time of the Presidential and Congressional elections a year ago, were now showing every evidence of growing lack of cohesion. It was interesting to observe therefrom that he confirmed the impressions of which we have been aware for some months and regarding which report has been duly made. He said, however, that the situation as it at present stood, created nothing but friction, and dangerous friction at that, for it continued to afford ammunition for attacks against the Government within the country, to say nothing of continued propaganda and attacks directed against Czechoslovakia from Germany. I said to him that I had had the privilege of unreservedly discussing this matter with President Beneš some months ago and, feeling confident of his knowledge of my interest in the welfare of this State, that I had formed the opinion from many sources that the two chief dangers were first the physical suffering in those districts, especially malnutrition of children; and, secondly, the bitter feeling occasioned by methods of administration in certain regions by Czech officials—to say nothing of the preference given to Czechs rather than to citizens of that region in connection with unemployment relief, road construction, etc. Dr. Veverka said that he unhesitatingly agreed in both opinions. He confirmed the information which I had already received from the son of ex-President Masaryk 31 that a fairly wide program of child feeding had been inaugurated and would be continued throughout the winter—observing in connection with this particular phase and the general lack of employment and cessation of normal activities, that the difficulties arose from the fact that these regions were almost wholly exporting districts—a process which, under present day clearing arrangements and financial impediments, appeared to bring in little, if anything, in return to the people of the region. With regard to the difficulties of Administration, he admitted that many mistakes, and some very egregious ones, had been made and that the Government was doing everything possible to correct it—although he agreed that, at one time in the evolution of this question, the Government had actually feared that the electorate would consider such change of policy as an evidence of fear of Germany and would act accordingly to the detriment of the Government. With the disinterested frankness with which I have always endeavored to discuss matters of this nature when broached to me by officials of this Government, I said that two and a half years residence in this country and extensive travel by automobile in all portions of it, led me more and more to the belief that if more elasticity of administration were resorted to in these districts, there could be no better way to draw the fangs of very bitter and latently dangerous criticism on the part of Germany—which might conceivably arrive at a point at which she would resort to any expedient for a display of force against this country. He agreed and observed again that the matter was very much in the minds of his Government at the moment. Turning then to the first point mentioned above: i. e., the Czech-Soviet Pact, he said that the main advantage of the Pact was really as a trading basis with Germany—for the truth was that Germany was very much afraid of Russia and that, therefore, an agreement of this nature between Czechoslovakia and the Soviets—while not inherently particularly tasteful to the Czech people—was not only the best insurance which this Government could at present find, but also in fact the only one available against Germany. He went further to state that if at any time a satisfactory agreement could be reached with Germany—upon a basis to which full credence could be given as a permanent obligation and with concomitant understanding and assurance that Germany would thereupon desist from all efforts to bring Czechoslovakia within the sphere of its economic control—the Pact with the Soviets might be discarded much more easily than was generally believed to be the case. He did not say that this development would occur immediately, but he did say that the channels of negotiation with Berlin appeared to be much more promising than before. I asked whether it was not true that these improvements were due not only to the ability of Minister Mastny in Berlin but also to the fact that Eisenlohr, German Minister at Prague, had proven a more available channel for such discussions than had originally been expected. He replied that such was the case—thus confirming the impressions which I had received from other sources to the effect that the German Minister (Eisenlohr) had found some of the duties incumbent upon him—such as the brusque announcement of the denunciation of the international control of navigation on German rivers, for instance—far from his liking and, further, that he had been found to be approachable. Dr. Veverka also intimated that he had been working along this line in Vienna with his German colleague, but he vouchsafed no definite information on this point. In connection with this problem as it is related to the restoration of normal commercial circulation in the Danubian region, and the Schuschnigg and Hodža plans, he stated that he believed it to be an interesting and opportune corollary of the present trade agreements policy of the United States and believed that we might be upon the eve of further developments in that connection. Respectfully yours, J. Butler Wright 29 On November 1, 1936; for text, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 343. 30 Not printed. 31 Jan Garrigue Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister to Great Britain. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 862.811/63 [Document 293] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 3179 Berlin , December 9, 1936. [Received December 28.] Sir : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It will be recalled that in Article II of the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin on August 25, 1921, 32 it was specifically stipulated that the rights and advantages of Part XII, inter alia , of the Treaty of Versailles will be accorded to the United States. So far as the Embassy is informed, no formal notification of this action of the German Government 33 has been given to the United States. On the other hand, not all of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles were advised and, as may be seen from the text of the announcement, the note was formally communicated only to those states represented on the various streams commissions. It has been learned that Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and Rumania have in the meantime protested against this latest unilateral denunciation. It is understood that the British note replied specifically to the German argument that no concessions had been made to Germany in the various negotiations concerning these waterways. It is anticipated that negotiations will eventually take place between Germany and the interested countries respecting traffic on German streams and the rights of German shipping on streams or parts of them under foreign control. These negotiations, however, are not yet under way, according to information obtained here from interested sources. Respectfully yours, William E. Dodd 32 Foreign Relations , 1921, vol. ii , p. 29 . 33 i. e., denunciation of part XII of the Treaty of Versailles. See telegram No. 335, November 16, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Germany, p. 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] . The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 751.62/380: Telegram [Document 294] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 16, 1936—11 p.m. [Received December 17—3:30 p.m.] 1262. For Moore. 33a My telegram No. 1261, December 16, 10 p.m. 33b In the course of my conversation with Bonnet today he agreed that the nub of the question of peace and war in Europe was the question of reconciliation between France and Germany. I said to him that we found it somewhat extraordinary that at a time when both the French and German Governments were engaged in saying privately every day that they desired ardently to reach complete understanding and reconciliation neither one was making any direct effort to approach the other in an attempt to work out a direct understanding. Bonnet said that he felt that such an effort should be made but added that he felt that the blessing of the United States would be necessary. I told him I was certain that any effort to reach such a reconciliation would have the full benediction of the United States. Later in the afternoon the German Ambassador Count von Welczeck, who returned from Berlin yesterday called on me to say that von Ribbentrop wished to come to Paris to have a conversation with me. He then said he had a somewhat extraordinary question to ask me on behalf of his Government. His Government desired ardently to reach a full understanding with France. Did I believe that it might be possible to reach such an understanding? If so what steps did I consider advisable? I replied that I was certain that the French Government desired intensely to reach understanding with Germany and that I believed the only method by which to reach it was through discreet conversations between France and Germany. He said that he had initiated such conversations by bringing Schacht to Paris; that Schacht’s conversation with Blum had been most promising but that the French had then conferred with the British and because of British opposition had not followed up the initiative of Schacht. He then pointed out that England, the Soviet Union, and Italy were all opposed to Franco-German reconciliation and that the United States was the only great power in the Western World which would regard such reconciliation favorably. I told him that our Government would certainly favor such reconciliation. He asked me if he could keep in constant touch with me with regard to this matter. I replied that I should be delighted if he would. He then asked me if it might be possible for me to visit Berlin at some time in the near future. I said that I considered such a visit entirely out of the question. We then discussed at length the problems involved in Franco-German reconciliation. He stated that in his opinion if the problem were attacked as a whole global unit in one negotiation involving economic and financial agreements and limitation of armaments there was a considerable chance of success. I asked him what would be the attitude of the German Government if Delbos should say to him that France would like to enter into such a global negotiation. He replied that the German Government would accept with enthusiasm. I am convinced personally that the chief hope of preserving peace in Europe lies in the faint possibility that France and Germany through direct negotiations may reach understanding. I believe that without involving ourselves in any way in such negotiations we should let it be known in private conversations that we would favor such reconciliation. As we are trusted by both the French and Germans we may be able in a small way to help. If at a given moment both nations would welcome some public statement by the President it might be possible for us to consider such a statement; but until the ground has been prepared by direct conversations between the French and German Governments I feel that any general pronouncements by our Government should be avoided. Bullitt 33a R. Walton Moore, Assistant Secretary of State. 33b Not printed. The Chargé in Latvia (Packer) to the Secretary of State 760D.61/169 [Document 295] The Chargé in Latvia ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State No. 264 Riga , December 17, 1936. [Received December 29.] Sir : As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to report that in the course of a conversation on December 15th with the Finnish Minister, Mr. Palin, I referred casually to the recent speech of Zhdanov at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in Moscow which was the subject of the Legation’s despatch No. 260 of December 12, 1936. 34 Mr. Palin, in reply to a direct question, stated that the Finnish Government was making no protest to the Soviet Government in connection with the speech in as much as the official text of the speech gave no ground for a protest on the basis of a threat to Finland. He felt, however, that there had in fact been a threat in the words which Zhdanov actually used. Mr. Palin then mentioned the general question of Soviet suspicion of Finland and the possibility of Finland being an ally of Germany in any future war that might arise between Germany and the Soviet Union. He said the whole purpose of the Finnish orientation toward Scandinavia was to align Finland with the Scandinavian countries, which were neutral in the late war, in the hope that should a conflict arise in Eastern Europe, Finland would be able to remain neutral. He said the Finns, of course, realized that the maintenance of neutrality would be an exceedingly difficult thing to achieve but that they might possibly have almost as good a chance as did Holland and Denmark during the World War. He said that there had been even before the World War a considerable number of ties between Finland and Germany and that many of these ties remained and that the Finnish people are especially grateful to the Germans for their assistance during the Finnish civil war, but that despite all these facts, Finland definitely does not want to become too closely involved with Germany. While the Department will, of course, find little new in the above, it is submitted for such value as it may have at the present time as giving the current views of the chief of mission of Finland in this capital where he has the reputation of being a well-informed person. Respectfully yours, E. L. Packer 34 Not printed. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 751.62/381: Telegram [Document 296] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 17, 1936—2 p.m. [Received 4:34 p.m.] 1266. For Moore. I had a brief conversation with Delbos this morning when I presented to him personally our note with regard to the wireless stations referred to in your 523, December 15, 4 p.m. 35 He promised to attend to this matter at once. In the course of our conversation I had an opportunity to allude to my talk yesterday with Count von Welczeck, the German Ambassador, reported in my No. 1262, December 16, 11 p.m. Delbos said that he was most grateful to me for having communicated to him the substance of my conversation with von Welczeck as both he and Blum were most anxious to initiate conversations directly with Germany. He added that both he and Blum had believed since 1919 that there could be no peace in Europe except on the basis of full reconciliation of France and Germany. He then said: “It is a horrible absurdity that at a [time?] like the present when I believe that Germany desires peace with France and France ardently desires peace with Germany, Europe should be plunging toward war because the two countries stand scowling at each other like dogs”. I then asked him why he had not followed up the promising conversations initiated by the visit of Schacht. He replied that von Welczeck was largely correct in his assertion that Schacht’s visit had not been followed up by the French because of British opposition. The British had frowned because Schacht had mentioned colonies. Delbos said that both he and Blum had told Schacht that they were entirely prepared to discuss the problem of colonies and that this had disturbed the British. He said that although France must be extremely careful to maintain her present good relations with England, the French Foreign Office would remain independent enough to indulge in direct conversations with Germany. He said that he would talk with Blum today or tomorrow and would then summon von Welczeck. He then went on to say that he had asked me to call on him this morning because, among other things, he wished to talk about the possibility that Georges Bonnet might go as Ambassador to Washington. 36 He wished to know unofficially whether or not Bonnet would receive our agrément . At this point our conversation was interrupted by the arrival of the Rumanian Foreign Minister and Delbos asked me to see him again tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. Bullitt 35 Not printed. 36 Georges Bonnet became French Ambassador in the United States on January 16, 1937. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Balkan)/162: Telegram [Document 297] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 18, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 18—12:20 p.m.] 1273. Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador, who has just returned from Warsaw, informed me yesterday that the French had been pressing the Little Entente to alter their mutual obligations for defense against Hungary and Bulgaria into mutual obligations for defense against Germany. He said that the Rumanians would not accept stipulations in proposal but had turned the onus of refusal on to the Yugoslavs by stating that while they were ready to consider the proposal they were sure that the Yugoslavs would reject it. I questioned Delbos with regard to this matter this morning. He said that the French Government had indeed inaugurated this project but that conversations with respect to it were being kept most secret. He stated that the Yugoslavs had replied to the French that while they were unable to accept at the present time they would take the matter under advisement. He said that he hoped in the course of time it would be possible to achieve the results desired. Bullitt The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/858 [Document 298] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 1094 Brussels , December 19, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department’s telegram No. 46, of December 16, 6 p.m., 1936, 37 directing the Embassy to forward at once by mail full digests of the notes which the British Government recently sent to the other Powers concerning a proposed Western Pact. In compliance with the Department’s instructions, there are transmitted herewith by the first available pouch: (1) A digest of the British note of September 17, 1936, to Belgium, France, Germany and Italy. (2) A digest of the replies of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy to the British note of September 17, 1936. These replies were collated in a note addressed by Great Britain to Belgium, France, Germany and Italy on November 4, 1936. (3) A digest of the British note of November 19, 1936. The enclosed digests are made from notes which a member of the Embassy (Mr. Sussdorff) took from the original documents during a conversation with a member of the British Embassy in Brussels. Inasmuch as the notes of the British Government and the replies of the Belgian, French, German and Italian Governments are long documents, it was only possible, in the short space of time available, to make excerpts and digests of the main points. Respectfully yours, Dave H. Morris [Enclosure 1] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) Referring to the joint communiqué issued by the British, French and Belgian Governments after the one day meeting of their representatives in London on July 23, 1936, concerning the desirability of a Five Power Meeting to discuss the question of a new Western Pact to replace the Treaty of Locarno, to the communication which the British Government addressed on behalf of Great Britain, France and Belgium to the Governments of Germany and Italy and to the German and Italian replies, the British Government, in its note of September 17, 1936, again expressed the earnest hope that a meeting of representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and Italy could be held at the earliest possible date. In its note of September 17, 1936, the British Government suggested to the four other Governments that, in its opinion, a consideration of the following points would be useful: (1) “What is to be the form of the new agreement to take the place of the Treaty of Locarno, i. e. will it include ( a ) non-aggression arrangements between certain Powers, and, if so, between which Powers; and ( b ) provisions guaranteeing those non-aggression arrangements, and, if so, which Powers will give and receive the guarantees and how will they operate?” (2) Will it be necessary to make special provisions in the new agreement for an air attack? (3) Should the new agreement contain provisions for arbitration and conciliation, as does the Treaty of Locarno? In order to clarify its position and to advance the discussion, the British Government then set forth its views on the above questions as follows: (1) Non-aggression agreements. The British Government expressed the opinion that in any new Western Pact provision should be made that the question of determining the aggressor should be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. In the event of the flagrant violation of a frontier the guarantees might operate immediately pending a final pronouncement by the League Council. (2) A special provision might be inserted in the proposed Western Pact for immediate assistance in the event of an air attack which constituted a violation of the non-aggression undertakings. This would obviate the necessity of a separate air pact. (3) The new agreement should contain provisions for arbitration and conciliation as did the Treaty of Locarno. [Enclosure 2] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) The Belgian note of October 22, 1936, in substance marked complete agreement with the British note of September 17, 1936. The principal points contained in the Belgian note were: (1) Appreciation was expressed that Great Britain had not asked Belgium to be a guarantor. (2) Belgium’s contribution would lie in the agreement to defend its own territory. (3) Belgium would also contribute to a program of collective security under the League of Nations. (4) For more than a year Belgium has been interested in an air agreement and will contribute in an air program. (5) Belgium agrees to arbitration and conciliation provisions in any new Western Pact. The principal points contained in the French note of September 30, 1936, were: (1) The provisions of the Locarno Treaty should be maintained in the proposed Western Pact with the modifications required by circumstances. (2) The status quo of France’s and Belgium’s frontiers with Germany should be maintained. (3) Each contracting Power to agree not to attack any other contracting Power by land, sea or air. (4) In case of attack, guarantees of assistance not less effective than under the Treaty of Locarno. (5) France is ready to serve as a guarantor to all parties to the new pact on the basis of reciprocity. (6) France has no objection to including Holland in the new pact in accordance with Germany’s suggestion. (7) The contemplated new pact might be the prelude to larger negotiations which would presuppose the collaboration of all the interested Powers. The following are the main points contained in the German reply of October 12, 1936: (1) The subject matter of the new negotiations should be confined in scope to a new Locarno agreement, including the question of attacks by air. Other problems only to be discussed when the question of a new Treaty to replace Locarno is concluded. (2) The structure of the new pact would naturally have to take into account the political developments which have given rise to the plan for such a pact. (3) The German Government has already declared itself prepared for a renunciation of aggression vis-à-vis France and Belgium unrestricted by any exceptions. (4) The German Government does not consider it necessary or appropriate to submit to the Council of the League of Nations the question of deciding whether an infringement of the obligation of non-aggression has taken place and consequently whether the guarantee obligation has entered into force. It will be necessary to examine whether such decisions should not be reached by a common decision of the parties to the Treaty who are not, in a given case, parties to the Treaty. (5) The obligations of the Treaty will apply to attack by air. But the German Government shares the British Government’s view-point that a separate air pact is not necessary. The Italian reply, which was undated, was rather brief. The principal points raised were: (1) Italy believes that the old Locarno Treaty should be used as a model and should be re-examined in the light of present circumstances. (2) In regard to the form of the guarantees, Italy prefers a joint Anglo-Italian guarantee. Italy believes that separate guarantees would weaken the whole plan of security by establishing two tripartite systems: one Franco-Anglo-German and one Italy-Franco-German. The replies of the four Governments as set forth above were collated by the British Government in its note of November 4, 1936. [Enclosure 3] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) In a further note, dated November 19, 1936, the British Government addressed certain supplementary views to the Governments of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy on the basis of the communication of views contained in the notes of the four Governments. In its note of November 19, 1936, the British Government raised the following points: (1) In the proposed Western Pact it asked for a guarantee for Great Britain from both France and Germany. (2) Question of the aggressor. The British Government again expressed the opinion that only one body is adapted to deciding this question—namely, the Council of the League of Nations. (3) Insistence was again laid on the importance of a subsequent meeting of other interested Powers in the event of the settlement of the question of a new Western Pact. 37 Not printed. The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State 760C.00/84 [Document 299] The Ambassador in Poland ( Cudahy ) to the Secretary of State No. 1438 Warsaw , January 7, 1937. [Received January 25.] Sir : I have the honor to report that this morning I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Józef Beck, and held a general discussion with him regarding the foreign relations of Poland since my departure on leave from Warsaw on May 25, 1936. The Minister reminded me that in all our previous interviews he had been a persistent optimist and said that nothing had developed since our last meeting to change his cheerful outlook. He said that he did not look for a war that is a war involving the Great Powers of Europe “for another generation”. Answering my queries concerning the great expenditures for war purposes and the vast expansion in the military establishment of Europe he said that it was normal for Europe to be in an armed state. He went on to explain that military equipment was much more costly than twenty years ago, therefore comparative figures on national expenditures for military purposes were not very instructive. Also he said that vast unemployment and the economic crisis have induced governments to provide employment in the military forces. He was never much of a believer in statistics, he said, and did not put much credence in the report that there were more men under arms today than in the summer of 1914. As for Mussolini’s armed millions he said that Mussolini was always given to making grand gestures and his rhetorical statements were not to be taken by any means as verities. He admitted that the economic situation in Germany was disquieting to the cause of peace and grounds for worry but said he saw no reason for present alarm despite the fact that the economy of Germany was a war economy and the greater part of all industrial effort in the country, according to his information, was engaged in the output of materials useful only for war purposes. Speaking of Spain Colonel Beck said no major conflict could arise from this civil war for the reason that no major power had any national objective in Spain. Nor would the Spanish trouble be used as a convenient “incident” because none of the Great Powers sought a pretext to begin hostilities. He said that there were a number of Poles engaged in fighting on both sides in Spain but he did not think the number was considerable. He did not anticipate international complications by reason of this participation because under existing passport regulations they were ipso facto denied Polish citizenship directly they took up arms in military combat in behalf of any alien force. All of these Polish volunteers were residents of France. Commenting upon Danzig the Minister said he did not believe, despite the troublesome questions which had arisen during the past six months between Germany and Poland concerning the Free City, that it would ever be the proximate cause of serious trouble between the two countries. He expressed the opinion that Danzig is too small a stake for Germany to risk a war with Poland, for Poland would certainly insist upon its rights in the Free City. The Minister said he found some satisfaction in the tardy acknowledgment even by the French press that his international policy was not pro-German. “It never was pro-German as you well know and always agreed”, he said, “but entirely pro-Polish.” He said it was too much to hope that the masses would understand the objectives of foreign policy or the considerations which directed foreign policy at the time important decisions were made but more and more people were becoming enlightened in this respect. He expected to continue the same pro-Polish [policy?] of maintaining existing satisfactory relations with Germany and Russia. Relations with France had been greatly strengthened through the recent French loan, he said. Comment I was struck by the Foreign Minister’s satisfied demeanor, and have never seen him so beaming and well disposed, a state of mind no doubt resulting from the almost unanimous popular support of his policies. The successful negotiation of the French Loan, for which he is given credit in many well-informed circles, has almost absolved him from the accusation of pronounced pro-German tendencies. Never before since my coming to Warsaw has his position been more strongly entrenched. Respectfully yours, John Cudahy The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Balkan)/164: Telegram [Document 300] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , January 16, 1937—1 p.m. [Received January 16—11:15 a.m.] 68. For the Secretary and Moore. I questioned Léger this morning with regard to the project reported to the Department in my telegram 1273, December 18, 1 p.m., 1936. Léger said that the French Government had offered to enter into pacts of mutual assistance with Yugoslavia and Rumania (as well as one with Czechoslovakia) provided Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia should alter their present obligations for defense against Hungary and Bulgaria into a general pact of mutual assistance against attack from any source. Léger said that no progress had been made because Yugoslavia was not anxious to disturb her present relations with Germany and Italy and feared German and Italian resentment. He said that Czechoslovakia was most anxious to conclude such a pact and he believed that Rumania would agree provided the objections of Yugoslavia could be overcome. Bullitt The German-Japanese Accord of November 25, 1936, against the Communist International The German-Japanese Accord of November 25, 1936, against the Communist International [301] The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 27, 1936. [Received November 16.] 762.94/78 [302] The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 11, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 11—7:11 a.m.] 762.94/76: Telegram [303] The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 13, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 13—10:10 a.m.] 762.94/77: Telegram [304] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 17, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 17—1:15 p.m.] 762.94/81: Telegram [305] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, November 17, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 17—2:09 p.m.] 762.94/80: Telegram [306] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 18, 1936—11 a.m. [Received November 18—9:15 a.m.] 762.94/82: Telegram [307] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, November 18, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 18—2:55 p.m.] 762.94/85: Telegram [308] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, November 18, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 18—2:45 p.m.] 762.94/84: Telegram [309] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 20, 1936—10 a.m. [Received November 20—9:50 a.m.] 762.94/90: Telegram [310] The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 23, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 23—10:35 a.m.] 762.94/92: Telegram [311] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 25, 1936—10 a.m. [Received November 25—9 a.m.] 762.94/94: Telegram [312] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 25, 1936—2 p.m. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 762.94/95: Telegram [313] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Polish Ambassador (Potocki) [Washington,] November 27, 1936. 762.94/112 [314] The Chargé in Poland (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Warsaw, November 27, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 27—3:07 p.m.] 762.94/99: Telegram [315] The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, November 28, 1936—1 p.m. [Received 1:20 p.m.] 762.94/101: Telegram [316] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 4, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 4—9:35 a.m.] 762.94/113: Telegram [317] The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 22, 1936. [Received January 14, 1937.] 762.94/147 The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State 762.94/78 [Document 301] The Chargé in Japan ( Dickover ) to the Secretary of State No. 2101 Tokyo , October 27, 1936. [Received November 16.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1753, March 30, 1936, 1 in regard to a rumored German-Japanese military agreement and to enclose herewith a memorandum of conversation which I had on October 26, with Baron de Bassompierre, the Belgian Ambassador in Tokyo. The Ambassador’s opinion is that there is some truth in the rumors of this agreement, which he believes is now approaching some definite form. Respectfully yours, E. R. Dickover [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Chargé in Japan ( Dickover ) of a Conversation With the Belgian Ambassador in Japan ( De Bassompierre ) [ Tokyo ,] October 26, 1936. In the course of a conversation this afternoon the Ambassador brought up the subject of the rumored German-Japanese military agreement against Russia and asked me if I had recently received any new information on the subject. I told him that I had not and asked him his opinion of the probable existence of such a pact. The Ambassador stated that he believed that some kind of an unwritten and informal agreement had been reached some time ago between Japanese and German military officers, but that this agreement was probably not even known to the Foreign Offices of the two countries. It was probably just some sort of a verbal agreement between army officers to combat the further spread of communism. The Ambassador, however, stated that he believed that some more concrete agreement was now being reached between the two countries. He said that as evidence of this, Colonel Ott, the Military Attaché of the German Embassy in Tokyo, had been suddenly called to Germany last summer while the German Ambassador was at home on leave. Baron de Bassompierre believed that this action was connected with some negotiations proceeding in Berlin. He went on to say that some time ago he had noticed an article in Le Matin pointing out the obvious advantages to Japan and Germany of some sort of an alliance against the Soviet Union. The thesis of the article was that it would be necessary for Germany, before waging war on the Soviet Union, to insure against the transference by the Soviet Union of its Far Eastern army to the western front. This could be done by some sort of an alliance with Japan, which would compel the Soviet Union to retain its army in the Far East. Baron de Bassompierre had clipped this article from Le Matin at the time, and recently on his return to Tokyo, when making his formal calls upon the Prime Minister, Mr. Hirota, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita, he had shown them both the clipping in question. He said that if there had been absolutely no truth in the rumor of a German-Japanese agreement, they would have waived the suggestion aside with a laugh. They did not do so, however, but simply sat, with immobile faces, and said nothing. Baron de Bassompierre considered this as very significant. E. R. D[ ickover ] 1 Vol. iv , p. 93 . The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State 762.94/76: Telegram [Document 302] The Chargé in Japan ( Dickover ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 11, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 11—7:11 a.m.] 231. Twice recently vernacular newspapers have published guarded references to an unspecified but allegedly important diplomatic project under consideration by the Government, the Asahi this morning stating that the matter will be submitted to the Privy Council for approval. The submission of the matter to the Privy Council suggests that an agreement which requires Imperial sanction is under consideration, and credence is given in well-informed circles in Tokyo to a report that the diplomatic project in question has to do with Germany and that it is being opposed by the liberal group in the Government. Dickover The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State 762.94/77: Telegram [Document 303] The Chargé in Japan ( Dickover ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 13, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 13—10:10 a.m.] 232. Embassy’s 231, November 11, 6 p.m. 1. The Embassy has learned that a ban was issued to the Japanese press a week ago on publication of news relating to negotiations between Japan and “a certain foreign country.” This morning the Foreign Office spokesman informed the foreign newspaper correspondents that telegraphic press despatches referring to rumored negotiations between Japan and Germany or to the conversations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador would be refused transmission and that a press ban on these subjects would be enforced against all newspapers published in Japan. 2. The above would tend to confirm the rumor reported in the Embassy’s 231 that an important diplomatic project having to do with Germany is under consideration. There is much speculation in Tokyo as to the nature of the project but informed sources believe that any agreement which may be reached will not be in the nature of an alliance or military agreement but will be some sort of joint declaration opposed to Communism; in other words, a declaration indicating that Japan is aligning itself with the Fascist nations. Dickover The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 762.94/81: Telegram [Document 304] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 17, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 17—1:15 p.m.] 279. Your 404, November 14, 2 p.m., to London, 2 and Tokyo’s 232, November 13, 5 p.m. Litvinov 3 told me the following this afternoon: 1. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs has admitted to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese and German Governments have signed a declaration calling for an international campaign against Communism. 2. The Soviet Government has also learned that a number of powers including Italy and Poland are being invited to adhere to this declaration. 3. The Soviet Government has additional information which convinces it that a further secret agreement has been initialled between Japan and Germany providing for cooperation and mutual assistance between those two countries in case either of them becomes involved in a war with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government is extremely surprised at the unexpected change of face on the part of Japan since it had felt that Japan was preparing to come to a full understanding with the Soviet Union with respect to all points of difference between the two countries. It believes that the agreements with Germany represent a further victory of the Japanese militarists over the Japanese Foreign Office. It is convinced that the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as the Japanese Embassy in Moscow had been working in good faith towards a Japanese-Soviet rapprochement . Repeated to Tokyo, Berlin and Rome. Henderson 2 Not printed; it repeated telegram No. 232, November 13, 5 p.m., from the Chargé in Japan, supra , with instructions to repeat to Berlin, Rome, and Moscow. 3 Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 762.94/80: Telegram [Document 305] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , November 17, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 17—2:09 p.m.] 468. My 465, November 16, 4 p.m. 4 The newspapers this afternoon feature a report from the British press regarding the conclusion of a German-Japanese anti-Communist agreement. The Government spokesman tonight while pointing out that there is not as yet sufficient information upon which to analyze the scope of the agreement expresses the conviction that it provides for cooperation in defense and “eventual reaction” against Communism and says that the anti-Communist front created at Berlin and broadened at Vienna has thus been extended to the Far East as he himself foreshadowed in his article of October 26 (my telegram 434, October 27, 11 a.m. 5 ). He then endeavors to prove that the “association of Italy, Germany and Japan in a defensive struggle against Russian Communism” was made necessary by Soviet action and for this purpose describes at length the decisions of the Komintern Congress at Moscow in July 1935 and the renewed activity of the Komintern in Europe immediately afterward. Everything he claims proves that the Communists are preparing further coups de main and that the spread of their activities from Europe to the colonies and Asia should serve as warning to the imperial powers. It is therefore natural that Japan should provide for her defense in her “robust imperial advance which unites soldiers, farmers and workers in the great constructive works of civilization”. The agreement today announced between Berlin and Tokyo he concludes is part of that defense “which will be isolated neither in Asia nor in Europe.” Phillips 4 Vol. iv , p. 378 . 5 Not printed. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 762.94/82: Telegram [Document 306] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 18, 1936—11 a.m. [Received November 18—9:15 a.m.] 281. My 279, November 17, 6 p.m. A Tass release published in today’s Izvestiya read as follows: “According to information obtained by Tass from authoritative circles the Chargé d’Affaires of Japan in the U.S.S.R., Mr. Sakoh, in a conversation which took place on the 14th of this month with the Chief of the Second Eastern Division of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Bikoslovski, declared that all the rumors concerning a Japanese-German agreement were without foundation and that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had instructed him to deny these rumors officially as untrue. On the 16th of this month in a conversation with the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in Tokyo, Comrade K. Yurenev, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Arita while denying the conclusion of any agreement directed against the U.S.S.R. admitted that conversations were proceeding with a third state which he did not name concerning the establishment of a bloc to fight Communism. Mr. Arita stated in this connection that Japan was endeavoring to establish closer and more friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. and that the conversations which were being carried on with a third state had neither direct nor indirect influence on Japanese-Soviet relations. Basing itself on these same authoritative sources, Tass is able to report, however, that the conversations with a third state, the existence of which Mr. Arita admitted, have been carried on with Germany and have led to the initialing of an agreement. Although this agreement, which is to be published, is concerned with the fight against Communism, in actuality the agreement is a cloak for a secret German-Japanese treaty concerning coordinating actions of Japan and Germany in the event that one or more finds itself at war with a third state”. Henderson The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 762.94/85: Telegram [Document 307] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , November 18, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 18—2:55 p.m.] 1126. In the course of a brief conversation today I asked Delbos 6 if he had any exact information with respect to the reported anti-Communist agreement between Germany and Japan. He said that he had had a long conversation with Potemkin, Soviet Ambassador, yesterday. Potemkin had stated that he believed there was nothing in the agreement beyond the published reports. He said that Potemkin had informed him later that further information reaching the Soviet Government indicated that the agreement had secret clauses which made it virtually an alliance directed against the Soviet Union. We had previously been informed from a German source that the agreement had been negotiated by “Rosenberg’s 7 Foreign Office” and that “von Neurath’s 8 Foreign Office” had nothing to do with it. Delbos said that his information confirmed this. In this regard it may be of interest to the Department to know that in passing through Berlin last May I had a conversation with von Neurath on the subject of the reports current at that time that Germany and Japan were engaged in negotiating an agreement to attack the Soviet Union jointly in case either should become involved in war with the Soviet Union. Neurath said that Germany had not negotiated such an agreement and would never negotiate such an agreement as it would be obviously contrary to the interests of Germany. If Germany should become involved in war with the Soviet Union Japan automatically would attack at once without any agreement. If Japan should become involved in war with the Soviet Union Germany could not possibly attack at once as the position of France, England and other European countries would have to be taken into consideration. Bullitt 6 Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 7 Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Nazi Party foreign political organization. 8 Constantin von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 762.94/84: Telegram [Document 308] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , November 18, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 18—2:45 p.m.] 470. My telegram No. 468, November 17, 6 p.m., and Moscow’s 279, November 17, 6 p.m. In my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador this morning he said that he understood an agreement between Germany and Japan had been initialed in Berlin but that it had not yet been formally approved by the Government in Tokyo. This formal approval he expected however would be given in due course. Some of the press despatches he added had maintained that in addition to the understanding reached in regard to resisting the spread of Communism and exchange of information on this subject there was a hidden military understanding between the two Governments. This the Ambassador assured me was not the case nor was it the desire of Japan to become involved in European affairs through a military alliance either with Germany or with anyone else. The Ambassador insisted that the initiative for this agreement had come from Berlin and that Japan would like to have any other country join the arrangement which was intended as a concentration of efforts to resist Communism rather than an alliance in any form. He recalled that there had been a Japanese officer stationed for some time in Berlin for the purpose of watching communistic activities and indicated that the new agreement was one step further along this line. Phillips The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 762.94/90: Telegram [Document 309] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 20, 1936—10 a.m. [Received November 20—9:50 a.m.] 343. Department’s 404, November 14, 2 p.m., to London. 9 In conversation at Foreign Office yesterday afternoon it was stated by responsible authority there that no alliance or anything in the nature of a real agreement existed with Japan. We were given to understand guardedly, in view of the tremendous secrecy imposed on the Foreign Office, that there may well be a declaration in the near future by Japan with respect to Communism similar to the statement in a communiqué by Count Ciano 10 at the end of his recent visit here. (See 4th paragraph of communiqué reported in Embassy’s 314, October 26, 1 p.m. 11 ). But we were told even such a declaration would not be directed against any particular power but rather to protect internal conditions in Japan. Our informant added that a similar statement on behalf of Austria might be expected in the next day or two at conclusion of Under Secretary Schmidt’s visit here. Regarding recognition of Manchukuo our informant gave us impression that Italy and Japan were arranging to exchange consular representatives in Manchukuo and Abyssinia, respectively, which, in effect, would amount to a recognition of these two situations. However, it was underlined that the German attitude toward Manchukuo remained unchanged. It was one thing for Italy to recognize Manchukuo having no substantial present or potential trade relations with China or property holdings there, but quite a different thing for Germany with her great interest in trade with China. Germany could not afford to offend China. Discussing German-Japanese relations generally my informant gave me every reason to believe that while Japanese have been pressing for some time for some form of alliance or entente with Germany, the latter has not made any such agreement since she is playing no favorites in the Far East. If the time ever should come when Japanese assistance would be desirable against Russia, that situation would work out so automatically for the best interests of both Germany and Japan that there is no necessity meanwhile to have an alliance or understanding to this effect which could be prejudicial to Sino-German as well as Anglo-German relations, not to speak of other considerations involved. We were also informed that the Foreign Office had just received a telegram from their Minister at Nanking reporting that in a conversation with the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs the latter had stated that the Sino-Japanese situation had considerably improved and he was hopeful that it would work out satisfactorily. The Foreign Office also stated that they considered Russo-Japanese relations were better despite appearances in Mongolia. The Kwantung army was more under control than previously. Cipher text mailed to London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, Istanbul. Dodd 9 See footnote 2, p. 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] . 10 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 11 Not printed. The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State 762.94/92: Telegram [Document 310] The Chargé in Japan ( Dickover ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , November 23, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 23—10:35 a.m.] 238. Embassy’s 237, November 20, 5 p.m. 12 1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him this afternoon. He stated that at the last general meeting of the Comintern, Japan, Germany and the United States had been specified as countries against which Communist activities should be directed. Japan has always been opposed to Communism and has consistently fought the spread of Communism within Japan. But now that Comintern activities have become international in scope the Japanese Government considered that defense against those activities should be international in character especially in view of the fact the recent activities of the Comintern do not appear to be directed as much against Europe as against Asia especially China, Manchuria and India. The Vice Minister then said that because of the above facts the Japanese Government has been holding conversations with the German Government for some time past and has arrived at an agreement which will probably be concluded and made public some time this week. The Vice Minister gave me the following summary of the agreement: “The agreement provides for the exchange of information regarding Comintern activities, consultation on defensive measures as well as for extending joint invitations to third powers. There is a supplementary protocol embodying concrete provisions concerning the execution of the above mentioned agreement; the protocol contains stipulations regarding the manner of cooperation between the authorities of the two high contracting parties, the measures to be taken vis-à-vis those persons connected with the Comintern and the formation of a standing committee”. 2. The Vice Minister further said that the agreement was not directed toward any particular power and that Japan had no intention of being drawn by the agreement into European politics or of joining any bloc of nations such as a fascist bloc. 3. I stated that there were rumors in Tokyo to the effect that the agreement would include a secret military or trade arrangement. The Vice Minister stated definitely that the agreement was not an alliance and would not include secret military or economic arrangements of any kind. He said that the entire agreement including the supplementary protocol would be made public. 4. The Vice Minister said that the above information was being given today only to the British and American Governments; to the British because questions had been asked in the House of Commons and to the American because the Japanese Government valued our friendship and did not wish any misunderstanding. He therefore desired that this information be considered as strictly confidential for the present. He added that he would give me the full text of the agreement before it was published. Dickover 12 Not printed. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 762.94/94: Telegram [Document 311] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 25, 1936—10 a.m. [Received November 25—9 a.m.] 294. My 279, November 17, 6 p.m. 1. The Chinese Ambassador has told me: ( a ) That Litvinov informed him categorically on November 18 that the Soviet Government had reliable information to the effect that Japan and Germany had entered into a secret agreement providing for mutual military assistance in case either country should become involved in a war with the Soviet Union. ( b ) That Litvinov also advised him that the Soviet Government had been reliably informed that the Nanking Government had decided to accede to the demand of the Japanese Government that both Governments enter into an agreement jointly to combat Communism in the Far East. ( c ) That he had replied that if the Soviet Government considered as reliable sources furnishing it with information of the kind contained in Litvinov’s second statement he would be inclined to doubt all information obtained from Soviet so-called reliable sources. ( d ) That his Embassy was not convinced that Japan and Germany had entered into a military pact of the kind suggested by Litvinov; and, ( e ) That Japan had been demanding for some time that China enter into an agreement with it providing for a joint campaign against Communism in the Far East, one of the means for the carrying out of the campaign being the establishment of a line of Chinese-Japanese military outposts following roughly the Great Wall from the sea to Turkestan but that China was determined not to comply with such a demand. 2. The French Ambassador has told me, ( a ) That Litvinov informed him on November 22 that it now seemed possible that the secret agreement between Japan and Germany merely provided that if one of the two powers should become engaged in a war with a third power the other power would not assist the third power by supplying it with military equipment or raw or other materials. Litvinov himself had apparently begun to doubt the truth of his previous statements regarding the scope of the so-called military agreement; and, ( b ) That the French Embassy was not convinced that Japan and Germany had entered into a pact obligating one of the parties to render military assistance to the other in case either should become involved in a war with the Soviet Union. 3. The Japanese Chargé d’Affaires has advised me, ( a ) That Litvinov told him last week that in view of the apparent inclination of Japan to enter into an agreement with Germany aimed at the Soviet Union, the Central Executive Committee had failed to authorize the signing of the fisheries agreement and that authorization would not be forthcoming until the attitude of Japan towards the Soviet Union had been clarified. ( b ) That the two drafts of the treaty had been prepared for signature and were to have been signed some time between November 18 and November 23; and, ( c ) That he had told Litvinov that he had no information which would cause him to believe that Japan and Germany had entered into any kind of an agreement aimed at the Soviet Union. Repeated by mail to Tokyo, Riga, Berlin and Paris. Henderson The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 762.94/95: Telegram [Document 312] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 25, 1936—2 p.m. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 349. My 343, November 20, 10 a.m. I have just returned from seeing the Foreign Minister at his request. He handed me the following document, copies of which I understand he gave to the British and French Ambassadors just prior to my visit. In reply to my question whether this agreement covered the entire arrangement with Japan, Neurath answered in the affirmative, remarking that there were no secret clauses, that this document told the whole story. Translation 13 “Agreement against the Communist Internationale. The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, in the realization that the aim of the Communist Internationale, called the Comintern, is the disintegration and violation of the existing states with all means available, In the conviction that the suffering of interference of the Communist Internationale in the domestic conditions of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being but also menaces the peace of the world in general, Have agreed on the following in the wish to cooperate together in opposing Communist disintegration: Article No. I . The high contracting states agree to inform each other mutually concerning the activity of the Communist Internationale to consult concerning the necessary measures of defence and to carry these out in close cooperation. Article No. II . The high contracting states will jointly invite third states whose domestic peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communist Internationale to adopt measures of defence in the spirit of this agreement or to participate in this agreement. Article No. III . For this agreement both the German as well as the Japanese text are to be regarded as originals. It goes into effect on the day of signing and is valid for a period of five years. The high contracting states will agree in good time before the termination of this period concerning the further form of their cooperation. In documentation whereof the undersigned duly authorized by their respective Governments have signed this agreement and affixed their seals thereto. Done in duplicate.” In addition a supplementary protocol has been given to the press as follows: “On the occasion of today’s signing of the agreement against the Communist Internationale the undersigned plenipotentiaries agreed on the following: ( a ) The competent authorities of the two high contracting states will cooperate in a close manner with regard to the exchange of information concerning the activity of the Communist Internationale as well as concerning the measures of enlightenment and defense against the Communist Internationale. ( b ) The competent authorities of the two high contracting states will adopt strict measures within the scope of the existing laws against those who are directly or indirectly active at home or abroad in the service of the Communist Internationale or abet its work of disintegration. ( c ) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent authorities of the two high contracting states laid down in [( a ) above,] a permanent commission will be established. In this commission the further measures of defense necessary to combat the work of disintegration of the Communist Internationale will be considered and discussed”. Both agreement and protocol were signed by Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador today. 14 Dodd 13 For “unofficial translation” transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in Japan in his despatch No. 2159, November 26, see Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 153 . 14 For text of secret additional agreement signed at Berlin on November 25, 1936, see Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918–1945 , series D, vol. i , p. 734, footnote 2a. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Polish Ambassador (Potocki) 762.94/112 [Document 313] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Polish Ambassador ( Potocki ) [ Washington ,] November 27, 1936. The only specific matter the Ambassador desired to mention had reference to the agreement between Germany and Japan, which has been fully reported in the newspapers. He desired to know whether we have received any information to the effect that Poland is a party to the agreement or proposes to be a party to the agreement, and I answered that question in the negative. He then said he wished us to understand that is the correct answer, since Poland has no intention of becoming complicated in the situation to which the agreement pertains. He said a Rumanian Commission is now in Poland headed by the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and mentioned the close arrangement between the two countries to cooperate for self-protection. R. W[ alton ] M[ oore ] The Chargé in Poland (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 762.94/99: Telegram [Document 314] The Chargé in Poland ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Warsaw , November 27, 1936—6 p.m. [Received November 27—3:07 p.m.] 137. Reliably informed Poland has not slightest intention of joining German-Japanese anti-Communist front. Colonel Beck 15 remarked to me on 24th that “The Polish Government’s relations with the Soviet Government are always formally correct.” Poland ignores the Third International and paradoxically has less fear of Communist propaganda than have many countries whose frontiers are not contiguous to Russia. Johnson 15 Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State 762.94/101: Telegram [Document 315] The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , November 28, 1936—1 p.m. [Received 1:20 p.m.] 351. The fact of the conclusion of the German-Japanese agreement not calling for the time chosen for its publication and the nature of its contents would seem to supply an important missing piece in the picture puzzle of Germany’s attitude in foreign affairs. The agreement goes a long way in our mind to connect such geographically distant regions as Czechoslovakia and Spain as regards German foreign policy and seems to confirm our feeling that Hitler may well have come to some rather definite broad scale decision. For example, we were told by a usually well informed source last Tuesday that the agreement to be published the next day meant that Germany would carry out with deeds as well as with words her “responsibilities” as a “bulwark” of Europe against Communism wherever this danger might show its head. In the view of many foreign observers here and foreign press comment and following the implications of the above information the German-Japanese agreement is considered to point as much towards Czechoslovakia as an ostensible military Soviet outpost as towards Spain. Generally speaking we feel that the German-Japanese agreement proceeds along Hitler’s clever line, as previously reported to the Department, of following a policy which can lead at the same time in any one or more of several directions. For example, anti-Communism as a justification for helping Italy with regard to Spain, for sharing in any of the economic advantages to be had there or in any future political or territorial opportunities in Morocco. Secondly, the German-Japanese agreement being anti-Communist is anti-Jewish. Thirdly, it may well develop or be developing with respect to Czechoslovakia as indicated above. Fourthly, the insistence of the implied distinction between the Communist International and the Soviet Government leaves a loophole for a change in Russo-German relations. Indeed the present German policy may even be of assistance to Stalin 16 in dealing with the Comintern should he so desire, permitting a better relationship between Russia and Germany as had important groups here in Germany at least greatly desired. Lastly, Hitler’s present policy may be used generally for the development, under a cloak of protection against Communist activities, of the vast imperialistic design which is often credited to him and to his most rash and influential advisers. In this latter connection I am fearful that Ribbentrop’s signature of the agreement confirms both our understanding that his has been the initiative in the negotiations towards German-Japanese accord for the past year or more and that Ribbentrop is Hitler’s real confidant for foreign affairs whose influence we consider unfortunate and inclined toward ever greater adventure. All this coincides with the economic difficulties inherent in the internal situation to which as is the case with all imperialism Hitler must and does give primary attention. We do not wish to overestimate the seriousness of the food, raw materials, and general economic conditions in Germany which it is easy to do at this time of the year. Our feeling is that the difficulties of the internal situation are now reaching a point where it is increasingly demanding Hitler’s attention and thereby exerting a greater influence on foreign relations in the direction of a more adventurous course. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in this dual party-state Government do not seem to have made any great advance lately towards solution, in fact we have the impression that if anything these difficulties have increased. A medley of brilliant inexperienced rivals in the party-state structure and a lack of coordinated government make for abrupt and adventurous policies. I realize this telegram is pessimistic. We feel, however, that it conforms to the situation here. It must always be remembered, however, that thus far Hitler has shown an amazing capacity to escape triumphantly from a seemingly insoluble state of affairs. It remains to be seen whether this will again occur or whether as is the case with most geniuses of this character he is beginning to overreach himself and is making his first mistake. Cipher text mailed to London, Paris, Rome, Praha, Riga, Istanbul. Dodd 16 Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 762.94/113: Telegram [Document 316] The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State Tokyo , December 4, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 4—9:35 a.m.] 251. Embassy’s 238, November 23, 6 p.m. 1. The Foreign Office appears to be surprised at the adverse reaction both in Japan and abroad to the recent agreement with Germany and is making every effort to minimize the effect by categorically denying the existence of a military understanding or participation in a Fascist bloc. For this purpose the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday held a general press conference, the second which he has called since taking office. Considerable opposition to the agreement is reflected both in the Japanese press and in conversations with Japanese business men, members of the Diet and others. There seems to be a feeling that Japan should strengthen rather than weaken her relations with the United States and Great Britain and that the suspicion engendered by the agreement with Germany has been unfortunate in that respect. 2. Leadership in Japan’s part of the negotiations which resulted in the agreement is difficult to trace. Some early conversations seem to have taken place in London between the Japanese Embassy and the German Ambassador. Isogai, Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs in the Ministry of War, appears to be one of the few active backers of the agreement. 3. Arita has described the agreement to be as in the nature of a police measure envisaging a standing mixed commission in Berlin in which Japan will be represented by an official from the Home Office. Information will be exchanged and the Japanese Government will proceed only against Japanese subjects at home and abroad who may indulge in communistic activities or propaganda. He said that the pact is aimed against no country and it is hoped that other governments may conclude similar agreements. 4. Nevertheless the general consensus of opinion among my diplomatic colleagues is that a secret military understanding between the German and Japanese General Staffs has been concluded. It appears that the negotiations were conducted in Berlin by Major General Oshima, the Japanese Military Attaché, and it is quite possible that neither the Japanese Foreign Office nor the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin had any direct participation. Colonel Ott, the German Military Attaché in Tokyo, was called to Berlin suddenly last autumn while the German Ambassador to Japan was in Berlin and the former returned to Japan shortly before the agreement was signed. He is now studiously avoiding talks with the other Military Attachés here. 5. My British colleague is convinced of the existence of a secret military pact and believes that the lack of success in carrying out the German trade agreement with Manchukuo has led, as one item of the alleged pact, to an arrangement for the shipment of German arms to Manchuria in payment for soya beans and other commodities. 6. The Soviet Ambassador insists that while the published agreement is only a facade to cover a secret pact for concerted action in case of war with the U. S. S. R. nevertheless this alleged secret pact is also aimed at Great Britain and that an understanding or agreement exists for the division between Japan and Germany of certain British overseas possessions as well as the Dutch East Indies in case of war. He regards the alleged agreement as part and parcel of Japan’s southern expansion program and of Germany’s need for colonies. While these theories may be far fetched, they are in line with the Soviet Ambassador’s usual and perhaps not unreasonable suspicion of Japanese activities and intentions. Yureneff has told me that his Government has indisputable evidence of the existence of a military agreement and he told Clive that this evidence might be published at an opportune moment. 7. In my talk with the Prime Minister, Hirota made the significant remark that the more the influence of the Comintern and communistic activities spread abroad the closer the relations between Japan and Germany would become. Grew The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 762.94/147 [Document 317] The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State No. 288 Nanking , December 22, 1936. [Received January 14, 1937.] Sir : I have the honor to transmit memoranda of conversations 17 which I have had with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and my French and German colleagues relative to the recent Japanese-German agreement. The Department will observe: (1) That the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses the belief that this agreement was instigated by the Japanese rather than by the Germans; (2) That the French Ambassador quotes Mr. Suma, Japanese First Secretary and Consul General, as stating that the agreement was not in any sense a treaty of alliance; and (3) That the German Ambassador has endeavored to make it clear to the Chinese Government that the German Government has no intention whatever of inviting other governments to participate in the agreement. It is perhaps not without significance to note that the German Ambassador made the comment that the Japanese might be putting a different interpretation upon the agreement from that placed upon it by the Germans. Respectfully yours, Nelson Trusler Johnson 17 None printed. Negotiations for the suppression of liquor smuggling into the United States: Negotiations for the suppression of liquor smuggling into the United States: 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 390 ff. Contents Belgium Belgium [318] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 25, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/210 [319] Memorandum by the Consul General at Antwerp (Wiley), Temporarily in the United States [Washington,] February 7, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/218½ [320] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) Washington, March 10, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/226 [321] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) Washington, March 10, 1936—6 p.m. 811.114 Belgium/224a: Telegram [322] The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 20, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/256 [323] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, May 20, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 20—4:10 p.m.] 811.114 Hillfern/129: Telegram [324] The Consul General at Antwerp (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Antwerp, May 21, 1936—11 a.m. [Received May 21—9 a.m.] 811.114 Hillfern/130: Telegram [325] The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State Brussels, May 22, 1936—7 p.m. [Received May 22—4 p.m.] 811.114 Hillfern/132: Telegram [326] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] May 22, 1936. 811.114 Hillfern/139 [327] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] May 26, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/251½ [328] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hicherson) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] May 27, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/257 [329] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] May 28, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/258 [330] The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State Washington, May 28, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/258 [331] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) Washington, June 1, 1936—5 p.m. 811.114 Belgium/258: Telegram [332] The Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State Brussels, June 22, 1936—6 p.m. [Received June 22—4:05 p.m.] 811.114 Belgium/288: Telegram [333] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) Washington, July 2, 1936—1 p.m. 811.114 Belgium/260: Telegram [334] The Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State Brussels, July 7, 1936—5 p.m. [Received July 7—1:15 p.m.] 811.114 Belgium/277: Telegram Memorandum by the Secretary of State 811.114 Belgium/210 [Document 318] Memorandum by the Secretary of State 2 [ Washington ,] January 25, 1936. During the call of the Ambassador, 3 I took up with him the question of alcohol smuggling into this country and spoke substantially along the following lines:— “Mr. Ambassador, I should like to discuss with you informally a situation which is of very real interest to the United States Government. Since last May, five steamers have sailed from Antwerp with a total of approximately 360,000 gallons of alcohol, destined for smuggling into the United States. Four of these vessels discharged their cargoes on the high seas into small, well-known smuggling vessels, and the fifth vessel landed its alcohol cargo at St. Pierre about the middle of last month. The illicit importation of this alcohol into the United States represents a loss to the United States Government of about five million dollars in revenue. “This smuggled alcohol is used as a base for the manufacture of cheap synthetic liquor; the 360,000 gallons which I have just mentioned would normally be manufactured into approximately 3,240,000 quarts of whiskey, gin, or brandy, which can, of course, be sold at a very low price since no duty or taxes have been paid on it. This illicit product, of course, competes with the products of legitimate producers, both foreign and domestic, and not only reduces their sales but has repercussions in allied trade and industries. “The United States Government has discussed with a number of other governments the elimination of this traffic. With the cooperation of other governments we have succeeded in eliminating all smuggling bases heretofore existing. Canada, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Great Britain and France have each taken appropriate measures to put an end to the use of their territory as a smuggling base. It is precisely because of the cooperation which we have had from these governments that smugglers have in recent months been compelled to trans-ship their cargoes on the high seas. In most cases, the governments mentioned have eliminated the smuggling of alcohol by requiring a bond in an adequate amount of the production of a landing certificate to insure a delivery of the cargo at its declared destination. “Belgium now remains the only country from which large-scale alcohol smuggling operations are directed against the United States. I am told that Belgium already has a law, (enacted July 30, 1930), requiring the giving of a bond for the production of a landing certificate covering shipments of alcohol and spirits to neighboring countries. It would thus seem to be a relatively easy matter for Belgium to extend this law to include all shipments of these commodities, regardless of their destination. Such a step would be of great assistance to us, and would be in line with similar action already taken by other countries. “Last October and November, Ambassador Morris discussed this question in considerable detail with officials of the Belgian Government. At that time your Prime Minister told Mr. Morris that he would be disposed to recommend cooperative action along the abovementioned line, provided that Belgium’s neighbors took similar steps. May I emphasize in this regard that the British and French Governments have already taken action to prevent the use of their territory which has heretofore been used as smuggling bases, and that Belgium is the only country with which we now have a smuggling problem. In these circumstances it seems to me that your Government might well feel that it could cooperate with us in this matter without stipulating that we discuss hypothetical questions with other countries where no problem exists. In fact, I cannot conceal my disappointment at the attitude which your Government has thus far taken. “May I express the hope that you will ask your Government to reconsider its decision in this matter and give earnest consideration to cooperative action to put an end to this illicit traffic.” * The Ambassador expressed special interest in this matter and inquired if he had not already written me a letter indicating that steps would be taken. I replied that no letter had come to my attention, but that I was aware of the fact that the Belgian Government had not thus far taken any steps or shown any sign of taking steps to cooperate with this Government under laws it already has for the purpose of preventing this smuggling, which is so damaging to the United States and worth so little to Belgium as a nation. The Ambassador said he would give the matter every attention right away and felt sure his Government would be glad to cooperate. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 2 Copy transmitted to the Ambassador in Belgium in Department’s instruction No. 320, February 4, 1936, not printed. 3 Count Robert van der Straten-Ponthoz, Belgian Ambassador in the United States. * The above quoted paragraphs are excerpts taken from a memorandum prepared in WE [Division of Western European Affairs] for the Secretary’s guidance, [Footnote in the original.] Memorandum by the Consul General at Antwerp (Wiley), Temporarily in the United States 811.114 Belgium/218½ [Document 319] Memorandum by the Consul General at Antwerp ( Wiley ), Temporarily in the United States [ Washington ,] February 7, 1936. Last evening after dinner the question of alcohol smuggling from Antwerp was raised in private conversation with the Belgian Ambassador. He told me of his recent conversation with the Secretary and stated that he had received an “eight page” instruction from his Government reiterating its position, namely, that it was the duty of the American Government to protect its own coast from smuggling and not the obligation of the Belgian authorities. He conveyed the impression that the attitude of the American Government was unreasonable and that the position of the Belgian Government had in no sense been modified by the Secretary’s representations to him. I told him that the coasts of the United States were so extensive that it was impossible effectively to prevent the introduction of smuggled alcohol without collaboration abroad. Antwerp is the principal base for the smuggling of alcohol into the United States. It would be an extremely simple matter to prevent this traffic by the imposition of a regime of landing certificate bonds and that indeed the whole business was so malodorous that it seemed highly opportune for the Belgian Government to take immediate, energetic steps. M. Ponthoz protested that as far as Antwerp was concerned the traffic in question was entirely legitimate. I replied that it was legitimate merely because of lacuna in Belgian laws. The alcohol was released from Belgian bonded warehouses without payment of tax for shipment to destinations which were known to be entirely fictitious. Indeed, there was no guarantee that alcohol thus released from bonded warehouses was not being reintroduced into Belgium. In fact, a recent incident, involving alcohol shipped by Meeus and Company, was believed by the customs authorities in Antwerp to indicate that the alcohol was destined for smuggling into Belgium. The Belgian Ambassador inquired with regard to the position taken by M. van Zeeland 4 in the matter. I informed him that as far as I knew the only concession Mr. van Zeeland had been willing to make was to agree to adhere to any general agreement that might be concluded with Holland, Germany, France, et cetera, for the prevention of smuggling. In other words, Mr. van Zeeland had put the whole case on a hypothetical basis and had thereby eliminated any possibility of effective action, despite the fact that Antwerp was the source of practically all the contraband alcohol originating in Europe. I suggested that to Belgian economy this traffic represented a “bagatelle”; probably the biggest shipments of alcohol did not exceed $10,000 in value in Belgium, though the same shipments represented very considerable loss to the American Treasury, in addition to the other factors involved. John C. Wiley 4 Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) 811.114 Belgium/226 [Document 320] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) No. 332 Washington , March 10, 1936. Sir : With reference to the confidential instruction of February 4, 1936, enclosing a copy of a memorandum 5 of my conversation with the Belgian Ambassador on the subject of alcohol smuggling into the United States, I desire to inform you that the Ambassador subsequently requested Baron Beyens, Second Secretary of the Embassy, to call at the Department and discuss the matter more fully. Baron Beyens did so on February 26 and 29, 1936, and there are enclosed for your information copies of three memoranda 6 which were handed to him on the occasion of his second visit. Commander B. M. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, was also present at both of these conferences. Baron Beyens stated that he believed that the Ambassador was favorably impressed by our arguments and would send a report to Brussels recommending that the action we desire be taken. You are requested to do whatever in your discretion may properly be done to facilitate the cooperation which this Government would appreciate receiving from the Belgian Government in connection with the suppression of alcohol smuggling. I may add that since Baron Beyens’ last call at the Department, word has been received from the American Ambassador at Mexico City that the President of Mexico signed a decree on February 29, 1936, designed to prevent the use of Mexican territory as a base for the smuggling of alcohol. 7 Very truly yours, Cordell Hull 5 See footnote 2, p. 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 318 ] . 6 None printed. 7 See telegram No. 40, February 29, noon, from the Ambassador in Mexico, p. 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) 811.114 Belgium/224a: Telegram [Document 321] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) Washington , March 10, 1936—6 p.m. 10. Department’s instruction No. 320, February 4, 1936. 5 Belgian Ambassador appears to be favorably impressed by our arguments for cooperation to suppress alcohol smuggling and stated that he is planning an approach to his Government which he hopes will be successful in obtaining action we desire. He asks that in the meantime we make no further direct efforts ourselves. Please disregard, therefore, the request in our instruction No. 332 of March 10 to do whatever you can to facilitate the Ambassador’s efforts, and omit any further reference to this subject for the present in your relations with the Belgian Government. Hull 5 See footnote 2, p. 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 318 ] . The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State 811.114 Belgium/256 [Document 322] The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State [Translation] 8 D. 6738 No. 2129 Note Verbale The King’s Embassy advised its Government of the keen desire of His Excellency the Secretary of State to see Belgium collaborate on its territory in the fight against the smuggling of alcohol. The Government of the United States desired that vessels leaving a Belgian port and carrying a cargo of alcohol should be required to give the authorities a bond which would not be returned except upon the exhibition of a certificate attesting to the unloading of the cargo at the declared destination. Unfortunately, besides the arguments it has used in the past against the establishment of such a system, the King’s Government finds itself obliged to state that Belgian laws do not permit the imposition of the system of the certificate of unloading on vessels leaving the ports of the Kingdom. According to the law, the captains of vessels leaving Belgian ports are relieved of any further obligation to the customhouse, from the moment they prove, in the view of the export bureau and in the usual form, that they have regularly complied with all the formalities required. If the King’s Government finds it impossible for it to accede to the proposals of the American Government in their present form, it nevertheless desires seriously to contribute to the solution of the problem and has sought for means to attain the object contemplated without violating the laws in force. The Embassy takes the liberty, firstly, to recall that the Belgian Administration of the Marine, upon the request of the Ambassador of the United States at Brussels, had a very severe supervision exercised by the maritime inspection service, particularly on board the Norwegian vessel Bodo , 9 suspected of coming to Antwerp to be loaded with alcohol for fraudulent introduction into the United States. This step seems to have given certain results, by arousing the fears of the vessels engaged in smuggling, which, as the Department of State has acknowledged, have refrained from further attempts since the beginning of 1936. The King’s Government will not fail to act in the same way in the future in like cases, and will always be happy to cooperate with the Ambassador of the United States at Brussels in this matter. Furthermore, the Belgian Government finds itself in the position of giving even more effective aid to the American Government in an order of ideas such as that which gave rise to the initiatives taken by Norway. It would be a matter of applying under these circumstances to the benefit of the United States the clauses of article 10 of the Belgian law of September 20, 1903, permitting the recall of the Belgian papers ( lettres de mer ) from a captain who should make illicit use of them. In other terms, a Belgian ship owner who might engage in fraudulent operations would see a more formidable threat hanging over him than that resulting from the possible confiscation of a bond. The Belgian Administration of the Marine has, moreover, recalled the papers ( lettres de mer ) of a Belgian vessel whose irregular operations in its territorial waters had been indicated by a foreign government. The King’s Government hopes that the American Government will appreciate the situation henceforth in its true light and that it will deem that in applying the above indicated measures Belgium is cooperating, as far as it is possible for it to do so, in the fight undertaken by the United States against alcohol smuggling. Washington , May 20, 1936. 8 File translation revised by the editors. 9 See telegram No. 94, November 29, 1935, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in Belgium, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 443 . The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Hillfern/129: Telegram [Document 323] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Brussels , May 20, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 20—4:10 p.m.] 28. Referring to the telegrams May 19, 10 a.m., and May 19, 10 p.m., 11 from the American Consulate General at Antwerp regarding steamship Hillfern , the Embassy addressed a note yesterday morning to the Belgian Foreign Office urgently requesting the latter in view of all the circumstances of the case rigorously to apply the pertinent Belgian laws and regulations, especially excise laws, to inflict whatever fines or punishment are possible under Belgian law and to prevent the shipment of the alcohol in question which is undoubtedly destined for smuggling into the United States. Sussdorff called on the Secretary General of the Foreign Office yesterday afternoon and emphasized the importance of the Belgian Government taking action which in the future would serve as a deterrent to the use of Belgian ports as a base of smuggling operations against the United States. Sussdorff and Maitre Gilon, the Embassy’s lawyer, had a conference this morning with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance and of the Marine Department. The Belgian officials all insist it is impossible under Belgian law to prevent the departure of the Hillfern with the cargo of alcohol. They state that they cannot prevent shippers of the alcohol from storing it in a Government warehouse under the control of the customs but that they will refuse permission to the shippers to store the alcohol in a private warehouse. Maitre Gilon is endeavoring to persuade the procureur général to proceed against the Hillfern because the latter gave a false destination in its clearance papers. In an after lunch conversation which I had with the Belgian Prime Minister today he reaffirmed his desire to cooperate fully with the United States Government and his inability under the present Belgian law. He again emphasized the fact that it would be useless for him to endeavor to stop liquor traffic here until the surrounding countries especially Holland have legislation preventing the use of their ports for smuggling operations. Morris 11 Neither printed. The Consul General at Antwerp (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Hillfern/130: Telegram [Document 324] The Consul General at Antwerp ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Antwerp , May 21, 1936—11 a.m. [Received May 21—9 a.m.] My May 19, 10 p.m. 12 Following our representations to Maritime Commissioner of the Port Hillfern seized and formal inquiry ordered. Telegraphic instructions from Minister of Marine ordered release of ship and abandonment of inquiry. She is now at liberty to sail at any time. She is, however, berthed near customs to permit constant surveillance. Meeus has informed customs that he believed he had found purchaser in Rotterdam for alcohol, that ship would probably clear therefor shortly and that ultimate destination of alcohol would be Switzerland. Prospective purchaser expected Antwerp Friday to inspect alcohol and close deal. Consul Rotterdam informed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wiley 12 Not printed. The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Hillfern/132: Telegram [Document 325] The Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Brussels , May 22, 1936—7 p.m. [Received May 22—4 p.m.] 29. Embassy informed by the American Consul General at Antwerp this morning that steamship Hillfern was under steam and ready to leave Antwerp and that the captain of the vessel had stated that it was his intention to proceed immediately to waters adjacent to the United States and to remain there until he had discharged his cargo of alcohol into rum runners. Sussdorff called on de Lantsheere 14 immediately and urged that Belgian Government find some means of stopping the shipment of the cargo of alcohol, pointing out that official and public sentiment in the United States would be outraged if this vessel were allowed to sail a second time with this cargo of alcohol obviously destined for smuggling into the United States. De Lantsheere replied that the Belgian Government had made a careful investigation and could find nothing on which it could justify the detention of vessel or the cargo. He said that the vessel had been detained for 2 days on flimsy pretexts but that no legal means of preventing its departure could be found. Sussdorff suggested that the Belgian authorities cross-examine thoroughly the officers and crew of the Hillfern and examine the ship’s papers especially the radio log but de Lantsheere demurred and said the Belgian authorities would be unwilling to proceed with such an investigation unless the British Consul General were willing to state in writing that the British Government had no objection. This information was immediately telephoned to the American Consul General at Antwerp. In view of the Department’s telegram No. 10 of March 10, 6 p.m., I am not sure of the precise position of the Department in the matter nor to what extremes it wishes me to go. If the Department is desirous of going to the limit, then I ask for instructions accordingly and suggest that the Secretary of State also “put on the spot” the Belgian Ambassador in Washington and “read him the riot act” so that he can report to Brussels that the American Government is scandalized. Morris 14 The Viscount de Lantsheere, Chef de Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Hillfern/139 [Document 326] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] May 22, 1936. The Belgian Ambassador being absent in New York, I sent this morning for Prince de Ligne, the Counselor of the Embassy, and read to him the substance of the accompanying oral statement. I then handed him the statement, making it clear that this was an oral representation and not a memorandum. In addition to the expressions contained in the statement I reminded Prince de Ligne that the Treasury was not only greatly exercised by the present situation, but that it had been brought to the attention of the President, who was also greatly exercised. I said that, in my opinion as an old friend of Belgium, it would be highly disastrous to have this whole unfortunate matter aired in the press and I hoped, therefore, that the Belgian Government could see its way to taking immediate action along the lines suggested. It seems to me that we should inform the Treasury Department that I made the above representations to the Belgian Chargé. William Phillips [Annex] Oral Statement by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) to the Counselor of the Belgian Embassy ( De Ligne ) 15 [ Washington ,] May 22, 1936. You no doubt recall the Ambassador’s conversation of January 25th with the Secretary of State regarding the matter of the use of Belgian territory and facilities in connection with the smuggling of alcohol into the United States. Since that time another vessel has left Antwerp with a large cargo of alcohol intended for smuggling into this country. The British Steamship Hillfern sailed from Antwerp on March 26 with 700,000 liters, approximately 185,000 gallons, of alcohol in tanks. The vessel’s ostensible destination was Montevideo, Uruguay, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the shipment pointed to another smuggling venture. On Saturday night, April 25th, the American vessel Charles D. Leffler was seized at Bayway, New Jersey, near Staten Island, New York, with a cargo of between 50,000 and 100,000 gallons of alcohol in tanks. The alcohol is said to have been obtained from a foreign steamer about 150 miles offshore, which was undoubtedly the Hillfern. As you are of course aware, the Hillfern has returned to Antwerp with the remainder of her cargo, the final disposition of which remains, as far as I know, undecided. I need hardly tell you that in the light of the incontrovertible evidence that the cargo of the Hillfern was destined for smuggling into this country, this Government will continue to feel the greatest concern until the danger is definitely averted. Aside from other factors in the present case, it will have come to the attention of your Government that the Hillfern returned to Antwerp without having called at Montevideo, Uruguay, her declared destination. This, taken in conjunction with the fact that she returned with only part of her cargo, immediately raises in my mind the question of why the vessel has not been proceeded against for giving a false destination in her clearance papers. In this connection, it has just now come to my attention that the Maritime Commissioner of the Port of Antwerp caused the Hillfern to be seized and ordered a formal inquiry. My information is that by means of telegraphic instructions to the Commissioner, the Minister of Marine has ordered the release of the ship and the abandonment of the inquiry. Apart from the case of the Hillfern , the American Consul General at Antwerp has been confidentially informed that another shipment of 1,250,000 liters of alcohol, presumably to be carried by the Hillfern or by a vessel of similar type, has already been assembled. With reference to the broad question of the use of Belgian territory as a base for smuggling activities directed against the United States, I am compelled to say that I am deeply disappointed with the aide-mémoire which you left with me May 20th. I was, of course, already aware that legislation requiring the production of landing certificates does not now exist in Belgium, and the whole purpose of this Government’s representations has been to obtain the passage of such legislation or such other effective control of shipments of alcohol as your Government might suggest The intentions of the Belgian Government with regard to the masters of Belgian ships are appreciated, but they do not, I think you will agree, touch the real roots of the problem. This Government has been careful to withhold from the press all information with regard to the Hillfern or the general question at issue. However, “leaks” have occurred, for which this Government is not responsible, and it is probably only a question of time before the State Department will be compelled to make known its position. You will picture, as readily as I can, the very unfortunate effect on public opinion in this country when the facts are known, and I do not consider it too strong to say that the very favorable reaction here to the trade agreement concluded between our two governments will be much affected. It is for this reason, among others, that I wish to impress upon you the seriousness with which the present situation is regarded by this Government. It is my earnest hope that the Belgian Government can be prevailed upon to view the situation in the same light and that it will take prompt and effective action, not only in respect to the Hillfern case, but in respect to the wider problem, in order that the experience of the Hillfern will not be repeated. 15 Filed separately under 811.114 Hillfern/140. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Belgium/251½ [Document 327] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] May 26, 1936. The Belgian Ambassador referred this morning to the oral communication which I handed to Prince de Ligne on Friday, May 22nd, with regard to the smuggling operations in Antwerp. He said that he was very much concerned about the whole affair, more especially since he had heard the names of certain Belgians of high standing who might be involved … The Ambassador expressed himself fearful that there was something radically wrong and he asked for every bit of help which we could give him, in order that he might communicate directly with the Prime Minister or even with the King; he asked whether I had any names which I could give him, but at this I demurred, saying merely that I would see whether we could give him any further details that would be of help to him. The Ambassador said it would be of help to him, in his communication with his Government, to have a talk with Secretary Morgenthau and added that, if I had no objection, he would endeavor to make an appointment. I replied that I felt sure Mr. Morgenthau would be glad to see him. Although the Ambassador was fully aware of the importance which we attached to smuggling operations, I availed myself of this opportunity again to point out the unfortunate effects which these operations would have, if continued, on the relations of the two countries; primarily the Treasury was concerned with the loss of revenue; the Department of State was concerned, in addition to the loss of revenue, with the effects which smuggling had on trade relations between the two countries and, in particular, upon the trade agreement. I pointed out that already there had been certain leaks in the press, but, as I understood it, the Treasury was trying to avoid, if possible, publicity of the whole affair, in the hope that the Belgian Government itself would take the initiative in finding a remedy. I added, however, that the story at any time might become public, in spite of the fact that we all hoped this could be avoided. I also pointed out that these smuggling operations had been brought to the attention of the President, who was very deeply and personally concerned. William Phillips Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hicherson) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Belgium/257 [Document 328] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hicherson ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] May 27, 1936. With reference to the prospective call of the Belgian Ambassador tomorrow morning to discuss alcohol smuggling from Antwerp, you may wish to hand him, as of possible interest, the attached translation of the decree of the French Government requiring landing certificates for shipments of spirits from St. Pierre-et-Miquelon, and of the decree recently issued by the Mexican Government containing a similar requirement. 16 Furthermore, you may wish to say to the Ambassador that we have been officially informed by the Netherland Government that legislation has been drafted and will soon be introduced into the States General amending the present law in force in the Netherlands with regard to licenses or permits to export alcohol in order to exercise better control over shipments originating in the Netherlands and destined for fraudulent importation into the United States. 17 Details regarding cooperation received from other Governments have already been furnished the Ambassador, particularly in the memorandum dated February 29, 1936, 18 which was handed to Baron Beyens, of the Belgian Embassy. J[ ohn ] D. H[ ickerson ] 16 For French decree of April 9, 1935, see Journal Officiel , May 15, 1935; for Mexican decree of March 9, 1936, see Diario Oficial , March 12, 1936; attachments not printed. 17 See enclosure to despatch No. 403, April 18, from the Chargé in the Netherlands, p. 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] . 18 Not printed. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Belgium/258 [Document 329] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] May 28, 1936. The Belgian Ambassador handed me this morning the accompanying note verbale , 19 which, after referring to the efforts of the Belgian Government in the case of the Hillfern , informs us that a decision has been reached to study the legislation for the suppression of this liquor smuggling. The Ambassador said that he had discussed the whole subject this morning with the Secretary of the Treasury and had advised him of his Government’s decision in this respect; he hoped that we would send over to the Treasury, as soon as possible, a copy, in translation, of his note verbale , which I assured him we would do. The Ambassador then asked for copies of our laws to prevent smuggling from United States territory. I said that I did not have these available, but I handed him copies of the French and Mexican laws governing this illegal traffic. The Ambassador asked whether I could give him any information with regard to any legislation on this subject in The Netherlands. I replied that we had been officially advised by that Government that legislation had been drafted and would soon be introduced into the States General, amending the present law governing the export of alcohol, in order to exercise a better control over shipments originating in The Netherlands and destined for fraudulent importation into the United States. I expressed great satisfaction that the Belgian Government would take similar action and I hoped for speedy results. Meanwhile I said that reports had come to us that the firm of Meeus Company had concentrated large amounts of alcohol in Antwerp for re-shipment to the United States and I hoped that the Belgian Government could do something to prevent this being done. I said that it appeared that the Hillfern stock of liquor was being disposed of in Holland for local consumption, 19a but that we were watching carefully this huge concentration of liquor in Antwerp. It is evident that the Ambassador is very much concerned about the whole matter. He mentioned that Meeus Company are very powerful and that it is quite possible that members of Parliament from Antwerp and other influential persons might have an interest in the company. He reiterated that he was doing everything he could and would continue to do so. William Phillips 19 Infra. 19a In undated telegram received May 23 and telegram dated May 28, the Consul at Rotterdam informed the Department that the Hillfern had arrived at Rotterdam on May 23 and departed on May 28 without cargo, all alcohol aboard having been unloaded and sold to a local firm (811.114 Hillfern/133, 143). The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State 811.114 Belgium/258 [Document 330] The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State [Translation] Washington , May 28, 1936. Note Verbale On receipt of the aide-mémoire which was sent to it on May 22 by the Under Secretary of State, with regard to the suppression of the contraband liquor trade, the King’s Embassy immediately telegraphed to Brussels. It desired to bring to the knowledge of the Belgian Government the data furnished by Mr. Phillips following the telegrams recently sent from Antwerp to the Department of State. The attention of the competent authorities has been especially drawn to the presumably fraudulent acts of the steamer Hillfern. Mr. van Zeeland has just acknowledged receipt of the Belgian Embassy’s communication above mentioned and has instructed it, on this occasion, to remind the American Government that while Belgium is in position to withdraw their sailing papers from Belgian vessels engaged in smuggling, it is not in a position to take action regarding foreign vessels, by reason of the fact that the latter are subject to the jurisdiction of their own consular authorities. The cooperation of the country whose flag is flown by the vessel is therefore indispensable. Nevertheless, for the purpose of cooperating in the restriction of possible abuses which might work prejudice to a country with which Belgium maintains especially friendly relations, the King’s Government has taken extremely severe police measures with respect to the Hillfern . It should be noted—as a confidential matter—that this vessel has even been arbitrarily held at Antwerp for two days. Moreover, the customs authorities have refused authorization for certain re-entries of liquor into Belgium as reimported liquor. It is the lack of cooperation encountered on the part of the consul of the nationality of the suspected vessel which has hindered action by the King’s Government. Cooperation of Belgian authorities in the case recently brought to their attention has been given up to the extreme limit of the powers under the legislation in force. However, as the measures taken have proved ineffective, the King’s Government is disposed to take up the study of a draft law authorizing the suppression of smuggling. For this purpose, it would like to know the powers of the American Government in similar cases. The Embassy of Belgium would appreciate it if the Department of State would assist it in obtaining such documentation. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) 811.114 Belgium/258: Telegram [Document 331] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium ( Morris ) Washington , June 1, 1936—5 p.m. 18. Your No. 29, May 22, 7 p.m. Belgian Ambassador called May 28 and left note 20 stating that cooperation of Belgian authorities in Hillfern case “(translation) has been given up to the extreme limit of the powers under the legislation in force. However, as the measures taken have proved ineffective, the King’s Government is disposed to take up the study of a draft law authorizing the suppression of smuggling. For this purpose it would like to know the powers of the American Government in similar cases.” Copy follows. Belgian Ambassador is evidently much concerned about the whole matter and stated he is doing everything he can and will continue to do so. Inform Antwerp. In view of above-mentioned note you should, unless you perceive objection, call at the Foreign Office and express gratification at the step it is now proposed to take; add that information desired by the Belgian Government as to American laws will be furnished as soon as possible, that considerable data on this general subject was furnished Baron Beyens of the Embassy staff when he called at the Department on February 29 last, that the Netherlands Government has already drafted legislation which will soon be introduced into the States General amending their present laws in order to exercise better control of shipments of alcohol from the Netherlands which are destined for smuggling into the United States and that you sincerely trust that the Belgian Government will speedily take action along similar lines, and that, in the meantime, everything possible will be done to prevent any further shipments of alcohol from leaving Antwerp which are intended for smuggling into this country. Hull 20 Supra. The Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Belgium/288: Telegram [Document 332] The Chargé in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) to the Secretary of State Brussels , June 22, 1936—6 p.m. [Received June 22—4:05 p.m.] 43. In the course of a conversation this morning at the Belgian Foreign Office Costermans, Chief of the Administrative Division, informed me that the Belgian Government will do everything possible to cooperate with the United States Government in an effort to put a stop to alcohol smuggling. Costermans said that with this object in view the Belgian Government is approaching neighboring countries and especially the Netherlands; that the Belgian Minister at The Hague has been instructed to report regarding the contemplated Netherlands law concerning landing certificates with bond. Costermans stated that he hoped legislation might also be passed in Belgium which would enable zthe Belgian authorities to require landing certificates with bond in the case of alcohol shipments of a suspicious character. Costermans declared that in the meantime the Belgian Ministry of Finance has proposed to the Foreign Office that by administrative action the shipment of alcohol from Belgium might be restricted to alcohol in barrels as this would make trans-shipment more difficult and to large [vessels?] carrying general freight thereby eliminating vessels such as the Hillfern, Reidun and Bodo . Costermans cautioned me that although the Belgian Government is sincere in its intent to take action all plans are still of a preliminary nature. Costermans said that he has had a conversation with Wiley at a luncheon on Friday and had suggested that in view of his excellent documentation Wiley might render assistance by furnishing technical information or possibly by attending a meeting of experts. Costermans added that the request for Wiley’s cooperation would of course be transmitted through the Embassy. 21 Costermans promised to keep the Embassy closely informed. I feel that the response which the Belgian Government is now making is encouraging. Sussdorff 21 In telegram No. 20, June 25, 5 p.m., the Department instructed the Chargé that either he or the Consul General, or both, should attend a conference of experts if invited, “but for the purpose of supplying technical information rather than taking burden of solving problem which is Belgium’s particular responsibility.” (811.114 Belgium/272) The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) 811.114 Belgium/260: Telegram [Document 333] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) Washington , July 2, 1936—1 p.m. 22. Your telegram No. 31, June 3, 5 p.m. and despatch No. 838, May 26, 1936. 22 Following excerpt from letter from Secretary of the Treasury may be communicated in writing to the Belgian authorities: “It is suggested that the Belgian Government should be advised that the laws of the United States authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to impose landing-certificate bond requirements upon any vessel of whatever nationality when necessary to protect the national revenue. This means that should a suspected vessel such as the Hillfern attempt to clear from an American port for a foreign destination, a landing-certificate bond could be imposed, and in this connection it might be added that such a bond would certainly be imposed should this be requested by the authorities of the country against which her activities were supposed to be directed. This action would be possible under American law, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation by its terms relates to instances where such action is necessary to protect the national revenue, on the very proper theory that where any vessel is engaged in the smuggling traffic, her unlawful activities might just as well be directed against the United States as against the foreign country supposed to be her actual destination. “Should a foreign-flag vessel come into an American port to take cargo under circumstances indicating an intent to smuggle such cargo into a foreign country or to permit this to be done by connivance with others, notice would be given to the ship’s master or agent that clearance would be permitted only after posting a substantial bond, this to be forfeited unless a landing certificate, properly authenticated by the customs authorities of the country of declared destination and evidencing lawful entry of such cargo into that country, should be produced in due course. If the operation of the suspected vessel were not legitimate, this would of course have the effect of preventing the loading of the vessel, for the reason that forfeiture of the bond would take all profit out of the proposed venture. The fact that the Government of the United States is known to be in a position to impose, and if necessary will unhesitatingly impose, landing certificate bond requirements, effectually prevents foreign-flag vessels from coming into American ports to take out cargoes destined for smuggling into other countries.” Above quotation embodied in note to Belgian Ambassador here. 23 For your own information see United States Code Title 19, Sections 1622, 1623 and 1624. Instruction follows. 24 Hull 22 Neither printed. 23 Dated July 2, 1936; not printed. 24 No. 379, July 1, 1936; not printed. The Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Belgium/277: Telegram [Document 334] The Chargé in Belgium ( Sussdorff ) to the Secretary of State Brussels , July 7, 1936—5 p.m. [Received July 7—1:15 p.m.] 47. Department’s 20, June 25, 5 p.m., and my 44, June 26, 7 p.m. 25 Costermans has just informed me that the Belgian Ministry of Finance has approved new regulations providing that shipment of alcohol from Belgium shall henceforth be restricted to vessels of regular route and itinerary and minimum tonnage of 3000 tons net and to barrels containing 100 liters which he declares will weigh about 200 kilograms and will be too heavy to transship at sea without the aid of a crane. Costermans stated that a decree will be signed by the Minister of Finance in a few days and that the new regulations will then be put into effect as an administrative measure. Sussdorff 25 Neither printed. Canada Canada [335] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, November 22, 1935—5 p.m. 811.114 Belgium/171a: Telegram [336] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, April 3, 1936. [Received April 7.] 811.114 Reidun/110 [337] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, August 5, 1936. 811.114 Belgium/296a The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 811.114 Belgium/171a: Telegram [Document 335] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) Washington , November 22, 1935—5 p.m. 138. Within recent months the Norwegian steamers Anders, Trajan and Reidun , and the Danish steamer Jan have loaded cargoes of alcohol at Antwerp for delivery on the high seas in vicinity of St. Pierre-Miquelon into smuggling vessels. Efforts to induce the Belgian Government to require bonds for the production of landing certificates to insure delivery at port of destination have so far been unsuccessful. Another shipment of approximately 23,000 cases is expected to leave Antwerp within next few days on Norwegian steamer Bodo. As approximately 25 per cent of this alcohol is smuggled into Canada, the Canadian Government might be willing to join in our representations to the Belgian Government to require landing certificates. If you see no objection, please discuss this matter informally with appropriate Canadian authorities and telegraph reply. Hull The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Reidun/110 [Document 336] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State No. 564 Ottawa , April 3, 1936. [Received April 7.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 210 of January 24, 1936, 26 enclosing duplicate copies of affidavits made by certain United States Coast Guard officers who witnessed the unloading on the high seas on November 10–13, 1935, of the cargo of alcohol carried by the Norwegian steamship Reidim , together with certain other documents tending to show that a part of this cargo was undoubtedly intended for smuggling into Canada. Under date of November 23, 1935, I had already brought to the attention of the Canadian Government the activities of the Norwegian steamers Anders, Trajan and Reidun , and the Danish steamer Jan , through an informal note, my note being based upon the Department’s telegram No. 138 of November 22, 5 p.m. In the Legation’s note No. 140 of February 4, 1936, the further information contained in the Department’s instruction No. 208 27 was also brought to the attention of the Department of External Affairs, and I have now received from this Department a note No. 33, dated April 2, 1936, on this question, a copy of which is enclosed. 26 From a perusal of this note the Department will perceive that the information in question was transmitted to the interested departments of the Canadian Government and is proving of great value to the Canadian Preventive Services, and that the Canadian Government desires to express its appreciation of our Government’s action in this matter. Furthermore, with regard to the suggestion that the Canadian Government should make representations to the Belgian Government supporting those already made by our Government, the note states that “the interested departments of the Canadian Government are of the opinion that it is desirable that the Belgian Government should adopt the course which your Government is urging”, adding that the Canadian Government is prepared to take such action to this end. Before taking this action, however, the Canadian Government desires such information as it may be possible to give with regard to the action already taken by the American Government through diplomatic channels and would, furthermore, like to be able to request that the British diplomatic representatives in Belgium confer with our own representatives in that country before discussing the matter with the Belgian authorities. In conclusion, attention is called to the fact that the Reidun has already been seized by the United States Preventive Services under powers conferred by the Anti-Smuggling legislation of 1935 28 and an opinion is requested as to whether, in view of the seizure, the action suggested should be deferred, pending the decision of the courts in the forfeiture proceedings. Respectfully yours, Norman Armour 26 Not printed. 27 Dated January 22, 1936; not printed. 26 Not printed. 28 Approved August 5, 1935; 49 Stat. 517. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 811.114 Belgium/296a [Document 337] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) No. 481 Washington , August 5, 1936. Sir : With reference to your despatch No. 564 of April 3, 1936, enclosing a copy of a note from the Department of External Affairs of Canada 29 expressing the willingness of the Canadian Government to support representations to the Belgian Government in order to prevent the shipment from Antwerp of cargoes of alcohol intended for smuggling into the United States and probably also into Canada, you are informed that no action was taken in the matter at that time since the Belgian Ambassador at this capital had requested that no further representations be made until he had had an opportunity to present his views on the subject to his Government. However, the return to Antwerp in May, last, of the British steamship Hillfern with a large part of the 700,000 liters of alcohol with which it had cleared on March 28, 1936, again raised the question, in connection with preventing the reshipment of this cargo. As a result, the Belgian Government has issued a decree, effective August 1, 1936, which was published in the Moniteur Beige of July 17, 1936, designed to prevent further illicit shipments. According to a telegram received from the American Chargé d’Affaires ad interim at Brussels, the decree in translation reads as follows: [Here follows text of translation of the Belgian decree.] The Chargé d’Affaires further telegraphed on July 28, 1936, 31 in reply to our inquiry, 32 that while persons who do not wish to avail themselves of the refund of excise duties and consumption taxes need not comply with the regulations, the alcohol could not profitably be sold abroad as the duties and taxes amount to about 60 francs per liter on alcohol of 100 degrees. It was further stated that the regulations cannot be applied to alcohol in transit through Belgium because of the provisions of the Barcelona Convention of December 1, 1921. (This is believed to be the “Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit”, which was signed at Barcelona on April 20, 1921, and which was open for signature until December 1, 1921. 33 The object of this Convention is to make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and transit.) The average weight of a metal cask containing 100 liters of alcohol at 100 degrees is said to be 115 kilograms. The Treasury Department had asked that the barrels contain a minimum of 50 gallons in order to increase the difficulty of transferring them at sea. The Chargé d’Affaires was informed that while the Treasury Department maintains its position that landing certificates are preferable, the action taken by the Belgian Government is much appreciated. Whether it will be successful in preventing further illicit shipments of alcohol from Antwerp remains to be seen. You are requested to inform the appropriate Canadian authorities of the above-mentioned developments and to add that we greatly appreciate their willingness to cooperate with us in this matter. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: William Phillips 29 Enclosure not printed. 31 Telegram No. 60, July 28, 1 p.m.; not printed. 32 Department’s telegram No. 26, July 23, 6 p.m.; not printed. 33 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vii , p. 11. Cuba Cuba [338] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Caffery) Washington, June 13, 1936. 811.114 Cuba/709b The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Caffery) 811.114 Cuba/709b [Document 338] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba ( Caffery ) No. 950 Washington , June 13, 1936. Sir : The receipt is acknowledged of the Embassy’s despatches No. 6406, of June 4, Nos. 6415 and 6420, both dated June 5, and No. 6432 of June 6, 1936, 34 all of which relate to the action taken recently by the Cuban House of Representatives to remove certain liquor export restrictions. Copies of the despatches have been forwarded to the Secretary of the Treasury for his information. The timely action of the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in discussing this matter with Senator Casanova and other appropriate Cuban authorities has been noted and it is hoped that the Embassy will be successful in its efforts to obtain a continuance of the present system which has done so much to prevent the smuggling of Cuban alcohol into the United States without hampering legitimate exports. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true, as the Chargé d’Affaires pointed out to Senator Casanova, that the active cooperation of the authorities of this Government in endeavoring to prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunition from the United States into Cuba is due in large measure to the gratification of the Secretary of the Treasury at the action taken by the Cuban Government in putting an end to the smuggling of Cuban alcohol into this country. With regard to recent action taken by other governments to prevent the use of their territory or facilities in connection with the smuggling traffic, you may inform the appropriate Cuban authorities that the Mexican Government, by a decree effective March 22, 1936, 35 has put an end to the smuggling of alcohol from that country; that the Government of the Netherlands has already drafted legislation which will soon be introduced into the States-General in order to exercise better control over shipments of alcohol from the Netherlands destined for smuggling, and that it is confidently believed that the Belgian Government will take similar action. There is enclosed for your use in this connection a memorandum 36 showing the cooperation which has been received from other governments as a result of which this nefarious traffic is gradually being completely eradicated. The Secretary of the Treasury is greatly concerned at the possibility of the removal of the export restrictions on liquor to Cuba. He has called to my attention the fact that if Cuba is now to remove its restrictions other countries which have recently taken action to prevent the use of their territory or facilities in connection with the smuggling of liquors, are likely to follow suit. Action by Cuba to remove its restrictions causes particular concern because of the existence in Cuba, according to reliable information, of some three million gallons of alcohol. You are requested to discuss this matter with such persons as you deem appropriate, with a view to demonstrating to those persons the advisability of continuing the present system, which has been so helpful in preventing the smuggling of liquor into the United States, and in view of which this Government has shown undue diligence in endeavoring to prevent the smuggling of arms to Cuba. If, despite your representations, the bill should be considered on the floor of the Senate, the Secretary of the Treasury desires that the following amendment be added at the close of Article I: “Provided—That such ports above referred to shall not include ports which are known to be smuggling bases. “Provided further: No exportation, as above mentioned, shall be permitted when the shipper is unable to furnish satisfactory evidence that goods are not to be transshipped at sea or transshipped at port cleared for to foreign ports known to be smuggling bases. Also, that all shipments shall be covered by a bond to produce duly authenticated landing certificate as covered in Paragraph 2, Page 3, of the Convention Between the United States and Cuba to Suppress Smuggling of March 11, 1926. 37 Provided further: That nothing in this law shall be considered as repudiating the aforementioned Convention or any other Convention or Agreement between the United States and Cuba in connection with smuggling.” Please keep the Department fully informed of all developments regarding this matter, to which great importance is attached by both this Department and the Treasury Department. 37a Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: William Phillips 34 None printed. 35 See footnote 49, p. 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] . 36 Not printed. 37 Foreign Relations , 1926, vol. ii , p. 23 . 37a The Embassy acted upon the request of the Department “to discuss this matter with such persons” as it deemed appropriate. Subsequently, despatch No. 6934 of August 5, 1936, reported that “the Senate yesterday evening voted down the bill, which had previously passed the House of Representatives, abolishing existing restrictions upon the export of alcohol from Cuba.” The Senate action was taken “in the face of the great pressure brought by the interested Cuban distillers.” (811.114 Cuba/722) France France [339] The Department of State to the French Embassy Washington , February 20, 1936. 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/330 [340] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) Washington, April 16, 1936—5 p.m. 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/358a: Telegram [341] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) Washington, June 26, 1936. 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/377 [342] The Vice Consul at St. Pierre-Miquelon (Gunsaulus) to the Secretary of State St. Pierre-Miquelon, October 9, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 10—7:55 a.m.] 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/410: Telegram [343] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, November 10, 1936—noon. 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/423: Telegram [344] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, November 13, 1936—3 p.m. [Received November 13—2:10 p.m.] 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/424: Telegram [345] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, November 23, 1936—7 p.m. 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/429: Telegram [346] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 4, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 6:32 p.m.] 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/434: Telegram [347] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, December 16, 1936—7 p.m. 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/434: Telegram [348] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 18, 1936—3 p.m. [Received December 18—11:05 a.m.] 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/443: Telegram The Department of State to the French Embassy 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/330 [Document 339] The Department of State to the French Embassy Memorandum Rumors have reached this Government during the past several weeks that there have been surreptitious shipments of alcohol from the warehouse at St. Pierre-et-Miquelon, in violation of the decree of April 9, 1935, 39 effective May 15, 1935, providing, inter alia , that a bond for the production of a landing certificate must be given on all shipments of alcohol from St. Pierre-et-Miquelon, and that no alcohol shall be exported in vessels of less than 200 tons. Within the past ten days definite confirmation of these rumors has been received. There is enclosed a copy of an affidavit 40 obtained from a former member of the crew of the liquor vessel Anagagana , stating that this vessel obtained a cargo of alcohol at St. Pierre-et-Miquelon on or about December 24, 1935, between the hours of midnight and daylight. There is also attached a paraphrased copy of a telegram 40 received from the American Vice Consul at St. Pierre-et-Miquelon reporting that he personally witnessed what appeared to be the loading of a motor vessel with several hundred cases of alcohol at the breakwater at St. Pierre-et-Miquelon between the hours of two and five o’clock on the morning of February 17, 1936. Furthermore, persons at St. John’s, Newfoundland, having knowledge of the alcohol smuggling traffic, have informed the American Consul General at that place that about half of the approximately 14,000 cases of alcohol which were landed at St. Pierre-Miquelon by the Norwegian steamship Bodo on December 19, 1935, has been surreptitiously removed. It is clearly apparent from the foregoing that the decree of April 9, 1935, has been violated by those engaged in the alcohol-smuggling traffic and it is believed that the French Government will wish to take effective measures to prevent a further disregard of its laws. Washington , February 20, 1936. 39 See telegram No. 344, April 17, 1935, from the Ambassador in France, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 414 . 40 Not printed. 40 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/358a: Telegram [Document 340] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) Washington , April 16, 1936—5 p.m. 123. Following is text of proposed decree forwarded to Minister of Colonies April 5 by authorities at St. Pierre-Miquelon to replace decree of April 9, 1935, now in effect: “Article 1. Decree of April 18, 1922, derogating decree of July 8, 1919, concerning whiskies and gins, and decree of July 29, 1926, derogating decree of July 8, 1919, concerning trois-six alcohol, are abrogated. Article 2. Decree of April 9, 1935, remains in force only for exportations of foreign alcohols in storage at St. Pierre-Miquelon. Article 3. A decree countersigned by the Minister of Colonies will regulate, should such a case arise, the installation of distilleries of alcohol in St. Pierre-Miquelon. Article 4. All provisions to the contrary are abrogated.” Above decree would prohibit importation foreign alcohols and whiskies and permit importation and exportation of all French alcoholic products. Unless you perceive objection, please discuss matter informally with French authorities and state that we greatly appreciate the helpful cooperation which the French Government has given in the matter of preventing the use of St. Pierre-Miquelon as a smuggling base, that we hope it will be continued and that we do not believe they would wish to see the unscrupulous persons engaged in the smuggling traffic once more obtain a foothold at St. Pierre. In order to avoid such a contingency it would seem to be desirable to retain certain provisions of the present decree for all exports, namely, article 1, prohibiting clearance for the high seas, article 2, prohibiting clearance in vessels under 200 tons, and article 6, regarding liquors for ships’ stores. It would seem to be especially necessary, in order to prevent smuggling, that the landing certificate bond continue to be required for all shipments of alcohol from St. Pierre, regardless of its origin. While the establishment of industries at St. Pierre-Miquelon is a domestic matter, the establishment of a distillery to manufacture alcohol would obviously be for the purpose of exporting it, as there is practically no demand at St. Pierre for this product. Any alcohol manufactured would therefore appear to be very likely intended for smuggling into the United States, where the illicit product made therefrom would compete with legitimate domestic and foreign liquors, including those of France. The continued cooperation of the French Government in preventing the use of its territory so close to the shores of this country from again being used as a base for smuggling into the United States, would be greatly appreciated. Telegraph reply for Treasury. Hull The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/377 [Document 341] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) No. 1384 Washington , June 26, 1936. Sir : There is enclosed a copy of a recent note 41 from the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the French Republic at this Capital, stating that the Minister of the Colonies has called the attention of the Administrator of the Islands of St. Pierre-et-Miquelon to the matter of the smuggling of alcohol from the Colony and has recommended the taking of the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of such violations. A copy of our reply to this note is likewise enclosed, as well as copies of a despatch, a report and a telegram from the American Vice Consul at St. Pierre-et-Miquelon on the same subject. 42 It will be observed that the Administrator states that he is doing everything he can with the means at his disposal to prevent the smuggling of alcohol out of St. Pierre and that he would welcome “strong protestations” by our Embassy to his Government. In this connection you are requested, unless you perceive objection, to call at the Foreign Office and to express appreciation for the information contained in the recent note from the Chargé d’Affaires referred to above, but add that it appears that, while the Administrator is endeavoring to the best of his ability to carry out his duties with regard to preventing the smuggling of alcohol from the Colony, he is apparently unable to cope with the situation with the means at his disposal. You may say that according to the information we have received from our Vice Consul at St. Pierre, another gendarme has returned to France, leaving only three and the Commandant to take care of patrolling the water front in addition to their other duties; that since the loading of the vessel from the trucks at the breakwater opposite the Custom House pier, which the Vice Consul personally observed on the night of June 1–2, 1936, and the other incidents mentioned in our note of June 13, 1936, to the French Embassy, at least two other vessels are strongly suspected of having departed with cargoes of alcohol, namely, the H. G. McLean , which left St. Pierre at midnight June 4–5 in a fog, traveling without lights and apparently heavily loaded, and the Casanova , which also appeared to be heavily loaded as it left St. Pierre in a fog on June 10. Furthermore, the information contained in the Vice Consul’s telegram dated June 20, to the effect that he plainly heard and saw an auxiliary schooner enter and leave the harbor between two and three o’clock on the morning of June 20, 1936, presumably after loading a cargo of alcohol, should also be brought to the attention of the French authorities. It would appear, therefore, that additional measures are required to stop the smuggling of alcohol from St. Pierre-Miquelon. We believe that the Administrator of the Colony is doing the best he can with the means at his disposal but it seems to be impossible for him to combat the smuggling traffic without further assistance. You should add that as this Government is doing its utmost to stamp out the illicit alcohol traffic, it naturally views with concern the revival of alcohol smuggling from St. Pierre-et-Miquelon and sincerely hopes that the French Government will find it possible to take whatever steps may be necessary to assist the Administrator in preventing these illicit activities. The Secretary of the Treasury, as you undoubtedly know, is very much concerned over the problem of the smuggling of alcohol and is doing everything possible to break up this illicit traffic. You are, therefore, requested to endeavor to impress upon the appropriate French authorities the seriousness with which this Government views the situation which seems to be developing at St. Pierre-et-Miquelon. The result of your representations will be awaited with interest. 43 Very truly yours, William Phillips 41 Dated May 28, 1936; not printed. 42 None printed. 43 In his despatch No. 2928, July 27, 1936, the Ambassador informed the Department as follows: “The Embassy has been advised by the Foreign Office that the Ministry of Colonies, appreciating the seriousness with which the Government of the United States views this question, has augmented the customs forces in the Islands and has also inaugurated a night patrol service.” (811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/397) The Vice Consul at St. Pierre-Miquelon (Gunsaulus) to the Secretary of State 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/410: Telegram [Document 342] The Vice Consul at St. Pierre-Miquelon ( Gunsaulus ) to the Secretary of State St. Pierre-Miquelon , October 9, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 10—7:55 a.m.] Referring to my despatch No. 100 [ 99 ], dated October 2nd, 44 the following proposed decree was mailed October 3, to the Minister of Colonies for approval or rejection: “The decree of April 9, 1935, regulating the exportation of alcohol from the Island of St. Pierre-Miquelon is abrogated, except insofar as it concerns the exportation of foreign alcohols now in warehouses at St. Pierre-Miquelon.” Accompanying this proposed decree was a resolution approved by the Administrative Council amending the local customs laws to prohibit the importation into the territory of all foreign alcohols. The Administrator explained that changes in the local customs laws must be approved by a resolution of the Council of Administration and that such a resolution automatically becomes decree law 3 months after it is published in the Official Journal of the French Republic provided no action is taken on the resolution within the 3-month period. He added that disapproval of or negative action on such resolutions was unusual. He further stated he had requested that action upon the proposed decree and resolution be simultaneous if they are approved by the French Government. If the above-mentioned resolution and decree are approved it is the understanding of this officer that the importation of all foreign alcohols into the territory would be prohibited; that the provisions of the decree of April 9, 1935, would be enforced only insofar as the exportation of foreign alcohols now in storage are concerned; and that unrestricted exportations of all French alcohols would be permitted in all types of vessels. Despatch and copies of resolution and decree follow by the next mail. 45 Bill Customs. Gunsaulus 44 Not printed. 45 Despatch No. 101, October 14, 1936; not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/423: Telegram [Document 343] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , November 10, 1936—noon. 453. Department’s telegram No. 123, April 16, 5 p.m., and Instruction October 28, 1936. 46 Vice Consul St. Pierre, replying Department’s request for his views as to desirability of suggesting that provision be included in new decree prohibiting or controlling operation of distillery, similar to provision in earlier proposed decree, states Minister of Colonies is said to have advised against including such provision in decree, that Administrator assured him he would not grant permission to operate distillery without instructions from French Government. Vice Consul suggests, however, that verbal assurance might be obtained from French Government that no distillery be permitted at St. Pierre. Vice Consul also states that while he believes insistence on landing certificate for French spirits would greatly antagonize people, he suggests that some assurance be obtained that no exportation of French alcohol known as “trois-six” will be permitted from St. Pierre-Miquelon. Please discuss matter with appropriate authorities and endeavor to obtain assurances mentioned. Telegraph reply for Treasury, including present status of matter. Moore 46 Latter not printed. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/424: Telegram [Document 344] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , November 13, 1936—3 p.m. [Received November 13—2:10 p.m.] 1105. Department’s telegram No. 453, November 10 noon. Foreign Office states that it has never heard of the question of operating a distillery in St. Pierre but that when the discussion of the proposed decree and the resolution takes place between the various ministries it will see to it that some provision is taken to prevent such a thing. Without regard to the exportation of French alcohol known as “trois-six” the Foreign Office states that if the resolution as now drafted is approved the importation of trois-six into St. Pierre will be prohibited since it is a “foreign alcohol.” The Foreign Office has promised to inform the Embassy when the decree and the resolution come up for discussion. Please inform Treasury. Bullitt The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/429: Telegram [Document 345] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , November 23, 1936—7 p.m. 475. Your No. 1105, November 13, 3 p.m. Treasury Department requests that French Government be asked to give favorable consideration to following suggestions: 1. That importation and exportation of all alcohol, French or foreign, be prohibited at St. Pierre-Miquelon, or, if this is impossible, that exportation be in conformity with decree of April 9, 1935, at present in effect. 2. That proposed decree be amended to apply to all alcohol now in warehouses at St. Pierre to guard against possibility that some of the stock might contain or develop alcohol of French manufacture. Unless you perceive objection, you are requested to present these suggestions to French Government with the hope that they will receive favorable consideration. It would also be appreciated if the oral assurances that measures will be taken to prevent operation of distillery at St. Pierre could be incorporated in decree. Please inquire whether Belgian or other foreign alcohol shipped from a French port, either by immediate transshipment or through purchase by someone in France and subsequent exportation, would be regarded as French product and therefore eligible for unrestricted importation and exportation at St. Pierre. Telegraph reply for Treasury. Moore The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/434: Telegram [Document 346] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 4, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 6:32 p.m.] 1194. Department’s telegram No. 475, November 23, 7 p.m. We have been informed by the Foreign Office that it intends to suggest to the Ministry of Colonies that it add to the decree proposed by the Administration of St. Pierre the following points: (1) The importation of French alcohols with the exception of “aperitifs, eaux-de-vie et spiritueux beneficiant d’une appellation d’origine ou constituant des pupiluits [ sic ] de ‘marque’” shall be controlled by a quota strictly based upon the amount of local consumption with a view to eliminating fraud; (2) the “régime de la caution” with regard to the exportation of alcohol from St. Pierre will be maintained in force until the present stock in St. Pierre-Miquelon is exhausted; (3) the manufacture of “alcool de traite” will be prohibited. We suggested to the Foreign Office that in view of the fact that in principle it wished to prohibit the exportation of alcohol from St. Pierre there should be in the proposed decree a specific provision to that effect. The Foreign Office informed us that it would suggest this matter to the Ministry of Colonies but that it doubted that the latter would agree thereto. The Foreign Office likewise informed us that its suggestion with regard to placing a quota on the importation into St. Pierre of French alcohol would probably be refused by the Ministry of Colonies which would likely propose that instead there be placed an import tax of 15 francs per litre amounting to the same as the export tax at present in force in order that the colonies might thereby benefit by the increased revenue. We have informed the Foreign Minister that we are reporting the foregoing to the State Department in order to ascertain the Department’s views thereon. Bullitt The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/434: Telegram [Document 347] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , December 16, 1936—7 p.m. 530. Your No. 1194, December 4, 5 p.m. The suggestions made by the Foreign Office are presumably in substitution for those we suggested in our telegram No. 475 of November 23, 7 p.m. We would, of course, greatly prefer to see the French Government prohibit the exportation of all alcohols from St. Pierre-Miquelon with the exception of those described in point (1) of your telegram or, if this is impossible, that the exportation thereof be in accordance with the provisions of the decree of April 9, 1935. If this also cannot be achieved, it is believed that the import tax of 15 francs per liter would be preferable to the imposition of a quota. With regard to point (2), please endeavor to have the word “foreign” omitted from the proposed decree in order that it may apply to all alcohol now in storage at St. Pierre-Miquelon. With reference to point (3) it is assumed that the term “alcool de traite” means all alcohol fit for human consumption. Please confirm this understanding. Moore The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 811.114 St. Pierre-Miquelon/443: Telegram [Document 348] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 18, 1936—3 p.m. [Received December 18—11:05 a.m.] 1275. Department’s telegram No. 530 of December 16, 7 p.m. Foreign Office states that it believes there will be no difficulty in having the word “foreign” omitted from the proposed decree. The Foreign Office is obtaining from the appropriate government office the exact definition of the term “alcool de traite”. The Embassy is advised by the Foreign Office that no reply has been received from the Ministry of Colonies with regard to its proposals and that no definite action will be taken until after consultation by the two Ministries. It says that it is practically certain that nothing will be definitely done before about the middle or end of January and in the meantime the decree of April 9, 1935, remains in force. Bullitt Mexico Mexico [349] The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State Mexico, January 24, 1936. [Received January 29.] 811.114 Mexico/407 [350] The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State Mexico, February 29, 1936—noon. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 811.114 Mexico/411: Telegram The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Mexico/407 [Document 349] The Ambassador in Mexico ( Daniels ) to the Secretary of State No. 3238 Mexico , January 24, 1936. [Received January 29.] Sir : With reference to the Embassy’s despatch No. 3146 of December 23, 1935 48 on the above mentioned subject, to previous correspondence regarding this matter, and to the Department’s strictly confidential instruction No. 973 of January 6, 1936, 48 I have the honor to report to the Department that I had a conversation with Licenciado Eduardo Suárez, Minister of Hacienda, this morning. Licenciado Suárez informed me that he had a decree on his desk which provides that shipments of alcohol out of Mexico must carry a bond for the production of a landing certificate. He stated that the decree would be presented to the President on Monday, January 27, and would be promulgated in the Diario Oficial shortly thereafter. It is believed that this action will be of material assistance in curbing the exportation to the United States of illegal liquor shipments and will act as a deterrent in the use of Mexican territory for this purpose. Respectfully yours, Josephus Daniels 48 Not printed. 48 Not printed. The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Mexico/411: Telegram [Document 350] The Ambassador in Mexico ( Daniels ) to the Secretary of State Mexico , February 29, 1936—noon. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 40. Referring to the Embassy’s despatch No. 3238, President today signed decree designed to prevent alcohol smuggling which will appear in Diario Oficial on Monday. 49 Please notify the Treasury Department. Daniels 49 The Mexican decree was promulgated on March 9 and published in the Diario Oficial of March 12, entering into effect on March 22. Netherlands Netherlands [351] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, April 18, 1936. [Received May 1.] 811.114 Netherlanda/60 [352] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) Washington, May 21, 1936—noon. 811.114 Netherlands/60: Telegram [353] The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State The Hague, May 22, 1936—noon. [Received May 22—9:40 a.m.] 811.114 Netherlands/62: Telegram [354] The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 3, 1936—4 p.m. [Received August 4—10:30 a.m.] 811.114 Netherlands/65: Telegram (part air) The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Netherlanda/60 [Document 351] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State No. 403 The Hague , April 18, 1936. [Received May 1.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Legation’s despatch No. 333, of December 6, 1935, 50 concerning the desire of the Treasury Department to obtain more effective cooperation from the Netherland authorities in the detection of fraudulent alcohol shipments from Dutch ports, and in connection therewith, the visit of Commander B. M. Thompson, of the Treasury Department, to The Hague. A reply to the Legation’s official note on this subject has just been received, and a copy and translation are enclosed herewith. The Department will observe that the Netherland Government has decided to adopt the method which I suggested informally in December to Mr. Beucker Andreae, head of the Judicial Department of the Foreign Office. This method seemed to Commander Thompson to be the simplest and easiest although new legislation would be required. The port authorities will presumably be able to use the powers granted under this new legislation to interfere with suspected shipments but will not be called upon to apply the regulations to all shipments so that free traffic of the port of Rotterdam will not be seriously interfered with. This was their chief objection to all plans of cooperation. I am enclosing herewith a note 51 which I at once sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs, de Graeff, assuring him of our appreciation of the decision of the Netherland Government. Their agreement to this request must be recognized as unusual and contains, I think, implications of friendliness and good will which should not be lost sight of. I will call on him in person on Monday. Respectfully yours, Warden McK. Wilson [Enclosure—Translation] The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs ( De Graeff ) to the American Chargé ( Wilson ) No. 12159 The Hague , April 16, 1936. Mr. Chargé d’Affaires : Referring to your Note No. 214, of December 9, 1935, relative to the smuggling of alcohol into the United States, I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Finance has the intention to submit shortly to the States General a supplementary draft amending the law in force in the Netherlands with regard to alcohol licenses, in order better to control the fraudulent importation into the United States of alcohol originating from the Netherlands. This draft is now in course of preparation at the Ministry of Finance. I avail myself [etc.] De Graeff 50 Not printed. 51 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) 811.114 Netherlands/60: Telegram [Document 352] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) Washington , May 21, 1936—noon. 9. Legation’s despatch No. 403 of April 18. Please submit immediate telegraphic report on present status of Government’s proposed legislation to prevent fraudulent exportation to the United States of alcohol from the Netherlands. Do you perceive any objection to our notifying Belgian Government that such legislation is contemplated as a means of persuading the latter to do likewise? Hull The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Netherlands/62: Telegram [Document 353] The Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , May 22, 1936—noon. [Received May 22—9:40 a.m.] 20. Department’s rush telegram No. 9, May 21, noon. Following information has been obtained from the Foreign Office: 1. Draft of proposed legislation has been in the Ministry of Justice. 2. Draft must be approved by Chief of Division in the Ministry, Minister of Justice, by the Cabinet and by the Council of State before introduction into the second Chamber. Foreign Office stated “It may take about 6 weeks to complete these steps in the case of legislation regarding which there is no hurry”. 3. Foreign Office has no objection to our notifying Belgian Government that such legislation is contemplated. Emmet The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Netherlands/65: Telegram (part air) [Document 354] The Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , August 3, 1936—4 p.m. [Received August 4—10:30 a.m.] 26. Department’s telegram No. 20, August 1, 2 p.m. 52 Minister of Foreign Affairs informs me today that bill to prevent fraudulent exportation of alcohol has been prepared at the Treasury and awaits approval of the Minister of Finance who is absent on leave till the end of August. Bill expected to receive prompt approval when introduced in September. 53 I feel everything is proceeding normally. Emmet 52 Not printed. 53 The proposed project of law was introduced on December 8, 1936, into the lower house of the States General, where a committee report on the bill was submitted on February 18, 1937. The bill appears to have been still under consideration in May 1940 when the Netherlands Government, constrained by force majeure , was temporarily removed to London. Norway Norway [355] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, January 24, 1936. [Received February 15.] 811.114 Reidun/70 [356] The Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State Washington, March 18, 1936. 811.114 Reidun/82 [357] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) Washington, March 26, 1936—6 p.m. 811.114 Reidun/101: Telegram [358] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, April 8, 1936—11 a.m. [Received April 9—4:45 p.m.] 811.114 Reidun/112: Telegram (part air) [359] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) Washington, April 15, 1936—6 p.m. 811.114 Reidun/114: Telegram [360] The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) Washington, April 23, 1936. 811.114 Reidun/119 [361] The Assistant Secretary of State (Moore) to the Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) Washington, April 27, 1936. 811.114 Reidun/122½ [362] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) Washington, May 7, 1936. 811.114 Reidun/138 [363] The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State Oslo, May 27, 1936. [Received June 9.] 811.114 Reidun/154 [364] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Norway (Patterson) Washington, June 12, 1936—4 p.m. 811.114 Reidun/155: Telegram [365] The Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State Washington, June 13, 1936. 811.114 Norway/32 [366] The Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State Washington, June 17, 1936. 811.114 Reidun/160 [367] The Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) to the Norwegian Chargé (Galbe) Washington, June 23, 1936. 811.114 Norway/35 The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Reidun/70 [Document 355] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State No. 93 Oslo , January 24, 1936. [Received February 15.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 16, November 12, 1935, 4 p.m., 54 in regard, inter alia , to the probability that the Norwegian steamship Reidun , then engaged in unloading alcohol on the high seas, might be violating Norwegian law concerning the participation of this country’s vessels in smuggling operations directed against a foreign country. While, as the Department has since been informed, 55 I promptly brought this intelligence to the attention of the Foreign Office and have received assurances that the appropriate Norwegian authorities (the Ministry of Justice, in particular) were engaged in investigating the case, no decision in the matter has yet been reached. I have today, however, had a pertinent conversation of possible interest to the Department with Mr. Arne Rygh, an Oslo attorney who called in the Legation, by appointment, to discuss a problem confronting the Reidun.… … While it was possible that the Reidun’s captain, who had permitted discharge of cargo on the high seas, might be held technically to have violated Norwegian law, it was doubtful if any Norwegian court would penalize him since the charter party provided for off-shore unloading (admittedly a vague term capable of a variety of interpretations) while, lacking a radio, the Reidun could not call for instructions when approached with a request, or demand, for discharge of cargo on the high seas. The cargo had actually been discharged off Newfoundland. At the same time, the Norwegian judicial authorities were continuing their investigation. It was, however, not for the purpose of supplying the above information that Mr. Rygh had called in the Legation, but in order to request the opinion of its officers concerning the possibility of the Reidun’s being seized by the United States authorities if the vessel, which had admittedly discharged alcohol at sea, should enter American territorial waters. He added that the vessel was at present in the West Indies, but that its owners contemplated sending it, under time charter, to United States ports. In reply to Mr. Rygh’s inquiry, I stated that I could give no assurances of the character desired, although I assumed that from information supplied the Legation in parallel cases, discharge of cargo at sea was of itself not sufficient to affect the vessel, although very possibly if, by the manifest, cargo were destined for United States ports and failed to be delivered there, some penalty could be imposed. I did not, however, encourage him to think that a vessel such as the Reidun could on one occasion form a link in a chain of smuggling activities and then expect the past to be completely overlooked by the American authorities. Respectfully yours, A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 54 Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 436 . 55 See telegram No. 25, November 13, 1935, 2 p.m., from the Minister in Norway, ibid. , p. 437 . The Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Reidun/82 [Document 356] The Norwegian Minister ( Morgenstierne ) to the Secretary of State Washington , March 18, 1936. Sir : I have the honor to refer to the interview which I had with the Assistant Secretary of State, Honorable Wilbur Carr, on the 16th instant, at which occasion Mr. William R. Vallance of the State Department was also present, with regard to the detention by the Customs authorities in New York City of the Norwegian S/S Reidun. According to information submitted to the Legation by the Norwegian Consulate General in New York the Reidun which was to have sailed from New York on Saturday the 14th instant, was refused clearing and is still being held in New York. The Norwegian Consul General was told Saturday afternoon at the Custom House where Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Stephen B. Gibbons, and several customs officers were present, that the Reidun was being held for a double reason, viz. for questioning of the officers and crew in connection with the death of the Reidun’s captain, during the night between Wednesday March 11th and Thursday March 12th due to suffocation from smoke caused by a fire in the captain’s cabin, as well as for alleged unloading in November 1935 of liquor at St. Pierre-Miquelon, in waters adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States. The Consul General immediately took the matter up verbally with the Collector of Customs, New York, and in a letter to him dated March 14, 1936, protested against the detention of the Reidun on the ground that such detention, under the existing treaties between Norway and the United States, was not justified by the circumstances of the case. As to the reported contention that the Reidun is being held for questioning of the officers and crew in connection with the Captain’s death, I venture to point out that a maritime hearing in accordance with Norwegian law was held on board on March 13, 1936, and that the death of the Captain was found to be due to suffocation from smoke emanating from a fire in his cabin. The Police Report dated March 12th 1936, and signed by Lieutenant Cornelius Sheehan of the 27th Precinct, explicitly cites the same cause of death. I beg to enclose copy of said report. 56 There seems to be no reason to suspect that a crime has been committed, and the Consulate General is not aware that any investigation which may have been conducted by the United States authorities has revealed any indication of such having been the case. According to Article XXII of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between Norway and the United States of America of June 5th, 1928, 57 a consular officer shall have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to private vessels of his country except when an act has been committed onboard which constitutes a crime according to the laws of the State to which such consular officer has been appointed. The Consulate General informs the Legation that a hearing was held on board the Reidun by American authorities in the evening of March 13th, but that the Consulate General was not informed beforehand that such hearing was going to take place and thus had no opportunity to be represented at a hearing of such importance to Norwegian citizens and interests. In this connection I beg to call attention to Article XXII, last paragraph, of the above-mentioned Treaty. As regards the reported contention that the Reidun is being held for alleged unloading of cargo consisting of liquor in waters adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States you will recall that the activities of the Reidun in November last year have been the subject of correspondence between the Department of State and this Legation as well as between the Legation of the United States of America in Oslo and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May I be permitted in this connection to recall the cooperation which the Norwegian Government for a number of years have been giving the American Government with regard to the prevention of smuggling activities outside the coast of the United States. On the occasion referred to the alleged unloading of cargo from the Reidun took place near St. Pierre-Miquelon and far beyond any territorial waters of the United States of America and at a far greater distance from the American coast than the distance stipulated in Article II, section 3 of the Convention between Norway and the United States regarding Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors of May 24, 1924. 58 It is my understanding that it has not been maintained by the Department of State that the alleged activities of the Reidun on the occasion referred to constituted any breach of American law or Norwegian-American treaty stipulations. At the instance of the Norwegian Government the question of the Reidun’s alleged participation in smuggling activities has been carefully investigated by the Public Prosecution of Norway and it has been established that the owners of the Reidun acted in absolutely good faith having timechartered the ship with the explicit reservation that it should be employed in lawful trade only. My Government maintain that in their opinion neither the said Convention between Norway and the United States nor general principles of international law can justify the detention of the Reidun on account of its previous alleged activities as referred to. Referring to the above and acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor, therefore, to voice their most earnest objection to the detention of the Reidun and to state that the Norwegian Government shall feel constrained to reserve their rights to claim compensation for any loss or damage of whatever kind to the Reidun and its owners, captain, officers, crew and others which may result from the detention of the ship in New York. Accept [etc.] W. Morgenstierne 56 Not printed. 57 Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. iii , p. 637 . 58 Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. i , p. 177 . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) 811.114 Reidun/101: Telegram [Document 357] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) Washington , March 26, 1936—6 p.m. 8. Steamship Reidun seized March 17 under Section 586 Tariff Act and 205 Anti-Smuggling Act. Four officers arrested same day charged with conspiracy under Section 88 Title 18 United States Code in connection with seizure smuggling vessel Pronto off South Carolina. Part of Reidun cargo found on Pronto and part on wharf at Keansburg, New Jersey. The above is for your information as Norwegian Minister is making active representations in the case. Hull The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Reidun/112: Telegram (part air) [Document 358] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State Oslo , April 8, 1936—11 a.m. [Received April 9—4:45 p.m.] 26. Department’s telegram No. 8, March 26, 6 p.m. and Legation despatch No. 148, March 28 59 regarding seizure of steamship Reidun. Acting Foreign Minister Aubert in exposition 1 hour’s duration yesterday reiterated with emphasis his remarks of March 25 concerning belief in illegal nature of action of the American authorities. He considered that Norwegian rights under treaty may have been infringed and that in a conflict between domestic law and international treaty, the Department of State should uphold treaty’s primacy against local authorities and insist that steamship Reidun and officers should be treated as property and subjects of a treaty nation. Despatch will be forwarded. 60 Biddle 59 Latter not printed. 60 No. 156, April 8: not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) 811.114 Reidun/114: Telegram [Document 359] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) Washington , April 15, 1936—6 p.m. 14. Your April 8, 11 a.m. Treaty referred to is presumably liquor treaty signed May 24, 1924. This treaty has no application to Reidun case since vessel came voluntarily into our jurisdiction and thereby the ship itself and those on board by their own act became subject to our laws. The seizure of the vessel and the indictment and arrest of the officers were normal result of their previous conduct. The full protection of the law and recourse to our courts is open to them if they wish to avail themselves thereof, and suit to recover vessel instituted at New York. See instruction No. 43, March 31, 1936. 61 Hull 61 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) 811.114 Reidun/119 [Document 360] The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Minister ( Morgenstierne ) Washington , April 23, 1936. Sir : I have the honor to refer to your two notes of March 18, 1936, 62 and my reply of March 26, 1936, 61 relative to the detention and subsequent seizure of the Norwegian steamer Reidun and the arrest of certain officers of the vessel, and to inform you of the receipt of a further communication from the appropriate authorities of this Government stating that the seizure of the Reidun and the arrest of the four officers were based on the following facts and circumstances: The Reidun left Antwerp October 23, 1935, with a cargo of approximately 20,000 cases of alcohol in addition to a quantity of whiskey and other cargo. According to available evidence, Per Naevestad, the late master of the Reidum , received instructions prior to the vessel’s departure from Antwerp that transshipment of the alcohol cargo should be made on the high seas near St. Pierre-Miquelon, and that certain precautions should be taken to avoid incurring fines in connection with such discharge which might accrue at ports of subsequent arrival. It is therefore impossible to avoid the belief that the late master and other responsible officers of the Reidun , prior to their departure from Antwerp, were actually and fully aware that the contemplated voyage was an employment of the vessel in the smuggling traffic. Following its departure from Antwerp, the Reidun proceeded to a position off the coast of North America where, between November 10 and 13, 1936, it discharged a large part of its alcohol cargo under the observation of vessels of the United States Coast Guard into certain British liquor vessels which have long been engaged in smuggling liquor and alcohol into the United States in violation of the revenue laws of this country. After apparently hovering in the vicinity for several days longer, the Reidun finally arrived at St. Pierre-Miquelon on November 20, 1935, and was fined 500 francs for failure to produce a bill of lading covering approximately 4,509 cases of alcohol which were still on board. The presence of this alcohol was noted by the Customs authorities at St. Pierre-Miquelon on the vessel’s clearance papers outward for Montreal, Canada. The Reidun left the port of St. Pierre on November 22, 1935, and returned there on November 26, 1935, apparently without having proceeded to Montreal. During the period between November 22 and 26, 1935, the Reidun presumably discharged a further quantity of about 2,912 cases of alcohol into smuggling vessels, as it had on board, on the occasion of its second arrival, approximately 1,597 cases of alcohol. It is understood that the Reidun was again fined 500 francs by the authorities at St. Pierre-Miquelon for failure to produce a bill of lading covering this alcohol. On November 27, 1935, the Reidun again left St. Pierre and proceeded to St. John’s, Newfoundland, and thence to Montreal, Canada, where it arrived on December 5, 1935. From the enclosures transmitted with my note of January 24, 1936, 63 you will observe that the late master of the Reidun made a statement under oath at Montreal in the course of which he declared that two or three of the masters of the contact vessels into which the alcohol was transferred informed him that their cargoes were destined to Florida. The appropriate authorities of this Government state that there is convincing evidence that a substantial part of the Reidun’s alcohol cargo has been landed in the United States in pursuance of the plan and conspiracy of which the unloading of the alcohol from the Reidun was a part. They further state that the facts available definitely show that the late master and other responsible officers of the Reidun were fully cognizant of the fact that the vessel was being intentionally utilized as an instrument in the execution of a criminal conspiracy to defraud the United States of its lawful revenue. The alcohol cargo unloaded by the Reidun represents a loss to the revenue of the United States which may amount approximately to $1,572,778. Furthermore, the master also stated, in the affidavit mentioned above, that the owners of the Reidun were aware that the vessel was carrying a cargo of alcohol. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that they were not also aware of the questionable nature of the enterprise. When the Reidun subsequently voluntarily entered a port of the United States on March 10, 1936, the vessel itself and its officers thereby became subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this country. In the opinion of this Government the treaty signed May 24, 1924, between the United States and Norway, entitled “Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors”, has no direct application to the present case. With respect to the statements contained in your second note of March 18, 1936, mentioned above, that the Norwegian Consul General at New York was not informed of the arrest of the four officers of the Reidun until the following morning, and that the arrested men had not previously been given an opportunity to communicate with their Consul General or with a lawyer, I am informed that the men were arrested and taken to the Poplar Street Police Station in Brooklyn, New York, about 7 p.m. on March 17, 1936, that the United States Marshal instructed the authorities to allow the prisoners to communicate with anyone whom they might wish to consult, and that at about 10 a.m. of the following day, March 18, the Deputy United States Marshal himself telephoned to the Norwegian Consulate General in New York. I am further informed that the arrested men were treated with consideration, were not held incommunicado, and were in fact accorded more privileges than our own nationals, arrested in this country on similar charges, receive. Norwegian vessels participated actively in the smuggling of liquor into the United States in the early part of the period during which the prohibition laws were in effect in the United States and on November 25, 1924, a note 65 giving a list of ten such vessels was sent to your Legation by Mr. Hughes, then Secretary of State. This Government greatly appreciated, therefore, the enactment by the Norwegian Government of the law of June 25, 1926, 66 making it an offense for Norwegian vessels to be used in the smuggling of contraband into foreign countries. As a result of this law, the use of Norwegian vessels in connection with this traffic practically ceased. Shortly thereafter the islands of St. Pierre-et-Miquelon became an important base from which liquor and alcohol were smuggled into the United States by means of small hovering craft. However, on April 9, 1935, the French Government issued a decree, effective May 15, 1935, which made it virtually impossible for those engaged in the smuggling traffic to continue their operations from St. Pierre-Miquelon. 67 They were therefore forced to find other means of carrying on their nefarious business and they adopted the scheme of having alcohol cargoes brought over from Europe and discharged on the high seas directly into smuggling vessels. Out of five steamships employed for this purpose within a period of seven months after the decree went into effect, four were Norwegian, as follows: Anders , cleared Antwerp May 11, 1935. Discharged a cargo of approximately 5,085 cases of alcohol in the vicinity of St. Pierre-Miquelon on May 30–31, 1935, into smuggling vessels. Trajan , cleared Antwerp July 25, 1935. Discharged a cargo of approximately 14,838 cases of alcohol in the vicinity of St. Pierre-Miquelon on August 18–22, 1935, into smuggling vessels. Reidun , cleared Antwerp Octooer 23, 1935. Discharged a cargo of approximately 20,000 cases of alcohol off Newfoundland November 10–13, 1935, into smuggling vessels. Bodo , cleared Antwerp December 1, 1935 Master refused to discharge a cargo of approximately 14,000 cases of alcohol on the high seas but carried it to its declared destination. You will recall that I wrote you on November 4, 1935, 68 regarding the activities of the steamships Anders, Trajan and Reidun and that on January 24, 1936, I sent you photographs showing certain well known smuggling vessels alongside the Reidun , together with affidavits and other documents indicating the participation of the Reidun in the alcohol-smuggling traffic. Notes were also addressed to the Norwegian Government by the American Minister at Oslo regarding these vessels, beginning with a communication dated July 18, 1935, 69 with a request that their activities be investigated as they appeared to involve a violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the above-mentioned law of June 25, 1926, reading in translation as follows: “Section 1. “The shipowner or agent who uses a Norwegian ship in smuggling into a foreign country shall be punished by a fine. “A shipowner or agent who rents a Norwegian ship or allows it to convey freight when he knows or should know that the charterer or shipper intends to use it for smuggling into a foreign country, shall be punished in the same way. “Section 2. “Under this law it will be deemed smuggling when a ship’s cargo is discharged at sea outside the customs limits of another country under such circumstances that there is overwhelming evidence that the cargo was to be smuggled in.” I invite your particular attention to Section 2 of this law, which seemed to the American Government to apply to the activities of the three Norwegian vessels mentioned above. However, the American Minister at Oslo was informed in a note dated March 19, 1936, 70 that the appropriate Norwegian authorities had reached the conclusion, after an investigation, that those responsible for the operation of these vessels had not violated this law. Had the Norwegian Government found it possible to take prompt action in the case of the Anders , the first of the steamers to engage recently in this traffic, it is probable that the other vessels would not have undertaken similar voyages. As the cases involving the Reidun and the four officers of the vessel are now pending in the courts of the United States, I am confident that you will understand that there is no action which the executive authorities of this Government can take in this matter. Accept [etc.] For the Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore 62 Second note not printed. 61 Not printed. 63 Not printed. 65 Not printed. 66 For translation of text, see despatch No. 300, July 5, 1935, from the Minister in Norway, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 422 . 67 See telegram No. 344, April 17, 1935, noon, from the Ambassador in France, ibid. , p. 414 . 68 Note not printed. 69 See telegram No. 25, November 13, 1935, 2 p.m., from the Minister in Norway, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , p. 437 . 70 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 144, March 21; not printed. The Assistant Secretary of State (Moore) to the Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) 811.114 Reidun/122½ [Document 361] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Moore ) to the Norwegian Minister ( Morgenstierne ) Washington , April 27, 1936. My Dear Mr. Minister : In connection with our note to you of April 23, 1936, in regard to the Norwegian steamer Reidun , I wish to make certain observations in regard to the subject matter of our note which may be of interest to your Government. You will have observed that in our note, after citing supporting evidence for the assertion, we state that it is impossible to avoid the belief that the late master and other responsible officers of the Reidun , as well as the owners of the vessel, were aware that the contemplated voyage was an employment of the vessel in the smuggling traffic. While we appreciate the efforts made by the Norwegian Government to learn the true facts in the case, we are of the opinion that the owners and officers did not make full disclosures to the Norwegian Government in connection with their statements as to the nature of the particular voyage, and that the Norwegian Government was not fully advised of the actual situation. As regards the statements in our note respecting the investigation which your Government was good enough to make at our request concerning possible violations of the Norwegian law of June 25, 1926, by Norwegian vessels last year, we recognize, of course, that it is a proper function of the Norwegian Government to determine whether there have been violations of Norwegian law and, while we regret that the decision in the particular cases involved was not otherwise, we do not doubt that the Norwegian Government reached, after a long and careful investigation, a decision in this matter which it deemed to be the correct one. I am [etc.] R. Walton Moore The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Biddle) 811.114 Reidun/138 [Document 362] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) No. 48 Washington , May 7, 1936. Sir : There is enclosed a copy of a note which has been addressed to the Minister of Norway at this capital 71 setting forth the facts and circumstances on which the seizure of the Norwegian steamship Reidun and the arrest of four officers of the vessel were based. There is also enclosed a copy of an informal communication which was subsequently addressed to the Minister 72 making certain observations in regard to some of the statements contained in our note. On April 24, 1936, Judge Clarence G. Galston of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sustained the exceptions filed by the owners of the Reidun to the Government’s libel, asking the forfeiture of the vessel. At the same time, the exceptions to the answer filed by the United States Collector of Customs for the port of New York in the suit brought by the owners of the Reidun against him for the release of the vessel were also sustained. The order for the release of the Reidun was suspended in order that the Government might have an opportunity to file an amended libel or to consider the advisability of an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. There is enclosed a copy of the opinion of the court in the case, as well as a copy of the libel and of the Government’s answer to the counterclaim. 73 Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore 71 Ante , p. 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] . 72 Supra. 73 None printed. The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Reidun/154 [Document 363] The Minister in Norway ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State No. 187 Oslo , May 27, 1936. [Received June 9.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 48 of May 7, 1936, with enclosures, setting forth the bases for seizure of the Norwegian steamship Reidun and the arrest of four of its officers. Considering that the data contained in the instruction were for the Legation’s information only, and that they had already been communicated to the Minister of Norway at Washington, I made no mention of them in recent talks with officials of the Foreign Office. Yesterday, however, in the course of a social reunion, Mr. Skylstad, Acting Chief of the Section of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, introduced the subject during conversations with Mr. Patterson 74 and, subsequently, with me. He stated that he had recently been shown cables by the local attorneys of the owners of the Reidun , which indicated that, insofar as the United States Government’s libel against the ship was concerned, the American authorities were disposed either to release the vessel upon abandonment by the interested Norwegians of their counterclaim, or to exact merely a relatively small fine in place of confiscation. The attorneys for the parties now seemed to be engaged in a contest to determine whether the sum to be exacted would be five thousand dollars or one thousand dollars. Mr. Skylstad seemed to take no particular exception to this pending pecuniary settlement, and indeed was evidently relieved over the thought that perhaps the vexatious question of the Reidun was about to be solved, even though the result of the trial of the four officers remained to be ascertained. Having had no information concerning this alleged development in the case, I was unable to confirm the accuracy of Mr. Skylstad’s information. I could have hoped, however, that, once publicity had been given to the seizure of the Reidun and the matter adjudicated in court, the Government might have allowed the controversy to lapse in view of the irritation of the Norwegian authorities over what they consider a high-handed and arbitrary American official procedure, and the probability that the action already taken by the United States authorities will effectively discourage further participation by Norwegian vessels in smuggling operations into the United States. Indeed, Mr. Skylstad admitted as much, adding that he had just induced the owners of the Trajan (a vessel concerning whose implication in smuggling activities the Legation, by instruction of the Department, has informed the Foreign Office) to give up an opportunity to do perfectly legitimate business involving entrance into United States ports. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will exert such influence as it possesses in preventing Norwegian vessels which have in the past incurred the suspicion of having formed a link on a chain of smuggling operations from engaging in even manifestly lawful commerce between foreign and American ports. Thus, it seems clear that the action of the American authorities against the Reidun has already been highly effective and has proved more persuasive than the Norwegian law of June 25, 1926 in arousing local officials to the importance of halting use of Norwegian ships in smuggling activities inimical to the interests of a foreign country. Respectfully yours, A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 74 Jefferson Patterson, First Secretary of Legation. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Norway (Patterson) 811.114 Reidun/155: Telegram [Document 364] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Norway ( Patterson ) Washington , June 12, 1936—4 p.m. 20. Your despatch No. 187, May 27, 1936. The suit and countersuit in the Reidun case have been dismissed without the payment of money but with a waiver of all claims, if any, against this Government arising out of the detention of the vessel, its officers and crew. Indictments against officers ordered nolle prossed. Hull The Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Norway/32 [Document 365] The Norwegian Minister ( Morgenstierne ) to the Secretary of State Washington , June 13, 1936. Sir : I have the honor to refer to my conference with Hon. Walton R. Moore, Assistant Secretary of State, on the 12 instant with regard to the Norwegian S/S Trajan and other Norwegian vessels suspected of having been misused—without the knowledge of the Norwegian owners—in connection with the smuggling of alcohol into the United States. On that occasion I had the honor to convey a communication from my Government expressing the expectation that in view of the recent settlement of the Reidun case, the S/S Trajan and possibly other Norwegian vessels suspected of having engaged in activities of a similar nature, should in future have free access to American ports without the risk of seizure or detention. In confirming my statement in this respect I also beg leave to confirm the assurance on behalf of my Government that they are fully prepared to continue the cooperation of many years standing to prevent the misuse of any Norwegian vessel in smuggling activities outside the coast of the United States. Accept [etc.] W. Morgenstierne The Norwegian Minister (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Reidun/160 [Document 366] The Norwegian Minister ( Morgenstierne ) to the Secretary of State Washington , June 17, 1936. Sir : I have the honor to refer to previous exchange of notes and to verbal conferences with regard to the detention in New York and subsequent release of the Norwegian S/S Reidun . As stated by me to Honorable Walton R. Moore, Assistant Secretary of State, and to Mr. Hickerson, the Norwegian Government,—while maintaining their views that the action taken against the Reidun and her officers was not in accordance with Norwegian rights or with existing treaties between Norway and the United States—agree on their part to waive any and all claims against the American Government in connection with the seizure and detention of the Reidun and the arrest and imprisonment of her officers. I have the honor to confirm herewith this assurance which in view of the agreement between the American authorities and the owners and the officers of the S/S Reidun respectively, I have already communicated verbally on behalf of my Government. I am also glad to take this opportunity to reaffirm also with reference to the S/S Reidun the assurance given in my note of June 13th, last, to the effect that my Government are fully prepared to cooperate with the American Government to prevent the misuse of any Norwegian vessel in smuggling activities outside the coast of the United States. Accept [etc.] W. Morgenstierne The Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) to the Norwegian Chargé (Galbe) 811.114 Norway/35 [Document 367] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Sayre ) to the Norwegian Chargé ( Galbe ) Washington , June 23, 1936. Sir : With reference to your Legation’s note dated June 13, 1936, inquiring whether the Norwegian steamship Trajan and other Norwegian vessels connected with the smuggling of alcohol into the United States will, in the future, have free access to American ports without the risk of seizure or detention, I desire to inform you of the receipt of a letter from the appropriate authorities of this Government from which the following excerpt is quoted: “In consideration of the assurances given by the Norwegian Government that they will cooperate to prevent the future employment of Norwegian vessels in smuggling enterprises directed toward the United States, I am glad to advise you that Customs officers will be instructed to permit the Norwegian steamships Trajan and Anders to have free access to any American port which they may hereafter enter in compliance with the laws of this country. “This office has no knowledge of any vessels of Norwegian registry which may recently have been engaged in the smuggling traffic other than the Trajan , the Anders , and the Reidun. ” Accept [etc.] For the Secretary of State: Francis B. Sayre Interest of the United States in the efforts of the League of Nations to promote international economic cooperation Interest of the United States in the efforts of the League of Nations to promote international economic cooperation [368] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, May 26, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 27—11:10 a.m.] 500.C1199/193: Telegram (part air) [369] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, July 14, 1936. [Received July 28.] 500.C1199/202 [370] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, August 26, 1936—1 p.m. 500.C1199/218a: Telegram [371] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 14, 1936—noon. [Received 2:20 p.m.] 500.C1199/224: Telegram [372] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, September 15, 1936—6 p.m. 500.C1199/224: Telegram [373] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, September 15, 1936—6 p.m. 500.C1199/225: Telegram [374] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State Paris, September 18, 1936—3 p.m. [Received September 18—12:20 p.m.] 500.C1199/228: Telegram [375] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 25, 1936—2 p.m. [Received September 25—9:25 a.m.] 500.C1199/234: Telegram [376] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 26, 1936—9 p.m. [Received September 26—7:30 p.m.] 500.C1112/32: Telegram [377] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 29, 1936—8 p.m. [Received September 29—3:20 p.m.] 500.C1112/33: Telegram [378] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 30, 1936—noon. [Received September 30—11:20 a.m.] 500.C1112/34: Telegram [379] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 30, 1936—2 p.m. [Received 5:20 p.m.] 500.C1199/241: Telegram [380] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 1, 1936—noon. [Received 1:51 p.m.] 500.C1112/35: Telegram [381] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, October 1, 1936—6 p.m. 500.C1199/241: Telegram [382] The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 1, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 1—4:20 p.m.] 500.C1112/38: Telegram [383] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, October 2, 1936—2 p.m. 500.C1112/41a: Telegram [384] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 2, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 2—1:05 p.m.] 500.C1199/242: Telegram [385] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 2, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 2—6 p.m.] 500.C1112/39: Telegram [386] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, October 3, 1936—3 p.m. 500.C1112/39: Telegram [387] The Counsul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 2 [3], 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 3—4:05 p.m.] 500.C1112/41: Telegram [388] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 3, 1936—6 p.m. [Received 10:10 p.m.] 500.C1112/42: Telegram [389] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 4, 1936—11 a.m. [Received 11:45 a.m.] 500.C1112/43: Telegram [390] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, October 4, 1936—10 p.m. 500.C1112/43: Telegram [391] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 5, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 5—10:35 a.m.] 500.C1112/45: Telegram [392] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 10, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 10—3:10 p.m.] 500.C1112/62: Telegram [393] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, November 23, 1936—noon. 500.C1199/247: Telegram [394] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, November 24, 1936—3 p.m. [Received November 26—7:45 a.m.] 500.C1199/248: Telegram (part air) [395] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, November 24, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 24—9:30 a.m.] 500.C1112/80: Telegram (part air) [396] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, December 2, 1936—4 p.m. [Received December 4—9:20 a.m.] 500.C1112/81: Telegram (part air) [397] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, December 5, 1936—10 a.m. [Received December 6—7:30 a.m.] 500.C1112/82: Telegram [398] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Washington, December 5, 1936—5 p.m. 500.C1112/81: Telegram [399] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 10, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 10—9:25 a.m.] 500.C1112/83: Telegram [400] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Buenos Aires, December 14, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 4:27 p.m.] 500.C1112/85: Telegram [401] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, December 15, 1936—5 p.m. 500.C1112/85: Telegram [402] The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State Geneva, December 17, 1936—4 p.m. [Received December 18—3:06 p.m.] 500.C1112/86: Telegram (part air) [403] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) Washington, December 30, 1936—5 p.m. 500.C1112/86: Telegram [404] The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State Geneva, December 31, 1936—3 p.m. [Received December 31—2:12 p.m.] 500.C1112/90: Telegram [405] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Grilbert) Washington, December 31, 1936—4 p.m. 500.C1112/90a: Telegram The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/193: Telegram (part air) [Document 368] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , May 26, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 27—11:10 a.m.] 195. Consulate’s 631, November 30, [1935,] 2 p.m. 1 1. Secretariat is today notifying members of the Economic Committee that next session will begin July 7 2 and that question of most-favored-nation clause will be placed on agenda. Secretariat note on this subject will probably be available in about 10 days. 2. Stoppani 3 informs me it appears unlikely that a separate technical committee will be set up. He states confidentially he is anxious to arrange that American policy be fully presented and suggests ( a ) that Rogers 4 might wish to name as substitute for July meeting some one such as Grady 5 who is fully familiar with American policy, ( b ) that Rogers be accompanied by some such expert (in which case no invitation would be issued and expenses would not be paid by the League), ( c ) that if Department so desired Stoppani might be able to arrange for the Economic Committee to invite two experts to attend July meeting having in mind Rist (France) and an American, their expenses to be paid by the League. 3. From what I can gather the initiative in the project to consider the most-favored-nation principle lies chiefly with the Secretariat. While I will keep you as informed as possible I do not anticipate that I shall be able to ascertain in advance how the matter may develop in the Committee or what positions may be taken. Stoppani states his conviction, however, that the attitude of the Committee will be to uphold the most-favored-nation principle. Please instruct. Gilbert 1 Not printed. 2 The session was postponed until September 7, 1936. 3 Pietro Stoppani, Director of the Economic Relations Section, League of Nations Secretariat. 4 James Harvey Rogers, professor of political economy, Yale University, and member of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations. 5 Henry F. Grady, Dean of the College of Commerce and professor of international trade, University of California at Berkeley. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/202 [Document 369] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State No. 1776 Political Geneva , July 14, 1936. [Received July 28.] Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report upon the possible trend of the discussions on economic questions which are expected to take place in the forthcoming sessions of the Economic Committee 6 and the Assembly of the League of Nations. 7 It will be recalled that Mr. van Zeeland, the President of the Assembly, in his closing address on July 4, 1936, (copies of which are enclosed 8 ), drew attention to the danger of relying entirely upon political methods and neglecting economic considerations and suggested that the next Assembly should again make a comprehensive and strenuous effort to set in motion an economic revival. I learn that Mr. van Zeeland had a number of discussions with Mr. Stoppani and Mr. Smets of the Economic Relations Section of the League Secretariat on the subject and I have therefore taken the occasion to obtain a more definite expression of their views with the thought that they would be of interest as throwing some light on the possible trend of discussions in the forthcoming meetings of League bodies. Mr. Stoppani considers that if political and economic conditions are allowed to develop along their present paths war is inevitable. German economy, for example, is now based upon rearmament (60% to 70% of its industry, he says, works directly or indirectly for armament). Germany finds obstacles to its exports on all sides, its money is exclusively internal, it can negotiate with other countries only on the basis of compensation, its policy of compensation is to secure the necessary materials for armament and it has used this system to secure a hold on the countries of eastern and central Europe. Without sane and normal communication with the outside world it can maintain its present economic position only by increasing the rhythm of its internal activity and this it can do only by constantly multiplying its military power. In a year’s time German armament will have reached a formidable level. It is all too likely that this enormous power will find some pretext for its use. Should it be possible, however, to arrive at a political settlement which would dispel the fear of war the position of the German dictator would be even more untenable. For how could Germany then justify continuing the manufacture of thousands of cannon and airplanes per week and on the other hand how could she cease this activity when it is by this means that she avoids unemployment and maintains her national economic activity? The answer, in Mr. Stoppani’s opinion, consists in reestablishing normal monetary, financial, and commercial relations with the rest of the world. Pointing out that there are other countries whose position is similar to that of Germany, Mr. Stoppani asks if it is not time for a last effort to reconstitute the bases for normal economic life. In his opinion the initiative for such a movement must come from that section of the world which enjoys a relatively good economic situation and which is free from quotas and exchange control, namely, the sterling group and the United States. Until recently Great Britain could hesitate between the alternatives of re-establishing a certain stability of exchange and of keeping its hands free to reply to possible devaluation in other countries. Furthermore, until recently France could consider whether the advantages to be gained would offset the sacrifices which its agriculture and industry would have to make were the system of quotas demobilized. Today, however, the disadvantages of stabilization and of the abolition of quotas and exchange control must be weighed against the possibility of a war which would ruin everyone. For these reasons Mr. Stoppani considers that it is indispensable that an early effort be made to initiate a project of international economic collaboration. He envisages an eventual provisional accord which he suggests might be developed along the following lines: (1) A common offer from the United States and Great Britain to maintain the present rate of exchange between the pound and the dollar for a period of, say, two years. (2) A proposal of these same states to examine, together with countries in monetary distress, particularly Germany, the possibility of aiding them to free themselves from exchange control and to avoid the internal panic which they dread. The conditions of such an operation would probably be: ( a ) stability of the pound and dollar; ( b ) minimum guarantees for exports; ( c ) some arrangements respecting debts. (3) As a counterpart to these offers a demand to the protectionist countries to envisage the progressive demobilization of quotas and the breaking down of prohibitive barriers. (4) Any accord must be based on the monetary parities existing at the time of its conclusion and it might be to the interest of countries such as France or Switzerland in the situation thus created to adopt a new parity for their currencies. It is unnecessary to draw attention to the difficulties which lie in the way of such a program and the part which political questions would play in its development. Mr. Stoppani hopes, however, that the Economic Committee in the report which it will prepare at its September session on the state of international economic relations will draw attention to these considerations, that its report will form a basis for the discussions in the Assembly, and that the Assembly discussion will lead to an eventual international effort to remedy the present deplorable situation. Respectfully yours, Prentiss B. Gilbert 6 Held September 7–12, 1936. 7 Seventeenth session, September 21–October 10, 1936. 8 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1199/218a: Telegram [Document 370] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , August 26, 1936—1 p.m. 98. Please deliver the following message to Stoppani from Rogers: “I am designating Mr. Leo Pasvolsky 8a as alternate to myself for the next meeting of the Economic Committee. We will both be in attendance. I understand and trust this is agreeable to you and to the Committee.” Hull 8a Economic Analyst in the Department of State. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/224: Telegram [Document 371] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Geneva , September 14, 1936—noon. [Received 2:20 p.m. 9 ] 331. Rogers and Pasvolsky inform us as follows respecting the meeting of the Economic Committee which closed September 12th. 1. Committee’s general report is a frank discussion of monetary exchange and quota obstacles to world-wide economic recovery through expansion of international trade. Removal of all such obstacles it [ is? ] treated as measure for maintaining peace. General economic conference is disapproved but bilateral and other consultations are recommended among states most seriously affected before approaching economically powerful countries. 2. Following are significant passages from the general report which is provisional and must be considered confidential until released here. 10 … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Report on the most-favored-nation clause is a lengthy but satisfactory document. 11 Its metric [ sic ] substance is summarized in the following conclusions. A. “The most-favored-nation clause and the regime of equality of treatment which it is designed to ensure constitute an essential guarantee for the maintenance and development of world trade. In this connection it is important to note that the most-favored-nation clause has in no sense ceased to exist but continues to be the principal rule governing the commercial relations of many countries. B. The clause loses a large part of its practical utility when international commerce is subjected to quotas, exchange controls and clearing and compensation agreements. Nevertheless even in such cases it retains its usefulness with respect to customs duties, et cetera. It thus narrows down the field in which it is necessary to create other guarantees of equal or at least equitable treatment, which are essential in order to permit trade to expand as far as possible even under restrictive conditions and to avoid unnatural diversion of trade currents. C. But such anomalies as quotas and exchange controls and clearing and compensation agreements are in turn incompatible [with] the existence of dynamic and prosperous trade. What is important therefore is not to discuss the merits or the faults of the regime of the equality of treatment but rather to renouncing as rapidly as possible these capital injuries to the mechanism of international trade. D. It is unnecessary to discuss the question whether or not the regime of the most-favored-nation clause will be the regime of the future for the simple reason that as soon as free negotiability of currencies and trade free from quantitative restrictions shall have been reestablished no nation will consent to submit to discriminations directed against it. And wishing to enforce for itself equality of treatment it shall be obliged to accord such equality to others.” 4. Rogers arriving with complete report on steamship Paris September 24th. Pasvolsky staying in Geneva a few days sailing 24th. 5. Will cable comments on meeting soon. 12 Gilbert 9 Telegram in two sections. 10 The full report, including the recommendations concerning the most-favored-nation principle, was released on September 23; for text, see League of Nations, Official Journal , November 1936, p. 1329. 11 League of Nations Document No. C.379.M.250.1936.II.B, “Equality of Treatment in the present State of International Commercial Relations: The Most-Favored-Nation Clause”. 12 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1199/224: Telegram [Document 372] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , September 15, 1936—6 p.m. 106. Your 331, September 14. The outline of the report you have transmitted seems to me highly satisfactory support for the general program on which this Government has been active and for which it has been seeking the simultaneous support of other governments. Will you kindly transmit this judgment orally to the Secretariat. Please keep the Department fully informed as to the further handling of this report by the Council and the Assembly so that at an appropriate time we can put our views publicly before either one or both of these bodies. The New York Times carries today a summary of parts of the report indicating that it has been released. This summary, however, does not at all deal with the Committee’s discussion of the most-favored-nation principle. I regret this greatly as it is the one phase of the subject least understood in this country and still believed by many to be a purely American principle. It would be most useful if another story was written by Streit 13 from Geneva setting forth that aspect of the most-favored-nation policy which the Committee’s report appears to have featured, to wit, that this clause has in no sense ceased to exist but continues to be the principal rule governing the commercial relations in many countries, and that as soon as there is greater negotiability of currencies and trade, nations will not submit to discriminations (your lettered points A and D). Will you, without indicating that you are acting under instructions, discreetly talk with Streit and possibly other American newspaper correspondents in Geneva and see whether there is a further story in this feature of the report because of the great American interest in it. 14 Moore 13 Clarence K. Streit, press correspondent for the New York Times , member of the International Association of Journalists accredited to the League of Nations. 14 On September 16 the Consul informed the Department that he was arranging to provide press correspondents with suitable material for use on the date of official release of the report of the Committee (500.C1199/225). The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 500.C1199/225: Telegram [Document 373] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) 15 Washington , September 15, 1936—6 p.m. 338. Please secure promptly a copy of the report of the League Economic Committee which has just been released. It deals with various aspects of commercial policy including the most-favored-nation question. In main substance it appears to be a highly satisfactory support for the program which the Department has been advancing and for which it has sought the concerted initiative of other governments. Also before the Assembly meeting, will you see the proper officials of the Government and query them as to what instructions will be given as to the disposition of the report by the Council and Assembly. You may freely make known our reaction to the report and our interest that it should not remain an ineffectual analysis and statement of recommendation and that everything feasible should be done by all interested governments to develop action in accord with it. Moore 15 The same on the same date to the Ambassador in France as Department’s No. 349. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/228: Telegram [Document 374] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State Paris , September 18, 1936—3 p.m. [Received September 18—12:20 p.m.] 885. Department’s 349, September 15, 6 p.m. 16 I [spoke regarding] this matter, in the terms of your telegram, with the official at the Foreign Office in charge of economic affairs on the morning of the 16th. He said that he was particularly glad to know at that time of the Department’s reaction to the report since an inter-Ministerial conference was to be held that afternoon to determine the attitude which the French Government would adopt at Geneva regarding the report. I was called to the Foreign Office this morning and handed an aide-mémoire the text of which I was informed had received the approval of the Foreign Office and of the Prime Minister. It reads in translation as follows: “The Government of the United States has made known to the French Government that having taken note of the recent report of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations, it approves the substance thereof as being in harmony with the program which it had always itself desired to be realized by the concerted action of other governments. The interest of the Government of the United States was that this report should not remain a dead letter but should on the contrary be the point of departure of action by all interested governments. It desired in this connection to know the instructions which would be given to the French delegation at the forthcoming meeting of the Council and of the Assembly. The French Government is glad in its turn to make known to the American Government that on the whole the principles set forth in the report of the Economic Committee of the League have its full support, that they will inspire its attitude during the next assembly of the League because they seem to it susceptible of furnishing the basis for action capable of greatly improving the situation of international trade. The French Government is ready to proceed to a more complete exchange of views with representatives of the Government of the United States regarding the most equitable method of drawing all the appropriate conclusions from the recommendations of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations.” Repeated to Geneva and copy to London. Wilson 16 See footnote 15, p. 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/234: Telegram [Document 375] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , September 25, 1936—2 p.m. [Received September 25—9:25 a.m.] 444. Embassy’s 435, September 17, 4 p.m. 17 Foreign Office handed me today following aide-mémoire: “His Majesty’s Government fully agree with Mr. Cordell Hull as to the satisfactory nature of the report of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations and generally endorse its conclusions. They anticipate that the question will be fully discussed at Geneva and they are not, of course, aware what resolutions will be proposed or what concrete suggestions will be put forward. They are not, therefore, at the moment, in a position to state precisely what the final instructions to the United Kingdom representatives will be, but their general attitude will be as indicated above and His Majesty’s Government will be very pleased to continue to keep in touch with Mr. Hull on the matter.” Bingham 17 Not printed. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/32: Telegram [Document 376] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 26, 1936—9 p.m. [Received September 26—7:30 p.m.] 362. 1. Secretariat officials are not yet aware of any definite plan for the discussions in the Second Committee following the announcement respecting French devaluation. 18 Loveday 19 thought the British genuinely wished to be helpful and would follow the French lead as far as possible. Stoppani feels that emphasis should be placed on the following points: (1) that this is a first step which should be followed by removing as quickly as possible the restrictions on trade; (2) the necessity of encouraging the small “weak” countries in such an endeavor; (3) the necessity for an atmosphere of good will in which the foregoing can be carried out. Charron 20 and Loveday agreed with this and the latter added that it was also important that the French move be well received abroad. 2. On a purely personal basis I was told by a friend that Morrison, 21 who is here with the British delegation, had remarked to him that today’s three power financial move had in it also the political motivation of forming a group “which would make the Fascisti block behave”. I was asked if Washington had such political aims in view. I replied that in my opinion our announcement was purely to assist international economic rehabilitation in which of course our own interests were involved. Morrison’s remark may easily have been a casual and careless private expression, but I am reporting it as I do not consider it as impossible in the abnormally charged political atmosphere of Geneva that something of this type may emerge as corridor rumor and be reflected in the press. Gilbert 18 See tripartite statement issued September 25, p. 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 459 ] . 19 Alexander Loveday, Director of the Financial Section and Office of Economic Studies, League of Nations Secretariat. 20 René Charron, financial expert, League of Nations Secretariat. 21 William Shepherd Morrison, financial secretary to the British Treasury, and member (substitute) of the British delegation to the seventeenth League of Nations Assembly. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/33: Telegram [Document 377] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 29, 1936—8 p.m. [Received September 29—3:20 p.m.] 371. In his Assembly speech today Bruce, 22 Australia, referred to the agreement between the United States, France and Great Britain 23 as a great gesture of leadership to the world and said that these countries have all indicated that they propose to pursue a policy which will tend to restore [ promote ] prosperity in the world and improve the standard of living and for these purposes to assist towards the realinement of currency and to see progressive relaxation of the present system of quotas and exchange control with a view to their abolition. He urged that the Assembly respond to this lead and make every effort to further economic cooperation which would, he emphasized, greatly contribute to the maintenance of world peace. Gilbert 22 Stanley Melbourne Bruce, Australian representative to the League of Nations. 23 Post , p. 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 459 ] . The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/34: Telegram [Document 378] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 30, 1936—noon. [Received September 30—11:20 a.m.] 373. 1. At the request of the French and British delegations the discussion of economic questions in the Second Committee 24 will not begin before Friday. The Assembly is expected to close toward the end of next week. 2. I learn that the British are sounding out delegates respecting a resolution providing for a study of the question of access to raw materials. It is expected to provide judicious joint inquiry by the Economic and Financial Committees with the assistance of experts. 3. Stoppani today gave me the following statement of his views of the situation: “The very important operation of ‘alinement’ of the three more important continental countries has been done on the basis of a rapid and effective collaboration between Washington, Paris and London to which Holland and Switzerland joined themselves immediately. It is not only the devaluation in itself but also the way in which it was made e.g. not merely by each nation individually with its own strength and its own weakness but as an international operation. The problem of the moment, as I see it, is to keep up this method of plurilateral and collective action also for the second part of the program i.e. liberation of exchange control which is not applied by the countries in question but by others in a further stage of the operation which will have to be done later and which will also require international collaboration. If the countries concerned, in particular countries with strong protectionist interests like France and Switzerland are now allowed simply to fall back on their own autonomous individual action I am afraid that there is very little prospect that devaluation [will] be followed by rapid and wide abolition of restrictions as would be necessary. Indeed I fear that if a change in import policy does not take place devaluation might be followed by such a rise in price as might give origin to very difficult situations and possibly social trouble, especially in France. It is therefore of the utmost interest that in some way the plurilateral collaboration begun in the monetary field (in which not only the five countries are concerned but also the countries of the sterling and dollar block [ blocs ] are mute participants) should be continued in the commercial field. We must not therefore, after the Second Commission has adopted a nice resolution, let the people drift asunder. If the United States Government could find it possible to express in some way this thought to the other Governments concerned, it would be at this moment, in my opinion, of a very great value for the economic recovery of the world and also to a very great extent for the pacification of Europe.” Gilbert 24 Meeting September 23–October 9. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/241: Telegram [Document 379] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , September 30, 1936—2 p.m. [Received 5:20 p.m. 25 ] 374. 1. The Argentine Foreign Minister 26 asked me to call on him at an early hour this morning. He first showed me a series of telegrams from Espil 27 conveying the substance of conversations with you. I had no opportunity to examine these messages with care. They were shown to me hurriedly certain passages being pointed out. The gist of them appeared to be, however, that you felt that a useful opportunity was presented to Saavedra Lamas as President of the Assembly to take some action here which might increase internationally the importance of the effect of American economic policy. However, this must now be considered in the light of the recent developments in financial stabilization in which we had participated. He tentatively envisaged carrying out your wish by ( a ) emphasizing your own pertinent public statements either by indorsing direct quotations or by paralleling them in his own language, ( b ) by indorsing the report of the Economic Committee perhaps emphasizing certain elements most acceptable to the United States following the same course with the report of the Second Committee if it turns out to be favorable; ( c ) by stressing the importance of the tripartite announcement respecting stability. 2. I had previously received intimations from members of his delegation that Saavedra Lamas wished to discuss with me American economic and financial policy. I prepared in advance a list of citations of what seemed to me to be the most pertinent passages in your speech of April 30. 28 I had also a copy of the press report of the joint statement of the governments of September 26. 3. Saavedra Lamas stated that he took as a point of departure for our possible present position the four following points which had emerged in various forms at the Montevideo Conference of 1933. 29 ( a ) The advocacy of bilateral commercial agreements, ( b ) The reconvening of the London Monetary and Economic Conference, 30 ( c ) The setting up of a world bureau to deal with economic questions, ( d ) The interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause in its relationship to regional agreements. Although in respect of the foregoing Saavedra Lamas made reference to specific statements made at Montevideo or to action taken by the Conference, my unfamiliarity with the details of the proceedings at Montevideo made it difficult for me clearly to understand the bearing of all the references. If the general language which Saavedra Lamas [used] in discussing these points which I have reflected above is not sufficient for their identification, I can seek further clarification. He specifically inquired which among the foregoing could be regarded as representing current American policy. He particularly requested a statement of our current commercial policy in relation to point ( d ) above. He courteously emphasized in respect of these inquiries that he was not asking for a confidential expose of our policy but in the light of your desires as he understood them he wished to have your practical suggestions as to accomplishment. 4. I told him that obviously many developments had taken place since 1933 of which the recent announcement respecting currencies could be considered as a most important factor. I then stated in general terms my own view that action taken in Geneva as a part of League procedures must be regarded in a special light and that in order to render any action acceptable the position of a given question before the League must be taken into full consideration. As a case in point I made mention of the references in the Economic Committee’s report to the employment of the general conference method at this time, in which Committee an Argentine national had participated and which had been submitted to the Council during a meeting at which he was present, which report was now before the Assembly. He said that this had escaped him and that he had not yet studied the Economic Committee’s report. 5. He expressed full agreement with what I said. His specific question taking all of the foregoing matters into consideration was “what he could best do now and in Geneva to carry out your desires”. He stated that as to method he saw two possible steps, ( a ) he could take action in the Second Committee leading to the formulation of a resolution which would meet the ends desired; ( b ) he could then indorse such a resolution in his final speech before the Assembly with such additional statements as might be pertinent. The Second Committee will probably begin the discussion of economic questions on Friday. He believes that the Assembly will close about October 9 or 10 which would be the occasion for his final speech. 6. He also has very much in mind the linking up of any action he might take here with action contemplated at the forthcoming Buenos Aires Conference 31 and requested that I should convey this thought to you. 7. I asked him specifically whether he had in mind that any statements he would make would be given as an expression of his own views or whether he contemplated in any way being a spokesman for Washington. He said that he did not contemplate giving the aspect of speaking for Washington except to the extent of such direct quotations as he might make of American Government official statements. 8. He told me that Eden 32 had urged him to take the opportunity offered him to emphasize the significance of the recent monetary developments. I inquired if Eden had made any disclosure of British policy or had made any specific statements of proposals. He replied that Eden had not gone beyond the general suggestion mentioned above. 9. He stated that he perceived the dangers in Geneva of a political motivation being attributed to elements in any statements he might make. He cited as an example the phrase “the three democracies” which the French had employed concerning the stabilization arrangement. He mentioned Morrison’s remark which I reported in paragraph 2 of my 362, September 26, 9 p.m., and stated that he understood that Eden had been saying something of the same order. He said that he felt that he must be most guarded in his language. 10. He impressed upon me his view of the confidential nature of any exchanges he might have with you concerning action here. He asked me that I convey all his messages to you personally. He then asked that I request of you not to discuss these questions with any member of the Argentine Embassy at Washington except Espil. I told him that I would convey this message precisely as he had worded it. 11. He said that Espil was shortly leaving Washington to confer with him in Europe concerning the Buenos Aires Conference and that he hoped that Espil would be able to convey to him your most recent views or desires respecting that conference. Espil would not reach Europe, however, until after the close of the Assembly and thus he could not be employed as a medium of communication on any aspect of immediate League action. 12. At the conclusion of our conversation, considering the turn it had taken, I felt that I could well hand him the material that I described under paragraph 2 above. I made clear to him, however, that the selections were entirely my own which I had prepared solely as a matter of convenience, and that they should in no way be considered as necessarily fully representing the current views of Washington or as being exclusive of other points. Gilbert 25 Telegram in two sections. 26 Carols Saavedra Lamas, President of the League of Nations Assembly, seventeenth session. 27 Felipe A. Espil, Argentine Ambassador in the United States. 28 “American Foreign Trade Policies,” Department of State Commercial Policy Series No. 24. 29 Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, December 3–26, 1933; see Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. 30 Held June 12–July 27, 1933; see ibid. , vol. i , pp. 452 ff. 31 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, December 1–23, 1936; see vol. v , pp. 3 ff. 32 Anthony Eden, British representative to the League of Nations. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/35: Telegram [Document 380] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 1, 1936—noon. [Received 1:51 p.m.] 382. 1. I today solicited Avenol’s 33 views as to the course economic questions might take in Geneva. I particularly inquired respecting his knowledge of any French project. He replied that he had heard the same rumors as the rest of us, that Blum 34 himself might attend the Second Committee but that he would know nothing definite until his arrival. In telling me, however, that the economic discussions in the Second Committee would now not begin before Saturday, I gained the impression that the deferment was in part to afford Blum opportunity for prior conversations here. 2. He then said that it was his impression that Washington favored some kind of an international economic conference. I told him that a number of ministers during the last few weeks had said the same to me but that it was something about which I knew absolutely nothing. He referred to the passage in the Economic Committee’s report concerning a conference of great powers and told me that he had also learned of the possibility of the Locarno Powers 35 taking up the economic issues. He stated that he did not feel this to be the best type of procedure, particularly in that the recent stabilization developments had created the possibility of a new approach. He felt it would be better for the states when they regulated their currencies to normalize commercial relations between themselves as quickly as possible and simultaneously to make it unmistakably clear that all other states were invited to join in similar common endeavors. Gilbert 33 Joseph Avenol, Secretary General of the League of Nations. 34 Léon Blum, President of the French Council of Ministers. 35 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, signatories of the Locarno treaties, October 16, 1925; for texts of treaties, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv , pp. 289–363. The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1199/241: Telegram [Document 381] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , October 1, 1936—6 p.m. 113. Your 374, September 30, 2 p.m. Please arrange to see Dr. Saavedra Lamas at the earliest opportunity and tell him that I deeply appreciate his message and that nothing could have afforded me greater satisfaction than to learn that he is disposed to lend the invaluable support which his own individual prestige and his eloquence will afford to the furtherance of liberal trade policies in the course of the discussion of international economic affairs in the Assembly. I have read his suggestions with great interest. In view of the shortness of time, it seems to me that the purposes which both he and I have in common will be best served by emphasizing and by dramatizing the conclusions and judgments embodied in the recent report of the Economic Committee insofar as it relates to most-favored-nation policy and exchange stability. These seem to me an excellent summary of the situation and an admirable indication of the way forward. In reply to his specific question as to “what he could best do now and in Geneva” I should think both of the steps he mentioned feasible: ( a ) action in the Second Committee leading to the formulation of a resolution in support of the conclusions ordered in the report of the Economic Committee; and ( b ) endorsement and dramatization, in the manner in which he is so successful, of this resolution in his closing address to the Assembly. His address on this theme might well serve to bring home to the Governments of the representatives present that all reports and resolutions will remain only reports and resolutions until the Governments of the world act and actually modify the excessive and burdensome restraints and restrictions on trade. The line of presentation I have summarized above would appear to me to fit in well with the prospective program for the Buenos Aires Conference. With specific reference to the four points mentioned in Paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference, it may well be that at this immediate juncture for reasons of expediency points ( b ) and ( c ) might be passed over. With regard to points ( a ) and ( d ), I feel that the text of the resolution adopted at the Montevideo Conference sets forth in simple and convincing language the considered policy of all of the American Republics with reference to the interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause in its relationship to regional agreements and in connection with the negotiation of bilateral commercial agreements. You may assure Dr. Saavedra Lamas that this interchange of views will be regarded as strictly confidential. In conclusion you may say that Ambassador Espil, when he leaves Washington next week for Europe, will take with him draft projects embodying the provisions which this Government hopes may receive the support of the American Republics at that Conference; that the Ambassador is fully conversant with the views of this Government and with the background of their elaboration; and that I hope to receive, as soon as may be possible after Dr. Saavedra Lamas has been afforded an opportunity of conferring with Dr. Espil, the benefit of Dr. Saavedra Lamas views with regard to these draft projects, as well as such amendments or modifications as he may be good enough to suggest. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/38: Telegram [Document 382] The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 1, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 1—4:20 p.m.] 373. Consulate’s No. 373, September 30, noon. During the conversation mentioned in my telegram No. 1071, October 1, 5 p.m. 36 Viénot 37 spoke of the work of Second Committee. He said that the French delegation had not yet completely established [the statement they would make] on economic matters. Furthermore it was hoped that Blum could be here to deliver the speech in person although the precarious situation of his Government made this still doubtful. Viénot added that the French intended to work out with the British if they could an agreement on the French statement; not that the French statement will be a presentation of the views of two countries but something to which they hope the British could give enthusiastic adherence. He then went on to say that his own view was that it would be helpful if an American could also collaborate in preparing this next French move which will be in the Second Commission to break the jam of the present economic difficulties inasmuch as the three Governments had worked together on the first step (French devaluation). He asked me tentatively and without having consulted his delegation whether I thought I might collaborate in this mixed commission. I replied that they would probably have to make their statement on Friday or Saturday; that our members of the Economic Committee had returned to America and that personally I was not sufficiently in touch with the matter for my views to be of value. Hence, there did not seem to be time for us to give advice on the subject even supposing it was thought wise for us to collaborate. I had been contemplating suggesting the advisability of supporting this next French move if it appears to merit it by means of a statement made in Washington to follow the French declaration here and hence invite your attention to Stoppani’s views in this connection. Wilson 36 Ante , p. 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] . 37 Pierre Viénot, French Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; delegate (substitute) to the seventeenth League of Nations Assembly. The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1112/41a: Telegram [Document 383] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , October 2, 1936—2 p.m. 115. Your telegrams 373, September 30, noon, and 382, October 1, noon and the Minister’s 373, October 1, 8 p.m. Our position in regard to discussions in Geneva concerning economic affairs is indicated by our reply to Saavedra Lamas. In substance it may be summarized as follows: (1) We believe it would be important that the representatives of the governments meeting at Geneva endorse and give support to the conclusions of the Economic Committee. (2) The next step would be the application of the principles embodied in that report. It seems to me that at the present time the best start in the way of application is action by the European governments taking the form of liberalization of quotas and relaxation of other types of restrictions by their own action or by bilateral agreements guided by the most-favored-nation principle. (3) In regard to any proposals for multilateral conversations, we should have to completely reserve our judgment until we could determine their possible usefulness and their possible political implications. I send you this summary for your guidance in such discussions as you may have with the representatives of the other governments in Geneva and with the Secretariat and not for communication to them. Hull The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/242: Telegram [Document 384] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 2, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 2—1:05 p.m.] 386. Have conveyed to Saavedra Lamas the contents of your 113, October 1, 6 p.m., and in the course of our conversation he expressed agreement with the points covered therein and his appreciation for your message. Gilbert The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/39: Telegram [Document 385] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 2, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 2—6 p.m.] 389. I have already reported postponement and I have recently been noting evidences of possible further delays in the beginning of the economic discussions in the Second Committee. 38 Rueff 39 who just arrived from Paris asked to see me privately and informed me as follows: 1. France contemplates issuing a decree tomorrow abolishing about 120 quotas and reducing tariffs 20 per cent on raw materials, 17 percent on half-finished products, and 15 per cent on finished products, and abolishing the “20 per cent license tax”. 2. Blum is considering addressing very shortly an inquiry to Washington as to whether we would be willing to join with France and Great Britain in conversations with the object of carrying forward the policy set forth in the tripartite identic announcement respecting trade, quotas and exchange control. His present thought is that he would be favorable to such conversations being held in Washington or Paris or perhaps elsewhere and further that it might be desirable to include Belgium and perhaps less possibly Holland and Switzerland. To seize advantage of the new financial arrangements and also for internal political reasons in France, Blum feels it to be imperative that some joint effort along the lines indicated be undertaken and immediately if it is to be effective. Rueff could not be more specific respecting the French idea of the scope of these conversations until after a conference with Blum which he is having this evening. 3. In respect of the British he did not go further than to state that “he thought they would be helpful”. 4. The French do not wish to enter into a general economic discussion in the Second Committee until some conclusions are reached on the above. 5. The foregoing is at the present moment tentative. This disclosed to me in strict confidence. Gilbert 38 Discussions began October 5 and continued until October 9. 39 Jacques Rueff, Assistant Director in the French Ministry of Finance; technical adviser to the French delegation at the seventeenth League of Nations Assembly. The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1112/39: Telegram [Document 386] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , October 3, 1936—3 p.m. 118. Your 389, October 2, and Department’s 115, October 2. For your further guidance in continuation of the summary of the Department’s position given you in its 112 [ 115 ]. (1) It is pleased by the news of the prospective French action in relaxing trade restrictions. It is following with close attention the discussions in the Assembly of the report of the Economic Committee since the principles and recommendations embodied in that report in its judgment are a promising basis for the further rebuilding of international trade. (2) The United States action has been directed along these lines under its trade agreements program. Its disposition to assist in maintaining monetary stability as a factor in the restoration of international trade is shown by the recent gentlemen’s agreement in that field reached with Great Britain and France. (3) All American action in the trade restrictions field has been and must continue to be carefully and thoroughly measured and in accord with the full requirements of the Trade Agreements Act. 40 In the commercial agreements already signed by the United States and in its adherence to broad principles such as those now supported by the Economic Committee, the United States has taken the initiative. The opportunity is now before the countries represented at Geneva to share the same initiative and to support the same principles. Further progress towards the rebuilding in international trade in this way can be carried forward if they will act to reduce some of their own trade restrictions and apply the broad principles of equality in the field of international commerce. (4) This is the clearly indicated line of practical action. We wait to see such action taken. We believe that individual and concurrent action by the governments concerned and represented at Geneva offers the greatest possibilities at this time. If, however, various European countries wish to enter into conferences with each other to discuss the terms and methods of simultaneous action, their efforts will arouse interest here. However, the Department does not wish to make any commitments of any kind in that connection. (5) The substance of the foregoing may be freely communicated to the French, the British, the Secretariat and other responsible officials. Hull 40 Approved June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943. The Counsul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/41: Telegram [Document 387] The Counsul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 2 [ 3 ], 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 3—4:05 p.m.] 394. Consulate’s 389, October 1 [ 2 ], 8 p.m. Spinasse 41 asked me to come to see him this morning. He said that he wished to inquire how the American Government would view an invitation to participate in conversations with the Governments of France, Great Britain, and possibly other countries respecting economic questions as outlined in my telegram under reference. He said that they did not wish in any way to embarrass the American Government and for this reason desired to make clear that their approach was informal and would be kept strictly secret. I said in reply that I would transmit his inquiry but suggested that consideration of this matter in Washington would no doubt be facilitated if he could give a more precise indication as to what he envisaged the nature of these conversations would be. He replied by stating that the French decrees suppressing many quotas and reducing tariffs had been announced this morning. The French Government felt that the next step should now be considered. He again referred to the simultaneous declarations of the three countries and said that these announcements had laid down the “principles” as regards international trade and particularly the suppression of quotas and exchange control. What was now needed [was?] to fix the “program” for putting this principle into effect and it was for this purpose that the French Government envisaged conversations between the countries which had made these declarations together with others, if this were considered advisable. He said that no political considerations whatever were involved and that this was in no sense an attempt to create the impression of the formation of a bloc but rather to examine how the principles enunciated by the three Governments could be furthered. In the event that the reaction of the American Government was favorable they would welcome suggestions as to what countries should be included. He mentioned in this connection the declaration of the Belgian Government adhering to the principles which had been announced by Great Britain and the United States 42 and also referred to the recent currency measures of the Swiss and Netherlands Governments. Spinasse said that the French expect to speak in the Second Committee on economic questions on Monday and that they would if possible like to know before that time the general disposition of the American Government toward what he had said to me. I then pointed out that as I understood our policy we were in general in sympathy with the conclusions contained in the report of the Economic Committee and inquired whether our reply would have any effect on the attitude which his Government would take in the Second Committee respecting that report. He replied in the negative and said that while they had not yet definitely determined what action they would take in the Committee, the conditions of the report represented the view of his Government and would receive its support. Although Spinasse did not so state, my feeling about the French position is that Blum must make a demonstration of action, that the French consider that the method they have proposed to us promises the best results, but if the United States is unwilling to concert with them in this, he must endeavor to obtain some action through the League even though he feels it to be a much less promising medium. I am inclined to construe this as the reason why the French are so anxious to have our reaction if possible before the Second Committee begins its economic discussion. Spinasse stated that if the London and Washington reactions were favorable he had in mind that the invitations would be sent almost immediately probably through Paris. He emphasized that if the conversations were to take place they should begin at the earliest possible date. The place could be fixed by agreement. He concluded by impressing upon me the necessity of secrecy respecting the suggestion he was putting forward. A further telegram on this subject immediately follows. Gilbert 41 Charles Spinasse, French Minister for National Economy; delegate to the seventeenth League of Nations Assembly. 42 Belgium adhered to the tripartite financial agreement on September 26, 1936. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/42: Telegram [Document 388] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 3, 1936—6 p.m. [Received 10:10 p.m.] 395. My 394, October 3, 5 p.m. 1. In my conversation with Spinasse I ascertained that the French had fully taken up the matter with the British here. Spinasse said that it had been presented to both of us in precisely the same terms and that I could feel entirely free to talk with Morrison. Morrison had previously asked me to lunch with him today. 2. Morrison outlined his understanding of the French position which agreed in all respects with what Spinasse had said to me. Morrison then stated that in what he might say to me he was giving his own views, that he had solicited advices from London which had not been received. He said that nevertheless that he believed his own views represented the probable British attitude. He indicated that the British were favorable to the project provided we would participate. On the other hand he did not believe that London would consider going into it without us. The reasons he gave for the British being favorable were in substance as follows. ( a ) They felt that something should be done and that to have efficacy it should be begun as soon as possible. ( b ) There might be various ways of achieving the same end but the method the French had proposed appeared to be simple and reasonable and one which lent itself to immediate action. ( c ) The British felt that for anything to be accomplished it must be done outside the League. Both for psychological and for other reasons the League was not a favorable medium. People and governments had grown weary of high sounding phrases from Geneva which come to no fruition. There was too much accumulated skepticism to be overcome for the League to take effective action. Furthermore, any project advanced in the League would probably be carried on on an indiscriminate multilateral basis, which was something which everyone desired to avoid at the present juncture. Moreover, in the League, such an endeavor could not be kept apart from a number of undesirable political connotations. The British did not intend either to advance or even warmly to support any implementation by the League of the Economic Committee’s report. Should the French not find some reasonable method outside the League they will presumably be forced to advance some project within the League which would almost certainly be futile if not definitely disadvantageous to any international effort. ( d ) The British also felt that such a move as the French proposed would lend support to Blum which they believed desirable from almost any international point of view. Morrison felt strongly that there should not only be no political motivation in such an endeavor but that the possibility of a political construction being put on it should be avoided at the outset and at every step, that its purely economic and essentially international character should be made clear at all times. Morrison did not feel that the French had any arrière-pensée in their suggestions. He regarded the French action as arising from reasonable and entirely understandable France [ French ] internal political and economic necessities. As to the parties to the conversations which the French envisaged, Morrison is inclined to be favorable to widening participation in any useful way. He felt that even if this served no other purpose it would emphasize their nonpolitical character and international objectives, nevertheless he said that the French had not particularly raised the matter of participants with him and that he had not thought the matter through. 3. In response to my inquiry as to the purpose of such conversations in respect of action, he said that he regarded them as for the very purpose of exploring what action might be taken. Having in mind your 115, October 2, 2 p.m. I asked him why he felt it to be essential that the United States participate and what he felt we could contribute. He replied that the announcements of the three powers had been striking in the action already taken and in their implications respecting future action and that our having been parties to the announcements our abstention from the first further efforts suggested therein would have an adverse effect even though our support respecting any action which might be worked out might be only moral. 4. In my conversations reported in this telegram and in my telegram under reference I made no statement or indication which could be construed as suggesting our possible attitude. Gilbert The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/43: Telegram [Document 389] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 4, 1936—11 a.m. [Received 11:45 a.m.] 396. My 395, October 3, 6 p.m. 1. Morrison calls my attention to an item in the French press to the effect that French in full agreement with the British had worked out a project to present in the League Second Committee. He does not believe that the French Government inspired this but that it was simply an erroneous rumor. He said that in any event it was completely untrue and that they were not working on anything with the French and that the British position remained precisely as he had described it to me. 2. Please instruct whether I should inform Paris and London of my conversations with Spinasse and Morrison. Gilbert The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1112/43: Telegram [Document 390] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , October 4, 1936—10 p.m. 120. Your 394, 395, and 396, October 3 [and 4] and Department’s 118, October 3. Please inform Spinasse: 1. That the American Government also attaches great importance to the parts of the simultaneous declaration which he cited, and greatly desires that governments make them effective. The action of the French Government in this field is most encouraging. 2. We believe, as he knows, that it is essential that governments undertake, as promptly as possible, to relax exchange controls and quotas, and substitute for the bi-lateral balancing and clearing agreement basis of trade, the basis of equality. The American Government will continue to urge this course on all other governments at every opportunity, and try to promote effective action. 3. His plans for general conversations to advance these objects seem vague. 4. Apart from that, however, this government does not favor any general conference. It has found direct diplomatic channels more feasible, and favors continuance of this method. 5. We hope that the governments now meeting at Geneva will, in accord with the report of the Economic Committee, declare their support for a program of lowering trade barriers through reciprocal trade agreements following most-favored-nation principles. Please make clear to Spinasse that the preceding is for the confidential information of his government, and not for publication. You may give British representatives at Geneva the same summary of our views, if approached again. Inform Embassies at Paris and London. Hull The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/45: Telegram [Document 391] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 5, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 5—10:35 a.m.] 397. Department’s telegram 120, October 4, 10 p.m. 1. I delivered your message to Spinasse this morning. Rueff said to me that the reply of the American Government had not been entirely unforeseen and that he did not consider it as being at variance with the views of the French Government which had merely wished to ascertain what method of approach to these problems seemed most feasible to us. Then he said that the French Government would convey to the American Government through the regular diplomatic channel perhaps immediately 43 such ideas as they might have on the general subject which Spinasse broached to me. They would keep any such action strictly confidential. 2. Rueff stated that his present idea was that the French would present a resolution to the Second Committee perhaps jointly with the British which would be a general indorsement of the conclusion of the Economic Committee’s report and to the simultaneous announcements of the three powers. Gilbert 43 See telegram No. 1067, October 30, 10 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, vol. ii , p. 94 . The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/62: Telegram [Document 392] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , October 10, 1936—5 p.m. [Received October 10—3:10 p.m.] 431. In introducing the report and resolutions of the Second Committee 44 which were approved by the Assembly this afternoon in substantially the form reported in the Consulate’s telegrams 426, October 9, 8 p.m., and 425, October 9, 2 p.m., 45 Spinasse made a strong plea for the removal of the obstacles to trade. Gilbert 44 Adopted October 9; see League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 157, pp. 86 and 97. 45 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1199/247: Telegram [Document 393] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , November 23, 1936—noon. 146. Department will probably wish to offer suggestion concerning appointment of American to Economic Committee. Ascertain from Stoppani latest date at which suggestion could be made. Moore The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1199/248: Telegram (part air) [Document 394] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , November 24, 1936—3 p.m. [Received November 26—7:45 a.m.] 478. Department’s telegram 146, November 23, noon. The Council in its session convening January 18 will appoint the entire membership of the Economic Committee, thus the reappointment of present incumbents is not automatic. Stoppani states that provided he be concurrently informed that the individual concerned would accept, the American whose appointment is desired could be named to him as late as January 7. This is, however, the extreme date which would permit him to take necessary steps. Should a name or names merely be “suggested” to him, a much earlier date would be possible in order to ascertain willingness to accept, etc. This is naturally a practical expression of the situation; I appreciate that technically the Department’s action is limited to suggestions. Gilbert The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/80: Telegram (part air) [Document 395] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , November 24, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 24—9:30 a.m.] 480. 1. In line with the Assembly resolution of October 10 46 (Consulate’s despatch No. 1924, political, November 4 47 ) the Council at its session convening January 18 must come to a decision where [ whether ] it will now constitute a committee on raw materials. 2. I am informed that if it be decided to constitute such a committee the Council would immediately thereafter designate the members. In discussing this with Stoppani he stated that should the United States be invited and should it be prepared to accept, and should Washington in such a case entertain desires respecting the American who might best serve, it would be necessary in order to fulfill these desires that they be informally communicated to him a reasonable time in advance of the Council session. As indicated in the resolution in the case of the United States there are three avenues for membership. 3. Stoppani informs me that if the committee be set up it is a [settled] matter that American, Japanese and German membership is desired. The Japanese have already indicated informally that they are prepared to participate. I may add that the Japanese Consul General in a recent conversation volunteered the same information to me. As Italy is a member of the Council an Italian will be invited, whether he would attend or not is another matter. The crux of the entire question is the position of Germany. Should Germany be unwilling to participate the British do not wish a committee set up. The British position is seen as a political one associated in particular with the German demand for colonies. The French, on the other hand, favor the constitution of a committee with or without Germany and advocate that an effort be made to prosecute an objective study of the raw materials problem. 4. Stoppani says it would be helpful could he be informally advised respecting Washington’s attitude regarding possible participation and if it favorable invites special attention to the question of membership mentioned in paragraph 2 above. 5. Stoppani stated that the Secretariat and he believed the majority of League states would be resistive to considerations which may be advanced that in order to accommodate Germany a committee for this purpose be established independent of the League. Gilbert 46 League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 155, p. 141. 47 Not printed. The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/81: Telegram (part air) [Document 396] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , December 2, 1936—4 p.m. [Received December 4—9:20 a.m.] 487. Consulate’s 480, November 24, 5 p.m. The German Consul General inquired of me today as to the attitude of the United States toward an inquiry into the question of raw materials with particular reference to our participation in the proposed League committee. I told him that while I naturally followed all such projects here with interest I had no knowledge as to Washington’s attitude. He then informed me that he had been instructed by Berlin to report on what might take place in Geneva in this matter and in our talk presented an aspect of the picture somewhat different from that set forth in my telegram under reference. He stated that his Government was interested in such an activity presumably to the extent of participating and that although it would definitely be difficult for Germany to take part in a League body such a possibility was not necessarily excluded. It would nevertheless in respect of a League body be easier if the meetings took place outside of Geneva and that the British being the proponents of the idea London came naturally to mind. He imparted to me that he had been specifically instructed not to discuss Germany’s possibly favorable attitude toward this matter with the Secretariat and that he was not to be responsive to any soundings by the Secretariat on this score. He stated that Berlin felt that the first move should come to them from the British through the diplomatic channel. He clearly implied that Berlin was surprised that this had not yet occurred inasmuch as Berlin believed that London had opened this question in some manner with Washington and Tokyo. He confirmed the impression that Japan was willing to participate in a League committee for this purpose. Gilbert The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/82: Telegram [Document 397] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , December 5, 1936—10 a.m. [Received December 6—7:30 a.m.] 495. Consulate’s 480, November 24, 5 p.m. The Economic Section of the Secretariat have advanced their consideration of the proposed committee on raw materials, and of preparing the following tentative list of participating states: from members of the Economic Committee—United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands; from the Financial Committee—Italy, South Africa; from “other qualified persons”, Germany, Poland, Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Portugal. It should be noted that the foregoing is on the assumption that the United States, Brazil, Japan, Italy and Germany will participate. It is felt that reliance can be placed on the collaboration of Japan and probably also of Brazil. There is great uncertainty concerning Italy and Germany (note Consulate’s 487, December 2, 4 p.m.); it has further been contemplated that failing to obtain a suitable person from Canada, Australia would be invited. The Economic Section requests that this be kept confidential inasmuch as the choice of states is necessarily a delicate matter. The committee would technically not be composed of government representatives. Thus, theoretically, members of the Economic and Financial Committee or individual experts could participate without the sanction of their governments. Gilbert The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/81: Telegram [Document 398] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 48 Washington , December 5, 1936—5 p.m. 72. For the Secretary of State and Feis. 48a As you know, the League Assembly on October 10, 1936, requested the Council “when it thinks fit” to appoint a committee to investigate the question of “equal commercial access for all nations to certain raw materials”. The resolution stipulated that the committee should be composed of: ( a ) some members of the League Economic and Financial Committees; ( b ) “other qualified persons, irrespective of nationality”; ( c ) “nationals of non-member as well as member States specially interested”. Gilbert reports that the Council session convening on January 18th must come to a decision as to creating such a committee and will, if it decides to create the committee, immediately thereafter designate the members. Stoppani has requested that, should we desire to participate, we suggest an individual a reasonable time in advance of the Session. He states that, if the committee is set up, American, Japanese and German membership would be desired. Gilbert is informed by the Japanese Consul General that Japan will participate. The German Consul General informs him that Berlin is interested in such an activity presumably to the extent of participating, and that although participation in a League Body would be difficult for Germany it would not be impossible, particularly if the meetings took place outside Geneva, possibly in London. The German Consul General indicated that Berlin expected to be approached by the British through diplomatic channels and was surprised that no such approach had yet been made. Gilbert understands that the French desire to go ahead with the committee with or without Germany but that the British do not want the committee set up unless Germany will participate. We have requested further information from London. Do you desire an American to participate and, if so, which of the three methods outlined above do you prefer? In connection with ( a ) you will recall that the American members of the Economic and Financial Committees may be changed at the January session. Moore 48 During the absence of the Secretary of State as head of the United States delegation at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires, December 1–23, 1936 (see vol. v , pp. — ff.), summaries of correspondence with American missions abroad were transmitted to him by the Acting Secretary of State. 48a Herbert Feis, Special Adviser to the United States delegation, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/83: Telegram [Document 399] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 10, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 10—9:25 a.m.] 604. Department’s 437, December 5, 3 p.m. 49 Foreign Office states in view of Sir Samuel Hoare’s original suggestion at Geneva, 50 the British are godfather to the idea of such a committee but they do not intend to approach any governments except through League channels. Discussions as to the formation of this committee will come up before the Council meeting in January. The British Government’s idea is that the committee will be one of technical inquiry very much as the recent Clearings Committee. 51 It also remains to be decided whether the invitations will be issued to nonmember states by the Council or by the committee when it is set up. The British Government are inclined to favor the latter proposal. The British Government likewise have the impression that the Japanese Government may accept. They have no information as to the attitude of the Italian Government. Foreign Office particularly referred to the fact that the terms of reference specifically omit territorial questions and in view of Schacht’s 52 speech of yesterday consider the German attitude as extremely doubtful. Copy to Geneva. Bingham 49 Not printed; it requested the Ambassador to report any information he was able to obtain concerning the attitude of the British Government toward the proposed committee on raw materials (500.C1112/80). 50 The need for an inquiry into the problem of access to raw materials was suggested on September 11, 1935, by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a speech before the Assembly of the League of Nations; for text, see League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 138, pp. 45–46. 51 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 529 ff. 52 Hjalmar Schacht, German Minister for Economic Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 500.C1112/85: Telegram [Document 400] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Buenos Aires , December 14, 1936—4 p.m. [Received 4:27 p.m.] 58. Department’s 72, December 5 and subsequent. I believe that this inquiry could serve a very useful purpose on the one hand by securing recognition for the necessity of reviving international trade and on the other hand by subjecting to careful examination various inadequate ideas regarding economic conditions. Therefore my present disposition is to favor American representation on this committee especially in light of indication in your 102 of December 12 53 that the British Government desires the committee to be one of technical inquiry. I do not think, of course, that American participation would be desirable if there were to be direct discussion of European political problems, but I assume that such is definitely contrary to the intention of the Secretariat and the British Government. Please communicate with Gilbert and inform him that our inclination is to favor American participation on the above understanding and request him to cable as to whether he believes this understanding completely justified. As for the method of selection of the American member of the committee, the procedure under ( b ) and ( c ) mentioned in your 72 would of course give a wider range of selection. In thinking over American representation it occurs to me that President Bowman of Johns Hopkins University would, both by training, knowledge and experience, be an excellent man. Have you any opinion on this or alternative suggestions? Hull 53 Not printed; see telegram No. 604, December 10, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, supra. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1112/85: Telegram [Document 401] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , December 15, 1936—5 p.m. 160. Your 480, November 24, 5 p.m. and subsequent telegrams concerning raw materials inquiry. We believe this inquiry could serve a useful purpose both in securing further recognition of the necessity of reviving international trade and in subjecting to careful scrutiny certain inadequate ideas concerning economic conditions. We are inclined to favor American participation on the distinct understanding that the Committee is to be one of technical inquiry and that there will be no direct discussion of European political problems. Please confer with Stoppani and cable whether you believe our understanding is fully justified. As to the method of participation, we believe that the second or third methods indicated in the Resolution of October 10 offer a wider range of selection. Moore The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/86: Telegram (part air) [Document 402] The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , December 17, 1936—4 p.m. [Received December 18—3:06 p.m.] 520. Department’s telegram 160, December 15, 5 p.m. (received December 17, 9 a.m.). 1. Stoppani expresses gratification at prospect of possible American participation on committee on raw materials. He pointed out that the Assembly’s mandate is in essence the setting up by the Council of a committee of experts to examine into the world aspect of the question of commercial access to raw materials. This mandate in no way envisages a political discussion and he sees no indication of any departure from the terms of reference. It is evident, nevertheless, that long standing problems with definite political connotations are in the background and no undertaking can of course be given as to what statements the experts who are acting in their individual capacities may make in the course of the discussions. He is agreeable to an American national serving through either of the methods mentioned by the Department. He desires, however, that if possible the name of a suitable person who is prepared to accept the appointment be communicated to him in time for presentation to the Council. Not being able to present a name to the Council would not necessarily exclude American participation as a way might be found out of this difficulty through the Council establishing the fact of American participation, the selection of an individual to be left to the Secretary General or to the Council rapporteur . At the same time, a definite decision on the question of participation would preclude the Council from perhaps merely appointing the American member of the Economic Committee or taking some other possibly inconvenient action. In all this it should be clearly borne in mind that action in this may not be taken by the January Council. The Secretariat is of the opinion that Great Britain is still preoccupied somewhat in the manner described in my No. 480, November 24, 5 p.m., paragraph 3 respecting the attitude of Germany, and as the British sponsorship of the plan places them in a special position, their request for a postponement of the matter to the [January?] Council might easily be acceded to. 2. Stoppani informs me that the Japanese have indicated their desire that the Japanese member of the Economic Committee (who will be a new appointee) serve on the committee. The Brazilian Consul General tells me that he has asked Rio de Janeiro for the name of a Brazilian participant. He has not yet received a reply but is under the impression that his Government will take favorable action. Gilbert The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) 500.C1112/86: Telegram [Document 403] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) Washington , December 30, 1936—5 p.m. 162. Your 520, December 17, 4 p.m. We are considering suggesting the same person for membership on the Economic and Raw Materials Committees. As apparently the Raw Materials Committee is to be composed largely of members of the Economic Committee we presume that meetings of the two bodies will be coordinated. However, we desire any information you may be able promptly to secure concerning such coordination and concerning the probable frequency, dates and duration of meetings of the Raw Materials Committee. Moore The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State 500.C1112/90: Telegram [Document 404] The Consul at Geneva ( Everett ) to the Secretary of State Geneva , December 31, 1936—3 p.m. [Received December 31—2:12 p.m.] 527. Department’s 162, December 30, 5 p.m. 1. Stoppani tells me that he is unable at the present time to give any more than a very general reply to the Department’s inquiry, pointing out that a decision in regard even to the setting up of the raw materials committee can be made only after the convening of the Council on January 18. He feels the probabilities are that the committee will be constituted at that time, the only difficulty so far as can be seen now being possible European developments affecting Germany. 2. Assuming the committee will be set up Stoppani is of the opinion that undoubtedly an effort will be made to coordinate the dates of its meetings with those of the Economic Committee by reason of their interlocking membership and common interest in subject matter. He can, however, give no assurance that such a procedure will prove possible. 3. According to present plans the committee on raw materials will probably hold its first session at the beginning of March. As regards frequency and duration of meetings Stoppani can only say that more than one session will be necessary and that each session will probably last nearly a week. 4. Stoppani stated incidentally he felt it would be advantageous to have the same American member on both committees. 5. In this connection he asked that I remind the Department of the situation with respect to the appointment of the American member of the Economic Committee which was discussed in Consulate’s telegram No. 478, November 24, 3 p.m. Everett The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Grilbert) 500.C1112/90a: Telegram [Document 405] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva ( Grilbert ) Washington , December 31, 1936—4 p.m. 163. Please suggest to Stoppani that he may wish to consider appointment to Economic Committee of Mr. Henry F. Grady, Dean of the College of Commerce and Professor of International Trade, University of California, Berkeley, California. In case he is appointed and the Council proceeds with organization of Raw Materials Committee, Council might provide that the American Member of the Economic Committee be a member of the Raw Materials Committee. Grady is regarded as exceptionally qualified both by experience and continuing relationships to explain American policies and is prepared to accept these appointments. Moore Principles underlying the policy of the United States for restoration of international commerce and finance Principles underlying the policy of the United States for restoration of international commerce and finance [406] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) Washington, March 11, 1936. 600.0031 World Program/3 [407] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Austria (Messersmith) Washington, June 17, 1936—4 p.m. Circular 600.0031 World Program/28a: telegram [408] The Minister in Hungary (Stewart) to the Secretary of State Budapest, June 20, 1936—4 p.m. [Received June 23—4:05 a.m.] 662.6431/89: Telegram (part air) [409] The Minister in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, June 20, 1936. [Received July 7.] 662.6831/38 [410] The Minister in Bulgaria (Sterling) to the Secretary of State Sofia, June 23, 1936. [Received July 7.] 662.7431/28 [411] The Minister in Austria (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State Vienna, June 24, 1936. [Received July 7.] 662.6331/337 [412] The Minister in Yugoslavia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Belgrade, June 25, 1936. [Received July 7.] 660H.6231/66 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 600.0031 World Program/3 [Document 406] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) No. 1231 Washington , March 11, 1936. Sir : There is enclosed herewith for your strictly confidential information, to be shown only to such members of your staff as you may select within your discretion, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation 1 which I recently had with a Chief of Mission here in Washington. Although the declarations which I set forth were illustrated by problems existing between the two governments concerned, in my opinion the principles and program enunciated are generally fundamental to all negotiations necessary for the normal restoration of the international finance and commerce of the world. In stressing these principles it was my purpose to suggest a higher plane than the narrow national and international political considerations which have been brought forward by certain nations to justify the extreme steps taken in the economic and financial field. Experience in recent years has clearly established that, when such narrow and momentary political considerations are used in this manner, efforts to establish commerce between nations on broad, sound, and forward-looking grounds are all too likely to end in failure. Consequently, the principles which I stated in my conversation in question refer solely to the economic aspects of multilateral trade and it is my belief that the general application of these principles will result in (1) The restoration of international commerce, tending to stabilize relations among nations; (2) The re-employment of millions of unemployed persons throughout the world; and (3) The establishment of a sound foundation for building a permanent structure of world peace. The purposes of this government’s liberalized policy is to restore the equality of commercial and industrial rights and to reestablish fair methods of trade relations in lieu of the existing network of trade barriers which keep the operations of international commerce and finance down to a minimum. The fulfillment of these purposes offers a secure foundation on which to build a permanent structure for peaceful international relations. There is every indication that if the acute conditions of the depression are permitted to remain static, many millions of the unemployed will be absorbed in military undertakings, unless these conditions are dealt with firmly during coming months. It is my hope, therefore, that the program sponsored by this government will be espoused by an ever increasing number of countries, especially industrial countries, to restore commerce, finance and employment. For one and one-half years we have been proceeding on a broad program of trade recovery on the basis of equality. If this movement, which is supremely vital to the national life and safety of the important countries of Europe, is not now given support by countries like Great Britain and France, Europe and the world will be doomed to the chaotic discriminatory bilateral bartering and bargaining trade methods with the disastrous results already well known to experience. I trust that you will lose no opportunity to explain the purposes of this government to the responsible officers of the government to which you are accredited and that you will report to me from time to time any reaction to the views as herein expressed. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull [Similar instructions were sent on March 11, 1936, to the American diplomatic missions in the following countries with which trade agreements either were being or had been negotiated: Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Similar instructions were sent on March 30, 1936, to the American diplomatic missions in the other American Republics with certain modifications in the final paragraph regarding procedural method in bringing the subject matter of the instruction and its enclosure to the attention of the appropriate officials of the Governments under reference. Copies of the instruction and its enclosure were likewise transmitted on March 11, 1936, to the Consulate General at Sydney, Australia, and to the American diplomatic missions in the following countries with which trade agreement negotiations had not been initiated: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, Turkey, Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. These missions were authorized to use this information “to explain, orally and informally and acting as without express instruction, to the appropriate responsible officials of the Government to which you are accredited the principles and program set forth therein. You should not associate the explanation with any immediate purpose on the part of this Government to initiate trade agreement negotiations with the Government to which you are accredited.” (600.0031 World Program/2) Copies of the memorandum of conversation and its covering instruction were also sent on March 11, 1936, to the American Embassies in Germany and Italy, and on March 20 to the Embassy in the Soviet Union in order to inform those missions of the action being taken by the Government of the United States to further the trade agreements program.] 1 Not printed; the enclosure paraphrased the memoranda of conversations, January 22 and February 5, 1936, with the British Ambassador, pp. 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 513 ] and 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 514 ] . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Austria (Messersmith) Circular 600.0031 World Program/28a: telegram [Document 407] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Austria ( Messersmith ) 1a Washington , June 17, 1936—4 p.m. Please submit brief telegraphic report on significance of visit of Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, 2 and supplement with full written report. You will appreciate that narrow bilateral bargaining agreements such as Germany and certain other European countries are endeavoring to make at this time may seriously interfere with our broader trade agreements program. If this narrow bilateral policy is greatly expanded its inevitable result will be further world-wide restriction of international trade and subsequent increase in unemployment and increasing dangerous political difficulties. Our policy has been fully explained in instructions and radio bulletins which have been sent to you, perhaps the most comprehensive being my address on May 22 in New York. 3 When opportunity offers, our broad objective should be explained to members and officials of the government to which you are accredited, pointing out the ultimate dangers of bilateral agreements in the long run. Several of the most important trading nations both in Europe and in this hemisphere have already become convinced of the benefits of the policy which we are now following. Repeat to Budapest, Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia. Hull 1a See last paragraph for instructions to repeat to Missions in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. 2 Hjalmar Schacht was also German Minister of Economic Affairs. 3 “Our Need for Foreign Trade”, Department of State Commercial Policy Series No. 26. The Minister in Hungary (Stewart) to the Secretary of State 662.6431/89: Telegram (part air) [Document 408] The Minister in Hungary ( Stewart ) to the Secretary of State Budapest , June 20, 1936—4 p.m. [Received June 23—4:05 a.m.] 25. Department’s telegram June 17, 4 p.m. Schacht arrived noon Wednesday and left Friday afternoon. He was very warmly received and upon his departure Imredy, President of National Bank, in statement to press paid high tribute to Schacht and expressed hope that their brief discussions of financial and economic questions would have a salutary effect on the further development of trade between the two countries. High official authority for National Bank informs Legation that no concrete changes resulted from conversations which consisted merely of an exchange of ideas; that although Hungary’s balance in Germany is less than that of other countries visited nevertheless Hungary’s policy is to reduce the balance which is now about 21,000,000 reichsmarks and to definitely restrict their import and export trade with Germany. On June 19th Schacht made a long statement at press reception. In brief he said that international debts can only be settled by an increase in exports; that marketing of creditor countries afford Germany and other debtor nations less and less opportunity to sell and that therefore Germany endeavors to establish economic relations where economic interests complement her own. He states that on his trip he has not presented any sinister political plans and that “if a part of the unwarrantable press objects to the fact that possibly our economic relations with this part of Europe may develop into more friendly political relations I must ask whether such development is desirable or not”. He pointed out the Bolshevik danger which can be diverted only by an endeavor to raise the standard of living which is possible only through the development of international trade. After his speech a journalist asked whether agricultural self-sufficiency was the aim of German policy or whether the policy tends toward further industrial development. He replied that while Germany has a duty to and must strengthen the farmer class whose energies are so vital to the interests of the nation at the same time further industrial development is needed to care for the surplus population. He added, “One cannot renounce industrial development merely because the price of iron is lower in Pittsburgh than in one’s own country.” Stewart The Minister in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 662.6831/38 [Document 409] The Minister in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 1226 Athens , June 20, 1936. [Received July 7.] Sir : In compliance with the Department’s circular telegram of June 14 [ 17 ], 4 p.m., relayed by the Legation at Vienna, and in reference to my telegram No. 67 of June 19, 4 p.m. 4 I have the honor to report that Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank of Germany, arrived in Athens from Belgrade by air on June 13th and was received at the Tatoi air-port by the Vice Governor of the Bank of Greece. Speaking to reporters shortly after his arrival, Dr. Schacht stated that he was paying an unofficial visit to his colleagues at the Bank of Greece. He added that although his was not an official mission, he would have an opportunity to discuss various questions affecting Greece and Germany. Dr. Schacht had an audience with the King and long interviews with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Governor and Vice Governor of the Bank of Greece. Virtually nothing was given out officially as to what was discussed at these meetings. On June 14 Dr. Schacht again received representatives of the Greek and foreign press, adding that his trip had no political significance and that he had no intention of engaging in financial arguments.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … So far as Greece is concerned, his Balkan tour appears to have been undertaken to promote the German scheme of economic penetration which is working like a steam-roller along all the roads nach Osten , and to remove such difficulties as may have arisen to impede it. Accordingly he listened non-committally to Greek complaints, and, while flattering the authorities with his august presence (like Goering 5 before him) and pleasing the public with his admiration for the Acropolis and Pericles (whom he did not fail to mention in his parting words), left the impression behind that Germany stands firm on her advantage and that Greece’s only hope is to put herself more and more in German hands. His denials that his trip has any political significance may be correct in a strictly limited sense. But the Department will take such statements with a grain of salt. German economic penetration in this part of the world is certainly a fact of international political significance. Informal conversations between this Legation and friends at the Bank of Greece and the Foreign Office have abundantly confirmed the report above quoted, in spite of official reticence. From these sources the Legation has been informed, however, that in regard to the Greek demand for international prices for German products, an arrangement was definitely arrived at. According to this arrangement prices of imports from Germany are to be fixed by direct negotiation between officials of the two countries. This would appear to be consonant with Dr. Schacht’s entire attitude on this visit, in that it seems to consider Greek complaints but to leave the answer pending and in a position to be controlled in Berlin. In addition, our official friends report that it was Dr. Schacht and not the Greeks who proposed the purchase of raw materials and foodstuffs, naming several products which would obviously not derive from Germany but from countries with which Germany carries on barter trade. In conclusion, I may say that opinion in financial and business circles in Athens appears to substantiate the Legation’s understanding that Dr. Schacht’s visit represents a further step in Germany’s economic penetration of the Near East. The “buy more from Germany” program to which clearing operations have converted the Greek Government, however unwillingly in certain quarters, is therefore expected to take on a new impetus. The secrecy drawn officially around the Schacht conversations is generally taken in these quarters to mean that Greece gained nothing and that many essential points were disregarded entirely. If Vice Governor Varvaressos does indeed go to Berlin as rumored “to renew negotiations,” it is hinted that “to receive instructions” would be the more correct interpretation. In regard to the difficulties caused to American trade by the Greco-German clearing, the Department is already aware of the efforts of this Legation. In this connection it is probably sufficient to refer to my despatch No. 1092 of March 12, 1936, 6 and the exchange of letters between the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and me relating thereto. 6 It is quite possible that increased difficulties will be encountered in the near future, which will be handled as heretofore. Meanwhile I wish to assure the Department, in regard to the instructions contained in its circular telegram under reference, that I have lost no opportunity in the past to inform the competent authorities of our trade policy as outlined in instructions and radio bulletins, and will lose no time in availing myself of such new opportunities as may arise, particularly with reference to the Department’s confidential instruction of March 11, 1936, 7 and to the Secretary’s speech of May 22nd in New York. Respectfully yours, Lincoln MacVeagh 4 Not printed. 5 Hermann Goering, German Minister for Aviation. 6 Not printed. 6 Not printed. 7 See bracketed note, p. 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 406 ] . The Minister in Bulgaria (Sterling) to the Secretary of State 662.7431/28 [Document 410] The Minister in Bulgaria ( Sterling ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 245 Sofia , June 23, 1936. [Received July 7.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s circular telegram of June 17, 4 p.m., and my reply of June 19, 1 p.m., 8 and to submit the following supplementary information concerning the visit of Dr. Schacht to Bulgaria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If the concrete results of the visit were not important, there is no doubt that it caused a considerable stir in view of the general uneasiness due to the increasing concentration of Bulgarian trade in Germany. This tension was aggravated by a series of remarks of a political nature made by Dr. Schacht in the course of his interviews and speeches. Some of them are hard to explain, unless, as has been suggested, he did not attach much significance to the Sofia visit, and was in a state of pleasant relaxation—he made almost affectionate references to attachments made with Bulgaria during the war when he served with the provisioning board—after the more trying negotiations in Belgrade and Athens. Especially resented was the attitude that Bulgaria was in effect a German colony, and that this country should so direct its productive energies as to supply the goods which will be most useful in the event of war, Bulgaria naturally to be allied with Germany. His principal speech, as summarized in the press, had received the generous attention of the censor, and was too disjointed to give any clear view of his thought. As reported by persons present, his thesis seems to have been that Bulgaria is historically and economically complementary to Germany; that the economic doctrines of Germany would best serve Bulgaria; and that Bulgaria should supply herself with industrial equipment from Germany, continue the satisfactory progress in the production of vegetable oils and other technical crops, and make another effort to exploit what mineral resources are available, all against future political developments in this part of Europe. In developing the theme of German economic doctrines he pointed out the risks to be incurred from contact with countries with weak and depreciated currencies—specifically the United States!—to which he joined a warning against confidence in, or expectation of support from, the League of Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Officials of the National Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the Export Institute have followed with interest the development of the American policy of trade agreements, and agree with it in principle. They would like, of course, to be set free from the clearing agreements which restrict their export trade, but do not see their way clear to remove the earlier evil, the foreign exchange restrictions. They hold that the volume of trade between the United States and Bulgaria is so small, amounting to only 1.2 percent of Bulgarian commerce in 1935, that adherence to the American policy would be disastrous unless Central European countries can be induced to join the movement. Respectfully yours, F. A. Sterling 8 Latter not printed. The Minister in Austria (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State 662.6331/337 [Document 411] The Minister in Austria ( Messersmith ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 813 Vienna , June 24, 1936. [Received July 7.] Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department’s circular telegram of June 17, 4 p.m., requesting the submission of a brief telegraphic report on the significance of the visit which Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank in Berlin, is making to various European capitals, which report is to be followed by a more complete written report. In accord with this instruction, I telegraphed the Department in my No. 32 of June 20, 10 a.m. 10 that while Dr. Schacht had spent the night of June 10 in Vienna, he had not had any conversations with officials of the Austrian Government here. I now have to transmit the following more full report, giving the information which is available here concerning the significance of the visit of Dr. Schacht. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aside from the convenience in breaking his trip by airplane here, there is, however, I think, reason to believe that Dr. Schacht also broke his journey here in order to have the opportunity to discuss various matters with the German Minister, Mr. von Papen. Although Dr. Schacht and Mr. von Papen may not thoroughly agree with all aspects of Germany’s present foreign policy, particularly with respect to Southeastern Europe, they are in agreement with the party policy, which is really German policy, to the effect that all of Southeastern Europe is the natural economic hinterland of Germany. This is a point in German policy which is not only National Socialist and therefore not new, and is a point on which practically all Germans who do any thinking agree. There are many Germans still who do not believe that the policy of endeavoring to force German political supremacy over Southeastern Europe is either a safe or a wise one. It is definitely National Socialist policy that political supremacy must either follow or even precede economic dependence and penetration in this area. Dr. Schacht and Mr. von Papen belong to that school in Germany which believes that German economic penetration must be achieved by any means at the disposal of Germany, but in such a way as not to precipitate a conflict with anyone. They believe that this economic penetration will be followed by political dependence and in certain cases by such impairment of sovereignty that it may lead in the end to German territorial aggrandisement. Mr. von Papen has made no secret since his stay in Vienna of his belief that all Southeastern Europe is economically a hinterland of Germany and that Germany has special interests in this area to the exclusion of the other great powers. He and his predecessor here, Dr. Rieth, have in moments of frankness spoken of the interest of the other powers in Southeastern Europe as an intrusion and as a presumption. Mr. von Papen has never considered that his field of activity as Minister to Austria is confined to that country, and has therefore very definitely concerned himself in an active way with political and economic developments in the other countries in this area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . After having completed his visit to Belgrade, Athens and Sofia, Dr. Schacht stopped at Budapest before returning to Berlin. Mr. Tyler, who, as the Department knows, is an American citizen and who is the adviser of the Hungarian National Bank, spent this last Sunday in Vienna, and I had the privilege of a three-hour talk with him. Mr. Tyler is, as the Department knows, a serious and trusted adviser of the Hungarian Government. He informed me that the visit of Dr. Schacht to Budapest did not have the same significance that it had to Belgrade, Athens and Sofia. While in Budapest Dr. Schacht had had long conversations with the President of the Hungarian National Bank and with other officials. The entire trade position between the two countries had been closely gone into. The Hungarian officials pointed out that the position of the trade relations between Hungary and Germany had changed completely in the last few years, and that the German debit balance to the Hungarian National Bank was now much too great for comfort. The bank, therefore, was taking measures to reduce this balance, which would involve reduction of German exports to Hungary, and Hungary was prepared to accomplish this by reducing Hungarian exports to Germany. This involved a sacrifice for Hungary, but it was necessary to do this, as Germany owed the Hungarian National Bank much too much for comfort. Mr. Tyler said that Dr. Schacht did not offer any particular objection to this procedure of the bank, which perhaps somewhat surprised the officials of the bank, who expected more resistance. Mr. Tyler was inclined to attribute this attitude of Dr. Schacht in Budapest to a desire not to disturb the German position in Hungary, which has so steadily become better. The economic position in Hungary for Germany is not so important as it is in some of the other Southeastern European countries. Practically the entire Hungarian Government and the higher command of the Hungarian Army are definitely pro-German. The major exceptions to this are Mr. de Kanya, the Foreign Minister, and the Secretary General in the Foreign Office, Baron Apor, who are of the opinion that this pro-German orientation is much too premature and therefore dangerous for Hungary. The Regent, without taking definite sides, is inclined towards the attitude of the Foreign Minister, Mr. de Kanya. Mr. Tyler was of the opinion that Dr. Schacht, knowing how favorable the German position in Hungary is, did not wish to do anything in any way to disturb the Hungarian Government. He is of the opinion that the visit of Dr. Schacht to Budapest was, therefore, more in the way of a courtesy than with the desire to achieve anything definite at this time. I am merely transmitting these observations of Mr. Tyler’s as they may be of interest in connection with the reports which the Department will receive from Budapest. I believe that the Department is correct in assuming that the present policy of the German Government with respect to Southeastern Europe, of which the visit of Dr. Schacht is a definite indication, offers specific dangers for our trade agreement policy and also for economic and political peace and security in Europe. As I have pointed out in this despatch, there can be no doubt as to the definite economic objectives of Germany in Southeastern Europe. These, entirely apart from the political expansionist objectives of the present German Government, present real dangers, not only for the economic and political independence of these countries, but also for peace and security in Europe. The present German thesis is that economic penetration must be followed by political dependence, if this does not precede it. Germany does consider that she has special interests in all of Southeastern Europe and she considers the interest of the other major countries in that region as a presumption and as an interference. Germany’s policy, therefore, in recent years has been directed towards keeping up disunion among the Southeastern European states and increasing her own trade with them by all means possible. Germany has, therefore, been definitely opposed to any collective agreements, economic as well as political, between the Danubian and Southeastern European states. She wants to keep the field clear for the making of bilateral agreements, in which Germany will have, because of the economic position she will have achieved vis-à-vis these states, specific advantages with respect to the other major European states. As a part of this policy, therefore, Germany has protested vigorously in Prague and Vienna against the putting into effect on July 1 of this year of the Czechoslovak-Austrian trade treaty which was signed early this year. 11 This treaty was the first important concrete expression of the will of the South-Eastern European states to make among themselves economic agreements open to all the other states, and which would have the tendency not only to strengthen the economic position of the states separately, but also to fortify their external position politically. This Czechoslovak-Austrian treaty, which was not concluded without difficulty by the states concerned, was too definite an expression of the will of the Southeastern European states to follow a certain path for Germany to accept it. Her vigorous protest, therefore, against this treaty, which has resulted in the decision of these countries to delay the putting into effect of the treaty, will also encourage certain other countries, such as Switzerland, to make similar protests. Germany has, therefore, definitely blocked for the present this movement towards economic cooperation among the Southeastern European states, and this not because she is so definitely interested in sharing in the concessions which Austria and Czechoslovakia make to each other, but because she wants to interfere with these agreements and keep the way open, as I have already pointed out, for purely bilateral agreements. For the making of these bilateral agreements on terms so advantageous to her and so disadvantageous to the other major European states, that is, to fasten her political and economic hegemony over Southeastern Europe, Germany has in the last few years proceeded on a definite plan. She has permitted herself to build up huge debits in practically all of these countries, and through her inability to pay, even if the desire were there, she has forced these states to increase their purchases from her. It is not for this Legation at Vienna to report on the degree to which this economic penetration has already taken place. So far as Austria is concerned, her trade with Germany, in spite of the unfavorable political relations, has steadily progressed. In the case of a country like Rumania over 50% of her exports now go to Germany. It would be interesting to have a report which will bring together in compact form tables showing the change in the trade between Germany and these respective Southeastern European states in the last few years. It would, I am sure, show to a startling degree how this economic penetration of Germany has already progressed. Some of these countries are alarmed over the position in which they find themselves already, and the visit of Dr. Schacht has undoubtedly for one of its ends the calming of these fears and preparing the way for decreasing these German debit balances through further taking of German goods, and therefore through further dependence on Germany. The Southeastern European states formerly hoped that through the clearing agreements they would be able to maintain their position of economic and political independence. They now realize that these clearing agreements have broken down and they are practically in the position where they have to take more goods. One has to realize situations like this set forth in the preceding paragraphs to appreciate how sinister these fascist and dictatorial governments are, because of the methods which they do not hesitate to use. We have developed a trade agreements program at home through the President and the Secretary, which is not only in our interest but in the general interest of all countries. The program is, I understand, sufficiently elastic to take into account certain special situations which exist in different parts of the world, and such a special situation, I believe, does exist among the Danubian states. The position in this part of the world is such that I think we must admit the principle of certain preferences among these states as long as we share with the major states all the preferences which may be accorded to the major states. I believe that we could make agreements, for example, with Austria and Czechoslovakia and all these other states within the framework of our trade agreements program and admitting these preferences among the smaller states themselves, on the basis that we stand on the same footing with the major powers, such as France, England, Germany and Italy. It is doubtful whether the autocratic governments of Germany and Italy will permit this. Italy has special privileges with Hungary and Austria under the Rome Protocols, 12 but it is true that she gives compensations and has, in fact, so far given more than she received. These Rome Protocols were really an endeavor on the part of Italy to maintain the economic position in these countries, in order to support their independence. It is quite possible that Italy with respect to these preferences could be brought into an amenable position, as she is interested principally in the maintaining of the political position. The present German Government, however, seems to be insistent on playing a dog in the manger policy, as indicated by her action with respect to the Czechoslovak-Austrian treaty already recited. Germany has other plans for imposing her economic as well as political will on Southeastern Europe. I have mentioned this aspect of the situation, for the existence of these dictatorships in several countries is as distinct an obstacle to economic peace as it is to political peace. The Department is wise in assuming, therefore, that the activities of Dr. Schacht as a part of the present German program are a distinct threat to our trade agreements program, but this is only one of the ways in which dictatorships have and will continue to upset all reasonable and wise arrangements between peoples. Any student of the European problem must realize that there is a certain basis to the contention of Germany that Southeastern Europe is its natural economic hinterland. The consuming power of the sixty-five million inhabitants of Germany is great, and greater than that of any other great power on the Continent. In spite of the present situation in Germany, in the long run the consuming power of these sixty-five millions must be envisaged as growing rather than decreasing. A Germany which is to a degree and will continue to be a country highly industrialized will have to have a more agricultural Southeastern Europe as a natural hinterland. Any arrangements which would tend to disturb such a natural situation and flow of trade would be dangerous to peace in continental Europe, but similarly just so dangerous to peace and economic stability are the pretensions of that group in Germany which believes that close economic relations of Germany with Southeastern Europe mean political dependence on Germany. The solution is to be found, I believe, in these Southeastern European states being permitted to make among themselves economic agreements which will do away with the barriers which are now causing so much distress and dislocation, and the major powers in Europe and elsewhere recognizing these preferences which the smaller states may accord to each other, without necessarily insisting on sharing therein, except to the degree they may be accorded to any non-Southeastern European country. Such a principle could be recognized by both Germany and Italy without interfering with certain natural advantages which they will inevitably enjoy in their trade relations with these states, if they are prepared to recognize the sovereignty and independence of these states. We are, however, I believe, unable to make any trade agreements with these Southeastern European states under our trade agreement program for the present until the political situation in Europe will have at least lost some of its uncertainties or until the present Governments in Berlin and to a degree in Rome have given an indication that they will not place such insuperable obstacles in the way of such agreements. For the moment the pressure which the political situation in Europe and the military pressure from certain directions exert on the countries in Southeastern Europe seem an insuperable obstacle in the way of definite progress with our program in this part of the world, or any progress among these states themselves in settling their serious economic problems. I have not failed, in accord with the admonition in the last paragraph of the Department’s telegram of June 17, 4 p.m., to already bring to the attention of the Austrian Government the broad objectives of our trade agreement program, and have not failed to point out the ultimate dangers of bilateral agreements. The Department may be assured that I shall continue to use every favorable opportunity to discuss this matter with the appropriate Austrian authorities. I may say in this connection that the Austrian Government is quite alive to the dangers of the German program and fears that it will soon begin to feel the results of the German economic pressure on other countries of Southeastern Europe. In fact, Austria is one of the countries which is definitely bound to feel the results of the German program. Already under the clearing arrangements between Austria and Germany, Germany is taking more Austrian cattle and agricultural products and refusing to take fabricated goods, which in so many lines are in competition with German goods in Germany. The increasing taking of German goods in other countries of Southeastern Europe which are a natural market for Austrian fabricated goods is bound to affect the Austrian industrial situation, and the use of blocked marks and blocked balances in these countries gives Germany a price advantage which will in the end work disastrously for Austria. The position which has developed and which is making such rapid progress is perhaps no more relished in other Southeastern European countries than it is in Austria, but for the present they see no solution to their difficulties. At present it is only the breakdown of this iniquitous system practiced by Germany which can be envisaged as the preventive to these countries being reduced to economic slavery and political subjection. I was informed in the greatest confidence in Berlin that Dr. Schacht quite appreciates this position and that he has expressed the opinion that if the revolving credits which Germany has in England and in the United States were to be curtailed, it would lead very rapidly to the impossibility of Germany carrying on its external trade policy, as well as inability to continue her internal industrial program and re-armament. I am not able to state to what degree these revolving credits are the means on which Germany is continuing her internal and external policy, but there is much reason to believe that the great powers which will in the end be most prejudiced by this German program have a powerful weapon in their hands in these credits, which they have so far not seen fit to use. There is transmitted herewith, as of interest to the Department, an article from the London Times of June 22 13 in the form of a despatch from its Vienna correspondent. Respectfully yours, George S. Messersmith 10 Not printed. 11 Signed April 2, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxx , p. 51. 12 Signed on March 17, 1934, by Austria, Hungary, and Italy for the promotion of closer economic and political relations among the signatory States, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cliv , pp. 281, 287, and 297. 13 Not reprinted. The Minister in Yugoslavia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 660H.6231/66 [Document 412] The Minister in Yugoslavia ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] No. 538 Belgrade , June 25, 1936. [Received July 7.] Sir : Referring to the Department’s circular telegram of June 17, 1936, I have the honor to report that Dr. Schacht, Minister for National Economy of the German Reich and President of the Reichsbank, concluded a two-day visit to Belgrade when he departed for Athens on the morning of June 13. He was accompanied by Dr. Reinhart, Balkan expert of the German Ministry of Economics, and Dr. Just the clearing expert of the Reichsbank. Dr. Schacht will also visit Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest. The German Minister’s tour has been a subject of keen attention and speculation in the local and especially in the foreign press; and the latter seized the occasion to sound a warning that Dr. Schacht was launching an economic offensive directed toward bringing the Danubian and Balkan States under the economic wing of Germany, which would tend toward closer political relations. In spite of Dr. Schacht’s declarations that his visit was in no sense a political one and that he was an economist and not a politician I am in agreement with this view. It is my opinion that he is conducting an astute economic political policy designed to bring the States of Eastern and Southeastern Europe economically under German dominance and which will possibly eventuate in their political dependency. As the Department is aware, German economic policy in the Danube and Balkan States has been to become heavily indebted through being a good customer and paying high prices; and then when pressed for payment to insist it could only be made in goods. There is no doubt in my mind, nor in the minds of those with whom I have discussed the subject, that the German Minister’s object here was to consolidate the position already attained and to urge the benefits of increasing the volume of trade between the two countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Referring again to the Department’s confidential circular telegram of June 17, 1936, I have the honor to report that on several occasions I have had conversations with Mr. Stoyadinovitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning the broad economic policy of the American Government which the Secretary of State has so frequently set forth in his speeches, and with special reference to the ultimate danger of bilateral commercial agreements such as Germany is now endeavoring to conclude with various Balkan and other countries. I have found Mr. Stoyadinovitch extremely well informed as to the present economic policy of the American Government, for he is not only a practical business man but has also long been a student of economic questions. He has also made long visits to the United States, one during the present presentation [ sic ], and is far more conversant with and interested in American affairs than are public men generally in this part of the world. Mr. Stoyadinovitch seemed willing to concede that the system of commercial agreements on the American line came closer to the ideal than did the bilateral agreements which are springing up in this part of the world. But the special geographic, economic, and even political situation of Yugoslavia made it necessary, he said, for that country to follow its present course. A few days before the receipt of the Department’s above mentioned circular telegram I had a conversation on the same subject with Dr. Pilja, the newly appointed Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs. Dr. Pilja had been previously an official at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and has only recently been promoted by Mr. Stoyadinovitch to the post of Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs for the special purpose of dealing with economic and financial questions which come to that Ministry. Dr. Pilja represented the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on the Commission which prepared the decree for the control of imports (Legation’s telegrams Nos. 20 and 21 of June 13 and 17, respectively 14 ). It was to discuss this question, which seems to me an indirect way of favoring economic relations with Germany to the detriment of the United States and certain other countries, that I called upon Dr. Pilja for the first time, and I took this occasion to try to explain to him also the broad policy concerning commercial agreements now being followed by the United States. I found him also surprisingly well informed concerning that policy and what has already been accomplished by the United States in putting it into practice. He repeated in general, however, the arguments of Mr. Stoyadinovitch and then went on at considerable length to explain why Yugoslavia had been obliged to issue the recent decree restricting imports. He said it was unfortunate that the foreign and even the local press had persisted in seeing in this measure an instrument intended to favor commercial relations with Germany to the detriment of certain other countries, which, he insisted, was not the case. I am absolutely convinced, however, that in spite of his assertion, that this will be the actual effect of the control. With reference to articles of American origin which will be affected by the terms of the decree, Mr. Pilja stated quite clearly that if the United States wished to export American products to Yugoslavia it must make up its mind to import an approximate equivalent of Yugoslav products. When and if an equilibrium is attained, the restrictions against the American products in question will, as it may be said, automatically disappear. Last year, 1935, he stated, there was not much difference in the trade balance between the two countries—about 4,000,000 dinars; but the first four months of 1936 had shown a very great falling off of Yugoslav exports to the United States and an increase of American imports into Yugoslavia, so that a trade balance very unfavorable to Yugoslavia now exists. Under these conditions Yugoslavia, he added, could not continue to pay for American goods in foreign exchange and, therefore, had turned for the same articles to countries with which it had clearing agreements, and under present conditions it seemed that Germany would be the first beneficiary. As a result of my conversation I am somewhat under the impression that Dr. Pilja himself, like many other Yugoslavs (Legation’s despatch No. 542 of June 23, 1936 15 ), fully realizes with some concern the danger of Yugoslavia becoming the economic and eventually, perhaps, the political satellite of Germany. But at the present time, and under present conditions, he sees no alternate course for his country.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It may be said, I think, that in so far as actual present results are considered, the visits of Dr. Schacht to Yugoslavia and other Danube countries have been from the German point of view successes, but I also believe that at the same time it has opened the eyes of many persons in the countries he visited to the dangers of the economic and, possibly, the political hegemony of Germany. Respectfully yours, Charles S. Wilson 14 Neither printed. 15 Not printed. Interest of the United States in liberalizing the policy of the International Rubber Committee with respect to the world supply of rubber Interest of the United States in liberalizing the policy of the International Rubber Committee with respect to the world supply of rubber 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 615 ff. [413] The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State The Hague, May 1, 1936. [Received May 9.] 856D.6176/356 [414] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) Washington, September 16, 1936—6 p.m. 800.6176/14: Telegram [415] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, September 22, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 22—11:20 a.m.] 800.6176/18: Telegram (part air) [416] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, September 23, 1936. [Received October 2.] 800.6176/28 [417] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) Washington, September 24, 1936—5 p.m. 800.6176/18: Telegram [418] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 24, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 24—2:25 p.m.] 800.6176/19: Telegram [419] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, September 26, 1936—11 a.m. 800.6176/19: Telegram [420] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 28, 1936—11 a.m. [Received September 28—5:28 a.m.] 800.6176/22: Telegram [421] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, September 28, 1936—4 p.m. [Received September 28—12:55 p.m.] 800.6176/23: Telegram [422] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, September 29, 1936. [Received October 9.] 800.6176/30 [423] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, October 1, 1936—noon. [Received October 1—9:15 a.m.] 800.6176/26: Telegram [424] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 5, 1936—4 p.m. 856D.6176/370a: Telegram [425] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, December 12, 1936—noon. [Received December 14—6:55 a.m.] 856D.6176/373: Telegram (part air) [426] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 15, 1936—7 p.m. [Received December 15—3:45 p.m.] 856D.6176/374: Telegram [427] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 17, 1936—6 p.m. 856D.6176/374: Telegram [428] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) Washington, December 24, 1936—noon. 856D.6176/373: Telegram [429] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State The Hague, December 28, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] 856D.6176/378 The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State 856D.6176/356 [Document 413] The Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) to the Secretary of State No. 423 The Hague , May 1, 1936. [Received May 9.] Sir : I have the honor to report that increased world consumption of rubber, the consequent reduction in rubber stocks and fairly steady prices have brought about a feeling of satisfaction among Netherlands Government officials and business men connected with the rubber trade. This is true in general and optimism is encountered more frequently than it was six months ago, when everyone gave the rubber situation a cold, analytical inspection which did not uncover anything very encouraging. There was in fact little to prove that the restriction plan was a success. 2 It is not yet a complete success but there is no longer any attempt to deny that planters and traders alike find the outlook more pleasant than two years ago, when the scheme was first adopted. The international rubber committee met in London on April 28th, and voted to increase the production quota from 60% to 65% or, vice versa, to decrease the restriction percentage from 40% to 35% for the two final quarters of the year 1936. This action (the first increase since the organization of the committee) in itself is an indication of an optimistic outlook on the part of Government experts. It was unexpected by the trade and caused a flurry in rubber prices, but Government experts and speculators always differ as to what constitutes a satisfactory figure for world stocks and consequently as to the correct application of the restriction. It is my understanding that Government experts here consider that half a million tons is not too great a reserve supply, whereas people in the trade think that three hundred thousand tons would be more advantageous. However, the outlook for the future must seem satisfactory in the eyes of the International Committee experts at least, since world stocks are supposed at present to be over half a million tons and yet an increase in production has been voted. As far as the Dutch planters are concerned, there is still a very unsatisfactory situation in regard to native producers. The Department has been kept informed by the Consulate General in Batavia concerning this problem, so it will be unnecessary to comment at length. It is sufficient to say that the Government’s (actually Premier and Minister of the Colonies Colijn’s) idea that exports of native rubber should be restricted by application of export duties, has not been a success. It was the wish of the East Indian Government originally to avoid individual restriction and to give the native grower as much freedom as possible while controlling exports and prices through the application of a duty which, originally Fl. 10.00 per one hundred kilos, was expected to be effective and which has since had to be raised gradually to Fl. 35.00 per hundred. With each slight increase in the price of rubber the native growers were apparently able to make a small profit despite the very high export tax, so that whereas originally plans were made, in connection with the restriction scheme, to prevent native rubber exports in excess of ninety thousand tons, the East Indian Government is now struggling with the problem of controlling native exports of about one hundred and fifty thousand tons. Exports of non-plantation rubber for the month of March were estimated at fifteen thousand tons. By this token, native export figures for the first quarter will exceed the quota by about five thousand tons. This explains the two most recent increases in the export duty, i. e., April 6th, to Fl. 34.00 per hundred kilos and April 19th to Fl. 35.00 per hundred kilos. The problem still remains unsolved and the Government may turn to another plan as Premier Colijn is determined to reduce native production. This determination, as pointed out in previous despatches, remains our safeguard for high price rubber means increased native growing. Respectfully yours, Grenville T. Emmet 2 The rubber producers’ restriction agreement was signed on April 28, 1934; see telegram No. 30, same date, from the Minister in the Netherlands, Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 657 . The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) 800.6176/14: Telegram [Document 414] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) 3 Washington , September 16, 1936—6 p.m. 26. It is our understanding that the current rate of release of crude rubber, as set by the International Rubber Regulation Committee, is not sufficient to meet the current consumption requirements of the world. As a result, world stocks have been declining even more rapidly than anticipated and have reached a point where they create the possibility and danger of inadequate supplies and unreasonably high prices. It is our feeling that the avowed purposes of the international regulation scheme cannot be carried out and the legitimate interests of consumers as well as of producers cannot be safeguarded unless the Committee provides for an increase in the release of rubber in the near future. With the annual rate of consumption in the United States estimated as exceeding 530,000 tons annually, stocks in the United States had already dwindled by the end of July to less than 230,000 tons, less than a 6-months’ supply, which is considered by American manufacturers as the minimum safety level. The Rubber Manufacturers Association, of the United States, is represented on the Consumers Panel of the International Committee by Colonel A. F. Townsend, Chairman of the Board of the Association and Chairman of Raybestos-Manhattan Company. Colonel Townsend is now on his way to England to attend the meeting of the International Committee about September 27. Associated with Colonel Townsend at this meeting will be Mr. William de Krafft, Chairman of the Finance Committee and Vice President of the United States Rubber Company. It is understood that these gentlemen wish to confer with members of the International Committee in London and in The Hague, and perhaps with officials of the two Governments, in advance of the Committee’s meeting. They probably will call at the Legation before arranging these conferences, and it will be appreciated if you will give them every appropriate assistance. I wish you to prepare the way for this meeting by discussing this entire matter with appropriate officials of the Government. You should check upon our understanding of the facts and if the statement of the situation as set forth above appears to be substantially correct you should stress the concern of this Government and of American rubber consuming interests and should urge that appropriate action be taken by the International Committee. It appears to the Department that prices may be already above the level which could justifiably be considered fair and reasonable and that the statistical position of supplies is now such that rubber prices may very well rise considerably higher if an announcement is not forthcoming from the International Committee in the near future that additional supplies will be released. Hull 3 Substantially the same telegram on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as Department’s No. 339. The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/18: Telegram (part air) [Document 415] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , September 22, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 22—11:20 a.m.] 36. Department’s telegram 26, September 16th, 6 p.m. Colonel Townsend and de Krafft are still in London and according to Baron Van Lynden of the United States Rubber Company they may not come to The Hague before the meeting of the International Committee on September 29th. If they should do so I have arranged for them to talk with Van Gelderen, rubber expert of the Ministry of Colonies, Bolderhey, chief Netherlands member of the Rubber Committee, and Premier Colijn if necessary. In the meantime have obtained the following information: Netherlands members of the International Committee will not insist on a reduction in percentage of restriction at this time. Premier Colijn does not believe that there is any danger at the present, his opinion being based on the official figures which do not at all correspond with those quoted by the Department They are as follows: world stocks on June 1st (including afloat) 499,000 tons, exports June to December 530,000 tons, consumption June to December 570,000 tons, excess consumption 40,000 tons, world stock on December 31st, 1936, estimated approximately 459,000 tons. They admit that if world rubber stocks were only 300,000 tons there would be real danger of excessive prices; they also admit that the year 1937 will present a more difficult problem in the control of prices since their own native rubber restriction export tax is to be abandoned for a system of individual native restriction on January 1st and it will follow that there will be less native rubber and it will bring a higher price. For this reason a reduction in the percentage of restriction of from 5 to 10 percent is considered a possibility or even a probability for next year. The Dutch official members of Committee would like to see more rubber released now but consider that British opposition would be too insistent. In view of foregoing does the Department wish me to take any action before the meeting of the Rubber Committee? I am fairly certain that their plans cannot be altered at this time. Does not Department agree that, in view of Premier Colijn’s repeated assurances and the fact that [after?] 2 years of restriction the price of rubber remains stable and satisfactory, we should defer our protests or inquiries until later when the situation will contain new elements and uncertainties? Wilson The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/28 [Document 416] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 548 The Hague , September 23, 1936. [Received October 2.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Legation’s confidential telegram No. 36, of September 22, 1 p.m., 1936, concerning the meeting of the International Rubber Committee to be held in London on September 29th and the possible visit of Colonel Townsend of the Committee and Mr. de Krafft, of the United States Rubber Company, to The Hague in that connection. I have almost nothing to add to the telegram, except to say that I am personally convinced that there is no change in the attitude of Premier Colijn and other Netherlands officials, that is to say, that they are still strongly opposed to the British idea of higher prices for rubber. As the Department will recall, Sir John Campbell and Mr. Eric Miller were in favor of ten pence gold a pound and are believed to be still in favor of raising the price through the restriction plan. In any case, I gather that while Mr. Bolderhey and other Dutch representatives might favor a ten per cent decrease in the restriction, they feel that the British would not follow at this time. I do not gather that the British are considered to be irrevocably opposed to a decrease when the time seems right. Presumably the right time would be when stocks are reduced to less than 350,000 tons. The fact that the tonnage figures quoted by the Department in its telegram No. 26, of September 16, 6 p.m., 1936 are not those which are used for working purposes by the Committee or by the Netherlands or British Government, seems to me a matter which requires some adjustment. Do the figures used by the Department for world stocks include all stocks afloat and in storage in the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Penang? I do not know whether the Department prefers not to accept the official figures of the Rubber Committee, but they are available in pamphlet form once a month and should, I think, be forwarded regularly by the Embassy in London. Basing their calculations on the figures given in the Legation’s above-mentioned telegram, the conclusion reached by the Netherlands experts,—and they are in everything that has to do with rubber Mr. Bolderhey and Professor van Gelderen of the Ministry of the Colonies,—seem to be convinced that there is no danger for the present of a shortage of world rubber stocks in the technical sense. In this connection they ask a question which at first glance seems difficult to answer, i. e., why is it that if the American rubber companies fear excessive rubber prices they are not for the moment stocking up and increasing their purchases? It is a fact that American stocks declined nearly 25,000 tons from January to June. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, Warden McK. Wilson The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) 800.6176/18: Telegram [Document 417] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) Washington , September 24, 1936—5 p.m. 27. Your 36, September 22, 1 p.m. The International Committee’s rubber statistics cited by Premier Colijn correspond substantially with our understanding of the world situation. Do not confuse these with statistics of American stocks and American consumption contained in the Department’s No. 26. The Department does not wish to enter a formal protest against the International Committee’s policies at the present time. Please see the appropriate officials of the Dutch Government again, however, and express the strong feeling of this Government that stocks have already been brought to a sufficiently low level and prices raised to a sufficiently high level to meet the expressed purposes of the international control scheme. Rubber prices during the last few months have reached the highest point since the present restriction scheme was instituted, in spite of the International Committee’s recent reduction in the percentage of restriction. It seems logical to expect further increases in prices as a result of the expected further reduction of stocks during the last months of this year if the International Committee does not give some evidence of its intention to pursue a policy of maintaining adequate supplies by a further reduction of the rate of restriction for the early part of next year if not for the last quarter of this year. You should assure the Dutch officials again that this Government appreciates and values Premier Colijn’s continued determination to seek a reasonable administration of the restriction program. As an alternative to the release of more rubber during the last quarter of this year, as reputedly desired by the Netherlands officials and opposed by the British, it is hoped that the Dutch representatives on the International Committee will seek a compromise at the meeting on September 29 to provide for additional releases of 5 to 10 percent beginning with January 1937. Moore The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/19: Telegram [Document 418] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , September 24, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 24—2:25 p.m.] 442. I arranged that Atherton and Butterworth 4 should meet with Sir John Campbell 5 and a representative of the Foreign Office today in connection with your 339, September 16, 6 p.m. 6 Application was made for an earlier date in an attempt to avoid what did occur, namely, Campbell interviewing Townsend before the latter called at the Embassy. It seems clear from the conversation that Campbell, and probably the Committee, will not favor a further quota release at the September 29 meeting. Campbell personally resents, and he intimated that the Committee resented, the recent reports appearing in the press indicating that American consuming interests are pressing for such an increase. He frankly stated that both he and the Committee also resented Townsend’s efforts in this direction, particularly his telegraphic request to Campbell for a special meeting in mid-August, which Campbell on his own authority turned down, his action afterwards being fully approved by the other members of the Committee. Campbell’s view of the Committee is that it is the international body charged with the control and that it should deal with its work without benefit of outside influence. Campbell stressed the difficulty of arriving at a figure for normal stocks since the rubber industry had never enjoyed a period of normality, but it came out in the discussion that his personal view, which he afterwards requested should be treated as confidential, was that world stocks should be 4½-months’ supply. He maintains that world stocks now constitute 6-months’ supply. Incidentally he mentioned that Krafft in a recent conversation with him had been willing to accept 4 months as a satisfactory figure. Campbell made much of this throughout the conversation, that the large American consumers were not really represented by Townsend. It also seems clear that Campbell and probably the Committee do not regard the present price of rubber as a maximum figure. Campbell in fact complained that the recent reports of American consumer dissatisfaction had hurt the rubber market and forced a decline in price. Although under questioning he admitted that it was slight and from the highest level it was quite apparent that a further gradual price increase is desired. However, Campbell is probably very anxious to avoid any violent price movements. The conference lasted more than an hour, a substantial portion of which was taken up by Campbell’s praise of the “fair and decent” attitude of his Committee. At one point he accused us of a suspicious attitude. The Embassy stated in reply that the American Government was frankly concerned about the situation, an attitude which should be understandable in view of our past experience with rubber restriction, and it was for that reason that it was deemed advisable to come and put our viewpoint quite frankly before the Chairman of the International Committee. Campbell’s attitude was briefly that the line of discussion lay in the realm of opinion; that if the American Government would make a formal factual case and present it through the usual channels, it would be answered in like manner but he saw fit to give his personal opinion that any such action would cause irritation in the Committee. Copy to The Hague. Bingham 4 Ray Atherton and William W. Butterworth, Counselor and Second Secretary of Embassy, respectively. 5 Economic and Financial Adviser to the British Colonial Office. 6 See footnote 3, p. 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 800.6176/19: Telegram [Document 419] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , September 26, 1936—11 a.m. 348. Your 442, September 24, 5 p.m. Your report of the conversation of Atherton and Butterworth with Sir John Campbell gives further emphasis to the difficult situation existing with respect to the leadership in both rubber control and tin control. Further instructions may be sent to you in the near future regarding this situation. In the meantime you are authorized, if you see no objection, to place the following facts before Sir John Campbell or other appropriate officials of the British Government: 1. It was understood that the Consumers’ Panel was created by the International Committee and that the Rubber Manufacturers Association was invited by the International Committee to appoint a representative on this panel. Unless this action on the part of the Committee was a completely empty gesture, it is difficult to understand how efforts of members of this panel to secure adequate protection of consumers’ interests could be considered outside influence or interference by the Committee. 2. The position taken by Colonel Townsend has been fully authorized by the Board of Directors of the Rubber Manufacturers Association, and representatives of the largest rubber consumers, including Firestone, Goodrich, Goodyear and United States, have fully supported this position. 3. Although this Government is not represented on the International Committee in any way, it feels that its interest in the world rubber situation is just as vital and legitimate as the interest of any government represented on the Committee. This Government certainly has no intention of making any demands upon the Committee or of issuing any threats. Its purpose is merely to seek a frank exchange of information and opinion and it is unable to understand how this attitude can cause any resentment or irritation on the part of the International Committee or any of its officials. Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/22: Telegram [Document 420] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , September 28, 1936—11 a.m. [Received September 28—5:28 a.m.] 448. The facts enumerated in your 348, September 26, 11 a.m., I understand were fully covered in the lengthy conversation which took place on September 24. I accordingly venture to suggest in view of the nature of the conversation reported in my 442, September 24, 5 p.m., that it would serve no useful purpose to reopen the matter by reiterating ground already covered. Bingham The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/23: Telegram [Document 421] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , September 28, 1936—4 p.m. [Received September 28—12:55 p.m.] 42. Department’s telegram 27, September 24, 5 p.m. Department’s instruction carried out. Professor Van Gelderen of the Ministry of the Colonies has just telephoned before leaving for London that (1) he agrees in principle with our point of view, (2) the Netherlands Government remains unalterably opposed to excessive prices or fluctuations, (3) he does not believe we should be too anxious about acts of Rubber Committee although he cannot even informally make any statement to me as to the future policy of the Committee. Wilson The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/30 [Document 422] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State No. 553 The Hague , September 29, 1936. [Received October 9.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 27, of September 24, 5 p.m., 1936, and previous correspondence concerning the meeting of the International Rubber Committee in London today and to confirm the Legation’s reply No. 42, of September 28, 4 p.m., in which I reported what Professor van Gelderen had to say in reply to informal representations made pursuant to the Department’s instructions. Professor van Gelderen is, as the Department will recall, the Government’s expert on East Indian rubber matters and one of the two chief Dutch delegates on the International Rubber Committee. Although he was naturally unable to give any assurances concerning the meeting or to say what the position of the Netherlands delegation would be, he did say enough, I think, to show that Colonel Townsend’s visit here and my informal intervention had done no harm and possibly some good. I understand from the Embassy in London that some resentment is felt there at our “suspicions” and what is considered a premature and unnecessary interference on the part of Colonel Townsend. There is no such feeling here and it is almost certain that the Netherlands delegates, while they may not favor a ten per cent increase in the restriction beginning January 1, 1937, will advocate a five per cent change. Presumably the international exchange situation will make it difficult for the Rubber Committee to do its work today. In so far as the pound sterling is concerned, the sudden strength of the dollar may not be permanent but even if Premier Colijn adheres to a “managed currency” instead of a fixed gold parity devaluation, there is little possibility of the florin not being for a long time approximately twenty per cent cheaper against the dollar. This morning the florin is at 1.80 to one dollar instead of 1.47. This would make the price of Dutch East Indies rubber to American manufacturers about what it was last year before the rise to sixteen and a half cents. With this altered exchange rate, American manufacturers can stock up to their hearts’ content and will probably do so, thereby bringing about a scarcity of world stocks which will automatically force the Committee into further releases of rubber. The situation is not at all clear as yet and wont be for several days but presumably the new situation will contain this possibility. Respectfully yours, Warden McK. Wilson The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 800.6176/26: Telegram [Document 423] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , October 1, 1936—noon. [Received October 1—9:15 a.m.] 451. My 448, September 28, 11 a.m., and previous telegrams. Townsend, who is sailing Saturday, called at the Chancery this morning to say that he thought the Embassy’s representations had had a beneficial effect. The currency situation had naturally made any decision impossible at the recent meeting of the International Rubber Committee, but he personally expected that the October 27 meeting would authorize a further release, probably by 5%, beginning January 1st. I gather he obtained this impression from Campbell. Townsend said that he had had satisfactory conversations with his German colleague who felt that the German Government should likewise make representations on behalf of German consumers and he would urge this course on his Government. Bingham The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 856D.6176/370a: Telegram [Document 424] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) 7 Washington , December 5, 1936—4 p.m. 438. Colonel Townsend will arrive on the Queen Mary December 7 to attend the International Rubber Regulation Committee meeting December 15. He will be accompanied by A. L. Viles, President of the Rubber Manufacturers Association, and James J. Newman, Vice President of the B. F. Goodrich Company. It appears that all of the major rubber manufacturers support Townsend as representative of the American industry and would not consent to the substitution of any other representative. Viles and Newman are making the trip at the request of Townsend and the Board of Directors of the Manufacturers Association in order to remove all question of the unity of the American industry in approaching the International Committee and to assist in presenting the American position to members of the Committee. The Department is convinced of the sincerity of these gentlemen and of their qualifications as representatives of the American industry, and it has every reason to believe the position to be taken by them vis-à-vis the International Committee, as described below, is reasonable and well supported by the available facts relative to the international rubber situation. You are instructed to render them every appropriate assistance and, when occasion offers, to emphasize the unity of the American industry and the confidence placed in Colonel Townsend. Independently of the activities of these spokesmen for the American industry, you are requested to place the position of the American Government, as outlined below, before the appropriate officials of the British Government, either orally or in written form, at your discretion. It is intended that your approach should be made directly to the British Government as such, making it clear that there is no intention to interfere with the work of the International Committee or to seek to influence its members directly. The available world supply of rubber in proportion to current absorption has been so greatly reduced in recent months that the recent rapid increase in rubber prices was inevitable. Prices have nearly reached 19 cents and 9 pence per pound and total known world stocks, outside regulated areas, including stocks afloat and in the hands of United Kingdom manufacturers, are now well below 470,000 long tons. Even the present limited stocks of rubber are badly distributed, leaving an actual scarcity in some areas. Probably little free rubber for future delivery is available to buyers and as a result there has been created the danger of greatly rising prices as a result of competitive bidding and the opportunity for a speculative squeeze on the rubber market. Aside from the potential dangers, the Department is of the opinion that the world rubber situation has already become alarming from the standpoint of consumers and distinctly out of line with the assurances to consumers which accompanied the initiation of the present international agreement. 8 It is recognized, of course, that the preamble setting forth the objectives of the International Agreement states only general propositions open to varying interpretation, but it is felt that impartial analysis of the present situation must lead to the following conclusions with respect to those objectives: 1. If present world stocks be considered in relation to present consumption requirements, they must be judged as already below a “normal figure” which would allow the orderly adjustment of supply to demand. 2. The present price level may rightly be considered by consumers to be unfair and inequitable because it will yield returns to efficient producers well above those which might be considered “reasonably remunerative” on the basis of the producers’ own production cost data. The Aide-Mémoire of the British Foreign Office dated April 26, 1934 9 was helpful in interpreting the objectives of the International Agreement. It contained a number of assurances to this Government with respect to the manner in which the interests of consumers would be protected under the regulation scheme. Based upon these assurances, the following remarks on the present situation appear to be pertinent: 1. The primary object of the scheme was stated to be the removal of “excessive stocks” of rubber; it is apparent that there are now no excessive stocks and that in some places stocks are inadequate. 2. Once excessive stocks were removed, it was stated that “all the rubber which consumers require will be forthcoming”; current releases of rubber appear to be more than 10,000 tons short of requirements each month. 3. Stocks in the hands of both dealers and producers appear to be below the ordinary normal requirements, creating an actual vacuum rather than a supply which could be called upon quickly to meet consumers’ requirements. The only action taken by the International Committee to meet this situation has been the announcement that releases for the first 6 months of 1937 will be set at 70 percent, only 5 percent in advance of the present rate. According to conservative estimates of consumption requirements, even a 75-percent rate of release would fall short of providing a balance between supply and demand in 1937. At the request of the Consumers Panel, the International Committee has agreed to discuss the rate of release for 1937 at its December 15 meeting and it is understood that the Consumers Panel, or at least the American representative, will propose a 75–percent rate of release for 1937 and the same rate retroactive for the last quarter of 1936; if the retroactive feature cannot be secured, then releases of at least 80 percent for the first 6 months of 1937 will be requested and 75 percent for the rest of the year. It is the considered opinion of the Department that the rates of release indicated above would represent the absolute minimum required to prevent an already bad situation from becoming worse, provided that permissible exports are promptly shipped from the restriction areas and that present consumption estimates are not exceeded. Even greater releases would appear to be necessary to correct the present situation, which, as indicated above, is considered to be out of line with earlier assurances to consumers. The first few months of the administration of the agreement encouraged considerable confidence in the judgment of the International Committee. It may be that the development of the present dangerous situation can be ascribed as much to unexpectedly heavy consumption as to tardy action by the Committee. This Government does not seek to invite a fruitless discussion or controversy over the interpretation of details of the present situation or of causes of that situation; the one important concern now is prompt and adequate action on the part of the Committee to correct the situation. This Government is reminded of the statements in the Aide-Mémoire of April 26, 1934 that the members of the International Rubber Regulation Committee are selected by the Governments concerned and that, therefore, it cannot be said that the decisions of the Committee will be “unchecked” or that these decisions will not be made with a full sense of responsibility. It is the hope of this Government, therefore, that the British Government will maintain a lively interest in the administration of the International Agreement at this important juncture, to the end that the legitimate interests of consumers may be adequately safeguarded. You may be interested in an extensive study of the rubber situation prepared by E. G. Holt of the Department of Commerce dated December 1, 1936, copies of which have been sent to Assistant Trade Commissioner Lockwood. Moore 7 A similar telegram, which, however, omitted paragraphs referring to the British aide-mémoire of April 26, 1934, was sent as No. 38 on the same date to the Minister in the Netherlands (856D.6176/370b). 8 Agreement Between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, India, the Netherlands, and Siam, To Regulate Production and Export of Rubber, signed May 7, 1934; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxi , p. 203. 9 Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 653 . The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 856D.6176/373: Telegram (part air) [Document 425] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , December 12, 1936—noon. [Received December 14—6:55 a.m.] 68. Department’s telegram 38, December 5, 4 p.m. 10 Colonel Townsend, Mr. Newman and Viles saw Van Gelderen, chief Netherlands Delegate in the International Rubber Committee yesterday afternoon. He gave them satisfactory assurances. The Dutch think more or less as we do but are not prepared to vote for a reduction of restriction to 20 per cent unless they are convinced that there are no technical obstacles and that that much rubber can be delivered. I did some informal groundwork before their arrival but Colonel Townsend thinks that written or oral representations in the sense of the Department’s instruction unnecessary at the moment. I agree. There is no resentment at all here such as appears to exist in London but will nevertheless take no further steps unless instructed. Wilson 10 See footnote 7, p. 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 856D.6176/374: Telegram [Document 426] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 15, 1936—7 p.m. [Received December 15—3:45 p.m.] 612. For Butterworth. 11 Please confer with the appropriate officers in the Department and bring the following to their attention with any background you may offer. At the rubber meeting today 75 per cent release was agreed on for the first 3 months of 1937 and 80 per cent for the second 3 months. Messrs. Townsend, Viles and Newman (see Department’s 438, December 5, 4 p.m.) express satisfaction with this figure and are sailing on the Europa on Thursday. Campbell has expressed himself openly and freely as excessively resentful of the interference by the American Government with an international committee (see my 442, September 24, 5 p.m.) both to these American representatives and to members of the International Rubber Committee. He also has expressed resentment at a letter written to Gwatkin of the Foreign Office based on the Department’s instruction 438, December 5, 4 p.m. a copy of which was apparently forwarded by the Foreign Office to Campbell. After my conversation with the American representatives today I feel that they are returning home having been persuaded by Campbell with British members of the Committee that in spite of resentment caused by the “interference” of this Embassy, the American representatives have succeeded in obtaining the maximum releases possible in view of the limited time before they are to go into effect. I have pointed out to them that any conversations between this Embassy and Campbell of the British Colonial Office are necessarily conducted through and arranged by the Foreign Office; nevertheless, I feel they have been persuaded that any presentation of United States official views directly or indirectly “is inadvisable for the future if it is likely to cause resentment.” I understand they will confer with the Department of State shortly. After your conference with the Department please cable if there are any points not completely clear. Bingham 11 Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom, temporarily in the United States. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 856D.6176/374: Telegram [Document 427] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , December 17, 1936—6 p.m. 449. Your 612, December 15, for Butterworth has been discussed in full and Butterworth concurs in the following. Irrespective of the point of view of American rubber manufacturers, expressed through representation on the Consumers Panel, this Government must continue to have a vital interest in the international rubber situation. Not only are we concerned with the general interests of ultimate consumers, as differentiated from the interests of rubber manufacturers, but also this Government has a vital interest in the protection of the supply of rubber which would be required in the event of a national emergency. It is believed that Townsend and Viles understand the independent position of this Government upon this question but this position will be reemphasized in conferences with them immediately upon their return. A review of the exchange of opinion between this Government and the British Government in regard to the establishment of the international rubber regulation scheme indicates that the British Government recognized the legitimate interest and concern of this Government in the character and operation of the scheme. At the same time the British Government indicated that it would continue to have a vital relation to the International Committee and that it would feel some responsibility for the administration of the scheme. Hence this Government has felt that there was no reason for hesitation in expressing its views frankly to the British Government without in any way seeking to interfere with the work of the International Committee. You are authorized if you see no objection to discuss the entire matter with the Foreign Office. You may wish to say, for the information of the British Government, that this Government has been informed of Campbell’s attitude, that it is at a loss to understand the basis of that attitude, and that it can see no justification for it, especially in view of Campbell’s position in the British Government. If the British Government feels that there is anything irregular in this Government’s expression of interest and opinion respecting the international rubber situation, this Government would of course desire to hear directly from the British Government. Moore The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) 856D.6176/373: Telegram [Document 428] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands ( Emmet ) Washington , December 24, 1936—noon. 43. Department’s telegram 38, December 5, 11a and your 68, December 12. It was the intention of the Department to request you to place the position of this Government in some detail before the Netherland Government, quite independently of the informal support to be given to the representations of Colonel Townsend and associates. This Government has a very important interest in the international rubber situation, not only because of its concern with the general interests of ultimate consumers, as differentiated from the interests of rubber manufacturers, but also because of its concern with the supply of rubber which would be required in the event of a national emergency. It is requested, therefore, that you place these general considerations and the position outlined in the Department’s telegram of December 5 before the appropriate officials of the Netherland Government, pointing out that in the opinion of this Government the action taken by the International Rubber Regulation Committee at its December meeting is not likely to correct fully the tendency toward even more inadequate supplies of rubber and unjustifiably high prices. In view of the reasonable position taken heretofore by the Netherland Government with regard to international rubber regulation, it is the hope of this Government that the Netherland Government will take such action as it can within the premises to ameliorate the situation, particularly by providing as promptly as possible a maximum release of rubber in the Netherland Indies. Moore 11a See footnote 7, p. 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] . The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 856D.6176/378 [Document 429] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State No. 614 The Hague , December 28, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the Department’s telegraphic instruction No. 43, of December 24, 12 noon, 1936, concerning the Rubber Restriction Plan. Today being the first opportunity, I handed a Note to Minister of Foreign Affairs de Graeff, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. 12 It at first seemed best to put the points contained in the Department’s original telegram, No. 38, of December 5, 4 p.m., 1936, in the form of an Aide-Mémoire , but on going over the correspondence for 1934, when our original representations were made, I found that there were repeated indications that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted our official intervention as entirely justified and reasonable. In my conversation today with Minister for Foreign Affairs de Graeff, I brought up this point and he reminded me with some emphasis of what he had previously said, namely, that they were most willing to listen to any opinion or argument which we might wish to present and in whatever form suited us best. During the conversation I asked Jonkheer de Graeff if there was any change to be looked for in Netherlands rubber policy and reminded him of the assurances given us that four and a half English gold pence would be a satisfactory price and one beyond which their restriction policy did not aspire. I pointed out that the present price was considerably more than four and a half English gold pence and was still going up, a thing which seemed to me to prove that the speculators acquainted with world rubber conditions must see eye to eye with the American consumers representatives, who feel that even the increased deliveries permitted by the arrangement of December 15th in London will not suffice to prevent a rubber shortage in 1937. Jonkheer de Graeff was of necessity somewhat noncommittal with regard to details. These matters are not in his bands but are really controlled by Professor van Gelderen in the Ministry of Colonies, under the supervision of Premier Colijn. However, he did repeat that the Netherlands did not want excessively high prices and definitely did not want an improper balance between supply and demand and that we could count on their cooperation. I do not attach great importance to these rather general assurances but will perhaps be in a better position to inform the Department after seeing Professor van Gelderen, which I expect to do tomorrow or next day. Respectfully yours, Warden McK. Wilson 12 Not printed. Preliminary discussions with respect to an international conference on production and marketing of sugar Preliminary discussions with respect to an international conference on production and marketing of sugar 1 1 For previous correspondence in connection with the London Preliminary Conference on Sugar, March 5–10, 1934, see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 664 ff. [430] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, January 3, 1936—4 p.m. [Received January 3—3:50 p.m.] 561.35E1/107: Telegram [431] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, January 10, 1936—8 p.m. 561.35E1/110: Telegram [432] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, February 6, 1936—2 p.m. 561.35E1/121: Telegram [433] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, February 8, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 8—10:35 a.m.] 561.35E1/122: Telegram [434] Memorandum by the Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom (Taylor) to the Chargé (Atherton) London, April 2, 1936. 561.35E1/137 [435] The Economic Adviser (Feis) to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department (Cox) Washington, April 20, 1936. 561.35E1/138 [436] The High Commissioner in the Philippine Islands (Murphy) to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department (Cox) Manila, May 9, 1936. 561.35E1/145 [437] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, May 11, 1936. 561.35E1/144 [438] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, May 19, 1936—7 p.m. 561.35E1/146: Telegram [439] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 10, 1936. [Received August 18.] 561.35E1/163 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 561.35E1/107: Telegram [Document 430] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , January 3, 1936—4 p.m. [Received January 3—3:50 p.m.] 4. My despatch No. 1875, December 18, 2 and previous. Informal note from Foreign Office received this morning proposes reconvening of International Sugar Conference, substance being as follows: (1) Discussions with interested governments of British Commonwealth now completed and all these governments are prepared to participate in further international discussions. British Government accordingly now feel able to consult with foreign interests immediately affected. Their view is that any new sugar regulation agreement must have wider scope than old Chadbourne agreement, 3 covering all those countries capable of having substantial effect on free market of sugar, and that free market is not further diminished by the increase of artificially stimulated production in importing countries. Difficulty of securing sufficiently wide agreement is fully recognized but certain progress has been made since conference of March 1934. British Government feel it would be a mistake to hold conference with no prospect of success and would not feel justified in arranging a conference without assurance from all ex-Chadbourne countries that they see definite prospect of agreement if free world market can be stabilized at a figure certainly not higher than 2,500,000 tons per annum, and possibly less. Before proceeding, therefore, British Government are seeking assurances on this vital point from Chadbourne countries. (2) On assumption satisfactory assurances are obtained, their proposals for a conference are as follows: Any further conference at this stage must necessarily be of a preliminary nature. It would be useless to try even in favorable circumstances to secure representation of every country whose eventual accession will be necessary to the success of the scheme but if some satisfactory agreement could be reached at a conference, necessary assurance could be sought from other countries capable of affecting the position. British Government attach importance to the principle that any agreement should include provision for reduction of government assistance to sugar production as prices rise; but working out of that in detail would be matter for the proposed conference. (3) With reference to details of procedure, British Government would propose that the conference should be held, like that of March 1934, under the auspices of the World Monetary and Economic Conference 4 and that invitations should be issued from Secretariat of that Conference. Question of which governments should be invited is of first importance. British suggestion is that these countries should be all those represented at Conference of March, 1934, with addition of following: British Dominions of Australia, Canada and the Union of South Africa, British indicated Santo Domingo, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan and Russia. British assume that the Philippines would be covered as before by the United States delegation. British consider it important that conference should not be held without participation of any country whose adherence to the agreement was regarded as essential by any of the other participants, and accordingly they would propose to ascertain unofficially whether those countries would accept an invitation, before any are issued. (4) British think conference could most conveniently be held in London and that the League of Nations would probably provide necessary Secretariat assistance, if possible, by staff of International Sugar Committee. In the British view delegations should be kept as small as possible and purely official, representatives of various sugar industries being present, if at all, solely in capacity of advisers with no voice or vote in proceedings. United Kingdom delegation would almost certainly be headed by a Cabinet Minister. (5) British Government consider it desirable before going further, to consult with countries who were represented at Conference of March 1934. Their provisional conclusions are therefore being put semi-officially to Dr. Colijn 5 on behalf of the Netherlands East Indies, and to International Sugar Committee on behalf of other ex-Chadbourne countries, as well as to the United States Government. They request to be advised as early as possible whether the United States would be likely to accept an invitation on basis outlined above and, if so, whether we have any observations on the points brought forth. Full copy of note forwarded by the pouch today. 6 Bingham 2 Not printed. 3 Signed at Brussels, May 9, 1931, by Cuba, Java, and the chief European sugar exporting countries; for text, see International Sugar Council, Document C. D. 242: Memorandum on the Aims and Provisions of the International Sugar Agreement of 9th May 1931 , Annex I. 4 See Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. i , pp. 452 ff. 5 Hendrik Colijn, President of the Netherlands Council of Ministers, Minister of the Colonies, and Minister of Defense. 6 Despatch No. 1897, January 3; not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 561.35E1/110: Telegram [Document 431] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , January 10, 1936—8 p.m. 8. Your No. 4, January 3. Please inform the Foreign Office in response to their informal note that this Government is sympathetic to and interested in the general possibility of a new international sugar agreement. The uncertainty recently created regarding governmental policy in the agricultural field 7 makes it necessary, however, to postpone reply to the British communication. As soon as this uncertainty is ended, we will formulate our views. Hull 7 By the invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (approved May 12, 1933; 48 Stat. 31) on January 6, 1936, by the Supreme Court; 297 U. S. 1. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 561.35E1/121: Telegram [Document 432] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , February 6, 1936—2 p.m. 47. Please cable any information available regarding the rumor current here that the issuance of invitations for the International Sugar Conference is being delayed on the ground that the United States will probably not be able to support commitments that might be undertaken regarding control of production and marketings of sugar. Hull The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 561.35E1/122: Telegram [Document 433] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , February 8, 1936—2 p.m. [Received February 8—10:35 a.m.] 53. Your 47, February 6, 2 p.m. According to reliable information the rumor, which has likewise been current here, is believed to have originated in the United States. A responsible and informed official of the Colonial Office when questioned about it is reported to have made the reply that the United States had not yet been officially consulted about the conference and that he had no knowledge as to the source of the rumor. A meeting took place 2 days ago between British representatives and Javanese. The British have not yet had time to reach any decision as a result of this conference. Further information may be available early next week. Atherton Memorandum by the Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom (Taylor) to the Chargé (Atherton) 561.35E1/137 [Document 434] Memorandum by the Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom ( Taylor ) to the Chargé ( Atherton ) 8 London , April 2, 1936. At the invitation and request of the Earl of Plymouth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Davis 9 and I called on him at 10:45 o’clock this morning. Mr. S. Caine, adviser to the Earl of Plymouth on sugar affairs, sat in the interview. The Earl of Plymouth was interested to learn the present status of sugar legislation in the United States and what changes, if any, are likely to be made in the plan under which the United States is now operating with respect to sugar. Mr. Davis stated that the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act, 10 under which we have been operating, was separate and distinct from the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and was not directly affected by the Supreme Court decision of January 6th; that the marketing quotas to domestic producers, to insular possessions and to other exporters of sugar to the United States are considered to be valid exercise of the Federal Government’s power over interstate and foreign commerce, hence were not covered by the Court’s adverse finding; and that the expectation when he left the States was that the sugar operations would be continued, with some modifications to avoid direct conflict with the rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court. Mr. Davis explained that the administration has recommended to Congress, a continuation of the ½¢ per pound excise tax as a part of the General Trading Revenue Bill; that direct contracts between the Federal Government and individual producers under which the producers would agree to limitation of acreage would not be continued in order to avoid conflict with the Supreme Court, but that the same general result could be secured in one of three ways which might be applied to 1937 and following years. For the current year plans are being made to handle the sugar areas in connection with the Soil Conservation Act. The three ways Mr. Davis mentioned were: (1) Additional payments to producers not based on contract, but made upon the application of the producer after he had proved compliance with conditions as to acreage and so forth, announced in advance. (2) By marketing agreements entered into with sugar refiners in the beet and cane areas, by which the majority would agree to quota restrictions, whereupon orders could be issued requiring the minority to comply, or (3) By grants to States in which sugar is produced, each State in turn agreeing to contract with individual producers to secure whatever limitation in acreage is decided upon. Lord Plymouth then asked whether there is any bar to our participation in an international sugar conference. Mr. Davis stated that from the standpoint of agriculture he knew of none. He mentioned the possibility, which he considers to be remote, that Congress may enact a new sugar law aimed to safeguard the plan against future difficulty on constitutional grounds. Upon adjournment of Congress, presumably in May, there will be no chance for additional legislation until Congress meets again in January, 1937. Therefore, we are in as good a position to sit in an international sugar conference now as at any time before Congress meets again. Mr. Davis stated his belief that the domestic sugar producers and refiners and the insular interests all appear to be reasonably satisfied with the operation of our sugar plan and desirous of its continuation. In expressing an opinion as to the willingness of our Government to participate in a sugar conference, Mr. Davis expressly limited his statement to the situation in the Department of Agriculture, reserving the general question for reference to the State Department through you. C. C. Taylor 8 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 2103, April 7; received April 17. 9 Chester C. Davis, Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, U. S. Department of Agriculture. 10 Approved May 9, 1934; 48 Stat. 670. The Economic Adviser (Feis) to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department (Cox) 561.35E1/138 [Document 435] The Economic Adviser ( Feis ) to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department ( Cox ) [Extract] Washington , April 20, 1936. My Dear General Cox : I am enclosing a complete draft of the radiogram to be sent to the High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands regarding the calling of the sugar conference in London, which you read and approved yesterday. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sincerely yours, Herbert Feis [Enclosure] Draft of Telegram to the High Commissioner in the Philippine Islands ( Murphy ) 11 Washington , April 20, 1936. On January 2, 1936, the British Foreign Office addressed to the American Embassy in London a letter 12 inquiring whether the United States would be likely to accept an invitation to participate in an international conference on sugar on the basis outlined in the letter from the Foreign Office. This Government delayed serious consideration of this question because of the uncertainty regarding the sugar program of this Government created by the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hoosac Mills case. A reply is now being sent, however, stating that it is probable that the Government of the United States would welcome an invitation to attend an international sugar conference along the broad lines suggested. This reply also calls attention to the fact that the Government of the United States does not now exercise any control over the production of sugar in the Philippines and the opinion is expressed that the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines should have a representative of its own upon a United States delegation attending an international conference on sugar. The following is the text of the informal note of January 2, from the British Foreign Office: [Here follows the text of the British note of January 2.] The British Foreign Office is being informed by this Government that this matter is being brought to the attention of the Philippine Government and that the Foreign Office will be informed as soon as possible by this Government regarding the position of the Philippine Government. It will be appreciated, therefore, if you will bring this matter to the attention of the Philippine Government and will then inform this Government regarding the position which the Philippine Government will take. The British Foreign Office has expressed the opinion that delegations should be kept as small as possible and should be purely official. It is probable that the Government of the United States would concur in this opinion and that an American delegation would be composed of official representatives and not of representatives of the sugar industry. This Government will be glad to have the opinion of the Philippine Government as soon as possible, including any comments upon the communication from the British Foreign Office or upon the problems which might come before an international sugar conference. Should definite plans be made for an international conference, probably it would be desirable for the representative of the Philippine Government to be included in the American delegation to meet with other members of that delegation for a discussion of their common problems in advance of the conference. It is understood unofficially that no definite date for the proposed conference is now under consideration. It was reported at first that the conference had been planned for this spring but it is believed that for various reasons that plan has been dropped. As soon as there is any indication of more definite plans with respect to the conference, you will be informed so that the information may be transmitted to the Philippine Government. 11 Transmitted as No. 281, April 22, to the High Commissioner by the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 12 See telegram No. 4, January 3, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] . The High Commissioner in the Philippine Islands (Murphy) to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department (Cox) 561.35E1/145 [Document 436] The High Commissioner in the Philippine Islands ( Murphy ) to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department ( Cox ) 13 Manila , May 9, 1936. No. 307. For the Department of State: The following from President Quezon: In reply to your 281, April 22nd. 14 “My dear Mr. High Commissioner: I have carefully considered the communication from the State Department of the United States containing one from the British Foreign Office which you have transmitted to me with your letter of April 28th, and I am glad to inform you that the government of the Commonwealth will be pleased to take part in the International Sugar Conference which the British Foreign Office proposes to call under the auspices of the world monetary and economic conference. Should the International Sugar Conference actually take place, the government of the Commonwealth will appoint a small delegation composed of not more than three official representatives, and it has no objection—on the contrary it finds it proper and probably more beneficial also—to include the Philippine representatives in the American delegation. It also concurs in the suggestion that the Philippine representatives meet the other members of the American delegation for a discussion of their common problems in advance of the conference. “It is unnecessary to state in this connection that the Philippine Government expects its delegation to have the right to vote on the questions that may be brought before the conference and upon which there may not be an agreement between the Philippine representatives and the other members of the American delegation, should such an unlikely event occur, and consequently it should not be bound by the vote of the other members of the American delegation on these questions. In other words, while the Philippine representatives will be instructed to cooperate and harmonize its views as much as possible with those of the other members of the American delegation, should there be conflicting interest between the Philippines and the other sugar producing units of the United States, the Philippine representatives will have to stand by the interest of the Philippines, and the subsequent action of the government of the Commonwealth will be naturally influenced by the demands of these interests. “This government does not feel that any further suggestion is necessary at this time, hoping that all matters to be brought before the conference will first be discussed by the several members composing the American delegation, and then will be the time for them or their respective governments to consider in detail the advisability of any intended action. Very cordially yours, Signed Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines.” Murphy 13 Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Secretary of War, May 13. 14 See footnote 11, p. 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 435 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 561.35E1/144 [Document 437] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) No. 1236 Washington , May 11, 1936. Sir : With reference to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1897 of January 3, 1936, 15 enclosing an informal note from Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin 16 regarding the possible International Sugar Conference, there is enclosed herewith a memorandum approved by the President, a copy of which it is desired be left with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs or the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office. You will please state that this memorandum is for the confidential information of the Foreign Office and is not to be made public without the consent of this Government, which cannot be given at this time. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Sumner Welles [Enclosure] Memorandum The note of Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin of January 2, 1936, raised a number of questions and problems for the consideration of the governments which are interested in or might be invited to a world sugar conference and it specifically raised the question as to whether the Government of the United States would be likely to accept an invitation to participate in a conference along the lines set forth in this note and if so, whether this Government has any observations to offer on the points discussed therein. In response to this request it is desired to make the following observations: 1) It is probable that the Government of the United States would welcome an invitation to attend an international sugar conference organized for the purposes and along the lines set forth in Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin’s note. Recognizing the interdependence between the American sugar situation and the position of sugar elsewhere in the world, especially in the so-called “free market”, the Government of the United States is prepared to support any well directed move toward stabilizing the production and distribution of sugars destined for world markets on a basis that would be economically sound. The Government of the United States considers that it has’ already taken far-reaching steps for the stabilization of the sugar industry of the United States, and that one of the steps has resulted in the marketing of greater quantities of Cuban sugar in the United States than would have been the case had there been no sugar control program. The Government of the United States desires to make it clear, therefore, that its participation in the proposed sugar conference cannot be predicated upon the admission of sugar from foreign countries, including Cuba, greater than the quantities which have been admitted under the existing provisions of the Jones-Costigan Act. During the present calendar year 1936 the basic quota established for Cuba is 1,982,401 short tons, raw value, and the basic quota for foreign countries other than Cuba is 27,440 short tons, raw value. The Government of the United States’ also desires to state as its opinion that even should pending legislation in the United States to which reference is made below not be enacted prior to the proposed international conference, the conference could proceed, since, as indicated hereafter, the broad purpose of removing surplus supplies and of reducing the amount of protection to domestic producers’ and producers in areas (except foreign countries) which supply continental United States has already been accomplished. 2) The Government of the United States has been engaged in a farreaching program to attain order and economic stability in the sugar industry in all principal areas supplying the American market during the past two years. The program included six main elements: ( a ) A reduction in the general rate of duty on sugar from 2½ cents per pound to 1.875 cents per pound. This reduction was made on June 9, 1934. ( b ) A further reduction in the effective duty on sugar (i. e. the duty on Cuban sugar from which source practically all foreign importations of sugar have been derived for many years) from the rate of 1.5 cents per pound to .9 cents per pound. This reduction was accomplished by a trade agreement with Cuba which became effective on September 3, 1934. 17 ( c ) A limitation upon the amount of sugar admitted from the Philippine Islands, duty free, to 850,000 long tons. This limitation upon Philippine sugars was brought about by the enactment of the Tydings-McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act) on March 24, 1934. 18 This limitation upon the admission of duty free sugars from the Philippine Islands became effective for the first time for the year 1936. ( d ) Establishment of quotas on the importation or receipts of sugar from all areas supplying the United States market in order to adjust available supplies to consumption requirements. ( e ) Production adjustment programs in all sugar producing areas supplying the United States market (except foreign countries) under which growers were compensated for reducing production of sugarcane or sugar beets to the level established by the quotas, with due allowance in each area for domestic consumption and necessary reserve stocks. ( f ) Regulation of labor conditions in the sugar producing areas supplying the United States market which are benefitted by the quota system and production adjustment payments, and control of the prices to be paid by processors to farmers for cane or beets. 3) It is believed that the effect of the foregoing policy of the Government of the United States upon the world sugar market has been of considerable importance. By making it possible for Cuba to obtain a market in the United States at a more remunerative price than has prevailed for many years for a satisfactory quantity of sugar, it has been possible for Cuba to avoid, since the termination of the international sugar agreement of 1931, pressing upon the world sugar market the tonnage which would otherwise have been forced upon it because of a curtailed market for Cuban sugar in the United States. By making payments to producers in the Philippine Islands to compensate them for the transition from the high level of production attained in the 1933–34 crop year of 1,500,000 long tons to the level of production established in the Philippine Independence Act, the excess stocks of Philippine sugars which would otherwise have accumulated and which might have been forced upon the world market were eliminated, and the relatively remunerative price established in the United States as the result of the quotas made it unnecessary for the Philippine producers to seek an outlet in the world market for part of its production. The world market has also been favorably affected by the avoidance of a possible surplus in continental United States and its sources of supply which threatened the world and the United States market at the time of the enactment of the Jones-Costigan Act. 4) The Jones-Costigan Act which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to establish quotas for importations or receipts of sugar from the insular areas and foreign countries and to establish marketing quotas for cane and beet sugar produced in the continental United States was enacted as an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. At the time of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the Hoosac Mills case on January 6, 1936 ( U. S . vs Butler , 56 S. Ct. 312) there was considerable uncertainty regarding the future status of the Jones-Costigan Act on which the Government’s sugar program of marketing quotas and benefit payments to producers had been based. The Secretary of Agriculture announced on January 7, 1936, that the decision of the United States Supreme Court of January 6, 1936, in the Hoosac Mills case, which had evidently invalidated those portions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act concerned with production adjustment and processing taxes, did not affect the quota provisions of the Jones-Costigan Act. Further, no suit to invalidate the quota provisions is now pending in the courts or is likely to be initiated in time to reach final adjudication in the Supreme Court during 1936. The present act, however, expires December 31, 1937, and, although new legislation is now pending in the Congress of the United States, which if enacted into law, would continue the power to maintain sugar quotas to the end of the year 1940, it is not possible for the government of the United States to give assurance at this time that the quotas will be continued after the year 1936, although it is reasonable to assume that the quota will be continued at least for the calendar year 1937. The authority contained in the Jones-Costigan Act to supplement quotas by far reaching cane and beet production adjustment programs, under which growers were compensated for maintaining production at the quota level in the continental United States and insular areas has been invalidated and it has not yet been determined whether alternative measures are possible or desirable to accomplish the same purposes. The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act recently enacted 19 provides for conditional payments to producers who comply with a governmental program for rational land utilization. A far reaching program of economic readjustment in Puerto Rico has been launched under special legislation which is aimed in part to reduce the present over-concentration of the Islands’ economy in the production of sugar. Diversification of production is receiving increased attention in the Hawaiian Islands and the expansion of sugar production is not considered probable. In the Philippine Islands the control of sugar production, administered at first under provisions of the Jones-Costigan Act, has now been taken over by the Commonwealth Government under legislation adopted by that Government. The amount of Philippine sugar which may be marketed in the United States free of duty each year is strictly limited by the Philippine Independence Act, as has been stated above, and the objective of the sugar control program of the Commonwealth Government under existing legislation is “to limit the production of sugar cane and sugar in the Philippine Islands to such an amount as would be sufficient to cover the quota allotted to the Philippine Islands under the United States laws and the needs of the local consumption, plus such reserves as may be determined from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” * 5) It is impossible to predict at this time the form which the pending sugar legislation will ultimately take and whether enactment of such legislation is likely. It will be noted from the above summary, however, that the results of the measures already taken by the Government of the United States in adjustment of sugar supplies, the reduction of the general duty on sugar and the special reduction of the duty on Cuban sugar in connection with the trade agreement with Cuba, the limitation upon the quantity of sugar which can be admitted from the Philippine Islands free of duty, and the measures of control which may be instituted under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act should be of material aid in the working out of an International Sugar Agreement, even if the pending legislation in the United States affecting sugar should not be enacted. 6) In view of the fact that the Government of the United States exercises at the present time no control over production of sugar in the Philippines, it is felt that the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines should be directly represented upon a United States delegation attending an international conference on sugar. The contents of your note of January 2, 1936, have been brought to the attention of Philippine authorities. In the absence of their views, which will be communicated upon their receipt, the Government of the United States is disposed to believe that the Philippine Government will cooperate with the American Government in any discussions or conferences which may eventuate. 15 Not printed; see telegram No. 4, January 3, 4 p.m., p. 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] . 16 Frank T. A. Ashton-Gwatkin, Counselor for Economic Relations in the British Foreign Office. 17 Signed August 24, 1934; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. v , p. 169 . 18 48 Stat. 456. 19 Approved February 29, 1936; 49 Stat. 1148. * Act No. 4166, approved December 4, 1934, Tenth Philippine Legislature, First Session. [Footnote in the original.] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 561.35E1/146: Telegram [Document 438] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , May 19, 1936—7 p.m. 168. Reference Department’s instruction 1236 of May 11, 1936. In presenting a copy of the memorandum you may state orally that the Philippine Government has indicated that it will participate in the proposed International Sugar Conference through representation on the American Delegation. Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 561.35E1/163 [Document 439] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State No. 2439 London , August 10, 1936. [Received August 18.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 2426 of August 6, 1936, 20 and to previous correspondence relating to the proposed International Sugar Conference. I now have the honor to forward a copy of a letter under date of August 7, 1936, which has been received from the Foreign Office in regard to this matter. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Herschel V. Johnson First Secretary of Embassy [Enclosure] The Counselor for Economic Relations of the British Foreign Office ( Ashton-Gwatkin ) to the First Secretary of the American Embassy ( Johnson ) No. W 7419/182/50 [ London ,] 7 August, 1936. My Dear Johnson , I am now in a position to let you know the latest developments regarding the international sugar conference since His Excellency saw the Secretary of State 21 on the 25th May. You will recall that in my letter of the 2nd January I stated that it was considered important that a conference should not be held without the participation of any country whose adherence to the Agreement was regarded as essential by any of the other participants in the conference, and accordingly, after considering the replies received from the International Sugar Committee and from Dr. Colijn, His Majesty’s Government took steps to ascertain the views of the Governments of Japan, Russia and Santo Domingo, whose participation in the conference was held to be essential. The Soviet and Dominican Governments expressed their willingness to participate in a conference, if called, although the Soviet Government made it clear that the character and extent of any liabilities to be assumed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to a future Sugar Convention could only be established at the conference itself and in connexion with the course of negotiations between the participants therein. The Japanese Government, however, while emphasising that they are anxious for international co-operation in all matters and have therefore given every consideration to the proposal to participate in an international conference and ultimately in a Convention on the subject of sugar, regret that they cannot subscribe to any agreement of the kind which has been suggested or attend a conference on this subject. The International Sugar Committee and Dr. Colijn have now been asked what action they can suggest in the light of these replies. I shall not fail to let you know if there are any further developments. Yours sincerely, F. Ashton-Gwatkin 20 Not printed. 21 i. e., Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Tripartite financial stabilization agreement by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, set forth in simultaneous statements, September 25, 1936 Tripartite financial stabilization agreement by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, set forth in simultaneous statements, September 25, 1936 1 1 See also Treasury Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1937 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 258 ff. [440] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, June 6, 1936—9 p.m. [Received 9:20 p.m.] 851.5151/838: Telegram [441] Memorandum by the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) London, June 15, 1936. 841.5151/557 [442] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] June 23, 1936. 851.5151/982 [443] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 4, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 4—3:50 p.m.] 851.5151/946: Telegram [444] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) Washington, September 4, 1936—7 p.m. 851.5151/946: Telegram [445] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 8, 1936—8 p.m. [Received September 8—1:55 p.m.] 851.5151/950: Telegram [446] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 9, 1936—9 a.m. [Received September 9—8:50 a.m.] 851.5151/952: Telegram [447] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) Washington, September 9, 1936—12 p.m. 851.5151/952: Telegram [448] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) Washington, September 14, 1936—11 p.m. 851.5151/964a: Telegram [449] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 15, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 15—10:45 a.m.] 851.5151/962: Telegram [450] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 17, 1936—9 p.m. [Received September 17—7:35 p.m.] 851.5151/969: Telegram [451] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 18, 1936—10 p.m. [Received September 18—6:33 p.m.] 851.5151/971: Telegram [452] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 19, 1936—11 a.m. [Received September 19—9:17 a.m.] 851.5151/972: Telegram [453] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) Washington, September 19, 1936—2 p.m. 851.5151/975a: Telegram [454] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 23, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 23—12:40 p.m.] 851.5151/986: Telegram [455] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Frame (Wilson) Washington, September 23, 1936—midnight. 851.5151/991: Telegram [456] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 24, 1936—9 p.m. [Received September 24—6:09 p.m.] 851.5151/993: Telegram [457] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) Washington, September 25, 1936—3 p.m. 851.5151/1025a: Telegram [458] The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Paris, September 26, 1936—11 a.m. [Received September 26—9:51 a.m.] 851.5151/999: Telegram [459] Statement by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), September 25, 1936 September 25, 1936 [460] Statement by the Secretary of State Issued to the Press, September 26, 1936 September 26, 1936 851.5151/1041 [461] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 6, 1936—9 a.m. [Received 9:35 a.m.] 851.5151/1052: Telegram [462] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 6, 1936—noon. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 851.5151/1053: Telegram [463] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) Washington, October 8, 1936—6 p.m. 851.5151/1062a: Telegram The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/838: Telegram [Document 440] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , June 6, 1936—9 p.m. [Received 9:20 p.m. 2 ] 467. From Cochran. 3 I saw Ministry [ Minister ] of Finance 4 at 6:45. He had just come from Chamber session where Government declaration was made 5 and from a talk with Caillaux, Chairman of Senate Finance Committee. I said we knew his Government was opposed to an independent national devaluation. I brought up the question as to whether the situation and Blum’s promises to his constituents would not assume another aspect if he could be assured that in case France devalued to a reasonable extent the other two main currencies would not undercut the franc. He is not willing to enter a separate triangular agreement on these terms which would involve devaluation of the franc and maintenance of an approximate status quo by Americans and British. He is personally willing to suggest to his chief and to his colleagues the idea of a monetary peace or truce envisaging a leveling out of currencies according to some common measure, most reasonably the world price level, provided this would be adhered to by the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, and that he be permitted to give advance information thereof to the Russians since the ruble is now attached to the franc. The plan would not be to have a general conference but for the United States to approach each of the above countries individually and informally as we have today approached the French and learn whether agreement can be reached between the two currencies involved, that is dollar vis-à-vis pound, florin, et cetera, and then each of these countries agree with each other country. Some Saturday when there is no stock market the general agreement of all of these leading monetary powers to a general international monetary truce carrying the agreed rates would then be announced to the world. There would have to be some stipulation in the agreement to the effect that rates of the currencies involved would not be subsequently altered except with the consent of the other parties to the agreement. He asked if Great Britain would reach an agreement with us, saying that the main struggle is between sterling and the dollar. He thinks we should first get some understanding with the British and that we should also approach the Dutch and the Swiss so that France is not singled out. He wants to keep unity within the three remaining gold bloc countries 6 if possible. He cannot approach the British or be quoted as even personally favoring or suggesting or inspiring any devaluation scheme. He was inclined to desire to tie in peace and economic measures but I told him monetary stabilization was enough to attempt at once and that situation was too urgent to permit delays that would be involved in discussing trade, raw material, supplies, et cetera. I reminded him that we already have fair trade agreements with the gold bloc countries including his own. He would be glad to have American reaction to his suggestion communicated informally to him. He cannot be quoted in any way. He would have to withdraw from the Cabinet if any leak involving his position above indicated should develop. He talked this afternoon with Caillaux who is an advocate of “alignment of currencies.” In Chamber debate this afternoon Reynaud 7 gave his usual arguments advising the Government to devalue at once or be forced into exchange control within a few days. He thought England and the United States would be receptive to the alignment of currencies idea. In conclusion, I should add that Auriol fears a currency depreciation race and was concerned about Germany and Italy. I told him I thought the minor currencies would be taken care of after the major currencies were adjusted. Proceeding to Basel at 10:50 tonight. Will be back in Paris 6:45 Monday morning. [Cochran.] Straus 2 Telegram in three sections. 3 H. Merle Cochran, First Secretary of the American Embassy in France; Mr. Cochran was charged primarily with duties regarding financial matters of interest to the Treasury Department. 4 Vincent Auriol. 5 On June 6 the French Premier, Léon Blum, who had formed the first Popular Front Government on June 4, announced the program of the Ministry to the Chamber of Deputies. 6 The so-called gold bloc at this time consisted of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 7 Paul Reynaud, party leader of the Democratic Alliance in the French Chamber of Deputies and former Minister of Finance. Memorandum by the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 841.5151/557 [Document 441] Memorandum by the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) 8 London , June 15, 1936. At the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer I called at his office in the House of Commons this afternoon. Mr. Chamberlain stated that for some time past he had intended to have a talk with the Ambassador or myself because he was disturbed by indications received lest there develop in Washington a prejudice against British policy and methods, which he would personally deeply deplore and to dissipate which he was quite prepared to do anything he could, for it could not in any way help the general outlook. He asked me if I were conscious of any such attitude on the part of his opposite number in Washington, or the Administration generally, or on the part of the President, and he said that fundamentally in his opinion the differences existing between London and Washington were not differences of viewpoint but differences of method of government. This often caused misunderstanding until it was fully grasped: that, for example, even if an English official had the same viewpoint and aims as a corresponding American official, the Englishman had to bear in mind that the American could never make a binding commitment for the legislative branch of the American Government had to enter into any agreement which the Executive branch might reach. That realization had taken a long time to permeate into all departments but it was now understood. The Chancellor then referred to the numerous people coming and going who had attempted to explain to him the attitude of the Administration, and said that it was from these people that he had been given the idea of possible misunderstanding arising. I said that for my part I felt that the viewpoints of the two countries in that they stood for peace and liberty and the well-being of the individual were identical. The method of achieving these aims was one to be worked out, and in a measure the progress in working them out depended on an understanding between the personalities involved. Furthermore, there were important matters in which, if the collaboration of the two nations could be achieved, it would mark a forward step for each of the two countries and for the world in general. At the present moment, I said, the most practical proof of any common understanding of world events was how far Great Britain and the United States could exhibit a common purpose in working for the restoration of economic well-being through the stimulation of world trade by the removal of tariff and other barriers to freer commercial intercourse. I then set forth at some length the aims and purposes of America’s commercial policy as explained and practiced by Mr. Hull, and pointed out the way in which British policy had in recent years run more or less counter to American policy, and very carefully detailed the representations which Mr. Hull had made to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 9 backed by the representations of this Embassy in recent weeks. Mr. Chamberlain said that he hoped I realized that such arrangements as the Spanish agreement, 10 etc., were in the English viewpoint abnormal—abnormal agreements made in an abnormal time and distasteful to the British Government. I informed him that I had already been advised on those lines, but that I felt that if the case was as strong as that, the British Government could go very far in openly making a strong statement of policy which would show agreement with the United States in a common aim and which would be very constructive in world economic centers. He said that he understood that Mr. Eden had handed the Ambassador a memorandum 11 not long ago and he hoped that Judge Bingham was very satisfied with this. Was that not my impression? I said that my impression was that he was pleased that the memorandum did not close the door but indicated the possibility of working something out. However, I said this memorandum had been transmitted to Secretary Hull and that we had had no indication from him as to his reaction, but we most certainly expected further instructions regarding the matter. Mr. Chamberlain said that he was most anxious to know Mr. Hull’s reaction to it and he assured me that he was waiting to give Mr. Hull’s reply his every consideration. The Chancellor then expressed appreciation of the information reaching him through the kindness of Mr. Morgenthau, 12 containing the views Cochran had obtained on the gold bloc situation, which bore out his own information. He did not feel that the French were at present prepared to devalue, due to internal political reasons; he thought that they would most likely put on restrictions which would be less satisfactory both to Great Britain and to the United States. In any case, whenever the French were prepared to devalue, the British Treasury would be forced to adhere in the given circumstances to its established policy in not predetermining definitely at what point the pound would in this relation be held. He particularly asked me to understand that this was no deviation from their past procedure. He then asked me if my Government fully understood how the British Equalisation Fund worked, and he said he asked me this because suggestions he had received from Washington indicated the possibility of daily collaboration between the American Treasury and the British Treasury. Without waiting for any reply he then went on to explain that in the operation of the British Equalisation Fund only questions of policy were determined by the Treasury; that the execution of policy was left entirely in the hands of the Bank of England; that the Treasury did not attempt to enter into, much less to determine the day to day transactions which the Bank of England undertook; and that therefore it was impossible, given the nature of these well established arrangements, for the British Treasury to inform the American Treasury of what the day to day transactions of the Bank of England were to be, in spite of all the good will in the world. He seemed most anxious that Washington should fully understand the separation of functions between the British Treasury and the Bank of England, which entailed that any day to day cooperation with America should be through the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England’s opposite number. He then went on to ask me if I thought this would be understood in Washington, not from the point of view of any British predilections but from the point of view of what was practical in London, and the Chancellor was evidently most anxious that Mr. Morgenthau should have a clear appreciation of the picture from this end. He said it was often difficult for people separated by great distances to understand the internal economic or political motives that predetermined policy, and then he repeated almost verbatim his introductory remarks, emphasizing that the possibility that there might be antagonism between London and Washington was something which he and his colleagues would deeply deplore, and that he hoped that a difference of technique did not necessarily mean an incompatibility of views, and that they were most anxious to work out with us any common purpose and remove any misunderstanding. R[ ay ] A[ therton ] 8 Transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 2261, June 16; received June 23. 9 See pp. 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 513 ] ff. 10 Clearing agreement between the United Kingdom and Spain, signed at Madrid, January 6, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxvi , p. 283. 11 See telegram No. 281, May 26, 11 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] . 12 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 851.5151/982 [Document 442] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [Extracts] [ Washington ,] June 23, 1936. The President asked me to sit in at a conference which he had this afternoon with Mr. Emmanuel Monick, French Financial Attaché in London. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . After the usual exchange of courtesies by the President with regard to Messrs. Blum and Herriot, 13 Mr. Monick asked permission to state the real reason of his visit to Washington. He proceeded to give a brief outline of the European political situation, of the weakening trend of the little countries surrounding Germany, notably Poland; he regretted that the French Government had not responded to Poland’s offer made sometime ago to cooperate in the event of the devaluation of the French franc; at the time this offer was made, however, France was preparing for elections and it was, therefore, not possible to consider devaluation. Mr. Monick touched on the defenseless conditions of Holland and Belgium and said that, should the 1914 situation be repeated, Belgium would not and could not resist the German military movement through Belgian territory. He drew this dark picture of European conditions, in order to show the importance of lending strength to the French Government and he admitted that the present government was in a somewhat precarious situation. Continuing Mr. Monick said he now wished to state the real purpose of his mission to this country. The French Government needed the support of the United States and Great Britain in the program of devaluation. He himself was an ardent devaluationist, but was in entire agreement with the French political leaders that it could not be undertaken without international approval and support. His thought was that France could develop its program in this respect if it was known that the United States would hold the dollar at its present value in face of French devaluation. Mr. Monick did not mention the point at which the French would devaluate vis-à-vis the dollar; if the French Government could be assured of the American attitude in this eventuality, it would be a simple matter to approach the British Government and to obtain its support. I asked Mr. Monick whether the French Government, in fact, had made any approach to the British Government along these lines during the last week or ten days, to which he replied in the negative. The President then took up the thread of the conversation. He reminded Mr. Monick that the British Government and people held very definite views about London as being the center of international banking and that, in dealing with the British Government, one always had to consider their “amour propre”. The President felt that the British Government would be very reluctant to accede to the French request unless the French Government had made a direct approach to them and that, in his opinion, three-cornered conversations should be held simultaneously. Mr. Monick thought this was an excellent idea and proposed that such conversations should be held now in Washington, he acting for the French Government, the British Embassy for the British Government. The President demurred and said that, from the British viewpoint, such a three-cornered conference would be considered in London as under the aegis of the American Government and that, here again, one must consider British “amour propre”. In his opinion, the best way to go about it would be for the French Government to send similar and simultaneous communications to London and Washington. In that event, London would presumably inform Washington that it had received such and such a message from Paris and would request the views of the American Government. A quick exchange of views, therefore, between Washington and London would take place and, in this way, the purposes of the French Government might readily be achieved. Mr. Monick accepted the President’s views and gave the impression that he would act on them at once. At the conclusion of the conference, the President asked me to get in touch with Secretary Morgenthau and it was my impression that Mr. Monick desired to have a further conference with the Treasury head. I assured the President that I would at once communicate with Mr. Morgenthau and I did so at his private residence. William Phillips 13 Edouard Herriot, President of the French Chamber of Deputies. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/946: Telegram [Document 443] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 4, 1936—5 p.m. [Received September 4—3:50 p.m. 14 ] 831. For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. Upon request of Minister of Finance Auriol I called upon him this afternoon. Baumgartner and Rueff 15 were also present. Minister of Finance said that we had been the first to offer our cooperation to him. He said that at the time we had our conversations shortly after he entered office “the way was barred.” He said that now it had been ascertained through Monick’s conversations in Washington and London 16 that there seemed a good chance for agreement of a type that could be found acceptable in France. He said that his Ministry had drawn up a provisional draft of a pre-stabilization agreement for submission to the United States and Great Britain. If these three countries are in agreement France would then endeavor to procure the adherence of the two gold-bloc countries the Netherlands and Switzerland. The immediate question of the Minister of Finance is to know whether Mr. Morgenthau would prefer that the draft document be submitted to him through me secretly and unofficially in advance of a copy thereof being submitted through Monick secretly and unofficially to the British Government or whether Mr. Morgenthau may prefer that the two copies be submitted simultaneously. Auriol would be glad to be able to say to the British that he had obtained the approval of the Americans to the proposition before submitting it to the British. On the other hand he does not want to give the British any cause for criticism of his approach. He is anxious that the entire affair be expedited in order that a decision may be reached with respect to drafting the French monetary law which would be necessary if the agreement is consummated. Since there is a meeting of the Council of Ministers on Monday September 7 Auriol would be very appreciative if he could have an indication of Mr. Morgenthau’s wishes on this one point before Monday. The submission of the propositions officially would be taken up only if and after unofficial approval is obtained. After leaving the Minister’s office Baumgartner and Rueff talked more freely with me in regard to the nature of the so-called agreement. It seems that it is what might be called an “agreement of intention”. It would involve a declaration by the three Governments. The British and American would be expected to maintain their respective currencies at approximately their present rates. A lowering of the French franc would be envisaged. The second point in the agreement calls for cooperation between the three banks of issue of the contracting countries, each central bank assuming the task of holding its respective currency within certain limits subject to certain conditions. The third point would be something in the way of declaration that this step having been taken toward monetary stability the way would be open to lowering trade barriers. Please do not accept the above as an entirely accurate description of the component parts of the agreement since I have not seen the document. I sought this information from the two permanent members of the Ministry in order that I might give enough description of the document to enable Mr. Morgenthau to determine what his attitude should be in regard to the point immediately in question. I should add that in answer to my query Baumgartner informed me that the part of the agreement with respect to matters of commercial policy is not interdependent with the points of fixing rates and supporting the currencies. They have drafted something which they think would meet the approval of the Secretary of State whose interest in lowering trade barriers has of course been well known to them and has been conveyed fairly recently by the French Ambassador in Washington. As I have indicated in earlier cablegrams Auriol’s main idea is to include French devaluation in a scheme of “world monetary peace which would lead to world economic peace.” [Cochran.] Wilson 14 Telegram in three sections. 15 Wilfred Baumgartner and Jacques Rueff, Director and Assistant Director, respectively, of the General Administration of Funds, French Ministry of Finance. 16 July 23–28. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) 851.5151/946: Telegram [Document 444] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France ( Wilson ) Washington , September 4, 1936—7 p.m. 337. For Cochran from the Secretary of the Treasury. Please inform Minister of Finance Auriol that you have been instructed by your government to inform him that we would prefer that draft document mentioned in cable 831 be presented simultaneously to both treasuries and in the case of the United States be transmitted through you. For your information and guidance please bear in mind that Monday September 7 is Labor Day and on Tuesday September 8 United States Treasury is offering to the public a 900,000,000 dollar bond issue. Keep me informed by cable or telephone if necessary on any developments. [Morgenthau.] Hull The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/950: Telegram [Document 445] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 8, 1936—8 p.m. [Received September 8—1:55 p.m.] 843. From Cochran. Reference my 833, September 5, noon. 17 French Minister of Finance handed to me French text of document in question at 6 o’clock this evening. I am making English translation which Rueff will check with me tonight. I may not therefore cable text until Wednesday morning. Monick was at Ministry of Finance this evening. He will leave for London tomorrow with text for British which cannot be delivered before late Wednesday evening or Thursday morning. [Cochran.] Wilson 17 Not printed. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/952: Telegram [Document 446] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 9, 1936—9 a.m. [Received September 9—8:50 a.m. 18 ] 844. From Cochran. Reference to my telegram 843, September 8, 8 p.m., when Minister of Finance Auriol handed me the document under reference yesterday evening he stressed its secret and unofficial character. He said that any equivocation in the present negotiations would lead to an attack on the franc which would necessitate immediate imposition of exchange control. He seeks Secretary Morgenthau’s reaction to this draft including any suggestions for modifications. In my 831, September 2 [ 4 ], 5 p.m., I gave the background for this draft. There follows an English translation of the constituent parts of the draft, which has been checked by Rueff. “Proposed note to the American and British Governments. 1. The Government of the Republic, while it has always discarded the possibility of unilateral devaluation, a simple episode in the economic struggle among nations, susceptible in turn of giving rise to new devaluations, is, on the contrary, very desirous of a real economic and monetary peace. It sees in this the principal means of putting an end to the development of autarchic tendencies, thus lessening the restrictions and restraints of all sorts which paralyze trade and which create an atmosphere of general insecurity, involving the gravest dangers to peace. 2. To this end the Government of the Republic desires in the first place to remedy the economic disequilibrium occasioned in the world by the fall of prices and by resultant devaluation of certain currencies. It is ready in so far as it is concerned to participate in a prestabilization agreement fixing the new monetary relations with precision and clarity, taking into account the world level of prices. The stipulations of such an arrangement should be maintained through the practice of close collaboration among the contracting parties and could not be modified except by common accord or in case of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, the final objective of the contracting parties being the general return to the international gold standard when the conditions necessary are found realized. The text which constitutes an annex to the present note if it receives the approval of all the parties concerned would presumably be of a nature to lead to the desired result. 3. The Government of the Republic deems also that the conclusion of the aforementioned agreement by attenuating the disequilibrium which at present isolates certain national economies should make possible immediate and vigorous action with a view to reduction of obstacles to trade. It is ready to consult with the American and British Governments as to the conditions under which such action could be undertaken with a view to general resumption of trade and international transactions which it holds to be the necessary preface to political organization of peace. (End of note.) Proposed prestabilization agreement. The high contracting parties are decided to devote all their efforts and to establish the closest collaboration among themselves towards maintaining the rates of their respective currencies within the limits fixed in the attached table. These limits shall not be modified except by common agreement or subject to notifying the contracting powers in case of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, the final objective of the contracting parties being the general return to the international gold standard when the conditions necessary are found to be realized. (Table, read down:) Currencies: Dollar Pound Franc Rate against: Pound, franc Dollar, franc Dollar, pound Lower limit: Upper limit: ” (The above headings in the final paragraph are for a table which the French prefer to leave blank for the present. The rates would be established once the text of the agreement is approved in principle.) Rueff suggested to me privately the need for haste lest circumstances may yet force France to act unilaterally. [Cochran.] Wilson 18 Telegram in three sections. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) 851.5151/952: Telegram [Document 447] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France ( Wilson ) Washington , September 9, 1936—12 p.m. 342. For Cochran from the Secretary of the Treasury. Your 844 September 9th. The document which Minister of Finance Auriol gave you last night for transmission to this Government has received our most interested consideration. Please give the Minister of Finance the following message verbatim: I have studied with most interested attention the text of the communication which the French Government indicates it might send to the American and British Governments. I understand the circumstances which have brought the French Government to consider realignment of the franc and to seek to take this action in such a way as it might result in bringing added stability into the field of foreign exchanges and increasing the movement of international trade. Furthermore I foresee that the creation of such stability should correct and ultimately bring to an end the disturbing and unwelcome movement of funds from one monetary center to another, which in itself is so clearly an element of uncertainty in the exchange and monetary situations. It would bring it about that the movements of capital would be governed by economic considerations and not by panic fears which have so recently caused extensive and disturbing refuge movements. The text as now drafted seems to me possibly to raise certain questions and to foreshadow certain immediate commitments which I do not believe to be essential to the achievement of this desirable purpose, and on which the American Government must necessarily express its views. I have in mind particularly the last sentence in the English translation of numbered section 2. I do not wish to suggest any specific revision of the text of this communication but rather merely to state what the position of this Government has been and would be in the contingency which his communication envisages: (1) It is and has long been the purpose and constant effort of this Government to maintain stability of the dollar in international exchanges, and thereby to contribute to continued exchange stability, and during the large part of this period substantial stability has been achieved. (2) This Government has not been unmindful of a like purpose and effort on the part of the British and the measure of success which has attended their efforts. (3) Should the French Government for reasons of domestic policy realign on mutually satisfactory basis the value of the franc in international exchange, this Government will continue to use appropriate available resources for maintaining stability in international exchange on such new basis in the confident expectation that the British authorities will continue their purpose and effort in the same direction. (4) The French Government will understand that in the continuous development of this Government’s policy and decisions in the exchange field our ultimate and final decisions will have to take into consideration internal prices and economic conditions. This Government would anticipate that some statement of intention substantially similar to that which it has just made would be forthcoming as well from the French and British Governments and possibly given simultaneous publication by all three Governments. This Government is furthermore prepared to discuss the precise measures that the Treasuries of the three countries might contemplate in immediate fulfillment of this statement of intentions. [Morgenthau.] Hull The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) 851.5151/964a: Telegram [Document 448] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France ( Wilson ) Washington , September 14, 1936—11 p.m. 348. For Cochran from the Secretary of the Treasury. This afternoon Mallet, Chargé British Embassy in Washington, transmitted to me from Sir Warren Fisher 19 a most secret note of which following is a paraphrased summary. A note from the French Treasury was presented by Mr. Monick and the Chancellor has given it consideration. This afternoon Mr. Monick was informed of the Chancellor’s readiness to give assurance that if there should be a reasonable change in the value of the franc counter measures would not follow, such as a further depreciation of the pound as a reprisal or the imposition on French goods of discriminatory duties. On the contrary His Majesty’s Government would continue their effort to bring it about that the Sterling exchange rate would not undergo undue fluctuations the prevention of which was the reason for creating the exchange equalization fund. Furthermore Mr. Monick was told that the Chancellor did not believe it possible to give a guarantee that the pound sterling should be linked to gold within points that were fixed. The Chancellor was not prepared under existing conditions to place a limit upon his power to act independently, by entering into a formal agreement such as the French note proposed. The Chancellor must be governed in any undertaking which he might give not only by the considerations contained in the French note (he realizes fully the weight of these considerations) but also by the opinion he may form from time to time of the credit policy which stable international relations and domestic recovery might make necessary. While the Chancellor feels unable to enter into any formal agreement for the reasons that just have been given, he is desirous of assuring Mr. Morgenthau that his action will continue to be directed to those ends which Mr. Morgenthau jointly with both His Majesty’s Government and the French Government have in prospect. The view has been expressed to the French Government by the Chancellor that the maintenance by each country of the greatest possible stability in monetary relations and appropriate considerations at all times of the effect of its decisions upon other countries afford both a more practicable and a more desirable basis of cooperation at this stage than any convention of a more formal character, and the Chancellor hopes that this view will commend itself to Mr. Morgenthau. You will observe that the British reply is in main substance the same as our reply to the French Treasury, which would seem to afford an adequate basis for continuing the discussion between the three Treasuries. Therefore I communicated with Mallet and expressed this judgment to him adding that the spirit of the British communication was very acceptable. I think it important that the Treasuries of the three countries should be completely informed of the course of all conversations. For that reason I told Mallet that I planned to inform you of the text of the note from Sir Warren Fisher to me and to authorize you in turn to pass this information on to the French Treasury. Mallet approved. Please therefore inform the French Minister of Finance, that the British have informed me of their reply to the French note and of my reaction to it. In addition if you believe it helpful you are authorized to pass on to the French Treasury all or part of the paraphrased text of the British note to us. [Morgenthau.] Hull 19 Permanent Secretary of the British Treasury. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/962: Telegram [Document 449] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 15, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 15—10:45 a.m. 20 ] 870. For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. This forenoon I informed Baumgartner of Department’s 348, September 14, 11 p.m., and left with him all of paraphrased text of the British note to us. The French had not yet received the text of the British reply to them since Monick is not arriving with it until 4 o’clock this afternoon. In the circumstances Baumgartner will present our communication to the Minister of Finance only after Monick arrives. Baumgartner said they would then call me to the Ministry either tonight or tomorrow. Baumgartner sees that we are all in agreement on motives and intentions. His problem is to convince the Minister that the American and British replies offer a sufficient basis for developing the French request for unilateral devaluation in a form that will be accepted by the French public as a realization of international “monetary peace”. The Ministry of Finance is entirely cognizant of the tense situation obtaining here now as a result of labor difficulties and does not want to give the public and particularly the Communists a reason through undisguised devaluation for rioting and perhaps upsetting the Government. [Cochran.] Wilson 20 Telegram in two sections. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/969: Telegram [Document 450] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 17, 1936—9 p.m. [Received September 17—7:35 p.m. 21 ] 884. For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. At 7:15 this evening in the presence of Baumgartner, Rueff, and Monick, Minister of Finance Auriol handed me for transmission to you the French draft of the proposed text of a joint declaration. There follows my English translation of this document which translation has been approved by Rueff. “1. The Governments of the United States of America, of Great Britain, and of France, equally anxious to safeguard peace and liberty and desirous of establishing as quickly as possible the best conditions for the return to international order have decided to make simultaneously the following declaration: The undersigned Governments affirm their common will to pursue a policy tending to the development of prosperity in the world and to the improvement of the standard of living of all social classes. They deem that the best means to accomplish this is to put an end to unilateral monetary manipulations which always risk leading to new adjustments and which provoke sudden movements of funds from one market to another detrimental to the equilibrium of national economies. They also desire to lighten and even to suppress progressively the restrictions and restraints of all sorts which paralyze trade and which create an atmosphere of general insecurity and uneasiness involving the gravest dangers to peace. They are convinced that in order to maintain the maximum of liberty for international trade the maximum of stability must be assured for the principal currencies, the final objective being the complete return to the international gold standard when the conditions necessary are fully realized. 2. With a view to such cooperation toward the economic and monetary peace desired by the nations, the Governments declare that their monetary policy is dominated by the two following principles: On the one hand, the maintenance, by each country, of the greatest possible stability in its monetary relations with foreign countries. On the other, careful consideration at all times to the effects of its decisions in this field upon the economy of other countries, common collaboration being necessary to the realization of these principles. 3. Such stability, moreover, cannot be assured unless a lasting compromise among the various economies on the very basis of world prices is previously reestablished. For this purpose the French Government has decided to proceed to the adjustment of its currency on the basis of these prices. The Governments of the United States and of Great Britain assure it of their close collaboration in order that this decision may constitute the starting point for a confident and constant cooperation among the three countries in the direction indicated by the present declaration and that it may benefit the entire world and peace. 4. With a view to this common action, it is decided that the Treasuries and the banks of issue of the three countries shall consult and unite their efforts to maintain the maximum of stability in international monetary relations, in order to reach the final object which consists of the complete return to the international gold standard. The three Governments, moreover, shall consult whenever it is necessary in order to maintain or restore monetary stability and shall endeavor to regulate, if necessary by common negotiation, the difficulties which might compromise this stability in case of exceptional circumstances due to the conditions of their internal marked influence or of the general situation. They declare also that immediate action shall be taken with a view to general resumption of trade and international transactions. They hope that other nations will collaborate in this policy and thus strive for maintenance and organization of peace.” Before handing the document to me the Minister of Finance delivered a really beseeching plea for our acceptance of this declaration and asked me to do what I could to hasten the matter. While it is understood that we or the British may wish to suggest minor amendments, he hopes that they will not involve serious changes in the form or sense of the declaration. The Minister thinks a joint declaration much better evidence of cooperation and more effective than three simultaneous but somewhat different declarations. He said that a joint declaration over the names of President Roosevelt, Secretary Morgenthau, Premier Baldwin, Chancellor Chamberlain, and Premier Blum would give the world the first real evidence since the war that the three great powers are genuinely cooperating. He thinks a monetary peace on this foundation will be the basis for working toward economic peace and finally achieving political world peace. Other countries should quickly follow to join in this declaration. The Minister said that he was yielding on two points that the French had urgently desired. He reminded me how dear to a Frenchman is a signed contract but he said he was willing to trust in the loyal cooperation of the Americans and British without insisting upon the more formal arrangement which he had originally proposed. The other point was in regard to fixed limits for pre-stabilization fluctuations of currencies. The Minister reminded me that France had devalued once since the war and that this operation had not been followed by success of long duration. France has been opposed to a second devaluation fearing illusory results and also fearful lest a whole series of devaluations constituting a downward race might ensue. It is to overcome such objections and fears that the Minister has sought as definite an arrangement as might be found possible. Although they told me at the Ministry that the Lille strike had been settled this evening, they were all anxious for speed in this matter. They endeavored to prepare a draft which would in a sense give a practical response to the President’s Chautauqua address 22 and would embody the main points set forth in the replies of the American and British Treasuries to the original French proposal. After going over the translation with me Rueff said that the idea would be for France to get the adherence of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium after the joint declaration may be agreed to by the three major countries. 23 He said that the Government’s political advisers thought that Parliament would accept devaluation if clothed in this proposed international arrangement but if it will be published as an isolated and unilateral act devaluation would not be voted. One draft of the proposed declaration was delivered to the British Treasury in London this evening and another copy handed to Leith-Ross 24 who is remaining here until Saturday. If agreement is finally reached our translation should be of course checked with the British. [Cochran.] Wilson 21 Telegram in seven sections. 22 August 14, 1936; for text, see Department of State, Press Releases , August 22, 1936, p. 163. 23 For adherences of the three countries under reference to the joint declaration, see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1937 , Exhibit 24, p. 259 (Belgium, September 26, 1936); ibid ., Exhibit 27, p. 260 (the Netherlands, November 21, 1936); and ibid. , Exhibit 28, p. 261 (Switzerland, November 21, 1936). 24 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, British Chief Economic Adviser. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/971: Telegram [Document 451] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 18, 1936—10 p.m. [Received September 18—6:33 p.m. 25 ] 892. For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. After you telephoned me at 3 o’clock I saw Baumgartner at 4. The following is in confirmation of the message which I then telephoned to you at 5:30. Baumgartner felt that most of the points which you had orally instructed me to raise with respect to the draft declaration communicated to you last night could be met by the French. He reminded me that the draft was purely French except for the use of a few phrases taken from the American and British replies and that my translation was strictly literal. He said that they would welcome suggestions as to rephrasing with the view to arriving at a common declaration which would be fitted for domestic consumption in each of the three countries. Baumgartner said they were entirely willing to cut out such phrases as the one you cited about improving the standard of living of all social classes. After talking with me Baumgartner consulted Minister of Finance Auriol and then telephoned me. He said that the Minister was not willing to concede entirely on the form of the declaration as introduced by the preamble. If they accept the idea of three simultaneous declarations but in the form which we suggested, that is “the Government of the United States, after consulting with the Governments of France and Great Britain declares et cetera” then Auriol essentially insists upon a common text. Toward that end they will continue to work and will be receptive to our ideas. Baumgartner said that the Minister agreed with him that it might be to their own, the French, advantage to omit any reference to an eventual return to the international gold standard. I suggested that the British had only used the phrase defensively when pressed for a statement of monetary policy. Baumgartner said that the French would probably follow the Belgian system in devaluing. An embargo would be declared upon the export of gold and exchange operations would be put under temporary control at the time a call is issued for special assembly of Parliament. The declaration of policy might be made at that time. The Government would seek from Parliament authority to revalue the franc within certain limits, and legislation creating a stabilization fund. Baumgartner indicated to me the limits that would be recommended, that is in percentage of devaluation of present franc, and also translated such percentages into terms of francs to the pound. He said Leith-Ross thought the lower limit could be accepted by the British but said they might be nervous if the rate moved toward the upper limit. Baumgartner favors the Belgian system since they will want to watch developments in relationship between dollar and sterling before fixing final gold content of revalued franc. Baumgartner said Chamberlain would not be in London for consultation with his assistants before Monday morning, so French expect no British reply before that day. Baumgartner said they, of course, had no objection to our consulting with the British if we wish. He hopes agreement on a common declaration may be reached early next week so that the complete monetary operation may be consummated before the end of the week. [Cochran.] Wilson 25 Telegram in two sections. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/972: Telegram [Document 452] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 19, 1936—11 a.m. [Received September 19—9:17 a.m.] 893. For the Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. Reference to my 892, September 18, 10 p.m., Baumgartner telephoned me this morning that Leith-Ross had also objected to inclusion of reference to eventual return to gold standard and had indicated that certain revision in phraseology would be necessary to suit British public. In final interview before Leith-Ross’s departure for London Minister of Finance Auriol stressed to him his insistence upon a simultaneous common declaration. It is arranged for me to communicate to Baumgartner tonight or tomorrow morning any suggestions that may be received from you in the meantime. [Cochran.] Wilson The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) 851.5151/975a: Telegram [Document 453] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France ( Wilson ) Washington , September 19, 1936—2 p.m. 359. For Cochran from the Secretary of the Treasury. For your guidance in the continuation of your discussions with the Minister of Finance, I would like to confirm and re-state more fully my statement on the position of this Government as explained to you over the telephone Thursday night and Friday morning. It is our understanding that statements by the three Governments will be made only when the specific limits of a mutually acceptable alignment of the three currencies have been determined. If I read the British reply to the French note correctly, the British Treasury has the same expectation. In considering the most practical way of advancing with the matter it seems to us that what should be envisaged is not a joint statement bearing the signatures of officials of the three Governments, but rather that the three Governments simultaneously issue statements, each of the statements being in the form of a declaration on its part. From the account of your conversations of Friday, I understand that this procedure is agreeable to the French Government. For greatest effectiveness it is desirable that the three statements be as nearly identical as possible in all fundamental points. Otherwise they may leave an impression of divergence of policy instead of the impression of harmony of policy and of close cooperation, upon which so much of the effectiveness of the whole move depends. It is my judgment that there should be no variations. The more complete the identity, the more effective the impression will be and the more satisfactory the results achieved. In the text of the French draft there are several points, both of phraseology and content, which from our point of view would require elimination or modification. The most important of these I touched upon in our telephone conversations. It is nevertheless apparent that there exists an ample basis for that substantial identity of statements necessary to assure that the French action would have a healthy and stabilizing influence throughout the world. Under the circumstances of the moment, the statement should be restricted solely to points essential for that purpose and should avoid raising matters not immediately essential and on which an actual or apparent divergence of views might possibly develop. In an effort to facilitate the formulation of mutually satisfactory statements, I suggest herewith the terms of such a statement as this Government would be prepared to make. I have attempted to incorporate and build upon those elements in the French and English presentations with which all three Governments are, I feel, in complete accord. “The United States Government, after consultation with the Governments of France and of Great Britain, joins them in an affirmation of a common desire to safeguard peace and to foster those conditions which will best contribute to the restoration of order in international economic relations. It shares with these other countries a common will to pursue a policy tending to promote prosperity in the world and improve the standard of living of the people. It is, and has long been, the purpose and constant effort of the American Government to maintain reasonable stability of the dollar in international exchanges, and thereby to contribute to general exchange stability. The American Government is convinced that a continuance of this policy will serve the general purposes which all Governments should share. Each Government in the continued development of the policy and decisions in the field of international currency relationships will of course always give full consideration to the requirements of its national prosperity. The French Government has now decided to proceed to realign its currency on a basis which will establish a more solid foundation for the increase of international stability in the interest of peace and commerce. The American Government takes this occasion to reaffirm its intention of using appropriate available resources in behalf of stability in international exchange on the new basis, and will collaborate with the Governments of France and of Great Britain for this purpose. We hope for and invite the collaboration of other nations in the achievement of the program formulated in this statement and we sincerely trust that no nation will attempt to derive an unreasonable competitive exchange advantage and thereby threaten to disrupt the international stability which the Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States seek to promote.” [Morgenthau] Hull The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/986: Telegram [Document 454] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 23, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 23—12:40 p.m. 26 ] 908. For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. Reference to my telegram No. 907, September 22, 8 p.m., 27 I saw Undergovernor Founder at Bank of France at 10:15 this morning. He raised two questions. (1) It is envisaged that the French stabilization fund will be operated by the Bank of France for the account of the French Treasury and Fournier will presumably be in charge thereof. He said that the plan would be to hold the franc from the beginning within the limits specified by the authority which will be granted the Government by Parliament to fix the new gold value of the franc by decree. The convertibility of the French franc into gold will be entirely suspended by the monetary legislation. Gold transactions would be only those between the stabilization funds that are agreed upon. The franc will not be immediately reattached to gold. The French stabilization fund would operate, however, during the transition period toward holding the franc at the middle rate between the two limits. The French fund would in its operations purchase dollars and sterling. It would desire to convert such currencies into gold and avoid the French error which Fournier says was made in 1926 of building up tremendous holdings of foreign exchange. Therefore could the American monetary authorities assure the French at this juncture that if a common declaration is issued the French stabilization fund could be permitted to exchange the dollars which it acquires against gold? The French would be willing on a reciprocal basis to give the American fund gold against the francs which it acquires. The latter operation would involve determining a price as long as the franc is not definitely attached to a fixed weight of gold. The price might be day to day or over a certain period. I told Fournier that I would raise this question immediately and that my personal impression was that if we find it possible to agree to the simultaneous declaration now being negotiated we presumably would grant the desired reciprocity. (2) It is anticipated that a call for special convoking of the French Parliament would be made at the time the declaration is issued. At that same time the French would [order?] the closing of their stock market and exchange market. That is, from the time of making such announcements no exchange transactions would be permitted until after the monetary law had been passed and announced. They do not contemplate closing the banks. They hope for such a period to begin with Saturday and probably terminate with Monday. Fournier had talked with Cobbold of the Bank of England on this point seeking similar action by the British. Cobbold said according to Fournier that the British were considerably perturbed lest the interim period between convoking Parliament and passing the law might see a tremendous attack upon the Swiss franc and the florin. Consequently Cobbold thought that the British might look with favor upon taking action similar to that contemplated by the French but that this would not be worth while unless the Americans followed the example. Fournier asked what we would be willing to do. I told him I would submit the question but that I had considerable doubt as to whether we would risk shocking our public to the extent that this might involve. Fournier subsequently talked with Governor Labeyrie. 28 The question was raised by the latter as to whether the Bank of France should communicate with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in regard to technical cooperation. I told them that for the present negotiations were being handled entirely in Washington. They will utilize present channels, therefore, until they may receive further suggestions from us. They both impressed upon me the necessity for haste in view of the nervous condition of the French market. As I left the bank I stopped to see Cariguel 29 who had been consulted by the Governor and the Undergovernor before I arrived. I told Cariguel of my uneasiness over suggesting that our markets be closed. He suggested, personally and most confidentially, as an alternative, that we might give our word that the Treasury or Federal Reserve would ask the important American banks to refrain from trading in the French franc or possibly other currencies during the period under reference. He thought cooperation of the banks in the United States most likely to engage in important transactions in foreign exchange could thus be achieved without upsetting the public. I think it would be well when I next see the Governor and Under-governor of the Bank of France to make it clear that if an embargo is placed upon the export of gold those American banks which may have sold dollars against francs in practice such as followed by the Guaranty and National City Bank should be entitled to obtain gold therefor. That is, we should not desire to see an American bank suffer loss through an embargo especially since the banks particularly under reference have been instrumental in maintaining the stability of the franc through their operations. President Trip 30 telephoned me this morning from Amsterdam that Labeyrie had requested that he postpone his visit to Paris until Friday noon instead of Thursday noon. Trip agreed to this and will call on me at 9:30 Friday morning. Without mentioning Trip’s plans I asked Fournier whether the French had notified any other countries of present negotiations. He replied in the negative but added that as soon as agreement might be reached governing declaration by the three powers the French would send three agents to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, to inform the monetary authorities respectively as to the declaration and solicit these countries joining after. Gold losses of Bank of France yesterday amounted to 370 million francs. By 11 o’clock this morning the Bank had lost 60,000,000 francs gold. At 12 noon Baumgartner was still in conference with Minister of Finance so I have not talked with him since he received British reply. Please provide me with answer to points (1) and (2). [Cochran.] Wilson 26 Telegram in four sections. 27 Not printed. 28 Emile Labeyrie, Governor of the Bank of France. 29 Foreign exchange expert of the Bank of France. 30 Leonardus J. A. Trip, Governor of the Bank of the Netherlands; President of the Bank for International Settlements. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Frame (Wilson) 851.5151/991: Telegram [Document 455] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Frame ( Wilson ) Washington , September 23, 1936—midnight. 367. For Cochran from Secretary of Treasury. The Secretary of Treasury has requested me to send this message to you. He has not yet completed his consideration of it, however, and therefore states that you are not to act upon it in any way until further instructed. Your number 908 September 23, I discussed the first question with you by telephone today. In this connection I send you below a confidential draft of a possible statement by the Secretary of the Treasury which you are to hold in strict confidence until I tell you what further to do with it. It is sent to you now to save possible delay later. Referring to question (2) closing of American stock exchanges would of course not be considered. I would be glad to use good influence to keep speculators in foreign exchange from taking advantage of temporary situation. In all my previous instructions to you I have emphasized the fact that the issuance of a simultaneous declaration can only take place when mutually acceptable range of rates has been determined. We have nothing as yet definitive regarding dollar sterling exchange range contemplated. Some of the major elements of the possible arrangements for release of gold between the three centers cannot be determined until ranges of rates are settled. There appear to be complexities in this not yet dealt with in any previous instruction to you. This position should be made clear beyond question to the French and the British because I do not wish to find myself deeply committed to a general position without full protection on these points. Text of possible statement follows: “In connection with the announcements made by him on January 31 and February 1, 1934, 31 to the effect that the Treasury would buy gold, and supplementing the announcement on January 31, 1934, referring to the sale of gold for export, the Secretary of the Treasury states that, hereafter, and until, on 24 hours notice, this statement of intention may be revoked or altered, he will also sell gold for immediate export to, or earmark for the account of, the exchange equalization or stabilization funds of those countries whose funds likewise are offering to sell gold to the United States, provided such offerings of gold are at such rates and upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary may deem most advantageous to the public interest. The Secretary announces herewith, and will hereafter announce daily, the names of [the] foreign countries complying with the foregoing conditions. All such sales of gold will be made through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United States, upon the following terms and conditions which the Secretary of the Treasury deems most advantageous to the public interest: Sales of gold will be made at $35.00 per fine ounce, plus ¼ per cent handling charge, and sales and earmarking will be governed by the Regulations issued under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.” [Morgenthau] Hull 31 Treasury Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1934 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 201. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/993: Telegram [Document 456] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Paris , September 24, 1936—9 p.m. [Received September 24—6:09 p.m. 32 ] 920. For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. At 7:30 this evening Baumgartner gave me the following latest text in English of a declaration drafted by the British which the French are willing to accept integrally: [Here follows substantially the text of the declaration issued, mutatis mutandis , on September 25, 1936, by the three interested Governments, page 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 459 ] .] This is the text which the British propose, after studying the French compromise draft which I submitted in translation in my 915, September 24, noon. 33 Baumgartner is cabling tonight to Appert 34 in New York the text in French of the declaration, corresponding to the above British draft declaration, which the French are prepared to make. Appert will take this to Washington at once so that you may have before you all texts, in the language of each country. Baumgartner told me that the British proposal for cooperation between French and British stabilization funds, quoted in my 917, September 24, 2 p.m., 33 has not been definitely accepted by the French. Cobbold of the Bank of England is arriving in Paris at 9:30 tonight to discuss this and other details of technical cooperation with Fournier of Bank of France. Spinasse 35 has gone to Bern and Rueff to The Hague to inform the Swiss and Netherlands Government respectively of the negotiations. It is still hoped that agreement between the three powers may be reached in time for announcements Friday night together with call for parliamentary session. [Cochran.] Wilson 32 Telegram in four sections. 33 Not printed. 34 Jean Appert, Financial Attaché of the French Embassy. 33 Not printed. 35 Charles Spinasse, French Minister for National Economy. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Wilson) 851.5151/1025a: Telegram [Document 457] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France ( Wilson ) [Extract] Washington , September 25, 1936—3 p.m. 370. From the Secretary of the Treasury for Cochran. I transmit to you below our latest redraft 36 of the proposed simultaneous declaration. You will observe that the proposed revisions of the Anglo-French text submitted to us are slight. Will you ascertain at once whether this draft is acceptable to the French government and whether it will modify its draft accordingly. We are giving a copy to the British Embassy in Washington at once with the request that they ask the British the same question. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Morgenthau] Hull 36 Not printed. The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/999: Telegram [Document 458] The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Paris , September 26, 1936—11 a.m. [Received September 26—9:51 a.m.] 926. From Cochran. At about 1 o’clock this morning the Minister of Finance of France gave to the press the French text of the declaration on monetary policy which was being made simultaneously with the American and British corresponding declarations.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Cochran] Wilson Statement by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), September 25, 1936 [Document 459] Statement by the Secretary of the Treasury ( Morgenthau ), September 25, 1936 38 September 25, 1936 By authority of the President, the Secretary of the Treasury makes the following statement: The Government of the United States, after consultation with the British Government and the French Government, joins with them in affirming a common desire to foster those conditions which safeguard peace and will best contribute to the restoration of order in international economic relations and to pursue a policy which will tend to promote prosperity in the world and to improve the standard of living of peoples. The Government of the United States must, of course, in its policy towards international monetary relations take into full account the requirements of internal prosperity, as corresponding considerations will be taken into account by the Governments of France and Great Britain; it welcomes this opportunity to reaffirm its purpose to continue the policy which it has pursued in the course of recent years, one constant object of which is to maintain the greatest possible equilibrium in the system of international exchange and to avoid to the utmost extent the creation of any disturbance of that system by American monetary action. The Government of the United States shares with the Governments of France and Great Britain the conviction that the continuation of this two-fold policy will serve the general purpose which all the governments should pursue. The French Government informs the United States Government that, judging that the desired stability of the principal currencies cannot be insured on a solid basis except after the re-establishment of a lasting equilibrium between the various economic systems, it has decided with this object to propose to its Parliament the readjustment of its currency. The Government of the United States as also the British Government has welcomed this decision in the hope that it will establish more solid foundations for the stability of international economic relations. The United States Government, as also the British and French Governments, declares its intention to continue to use appropriate available resources so as to avoid as far as possible any disturbance of the basis of international exchange resulting from the proposed readjustment. It will arrange for such consultation for this purpose as may prove necessary with the other two Governments and their authorized agencies. The Government of the United States is moreover convinced, as are also the Governments of France and Great Britain, that the success of the policy set forth above is linked with the development of international trade. In particular it attaches the greatest importance to action being taken without delay to relax progressively the present system of quotas and exchange controls with a view to their abolition. The Government of the United States, in common with the Governments of France and Great Britain, desires and invites the cooperation of the other nations to realize the policy laid down in the present declaration. It trusts that no country will attempt to obtain an unreasonable competitive exchange advantage and thereby hamper the effort to restore more stable economic relations which it is the aim of the three Governments to promote. 38 Issued simultaneously with similar statements by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, announcing common principles with respect to international economic relations; reprinted from Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1937 , p. 258. Statement by the Secretary of State Issued to the Press, September 26, 1936 851.5151/1041 [Document 460] Statement by the Secretary of State Issued to the Press, September 26, 1936 September 26, 1936 [Extract] Naturally, I am immensely gratified to see a vitally important step in the direction of stable monetary arrangements. The action of the Treasuries of the three Governments in making simultaneous and virtually identical statements of policy should greatly strengthen the prospect of stability in international exchange relationships. This should result in further strengthening the basic conditions of our domestic recovery. The declarations of policy amply provide for taking into account the full requirements of internal prosperity. This advance toward stability should also greatly facilitate the reduction of excessive phases of quota, exchange controls, and of other excessive impediments to commerce between nations, which themselves were partly caused by exchange uncertainties. For it has been apparent for a substantial time that progress toward stability and the reduction of barriers to commerce should go forward concurrently, or as nearly as possible, simultaneously. The step taken is in harmony with our reciprocity trade agreements program, as it is an indispensable part of any program for full and stable business recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/1052: Telegram [Document 461] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , October 6, 1936—9 a.m. [Received 9:35 a.m. 39 ] 970. For the Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. In two conversations by telephone last night you mentioned the probable issuance by you of a statement on gold and the possibility of simultaneous declarations by the French and British. In accordance with your instructions I am now at 9:30 going to the Ministry of Finance to sound out Auriol as to whether France may care to make a statement. I shall telephone you around noon if I have an answer by that time. [You] asked my opinion [on the] matter of declarations. I told you that I hoped [you would] follow as generous a policy as possible. With the breakdown of the gold bloc practically no nation outside of Belgium is really eligible to receive gold from us under the existing rules. Unless we desire to freeze a good part of the world’s supply or move further towards cornering it we must revise our rules about yielding gold. This is necessary if the three-power monetary arrangement is to work. In thus implementing this arrangement we have at the same time an occasion for a grand gesture which will not cost us much. I respectfully recommend that the only declaration necessary at this moment is one on your part and that this should merely be an amendment to your statement of January 31, 1934, to the effect that hereafter until further notice you will “sell gold for immediate export to, or earmark for the account of, foreign monetary authorities”. The remainder of the statement of January 31 needs no alteration. By “monetary authorities” I include central banks, the B. I. S., 40 stabilization and equalization funds, monetary commissions, et cetera. There is no scarcity of gold. We have far more than our share. At London in 1933 41 even the United States subscribed to the principle that gold should be used in settling international balances. Although we do not let gold circulate internally it is surely to our advantage to help in its circulation internationally. The more use that can be gotten out of it for this purpose the greater the benefits that will accrue to us. Why should we restrict the use of gold in settling balances between our own and other countries? We go to great effort to get trade treaties and then we contradict this policy by making it difficult for our customers to keep balances in our markets. We force our customers to operate over London where they are willing to risk fluctuating currency because they know that they can get gold for it if they desire. Every extra banking operation costs and diminishes interest in and capacity for trade with us. If we are seriously striving for international monetary stability we should facilitate such countries as Yugoslavia and Austria in getting gold to build up their resources. We do not want dinars or crowns so why should we seek gold reciprocity from those countries? We prefer that our trade be carried in dollars and we have at this moment an opportunity to make the dollar really an international currency. I have always doubted the efficacy of our gold as a weapon to force the British to stabilize. Even if it may have constituted some potential threat toward this end in the past we have now obtained from the British as binding a pledge toward stability as we can ever hope to have before they decide of their own free will to return definitely to a fixed gold parity so this threat is no longer valid. We still have access to the London free gold market without any demand upon us for reciprocity. France yesterday bought two and a half tons of gold from Belgium without any formality other than to indicate to the National Bank of Belgium the day’s price that the Bank of France was ready to pay therefor. With the greatest respect and loyalty I venture therefore the opinion that the proposed Treasury statement as contained in the Department’s 367 September 23 midnight is narrow and shortsighted. Our part in the triangular monetary arrangement has reacted to our credit. I feel that a statement from us now involving a “24 hour” policy, a day to day certificate of eligibility and demanding reciprocity from England which already has a free gold market, from the gold bloc, which yielded gold to us until exhausted, and from Italy and the vast number of other nations whose gold resources have almost disappeared would go far toward disappointing a hopeful world and incidentally toward diminishing the esteem which our monetary policy is beginning to command. [Cochran.] Bullitt 39 Telegram in three sections. 40 Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland. 41 i. e., at the Monetary and Economic Conference, held at London, June 12–July 27, 1933; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. i , pp. 452 ff. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 851.5151/1053: Telegram [Document 462] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Paris , October 6, 1936—noon. [Received 5:45 p.m. 42 ] 971. For the Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran. At 10 o’clock this morning I saw Minister of Finance Auriol. This was my first visit since the issuance of the simultaneous declarations of monetary policy. He reiterated his appreciation of American cooperation in this move and insisted that passage of the French monetary law would have been absolutely impossible if it had not been accompanied by the three-power agreement. The Minister of Finance had been especially pleased with the privilege of direct communication with Mr. Morgenthau and hoped that this method could be utilized in the future.… The Minister said that there was nothing that France could do now on war debts. 43 After internal order may be restored and some degree of prosperity achieved Auriol hopes that it may be his pleasure and opportunity, say in another year or year and a half, to make spontaneously to the United States an offer of final settlement of the war debt. Such an offer would be arrived at after studying all phases of the question including the Hoover moratorium, 44 the Lausanne agreement 45 and the character of the constituent parts of the indebtedness. Auriol said that we had taken a big step forward in the three-power declaration. He was greatly pleased at the reception given this declaration by most of the European countries, Germany being the principal exception. Italy’s action yesterday 46 was particularly gratifying to him. He asked me what I thought Schacht 47 would do. I told him that I might have occasion to see Schacht this weekend. Auriol said that he had not wanted Schacht in the original negotiations principally because he and Norman 48 were so close that there might have been Anglo-German collusion in the negotiations which would have made arrangements difficult. He said that he was sending word to Schacht by Labeyrie that whenever Germany may see fit to follow the precedent set by France the latter will be ready to cooperate with Germany toward achieving stabilization and toward reduction of barriers. Auriol will insist, however, that the financial burden which the policies of armament now being followed in Europe entail will prove to be unbearable by the various treasuries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Cochran] Bullitt 42 Telegram in three sections. 43 For correspondence regarding debts owed the United States by France as a result of the First World War, see pp. 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] ff. 44 See telegram dated February 26, 1932, 11 a.m., to the Ambassador in France, Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , p. 584 . 45 See telegram dated July 12, 1932, 4 p.m., from the Consul at Basel, ibid. , p. 687 . 46 Issuance of a royal decree-law, October 5, 1936, adjusting the intrinsic value of Italian currency “to the value of the most important and widely used currencies in circulation on the principal world markets”; see Federal Reserve Bulletin , November 1936, p. 881. 47 Hjalmar Schacht, German Minister of Finance, and President of the Reichsbank. 48 Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) 851.5151/1062a: Telegram [Document 463] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) Washington , October 8, 1936—6 p.m. 393. For Cochran from the Secretary of the Treasury. The text of the statement I propose to issue follows: [Here follows the text of the statement issued on October 13, 1936, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1937 , page 260. Except for minor verbal alterations in the first sentence, the text is identical with that transmitted in telegram No. 367, September 23, midnight, to the Chargé in France, page 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] .] As I told you over the telephone this will be signed by myself and the President and if satisfactory I plan to give it out at my regular press conference next Monday afternoon for release in the Tuesday morning papers and effective beginning Tuesday. At the same time that I give it out I shall make a short and informal explanation of its purpose and meaning, without going into details as to the arrangements. I trust that the French and British Governments will also on Monday afternoon make similar statements. I have given a copy of this same text to the British Embassy in Washington for transmission to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I shall, of course, be glad to consider any comment which Mr. Auriol or the Chancellor may have to make, but the text must naturally conform to our legal requirements. As I stated to you over the telephone also, I leave it to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to work out the details of operation with the Bank of France and the Bank of England. If they wish, these institutions may be free to begin discussion of the matter with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York tomorrow, Friday. [Morgenthau.] Carr Status of intergovernmental debts owed the United States by reason of the First World War Status of intergovernmental debts owed the United States by reason of the First World War 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 374 ff; concerning the position of the Department of State with respect to the treatment of foreign war debts, see post , pp. 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 464 ] ff. [For summary of intergovernmental debts due December 15, 1936, see Department of State, Press Releases , November 28, 1936, p. 415. For exchanges of correspondence in connection with amounts due the United States under arrangements effected by the World War Foreign Debt Commission, see Press Releases , as follows: Belgium: June 20, 1936, p. 621; December 19, 1936, p. 523. Czechoslovakia: June 20, 1936, p. 618; December 19, 1936, p. 525. Estonia: June 13, 1936, p. 589. Finland: June 13, 1936, p. 583; December 5, 1936, p. 458. France: June 13, 1936, p. 591; December 5, 1936, p. 458; December 19, 1936, p. 512. Greece: April 4, 1936, p. 285. Hungary: June 20, 1936, p. 616; December 19, 1936, p. 514. Italy: June 13, 1936, p. 582; December 19, 1936, p. 516. Latvia: June 13, 1936, p. 593; December 19, 1936, p. 517. Liberia: February 29, 1936, p. 179. Lithuania: June 13, 1936, p. 584; December 19, 1936, p. 519. Poland: June 20, 1936, p. 619; December 19, 1936, p. 521. Rumania: June 13, 1936, p. 586; December 19, 1936, p. 527. United Kingdom ( Great Britain ) : June 13, 1936, p. 580; December 12, 1936, p. 498. Yugoslavia: June 13, 1936, p. 588. The foregoing Department of State Press Releases, omitting the statements of amounts due, are reprinted in Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 288, and ibid., 1937 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 271; see also ibid., 1936 , p. 77, and ibid., 1937 , p. 74.] Position of the Department of State with respect to the treatment of foreign war debts Position of the Department of State with respect to the treatment of foreign war debts [464] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth) [Washington,] April 14, 1936. 800.51W89/979 [465] Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser (Livesey) [Washington,] May 11, 1936. 800.51W89/979 [466] Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser (Livesey) [Washington,] June 19, 1936. 800.51W89/982 [467] Memorandum by Mr. John H. Spencer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [Washington,] December 29, 1936. 800.51W89/995½ Contents Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth) 800.51W89/979 [Document 464] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser ( Hackworth ) [ Washington ,] April 14, 1936. It seems to me that this Department has but little authority in connection with the adjustment of the war or post-war obligations of foreign governments to the United States incurred under authority of several Acts of Congress. The Act of April 24, 1917, generally referred to as the “First Liberty Bond Act”, provides in Section 2 that— “… the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, is hereby authorized, on behalf of the United States, to purchase, at par, from such foreign governments then engaged in war with the enemies of the United States, their obligations hereafter issued, bearing the same rate of interest and containing in their essentials the same terms and conditions as those of the United States issued under authority of this Act; …” (40 Stat. 35) The Act approved September 24, 1917, known as the “Second Liberty Bond Act”, contains in Section 2 provisions substantially the same as those contained in the Act of April 24, 1917 (40 Stat. 288). Section 3 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to convert short-time obligations into long-time obligations bearing a higher rate of interest to conform to higher rates paid by the Government of the United States on Liberty Bonds. Section 2 of the Third Liberty Bond Act, approved April 4, 1918, merely increased the amount that might be loaned to foreign governments from $4,000,000,000 to $5,500,000,000 (40 Stat. 502), while Section 2 of the Fourth Liberty Bond Act of July 9, 1918, increased to $7,000,000,000 the amount of loans that might be made (40 Stat. 844). The Act approved March 3, 1919, known as the “Victory Liberty Loan Act”, provided in Section 7 that until the expiration of eighteen months after the termination of the war between the United States and Germany, “… the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, is hereby authorized on behalf of the United States to establish, in addition to the credits authorized by section 2 of the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, credits with the United States for any foreign government now engaged in war with the enemies of the United States, for the purpose only of providing for purchases of any property owned directly or indirectly by the United States, not needed by the United States, or of any wheat the price of which has been or may be guaranteed by the United States.…” The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to make advances to or for the account of any such foreign government and to receive its obligations bearing interest at not less than 5 per centum per annum, maturing not later than October 15, 1938, and containing such terms and conditions as the Secretary of the Treasury might prescribe. The section further provided that— “The Secretary, with the approval of the President, is hereby authorized to enter into such arrangements from time to time with any such foreign government as may be necessary or desirable for establishing such credits and for the payment of such obligations before maturity.” The Secretary of the Treasury was also authorized to convert short-time obligations of foreign governments into long-time obligations. (40 Stat. 1309) It will be seen from the foregoing that the Secretary of State was given no authority under the several Acts of Congress to negotiate these loans with foreign governments, and that the whole matter was left in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury who was to act with the approval of the President. When it came to adjusting the indebtedness of foreign governments to the United States following the establishment of peace, Congress by an Act approved February 9, 1922, provided for the establishment of a World War Foreign Debt Commission. (42 Stat. 363) Section 2 of this Act, as amended February 28, 1923, stipulated that the Commission should be composed of eight members, one of whom should be the Secretary of the Treasury, “who shall serve as chairman”, and seven of whom “shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The Secretary of State was a member of the Commission, as were also three members of Congress—Senator Smoot, and two members of the House. Section 2 of the original Act authorized the Commission, subject to the approval of the President, to refund or convert, and to extend the time of payment of the principal or the interest, or both, of any obligation of any foreign government arising out of the World War, into bonds or other obligations, in such form and of such terms, conditions, etc., as might be deemed for the best interests of the United States. Section 5 of the Act of 1922 provided that the annual report of the Commission should be included in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the state of the finances, and that the Commission should immediately transmit to the Congress copies of any refunding agreements entered into by each foreign government upon the completion of the authority granted by Congress. The Acts as amended January 21, 1925, provided that the authority granted should cease and determine on February 9, 1927. (43 Stat. 763) While the Secretary of State was designated as a member of this Commission, he was not so designated by the Congress and was not given any special function. For the most part the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chairman of the Commission, was regarded as more directly charged with the responsibility for the negotiations. All agreements concluded were approved by the Congress. On June 20, 1931, President Hoover proposed to the European Powers postponement during one year, beginning July 1, 1931, of all payments on inter-governmental debts, reparations and relief debts, but he stated that postponement by the United States on debts of foreign governments to this Government would be “subject to confirmation by Congress”, and further that—“Authority of the President to deal with this problem is limited as this action must be supported by the Congress. It has been assured the cordial support of leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House.” The action of the President was approved by a Joint Resolution, December 23, 1931. (47 Stat. 3) That resolution stated: “… the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, is authorized to make, on behalf of the United States, an agreement …” The resolution contained in Section 5 the following significant statement: “It is hereby expressly declared to be against the policy of Congress that any of the indebtedness of foreign countries to the United States should be in any manner canceled or reduced; and nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed as indicating a contrary policy, or as implying that favorable consideration will be given at any time to a change in the policy hereby declared.” It will be seen from the legislative history that these obligations have at all times been controlled by the Congress; that the agreements have all been subject to the approval of the Congress; and that that body has declared it to be contrary to its policy to cancel or reduce any of the obligations. The only way by which the Secretary of State could be said to have any responsibility in these matters would be by virtue of authority vested in the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. This, however, is not believed to confer upon the Secretary of State any duty to take the initiative in any negotiations looking to a readjustment of the situation. While the Secretary as representative of the President might be authorized under the general broad powers of the Executive to negotiate agreements, such agreements would, of course, at all times be subject to the approval of the Congress. This would seem to follow, not only from the several Acts referred to above, but also from Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, providing that— “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; …” The foreign government bonds held by the United States are property of the United States and as such are subject to the control of Congress. In view of the position which Congress has heretofore taken, and of the small part which the Secretary of State has played in these matters, I do not feel that he would be warranted in assuming to enter into negotiations of any kind without prior authorization of the Congress. Green H. Hackworth Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser (Livesey) 800.51W89/979 [Document 465] Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser ( Livesey ) [ Washington ,] May 11, 1936. During the Wilson Administration the war debt question was clearly a Treasury matter, negotiations concerning which were handled directly between the Treasury and foreign representatives in Europe. An important exception was that on May 21, 1920, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the American Treasury representative that the British Government had decided to suspend for the time being the negotiations with regard to the funding of the war debts, since decisions reached at the conference with France raised “questions of great importance unsuited for departmental treatment between our two Treasuries”. 1 He stated that the Prime Minister intended to take up the matter directly with the President of the United States. This was followed by the Premier’s letter of August 5 2 to President Wilson suggesting an all-around arrangement for the reduction or cancellation of inter-allied indebtedness, and President Wilson’s reply of November 3, 1921 [ 1920 ] 3 (the history of the debts under Wilson is well summarized in Chapter 3 of Moulton and Pasvolsky’s War Debts and World Prosperity ). The first step under the Harding Administration appears to have been a conversation between Secretary Mellon and the British Ambassador on May 2 at the Department of State and in the presence of the Secretary of State. Secretary Mellon told the Senate Finance Committee on July 21, 1921, that this was the first and the only conversation that he had had with any of the representatives of debtor governments. 4 He said he had spoken to the Secretary of State about the obligations two or three weeks before the actual conference and asked him what the procedure should be to bring about some attention to the obligations. Mr. Hughes said that he would mention it to the Ambassador, and that he supposed the natural way would be to arrange a conference. Mr. Mellon received word that Mr. Hughes had made the appointment for them to meet. There was a short general discussion on the whole financial situation of the European governments. In June, 1931 [ 1921 ], the Administration asked Congress to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to make agreements with foreign governments. The Congress responded February 9, 1922, by establishing the World War Foreign Debt Commission. Mr. Mellon and Mr. Hoover were members of the Commission throughout its life, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Kellogg successively representing the Department of State. The Commission had 74 meetings between April 18, 1922 and May 1, 1926. From October 20, 1923 to August 6, 1925, it held only six meetings and accomplished little. Up to the latter date, its accomplishments were the very important agreement with Great Britain June 18, 1923, and agreements with Finland ($9,000,000), Hungary ($1,939,000), Lithuania ($6,030,000), and Poland ($178,560,000). Looking at the record it seems quite clear that after the British had made their great decision in 1923, the other important settlements were almost forced by the need the debtors felt for American credits for stabilization purposes and by the policy reported as follows in the Commission’s minutes for August 6, 1925: “In May, 1925, certain banking interests in New York consulted the State Department as to its attitude toward the flotation of a Czechoslovak loan in the United States. After consulting with the President, the Chairman of the Commission, and Mr. Hoover, it was decided that the State Department should object to the flotation of a loan of any foreign government indebted to the United States which was unwilling to enter into negotiations for the funding of its debt on a proper basis.” 5 After the Commission expired in February, 1927, Austria came forward with a debt funding proposal which had been made also to the other eight countries which were pari passu creditors of Austria in respect of relief debts. 6 The work of examining this proposal and preparing it to present to Congress was handled almost entirely by the Department of State, but the actual presentation to Congress was by Under Secretary of the Treasury Mills. The Greek debt settlement 7 was worked out in 1928 by the two departments in close collaboration negotiating with the Greek Minister. Mr. Mills again presented the case before the Congressional committees. Both matters were presented to the Congress through letters of the Secretary of the Treasury to the President forwarded by the President to the Congress with an approving message. During the time between the signature of the agreement with France in April, 1926, 8 and its ratification just before August 1, 1929, the French maintained a Financial Attaché who was in contact with the Treasury, but such matters as negotiation of the terms on which France made payments of the amounts scheduled in the unratified agreement were handled through the Department of State. During all this time, from the point of view of the public and of Congress, war debts appeared as Treasury business. It came to be the accepted theory that debt settlements were made on the basis of the ascertained capacity to pay of each debtor—a financial question. When announcements regarding debt negotiations were made, they emanated from the Treasury. The Department of State seemed particularly glad to leave to the Treasury the task of presenting debt matters to the Congress. On one particular occasion the State Department very brusquely washed its hands of a war debt matter. On March 15, 1927, Secretary Mellon sent to Mr. Hibben, President of Princeton University, a letter 9 answering his statement and one signed by 116 members of the University faculty, 9a urging reconsideration and revision of the debt settlements. Unfortunately a stenographer transcribing the letter, which was drafted by Mr. Mills, omitted, at one place, the words “except Great Britain”, which were in the draft approved by Mr. Mills. On May 2, 1927, the British Embassy sent the Secretary of State a long note 10 to clarify the British policy and position regarding war debts and gave notice they were about to publish the note. May 4, the Secretary of State replied very briefly 11 that “The Government of the United States regards the correspondence between Mr. Mellon and Mr. Hibben as a purely domestic discussion and does not desire to engage in any formal diplomatic exchanges on the subject”. By vigorous haste the Treasury was able to issue a statement of its position to the press May 5, 12 simultaneously with the publication of the British note, which it blanketed. The State Department practically declined to have anything to do with the preparation of this Treasury statement, although the Treasury would have welcomed assistance. From the time that Mr. Garrard Winston became Secretary of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, at its August 6, 1925 meeting, until March 4, 1933, the debt question was chiefly handled by Mr. Winston and by Mr. Mills successively. Mr. Mills was very active in the discussions in June, 1931, leading up to the announcement of the Hoover Moratorium 13 on June 20. However, the chief preliminary discussions with outside advisers and the later discussions with foreign representatives were conducted by Mr. Stimson at his own home. The trans-Atlantic discussions with France through Mr. Mellon at Paris were conducted by telephone from the State Department or the White House, with the President, the Under-Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury all participating. The Secretary of State participated in the presentation of this matter to the Congress in December, 1931. During the first half of 1932, the United States had to insist rather strenuously to obtain the actual signature of moratorium agreements 14 so that the war debtor governments should not enter the Lausanne Conference on Reparations 15 with the agreements still unsigned. The departments cooperated in this. During this time there seemed to be considerable danger that war debts and reparations might be entangled by the European governments and it was not at all clear what would happen to reparations at the conference—the crisis of which coincided exactly with the bottom of the depression of the United States as measured by many indices. By this time war debts were a principal preoccupation of the Secretary of State and no longer merely a Treasury matter. The default correspondence of December, 1932, 16 was handled by both departments working in close collaboration. In connection with this correspondence, President Hoover suggested the appointment of a commission or an agency to be selected with President-elect Roosevelt, which agency would have the power to negotiate. Mr. Roosevelt declined to accept responsibility for negotiations before March 4, but authorized the Secretary of State to give notice to several debtor governments that the incoming Administration would be glad to receive their representatives separately beginning in March for the purpose of discussing war debts. Under the Roosevelt Administration, the Treasury Department has apparently not felt that war debts are a question peculiarly in its jurisdiction. This is suggested, for example, by a letter sent the Secretary of Commerce by the Secretary of the Treasury, April 9, 1935: “I have your letter of March 25, 1935, advising that there is due the Government of Belgium in connection with the settlement of litigation arising out of certain cases resulting from a voyage of the S. S. City of Brunswick the sum of $40,000 and suggesting that this sum might be applied on account of the indebtedness of the Belgian Government to the United States. “I feel that this matter is a question of policy that should be decided by the State Department and have referred it to the Secretary of State.” The Treasury apparently has no high officer as well informed on and interested in war debts as were Mr. Winston and Mr. Mills, in whose hands war debt matters accordingly tended to center. Neither is there in the permanent Treasury service anyone as thoroughly informed on them as Mr. Bell, now Acting Director of the Budget. I know of no particular indication in the record that the debts have been treated as a Treasury rather than a State Department matter because of the fact that the Secretary of State is charged with the conduct of political relations with other countries. However, it is a clear central fact that the United States has always tried to treat the debts as ordinary financial obligations of each of the debtor governments while the debtors have always tried to treat them as political rather than commercial obligations. In setting up the Debt Commission by statute, the Congress forced the debtor governments to deal with a special financial commission rather than with the central political authorities of the United States Government. A statute of this kind of course greatly eases the pressure on the Secretary of State to discuss debts in connection with other phases of relations with foreign countries. The debtors on the other hand have consistently sought to establish the whole war debts and reparations nexus as a single problem which must be settled by an all-around arrangement. That is where they left the situation by the Lausanne Agreement of July, 1932, and the default correspondence of December, 1932. If the United States should now wish to undertake serious negotiations to collect war debts, it would probably find difficulty in getting the individual debtors to treat separately on the basis of their capacity to pay. Great Britain would probably not pay much to the United States without collecting from France. If France could settle for a reasonable payment to the United States and a reasonable payment to Great Britain which the latter could pass on to the United States, and if France could foresee sufficient political and other advantage to itself therein, negotiation might accomplish something. Neither of these two principal debtors has pleaded inability to pay. If they made new agreements, minor debtors with some capacity to pay would probably follow. It is rather hard to foresee the debtors undertaking new negotiations in which Treasury calculating machines will grind out new schedules for payments of millions of dollars per annum for decades to come. 1 Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, 1922–1926 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1927), p. 70. 2 Ibid. , p. 72. 3 Ibid. , p. 73. 4 See Refunding of Obligations of Foreign Governments , Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 67th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 2135 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 153. 5 See Foreign Relations , 1925, vol. ii , pp. 39 ff. 6 See Foreign Relations , 1927, vol. i , pp. 442 ff. 7 See ibid. , 1928, vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 8 See ibid. , 1926, vol. ii , pp. 91 ff. 9 Ibid. , 1927, vol. ii , p. 732 . 9a Ibid. , p. 731 . 10 Ibid. , p. 739 . 11 Ibid. , p. 745 . 12 Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, 1922–1926 , p. 627. 13 See Foreign Relations , 1931, vol. i , pp. 1 ff. 14 See ibid. , 1932, vol. i , pp. 584 ff. 15 See ibid. , pp. 636 ff. 16 See ibid. , pp. 700 ff. Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser (Livesey) 800.51W89/982 [Document 466] Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser ( Livesey ) [ Washington ,] June 19, 1936. The Secretary of State today told the Secretary of the Treasury that the latter had full jurisdiction in war debt matters. This statement was made by the Secretary of State in the course of a conversation which had not previously touched on war debt matters or on questions of the respective jurisdictions of the Departments. The Secretary of the Treasury definitely noted the statement as disposing of a question which had not previously been discussed. He took occasion to say that the Department of State has given the Treasury Department better cooperation in all matters of Treasury interest than any other Department has done. Memorandum by Mr. John H. Spencer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 800.51W89/995½ [Document 467] Memorandum by Mr. John H. Spencer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] December 29, 1936. I. The Texts of the Replies of the Debtor States ( 1936 ). 17 The notes despatched by this Department on November 25, 1936 to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Italy, Great Britain and France, * concerning the amounts due and payable to the United States on December 15, 1936 in accordance with the debt agreements between the United States and the above-mentioned countries, in no wise departed from the form previously adopted by this Department with regard to the notifications which it has addressed twice yearly to the above-mentioned debtor States. The notes of all but the last three of the above-mentioned States sent to this Department in reply to the said notes of November 25, 1936 do not appreciably depart from the terms used in the previous replies sent by these countries in this matter. However, certain modifications have been introduced in the replies of Italy, Great Britain and France, to the notes of November 25, 1936 which distinguish the said replies from those sent by the same three States on June 7, 1936 (Great Britain) June 8, 1936 (Italy) and June 13, 1936 (France). In the case of Italy, the reply of June 8, 1936 contained the phrase “my Government regrets to be unable at the present time to submit any proposals etc.…”, which phrase was modified in the reply of the Italian Government of December 11, 1936 to the said note of November 25, 1936 to read “… regrets to be still unable at the present moment , to submit …” (underscoring added). Such a modification would seem to imply the possibility of proposals by Italy in the not distant future. The reply of the British Ambassador of December 10, 1936, to the said note of November 25, 1936 differs from the previous reply of June 7, 1936 by the omission of paragraph two of the latter note, which paragraph reads as follows:— “His Majesty’s Government explained in their note of the 4th June, 1934, the reasons for which they were reluctantly forced to suspend payments under those agreements. Those reasons are unfortunately no less valid now than they were then.” The omission of this paragraph in the note of December 10, 1936 would appear to imply a greater willingness on the part of the British Government to undertake negotiations concerning the settlement of the said debt question. Finally, the reply of the French Government, dated December 14, 1936, marks a considerable departure from the phraseology adopted in the previous replies sent by the French Government with respect to the said debts. In its reply of December 14, 1935, the French Government declared that “it desires in turn, … to repeat that it is prepared to seek, as soon as circumstances permit, a settlement of its debt on bases acceptable to both countries.” In the reply of June 13, 1936, this phrase was modified to read, “… it desires on its part to make it absolutely plain that it is prepared to seek etc.…” (underscoring added). The reply of December 14 of this year follows textually the first two paragraphs of the notes of December 14, 1935 and June 13, 1936 as well as the first sentence of paragraph three (which forms a single paragraph in the reply of December 14, 1936.) However, at this point, the following two paragraphs have been added. “Therefore, desirous of promising only what it will be able to perform, it regrets profoundly that the distressing economic depression which the country has just undergone and the state of world economic relations do not permit it as yet to present any proposals. Such proposals, in view of the disequilibrium of the balance of trade and of the balance of payments, might have an influence on its effort toward recovery and might compromise the beneficial effects of the international monetary understandings in which it has been happy to participate recently. “It hopes that these cooperative understandings, together with the improvement of world economic conditions and also the triumph of the democratic thesis which it is endeavoring to sustain by the limitation of armaments, will permit it to open through normal diplomatic channels negotiations with a view to an arrangement acceptable to both countries which would strengthen their bonds of friendship and of confidence to the benefit of the welfare and the peace of the peoples.” These two paragraphs, which did not appear in the previous replies of the French Government in regard to the said debts, although somewhat noncommittal, would, by the mere fact of their addition to and modification of the texts of the preceding notes appear to imply that the French Government is more favorably inclined than in the past to envisage the possibility of a final settlement of the debt question. II. Import of the Modifications Introduced into the said Replies. Such are the impressions which would appear to be created by the texts of the notes of the three above-mentioned countries. In the case of Great Britain, however, the tenor of the note of December 10, 1936 which is slightly more conciliatory than the previous notes of the British Government, has not been supported by any other statements or actions, on the part of the British Government. Consequently, the above-mentioned modification of the previous note sent by the said government is probably of no great significance. The Italian note of December 11, 1936, slightly more conciliatory in tone than the previous notes sent by that Government in regard to debts, was in fact, preceded six months ago by an informal conversation between representatives of the United States and officials of the Italian Government but, no formal diplomatic conversations have taken place. Consequently, the modifications of text which distinguish the note of December 11, 1936, of the Italian Government from that Government’s note of June 8, 1936, would appear to be of but slight significance. Finally, the considerable modification introduced by the note of December 14, 1936, into the text of the usual reply of the French Government in the matter of debts may be said to be indicative of a change in attitude on the part of the French Government for political as well as financial reasons. The desire of the French Government to regain the good will of the citizens of the United States in order to obtain an understanding with or assistance from the United States in case of war in Europe as well as the desire of the said Government to obviate the restrictions imposed by the Johnson Act 18 have been factors of importance in this respect. On November 28, 1936, a conversation was held between Ambassador Bullitt and Mr. Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning, among other subjects, the debt. 19 In the course of this conversation, the French Foreign Minister expressed a desire on the part of the French Government to arrange a settlement of the debt but he did not offer any suggestions as to the time, manner and form of negotiations and settlement, nor have any formal proposals been subsequently made by the French Government. The announcement in the New York Times of December 23, 1936, of the acceptance by Mr. Bonnet, former Minister of Finance and of Commerce, of a six month’s (?) mission to the United States as French Ambassador would tend to confirm the desire of the French Government to open diplomatic negotiations with a view to the settlement of the debt question. In conclusion, one final remark may be pertinent. In view of the inter-governmental loans extended to France by Great Britain, and in view of the fact that the British Government still entertains the hope of an eventual repayment, at least in part, of these same loans, and in view of the further fact that the British Government is, at present, determined not to provide in its annual budget for the repayment of British inter-governmental debts to the United States, the British Government would insist upon a settlement of its debt to the United States which would, in accordance with the principle enunciated in the Balfour note of August 1, 1922, 20 enable it to pay off its indebtedness to the United States with the sums received from the French Government in payment of the loans extended to it by the British Government. Consequently, should the French Government insist upon a reduction of its indebtedness to the British Government proportionate to that reduction which it may obtain or seek to obtain as regards its indebtedness to the Government of the United States, then the British Government would seek to obtain a proportionate reduction of the debts which it, in turn, owes to the Government of the United States. Finally, notwithstanding the inter-governmental wartime loans extended by Great Britain to Italy, there would appear to be no reason for holding that any settlement which might be reached concerning the war debts owed the British Government by the Italian Government would operate to affect the settlement sought by the British Government of the debts owed by it to the Government of the United States, for the reason that the British Government has practically abandoned the hope of obtaining repayment of the war debts owed to it by the Italian Government. 17 For citations to texts of correspondence mentioned herein, see p. 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of General: ] . * The correspondence with Estonia and Yugoslavia is not yet published. [Footnote in the original.] 18 Approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574. 19 See telegram of November 28, 1–6 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, vol. ii , p. 578 , specifically the section numbered 1164, p. 580. 20 Enclosure to despatch No. 1550, August 4, 1922, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, Foreign Relations , 1922, vol. i , p. 406 . France France [468] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, April 17, 1936. [Received May 1.] 800.51W89 France/1036 [469] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, May 14, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 14—7:45 p.m.] 800.51W89 France/1037: Telegram [470] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, May 19, 1936. [Received May 26.] 800.51W89 France/1045 [471] The Ambassador in France (Straus) to President Roosevelt Paris, May 23, 1936. 800.51W89 France/1049 [472] Suggested Draft of a Letter for the Signature of President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France (Straus) undated 800.51W89 France/1049 [473] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 1, 1936—6 p.m. [Received December 1—3:45 p.m.] 800.51W89 France/1057: Telegram [474] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 1, 1936—7 p.m. [Received December 1—4:15 p.m.] 800.51W89 France/1057: Telegram [475] The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 10, 1936—3 p.m. [Received 3:24 p.m.] 800.51W89 France/1063: Telegram [476] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) for the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] December 31, 1936. 800.51W89 France/1073 The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1036 [Document 468] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 2693 Paris , April 17, 1936. [Received May 1.] Sir : I have the honor to report that after being ignored by the French press and by the public for a long period, the question of the French war debt to the United States was raised in an election speech delivered by former Premier Herriot at Lyons on April 9, 1936. The full text of the address, as published in Le Temps of April 10, 1936, is enclosed herewith, and as of interest to the Department the following translation is provided of his statement in so far as it related to the French war debt to the United States: “At the end of 1932, almost willingly, I was forced out of office because of the American debt question. As a matter of fact, I stood up for an idea which was not quite popular, but I defended the honor of the signature of France. I defended it all the more since, in the case under consideration, it was not only a question of the war debts, but of debts which had been contracted for the reconstruction of France; these debts were not debts from government to government, but represented 60 millions * subscribed by American citizens who had, in all confidence, rushed to the banks to afford us necessary assistance. Furthermore, we purchased the war stocks which remain to this day unpaid. Having certain ideas on probity, I say today that if it were necessary to begin over again, I would do so. When I hear citizen Pierre Taittinger say that I wanted to reduce France to servitude, I feel inclined to shrug my shoulders. What I would not accept, and still refuse to accept, is that it could be said ‘France does not want to pay’. “The Chamber of Deputies did not follow me, and I returned to the side lines. “In 1933, I was President of the Radical Socialist Party, and President of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. I upheld the Radical Party on the Committee, even when I was not of the same opinion as the Government, as for the question of the Pact of Four. 21 I supported the Government as President of the party, and, as a matter of fact, I only took two initiatives, namely: a mission as Delegate of the French Government to the United States, and a private voyage of study in Russia. I went to the United States because, by a démarche which, in my opinion, was an honor to me, Mr. Roosevelt had asked to see me. 22 While I had no official post, Mr. Roosevelt nevertheless wanted to see me so that, together, we could seek ways and means of settling the problem of the debts. “I saw Mr. Roosevelt, who is a great democrat, the chief of American democracy, and I found myself face to face with a man very well disposed towards France. I think I may resume, as follows, the terms in which he expressed himself to me: ‘Make a gesture’. (‘ Faites un geste ’). Perhaps some day I will publish the notes which I took at the time, and they will, I think, interest the French people. Mr. Roosevelt explained: ‘I am in an impossible situation vis-à-vis the American public which is composed not only of employers, but of workmen, and employees. Give me something on account, whatever you want. I shall be only too glad to assist you, if I can, in all international affairs.’ “You know what followed; at the present time I am quite concerned with the thought that Mr. Roosevelt will perhaps be the last American President friendly towards us. Who knows whether one of these days we shall not see at the White House some German-American? However this may be, my views were rejected; and the Right covered me with insults. “I now invite your attention to the following. If, in 1932, the Americans came to our assistance, today, surrounded by immense difficulties, the Americans refuse to aid us. They are in another planet. Oh! if we were sufficiently wise not to forget our friendships! I hope that the day will never come when we shall have need of petroleum and of credits. Where shall we find them? I am, I repeat, for the respect of signatures and of contracts.” Le Temps then proceeds to quote the following reply made by Mr. Herriot to an interruption made during the speech on the subject of the Hoover moratorium. “Those who are against payment of the debt explain their attitude by stating that it is because the Hoover moratorium had thrown the machinery out of gear. If you will examine the texts you will see that Mr. Hoover said: ‘You are free to accept or not to accept, but this will in no way tie up the question of the French debts towards the United States’. I myself did not vote in favor of the acceptance of the Hoover moratorium. Others, on the other hand, voted for it. France, therefore, is held to its undertaking. What I cannot understand is that those who voted the moratorium refused to accept the consequences. I also beg to invite your attentions the fact that I did not vote in favor of the debt settlement project established by our ambassador in 1926, 23 for the reason that this project did not embody safeguard clauses. After these votes had been taken the situation changed entirely. France has given its word, and under these circumstances, I intend to adhere to it.” The details thus furnished by M. Herriot relating to his conversation with the President during his visit to the United States in 1933 appear to have now been made public for the first time. The comparatively brief and guarded statements relating to the results of his mission made by the former French Premier upon his return to France were the subject of the Embassy’s telegram No. 205 of May 8, 1933, and the Embassy’s despatch No. 3560 of May 9, 1933. 24 As concerns M. Herriot’s apparent reference to the text of the arrangement reached with France 25 on the application of the Hoover moratorium, and the independence of the war debt payments, the Embassy’s records of the moratorium negotiations which took place in Paris in June and July 1931 indicate that at a meeting held between the French and American representatives on June 29, 1931, a communication along the lines of his statement was made by Mr. Mellon to M. Laval, based on instructions contained in paragraph 7 of section 4 of the Department’s telegram No. 298 of June 27, 10 p.m., 1931. 26 This was reported to the Department in the last two paragraphs of the Embassy’s telegram No. 373 of June 29, 5 p.m., 1931. 27 The possibility of the eventual revision of the war debt agreements raised by M. Flandin during the negotiations were reported in the fourth paragraph of the Embassy’s telegram No. 379 of June 30, 5 p.m., 1931, 28 which indicated that the American negotiators, in reply, stressed “that it would be absolutely useless for the French Government or anyone else to harbor such a hope”, and in this connection the American negotiators pointed out the plain statement covering this point in the President’s moratorium proposal published on June 20, 1931. 29 The present attitude of M. Herriot towards the question of the war debts, and his apparent understanding of the terms of the moratorium agreement would appear to present a certain interest in the event that the Left parties obtain the upper hand, in the coming elections, and M. Herriot be given a place in the new government. It is for this reason that his recent declarations in this connection are referred to at some length. It seems worth noting that, as far as is known, the resurrection of the war debt question by M. Herriot has not provoked any comment or notice in the French press.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, Jesse Isidor Straus * Note: apparently a misprint. [Footnote in the original.] 21 Agreement of Understanding and Cooperation between France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, signed at Rome, July 15, 1933; see Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. i , pp. 396 ff. 22 See ibid. , pp. 494 – 501 , and Department of State, Press Releases , April 15, 1933, p. 247. 23 Agreement signed April 29, 1926; see Foreign Relations , 1926, vol. ii , pp. 91 ff. 24 Neither printed. 25 Dated July 6, 1931, Foreign Relations , 1931, vol. i , p. 162 . 26 Ibid. , p. 88 . 27 Ibid. , p. 101 . 28 Not printed. 29 See telegram No. 262, June 20, 1931, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, Foreign Relations , 1931, vol. i , p. 33 . The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1037: Telegram [Document 469] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State Paris , May 14, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 14—7:45 p.m. 30 ] 410. The Embassy learns this evening from a strictly reliable and confidential source that Léon Blum, leader of the Socialist Party, has delegated a member of the Executive Committee of his party to prepare a full report on French war debts to the United States. Laboulaye, 31 according to the Embassy’s informant, is returning from Washington shortly and will be called in consultation. Furthermore, Herriot, taking France’s precarious position in foreign politics into consideration, is reported to have brought strong pressure to bear on Blum to take some action towards debt settlement. Blum is believed to have stated that inasmuch as he had never voted against the payment of war debts his record was such that he felt that he could reopen the question. The Embassy’s source of information, who has been in close contact with Barthod who is secretary to Herriot in his capacity as Mayor of Lyon, was informed that Blum, as soon as he takes over the Premiership of the Front Popular Government, will make a statement of foreign policy before the Chamber when Parliament reconvenes in June which will include a reference to the advisability of settling in some form or other France’s war debt to the United States. Straus 30 Telegram in two sections; section 2 not printed. 31 André Lefebvre de Laboulaye, French Ambassador in the United States. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1045 [Document 470] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 2768 Paris , May 19, 1936. [Received May 26.] Sir : I have the honor to report as follows. M. Léon Blum, leader of the French Socialist Party, was the guest of honor and speaker at the luncheon of the American Club on Friday, May 15th. On that occasion he delivered a speech which attracted wide attention in the French press and which eventually found echoes in Rome, Berlin and London. During the course of his remarks, which he prefaced by stating that they were delivered in an entirely personal capacity and without engaging the responsibility of any Government official, he brought up the question of France’s War debt to the United States in a manner which could only be interpreted as an intention on his part to reopen the issue when he will assume power as Prime Minister on June 3rd. M. Blum’s references to the debt question have, it is believed, been erroneously reported by at least one of the American agencies in Paris as a definite intention on the part of the French Government to consider some form of token payment on June 15th (the date of the next debt instalment) or to offer a solution for a settlement on a reduced scale. It would be wrong to infer anything of the kind. M. Blum did, however, make it clear that it was his intention to reopen the question and he frankly acknowledged that France’s unilateral denunciation of a solemn contract had offended America’s sense of moral and commercial honesty. The exact stenographic text of M. Blum’s remarks, together with a careful translation thereof, are enclosed. There are also enclosed numerous clippings, 32 without translation, which appeared in the more important Paris newspapers of varying shades of political opinion. It may be of interest in this connection to furnish a little background in connection with these developments. On May 5th Mr. Tuck, First Secretary of the Embassy, accompanied by Mr. Edgar Mowrer, Paris correspondent of the Chicago Daily News , lunched with M. and Mme. Blum. During the course of conversation, M. Blum asked Mr. Mowrer what was thought of France in the United States. The latter, with characteristic frankness, replied that the United States had not, as seemed to be generally believed in France, forgotten the question of debts and consequently a very definite feeling of animosity existed. He added that in his (Mowrer’s) opinion, the Johnson Act and the recent Neutrality Legislation 33 had their origin, at least in part, in the failure of certain European countries to make any gesture towards debt settlement. The American public, Mr. Mowrer considered, had become convinced that France quite wrongly seemed to believe that the affair was no longer an issue in the United States. M. Blum appeared interested and, turning to Mr. Tuck, asked him whether he shared Mr. Mowrer’s views. Mr. Tuck replied that it was embarrassing in his official capacity for him to express an opinion but, since the question had been asked in complete frankness, he could not but concur with Mr. Mowrer’s point of view. Subsequently, the Embassy learned from an entirely confidential and reliable source that M. Herriot, who is greatly disturbed at France’s truly precarious position in foreign politics, had urgently besought M. Blum to take some action towards debt settlement and that the Socialist leader had consequently delegated a member of the Executive Committee of his party to undertake a full report on the question. M. de Laboulaye’s return to France is also believed to be connected with the matter and it is possible that he might be called into consultation. M. Blum, according to reports, had no scruples about bringing up the matter of debt settlement since he has never voted against the payment of war debts and consequently felt that his record was such that he could, in all propriety, reopen the question. It is therefore possible that when M. Blum delivers his Ministerial Declaration on June 3rd that he will include therein a direct reference to the debts. Contrary to the report contained in the Embassy’s telegram No. 410 of May 14th/8 p.m. the Ere Nouvelle , M. Herriot’s personal organ, carries the story today that he has definitely decided not to accept the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Front Populaire Government, which has been offered him at least three times. However, he and M. Blum will meet this week and it may still be possible that the Mayor of Lyons may be induced to change his decision. During the course of the luncheon at the American Club I sat next to M. Blum. He asked me why there was such animosity between our respective countries. I replied that, in my opinion, and talking purely personally, there were two fundamental reasons which influenced my country. The first was that the debt question was not forgotten in America and, secondly, strong anti-French attitude on the part of the Hearst press. He also questioned me with regard to the Neutrality Legislation and I explained to him that it was my belief that the fundamental policy of such legislation was to keep the United States out of European embroilments and that it was in no way aimed directly against Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, Jesse Isidor Straus 32 Enclosures not printed. 33 Joint resolution, August 31, 1935, and amendments, February 29, 1936; 49 Stat. 1081 and 1152. The Ambassador in France (Straus) to President Roosevelt 800.51W89 France/1049 [Document 471] The Ambassador in France ( Straus ) to President Roosevelt 34 Paris , May 23, 1936. Dear Mr. President : In the Paris New York Herald of Thursday, May 21st, there is an intimation (whether correct and authoritative, of course I do not know), that the Secretary of the Treasury had in mind a series of conferences looking toward the stabilization of currencies and a suggestion that war debt settlement will form part of such discussions. This appears to have been made apropos of the agreement with the Chinese Government. 35 In the press of other matters you may have forgotten the method of possible adjustment of war debts I made to you almost two years ago, and the memorandum 36 I then at your request drew up for you. At that time you accorded me permission informally and unofficially to discuss the thought with French officials. This I have frequently done, always distinctly impressing on whomsoever I presented it to that it was my own personal solution of a puzzling and irritating cause of American dissatisfaction with French postwar policy. Various responsible elements in France, it would appear, are beginning to realize that France has needlessly incurred American displeasure and that some tender, which must, as I have so often repeated to my official contacts, emanate from the debtor, will have to be made, and Léon Blum, in his American Club speech a week ago yesterday, gave the first semi-official recognition of the desirability of seeking a better Franco-American relationship. Something may come of it, particularly if Herriot takes the Foreign Ministry. Hence this letter. With kindest regards [etc.] Jesse Isidor Straus P. S. I am enclosing a memorandum of a possible plan for payment. 37 34 Referred by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury for preparation of a reply, and informally transmitted by Mr. Morgenthau to the Secretary of State for suggestions regarding a letter to the Ambassador over the President’s signature. 35 May 18, 1936; see Treasury Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1938 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 267. 36 Despatch No. 1183, September 4, 1934, from the Ambassador in France; not printed. For outline of Ambassador’s suggestion, see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 558 . 37 Not printed. Suggested Draft of a Letter for the Signature of President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France (Straus) 800.51W89 France/1049 [Document 472] Suggested Draft of a Letter for the Signature of President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France ( Straus ) 38 undated Dear Mr. Ambassador : I see again from your letter of May 23 how alertly you follow matters. We have not suggested and are not likely to suggest that war debts and stabilization should be joined in any discussion or negotiation. This would complicate the handling of the two dissimilar problems, each of which is difficult in itself. I am glad to have your assurance that you discuss war debt settlement projects with French officials only on a purely personal and unofficial basis. Any proposals must come from the debtors, and we must be free to consider them on their merits. We probably should not wish to relate debt payments too closely to American purchases of foreign goods and services, except in the possible case of some unusual type of purchases. We sell almost all these countries much more than we buy from them. Many countries already have the idea of limiting their purchases in the United States to the amount they can pay for the dollars obtained directly from Americans for goods and services. If they apply these dollars to debt payments, they may not wish to get dollars elsewhere to buy American goods. Several debtors still have large stocks of gold and other means of making debt payments here besides their own sales here, tourist expenses, et cetera. We were interested by Mr. Blum’s address before the American Club and hope that he will soon find himself in a position to pursue the matter. Very sincerely yours, 38 Drafted on June 25, 1936, by Frederick Livesey, Office of the Economic Adviser. No record as to whether President Roosevelt sent this letter has been found in the Department’s files. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1057: Telegram [Document 473] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 1, 1936—6 p.m. [Received December 1—3:45 p.m.] 1176. Blum lunched with me alone today and I had an opportunity to repeat to him everything that I had said to Delbos 39 with regard to the absolute determination of the United States to stay out not only of any wars on the continent of Europe but out of any engagements or commitments which might possibly lead to our involvement in wars. I repeated what I had said to Delbos; to wit: that I should be a bad friend of France if I did not advise him against basing his foreign policy or any portion of it on the expectation that by debt payments or any other means of cultivating a pleasant atmosphere France could by hook or by crook get the United States to take the position which we took in 1917. Blum explained that on December 15, 1936, he would like to send a note to the United States Government saying that France was prepared to discuss the portion of the French debt to the United States which was represented by the payments due for the American “war stocks”. He said that this was the only proposal he could make without arousing violent opposition in the French Parliament. Bullitt 39 On November 28, 1936; see telegram No. 1160–1165, November 28, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, vol. ii , p. 578 . The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1057: Telegram [Document 474] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 1, 1936—7 p.m. [Received December 1—4:15 p.m.] 1177. Continuing my 1176, December 1, 6 p.m. I pointed out to him as I had pointed out to Delbos that this particular “egg” could not in my opinion be “unscrambled” from the Mellon-Berenger agreement. 40 I pointed out further that the United States in my opinion could not accept a payment of this sort as a specific payment on account of the “war stocks” but could only hold it in a special fund against the unpaid amount due us under the Mellon-Berenger agreement. I went over the exact amounts due to us under that agreement and asked him if he thought there was the faintest possibility of the French Chamber and Senate accepting a proposal which also would be acceptable to the American Congress. He replied that he did not. I then cautioned him against stirring up bad blood by starting polemics on both sides of the Atlantic on the subject of the debt. He finally said: “You mean that you think we should make no offer whatsoever?” I replied that I did not mean that but that I felt any offer made must be a very serious one and that the worst thing that could happen for relations between our two countries would be a public reopening of debt conversations which would lead to ultimate disagreement. He thereupon asked me to discuss the matter further with him and Minister of Finance Auriol. I said that I would be glad to do so. Bullitt 40 For the negotiations between the Secretary of the Treasury and the French mission charged with the settlement of the French war debt to the United States, see Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, 1922–1926 , p. 44; for text of agreement see ibid. , p. 257. The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1063: Telegram [Document 475] The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 10, 1936—3 p.m. [Received 3:24 p.m.] 1225. I lunched today with Blum and Auriol. The latter explained his ideas with respect to the French debt to the United States. He said that he had examined the figures carefully and had decided that the amounts already in default as well as those due under the Mellon-Berenger agreement were so great that they could not be paid at the present time without gravely upsetting the balance of payments and that he was certain that if he and Blum should attempt to pay the defaulted amounts and the installment due on December 15 the Chamber of Deputies and Senate would vote against them. Auriol said, however, that he and Blum (the latter nodding assent) were extremely anxious to work out a settlement of debts and had decided to make formal announcement on December 15 which would indicate this desire. He went on to say that he saw no basis of settlement unless the European debtors of the United States should lump their obligations together and make a joint offer to the United States. He hoped to get the money for payments to the United States by several different methods, the first to be a tax on exports to the United States, the second to be an extra interest charge on any loans had [ made ] to European countries. He added that many more methods could be devised which would not upset the balance of payments. I expressed no opinion as to his general project beyond the statement that we did not relish the idea of putting all our debtors in one boat. I then asked him please to keep in mind that any new debt settlement would be controlled entirely by the Congress of the United States and that the Congress at the present time was opposed to any alteration of the Mellon-Berenger agreement. Auriol said that he intends shortly to consult Van Zeeland 41 with regard to the ideas he has in mind as he has been informed from Brussels that Van Zeeland is working on a project similar to his project. Bullitt 41 Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Prime Minister, June 1936–October 1937. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) for the Acting Secretary of State 800.51W89 France/1073 [Document 476] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Dunn ) for the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 31, 1936. The French Ambassador came in this morning to inform you with regard to a conversation which he had just had with the President at the Executive Office. The Ambassador asked the President whether he thought anything might be accomplished now with regard to a reconsideration of the arrangement for the payment of the French debt to the United States. The President told the Ambassador that the Vice President and his political advisers in the Senate and House were strongly opposed to having the matter come up in this session, as they did not think it was an opportune time for consideration being given to it in this session of Congress. The President said that he recognized and agreed with this position and suggested that no steps be taken immediately on the subject. The President said that he felt, however, that it might be possible later on, in perhaps two or three months, for conversations to be undertaken in a more helpful atmosphere. The President said, however, that he felt that any discussion of the subject should be undertaken through diplomatic channels, and furthermore it was his opinion that it would not be advisable for the French Government to appoint an Ambassador to come over on a special mission for the purpose, as the public discussion in the press which would result would greatly hamper the smooth progress of the discussions. The Ambassador mentioned the possibility of Monsieur Bonnet, former Minister of Finance of France, who has been spoken of as coming on a limited mission of six months for the purpose of arranging a new debt settlement, 42 and the President said that while there appeared to be no objection to Bonnet personally, the fact that he did not speak English and the fact that he had been mentioned as coming here for the purpose of discussing the debt settlement would not be helpful in the circumstances. The President also said that there was a certain feeling in this country that the French had in mind making an arrangement by which they would make very small payments to this country, and in exchange would place themselves in a position which would permit of their floating or obtaining large loans here. He said that there was a very strong feeling in the country that such an arrangement should not be permitted. The President further said that he was extremely anxious to obtain discretionary authority in connection with the proposed legislation for the maintenance of a neutral attitude on the part of this country in the event of future war in Europe, and that he was desirous also of obtaining in connection therewith discretion as to the obtaining of loans or credits in this country by foreign governments in war times. He said that it would be best to permit the discussion on the neutrality question to run its course before the question of settlement of foreign debts were injected into the picture. The Ambassador said that the President at the end of his conversation again referred to his feeling that any conversations on the subject of debts should be undertaken through diplomatic channels, in order that they might be kept entirely confidential until they had progressed to a point where there might be some possibility of arriving at an agreement. The Ambassador asked me particularly to express to you his thanks for having arranged the interview with the President at this time, as he considers it extremely important that his Government be informed now as to the President’s attitude toward this subject. James Clement Dunn 42 Georges Bonnet became French Ambassador in the United States on January 16, 1937. Italy Italy [477] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to President Roosevelt Rome, January 31, 1936. 800.51W89 Italy/280 [478] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Long) Washington, February 27, 1936—noon. 800.51W89 Italy/281: Telegram [479] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, March 2, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 2—2:45 p.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/282: Telegram [480] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, March 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 14—8:55 a.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/283: Telegram [481] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, April 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received April 14—3:10 p.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/285: Telegram [482] The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, April 20, 1936—7 p.m. [Received April 20—4:52 p.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/286: Telegram [483] The Chargé in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Rome, June 1, 1936—5 p.m. [Received June 1—4:03 p.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/289: Telegram [484] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] June 3, 1936. 800.51W89 Italy/289 [485] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Italy (Kirk) Washington, June 5, 1936—5 p.m. 800.51W89 Italy/289: Telegram [486] The Chargé in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Rome, June 8, 1936—11 a.m. [Received June 8—6:30 a.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/290: Telegram [487] Memorandum of Press Conference, November 13, 1936 November 13, 1936 800.51W89 Italy/299 [488] The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, December 2, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 2—8:35 a.m.] 800.51W89 Italy/301: Telegram The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to President Roosevelt 800.51W89 Italy/280 [Document 477] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to President Roosevelt 43 [Extract] Rome , January 31, 1936. My Dear Chief : There are two things of a constructive nature I would like to do here before I leave—and I hope you are not going to leave me here long after the present difficulties smooth out. First, I would like to induce the Italians to pay their war debt and to break the solid front in Europe which exists against the United States in that matter. And Second, I would like to buy the house I now live in as a residence for the string of American Ambassadors who will follow me. These two things are susceptible of combination. One reason the Italians have not paid their debt is because of the transfer problem. As you know, they have had a very limited supply of gold, and it would have been at any time very difficult for them to have made payments in gold. They now owe us about $2,000,000[000]. 44 If we could buy this house—and it really makes the best Embassy in Rome, except the Farnese Palace, which is the French Embassy—at a cost of $800,000 or $1,000,000, we could deduct that from the sum which the Italians owe us. They could then pay us the balance and continue their other payments pending the possibility of some adjustment to be made of the whole question at some subsequent date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Affectionately and respectfully, Breckinridge Long 43 Transmitted to the Department from the White House, February 15, 1936. 44 The unpaid principal of the total funded indebtedness of Italy to the United States growing out of the First World War was $2,004,900,000; Treasury Department, Document No. 3079, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937), Table 50, p. 470. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Long) 800.51W89 Italy/281: Telegram [Document 478] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) Washington , February 27, 1936—noon. 17. Reference your letter January 31 to the President regarding acquisition of residence as part of settlement of debt which in principle has our unqualified approval. Will you therefore in your discretion take such steps as may be necessary to find out definitely whether a settlement can be arranged and the residence offered as part payment. If a reasonably satisfactory offer is forthcoming along the lines of your letter of January 31, I will be glad to consult our leaders in Congress, since payment in this way necessitates congressional authorization. Please cable developments. Hull The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/282: Telegram [Document 479] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , March 2, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 2—2:45 p.m.] 66. Your No. 17, February 27, noon. Suvich 45 expresses real interest in the subject. He is uninformed as to financial ability but will discuss with the Minister of Finance, the Foreign Exchange Control and Mussolini and will talk to me in a few days. He says they have no understanding with England or France and it is preferable that those Governments be not advised that the matter is even being considered. Long 45 Fulvio Suvich, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/283: Telegram [Document 480] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , March 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received March 14—8:55 a.m.] 80. My No. 66, March 2, 7 p.m. In conversation with Suvich he said the financial authorities were considering this business very seriously but that he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss it in detail with them. In my mind there is no doubt that they are considering favorably the possibilities of it and that they would like to make some arrangement. During the conversation Suvich said he understood that we had made an arrangement with Greece to settle at 35 cents on the dollar. I told him I had no information about it and had not heard of any recent discussion on war debts by the United States with any of the debtor nations. He said the Greek arrangement might not have been entirely analogous to the Italian obligation. While I understand there is a small obligation on the part of Greece to the American Government I believe the loan was made after the war and for refugee resettlement purposes. 46 However, his mention of this matter would appear to indicate that they might be considering making a suggestion for settlement on that basis. As I have no information about the Greek arrangement I will be glad to be advised for background purposes and will gladly receive any suggestion you may have for my guidance in connection therewith. Long 46 See Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/285: Telegram [Document 481] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , April 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received April 14—3:10 p.m.] 106. My 95, April 8, noon. 47 Mr. Suvich brought up the subject today and said that the Ministry of Finance had not been able to reconcile with the military needs of Italy the expenditure of a sum of gold to approximate $63,000,000, the amount that will be due including interest and arrears as of June 15. He expressed the fear that it might be too late now to make a proposal in liquidation because of the near adjournment of the Congress. I got the impression that they were afraid that if they made an offer in smaller amount it might not be accepted and that they would be in an embarrassing position because of the refusal of an offer. Consequently I told him that it was not yet too late and if they would authorize me to name a specific amount I would ask you whether you would be willing to consider an offer of that amount prior to its being made. There is no doubt in my mind that the Italian Government is very much interested in making the settlement and that it is prepared to go as far as it feels it can go considering the necessities of their gold reserve and the possibility of expenditures for military purposes. They are reasonably sure now that the expenditures for military purposes are nearing the end but as the amounts to be due June 15 together with arrears approximate 20 to 25 per cent of their total gold supply they are still unable to come to a definite decision. However, it is possible that I may hear something before I leave for Washington which I intend to do not later than April 21. Long 47 Not printed. The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/286: Telegram [Document 482] The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State Rome , April 20, 1936—7 p.m. [Received April 20—4:52 p.m.] 107. My 106, April 14, 7 p.m. I discussed the subject with Mussolini this afternoon. He called in Suvich. The three of us discussed the general proposal that Italy pay an undetermined amount but less than the sum to be due June 15 including arrears. The general understanding was that Italy was considering an offer of an undetermined amount in lieu of the total amount, the payment of which would be accepted as settlement in full for the amount due up to the date mentioned. Thereafter, discussions would take place for a new settlement agreement. Upon payment of that amount, if it was accepted by the United States Government, Italy’s situation would be regularized and she would be able to enter into financial negotiations with private bankers in America with the idea of floating loans there. Mussolini expressed his intense interest and said he considered the subject of the matter of very great importance. He had not had time to give it proper attention because of affairs in Europe and Africa transpiring in the last few weeks. He now had time to consider it and thought the matter most important. He said it would be practically impossible for him to borrow money from either England or France because of the political conditions which those Governments would attempt to attach to any loan and that he would not compromise himself with political conditions. He hoped that his efforts to regularize his position with the United States would meet with the sympathetic understanding by the American Government and that they would realize that the transfer problem was one of his principal concerns. He realized that the purchase of the villa would help in a way but would not be a great help and wondered if there was any other way in which we could help him with the transfer problem. He made no definite commitment but I have little doubt that within the next 10 days or 2 weeks he will make, either through the Embassy here or through his Embassy in Washington, some kind of a proposal. He would like to regularize his position not only because it would establish better relations between Italy and America but because [it] would solve some of his problems. In my conversation with him, I emphasized the advantages that would accrue to Italy and definitely abstained from making any plea for payment. I placed the matter entirely upon the grounds of Italy’s just debts to the United States calling attention to the advantages that would accrue to Italy if they could arrange the matter. I plan to leave Rome tomorrow but the state of my health is somewhat precarious and I may not be able to catch the Washington Thursday. There will be nothing more to report on this, however, in the immediate future. Long The Chargé in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/289: Telegram [Document 483] The Chargé in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Rome , June 1, 1936—5 p.m. [Received June 1—4:03 p.m.] 185. Ambassador’s 107, April 20, 7 p.m., and previous. The Minister of Finance 48 asked me to call on him this afternoon and I have just returned from his office. After referring to Ambassador Long’s conversation with Mussolini and Suvich on the question of Italy’s debt to the United States, the Minister said that Suvich had sent him the notification which the Italian Embassy had received from the Department as to the June payments and that in view of the impossibility through lack of time to discuss the matter before June 15th, he considered that it would be necessary to send the usual negative reply. However, the Minister stated, the Italian Government wishes to enter into discussion with the United States Government with a view to ascertaining if some settlement could be reached and asked if it would be possible to let him know the views of the United States Government as to how these conversations might be initiated and where they might be held. I told him that I would communicate to you this inquiry and would acquaint him with the reply as soon as it was received. My conversation with the Minister was brief and no matters were discussed in any detail. He said that there were two main groups of questions to be considered, namely, those relating to the payments in default and those relating to the entire indebtedness of Italy to the United States. He emphasized the fact that due consideration would have to be given to Italy’s ability to pay and he referred to the matter of the refunding at a lower rate of interest of Italian commercial debts owed in the United States as a factor in the consideration of the entire question. In conclusion I might add that from this conversation with the Minister it appears that it is not his present intention to put forward in the reply to the Department’s above mentioned notification any proposals in regard to the payment of Italy’s indebtedness, but that he wishes you to be informed of the willingness on the part of his Government to discuss the matter. Kirk 48 Count Paolo Thaon de Revel. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 800.51W89 Italy/289 [Document 484] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] June 3, 1936. At the President’s request, I submitted this draft reply to Rome 49 to Secretary Morgenthau at the Treasury this afternoon. We discussed the whole matter from various angles and Mr. Morgenthau agreed entirely to the Department’s draft instructions. I thereupon called up the White House and asked Mr. McIntyre to convey this message to the President inasmuch as the latter had just left the offices. Mr. McIntyre promised to do so at once. William Phillips 49 Infra. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Italy (Kirk) 800.51W89 Italy/289: Telegram [Document 485] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Italy ( Kirk ) Washington , June 5, 1936—5 p.m. 56. Your 185, June 1, 5 p.m. The notification sent to the Italian Ambassador May 22, 1936, 50 states that this Government is fully disposed to discuss, through diplomatic channels, any proposals which the Italian Government may desire to put forward in regard to the payment of its indebtedness to the United States, and that such proposals would receive careful consideration with a view to eventual submission to the American Congress. The Department would be glad to discuss informally any proposals that the Italian Government may initiate through diplomatic channels at Washington. Hull 50 Department of State, Press Releases , June 13, 1936, p. 582. The Chargé in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/290: Telegram [Document 486] The Chargé in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Rome , June 8, 1936—11 a.m. [Received June 8—6:30 a.m.] 199. Department’s 56, June 5, 5 p.m. I called by appointment on the Minister of Finance this morning and communicated to him the substance of the Department’s instruction referred to above. He said he would confer with the Chief of the Government on the matter. Kirk Memorandum of Press Conference, November 13, 1936 800.51W89 Italy/299 [Document 487] Memorandum of Press Conference, November 13, 1936 November 13, 1936 [Extract] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . War Debts A correspondent enquired whether the question has been brought up of the possible settlement of the Italian war debt, with a view toward lending by this Government or by private interests perhaps of additional sums to Italy. The Acting Secretary replied that off the record, so far as the State Department is concerned, it has been heard that the Italians may be trying to borrow money on short term loans privately in New York, but that the State Department has nothing to do with it. A correspondent enquired whether this is not forbidden by the Johnson Act. The Acting Secretary replied that the Johnson Act was a pretty broad act forbidding the floatation in this country of bonds of foreign governments, which defaulted on their payments to this Government, but that shortly after the Act was passed the Attorney General issued a lengthy opinion 51 stating how far short term commercial credits might be considered not within the purview of that Act. A correspondent said there was a story out at Geneva to the effect that Italy was hoping to agree to settle the war debt in return for a very favorable trade relationship. The Acting Secretary replied that he had heard nothing of that sort. With reference to lending money to the Italians, a correspondent asked whether the bankers did not first have to ask the advice of the State Department before making any decision. The Acting Secretary replied that in former times persons thinking of facilitating loans in this country or having financial transactions with other governments did come to the State Department and get information as to whether the Department objected or not. He said that the attitude of the Department was denounced in Congress and that since this Administration had taken office there had been nothing of the sort. The Department has not undertaken to say it does or does not object. 51 May 5, 1934; 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 506. See also letter of April 23, 1934, from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General, Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 528 . The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 800.51W89 Italy/301: Telegram [Document 488] The Ambassador in Italy ( Phillips ) to the Secretary of State Rome , December 2, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 2—8:35 a.m.] 503. My 397, October 1, noon. 52 From a variety of well-informed but unofficial sources it is reported that the Italian Government is preparing to inaugurate discussions in Washington looking toward the settlement of its war debts. It is even said that the Minister of Finance has stated that Italy will propose some form of token payment. When these reports have been brought to my attention I have refrained from making any comment whatsoever. Phillips 52 Not printed. Rumania Rumania [489] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in France (Wilson) Paris, December 14, 1936. 800.51W89 Rumania/222 Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in France (Wilson) 800.51W89 Rumania/222 [Document 489] Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in France ( Wilson ) 53 [Extract] Paris , December 14, 1936. M. Alexandre Zeuceanu, Rumanian financial representative in Paris, whom I have known since the days of the Reparation Commission, came in to see me. He said that he had received instructions from his Government to inquire from our Embassy what the attitude of the American Government was regarding the possibility of negotiating a new settlement of the war debts. He referred to reports of conversations which Ambassador Bullitt had had with M. Delbos on the question of the French war debt to the United States, and asked whether any definite proposal had been submitted to us by the French. I said that on the general question of the war debts, the attitude of our Government, so far as I knew, remained that set out in the notes sent to the French Government semi-annually transmitting a statement of indebtedness and adding that we were prepared to consider any proposal which the French Government desires to submit to us with a view to laying such a proposal before the Congress. I said that, as regards the recent conversations between Ambassador Bullitt and M. Delbos, there had been a vast amount of exaggeration in the press; that these conversations had been of a very general character and that no definite proposition had been submitted to us. M. Zeuceanu then said he had heard that in these conversations at the French Foreign Office, Ambassador Bullitt had made a statement regarding the necessity of fulfilling certain prior conditions before any discussion of the debt agreements might take place, and he pulled out of his pocket a sheet of paper from which he read to me a statement about as follows: that Ambassador Bullitt had stated that it would be necessary to make payment to date in full of all arrears due under the debt agreement before the American Government would give any consideration to the possibility of negotiations regarding the debt agreement. M. Zeuceanu asked me if Mr. Bullitt had in fact stated this to be the position of our Government. I said that I felt that I could assure him that Mr. Bullitt had not made any such statement as this. On the contrary, the attitude of our Government, to which I had referred as set out in our notes to the French Government, had stated our willingness to consider with a view to laying before Congress any proposal which the French Government might desire to make. M. Zeuceanu said that he appreciated this information, which he would transmit in confidence to his Government. He said that he did not know the exact purpose which his Government had in mind in asking him to discuss these points with the Embassy, but he assumed that his Government was undertaking a study of the war debt question with a view to making some proposal. M. Zeuceanu said that of course what the French Government wanted was to be able to borrow again in the American market, as their borrowing possibilities in France were practically exhausted and the Treasury would shortly be in need of funds as well as being faced with a heavy deficit next year. I said that the idea that an interest was being shown in the possibility of a debt settlement in order to satisfy the requirements of the Johnson law so that the American market might be opened for further loans, had indeed occurred to us. [The omitted part of the memorandum relates to Rumanian armament purchases in France.] Edwin C. Wilson 53 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in France in his despatch No. 202, December 15; received December 30. Opposition of the Department of State to proposals to increase tariff rates on imports from countries in default on war-debt payments Opposition of the Department of State to proposals to increase tariff rates on imports from countries in default on war-debt payments [490] The Secretary of State to Representative Robert L. Doughton Washington, February 1, 1935. 611.003/3389 [491] The Secretary of State to Representative Harry B. Coffee Washington, April 20, 1936. 611.003/3536 The Secretary of State to Representative Robert L. Doughton 611.003/3389 [Document 490] The Secretary of State to Representative Robert L. Doughton 1 Washington , February 1, 1935. My Dear Mr. Doughton : I thank you for your letter of January 11, 1935, 2 through which the Committee on Ways and Means requests any comments or recommendations I may care to make with respect to the Bill H. R. 2051, “To levy additional tariffs on imports from certain countries which are in default on war debts to the United States.” The Bill provides that there shall be levied, collected and paid upon all articles imported from any foreign country which is in default on its national indebtedness to the United States incurred in connection with the World War, duties in lieu of the duties prescribed under existing law and three times the amount of the duties prescribed under existing law. Such duties shall be imposed on articles imported from a foreign country during any period during which more than ten percent of the amount due on its indebtedness to the United States remains unpaid. Amounts collected in excess of the amount which would be collected under the provisions of existing law shall be credited as payment on amounts due on such national indebtedness. The last section of the Bill reads: “Nothing in any treaty or agreement made by the United States shall be construed to prevent the operation of this Act according to its terms.” The Bill would reverse the policy hitherto followed in the matter of the repayment of war debts. For a policy of negotiated agreements under which the debtors voluntarily pay agreed amounts, the Bill would substitute a policy of undertaking direct collection by discriminatory legislation against the trade of debtor countries. Instead of looking to the debtor’s obligation, secured on its good faith and credit, to pay from all its resources, the Bill would disregard all agreement and look only to the exports of each country to the United States, although in almost every case the value of such exports is insufficient to pay even for the goods which the debtor country buys from the United States, while the annual debt payments scheduled to be made by our important debtors also exceed the value of their total annual exports to the United States. The capacity of one country to pay another is not measured either by its exports to or by its balance of trade with the creditor. There is at present a considerable tendency for debtors to pretend that they can pay foreign debts only out of the proceeds of direct sales of goods in the creditor country. This argument is particularly used to justify stopping payments to Americans while continuing payments to European creditors. In effect it is argued that a country can pay foreign debts only to countries to which its exports exceed its imports, and, therefore, that it is impossible to pay debts to Americans. The fallacy is in exaggerating the importance of the direct balance of trade between each two countries, and in excluding the normal triangular and multi-angular trade and payment relations. The Bill, H. R. 2051, would seem to be in line with this fallacy, although the Bill would operate in practice to decrease the exports of debtors to the United States and therefore their capacity to pay. Imports from all countries to the United States are subject to high non-discriminatory duties. The Bill proposes to increase these duties on goods from debtor countries, and to apply on the debts any amounts collected in excess of the present duties. However, it seems probable that the increased and discriminatory duties would almost destroy exportation from those countries to the United States and would seriously impair their capacity either to buy American goods or to pay their debts. There might be a decrease rather than an increase in the revenue collected. Our debtors, in correspondence which has been published, have continued expressly to recognize their obligations even while stating that they do not feel that they can wisely undertake to make the current scheduled payments. There seems no occasion for American legislation which might decrease or take over in whole or in part their responsibility for the discharge of their obligations and which might result in a further reduction of international trade at a time when the total value of the world’s exports and imports is about one-third of the 1929 value. The provision in the final section of the Bill that the United States should disregard any agreement or treaty which might be construed to prevent the operation of the proposed legislation, would be inappropriate in any legislation but is particularly inappropriate in the present connection. The United States and the world have an overriding interest in preserving the sanctity of international obligations and the capacity of governments to conduct their relations with one another on the basis of friendly negotiation and binding agreements. A smaller consideration is that these agreements of the United States which contain mutual assurances against trade discrimination have been made in order to protect the interests of the United States and cannot be violated without danger to the trade of the United States. Apart from the particular merits or demerits of any piece of proposed legislation, the adoption of any permanent measure embodying a policy of retaliation requires the most careful and responsible consideration on broad grounds. The trade of the world has already suffered greatly from the effects of policies of retaliation which countries have adopted in one connection or another during the past few years. Retaliation begets counter-retaliation—all hurting not only the country against which resentment is directed but also the volume of general trade. The countries of widest interest, such as the United States, are those which suffer the most from this unfavorable atmosphere. It will be difficult indeed to foster recovery as long as the processes of trade are subordinated to a spirit of mutual reprisal. The Government of the United States in its relations with foreign governments will not fail to safeguard American interests and to support definite American rights in every appropriate way, but it has never been clearer that the cultivation of the widest cooperative relations in working for economic recovery is itself one of the greatest of American interests. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 1 Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, House of Representatives. 2 Not printed. The Secretary of State to Representative Harry B. Coffee 611.003/3536 [Document 491] The Secretary of State to Representative Harry B. Coffee Washington , April 20, 1936. My Dear Mr. Coffee : I refer again to your letter of March 30, 1936, 3 asking my views with reference to a proposal to provide a ten percent ad valorem tariff on all imports from all countries now in default on their indebtedness to the United States, and to my acknowledgment of April 3 [ 4 ]. 3 Action such as you suggest is open to several objections of a general character which I have stated in a letter of February 1, 1935, 4 to the Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 2051. I am enclosing a copy of this letter as a convenient way of presenting some of these general considerations. A ten percent ad valorem rate would be much less destructive of trade and revenue than the punitive rates suggested in H. R. 2051. However, even small discriminations might have a considerable effect in impairing the volume of imports from particular countries and the volume of revenues collected thereon. On some products of a specialized nature which could not readily be imported from alternative sources of supply, the effect would be to increase the cost to the American consumer and raise new revenues. The total effect on the revenues might be a small increase or decrease and the entry of the amount of the specially collected ten percent duty as a credit against the debts of foreign governments. I am sure that you will find the arguments sketched in my letter of February 1, 1935, convincing. It would clearly be a mistake to take any action which might be taken to relieve our debtors from their responsibility to pay the United States from all their resources rather than from such funds as might be made available from their trading relations with the United States. However, in view of your interest in the question but without making the slightest concession to the fallacy that debt paying capacity is measured by the direct trade between debtor and creditor, I may cite the following statistics for the calendar year 1935, in regard to the five countries whose obligations make up $10,844,000,000 of the $11, 156,000,000 of such obligations held by the Treasury June 30,1935: Country Imports into United States Exports from United States Debt payments falling due in 1935 Great Britain $155,322,776 $433,384,884 $203,341,530.10 France 58,332,861 116,920,014 86,675,449.85 Italy 38,671,829 72,450,043 17,283,186.76 Belgium 39,759,908 58,207,891 12,051,907.76 Poland 9,811,312 24,485,703 9,563,079.42 Our export statistics to some of the smaller countries are misleading because many of our exports to interior and remote markets are reshipped from intermediate points. However, I am enclosing a complete tabulation of the statistics for 1935 for all the debtor countries. 5 The tabulation is of interest in connection with any consideration of intergovernmental debts or of any form of retaliation. However, it should not obscure the other points I developed in my letter to Mr. Doughton. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 Supra . 5 Not printed. Views of the Department of State on bill providing for acquisition of essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods Views of the Department of State on bill providing for acquisition of essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods [492] The Acting Director of the Budget (Bell) to the Secretary of State Washington, March 19, 1936. [Received March 20.] 811.24/1044 [493] The Secretary of State to the Acting Director of the Budget (Bell) Washington, April 6, 1936. 811.24/1044 The Acting Director of the Budget (Bell) to the Secretary of State 811.24/1044 [Document 492] The Acting Director of the Budget ( Bell ) to the Secretary of State Washington , March 19, 1936. [Received March 20.] My Dear Mr. Secretary : I enclose a copy of a proposed report 1 by the Secretary of War on H. R. 11001, a bill “To provide for the common defense by acquiring commodities essential to the manufacture of supplies for the armed forces in time of emergency, and for other purposes”, such commodities to be acquired (1) by purchase from foreign countries by crediting to their national debts to the United States arising out of the World War an amount equal to the agreed value of the commodities acquired, or (2) by exchange with foreign countries of agricultural commodities owned by the Federal Government, or (3) to the extent that (1) and (2) are insufficient, by direct purchase. I would greatly appreciate an expression of your views with respect to this proposed legislation. Please return enclosure with your reply. Very truly yours, D. W. Bell 1 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Acting Director of the Budget (Bell) 811.24/1044 [Document 493] The Secretary of State to the Acting Director of the Budget ( Bell ) Washington , April 6, 1936. My Dear Mr. Bell : I am glad to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 19, 1936, enclosing a copy of H. R. 11001, a bill to provide for certain purchases of minerals, and a copy of a proposed report by the Secretary of War on this bill. In response to your suggestion I offer the following comments on this proposed legislation. The Department of State is in agreement with the objectives of the proposed bill not only because adequate stocks of the minerals enumerated in the bill would appear to be necessary in connection with preparedness for possible national emergencies but also because it is believed that possession of these stocks would be in line with the foreign policies of this Government in time of peace. I find it impossible, however, to support the bill under consideration in its entirety. The acquisition of stocks of minerals from foreign countries by the methods authorized by the bill would raise questions of policy relating to the whole field of the foreign relations of this Government and in all probability would have a direct effect upon the international commercial policy of the United States and upon the policy of the Government with respect to the obligations of foreign Governments to the United States arising out of the World War. 2 Therefore it appears to me that the bill does not make adequate provision for the direction of negotiations in connection with the purchases authorized and does not provide in any way for a method of coordinating policy relating to these purchases with other foreign policies of this Government. In my opinion the bill would be much improved if it authorized the President to acquire these stocks and provided for the creation of a special interdepartmental committee, either to advise the President with respect to policy and to supervise the purchases authorized by the bill, or at the direction of the President to carry the full responsibility for the negotiations incident to these purchases. I believe that this committee should function under the chairmanship of a representative of the Department of State and should include in addition representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Department of Agriculture, and the Treasury. It may be that the quantities and kinds of commodities authorized under the provisions of this bill could not be acquired from foreign countries by the extension of credits on their national debts to the United States arising out of the World War or by exchange of agricultural commodities owned by the Federal Government. In this event, the interdepartmental committee which I have suggested would be of value as an appropriate agency for a study and analysis of the situation as a basis for recommendations to the President and to Congress with respect to appropriations for cash purchases authorized by the bill. I should agree with the Secretary of War that it would be desirable to so word the bill that the Secretary of War should be charged with the responsibility of determining the quantities and the specifications of the minerals to be acquired. Furthermore, I believe that Section 2 and Section 4 of the bill as drafted are wise, placing with the Secretary of War full authority and responsibility for providing storage of the stocks acquired and for controlling the use of such stocks. The suggestions I have made in this letter have been fully discussed with the War Department. The Secretary of War is in agreement with them, and ready to support them, if consulted. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 2 See pp. 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 464 ] ff. Representations by foreign governments against proposed legislation restricting tourist cruises from American ports to American ships Representations by foreign governments against proposed legislation restricting tourist cruises from American ports to American ships 1 1 See Voyages to Nowhere—Cruising Ship Bill: Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 2d sess., on H. R. 112 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936). For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , pp. 914 ff. [494] The Canadian Legation to the Department of State Washington , March 17, 1936. 811.801/680 [495] The French Ambassador (Laboulaye) to the Secretary of State Washington , March 17, 1936. 811.801/674 [496] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 18, 1936. 811.801/674 [497] The German Embassy to the Department of State Washington , March 19, 1936. 811.801/679 [498] The Netherland Minister (Van Haersma de With) to the Secretary of State Washington , March 20, 1936. 811.801/673 [499] The Polish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , March 23, 1936. 811.801/677 [500] The Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland Washington, March 23, 1936. 811.801/681 [501] The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Laboulaye) Washington , March 23, 1936. 811.801/674 [502] The Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland Washington, March 23, 1936. 811.801/672 [503] Memorandum by the Assistant to the Legal Adviser (Vallance) [Washington,] December 22, 1936. 811.801/704 The Canadian Legation to the Department of State 811.801/680 [Document 494] The Canadian Legation to the Department of State Memorandum On January 3rd, 1935, a Bill (H. R. 112) was introduced in the House of Representatives to amend the shipping laws of the United States by substituting the following language for that now appearing in Section 289 of Title 46 of the United States Code of Laws: “No foreign vessel shall transport passengers between ports or places in the United States or its possessions, now or hereafter embraced within the coastwise laws, either directly or by way of a foreign port, or for any part of such transportation, nor on a continuous voyage terminating at the port of departure or at any other port in the United States or its aforesaid possessions, notwithstanding that said vessel enters or touches any foreign port on such voyage, under a penalty of $200 for each passenger so transported and landed.” The wording of the present statute is as follows: “No foreign vessel shall transport passengers between ports or places in the united States, either directly or by way of a foreign port, under a penalty of $200 for each passenger so transported and landed.” The pending Bill is identical in content with Bills introduced in the 72nd Congress, which were the subject of a Memorandum left at the Department of State by the Canadian Legation on March 2nd, 1932. 2 Since the Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio, and Fisheries of the House of Representatives is understood to have called a hearing on this measure for March 24th, the Canadian Legation has been instructed to bring once more to the attention of the Department of State the seriously detrimental effect of its passage on Canadian shipping interests. When this proposal was under consideration in 1932, it was understood that its purpose was to restrict to vessels registered in the United States tourist cruises from ports in this country. The adoption of the Bill would not only prevent Canadian shipping companies from conducting tourist cruises from United States ports, but would also bear most heavily on a large number of regular shipping lines engaged in ordinary passenger traffic between ports of Canada, the United States, and other countries. Tourist cruises have been developed out of United States ports since the Great War in response to a widespread and increasing public demand for an opportunity to visit foreign ports, especially during the winter season, while enjoying the comfort of ocean travel on large liners. The traffic, which has grown up not only in the United States but also in many other parts of the world, is generally recognized as an entirely legitimate mercantile enterprise. The demand has been created and in large part served by foreign shipping companies, and Canadian companies have shared in meeting it. One Canadian shipping company maintains a winter cruising service from New York to ports in Venezuela, Panama, the British, French, and Dutch West Indies, Cuba, and Puerto Rico; these cruises are of three or four weeks’ duration, and are conducted on a regular schedule during the winter season. A similar cruising service is operated by another Canadian company from Boston to Panama and West Indian ports. It is not believed that cruises of this type are in any way competitive with regular all-year services maintained by United States lines. It is understood that the introduction of the bill in 1932 was prompted in part by objections to the so-called “cruises to nowhere” and to the practice of some foreign cruising vessels of calling at a port in Florida. These practices were not carried on by Canadian vessels, and it is believed that they were discontinued some years ago by all foreign cruising vessels. In connection with the effects of the measure on regular Canadian shipping lines which visit United States ports, it may be pointed out that none of these lines was established with a view to the cruising traffic. Frequently, however, passengers desire to take a round-trip voyage, for example from New York to Montreal, or across Lake Ontario from Lewiston to Toronto, or from Seattle to Victoria and Vancouver. Any Canadian ship carrying a passenger from a port of the United States on such a round-trip would appear to be engaged “on a continuous voyage terminating at the port of departure”, and would therefore be liable under the proposed legislation to a penalty of $200 in respect of each passenger so transported. On the Atlantic Coast a Canadian line maintains an all-year service, starting at Montreal in summer and at Halifax in winter, between Canada, Bermuda, and the British West Indies, and these vessels regularly call at Boston. A proportion of the passengers joining the vessels southbound at Boston returns on the same ships after visiting the regular ports of call in southern waters. The same company maintains a weekly service in winter between Boston and Bermuda. Another Canadian company has a regular winter service between New York and Bermuda and a regular summer service between New York and Montreal. These are all international services of exactly the same nature as services to European ports. Long-established services on the Great Lakes would be placed in the same difficulty. For many years a popular and frequent passenger service has run from Toronto across Lake Ontario to ports two or three hours distant at the mouth of the Niagara River, including Lewiston, New York. Another short international route is from Cobourg to Rochester, New York. If a passenger embarked on one of these vessels at Lewiston or Rochester and chose to return on the same trip of the same vessel (a common practice, especially in warm weather) the vessel would become liable for the prescribed penalty of $200. Several other Canadian lines on the Great Lakes would be similarly affected, and it is believed that such a consequence is entirely foreign to the purpose of the proposal. It may be mentioned that it would not be feasible on brief voyages such as these and those on the Seattle-Victoria-Vancouver run for shipping companies so to examine the passengers as to eliminate all round-trip travellers. On the Pacific Coast a service, inaugurated in 1904, has been maintained for many years by a Canadian company between Victoria, Vancouver, and Seattle; two trips are made daily on an all-year schedule, and by mutual arrangement tickets of this line are honoured on vessels of a United States line which participates in the traffic. Though this is a stable passenger service, it is also used for excursion purposes and for round-trip traffic on business or pleasure; the passage of this measure would gravely interfere with its operation. The measure would bear with especial weight on lines operating between ports in British Columbia and Alaska. Two Canadian lines maintain services between Vancouver and Skagway, Alaska, which is the port through which practically all traffic between the Canadian Yukon and the rest of Canada must pass. One, an all-year service, was inaugurated in 1898; the other, started in 1912, is an extension in summer months of a service between Vancouver and Prince Rupert. (United States vessels participate in the traffic between Canada and Alaska by calling at Vancouver and Victoria). This measure would forbid foreign vessels from transporting passengers between “ports or places in the United States or its possessions …, either directly or by way of a foreign port, or for any fart of such transportation .” This would appear to prohibit, for example, a Canadian ship from carrying from Skagway to Vancouver a passenger going from Alaska to any destination in the United States under penalty of being fined $200 on its return to Skagway. The Bill indeed would seem to make it unlawful for all residents of the United States or Alaska to be carried on Canadian vessels for part of their journey to or from Alaska, either on a single voyage or on a round trip. This might even apply to a resident of the United States who wished to travel from the United States to a destination in the Canadian Yukon or northern British Columbia, which he could only reach through an Alaskan port. Canadian trans-Pacific services to the Orient and Australasia which call at Honolulu would apparently be similarly debarred from carrying between Vancouver and Honolulu any passengers coming from or destined to any place in the United States. It has been thought desirable to indicate in some detail in this Memorandum the effect of the adoption of this measure on Canadian shipping services. In general it may be said that legislation so widely extending the principle of coastwise shipping laws is not only contrary to long accepted practice, but must also tend to intensify and increase restrictions imposed on shipping generally, to the serious detriment of travel facilities between nations. The legislation would broaden the scope of the coastwise shipping laws of the United States so greatly as to make them apply in certain important respects to Canadian ports as well. The Bill would embrace regular services long maintained by Canadian lines, with which it is apparently not intended to interfere; and these services, convenient and necessary as they are to the regular commerce of both countries, would be hampered and restricted, if not actually eliminated, should the Bill be passed without extensive amendments. Washington , March 17, 1936. 2 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , p. 926 . The French Ambassador (Laboulaye) to the Secretary of State 811.801/674 [Document 495] The French Ambassador ( Laboulaye ) to the Secretary of State [Translation] The Ambassador of France in the United States has the honor to invite the kind attention of His Excellency the Secretary of State to bill No. H. R. 112 which Mr. S. O. Bland, Representative from the State of Virginia, introduced in the House of Representatives on January 3, 1935. This bill is identical throughout with that which was introduced in Congress on February 4, 1932, under Nos. S. 3502–H. R. 8875 and the purpose of which was to amend the Act of June 19, 1886, 3 by introducing into the definition of coastwise navigation the practice of a continuous voyage ending at the point of departure or at any other port of the United States, with or without touching at a foreign port. The Ambassador of France takes this occasion to remind His Excellency the Secretary of State of the terms of the communication of February 25, 1932 4 in which his predecessor pointed out that this bill appeared to be in contradiction with the principle of international law according to which foreign vessels have free access to the ports of any other country in order to engage there in commerce on the same footing as national vessels, a principle incorporated in several treaties now in force between the United States and a certain number of foreign countries. Moreover, in asking the prohibition not of the ordinary transportation of passengers from one American port to another, already reserved to American shipping by the old wording of the Act of 1886 regulating coastwise navigation, but of tourist cruises, the Bland bill appears not to take into account the fact that the tourist trade on the high seas with stops at foreign ports is essentially an act of international commerce. Its adoption would not fail to have injurious repercussions in the case of certain navigation companies. Thus, for example, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique Française, which has initiated tourist cruises to the Bermudas, to the Bahamas, to the West Indies (Martinique and Guadeloupe), etc., having New York as the point of departure and arrival, would run the risk of finding it impossible to continue this business. Under date of March 3, 1932, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of State, in a letter 5 addressed to the Honorable Hiram Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, pointed out the artificial extension which the new bill gave to the definition of coastwise traffic. Moreover, bearing in mind the long period during which such cruises have been carried on and the advantages which American commerce had drawn therefrom in the West Indies, he concluded that the adoption of this bill would be a profound modification of the principle of non-discrimination between flags in international commerce and that such legislative act would run the risk, ipso facto , of provoking measures of reprisal on the part of the countries concerned. In recalling these facts to the attention of His Excellency the Secretary of State, the Ambassador of France would be happy if he would be good enough to communicate again his point of view to the proper Committees of the two Houses, which are to examine the new bill introduced by Mr. Bland. Mr. de Laboulaye is happy to take this occasion [etc., etc.]. Washington , March 17, 1936. 3 24 Stat. 79. 4 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , p. 922 . 5 Fighting Ship and Cruising Ship Bills: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 72d Cong., 1st sess., on S. 3501 and S. 3502 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1932), p. 95. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.801/674 [Document 496] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 18, 1936. The French Ambassador handed me this memorandum 6 today which refers to a bill recently introduced by Representative Bland, of Virginia, the purpose of which is to prevent foreign vessels from touching at American ports. This is a continuation of an effort which has already been made in the past. The Ambassador pointed out, however, that if by any chance the bill should become a law, it would invite retaliation on the part of foreign governments with regard to American vessels touching, for instance, Mediterranean ports. I think he had in mind in particular the winter cruises which are becoming more and more popular every year in the Mediterranean. William Phillips 6 Supra . The German Embassy to the Department of State 811.801/679 [Document 497] The German Embassy to the Department of State [Translation] The German Embassy has learned that Congressman Bland’s Bill (H. R. 112), introduced in the First Session of the 74th Congress on January 3, 1935, will in a few days be made the subject of hearings by the Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio and Fisheries, and has the honor to refer to the German Embassy’s Memorandum of February 27, 1932, 7 and the note of April 21, 1933 8 in which the serious objections of the German Government to Bills H. R. 8875 and H. R. 1494, the wording of which is identical with the bill introduced just last year, were expressed. In view of the impending discussion of the Bland Bill, the German Embassy again finds itself impelled to express its serious objections to this bill. The German Embassy herewith ventures to point out again that H. R. 112 provides for an extension of the conception of “coastwise navigation”, which would mean a serious restriction of the principle of the freedom of navigation. The bill, which aims at subjecting to the existing restriction on coastwise navigation the transportation of passengers from an American port via a foreign port situated nearby back to an American port, would considerably restrict, if not render entirely impossible, the cruises developed by the German navigation lines in a practice covering many years, which form a legitimate branch of international navigation. Furthermore, it has always been a recognized principle of international law that the transportation of persons and cargoes on the high seas shall be free and open to ships of all nations in the same way. By the contemplated extension of the conception of coastwise navigation, a considerable share of the heretofore free transportation of persons and goods would be claimed as the prerogative of a certain national flag. Aside from these generally applicable views on international law, however, weighty objections to the contemplated expansion of the conception of “coastwise navigation” are to be raised from the standpoint of treaty rights. The expansion of the conception of coastwise navigation is incompatible with Article XI of the German-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, 9 which was based on the conception of coastwise navigation as it prevailed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. A unilateral extension of this conception cannot be agreed upon. The value of the stipulations referring to navigation contained in the above-mentioned treaty would be considerably reduced for Germany by such an extension. The payment of $200 per passenger which would be demanded for round trips which previously, in accordance with the treaty, had not been considered as coastwise navigation, would have to be regarded as a violation of this treaty. The German Embassy would be grateful to the Department of State of the United States, if care were taken that the above points of view were considered during the discussion of the bills by the competent American authorities. Washington , March 19, 1936. 7 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , p. 924 . 8 Not printed. 9 Signed December 8, 1923, Foreign Relations , 1923, vol. ii , p. 29 . The Netherland Minister (Van Haersma de With) to the Secretary of State 811.801/673 [Document 498] The Netherland Minister ( Van Haersma de With ) to the Secretary of State No. 914 The Netherlands Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and acting on instructions from the Netherlands Government, has the honour respectfully to draw Mr. Hull’s attention to the contents of a bill, H. R. 112, on the subject of which a public hearing will [be] held on March 24 next, and which if enacted would ruin an important branch of the Netherlands shipping trade. The bill in question intends to make it unlawful for any foreign vessel “to transport passengers on a so called continued voyage terminating at the port of departure or any other port in the United States, notwithstanding that said vessel enters or touches any foreign port on such voyage, under a penalty of $200 for each passenger so transported and landed.” The result of this legislation would be that no Netherlands vessel would be allowed to engage in passenger-cruises from New York to the Mediterranean, the West Indian Islands etc. and back to New York or even to take passengers on a round trip from New York to a port or ports in the Netherlands West or East Indies and back to the United States, notwithstanding the fact that on none of these voyages any other United States port is touched. The Netherlands Government fails to see how voyages of the nature described above could possibly be classified under coastwise trade which should be reserved for American ships only and trusts that the United States Government will avert enactment of this measure which would deal a death blow to the particular branch of Netherlands shipping involved. Washington , March 20, 1936. The Polish Embassy to the Department of State 811.801/677 [Document 499] The Polish Embassy to the Department of State 1) The attention of the Embassy has been drawn to a bill known as H. R. 112 now pending before the United States Congress which, if passed, would prevent any foreign vessel from transporting passengers between ports or places in the United States even though such transportation were to take place by way of a foreign port or on a continuous voyage terminating at the port of departure or at any other port in the United States. 2) The Department is no doubt aware that Polish steamship lines, notably the Gdynia America Line, have been for some time past engaged in trade of this kind, their ships departing from the port of New York and, after calling at one or several foreign ports, returning to their port of departure in the United States. Under the bill referred to the Polish lines would be prevented not only from taking passengers on their cruises to nearby foreign ports, but also from accepting round-trip bookings for any voyages involving a call at a United States port. 3) The curtailment of trade as envisaged by H. R. 112, forms a direct contravention of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights concluded between Poland and the United States on June 15, 1931. 10 Article X of the Treaty provides not only that “Merchant vessels and other privately owned vessels under the flag of either of the High Contracting Parties shall be permitted to discharge portions of cargoes at any port open to foreign commerce in the territories of the other High Contracting Party, and to proceed with the remaining portions of such cargoes to any other ports of the same territories open to foreign commerce”— but stipulates that no higher dues than those paid by national vessels in like circumstances should be levied on vessels of the other High Contracting Party. Although it is stipulated that the coasting trade of the High Contracting Parties is exempt from the provisions of this Article, it is obvious that the application of the term “coasting trade” to Polish vessels departing from an American port and returning thereto after calling at one or several foreign ports would nullify whatever benefits Poland may have derived from this part of the Treaty and distort the intentions of the Contracting Parties at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty. Additional evidence as to the inconsistency of the pending bill with the Treaty is seen in Article VIII which provides, in respect of dues and charges of whatever denomination, an equality of treatment which “shall apply reciprocally to the vessels of the two countries respectively from whatever place they may arrive and whatever may be their place of destination ” 4) That the above interpretation of the effect of legislation of this kind on treaties concluded between the United States and other Powers was at one time concurred in by the Department is seen from a letter written by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, on March 3, 1932, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Commerce in connection with the so-called Cruising Ship Bill (S. 3502), the provisions of which were identical with the H. R. 112. At that time Mr. Stimson wrote that “you may desire to consider whether the proposal contained in this bill to extend the effect of our coastwise navigation laws to foreign ships which sail from an American port and, after calling at one or more foreign ports return to the American port of departure, does not involve an artificial extension of the definition of coastwise trade beyond all precedent and beyond any previous application of the term.… “In considering the effect of the enactment by the Congress of the United States of the bills of the character of S. 3501 and S. 3502, it should be noted that they are radical departures from the long-established practice of non-discrimination between flags in international trade, a practice which has been developed through many years, and has been embodied in the treaty-making policy of the United States.” 5) While it is realized that the bill in question is still the object of discussion within the legislative branch of the United States government, the Embassy feels that the members of the Committee before whom this legislation is pending may be interested in studying its possible effects on the Treaty concluded between Poland and the United States. Washington , March 23, 1936. 10 Foreign Relations , 1931, vol. ii , p. 938 . The Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland 811.801/681 [Document 500] The Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland Washington , March 23, 1936. My Dear Mr. Bland : On March 18, 1936, the Minister of Sweden called upon me to say he had been informed that hearings had been set for March 24, 1936, on Bill H. R. 112 now before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and pointed out that provisions of this bill in respect of cruises by foreign vessels were substantially similar to provisions contained in a bill introduced in the past and against which his Government and the governments of various other foreign nations had entered protest. The Minister did not enter into details because he said there were already on file in the Department of State detailed statements of the views of his Government to which he asked that reference be made. The statements in question relate to Bill H. R. 8875, introduced February 4, 1932, to amend Section 8 of the Act of June 19, 1886 as amended by Section 2 of the Act of February 18 [ 17 ], 1898, 11 (U. S. C. title 46, see. 289), and are contained in a note from the Minister of Sweden under date of February 24, 1932. 12 Since it appears that important questions are involved I am sure you will want to consider the previous representations made by the Swedish Government as these may now be applicable to Bill H. R. 112, and I am therefore transmitting a copy of the note referred to. Similar representations made by the Governments of Canada and the Netherlands have already been transmitted to you. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 11 30 Stat. 248. 12 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , p. 921 . The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Laboulaye) 811.801/674 [Document 501] The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador ( Laboulaye ) 13 The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of France and acknowledges the receipt of his note of March 18, 1936, with regard to certain legislation pertaining to shipping (H. R. 112) which was introduced in the House of Representatives January 3, 1935, and upon which hearings are to be held before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives March 24, 1936. The note of the French Government referred to is being transmitted by the Secretary of State to the appropriate agencies of the United States Government. Washington , March 23, 1936. 13 Similar notes were sent to the missions in Washington of each of the countries which had lodged representations against H. R. 112. The Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland 811.801/672 [Document 502] The Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland Washington , March 23, 1936. My Dear Mr. Bland : I have received your letter dated March 18, 1936, 14 transmitting a copy of the bill H. R. 112, introduced on January 3, 1935, commonly called “the voyages to nowhere bill”. You state that the Committee believes that I may desire to express an opinion and transmit recommendations with reference to this legislation. You also request that a representative or representatives from this Department be present at the hearing to be held on Tuesday, March 24, at 10 a.m., in Room 219, Old House Office Building, to explain the views of this Department and to answer pertinent questions propounded by the members of the Committee. I understand that the bill H. R. 112 proposes to extend the effect of our coastwise navigation laws to foreign ships which sail from an American port and, after calling at one or more foreign ports, return to the American port of departure. I believe you will desire to consider whether this proposal does not involve an artificial extension of the definition of coastwise trade beyond all precedent and beyond any previous application of the term. If such cruises are in fact foreign commerce there arises the question whether our treaties would be violated by its provisions. The restriction of such cruises to American vessels could hardly fail to produce complaints from foreign governments that the bill is discriminatory and in conflict with treaty provisions such as that contained in Article VII of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights concluded between the United States and Norway on June 5, 1928, 15 which provides that “the nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties equally with those of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their vessels and cargoes to all places, ports and waters of every kind within the territorial limits of the other which are or may be open to foreign commerce and navigation”. Similar provisions are contained in treaties with other countries. The bill as drawn would apparently prevent any continuous voyage ending at port of departure by a foreign vessel no matter what the duration of the voyage might be or at how many foreign ports the vessel might call. It may well be doubted whether a vessel in taking an extended cruise in the Caribbean starting from and terminating at New York but putting in at several foreign ports can in any proper sense be said to be engaged in an American coastwise voyage. In connection with the examination of H. R. 112 and its broad application, consideration will undoubtedly be given by your Committee to the history of these cruises and the length of time they have been carried on by the various foreign lines such, for example, as the Netherlands Line to Curacao. Also the question arises how far the character of the boats recently devoted to this service has increased patronage rather than diverting it from other lines, thereby providing a new service sought by American citizens with results also beneficial to the nearby islands in the Caribbean which are large importers of American commodities. In considering the effect of the enactment by the Congress of the United States of bills of the character of H. R. 112, it should be noted that they are radical departures from the long established practice of nondiscrimination between flags in international trade, a practice which has been developed through many years and has been embodied in the treaty making policy of the United States. The legislation under consideration has attracted widespread attention among the Governments in Europe and has been the subject of representations by them to the State Department. In connection with the proposed legislation the question necessarily arises whether the passage of the bill might not have an injurious effect upon the efforts of this Government to obtain for its citizens, its trade, and its shipping abroad freedom from discrimination. I shall address a further communication to you designating the officers who will represent this Department at the hearing scheduled for March 24, 1936. 16 Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 14 Not printed. 15 Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. iii , p. 593 . 16 Messrs. Jesse E. Saugstad, Shipping Adviser, Trade Agreements Division, and William R. Vallance, Assistant to the Legal Adviser, represented the Department of State before the Committee; see Voyages to Nowhere—Cruising Ship Bill , pp. 100 and 126. Memorandum by the Assistant to the Legal Adviser (Vallance) 811.801/704 [Document 503] Memorandum by the Assistant to the Legal Adviser ( Vallance ) [ Washington ,] December 22, 1936. Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Third Secretary of the German Embassy, called on me this morning regarding the bill which was pending at the last session of Congress known as the “Cruises to Nowhere” Bill. He asked whether this bill had been rejected by the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries or filed with no action taken on it by them. I told Mr. Blankenhorn that it was my understanding that no action had been taken on this bill by the Committee. He asked whether it was likely to come up at the next session of Congress and I told him that I had no information indicating that it would be given consideration, that it depended upon whether the American steamship owners operating cruises to the West Indies were sufficiently interested to press for action at the forthcoming session. Mr. Blankenhorn referred to the strike situation and added that if it continued there probably would not be sufficient American ships available to engage in this traffic. W[ illiam ] R. V[ allance ] Representations of certain foreign governments against proposed legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships Representations of certain foreign governments against proposed legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships [504] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 15, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/87 [505] The Swedish Legation to the Department of State Washington , May 18, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/91 [506] The Norwegian Legation to the Department of State Washington , May 25, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/92 [507] The Netherland Chargé (Molekamp) to the Secretary of State Washington, May 26, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/94 [508] The Danish Legation to the Department of State Washington , June 3, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/100 [509] The Acting Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland Washington, June 8, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/101 [510] The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State Washington , June 10, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/102 [511] Representative Schuyler O. Bland to the Secretary of State Washington, June 11, 1936. 811.801 Wireless/104 The British Embassy to the Department of State 811.801 Wireless/87 [Document 504] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Embassy have had under consideration Senate Bill No. 4619 introduced by Mr. Copeland on the 12th May 1 for the purpose of amending the Communications Act of 1934. 2 While the requirements of this Bill follow generally those of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1929, 3 and are thus substantially in accord with those of the British Merchant Shipping Acts, the Embassy desire to point out that, while the Rules made under the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1919 and 1932, require that cargo vessels of between 1,600 and 5,500 tons gross shall carry one operator, Mr. Copeland’s Bill proposes that such vessels should carry either two operators or one operator and an automatic alarm apparatus. The Embassy would further draw the attention of the Department of State to the fact that the exemption in favour of foreign ships contained in Section 353 ( c ) applies only to the technical requirements of Section 355, whereas it is desirable that the existing position should be maintained, viz: that certificates issued in the United Kingdom attesting compliance with the provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1929, as to wireless should continue to be accepted in United States ports as covering all the requirements of United States law regarding the wireless installation and personnel to be carried on ships and that the acceptance of these certificates should not be confined merely to the technical requirements of Section 355. Washington , May 15, 1936. 1 See Congressional Record , vol. 80, pt. 7, p. 7040; for text of bill No. 4619, see ibid. , pt. 8, p. 8435. 2 Approved June 19, 1934; 48 Stat. 1064. 3 See Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , pp. 368 ff.; for text of the convention, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 910, or 50 Stat. 1121. The Swedish Legation to the Department of State 811.801 Wireless/91 [Document 505] The Swedish Legation to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire There is pending in the Senate a bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934, approved June 19, 1934, for the purpose of promoting safety of life through the use of radio, and for other purposes (S. 3954). 4 Hearings on this bill were held before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on commerce, on April 29, 1936. The provisions of the bill are based upon the international convention for the safety of life at sea, London 1929, not yet ratified by the United States, but in some respects they go beyond the convention. Section 354 ( a ) provides that cargo ships, not fitted with autoalarms, are required to carry two qualified operators, and the same shall apply to passenger ships, whether they have autoalarm or not. Section 354 ( b ) provides that cargo ships of 1600 gross tons or more which are fitted with an autoalarm shall carry at least one qualified operator. Under the international convention, cargo ships of 5.500 gross tons or less are required to have one qualified operator but are not bound to be equipped with autoalarm. Cargo ships over 5.500 gross tons shall have one operator and autoalarm. A passenger ship under 3.000 gross tons shall carry one operator and is not bound to have autoalarm in addition. A passenger ship of 3.000 gross tons and over is required to carry an operator and autoalarm. Stricter rules have also been proposed in regard to watchers and watch time. Section 354 ( a ) and ( b ) would apply to foreign as well as American vessels leaving any harbour or port of the United States for a voyage in the open sea or the great lakes. The Swedish Minister would highly appreciate it if, through the courtesy of the Department of State, it could be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities that the requirements of the proposed new legislation in some respects are more burdensome for certain foreign vessels than those of the international convention. Washington , May 18, 1936. 4 Subsequently amended in committee and renumbered 4619; the text of S. 3954 is printed in Safety of life at Sea Through the Use of Radio: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 3954 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 1–7. The Norwegian Legation to the Department of State 811.801 Wireless/92 [Document 506] The Norwegian Legation to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire The attention of the Norwegian authorities has been called to a measure introduced in the United States Senate in February this year as S. 3954, and to a substitute bill S. 4619, amending the Communications Act of 1934 for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communications. It seems that the main purpose of the bill is to introduce legislation regarding radio installations on ships similar to the rules contained in the International Convention for Safety at Sea of 1929. One section of the bill S. 3954, amending art. 354 of the Communications Act of 1934 does, however, go further than the Convention mentioned above, as it prescribes: “( a ) Each cargo ship required by this part to be fitted with a radio installation and which is not fitted with an auto-alarm, and each passenger ship required by this part to be fitted with a radio installation, shall for safety purposes carry at least two qualified operators. ( b ) Each cargo ship required by this part to be fitted with a radio installation and which is fitted with an auto-alarm shall for safety purposes carry at least one qualified operator.” A similar provision is found in section 10 of the bill S. 4619. The provisions quoted would, according to the wording of the two bills, be applied not only to ships of American registry, but also to foreign flag vessels. The application of these provisions to Norwegian vessels would imply onerous and important alterations with regard to the radio installations and the radio service on a large number of Norwegian ships. The Norwegian Government is interested in all measures which tend to increase the safety at sea, and consequently has been satisfied to note that the measure proposed to a great extent would bring American legislation in accordance with the Convention of 1929 which the Government regards as the best basis for achieving safety at sea. The Government, however, feels concerned regarding the provisions quoted above as they differ from the Convention and therefore, in the Government’s opinion, would tend to counteract the main purpose of the Convention: to provide for safety through a similarity of laws and regulations in all countries. It seems that the provisions quoted are natural consequences of provisions in paragraphs ( c ) and ( d ) of the same section which provides for radioservice, watches etc. on board ships of American registry. As paragraphs ( c ) and ( d ) cover a matter usually regulated by the laws of the country in which the ship is registered it would seem natural, in the Norwegian Government’s opinion, that paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ), the wording of which seems to be based on the two subsequent paragraphs, if enacted, should not be made to apply to ships of foreign registry. Washington , May 25, 1936. The Netherland Chargé (Molekamp) to the Secretary of State 811.801 Wireless/94 [Document 507] The Netherland Chargé ( Molekamp ) to the Secretary of State No. 1713 Washington , May 26, 1936. Sir : I beg leave, acting on instructions from my Government, respectfully to draw Your Excellency’s attention to the difficulty which would be caused if either of Senate Bills S. 4619 or S. 3954, at present under consideration, were enacted in their present form and wording. Section 354 of both bills provides that every passenger ship which is required to be fitted with a radio installation has to carry at least two qualified operators, even if it should be equipped with an auto alarm, whereas under the rules of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1929, a passenger ship when fitted with wireless is required to carry a safety operator and an auto alarm and only if it is not equipped with an auto alarm to have a second operator or watcher to enable the ship to maintain continuous watch. Both bills therefore intend to depart from the rules adopted by the Convention and put into effect by all the signatories to the Convention. The Netherlands Government fears that if the present wording of either of the proposals of law above referred to were enacted the very object of the Convention namely promotion of international uniformity of safety regulations would be defeated. I should feel greatly obliged if Your Excellency would be good enough to have the above stated consideration placed before the United States Government in order to avert, if possible, enactment of the stipulation in question. I avail myself [etc.] B. Kleijn Molekamp The Danish Legation to the Department of State 811.801 Wireless/100 [Document 508] The Danish Legation to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire The attention of the Danish Government has been called to a bill, S. 3954, to amend the Communications Act of 1934 for the purpose of promoting safety of life through the use of radio, and for other purposes. This bill was substituted by S. 4619 introduced on May 12, 1936. The proposed legislation as a whole follows the corresponding provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1929. It raises, however, the requirements above those of that Convention with regard to operators, watches and auto-alarm. Sec. 354 provides as follows: “( a ) Each cargo ship required by this part to be fitted with a radio installation and which is not fitted with an auto-alarm, and each passenger ship required by this part to be fitted with a radio installation, shall, for safety purposes, carry at least two qualified operators, and, where the hours out of port exceed forty-eight, at least three qualified operators shall be provided. “( b ) A cargo ship, required by this part to be fitted with a radio installation, which is fitted with an auto-alarm in accordance with this title, shall, for safety purposes, carry at least one qualified operator.” According to their wording these provisions would also apply to foreign ships. For Danish cargo ships of 1600 to 5.500 gross tons and passenger ships the standards of which in this respect are fixed by law in accordance with the International Convention the above quoted provisions would entail considerably increased burdens in form of either additional equipment or more personnel. The Danish Minister would greatly appreciate if through the good offices of the State Department these observations might be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities. Washington , June 3, 1936. The Acting Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland 811.801 Wireless/101 [Document 509] The Acting Secretary of State to Representative Schuyler O. Bland 5 Washington , June 8, 1936. My Dear Mr. Bland : I am enclosing for the consideration of your Committee copies of an aide-mémoire of June 3, 1936, received from the Danish Legation, of a note of May 26, 1936, received from the Netherland Legation, of an aide-mémoire of May 25, 1936, received from the Norwegian Legation, of an aide-mémoire of May 18, 1936, received from the Swedish Legation, and of an aide-mémoire of May 15, 1936, received from the British Embassy, making certain observations concerning Senate Bill 4619, for the purpose of amending the Communications Act of 1934 as regards radio facilities on ships. All the foregoing communications, with the exception of the aide-mémoire from the Danish Legation, were transmitted by the Department to Senator Copeland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce. In a letter of May 29, 1936, addressed to the Department 6 Senator Copeland stated inter alia that “it is evident that the maximum of safety, through the use of radio, can only be attained when all ships are radio-equipped and human operators are on watch at all times. While the Bill (S–4619) does not reach this desired limit of safety, yet it cannot be said that it in any way lessens the requirements of the Convention in this, its major purpose and no discrimination is involved.” As you are aware, the Bill was approved by the Senate and it is my understanding that it has been referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries for consideration. In bringing to your attention the protests from the several representatives of the foreign governments at this capital, I should like to make it clear that this Department naturally favors every possible safeguard for life at sea. It realizes, however, that serious inconveniences can be caused to international shipping by a departure from the uniform terms of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention if individual nations see fit to apply not only to vessels flying their own flags but also to foreign vessels special requirements in excess of the minimum provided for in the foregoing Convention, which was signed on behalf of the United States and is under consideration in the Senate. While, therefore, the Department favors the strict measures of safety as contemplated in the proposed legislation so far as American vessels are concerned, it fears that the application of such measures to foreign vessels may lead to the promulgation by foreign nations of different and more stringent regulations, not only for their own vessels, but also for foreign vessels, which might result in seriously handicapping American shipping. I shall appreciate it, therefore, if you will be good enough to give your earnest attention to the foregoing considerations as well as to the points raised in the communications from the foreign missions at this capital and if you will advise me of the conclusions reached by your Committee with regard to this matter. Sincerely yours, Wilbur J. Carr 5 Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives. 6 Not printed. The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State 811.801 Wireless/102 [Document 510] The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State [Translation] 7 No. 2332 Verbal Note Pursuant to instructions from its Government, the Embassy of the King has the honor to call the kind attention of His Excellency, the Secretary of State, to the effect which the application of the measures provided for by the proposed law amending the “1924 [ 1934 ] Communications Act”, which is now being studied by the House of Representatives, might have upon Belgian interests. As the Department of State is aware, Belgium is a party to the London International Convention of 1929 for the Safety of Life at Sea. Some of the provisions of the legislation contemplated exceed the obligations provided for by the International Act of 1929. The Government of the King would be happy if Belgian ships stopping in American ports were not subjected, in this connection, to requirements other than those called for by the above mentioned convention. Washington , June 10, 1936. 7 File translation revised by the editors. Representative Schuyler O. Bland to the Secretary of State 811.801 Wireless/104 [Document 511] Representative Schuyler O. Bland to the Secretary of State Washington , June 11, 1936. Dear Mr. Secretary : I have your letter of the 11th instant 8 transmitting copy of a note from the Belgian Embassy regarding S. 4619, amending the Communications Act of 1934 and requiring radio installations on shipboard. The Committee yesterday decided to table this bill for the remainder of the session; 9 however, I am placing your letter and the accompanying note on file for further consideration in the event the matter is taken up at a later date. Yours very sincerely, S. O. Bland 8 Not printed. 9 This information was communicated on June 11 by telephone to the interested Embassies and Legations. Participation by the United States in the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, June 8–26, 1936 Participation by the United States in the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, June 8–26, 1936 [For the proceedings of the Conference, text of the convention signed by all the participating Governments except the United States, and other documents, see League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Texts of the Debates (C.341.M.216.1936.XI [1936.XI.20]). The statement of the American delegation setting forth the reasons for its inability to sign the convention on behalf of the United States is printed in the Records , page 174. See also Department of State, Press Releases , December 12, 1936, page 492, and Conference Series No. 30: American Delegations to International Conferences (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937), pages 82–84. Pursuant to separate instructions, the head of the American delegation signed a procès-verbal, June 26, 1936 (League of Nations document C.286(c).M.174(c).1936.XL), to alter the latest date of issue of the annual statement of the estimated world requirements of dangerous drugs as required under the Convention of July 13, 1931 (see Foreign Relations , 1931, volume I, pages 646 and following pages). The procès-verbal did not come into force, having failed to receive unanimous adherence of the States signatories to the Convention of 1931.] Participation by the United States in the international conference for the standardization of the keeping and operation of herdbooks, Rome, October 12–14, 1936 Participation by the United States in the international conference for the standardization of the keeping and operation of herdbooks, Rome, October 12–14, 1936 1 1 See also Department of State, Treaty Information , Bulletin No. 83, August 31, 1936, p. 12; ibid. , Bulletin No. 87, December 31, 1936, p. 11; and Institut International d’Agriculture, Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique Internationale pour l’Unification des Méthodes de Tenue et de Fonctionnement des Livres Généalogiques du Bétail (Rome, 1937). [512] Memorandum by Mr. John H. Lord of the Division of Protocol and Conferences [Washington, January 13, 1937.] 562.22A1/76 Memorandum by Mr. John H. Lord of the Division of Protocol and Conferences 562.22A1/76 [Document 512] Memorandum by Mr. John H. Lord of the Division of Protocol and Conferences [ Washington , January 13, 1937.] Diplomatic Conference for the Standardization of the Keeping and Operation of Herdbooks Delegate: J. Clyde Marquis, of Indiana, American Member of the Permanent Committee, International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, Italy. The following countries were represented by delegates with full powers to sign a convention for the standardization of the keeping and operation of herdbooks: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, 2 Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and Yugoslavia. The convention was signed by Mr. Marquis 3 on behalf of the United States, including Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands. The official French text of the convention is on file in the Departments of State and Agriculture, together with an unofficial English translation 4 prepared by a committee at the International Institute of Agriculture. J[ ohn ] H. L[ ord ] [On April 24, 1937, the Department of State requested advice from the Department of Agriculture regarding the submission of the convention to the President and the Senate with a view to its ratification (562.22 A 1/83). The Department of State was informed on June 8, 1937, by the Acting Secretary of Agriculture that this Government had no legal jurisdiction over the herdbooks in the United States maintained and operated by the various breed associations; that acceptance and ratification of the convention by the United States would have no binding effect upon the breed associations unless legislation were subsequently enacted to give effect in the United States to the object sought, namely, the requirement of uniformity in keeping and operating herdbooks; and that the Department of Agriculture would be reluctant to suggest the proposal in question unless generally endorsed by the breed associations. The letter from the Acting Secretary of Agriculture also stated that that Department had no interest in the matter “except from the standpoint that approved herdbooks of foreign countries are relied upon for identification purposes in connection with the issuance of certificates certifying to the pure breeding of animals imported into this country for breeding purposes, in order that such animals may be entered free of duty.” (562.22 A 1/85).] 2 The French delegates were also empowered to represent Morocco and Tunis. 3 On November 12, 1936. 4 Not printed; for French text, see Actes de la Conférence , p. 84. Extradition treaties signed between the United States and certain other countries Extradition treaties signed between the United States and certain other countries [Supplementary extradition treaties of the nature described in the Department’s telegram of March 10, 1934, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, Foreign Relations , 1934, volume I, page 794 , were signed in 1936 between the United States and the following countries: Denmark, May 6, Treaty Series No. 911; 50 Stat. 1308. France, April 23, Treaty Series No. 909; 50 Stat. 1117. Rumania, November 10, Treaty Series No. 916; 50 Stat. 1349. An original extradition treaty between the United States and Liechtenstein, consequent to negotiations conducted through the Swiss Government, was signed on May 20, 1936, Treaty Series No. 915; 60 Stat. 1337.] The British Commonwealth of Nations: The British Commonwealth of Nations: Contents Efforts of the Secretary of State to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program; preliminary discussions respecting a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom (Documents 513-555) Informal discussions regarding proposed restriction of trade between Australia and New Zealand to British shipping (Documents 556-562) Supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property, signed May 27, 1936 (Documents 563-566) Reciprocal arrangements effected by the United States with the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for trans-Atlantic air service (Documents 567-572) Refusal of the British Government to recognize the right of the United States to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying the British flag, except as provided by treaty (Documents 573-573) Informal representations against proposed preferential tariff rates in certain British West African colonies favoring Empire trade (Documents 574-577) Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (Documents 578-581) Unsatisfactory trade relations between the United States and Australia (Documents 582-616) Informal arrangements between the United States and Australia respecting the importation of American aircraft and aircraft parts into Australia (Documents 617-624) Informal discussions between officials of the United States and Canada with respect to trade relations (Documents 625-626) Convention between the United States and Canada respecting income taxation, signed December 30, 1936 (Documents 627-630) Protests of the Canadian Government against certain provisions of the liquor tax bill; settlement of United States claims against Canadian distillers (Documents 631-657) Negotiations respecting the revision of the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (Documents 658-663) Proposed negotiation of a new treaty to deal with the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin as a whole, including the Niagara Falls (Documents 664-671) Disinclination of the United States to enter into a trade agreement with the Irish Free State (Documents 672-673) Representations regarding discrimination against American commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa (Documents 674-674) Efforts to meet complaints from South Africa that American import regulations unduly restricted South African exports to the United States (Documents 675-691) Efforts of the Secretary of State to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program; preliminary discussions respecting a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom Efforts of the Secretary of State to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program; preliminary discussions respecting a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 1 – 4 . [513] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 22, 1936. 611.4131/140 [514] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] February 5, 1936. 611.4131/141 [515] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, February 13, 1936. 611.4131/141a [516] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, February 20, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 26—3:57 p.m.] 611.4131/144: Telegram [517] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, February 28, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 28—11:53 a.m.] 611.4131/148: Telegram [518] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, February 28, 1936—7 p.m. 611.4131/144: Telegram [519] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, February 29, 1936—noon. [Received February 29—8:40 a.m.] 611.4131/149: Telegram [520] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, March 18, 1936—1 p.m. 611.4131/150a: Telegram [521] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, March 19, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 19—11 a.m.] 611.4131/150: Telegram [522] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, March 28, 1936—2 p.m. 611.4131/155d: Telegram [523] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) [Washington,] March 30, 1936. 611.4131/156 [524] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] April 1, 1936. 611.4131/157 [525] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, April 7, 1936—1 p.m. [Received April 7—10:20 a.m.] 611.4131/154: Telegram [526] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, April 11, 1936—3 p.m. 611.4131/155a: Telegram [527] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, April 11, 1936—4 p.m. 611.4131/154: Telegram [528] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, April 28, 1936—5 p.m. [Received April 28—12:30 p.m.] 611.4131/161: Telegram [529] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, April 29, 1936—5 p.m. [Received April 29—2 p.m.] 611.4131/162: Telegram [530] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 1, 1936—noon. [Received May 1—7:25 a.m.] 611.4131/163: Telegram [531] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 26, 1936—11 a.m. [Received May 26—5:50 a.m.] 641.0031/59: Telegram [532] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, May 26, 1936—11 p.m. [Received May 26—6:30 p.m.] 641.0031/60: Telegram [533] Memorandum by Mr. William A. Fowler of the Division of Trade Agreements [Washington,] June 17, 1936. 611.4131/178 [534] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, June 18, 1936—6 p.m. 641.0031/60: Telegram [535] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, June 19, 1936—7 p.m. [Received June 19—2:30 p.m.] 641.0031/62: Telegram [536] Memorandum by Mr. Richard Eldridge of the Division of Trade Agreements [Washington,] June 24, 1936. 611.4131/185 [537] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, June 25, 1936—5 p.m. [Received June 25—1:15 p.m.] 641.0031/64: Telegram [538] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, June 26, 1936—6 p.m. [Received June 26—2:10 p.m] 641.0031/65: Telegram [539] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 3, 1936—4 p.m. 641.0031/64: Telegram [540] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 9, 1936—6 p.m. [Received July 9—1:05 p.m.] 641.0031/66: Telegram [541] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 20, 1936. 641.0031/71 [542] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 25, 1936—4 p.m. 641.0031/67: Telegram [543] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received July 28—2:25 p.m.] 641.0031/73: Telegram [544] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, September 3, 1936—6 p.m. 611.4131/182a: Telegram [545] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 9, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 9—1:05 p.m.] 611.4131/183: Telegram [546] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, September 19, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 19—11:57 a.m.] 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/797: Telegram [547] Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] September 21, 1936. 611.4131/190 [548] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins) [Washington,] September 29, 1936. 611.4131/193 [549] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 22, 1936. 611.4131/195 [550] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 3, 1936. 611.4131/198 [551] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Constant Southworth of the Division of Trade Agreements [Washington,] November 16, 1936. 611.4131/205 [552] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, November 20, 1936—8 p.m. [Received November 20—5:30 p.m.] 641.0031/77: Telegram [553] Memorandum by the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) of a Conversation With the President of the British Board of Trade (Runciman), December 18, 1936 December 18, 1936 611.4131/216 [554] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) [Washington,] December 19, 1936. 611.4131/214 [555] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins) [Washington,] December 26, 1936. 611.4131/215 Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.4131/140 [Document 513] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] January 22, 1936. The British Ambassador 2 called upon my invitation. After some preliminaries leading up to the matter, I proceeded briefly to rehearse the fundamentals of our international trade agreements program, which the Ambassador well understood, and to emphasize the extreme importance and urgency of world economic rehabilitation. I stated more than once the necessity for such rehabilitation both from the standpoint of world peace and of prosperity, in both of which Great Britain and this country were tremendously interested, and concluded very earnestly with the statement that if the present movement to restore international trade should not be carried forward because of Great Britain and other important countries not being disposed to share in it, I was not prepared to say what might happen to the world after this movement should break down through lack of support from important commercial nations, especially those greatly interested in international trade, as was Great Britain. The Ambassador seemed entirely in accord with these statements and objectives. I proceeded then to add that I knew the Ambassador would not think I had in mind any seriously controversial purpose in what I was about to say, but that I felt constrained, in the same cooperative spirit that I hoped might be even further developed economically between our two countries, to bring to his attention and that of his Government certain methods and practices in trade on the part of his Government which I felt were seriously handicapping the prosecution of our international trade recovery program. I continued by saying that this Government, in carrying forward its program, had been governed entirely by the long view in contrast with narrow, shortsighted, trade objectives; that this, of course, had been expensive to this Government, but that we had felt and still did feel that the broad program for full, permanent and sound international economic recovery was the only program that could either consistently or safely be considered, especially by important commercial nations like Great Britain and the United States; that, as an illustration, when this Government entered into its trade agreement with Brazil 3 it had it in its power to take over a large and unequal share of exchange and let the nationals of this country apply it on their indebtedness existing in Brazil, but instead this Government had steadfastly clung to its policy of equality and proceeded to share its much less but equal portion, while the British correspondingly benefited from this American sacrifice; that we had foregone sales of vast quantities of cotton to Germany rather than adopt a narrow, temporary, shortsighted trade practice. I then stated that in most cases the clearing arrangement had an inevitable tendency to drive trade straight into the bilateral channel alone; and that this course if adhered to by Great Britain and numerous other countries would not only cripple but gradually break down the entire program of the favored-nation policy for the restoration of bilateral, triangular and multilateral trade on a full and stable basis. I said I had recently observed in our efforts to induce Spain to liberalize her economic mind and attitude, where we were striving to enter into a very limited trade arrangement under which we would be called upon to buy more in dollars and cents than we would sell to Spain, 4 that the result would be that the increased exchange Spain would realize would go to Great Britain under her clearing arrangements and at the loss of the United States; that a number of similar clearing arrangements on the part of the British Government were understood to have like obstructive and handicapping effects upon the efforts of this Government to carry forward its broad program with the favored-nation policy underlying it. I stated that of course the British Government had a perfect right to take these shortsighted steps, as we considered them wherever practiced and by whom, and that I must not be understood as criticizing now or hereafter, but that I deeply felt that being more interested in the recovery of wholesome international trade than any other nation, Great Britain might probably decide to gradually desist from clearing arrangements such as I had referred to and collaborate correspondingly more with this Government and others in carrying forward the broader economic policy which our trade agreement program embodied. I set out the names of the Argentine, Germany, Italy and two or three other countries, including the Scandinavian countries, where the British by unusual and objectionable methods were forcing the bilateral trade practice at the expense of healthy triangular and multilateral trade. The Ambassador replied that he was under the impression that the effect of the British Government’s action in the instances mentioned, not to include others, was more or less natural, due to the unfavorable balance of trade on the part of the British Government. I, with some deference, pointed out how, according to my understanding of the facts, the whole tendency in a majority of most of these clearing house cases was to drive straight towards bilateral trading and correspondingly to restrict and obstruct the sum total of world trade. I said further that of course the British Government could go along with the expectation of a more or less favorable development in their domestic economy, sitting behind tariff walls and Empire preference; that the building construction boom and artificial, but in my opinion temporary, advantages would make this possible for another year or two; that the British Government had been thus pursuing a rather isolated economic policy with no manifestation of interest, as stated, in the program of this Government for international finance and trade recovery; that while thus pursuing this course of aloofness, the British Government suddenly had their attention attracted to an astonishing development in world affairs in that they saw a million heavily armed men on the march from Italy to Ethiopia. 5 I stated the result was that at once the British Government had felt obliged to order its Navy to assemble posthaste, from every part of the earth, on the Mediterranean; that today the British Government had felt obliged to prepare a huge budgetary increase of 1½ to 2 billions of dollars for heavily increased armaments; that both his Government and mine would have to agree that if Italy had had even near her pre-panic quantity of exports there was a real possibility that her armies would not be on the march today; that, of course, the British Government could continue to proceed leisurely with respect to cooperating in the restoration of world trade, including exchange stabilization, waiting for every possible development desired before proceeding with the fundamentals of economic rehabilitation; but that there was a real probability that the German military forces would be on the march before this leisurely policy of restoring trade and employment had been taken sufficiently in hand and dealt with; and that the experience with Italy should be a warning to all of our governments alike. I emphasized the view that when people are unemployed, and with their families in more or less economic distress, they fall a ready prey to agitators, revolutionaries and dictators, who in turn are liable to throw them into war; that the most incomprehensible circumstance in the whole modern world is the ability of dictators, overnight almost, to stand 35 million Italians and 65 million Germans on their heads and so dominate their mental processes that they arise the next morning and insist on being sent to the first-line trenches without delay; that when people are employed and they and their families are reasonably comfortable and hence contented, they have no disposition to follow agitators and to enthrone dictators. I then added that the world today was producing and consuming substantially less than it did six or eight, or possibly ten, years ago; that after every country had developed its domestic economy as fully as practicable in the light of the disposition of the various peoples, there would remain ample occasion and room for 20 billions of mutually profitable international trade and immense investments—immense investments that a hard-headed business man would consider sound; that restoration of such trade would mean the reemployment of the chief portion of unemployed and more or less distressed wage earners in such countries as Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the United States; that this action would probably mark the difference between war and peace in Europe in the not distant future; that in any event this course of trade restoration and of reemployment of 12 to 14 millions of unemployed persons offered the only possible alternative to the old order supplemented by extremely dangerous possibilities of war already in existence. I then suggested that, unless the Ambassador had a contrary view, I had in mind to prepare a memorandum containing the true facts as to these clearing arrangements and get it before the British Foreign Office; that I was wondering whether to clarify the matter most effectively I should, while giving the British Ambassador here a copy, send the memorandum to Mr. Atherton 6 at London who would converse in person with Mr. Runciman 7 in the office of the Board of Trade. The Ambassador promptly expressed the view that it would be more satisfactory to have a full conversation back and forth between Mr. Runciman and Mr. Atherton. The Ambassador seemed entirely sympathetic all the way through the conversation with the exception of the one statement above set out. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 2 Sir Ronald Lindsay. 3 For text of agreement, signed February 2, 1935, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 82, or 49 Stat. 3808. 4 See vol. ii , pp. 785 ff. 5 See vol. iii , pp. 34 ff. 6 Ray Atherton, Chargé in the United Kingdom. 7 Walter Runciman, President of the British Board of Trade. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.4131/141 [Document 514] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] February 5, 1936. The British Ambassador called and said that he desired to refer back to our conversation of some days ago in regard to conferences between our respective governments looking towards some degree of cooperation to promote our trade agreements program and a broad economic program generally for international business recovery. The Ambassador said that, speaking solely on his own initiative, he was in fear that we might provoke controversy with his government in regard to ship subsidies, debts and other conditions, which sooner or later would call for conference and settlement, or at least a better understanding between the two countries. I at once interrupted the Ambassador and assured him that that was not what I had in mind at this time. I then stated that the scope and specific purpose of my suggestion was that international business and general economic recovery was extremely urgent from the standpoint of both peace and satisfactory conditions of prosperity; that the trade agreements program which this Government has been carrying forward was worldwide in its application and was better calculated than any other plan or program to bring about world economic rehabilitation; that no two nations were more interested in promoting better conditions of peace and prosperity than our two countries; that suitable steps would not be taken and the necessary efforts would not be put forth to carry into operation the necessary economic program for international, financial, exchange, credit, and trade restoration to normal, unless the United States and Great Britain took the lead. I then sought to state further that Great Britain had not thus far cooperated in these respects; that while this Government was taking its political life in its hands to hold up and carry forward our vitally important and urgent program for international economic recovery from the long viewpoint, the British Government had not indicated any interest whatever in this long view and the program involved, but had instead been confining its chief attention to the narrow and shortsighted economic view which in the main contemplates purely bilateral bargaining and bartering transactions under more or less compulsion of clearing arrangements, in which a country with an unfavorable trade balance in most instances, as in the case of Great Britain, was in an excellent position to engage. I repeated that the British Government had a perfect right to do this now and in the future, but that my appeal was to the extreme danger of Germany or other countries breaking forth in a military way unless their unemployed people, as well as other unemployed people, were put back to work, et cetera, et cetera; that it was in these circumstances that I was directing the attention of the British Government to what my Government considers an extreme emergency situation from the standpoint of both peace and stable prosperity. The Ambassador said he was very glad to be set right about the matter; that he had not quite caught my full purpose. I added that, of course, as we went along, the question of ship subsidies, debts and other unsatisfactory conditions, would be discussed, attacked, and, I hoped, solved satisfactorily to all concerned. The Ambassador raised the question as to the readiness of our two governments to discuss even some phases of the proposed program for international business recovery, such as exchange stabilization. I replied that nations would never feel absolutely and entirely ready to sit down and deal fully with that problem, but that I considered it as all important, unless we were willing to take the great risk of letting the German nation get ahead of us with a military rampage over Europe, and high time that our two countries were proceeding at least to put out to the world educational utterances and activities with respect to the fundamentals of the proposed program and also to enter upon preliminary consideration and discussions of the problems which ultimately would have to be dealt with; that this would within itself inspire business confidence and contribute to business improvement. I emphasized to the Ambassador that I had not conferred with either the President or the Secretary of the Treasury about the exchange stabilization problem, but that I was only speaking from my own standpoint in connection with our trade recovery program, adding that of course a chief purpose, if not the chief purpose, of exchange and other mechanisms of like nature, was to facilitate and make possible the movements of commerce. I finally added that it was not my idea at this stage to enter into any controversial questions with the British Government; that my proposal as already explained did not on its face undertake anything deemed controversial, but that it was a simple statement calling attention to what is considered the extreme urgency for economic rehabilitation among the nations and hence for the wholehearted, unimpeded cooperation of our two governments in support of the long view program and, naturally, the abandonment of conflicting trade practices of a purely bilateral nature which made impossible satisfactory or real cooperation in support of the long view policies. I again repeated that of course the British Government had a right to take either course that it might desire, but that I felt constrained very earnestly to emphasize the conditions and the views which I had expressed to the Ambassador. I told the Ambassador that I was simply bringing this matter to his attention in this oral and informal way, that I was sending no note upon the subject, but that I would prepare an informal memorandum setting forth the clearing and like practices already referred to which would be given to him in a few days. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 611.4131/141a [Document 515] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) No. 1130 Washington , February 13, 1936. Sir : I am bringing to your attention a matter which is of the highest importance to us and I am going to ask you to spare no effort to bring our views to the attention of Mr. Eden 8 and any other members of the British Government who, in your opinion, should be acquainted with them. The memoranda enclosed herewith of my conversations with the British Ambassador 9 will give you the general tenor of our thoughts and will place you in a position to open preliminary conversations. The somewhat lengthy document which I also enclose is a technical survey of the entire subject and may be used by you whenever you feel that it should be presented. A copy of it will, in due course, be handed to the British Ambassador. My thought is that it would be best for you to seek an interview with Mr. Eden and endeavor to obtain his interest and support without, however, burdening him with the technical details. You might say that I have learned with a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction of Mr. Eden’s cordiality to Mr. Phillips 10 and of the desire which he expressed with regard to the relations of our two countries. You might then point out that we have been for some time considerably disturbed by what appears to us to be a trend in the policy of the British Government which, in view of its tendency to force trade into closely controlled bilateral balancing, may check all efforts to revive world trade on a general scale and that our misgivings on this score were greatly increased by the conclusion, on January 6, 1936, of a clearing agreement between the United Kingdom and Spain. 11 Further, we are somewhat fearful lest, for reasons given in the memorandum, this nascent British policy may thwart our own effort under the Trade Agreements Act and cause troubling divergences of policy contrary to Mr. Eden’s hope and mine with regard to our mutual relations. I know Mr. Eden will fully agree with my judgment that the most promising way to soften at least some of the present discontents would be to bring depressed peoples into active trading relations with one another. I do not think it desirable at the present stage to address a note on this subject to His Majesty’s Government. It would seem to me preferable to ascertain first whether Mr. Eden and Mr. Runciman were aware of the divergent trend of policies of the two Governments and, if so, whether they could not find some means to lessen our apprehension so that the two leading commercial nations of the world could go forward on a liberal and farsighted commercial policy in an effort to restore international trade throughout the world. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull [Enclosure] Memorandum [ Washington ,] February 11, 1936. For more than six years the world has suffered from an economic depression of unparalleled severity among the major characteristics of which have been the collapse of international trade and the protracted inability of Governments to re-create the conditions in which it can recover. The shrinkage of foreign trade has deprived of their means of livelihood millions of workers who, despite the efforts of their Governments to create domestic prosperity in the midst of international stagnation, are still for the most part the objects of public assistance. Increasingly Governments are tempted to find relief from pressure and distress at home by recourse to military adventures abroad. Deeply impressed by the seriousness of these conditions, the United States inaugurated in the summer of 1934, and has since then energetically pursued, a policy designed to restore international trade by a reduction of the barriers that hamper its natural flow and by its liberation insofar as possible from the many extraordinary restrictions and handicaps which have been placed upon it in recent years. The United States attaches the greatest importance to this effort in the belief that the economic rehabilitation of the world, on which the hope of durable peace depends, is impossible without a substantially larger flow of international trade than is taking place today. The success of this effort depends in large measure upon the adherence and support given by the major commercial nations to certain fundamental principles. A full restoration and substantial future development of international trade require not only a reduction of trade barriers, but also the replacement of the existing network of discriminatory practices by a régime of equality of treatment in international commercial relations. Hence, while negotiating mutual customs concessions, the Government of the United States has steadfastly held to the principle of equality of treatment in connection with the trade agreements into which it has entered. Not only do these agreements provide for reciprocal unconditional most-favored-nation treatment, but the United States extends the concessions granted in them to all countries which do not, in fact, discriminate against its commerce. The treaties and agreements negotiated by the British Government during the past three years also contain reciprocal pledges of most-favored-nation treatment, and the concessions granted in these treaties and agreements are freely generalized by the United Kingdom to other countries. The policy of the British Government in this respect was stated as follows by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, speaking in the name of his Government, before the Second Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 23, 1935: 12 “… The imperative necessity of bringing about a freer flow of trade throughout the world has always been recognized by His Majesty’s Government. Our markets, freed as they are from purely internal restrictions, operated under conditions which permit of prompt payment without exchange control, are of supreme importance to the traders of other countries, and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been able to make a number of agreements resulting in some breaking down of the barriers opposed to ourselves. We cannot in this way break down the barriers against the trade between other countries, barriers which impoverish them and render them less able to purchase our goods. But what we have done is, by adherence to the most-favoured-nation principle, to secure that so far as other exporting countries are interested in those categories of goods for which we may accord concessions in our trade agreements, those concessions are shared by such of them as are entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment. At this point I should perhaps utter a note of warning; I think it must be remembered that if the most-favoured-nation principle is to have its full usefulness no country can sit back and hope eternally to receive its benefits without itself actively contributing. The principle must be based on fair treatment. We believe that the principle of the most-favoured-nation clause, so practised, is of the greatest value to international trade as a whole because it tends to make every agreement for the reduction of trade barriers redound to the benefit of trade generally and not merely of the parties to the agreement, although naturally they benefit most directly since the agreement is designed with that object. Above all do we consider this principle of importance in a period during which we hope and trust that there will be a lowering of trade barriers in many countries.” The establishment of an effective régime of equality of treatment, however, requires not only that nations refuse to grant preferences in their own markets, but also that they refrain from seeking a preferred position in the markets of other countries. The pursuit of exclusive advantages tends to render it difficult and, in certain cases, impossible for the country which grants them to extend equally favorable, and hence non-discriminatory, treatment to the commerce of all other nations. In this respect, the practice followed in recent years by the Government of the United Kingdom appears to have diverged, in several important instances, from essential adherence to the principle of equality of treatment. An examination of a number of the agreements into which it has entered reveals that, while the British Government has refrained in general from measures which would discriminate in the British market between countries not members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, it has obtained for the commerce of the United Kingdom in foreign markets advantages which, by their very nature, could not be extended to all third countries. For instance, in agreements with several North European countries, the balance of trade between them and the United Kingdom is referred to and made to serve as the basis for undertakings on their part to encourage imports of British goods. Such commitments manifestly constitute especially advantageous treatment which cannot be extended to all third countries. In fact, if these undertakings are implemented, some, if not all, third countries, and particularly those with which the nation in question has a passive balance, must inevitably suffer through the resulting diversion of trade. This tendency toward bilaterally balanced trade or payments which is manifesting itself so strongly at present is highly unfavorable for the recovery of international trade, and for this reason, should not be encouraged, particularly by countries with world-wide commercial and financial interests. Of even more serious nature, from the standpoint of their divergence from the principle of equality of treatment, than these commercial agreements, are the agreements concluded by the British Government relating to exchange and payments on international accounts. The United Kingdom has entered into agreements on this subject with the following countries: Argentine Republic Convention relating to Trade and Commerce, signed May 1, 1933; 13 Germany Payments Agreement, signed November 1, 1934; 14 Italy Exchanges of Notes of March 18 and April 27, 1935, regarding Trade and Payments; 15 Turkey Agreement respecting Trade and Payments, signed June 4, 1935; 16 Uruguay Agreement regarding Trade and Payments, signed June 26, 1935; 17 Rumania Payments Agreement, signed August 3, 1935; 18 Spain Payments Agreement, signed January 6, 1936. With reference to arrangements relating to clearing and exchange, Dr. Burgin said, in his statement at Geneva mentioned above: “To turn to clearing arrangements, His Majesty’s Government are in general agreement with the report of the Joint Committee. These clearing agreements are no doubt designed with the intention of bringing about a balance of payments but they appear in practice to have the effect of forcing trade into purely bilateral channels and they inevitably tend to mate the desired balance at a low level. Equilibrium of itself is obviously not the end in view: one may reach equilibrium with nothing passing either way but that is clearly not the end desired. His Majesty’s Government obtained from Parliament some time ago authority to impose a clearing in those cases where exchange restrictions in foreign countries might render such a course necessary but they have been reluctant to exercise that power and hitherto have not found it necessary to do so, although they have in the case of certain countries entered into agreements designed to secure the liquidation of outstanding commercial debts and at the same time provide better conditions for the conduct of current trade.” No exception can be taken to the objectives described by Dr. Burgin provided they are sought without prejudice to the position and interests of other nations and without impairment of the principle of equality of treatment. It appears, however, that in each of the abovenamed agreements, the United Kingdom has sought to secure for its own purposes a large proportion, and in some instances almost all, of the exchange created by its purchases of that country’s goods. This action has necessarily reduced the share of that country’s current receipts of foreign exchange available for payments to nations which are not in a position to take similar action or which are unwilling in principle to do so. The result is inequality of treatment: preferential for the United Kingdom and discriminatory against some, if not all, other nations, in that the foreign exchange receipts of the country in question are not divided among its creditors on current account in proportion to the size of their claims, but according to an arbitrary plan. In the Report of the Joint Committee for the Study of Clearing Agreements, 19 with which Dr. Burgin states the British Government is in general agreement, the disadvantages of the clearing system are stressed and the recommendation is made not only that the system “should not be extended” but also that “it should … be abolished as soon as possible”. Yet of the arrangements which the British Government has made with the above-mentioned seven countries regarding exchange, three have the character of clearing agreements and have been concluded since the date of the above-mentioned report. As defined by the Joint Committee, a clearing agreement may be said to exist when payments for exports are received, and for imports are made, in domestic currency through local agencies in both countries, the out-payments of these agencies being offset and only the balance requiring transfer or other disposal. The agreements between the United Kingdom and Italy, Turkey, and Spain are of this nature. The manner in which current payments are dealt with in these three agreements and in those with the other four countries (Argentina, Germany, Uruguay, and Rumania) is materially different, even though the term “payments agreement” or some similar expression containing the word “payments” has been applied equally to the three which embody the clearing mechanism and to those with Germany, Uruguay, and Rumania which do not. Furthermore, the manner of handling current payments in the agreement with Argentina seems similar to that employed with Germany, Uruguay, and Rumania, despite the fact that the latter are termed payments agreements while the former bears a different title. The essential difference between the two groups of agreements appears to be that in those with Italy, Turkey, and Spain, the clearing mechanism is present, whereas under those with the Argentine, Germany, Uruguay, and Rumania, payments from the United Kingdom are remitted in the usual manner to these countries which then dispose of their receipts of sterling exchange according to a prescribed plan. Despite the fact that a distinction has been drawn by the British Government between exchange agreements based on the clearing mechanism and those that are not (which latter, for the purposes of this note, may be termed payments agreements although this name has been applied to agreements of both sorts), several of the characteristics which are widely regarded as undesirable in the former are also present in the latter. Payments, like clearing, agreements tend to place the weaker participant in a position where it is unable to grant equal treatment to all third countries. The object of one, as much as of the other, appears to be the securing of treatment which is by its nature preferential. Payments agreements, it is true, may leave to the weaker participant a freer hand than do clearing arrangements in the disposal of the net balance of exchange, so that this balance may be employed for payments due to other countries. However, even this distinction does not always hold good. The payments agreement entered into between the United Kingdom and Rumania on August 3, 1935, provides that almost the entire balance of [Rumania’s current receipts in sterling above the amount allocated for payment of imports shall be applied to divers other payments due in the United Kingdom. Thus tacit support is given to the tendency now widely manifest for nations to deal with their foreign trade or with their total external financial transactions on a bilateral basis. Another feature which payments agreements have in common with clearing agreements is the tendency to divert trade from existing channels. Importers in a weak currency country are prompted, either by the exchange control authorities or simply by the greater facility which they know they will have in obtaining exchange, to direct their purchases to the country with which a payments agreement is in force since the current receipts of that country’s exchange are of limited availability for purchases from other countries. For these reasons primarily, although not alone because of them, it is difficult to make an important distinction between payments and clearing agreements other than in their technical aspects. The pursuit of special advantage by the one method as by the other creates fresh obstacles to the development of world commerce and, by restricting the opportunities of other nations, contributes to preventing a relaxation of the present international tension. In addition to the preferential treatment with respect to payment for current commercial transactions secured by the United Kingdom in the agreements regarding exchange concluded with the seven countries mentioned above, the British Government has obtained other advantages of a nature such that their extension to all third countries is impossible. In the agreement with Germany and the earlier agreement with Rumania, signed on February 8, 1935, arrangements were made for the liquidation of outstanding debts, by the immediate provision of a lump sum followed by periodic payments, that appear to disregard the relation between the debtor nation’s total exchange assets and liabilities. In the agreement with Germany, moreover, the British Government dissociated itself from the position taken by the United States Government in demanding equality of treatment of all holders of the German Government seven per cent External Loan of 1924 and the German Government international five and one-half per cent loan of 1930 regardless of their nationality. Instead, the British Government secured from the German Government the undertaking that it would continue to provide sterling for the purchase of the coupons of these two loans in the ownership of British holders. The German Government in this agreement also undertook as regards other medium and long-term obligations to offer to British holders funding bonds in respect of interest, dividends and other regularly recurrent payments of a similar nature. Policies directed toward the creation of exclusive bilateral preferences, of the type embodied in the recent agreements concluded by the British Government, cause injury to the interests of nations other than those immediately concerned. Moreover, they tend to strengthen those elements within individual countries which seek a perpetuation and extension of the existing narrow and short-sighted policies and measures—to the inevitable long-range detriment of the countries applying such policies and measures and of the world as a whole. So far as the United States is concerned, the policies pursued by the British Government are having precisely this effect. American interests have suffered over the past three years through the pursuit of these policies. The position of American exporters to, and creditors of, a number of countries has been prejudiced by the discrimination to which they have been subjected by reason of the preferred treatment which the British Government has obtained for similar British interests. The policy of the British Government has added to a considerable degree to the strength of those forces in the United States which have opposed the policy of granting and of seeking only equal treatment. The action of the British Government in securing preferential treatment in the allocation of exchange, first from the Argentine and later from other countries, has provoked numerous and persistent demands in the United States that the American Government take similar action with certain other countries, in particular Brazil. Although it has been done only with difficulty and although the cost has been considerable, the Government of the United States has resisted these demands in the belief that the fundamental long-range interests of the United States, with which those of Great Britain are believed to be in harmony, demand that no further obstacles, even though they be of temporary self-interest, be placed before the development of international commerce. The particular features above alluded to of the commercial and exchange agreements entered into by the British Government, moreover, have rendered it more difficult for the Government of the United States to carry out its trade agreements program. The countries which have granted such special advantages to the United Kingdom frequently find themselves unable to grant treatment to American trade which is substantially non-discriminatory. The prospect that the United States may be able to negotiate trade agreements with such countries providing for mutual reductions in trade barriers is thereby materially impaired. An illustration in point is provided by the Payments Agreement recently concluded between the United Kingdom and Spain which has rendered more difficult the conclusion of a trade agreement between the United States and Spain, although prior to the action of the British Government in securing from Spain preferred treatment as regards exchange such an agreement was on the point of being concluded. Checks such as this to the attempt now being made to bring about a reduction in trade barriers and a return to more liberal commercial principles throughout the world may have most unfortunate consequences upon the future course of world trade and hence upon international relations generally. These consequences may be regarded as substantially more serious than even the immediate injury to American national interests. As was pointed out at the beginning of this memorandum, the policy of the United States is based on the belief that a general return on the part of the major commercial nations to the broad, liberal principle of seeking and of granting only equal opportunity and treatment with the commerce of other nations, combined with the gradual reduction or elimination of the numerous restrictions now throttling trade, offers the surest, if not the only way, of restoring international commerce. Were the United States and the United Kingdom, the two leading commercial nations of the world, to stand united on this liberal, farsighted policy in all its essential respects, the outlook for world peace and prosperity would be brighter by far than it is today. 8 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 9 Ante , pp. 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 513 ] and 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 514 ] . 10 William Philiips, Under Secretary of State; delegate to the London Naval Conference, 1935–1936 (see pp. 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] ff.). 11 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvi , p. 283. 12 See League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 140, pp. 35 ff. 13 The Roca-Runciman agreement, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxliii , p. 67. 14 Ibid. , vol. clxiii , p. 79. 15 Ibid. , vol. clx , pp. 289, 296, and 306. 16 Ibid. , vol. clxvii , p. 91. 17 Ibid. , vol. clxxvi , p. 153. 18 British Cmd. 4976, Roumania No. 2 (1935): Anglo-Roumanian Payments Agreement [ With Annex ], London, August 3, 1935 . 19 League of Nations, Enquiry Into Clearing Agreements (Official No.: C.153.M.83.1935.II.B.), pp. 7 ff. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/144: Telegram [Document 516] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , February 20, 1936—7 p.m. [Received February 26—3:57 p.m.] 79. I had an hour’s conversation with Eden this afternoon and outlined to him at length the views contained in your instruction 1130 of February 13. I read the instruction and memorandum from which he made extensive notes but I did not leave a copy with him at this time because I wished to avoid its passing into the hands of the Foreign Office experts who would merely write a technical appraisement. While the Foreign Secretary was familiar with Burgin’s speech at Geneva, he was obviously unaware of the extent that British practice had deviated. Eden did say that in determining the British course of action in this matter there were many other allied considerations for discussion with the United States. I told him that the essential first and foremost was that the two countries as the two great trading nations should agree in principle to work for the abolition of trade barriers. Eden said he agreed with this and felt it was vital for the economic welfare of the world we should endeavor to accord our two views. He asked me to express to you personally his appreciation that you had had your views directly presented to him, and that from the notes he had made he would at once proceed to take the matter up with the Foreign Office experts. Subsequent to that, and he hoped before his departure for Geneva on Sunday, he could discuss the situation with Runciman. This would enable Runciman to be prepared to discuss the matter again with Eden on his return from Geneva and as soon as possible thereafter the Foreign Secretary would send for me again and convey his further views. Atherton The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/148: Telegram [Document 517] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , February 28, 1936—1 p.m. [Received February 28—11:53 a.m.] 81. Reviewing his term of office at the Board of Trade, Runciman in a speech last night before the Bradford Chambers of Commerce stated in part: “One thing, however, is certain—that the economic and fiscal and financial policies of the nations of the world are so interwoven that one could not be dealt with without touching the others. How is it possible, for instance, for the United States to throw down her tariff barriers so long as she maintains her present fiscal system. It is not for me to teach the Americans how to do their business but I have no hesitation in saying that the rapidity and volume of their trade would be vastly increased if the United States would release some of her stores of gold and if her attitude towards the borrowing nations was a little more adventurous as her own home policy.” The best available press report of Runciman’s references to his trade agreements reads as follows: “We hope to get into foreign markets by reason of these agreements and I intend to pursue that policy as long as I am where I am.” He was not in the least frightened of that policy by being told that his agreements were open to criticism because there had been markets regained where hundreds of thousands and millions of pounds had been brought back to this country which could not have been obtained by other means. Some of the agreements were coming up for revision. “Two things above all others we are going to keep in mind. One is that there are many debts owing to United States from abroad which we ought to be allowed to collect and in the second place that financial arrangements which naturally spring out of these agreements should be reciprocal. We like our accounts to balance but we are quite prepared to calculate our balance over a very wide area—not simply between one country and another but between countries as a whole. Unless we take that broader view of international trade we shall fail in our conception.” In view of my interview with Eden, reported in my 79, February 26, 7 p.m., I informally asked the Foreign Office for the text of this speech concerning which they said they were ignorant but which they would endeavor to obtain. Atherton The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 611.4131/144: Telegram [Document 518] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , February 28, 1936—7 p.m. 70. Your 79, February 26, 7 p.m., and 81, February 28, 1 p.m. Do you believe that Eden had talked with Runciman on subject of my instruction 1130 of February 13 before Runciman made the speech reported in your 81? I am very anxious to have any information which might become available to you relating to this subject. Hull The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/149: Telegram [Document 519] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , February 29, 1936—noon. [Received February 29—8:40 a.m.] 82. Your 70, February 28, 7 p.m. I learn that although Foreign Office had communicated with Board of Trade subsequent to conversation reported in my 79, February 26, 7 p.m., Eden had not talked with Runciman before latter made his speech (apparently without notes) reported in my 81, February 28, 1 p.m. Last night Eden stated it was improbable that he could arrange to see Runciman before his departure for Geneva on Sunday but that he would take the earliest opportunity on his return. I further learn that Eden admits that, owing to the problem of sanctions, 20 his relations with Runciman are not too easy, and that although he did not criticise Runciman’s remarks he was obviously somewhat taken back when they were first brought to his attention. Atherton 20 In connection with the Ethiopian-Italian conflict; see section entitled “Efforts of the League of Nations and of France and the United Kingdom To End Hostilities, January-May 9, 1936,” vol. iii , pp. 85 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 611.4131/150a: Telegram [Document 520] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , March 18, 1936—1 p.m. 84. Some time ago when the Secretary first brought up the subject referred to in our instruction 1130 of February 13th the Secretary told the British Ambassador that he would give him a copy of the memorandum which was being drawn up on the subject. He had in mind giving him the memorandum after you had had time to take it up with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the interested Cabinet members. We realize there may have been a delay in the consideration of this matter, but in order not to wait too long before giving the Ambassador here a copy we would like to know whether you have yet furnished a copy to the Foreign Office or any other Government official. Phillips The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/150: Telegram [Document 521] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , March 19, 1936—1 p.m. [Received March 19—11 a.m.] 136. Department’s 84, March 18, 1 p.m. As indicated in my 79, February 26, 7 p.m., although Eden read and made extensive notes from the memorandum, I did not leave a copy with him as a precaution against the question at issue passing into a wholly technical sphere of discussion. The ensuing political crisis has prevented a personal consideration of the question by the relevant members of the Cabinet and has in fact changed the whole tactical situation. In the circumstances I venture to suggest that a copy of the memorandum be given to the British Ambassador at Washington since these [this?] would afford an opportunity for impressing upon him again the American viewpoint. Atherton The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 611.4131/155d: Telegram [Document 522] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , March 28, 1936—2 p.m. 103. My despatch 1130 of February 13, 1936. I am appending hereto a memorandum I have drawn up on the subject of the general trade policies to which I referred in my conversations with the British Ambassador here on January 22 and February 5, 1936. I will leave to your judgment the propitious moment for bringing this matter again to the attention of the British Government in a manner and at a time when it will receive the study its importance warrants. I am today giving a copy of this memorandum to the British Ambassador as well as a copy of the memorandum which accompanied my instruction No. 1130 transmitting to you memoranda of my two conversations with the British Ambassador here: Memorandum Referring to oral conversation between the British Ambassador and myself on two occasions, one in January and the other in February last, relative to the pursuit by important nations, and particularly Great Britain and the United States, of a comprehensive and practical program for international economic rehabilitation, I regret to learn that the British Government construed my proposal, which was in the nature of an inquiry, to embrace minor and other subordinate questions of a controversial nature. This was entirely foreign to my purpose. The single outstanding question I sought to raise with the British Government was whether that Government could see its way clear to pursue virtually the identical course the United States Government has pursued under the Trade Agreement Act of 1934. 21 By this program is meant an announcement to the world by a given government, the British in this instance, that it is high time the drift of the nations further and further toward economic isolation should be halted, and a gradual but definite movement with an adequate program having for its chief objective the restoration of the normal processes of international trade and other normal economic relationships between nations should henceforth be carried forward. This mere announcement by the British Government would be followed by similar announcements by other governments, with the result that the moral effect of a pronouncement so urgent and so sound would inspire confidence in the industrial and business world as it would also quiet much of the high tension in both the economic and political situations. This announcement by the British Government would in no sense imply an obligation immediately to proceed with final steps with respect to a lowering of trade barriers generally, the abandonment of undesirable trade methods and practices deemed necessary for the time being on account of depression conditions, or any lengthy or definite step with respect to exchange stabilization. The course of the United States Government in the administration of the Trade Agreement Act with the program it comprises best illustrates the one question this Government is undertaking to raise with the British Government, and that question is as stated at the outset, whether the British Government cannot see its way clear to make the world announcement that in its own way but to as full an extent as practicable and consistent with its domestic welfare, it proposes to join in support of the program and the movement for the restoration of the normal processes of international trade and general economic relations between the nations. It is thus apparent that my references to certain trade methods of the British Government embodying bilateral and clearing practices in harmony with purely economic nationalism were only intended to illustrate my one outstanding proposal to the British Government by showing first that if this course of nationalism is pursued indefinitely it will in the long run be disastrous to all governments pursuing it and to the world as well, and secondly that the pursuit of these nationalistic trade methods by a great country like Great Britain to a large extent prevents other nations like the United States from going forward successfully with the broad program for international economic restoration and fair and friendly trade methods and trade practices between nations, all of which afford the only solid foundation upon which to restore full and stable prosperity and conditions of permanent peace. Hull 21 48 Stat. 943. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Dunn) 611.4131/156 [Document 523] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Dunn ) [ Washington ,] March 30, 1936. Referring to the Secretary’s telegram 103 of March 28, 2 p.m., to the Embassy in London, pursuant to the Secretary’s instructions I delivered to the British Ambassador on March 28 a copy of the memorandum embodied in the telegram to London and a copy of the memorandum which accompanied the Secretary’s instruction No. 1130 of February 13, 1936 to the Embassy in London. In transmitting these memoranda, I called the Ambassador’s attention to the fact that it was the Secretary’s particular wish that this question of the attitude of the British Government, toward a broad trade program looking to the restoration of international trade, not become involved in technical discussions as to exact methods of its execution. I called the Ambassador’s particular attention to the second paragraph of the Secretary’s memorandum of March 28th which points out that an announcement by the British Government of the initiation of a broad trade program similar to that now being pursued by the United States under the Trade Agreement Act would not obligate the British Government to any immediate or specific steps, but would have the effect of giving assurance generally that it was the intention of the British Government to carry out such a program. I said that the Secretary would not wish to have the technicians in the British Government pick out any particular questions that might come up in the execution of a program of this kind, nor should they take the attitude of seeking to lay stress on any particular phase which would require intensive study and decisions before the plan could be put into effect. I again laid stress on the fact that there were no immediate obligatory or final binding steps to be taken with regard to such matters as stabilization, et cetera. These were all questions which could be taken up in due time and when some possibility of their solution could be foreseen; that what the Secretary had in mind at this time was a general declaration of intention and policy. The British Ambassador expressed himself as very much relieved to know that no particular steps were intended for adoption at this particular time and said that he hoped the whole matter would be kept on a plane of policy and declaration until such times as the different phases could be successfully dealt with. He said that he would make every effort to explain the matter again to his Government particularly along the lines of the Secretary’s new memorandum and hoped that from the policy viewpoint it could be accepted and put into effect by his Government. James Clement Dunn Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.4131/157 [Document 524] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] April 1, 1936. The British Ambassador called at his own request. After some general preliminary exchanges of remarks, I inquired of the Ambassador what was ahead politically in Europe. He said that, speaking solely for himself as an individual, Hitler and his associates were very much like the Kaiser, that is, without tact or deliberation; that the Kaiser did not really intend war, but he jockeyed himself by his blustering and bantering straight into war; and that Hitler had driven the British straight into the arms of the French—at least to the extent of opening staff discussions, and that that was going a considerable distance. Presently, the Ambassador remarked that that was a very interesting memorandum I sent him some days ago on the international trade situation, that it lifted all the problems relating to international economic affairs to a higher and clearer level and that he was much interested and impressed with it. I promptly reminded him that it was not a note or really a memorandum, but was a part of our oral conversations of January and February on the subject of an international trade program and British interest therein; that the so-called memorandum only more clearly defined my position from the beginning of our conversations in January and February. The Ambassador indicated repeatedly that he was very much impressed with the idea, but before unequivocally approving it, except by implication, he said that, just giving expression to his own individual views and surmise, it might seem to the British Government more or less difficult to reverse its present definite course and attitude and merely announce that it proposed gradually in the future to move in the opposite direction of liberal commercial policy as proposed by this government and as supported by this government under the Trade Agreement Act of Congress. The Ambassador said that British officials were adverse to mere empty declarations, which might or might not be carried out or mean as much as they purported to mean when uttered by many others in most parts of the world, and that British statesmen were more or less averse to making such empty declarations; that, in addition, the British Government might be expected to take some definite step or steps before it would be ready or be prepared to do so; and that, in brief, their country was moving forward fairly well in the present situation and the disposition might be to so continue; but these, the Ambassador said, were his own individual utterances as to a possible course and outcome of the matter at London. I replied that scarcely nothing conceivable would be more disappointing to this Government, and to the friends of almost any kind of international cooperation, than an announcement by the British Government that it is content for the indefinite future with the status quo . I said that during recent years all nations have been sitting back behind economic fortresses, each making such progress in its domestic economy as has been made either by the production of war implements and supplies or by renewals, repairs, replacements and needed new building construction; that nothing whatever has been done or seriously thought out or proposed in any concrete form to revitalize and rehabilitate the international financial, exchange, credit and trade situation; that the whole structure of international finance and commerce is lying virtually prostrate, as it has been for several years, with no concern as to its restoration save by the espousal of the economic program for the restoration of international trade and finance which the United States Government has been strenuously supporting during the past two years; that matters have reached a stage where it is all-important that Great Britain should join in this movement, not in the form, however, of an alliance, but moving forward in concert; that, in my judgment, Great Britain is far more interested, from the standpoint of business prosperity and the preservation of peace, in the restoration of normal international economic relationships than any other nation, including the United States, which I agreed is tremendously interested. I said that this Government, in order to pursue a course the main objective of which is liberal commercial policy, was obliged to challenge almost a solid wall of narrow isolationist embargo tariff sentiment and that this is in great contrast with the far easier position the British Government is in to move in the direction this government has been going in the past two years; that the alternative of sitting still, utterly inert, with no objective except purely nationalistic economy, has been tried out for several years by all nations, and inevitably means extreme, high political tension in many places at all times and that this is almost universally brought about by high economic tension or distress; that if ourselves and other important nations had been functioning behind a suitable economic program during the past two or three years there is little doubt that Italy would not be on the rampage today under economic pressure, that Japan within twenty-four hours after Italy began to march would not have extended the area of her proposed military domination of China, that Germany later would not have reached into the Rhineland, and Turkey would not be threatening to fortify the Dardanelles,—all of which is a chain of circumstances and developments put into operation by the Italian outbreak. I said that I cannot conceive of a more discouraging or hopeless world outlook if the present and absolutely chaotic economic situation as it pertains to international relations is to remain undisturbed while the forces of extreme nationalism, as hitherto, endeavor to dominate the domestic affairs of each nation, including Great Britain. The Ambassador remarked at one time that the Manchester Guardian had recently come out in favor of the clearing agreement policy, which Great Britain is practicing under shelter of its unfavorable trade balances, and added that his countrymen were very strongly behind the present tariff and bilateral, clearing arrangement policies Great Britain is pursuing, and that it might be difficult for his government officials to resist the appeals of businessmen in its support. I replied that this government has had many similar experiences, including that with regard to the Brazilian trade agreement, when large numbers of our most powerful businessmen and bankers came here and insisted that we compel Brazil to pay off all blocked exchange indebtedness instead of applying the favored-nation policy and rule of equality of treatment, and that I had promptly replied to them that the broad economic program we were pursuing to restore the normal volume of world trade would yield dollars to them, while their proposed, short-sighted policy would yield nickels, and that therefore we felt absolutely constrained without hesitation to pursue the long view and more liberal commercial policy. I added that the British statesmen in charge of that government undoubtedly realize the vast difference in benefits to Great Britain from a healthy, normal international trade, including the triangular and multilateral methods with equality as the basis, when compared with the narrow, limited and short-sighted policy of bilateral, clearing arrangement trading based on discriminations; and that it would seem to me to be almost inconceivable that the British Government would make a deliberate decision in support of the purely nationalistic policy for and during the indefinite future. I finally remarked that at one time the Italians imagined they could get along in a purely nationalistic way, whereas they now have Mussolini with Fascism; that Germany started off with a great blare of trumpets announcing the policy of self-containment, whereas their armies are now on the march under economic pressure. I repeatedly emphasized the beneficial effects on peace conditions of the liberalized commercial policy, such as we stand for, and expressed the opinion each time that economic peace more than ever before must underlie political and military peace. I reminded the Ambassador that in this country the most outstanding conservative thought among our largest business men and able statesmen of both political parties alike and of the press have greatly modified their original attitude in favor of extreme high tariffs and economic nationalism, and in large numbers have given their support to the reciprocal trade agreement program with the favored nation policy which this Government is carrying forward; that, therefore, it should not occasion the slightest embarrassment to the conservative statesmen of Great Britain to modify their course and attitude; that it is both logical and necessary that two countries like ours should have a combined domestic and international economic program designed to develop both phases of the economic situation with the objective of bringing about full and stable business prosperity and gradually improve international relationships and hence conditions of peace; that there is no alternative to this course, except the practical and permanent destruction of the international trade situation, increasing irritation among the nations and a chronic state of political high tension and threatened wars, with most nations feverishly arming presumably for self-defense; that unless this movement and program for the restoration of normal trade and general economic relations among the nations is carried forward now, but instead is deliberately denied the support of hitherto great trading nations like Great Britain, the statesmen of most countries, including the United States, will give way to utter discouragement, if not despair, as to the future world situation; that this country in particular would feel less concern than ever before about any knd of international relationships. I suggested the fact that many persons and even high officials today suggest that political and economic conditions, especially in Europe, are too turbulent and too badly dislocated for any step of any importance in the direction of economic rehabilitation, and then I strongly emphasized the view that this is the very time for the outstanding nations to assert leadership and proclaim a program of liberal commercial policy as an ultimate objective, accompanied by a warning that extreme isolationist or nationalistic economic practices and methods are largely responsible for, and will continue to aggravate and make worse, the existing chaotic economic and political situations. I said that a program for the restoration of normal international trade and other economic relations will immediately arouse hope and confidence in the future, especially among business people and statesmen, with the result that from the beginning a gradual improvement in the direction of more stable political and economic conditions can be expected. This, I said, I desire to repeat with the profoundest conviction. Instead of being inopportune, now is precisely the time for a program for gradual return to economic sanity to be proclaimed, and, I added, that if not now,—when? And I answered my question by stating that it would be when these same acute conditions in the way of high political and economic tension had grown even worse. I again reminded the Ambassador that the outlook ahead could scarcely have been more dark than when the United States Government resolutely announced its economic program and, single-handed, proceeded to carry it forward. I then raised the further question that while, of course, Great Britain and other countries could float along for a time yet, pursuing narrow, nationalistic policies, such as we have discussed, with the inevitable increasingly-bad results, as to which most all persons are in agreement and which has been demonstrated by recent years of experience, Great Britain and other countries thus continuing in these narrow economic policies will find themselves, as they have since Italy and Germany have gone on the rampage largely under economic pressure, constantly arming on an ever-increasing scale for the purpose of dealing with symptoms, instead of the disease. I stated that my appeal is that the nations have dealt with symptoms too long already and the proposed program undertakes to go straight to the seat of the disease. The Ambassador became more favorable as the conversation went along, in that he would express his acquiescence in most of the foregoing statements, but without extended comment or discussion. He finally said that this line of ideas in the light of the present and prospective situation was unanswerable. Whatever may have been his real state of mind, he appeared towards the end of the conversation to be sympathetic with the views I expressed and indicated his earnest hope that his government might see its way clear to cooperate. He likewise expressed himself as feeling better or somewhat relieved of whatever was on his mind in the way of pessimism as he was about to leave. He made one inquiry at the close as to whether this proposal was being made to any other nations, and I promptly replied that I had no purpose whatever to make this proposal to any other country except Great Britain, until that Government had had full time and opportunity to take action with respect to it and acquaint me with its decision. This seemed also pleasing to the Ambassador. It is not at all improbable that the Ambassador had received a despatch of some kind from the Foreign Office in London, which possibly offered more or less sketchy comment on the inquiry of this Government as contained in my January and February conversations with the Ambassador, indicated at least the tentative slant of mind of the Foreign Office towards this proposal or inquiry, and requested the Ambassador to call on me and develop the entire matter a little more fully, and in any event to ascertain whether he could gather any new impressions relative to the exact state of mind and purposes of this Government in relation to the entire matter. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/154: Telegram [Document 525] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , April 7, 1936—1 p.m. [Received April 7—10:20 a.m.] 184. I met the Foreign Secretary by appointment this morning at 10 a.m. and delivered to him a copy of the memorandum textually quoted in Department’s 103, March 28, 2 p.m. He said that despite the pressure upon him of European matters, he had given this matter much thought and was glad to have this memorandum because he had understood the copy for the Foreign Office from Sir Ronald Lindsay would not be delivered until April 9th and he is leaving for Geneva today at 2 o’clock. He said he would examine the memorandum before going away and see that it was delivered to Mr. Runciman. He stated that while he was not an expert on the technical side of this subject, he was fully aware of its importance and its political implications and that it was his intention to make every effort to avoid a conflict of trade policy between Great Britain and the United States. He said that he realized the importance of an expansion of international trade as a force in the direction of maintaining peace. He said he wished to take this matter up with me again as soon as possible after Easter, and that he would communicate with me as soon as he had an opportunity to do so and he regretted that the pressure of events had not permitted him to make the progress he had expected to achieve when this matter was first brought to his attention. At Embassy lunch yesterday permanent Assistant Secretary to the Board of Trade, now in charge of the Anglo-Argentine trade negotiations, pointed out the rapidly failing health of Lord Runciman and that, in his opinion, with the death of his father, Mr. Runciman would be forced to give up the Board of Trade upon his entry into the House of Lords. He said Mr. Runciman was far more liberal in his views and policies than any successor was likely to be. He described Mr. Runciman as “a good man struggling against an adverse tide of events”. By inference this officer substantiated that a continuance of a policy of economic expediency in view of the European political situation was the general Cabinet attitude. In the course of this conversation he repeated an inquiry in the form of a statement made several times in the current year that it was assumed the United States Government was not prepared to go any further in the matter of a trade negotiation with this country until after the November elections. Incidentally he mentioned that the Board of Trade would never consider in any agreement “preferential treatment on cotton”. In conversation with high Treasury official today he too stressed the urgency of European political situation as the primary factor dominating British policy in all fields which compelled, reluctant as they were to admit it, a policy of expediency in economic and financial international questions. Bingham The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 611.4131/155a: Telegram [Document 526] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , April 11, 1936—3 p.m. 124. In response to questions at the press conference this morning regarding Associated Press despatch to the effect that the United States and Great Britain are engaged in a survey of Anglo-American trade which may bring negotiations for a reciprocal trade agreement, I made the following statement: “There is absolutely nothing new about the casual conversations with the British representatives. They are no more than such general exchanges of information as we carry on with everybody in the world here about general economic conditions. There has been absolutely nothing said about definite conversations or conferences or negotiations, much less about any fact or factor or item that might be discussed in a trade agreement conference.” Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 611.4131/154: Telegram [Document 527] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , April 11, 1936—4 p.m. 125. The attitude of the British Government as reported in your No. 184 of April 7, 1 p.m., is disappointing. The British authorities do not appear sufficiently to appreciate the possible full consequences of the continuance by the United Kingdom and other important commercial countries of the narrow and restrictive commercial policies which they recently have been pursuing. I believe there is a chance that fuller consideration may produce a change in their present judgment, and induce them to undertake the step I have suggested—namely, a public announcement to the effect that the British Government plans to bend its effort, as circumstances may permit, towards the long-run objective of lowering trade restrictions and putting trade arrangements back on a basis of equality. I intend to continue the effort here to secure full consideration from them for the wisdom of some such step. I desire to do likewise in London. Please therefore take advantage of all opportunities to present these views to the British Government for their consideration. I suggest that at what you judge to be a suitable and propitious opportunity you talk again with Eden and Runciman, and leave with them an informal memorandum in summary of your remarks, setting forth the underlying reasons which have led this Government to bring the matter before the British Government, somewhat as follows: “The disturbance and protracted curtailment of international trade has created most serious problems of internal adjustment for every country. These problems are far from solved, and it may be judged that they are shaping both the economic and the political policy in many countries of Europe along lines calculated to produce distinctly grave consequences. The economic consequences either immediately or ultimately to be expected from the restriction of international commerce may be clearly seen in present facts and tendencies that menace our era—namely, in the great unemployment, the increasing burdens on Government finances incidental to the constant extension of Government into economic life because private industry cannot meet its difficulties, the diversion of international trade from channels of economic benefit to channels of political influence, the growth of special and preferential commercial agreements which are an unsatisfactory and weak basis for a restricted trade that is constantly at the mercy of political chance and changes. These conditions have stimulated an opinion that countries cannot depend upon being able to buy and pay for necessary raw materials through the processes of international commerce, which was previously the means by which these materials were procured. Correspondingly the belief has strengthened that supplies of these raw materials must be assured either by ( a ) the creation of self-sufficiency irrespective of all economic calculations, ( b ) the acquisition of territorial control and/or ( c ) the directing of purchases of raw materials solely to areas willing to supply them on a barter basis, again irrespective of economic costs. If trade continues to be determined and restricted by these conditions and beliefs, existing economic difficulties may be expected to continue, and the policy of discriminations will be further entrenched at the very time that world efforts must be exerted to rebuild international trade along the opposite lines of equality and permanent economic benefit. Underlying economic conditions and tendencies are an important cause of present political tensions and mistrusts which are indicated by the vast increase in armaments and of fighting forces that has now taken place. Furthermore, as these armaments and fighting forces are increased, economic arrangements in all countries are becoming increasingly dependent upon the perpetuation and operation of great armament industries and upon the maintenance of enormous military establishments. The political ideal in which this country has developed largely under the inspiration of British history is one that contemplated a world of independent liberal and thriving democracies serving general welfare by widespread commerce. The world that appears to be emerging from the conditions outlined is one in which the living and working arrangements of great sections of each people are devoted, under strict governmental control, to furnishing the means for great military organizations directed by a dictatorial plan, subordinating conditions of economic welfare to calculations of national might. It is these tendencies which are forcing great peace-loving nations like Great Britain and the United States greatly to increase armaments also. It is because of our belief that the British Government views these developments with the same general disquietude that this Government does, that we believe that a common ground exists for concerting economic policies along lines that may affect desired change. At present the world is left in grave doubt as to whether the important surplus-producing and trading nations have completely accepted present trends, as to whether they too have committed themselves to policy of attempted self-containment and economic isolation, or as to whether they contemplate plans for moving as early as possible towards a restoration of normal international trade and equality of trade opportunity. This is the reason for considering whether there is not some possible way by which countries who still possess this broader long-run objective may not immediately acquaint other nations now of their ultimate wish and intention. To postpone all possible initiatives aimed at remedying underlying economic conditions until present political difficulties are all settled may be tantamount to doing nothing ever; for these economic conditions themselves aggravate the political difficulties. A new hope of general economic improvement, through a rebuilding of international commerce, is necessary to turn the judgment of many peoples away from the growing belief that only by force of arms will they be able to create a satisfactory condition for themselves. This new hope would arise if the Governments of the important trading countries could definitely make clear that they intend, as circumstances permit, to direct their policies towards the reestablishment of international commerce. Would this not serve as at least one important preparatory step facilitating the composition of political difficulties? The weight of these considerations seems to the American Government so genuine that it is venturing to present its analysis to the British Government. In view of the great size and influence of the British Commonwealth of Nations—its commerce, liberal tradition, and wish for peace—the announced support of the United Kingdom for a broad economic objective would go far towards creating a certainty that this might be made into world policy, and into a new direction for international economic relations. On the other hand, if British commercial policy is further directed along lines which, though without intention, produce discriminatory situations and which furthermore do not in any way encourage, now, even the general idea of striving for eventual lowering of trade barriers, then the efforts of this Government and of other governments to that end must obviously be handicapped. Even though there may be no disposition whatsoever to do so, British commercial policy might well impede and discourage the gathering momentum of any movement in the other direction. The American Government fully realizes the great economic difficulties which the British people have faced, and so ably dealt with. It appreciates that in any transition of commercial policy looking forward to a gradual lowering of trade barriers on a basis of equality, the British Government would have to reckon with troublesome internal problems. The American Government has been dealing each day with such difficulties. It was in fact because of this current experience that this Government in the prior oral presentation which it has made suggested the fullest possible latitude as to the time when the British Government might be able to take any actual significant steps towards lessening restrictions, and as to the particular ways in which this might be achieved. The suggested program does not contemplate such drastic readjustment of trade barriers as would subject the industries of any country to unreasonable and excessive competition. If no determined movement along liberal economic lines can be developed now it is hard to retain assurance regarding future prospects. Anticipation must reckon with the possibilities of a still more extreme movement toward self-sufficiency in many countries irrespective of economic costs, still more complete and arbitrary restriction of international trade, continuing unemployment, renewed surpluses leading to enlarged Government subsidies for export, the further governmental organization and regimentation of economic life, enlarged absorption of labor and production into armed forces, increased Government expenditures for military purposes, threatening universal currency depreciation—with an ultimate outcome which reason rejects.” Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/161: Telegram [Document 528] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , April 28, 1936—5 p.m. [Received April 28—12:30 p.m.] 231. My 222 of April 23, noon. 22 I saw the Foreign Affairs Secretary by appointment at 4 o’clock this afternoon and handed him the memorandum contained in your 125, April 11, 4 p.m. He asked me to say to you that his Government has taken great satisfaction in the views you have expressed in your communications and is giving them active sympathetic consideration; that his Government welcomes the opportunity which you have created for an exchange of views for the purpose of establishing a common policy; that his Government is greatly impressed by the ideals inspiring your policy and by the courage with which you advocate them; that while he is not prepared to make a definite statement as to the contents of the memorandum which his Government is preparing he hopes when it is ready that it will show that the aims and methods of his Government are substantially similar to those of our own and he anticipates that this memorandum will be ready in the very near future. Incidentally during our conversation I referred to paragraph 3 of heading 8 of the text of proposals in the British Government’s White Paper of March 19 23 regarding the extension of economic relations between nationals which Eden admitted constituted an open lead bearing on the question at hand. Bingham 22 Not printed. 23 British Cmd. 5134, Germany No. 2 (1936): Text of Proposals Drawn Up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Italy, London, March 19, 1936 . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/162: Telegram [Document 529] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , April 29, 1936—5 p.m. [Received April 29—2 p.m.] 234. Runciman lunched with me today and I took occasion to go over the ground I had covered with Eden yesterday and to hand him a copy of your memorandum based on 125, April 11. Runciman immediately said that through his son he had received your message to him 24 which he appreciated and that he wished me to convey to you his acknowledgment. In the course of our discussion Runciman maintained that the eventual aims of our two countries were not in their more important aspects dissimilar but that in this country and, he presumed, in ours, the Cabinet officials concerned had to take into consideration in forming their immediate plans responsible groups which were an important element in political and public opinion. He elaborated on the pressure which had been brought to bear on him and the whole Cabinet by Amery 25 and his followers to abandon the most-favoured-nation clause, and he also emphasized the pressure which particular industries, such as textiles and steel, including financial interests, exerted. Nevertheless, he said his Cabinet colleagues, including Chamberlain 26 had with him stood by the most-favored-nation clause, and that in his speech before the association of British Chamber of Commerce tomorrow night he would make occasion to set forth anew the Government’s viewpoint. When I pointed out to him that often the British bilateral agreements, while permitting the maintenance of the most-favored-nation clause as such in this country, were nevertheless restrictive on the other party, he immediately analyzed this statement in somewhat the following way: that the Scandinavian countries had very large freedom of action, dependent on their own internal decisions; that the Spanish treaty had been a failure, which he did not want to repeat; that the German treaty gave that country a wide margin of action; and that the Argentine treaty, which I took occasion to point out to him, was very much to the forefront in United States eyes, particularly vis-à-vis the United States-Brazil treaty, he quite frankly said was of such a beneficial character that he would be very glad to renew it again in its present form. He then went on to point out that the majority of these treaties had one factor that the British negotiators had to have in mind; namely, the payment of the foreign debts due to England, such was the importance of that factor in British internal economy. Runciman’s attitude did not remind me in any way of his remarks reported in Embassy’s 81, February 28, 1 p.m., and I felt that he was at pains to give me the palatable interpretation of British commercial policy within the limits of what they conceived to be their greatest self interest. Incidentally he touched on the question of trade negotiations and said that in any such matter as tariffs Great Britain would be concerned over what the future fiscal policy of the United States was to be, with particular reference to the content of the dollar. Bingham 24 Not found in Department files. 25 Leopold Stennett Amery, British Member of Parliament. 26 Neville Chamberlain, British Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/163: Telegram [Document 530] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , May 1, 1936—noon. [Received May 1—7:25 a.m.] 238. My 234, April 29, 5 p.m. I attended the British Chamber of Commerce dinner last evening at which Mr. Runciman also spoke. He declared that he had long had sufficient faith in those who were engaged in the commerce of this country to believe that they could recover from almost anything, but there were times when Government assistance was required, and we British now come to the end of the era where the Government could allow things to take their natural course. “I cannot forget that Government activity during the last 3 or 4 years has not only added to our turnover, but has saved us from disaster. Our foreign agreements had aimed directly, and with some success, at regaining what we had lost in markets abroad, by direct negotiation.” Mr. Runciman then referred to the fact that I was present and added: “The American Ambassador is the representative of a Government which has again and again stated that it wished to see a much freer flow of international trade. In so far as it lends itself to that ambition, they will find us ready to cooperate.” Mr. Runciman said, in concluding: “Peace is not to be gained through mere emotional appeal; still less by effusive threats. The stabilization of peace depends upon the slow and careful building of a solid substructure of sound political conditions and healthy economic relations between nation and nation. The turn which economic issues take today in large part spells the destiny of tomorrow.” Bingham The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/59: Telegram [Document 531] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , May 26, 1936—11 a.m. [Received May 26—5:50 a.m.] 277. The Foreign Secretary, when handing me a memorandum on British commercial policy, said that he hoped we would find the statement clear and reasonable and added that he was pleased that the Board of Trade had cooperated to an extent that was gratifying to him. The memorandum is six pages in length and is difficult to summarize satisfactorily. Do you wish me to send it by the direct wire or bring it with me on the Queen Mary? Bingham The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/60: Telegram [Document 532] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State 27 London , May 26, 1936—11 p.m. [Received May 26—6:30 p.m.] 281. Your 179, May 26, 4 p.m. 28 The British memorandum reads as follows: 1. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have received Mr. Hull’s communications on the subject of commercial policy, and have noted with great satisfaction their broad outlook over the difficulties from which the world is suffering and especially the friendly language towards this country in which they are couched. 2. His Majesty’s Government welcome unreservedly the opportunity afforded by Mr. Hull’s communications for the exchange of views on the commercial policy of the two countries. They entirely share the view of the Government of the United States of America that the restoration of world trade through a lowering of trade barriers and the principle of equality of trade opportunity are objectives of great importance from the broadest point of view. They appreciate the significance of the suggestion that two great trading nations, such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which together transact about a quarter of the world’s foreign trade, should pursue a common policy so far as possible. They realize the importance of their keeping one another well-informed of the trend of their policy in commercial matters and of leaving other countries in no doubt of the enlightened objectives which are the ultimate aim of both. They share Mr. Hull’s desire to avoid the possibility that critical examination of the measures they have taken in any particular instance should mask the fundamental agreement which exists between the aims of the two countries. They note with appreciation his references to the economic difficulties which the British people have faced and with which they are still confronted. 3. His Majesty’s Government believe that not only the aims of the two Governments, but also the methods by which those aims are sought to be achieved, are substantially similar. In this connection, they think it desirable to recall the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the World Economic Conference on the subject of economic policy. 29 In the course of that statement Mr. Chamberlain expressed the conviction that the full restoration of the world’s economic life could be achieved only if existing facilities for international trade were increased. He urged a reduction of excessive customs tariffs, saying that in the view of His Majesty’s Government this could best be achieved by a series of bilateral negotiations taking detailed account of the particular trade relations of the negotiating countries. He pointed out that by the application of the most-favoured-nation clause concessions granted to one country were shared by all countries entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment. He added that it had long been the policy of the United Kingdom to secure the widest and most unconditional interpretation of that clause. Dealing with quotas he said that the United Kingdom were strongly in favour of the progressive abolition of import quotas arbitrarily imposed for the protection of the home producer. Mr. Chamberlain also referred to the restrictive effects upon international trade of attempts to obtain a precise balance in the exchange of commodities between two countries, pointing out that, unless the tendency to adopt such arrangements, which was already apparent, could be checked, other countries which had hitherto avoided them would be compelled to adopt them. This statement of policy was reaffirmed by Dr. Burgin at Geneva in September 1935. 4. The World Economic Conference unfortunately failed to produce agreement with a view to rehabilitating the trade of the world, but His Majesty’s Government have continued to frame their own policy in commercial matters on the basis of the principles put forward by Mr. Chamberlain on that occasion for general adoption. 5. On this basis they have successfuly negotiated a number of commercial agreements; and this basis differs in no respect from that adopted by Mr. Hull in his recent no less successful commercial negotiations. The essential similarity not only of aim but of method may be obscured by differences of detail arising from the respective economies of the United States of America, of the United Kingdom and of the other countries with whom they negotiate. But the aim is in every case increase of trade, and the method is in every case equality of opportunity, in so far as present abnormal conditions permit. 6. With regard to quota restrictions, His Majesty’s Government have always taken a view which they believe to be shared by the United States Government. It is that such restrictions, whether their object is to control markets so as to restore and maintain a remunerative level of prices for primary producers, or, more arbitrarily, to give additional protection to home producers, should be based on a fair and reasonable division of the quota amongst suppliers, having regard to the trade in some recent period. They consider that any other method of allocation would not be in accordance with the principles of most-favoured-nation treatment. That principle must, in their opinion, be maintained if bilateral negotiations between countries are to serve the purpose of lowering the barriers to international trade. 7. His Majesty’s Government have adhered to this principle in regulating the United Kingdom market for agricultural produce. They have also done their utmost to urge its adoption on other countries where the method of quota restriction is in force as a means of protecting the home market. They have been not unsuccessful in checking the tendency to operate quota systems in a manner which could not be reconciled with the most-favoured-nation principle. 8. With regard to the third class of obstacles to international trade, namely, the control exercised by means of exchange restrictions, Mr. Hull will no doubt appreciate how different are the problems created for the two countries by such measures. The United Kingdom on the one hand has a large adverse balance of merchandise trade. The accounts of the United States on the other hand show a substantial favourable balance of such trade. His Majesty’s Government are far from desiring to add to the difficulties of international trade by seeking to canalise the commercial exchanges between the United Kingdom and other countries on the basis of bilateral balancing of payments through the establishment of clearing offices or the like. 9. It is however a matter of imperative importance from the standpoint of national economy, as Mr. Hull will no doubt recognize, that the position created by the country’s trade balance should not be made more difficult by an accumulation of frozen assets. It is this consideration and this consideration alone which has compelled His Majesty’s Government to seek means of freeing the debts due to United Kingdom traders which have become immobilized as the result of exchange restrictions imposed by foreign countries. They regard clearing agreements as a last resource and payments agreements as only one degree less objectionable. They desire most earnestly to assure Mr. Hull that they have no intention of allowing these expedients, which they have been forced to adopt in abnormal conditions, to become a permanent and accepted feature of a normal economy. It is no part of their general policy to initiate a system in which the sterling available from the sale of produce in the United Kingdom should be solely reserved for the payment of United Kingdom goods and services. 10. Where His Majesty’s Government have resorted to arrangements of this kind they have been compelled to do so by the action of foreign countries, which, ignoring the accumulation of payments due to the United Kingdom, have used the large sterling balances accruing to them to meet commitments in third countries. In such cases there has naturally been strong pressure on His Majesty’s Government to ensure that the frozen assets of United Kingdom traders are liquidated as a first charge on the sterling available. They have, however, sought while realizing this limited objective to reduce to a minimum the interference with the normal course of trade. Reference may be made in particular to the case of Spain. The proposal that the whole of the sterling obtained from Spanish exports to the United Kingdom should be allocated for payments due from Spain to the United Kingdom was put forward by the Spanish authorities. It was their desire that the arrears should be liquidated as rapidly as possible, and the agreement itself provides that, when a stage is reached at which payments are being made without delay, the clearing shall cease. The object of the agreement is the purely temporary one of liquidating arrears and the United Kingdom Government’s desire is that normal commercial methods of payment should be resumed as soon as possible. 11. Finally the United Kingdom Government feel it desirable to refer to the circumstances arising from the fact that the export trade of the United Kingdom is largely in manufactured articles which have to be disposed of in competition with the manufactures of many other countries. It is therefore much more vulnerable and sensitive to disturbed conditions than is the trade of countries exporting principally produce and raw materials with which purchasers cannot dispense. The problem created for His Majesty’s Government is thus both acute and diversified; it must be met by dealing with exceptional circumstances as each case demands. It should nevertheless be evident that they cannot, by reason of the great interests at stake, afford to slacken their efforts to reduce and to remove barriers to trade of all kinds by every means at their disposal. The wide variety both of the products and of the markets of the United Kingdom must necessarily determine the Government’s vigorous support of the most-favoured-nation principle. 12. His Majesty’s Government have permitted themselves these general remarks on the various aspects of their commercial policy in the hope that Mr. Hull will find that there is no real divergence either of interest or of policy on the part of the two countries, but rather that the objectives of His Majesty’s Government are virtually identical with those pursued by the United States Government under the Trade Agreement Act of 1934. 13. His Majesty’s Government have considered the particular proposal made in Mr. Hull’s communications that the objects common to both countries could be advanced by a statement to be made on their behalf. It appears to them that the public statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the World Economic Conference and of Dr. Burgin on 23rd September last to the Second Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations show very clearly the close agreement between the policies of the two Governments in regard to the improvement of the international trade position. His Majesty’s Government would nevertheless be glad to reaffirm at an early and suitable opportunity the principles set out in these public statements, if as they understand, this would be regarded by the United States Government as a useful contribution to the attainment of the objects which Mr. Hull has in mind.” Bingham 27 Attached to the file copy is a memorandum by the President, dated May 28, 1936, reading as follows: “This is a most interesting reply from the British Government. I think there is no objection to a general statement between now and November, but I do not think it should be more than a general statement. In other words, we do not want to involve ourselves in the next few months in controversy over specific details which would narrow the field to specific commodities. It is, however, a very useful beginning. F. D. R.” 28 Not printed; it instructed the Ambassador to wire the text of the British memorandum (641.0031/59). 29 For correspondence concerning the London Economic Conference, see Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. i , pp. 452 ff. Memorandum by Mr. William A. Fowler of the Division of Trade Agreements 611.4131/178 [Document 533] Memorandum by Mr. William A. Fowler of the Division of Trade Agreements [ Washington ,] June 17, 1936. Conversation: Mr. H. O. Chalkley, Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy; Mr. Grady; 30 Mr. Hawkins; 31 Mr. Culbertson; 32 Mr. Fowler. Mr. Chalkley called at Mr. Grady’s request for the purpose of discussing the progress of the exploratory studies of trade relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. He was informed that our studies had progressed to the point where we believed that a comprehensive trade agreement of great value to both countries could be consummated provided the British Government would be prepared to consider modifications of imperial preferences affecting a very substantial portion of our export trade with the United Kingdom. Mr. Chalkley was assured that this did not mean that we would request the abolition of imperial preference, but that we would like to have the assurance that requests for modifications of preferences on particular commodities of major interest to us would be the subject of discussions during the course of the negotiations. If his Government should take the position that the question of imperial preferences would have to remain outside the scope of the discussions, it was pointed out that only a very limited agreement, if indeed any agreement at all, could be negotiated. During the course of the ensuing discussion, it was pointed out that it would be possible to provide for deferred concessions in respect of products now covered by the Ottawa agreements 33 to take effect when those agreements expire in August 1937; and that unless it is renewed, the Trade Agreements Act will expire before that time. Mr. Chalkley was told frankly that we were somewhat concerned about the preliminary negotiations between representatives of his Government and of the Governments of certain of the Dominions reported to be about to take place in London. It was pointed out that we would regard it unfortunate if these conversations should result in commitments to the Dominions which would make it impossible for the British Government, later on, to entertain our requests in respect of particular products of interest to us which are now covered by the Ottawa agreements, and hence preclude the possibility of a really worthwhile agreement with the United States. Although Mr. Chalkley did not show much enthusiasm in regard to these suggestions, but on the contrary expressed skepticism as to the extent to which we might be prepared to reduce our tariff on British goods (he said that his people had been thinking in terms of six or seven concessions from us), he gave the impression that he might expect his Government to agree to include within the scope of the negotiations the consideration of particular rates or preferences in those cases in which we can show that they are “excessive” or have caused a diversion of trade. He also gave the impression, however, that it was his opinion that his Government would not be in a position to know what to do about preferences in a trade agreement with the United States until it knows on what basis the Ottawa agreements will be extended. As to the next step to be taken, Mr. Chalkley stated that it was his understanding, based on reported conversations in London between Mr. Ryder 34 and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, 35 that we would prepare both a list of requests for concessions and a list of possible concessions to the United Kingdom; and that in view of this understanding his Government had undertaken no studies of its own but had awaited the results of our study. The unusual nature of such a procedure was pointed out to Mr. Chalkley, and it was explained that in advance of public hearings it would be very difficult if not impossible for us to give them, even informally, a list of specific concessions which we might be able to grant under a trade agreement with the United Kingdom. After some further discussion, it was agreed that we would continue our studies with a view to presenting informally through the Embassy to the British Government, as soon as possible, a tentative but fairly complete and detailed list of the products on which we would request concessions and an indication of the nature of the concession (reduction or binding of duties or preferences); together with a general statement in regard to the concessions which we might be in a position to grant. Mr. Chalkley offered to come in again for the purpose of suggesting how this material might be set up in such a way as to be most helpful to his Government in reaching a decision as to whether a promising basis exists for a trade agreement. 30 Henry Grady, Chief, Division of Trade Agreements. 31 Harry Hawkins, Assistant Chief, Division of Trade Agreements. 32 Paul T. Culbertson, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs. 33 Signed August 20, 1932, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxxxv , p. 161. 34 Oscar B. Ryder, Commissioner, U. S. Tariff Commission; American representative on League of Nations Joint Committee for the Study of Clearing Agreements in 1935. See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 1 ff. 35 Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 641.0031/60: Telegram [Document 534] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , June 18, 1936—6 p.m. 214. Your 281, May 26, 11 p.m. You should seek the earliest possible opportunity to present the following memorandum to the British Government. “The Government of the United States of America is gratified to learn that the British Government would be glad to declare and to reaffirm at an early and suitable opportunity the principles embodied in its memorandum on British commercial policy handed to the American Ambassador on May 26, 1936. “We feel that a declaration by the British Government along these lines would be of the greatest value in checking the steady increase and in furthering the reduction of obstacles to international trade on the part of the important trading nations of the world. It seems to this Government that the present offers a particularly opportune moment for such a declaration, or indeed even a stronger one along these general lines, if the British Government should feel disposed to do so. It is clear to us that much of the political tension existing throughout the world is in the final analysis directly traceable to the dislocation of world trade by innumerable trade barriers and a consequent fear on the part of nations that they will no longer be able to maintain even their present standards of living. It is therefore important that the great trading nations of the world should utilize this unusually propitious moment to crystallize world sentiment in the direction of economic sanity and to create new hope for a troubled world. In face of the struggle of individuals and peoples against the slowing down of international commerce a definite leadership by the important nations is needed to restore opportunities for trade and thus prevent a prolongation and intensification of existing fear and discouragement.” Hull The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/62: Telegram [Document 535] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , June 19, 1936—7 p.m. [Received June 19—2:30 p.m.] 319. I delivered the memorandum contained in the Department’s 214, June 18, 6 p.m., to the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. He said he wished to continue to handle this matter personally after his return from Geneva. He leaves London probably Wednesday of next week. I shall see Chamberlain on Wednesday of next week and take occasion to draw his attention to this latest memorandum. Atherton Memorandum by Mr. Richard Eldridge of the Division of Trade Agreements 611.4131/185 [Document 536] Memorandum by Mr. Richard Eldridge of the Division of Trade Agreements [ Washington ,] June 24, 1936. Conversation: Mr. H. O. Chalkley, British Embassy; Mr. Harry C. Hawkins; Mr. W. Fowler; Mr. Constant Southworth; Mr. Richard Eldridge. Mr. Chalkley recalled a statement made to him that 40 per cent of American export trade to the United Kingdom was affected by imperial preferences. He asked that the accuracy of this figure be ascertained and that he be given more detailed trade figures on the basis of American sources. Mr. Chalkley gave a tentative list of commodity groups for which some concessions would be requested. He prefaced his remarks with the reservation that his list was one year old, unofficial and subject to revision. The commodity groups were: 1. Woolen products, including both finished goods and waists, tops, yarns, etc. 2. Linen goods. 3. Some cotton goods. In connection with cotton goods Mr. Chalkley said that some special classification for high-priced cotton shirtings would be requested in order to secure relief from the recent increased duties directed towards Japanese goods but which had affected some British counts of cotton. 4. Leather and leather goods. 5. Earthenware. 6. China Clay. 7. Salted Herrings. 8. Miscellaneous. (Mr. Chalkley transmitted the items which follow stating that they were requests which had been received by the British Government but which had not yet been studied.) Glassware and glass products. Edged Tools. Golf Balls. Mr. Chalkley requested a list of products entering the United Kingdom for which reductions or bindings of duty would be requested. He expressed the fear that there would be “very little indeed in the way of reductions in duties”. It was explained that such a list had not been prepared. For his personal information, however, it was said that probably on such a list would appear such items as wheat, flour, hams, apples, grapefruit, oranges, dried prunes, dried raisins, lumber, doors, safety razor parts, chemicals, oil and gasoline, hosiery and knitting machinery, other machinery, aluminum plates, various iron and steel products. In the very general discussion which ensued Mr. Chalkley minimized the need for a reduction of the British import duty on wheat, which he stated amounts to only six cents per bushel, and especially in view of the fact that there was little prospect of the export of wheat from the United States at the present time. He also referred to the difference in the varieties of wheat grown in the United States and in other countries exporting wheat to the United Kingdom. Mr. Chalkley’s conversation was to the effect that there was very little proof that imperial preferences are of themselves effective in diverting American trade. In the absence of definite proof, he indicated, furthermore, that there would be difficulty in securing deductions in import duties. With respect to imperial preferences, he was of the opinion that effective argument against them was difficult except in very exceptional circumstances. He was also of the opinion that if the United States wished to secure some revision of imperial preferences granted to Canada, an effort by the American Government to reach an understanding with Canada regarding preferences of major importance to the United States should precede negotiations with the United Kingdom. He stressed the complete and favorable change in atmosphere and in policy which had been brought about by the present Canadian Government. Mr. Chalkley was emphatic in suggesting that the words “abolition of preferences” be not used in negotiations. He also stressed the value to the United States of securing stability of the status quo both with respect to import duties and to preferences while pointing out the necessity for the increase in some of the existing import duties. He was of the opinion that the elimination of quotas which is under consideration may be followed by increases in import duties and that the British Government appears to be inclined to substitute, for import quotas, import levies upon certain competitive imports to be earmarked for subsidies to the domestic industry. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/64: Telegram [Document 537] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , June 25, 1936—5 p.m. [Received June 25—1:15 p.m.] 323. I saw Chamberlain at a lunch, as indicated in my 319 of June 19, 7 p.m., and gave him a copy of your memorandum which he had not seen. He said in the near future he wanted to continue the conversation reported in my telegram 315 of June 18, 6 p.m. 36 I met Runciman at a luncheon today and after a conversation on the present unsatisfactory international situation referred to the world’s economic ills and asked whether he had seen the memorandum I delivered Eden on Friday last. He said yes and then went on to point out that he was facing negotiations for the renewal of some of British trade agreements most of which were for a period of a year as with the northern European countries, but the Argentine treaty for a longer period with a proviso for its abrogation after due notice. The past practical results of these agreements he could not overlook. He went on to explain as his own personal views that while he favored such a declaration as outlined in your memorandum he felt it would be more effective should it not be an isolated statement of policy but be followed by announcement of practical achievement between our two countries. His definition of this latter was somewhat vague. He said he had in mind in this connection “commodity relation between countries”. He felt that after study between our two countries we might evolve an agreement on certain definite lines against tariff increases. We were interrupted at this point but he left me with the impression that he wants to play for time in view of his trade negotiations. Atherton 36 Vol. iii , p. 158 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/65: Telegram [Document 538] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , June 26, 1936—6 p.m. [Received June 26—2:10 p.m] 326. At his request I had a further conversation with Chamberlain today, report of which goes forward by next pouch. 37 After emphasizing rapid rate of political deterioration in Europe and the opening caused by Germany’s clearing arrangements, et cetera, he referred to this country’s pending trade agreement negotiations and frankly expressed the fear lest he should be branded with “inconsistency” should they make the contemplated public policy declaration while these trade agreements were in process of negotiation. I felt his attitude as well as Runciman’s reported in my 323, of June 25, 5 p.m., was based on Cabinet consultation and decision to play for time. Atherton 37 Despatch No. 2297, June 27; not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 641.0031/64: Telegram [Document 539] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 3, 1936—4 p.m. 234. Your 323, June 25, and 326, June 26. I am disappointed that the British Government appears to have decided to defer the statement regarding their general aims and objectives in the field of commercial policy. Will you seek an early and suitable opportunity to resume discussion of this matter with the members of the Cabinet with whom you have been talking, and leave with them informally the following response to the messages conveyed to me through you: “Amidst the difficulties of opposition, at home and abroad, to the effort to bring about a lessening of trade restrictions, there has been nothing more reassuring than the word received that the British Government would be glad to reaffirm at an early and suitable opportunity those principles outlined in its recent memorandum as the permanent bases of British commercial policy. That the British Government now appears to have decided to defer this statement is a disappointment of corresponding magnitude. I believe this Government has a correct understanding of the immediate conditions and considerations which might seem to make postponement of the declaration advisable, but I do not believe that it is to the main interest of any of the great trading countries that these considerations should be given dominant weight. The same conditions and considerations in one form or another are, I believe, also confronting us here. I know that the type of trade arrangement being negotiated between countries having controlled and completely conditioned exchange and trade systems is operating to displace and handicap the trade and investment interests of other countries like Great Britain and the United States. The permanent entrenchment of these arrangements will mean the permanent stagnation of international trade and change its character to one determined by bitter struggle. If this is to be avoided it is essential that the governments of those countries which desire that trade be permitted again to flourish along lines of economic advantage should act vigorously and promptly to convince the whole world that this is their definite ultimate objective. If, among the other important trading nations, Great Britain hesitates and defers action, its attitude would be construed to be either that of indifference or resignation, or even indefinite or permanent participation in the new methods of trade arrangements; it will be thought that it too has renounced the hope of bringing back international trade to world-wide dimensions and to economic routes. If present tendencies continue, the Governments of the smaller countries which feel themselves completely dependent upon the willingness of the larger countries to purchase their goods will reach the conclusion that they have no alternative except to build their trade policies along narrow lines. In still other countries which are handicapped by severe shortage of exchange and by external obligations, the effort to shape their relations with the outside world in such a way as to permit them to trade freely and to deal with outside countries on conditions of equality and economic advantage will lapse; in fact countries in this position having difficulty will necessarily conclude that they are being forced into the strictly bilateral and conditioned trade arrangement by the larger trading and creditor countries, and in their turn will expand their initiative in the field of special agreements where and as they can. I know the British Government joins this Government in the view that under these circumstances the trade system of the world will become a chaos of special accords marked by no common principle, and eternally and constantly disturbed by the competitive struggle between governments. If this becomes the situation, international trade will become primarily a form of international struggle for power and advantage and lose both its unifying and beneficial effects. The inevitable result will be further movement by all countries toward commercial anarchy. In the face of this possibility prompt action seems to me urgent, although in taking such prompt action governments may expose themselves to minor immediate disadvantages and difficulties. This Government through its trade agreement program and declarations of policy is endeavoring both to improve the underlying conditions and difficulties which have fostered restrictive trade arrangements, and to encourage other countries in a calculation that their best chance of ultimately overcoming their difficulties is under an order where trade can move free from excessive or unreasonable restrictions. An independent declaration by the British Government such as was summarized in the British memorandum would greatly contribute to this end. It would mean that statesmen were planning and preparing further to overcome the causes of maladjustment in international economic relations and were building for the future a peaceful international economic world, and not merely fighting to maintain limited immediate interests. If in this matter the purposes and desires of countries like Great Britain and the United States are made clear and are firmly sustained, then the responsibility for directing trade and economic relations along less desirable lines will rest squarely on the government whose operations check the effort. The argument from necessity which is so prevalent at the present moment will lose its force. Countries that are unwilling to participate in the more freely operating trade arrangements can then with greater certainty and justice be excluded from the benefit. In this matter the time appears to have arrived when the great trading democracies must either take a courageous lead in the fight to restore conditions of sane and peaceful trade, or themselves be drawn into a maelstrom of conflicting and competitive agreements. The issue is before the government of each of these democracies. Only my sense of its importance leads me to venture to again put these thoughts and considerations before the British Government. Singlehanded the United States Government may not be able to carry forward to successful fruition a program of vital concern to all countries; but if other great countries move simultaneously in a parallel direction, the likelihood for success will be greatly augmented.” Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/66: Telegram [Document 540] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 9, 1936—6 p.m. [Received July 9—1:05 p.m.] 341. Until Eden, who is away for a week, returns I cannot appropriately take up your 234, July 3, 4 p.m., with any other Cabinet Minister. I shall, however, act on it at the earliest practicable moment. Before doing so I venture to suggest for your consideration that the second sentence of your memorandum be changed to read as follows: “Should the issuance of this statement be long deferred it would be a disappointment of corresponding magnitude”. 38 Although Runciman’s and Chamberlain’s statements contained in the Embassy’s 323, June 25, 5 p.m., and 326, June 26, 6 p.m., were undoubtedly authoritative, nevertheless no official answer has been made by Eden to the memorandum contained in your 214, June 18, 6 p.m., and it would also seem to be desirable tactics not to proceed on the assumption that a hard and fast decision had been reached. Bingham 38 By telegram No. 246, July 10, 1 p.m., the Ambassador was informed of the Secretary’s approval of the suggested change. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 641.0031/71 [Document 541] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] July 20, 1936. The British Ambassador came in and handed to me, as a matter of courtesy, an extract, in which he thought I would be interested, from the speech in the House of Commons of Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, relative to the British commercial policy. A copy is hereto attached. I read the statement and expressed the opinion that Ambassador Bingham had cabled most of this to me some days ago 39 but that I was nevertheless very appreciative of the kindness of the Ambassador in bringing me a copy. I then stated that in the abstract the statement of Mr. Runciman was excellent and encouraging, especially if the qualifications and exceptions in it were not to be too much emphasized. I added that the one discouraging note about the matter was my feeling, which I could not help but entertain, to the effect that the statement was too much in the abstract, implying a static or inert attitude of the British Government rather than some step or steps, or some sort of suitable activities, in the direction of leadership with a program approaching and attacking the disorganized and disrupted world economic situation, somewhat after the fashion undertaken by this Government two years ago and still pursued. I said that I desired to express my appreciation of the tone of Mr. Runciman’s remarks, especially as viewed from the abstract standpoint, and added that I would not be quite frank if I did not express a little disappointment in the failure of Mr. Runciman to indicate a single step or act or utterance in the direction, as stated, of some substantial activities on the part of the British Government in the definite direction of seeking and adopting a liberal commercial policy. I further stated that unfortunately the inert or static attitude of the British Government in this respect was pointed to both at home and by most of the capitals of Europe, and emphasized, in support of the state of mind of the opposition, to the effect that the British Government was not moving one fraction of an inch in the direction of either carrying forward any kind of a program or furnishing any kind of leadership for the purposes of international economic rehabilitation; and that I felt sure the Ambassador could understand the distinction I was drawing and the point I was emphasizing. He replied in the affirmative. I suggested that I was hoping that the desultory conversations between the British Government and the United States Treasury Department might sooner or later result in some encouraging development; that there was a crying need for leadership of the economic section at Geneva; that there was a splendid opportunity for the British to take one step of real leadership and avoid what seemed at this distance to be an attack on the favored-nation policy by lobbyists or fixed interests, as was revealed by the resumption of the discussion and consideration of the favored-nation policy, which had been postponed from time to time and was now set for September. I said that another method of leadership would involve the question of carrying forward an equality program somewhat after the fashion of our operation of this program with Brazil, and that was that instead of taking advantage of our unfavorable trade balance to require every dollar of debt due in our country to be paid promptly, we had made reasonable arrangements with the Brazilians by which the chief portion of the frozen exchange situation was taken care of, with the further understanding that the remainder, which would be made good by security, would be paid later as trade increased under our liberal reciprocity trade program; that if the British Government could see its way clear to make some similar application of the doctrine of equality, it would be a great stroke of leadership in the right direction, whereas the other course of collecting every penny of debt promptly would inevitably become impossible in the not distant future on account of the complete network of artificial and arbitrary trade methods and practices generally and under the course of economic isolation which was so far being pursued. The Ambassador inquired whether Great Britain was not virtually doing this very thing, to which I expressed the view that I was not absolutely certain but it was not my understanding at all. I called upon the Ambassador to give me any suggestion that he might have that would be helpful to our two Governments in finding ways to go forward by word or act in pursuit of liberal commercial policies. He expressed entire sympathy with my views and indicated that he had no suggestion in mind at the moment. We both agreed that we were in no sense speaking officially but simply as two individuals discussing economics in a general way and that I was not in the remotest speaking for the Treasury or the President or my Government, especially in my reference to the exchange stabilization program. On this latter phase I raised the inquiry as to why it would not be possible for the British and the American Governments to sum up the economic problems presented and the urgency for their solution and the increasingly disastrous effects of the present narrow policies and announce to the world that hereafter they would undertake to keep the pound and the dollar within certain ranges, with the one qualification of providing that if another country or other countries should manipulate or drastically change their currency or monetary situation with resultant bad effects upon the domestic economy of Great Britain or the United States, the fullest right and privilege was reserved to make such offsetting readjustments as might be deemed necessary and effective. The Ambassador seemed much interested and entirely sympathetic with these inquiries in the nature of suggestions. I again spoke of the fact that a purely nonaction course or policy as heretofore followed was every week rapidly driving all food and raw material producing nations to a policy of industrialization and that no matter how cruel this might be it was wholly and hopelessly uneconomic from everybody’s standpoint; that in certain parts of Europe economic penetration on a steadily increasing scale, which might soon result in both economic and political problems, not to say dangers, was being encouraged and largely forced by a policy of inaction on the part of other important nations; that the longer nations waited before proceeding with a sound program, the more destructive the results which would follow and the more aggravated the difficulties which would arise; that it was clearly important that nations should find some method of approach and of attack of the structure of economic difficulties confronting the nations generally. There was some reference to the opposition to the trade agreements program here at home. I expressed the view that no matter what the outcome of the November elections this program would continue and would be kept alive; that at the Cleveland Convention 40 the platform faced in several directions and that in brief this nation had no alternative except to turn to wholesale regimentation and to a radical and drastic reorganization of the entire economic life of the country, which was unthinkable to the rational person. I said that while I felt that the trade agreements would be preserved in any event, it would not do to overlook the sources of pressure by extremely nationalistic and also selfish groups for the formulation of permanent economic policies for the purposes of both peace and war; that this latter included pacifists and other strong peace organizations; that such pressure naturally would go to the extent of attempted isolation in virtually every way in time of war, including such vital phases as international credit and trade policies; that this again illustrated the importance of economic rehabilitation at the earliest possible date along the lines of a liberal commercial policy; that I could not help but feel that great strides would already have been made had Great Britain moved forward as the United States did beginning two years ago; that, as already indicated, there was a feeling among the opposition in this country and among most countries of Europe that the British Government was almost absolutely static with reference to its economic and commercial policy; that it was seemingly settling and falling back to a two-fold major objective of large armaments and Empire preference; that it was in these unfortunate circumstances that I was finding it difficult to induce other countries in Europe to move forward in support of the liberal economic program such as I knew the British statesmen, as well as the Roosevelt Administration, whole-heartedly believed in and to which I had no doubt the British Government at some time in the future expected to make a real contribution in its carrying out. The Ambassador seemed greatly interested and emphasized from time to time what I said, and we made it thoroughly clear that we were only speaking to each other in a purely casual and individual way. I finally added that it was barely possible that before the Ambassador left for home in August we might have a purely oral conversation for the benefit of our respective Governments which he could carry home with him. He expressed much interest in this and whole-hearted approval of the idea, in case, as I stated, there should be such facts or developments as would afford an occasion and a basis for such oral conversation. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] [Annex] Extract From the Speech in the House of Commons Delivered by the President of the British Board of Trade ( Runciman ) on July 15, 1936 I would like to say a few words on the commercial policy of this country, and I am sure it will give satisfaction at all events to the majority of the Members of the House to know that the commercial policy of this country remains unchanged. It is now a well tried policy. We are able to judge by results, and we have no intention of taking any undue risks in the future. Our policy is founded on equality of opportunity for all nations, and is qualified only by the duty of other nations to play their part in the same general scheme. Our policy rests on the belief that only the removal of the artificial restrictions which at present hamper multilateral trade can restore the volume of turnover which was reached before the crisis of 1931. Events since that date have reduced the volume of world trade by 20% and its gold value by 60%, and this disastrous decline can only be due to the impoverishment of nations, to the closing of markets and to the increase of restrictions of all kinds. Not only have tariffs been increased but far more drastic barriers have been raised in the form of prohibitions and quotas and also by the operation of exchange restrictions. The quantitative regulations of imports commonly called quotas are of two kinds. They can be adopted merely as an additional means of protection or they can also be used for the better regulation of production and marketing in the case of certain primary commodities, especially of agricultural products. As regards exchange restrictions, these are happily unknown in the United Kingdom. They are the outcome of fear for the exchange value of the currency in those countries which are haunted by memories of uncontrolled inflation, or by apprehension of the flight of capital. Such fears readily arise in countries where the currency is overvalued. In this country I am glad to say there are no such fears, but in some others they have been constantly present since the crisis of 1931. Such countries, having no currency that can be freely exported, are driven back upon various kinds of barter trade of greater or less rigidity. Clearing agreements are the modern sophisticated form of barter; their object is to get over exchange restrictions or to secure a balance of payments. His Majesty’s Government believe that payments can only be made to balance by artificial means at a lower level of trade all round, but in self-defence we have been compelled to use clearings, or agreements of the nature of clearings, in the case of countries having exchange restrictions where it was essential to secure the liquidation of outstanding commercial debts and to provide more hopeful conditions for current trade. The British import market, which is by far the largest import market in the world, has been kept open for the goods of all nations on fair and equal terms. All through these difficult years the control of this market for the purpose of buying from those who buy from us is a temptation to those who believe that clearings really provide the foundation of a system of balanced trade. Upon certain countries and for a certain period we could no doubt force the greater quantity of United Kingdom goods, but we do not believe that a policy of force in this régime would prosper for long. It would lead to the impoverishment of our customers and of third parties in whose prosperity we are interested, and eventually to a fall in our own trade. We have therefore used the power of our huge import market with great caution to promote the sales of our goods abroad rather than to compel artificially changed purchases. This has been the policy of the Ottawa agreements and of our trade agreements, and it is the policy which we shall continue to follow. 39 Telegram No. 349, July 16, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom; not printed. 40 Republican National Convention. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 641.0031/67: Telegram [Document 542] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 25, 1936—4 p.m. 283. Department’s 234, July 3, and your 349, July 16. 41 The British Ambassador came to see me on July 20 and handed me as a matter of courtesy an extract of Mr. Runciman’s speech that you transmitted in your 349. In the light of this speech believe it advisable that memorandum transmitted in Department’s 234 be not presented until revised. Department will transmit revision. Hull 41 Latter not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/73: Telegram [Document 543] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , July 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received July 28—2:25 p.m.] 378. Your 283, July 25, 4 p.m. When I saw Eden this morning I referred to Runciman’s speech and said that while I was glad such a statement had been made I regretted it had not gone further. Eden said he also regretted it, but that the opportunity came for Runciman to make this statement in the House of Commons without time for him to amend the statement Runciman had prepared and that both he and Runciman agreed that it would be better to go on with the statement which was ready rather than to postpone it and perhaps bring it in on another occasion outside of the House of Commons. Bingham The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 611.4131/182a: Telegram [Document 544] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , September 3, 1936—6 p.m. 324. Despite Mr. Runciman’s last statement in the House of Commons, there would appear to be no signs that the British Government is planning any action or pronouncement in the trade field that would be of use in creating an enlarged trade moving on lines of economic calculation beyond the confines of bilateral arrangements. Instead the British Government seems to be pressing more vigorously than ever for special advantages in other markets through trade agreements which result in placing third countries at a disadvantage and consequently increase both their sense of justification and the necessity for likewise striving for such immediate special advantages as they can obtain. The Department remains convinced that the continued application of this policy means, first, that the volume of trade between countries cannot grow substantially; second, that in the absence of such growth the chances of successfully working out the pressing internal economic problems of many countries are receding and, third, that the attitude, natural to these circumstances, that each country must to the very utmost prepare for war, and risk war rather than be completely bested in the struggle for national advantage, is becoming more firmly implanted than ever before. The Department wishes to continue its effort to awaken the British Government to the full ultimate consequences of these developments, and to again make clear to the British Government its sense that the influence and interests of the British Empire create a clear responsibility for sharing in the leadership, in word and action, to change the present trends. Up to now the conversations which have taken place with various representatives of the British Government have been kept for the most part on a general plane and have been regarded as informal and confidential. In this instance the Department wishes to connect its general statements with the negotiations now taking place for a new agreement between Argentina and Great Britain. 42 Will you seek appointments with Eden and Runciman and inform them that you have been instructed by your Government once again to raise the question of general trade policy with them, and to express its disappointment that the British Government has not up to the present either by word or action lent any support to the endeavor to bring about a lowering of trade barriers and a restoration of the practice of equality of trade which this Government has been seeking to advance both through continued advocacy and through its trade agreements. Please continue to the effect that this disquietude is augmented by information received concerning certain features of the prospective Anglo-Argentine commercial agreement. It is believed advisable that your presentation should cover the following points which should be embodied in a memorandum to be left with the British Government: (1) Throughout the time during which the English and American Governments have been engaged in informal discussion of the international trade situation and of trade policies, the general outlook both as regards international trade and international relations appears to have grown worse and more threatening. The quantity of international trade, especially on the continent of Europe, is growing only very slightly if at all, although employment and production within the individual countries have increased, largely under the stimulus of the vast expenditure for armament purposes. The size of armies, navies, and air forces and the killing power of these forces are being increased steadily; the continued operation of the economic life of many countries is growing more and more intimately connected with the conduct of the military establishments. The hope and vision of creating a steady and improving standard of life by the peaceful application of improving means of production and by interchange between nations is weakening. The drama and expectation of the world seem to be centering increasingly around the dictators that head governments and the vast forces they command. (2) In the face of these tendencies it is not believed that governments of countries like the United States and the British Empire can merely resign themselves, in grim despair adding to their own armaments, but unable to suggest or effect measures which will change the obvious trend of human affairs. Direct action within the sphere of European political relations seems, for the time being, to face great difficulties. The direct attack on the size of armament similarly for the moment appears to have failed. But in the judgment of the Government of the United States, the possibility of acting on economic matters is genuine and the duty of trying to do so seems clear. It is believed that the peoples of different countries may be brought to support their governments in any revision of their international trade relations which promises to improve the chances of maintaining peace by increasing trade; on the other hand, the absence of any effort to achieve this result will mark the decay of the determination to master events rather than be mastered by them. (3) The Government of the United States is endeavoring both by continuing advocacy and by the trade agreements into which it has been entering to bring about a lessening in the actual restrictions imposed upon trade and to secure the acceptance of trade policies that will permit the people of different countries to deal with each other on conditions of equality in accordance with mutual economic benefit. This policy is calculated to permit international trade to resume its dynamic growth. It is plain that this effort cannot in the end succeed in its ultimate purposes unless the governments of other important trading countries seek simultaneously to achieve the same result. (4) This Government realizes that the markets of the United Kingdom have been kept open in a very fruitful measure to the products of other countries and that this has been a most important factor in preventing international trade from declining much further than it has. However, during the past few years the acts of the British Government in the field of commercial policy have almost without exception increased restrictions on trade and more recently in some of the bilateral agreements which the British Government has negotiated preferences have been sought and established which create disadvantages for other countries and thereby increase both the justification and the necessity for them either to restrict trade or to seek in turn special advantages. The American Government has in mind such agreements as that negotiated with the Spanish Government shortly before the outbreak of the revolution, and the agreement which this Government understands to be under negotiation with Argentina. (5) Both because of the possible importance upon the whole trend of world events of the terms and principles that may be embodied in these agreements and because of the particular American interest in conserving liberal trade relations throughout these regions, this Government is distinctly disquieted by reports of the terms of various agreements now under discussion. Articles 2 and 6 43 of the Roca-Runciman Agreement are an expression of the bilateral principle of trade and the bilateral basis of trade agreement and in their Application by Argentina have resulted in preferential advantages for the trade and investment of Great Britain and have interfered with and handicapped the trade and investments of other countries. The continuation of these provisions in the agreement with Argentina now under negotiation would be a definite reinforcement of the bilateral principle and would give the support of important example to such practices by other countries. The American Government believes these conclusions to be justified even though the agreement should not contain some of the features which according to some current reports have been put forward for inclusion in it, such as a provision under which the Argentine Government might be obligated to maintain the discriminatory exchange surcharge it is now imposing on goods from many countries, and an arrangement whereunder the treatment accorded British investments of all kinds in Argentina would be elevated over the investments of all other countries. (6) In again bringing these questions before the British Government, the American Government is not forgetful of the extent to which British trade has suffered from the rigid controls and nationalistic policies of other countries, of the importance of the British foreign investments affected by the narrowing of British and other markets, or of the pressure to salvage each particular interest where a foreign government can be induced to give it preferential treatment at the expense of some non-British interest. Its presentation is not conceived merely or mainly as a protest on behalf of American interests directly affected by discriminatory agreements between other countries. Bather it calls attention to the importance of the general results offsetting any limited immediate gains for British interests from the creation by act of the British Government, without intention but as natural consequence, of new discriminations against American and other interests. The strengthening of the impression that the British Government is taking no responsibility for leadership for the improvement of international economic relations but is devoting itself to the protection of particular British interests even through practices which adversely affect general relations, will not increase the hope remaining in the world that the present dangers which menace it will be overcome by courageous foresight, by farsighted cooperation and by the recovered mutual advantages of peaceful trading. After careful study of this memorandum, please advise the Department if you have any suggestions for change, either in substance or tone. Also please fully report the course of your conversations. We are also discussing the matter of the Anglo-Argentine Agreement with the Argentine Government in the hope that they either will completely free their exchanges or end discrimination under the exchange control from which the American interests are substantially suffering. 44 Hull 42 British Cmd. 5324, Argentina No. 1 (1936): Agreement Between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Argentine Government Relating to Trade and Commerce [ With Protocol, Protocol of Signature and Letters ], London, December 1, 1936 . 43 Corrected by telegram No. 345, September 23, 2 p.m., which reads: “Reference should have been solely to article II, especially numbered paragraphs (1) and (6) of article II. Please inform Foreign Office.” (611.4131/184). 44 See vol. v , pp. 200 ff. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 611.4131/183: Telegram [Document 545] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , September 9, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 9—1:05 p.m.] 425. Your 324, September 3, 6 p.m., and 327, September 4, 6 p.m. 45 Eden is ill and confined to his house. I shall, however, make every endeavor to see him as soon as he returns to the Foreign Office and before he leaves for Geneva. I have no suggestions to offer for change in the text of your memorandum. Bingham 45 Latter not printed; it concerned the U. S. representations regarding the Anglo-Peruvian Commercial Agreement (see vol. v , pp. 908 ff.). The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/797: Telegram [Document 546] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] London , September 19, 1936—1 p.m. [Received September 19—11:57 a.m.] 439. Department’s 324, September 3, 6 p.m., and 338, September 15, 6 p.m. 46 I saw the Foreign Secretary this morning for the first time in some weeks, as after his holiday he came down with an attack of chickenpox and was in his office for the first time yesterday. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I then took up the main purpose of my conference with him on trade relations and he sent for a copy of his Geneva speech 47 and read to me a paragraph in which he expressed his approval of the special report of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations 48 but qualified that by referring to the political situation which made easy progress so difficult until and unless the political situation was relieved. I read him your statement and delivered to him the document. At the same time I urged upon him the point of view that the feasible and practicable way to relieve difficult political situation was by relieving economic distress, and that we believed that by our own trade policy we were following the line which had the best, if not the only hope for improving the political situation and therefore reducing the danger of war. He agreed with me entirely in principle but again referred to the domestic, political difficulties with which his Government was confronted. I asked him if he had seen Sir Ronald Lindsay and he told me that he had had a talk with him and that Sir Ronald had strongly presented the view of the American Government on the general subject and that he expected to see him again after his return from Geneva. I impressed upon him the importance of this whole subject, the fact that the Administration’s policy had strong support from the American people; that many who were politically opposed to the present Administration supported this policy, including nearly unanimous support from the press, despite the fact that the majority of the American press were in political opposition to the Administration. He expressed his deep interest, in which I have no doubt he is sincere, in doing everything possible to maintain the best relations with the United States and said that he would give this matter more time and effort and would take it up with Runciman and Neville Chamberlain as soon as he returned from Geneva and that he would like to see me again as soon as possible thereafter. However, I doubt his ability to influence his colleagues sufficiently to modify their views. Copy to Paris. Bingham 46 Ante , p. 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] . 47 League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 155, pp. 44–47. 48 League of Nations, Economic Committee, Remarks on the Present Phase of International Economic Relations (Official No.: C.378.M.249.1936.II.B.). Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs 611.4131/190 [Document 547] Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] September 21, 1936. Mr. Chalkley had come to the Department at our request to talk about several dominion and colonial matters. Shortly after the conversation began, Mr. Dunn was called away by the Secretary and I continued alone to convey to Chalkley the sense of our planned conversation. After covering the subjects which we had planned to talk about Mr. Chalkley inquired of me in a roundabout way regarding the outlook for continuing conversations regarding a trade agreement with the United Kingdom. He said that he hoped we were not overlooking the time element; that his last conversations with the Department had been in June; that he was told at that time that we would continue our studies seeking a “basis”; that he wondered whether the “basis” had been found and whether if found we were intentionally waiting until after elections to reveal the same. He went on to say that he had no instructions but that he was simply taking this occasion to express his personal feeling that it would be a physical impossibility to conclude an agreement before June 12, 1937, 49 if matters were still in a very preliminary stage at the middle of November. He said that the British had made no studies whatever and that he was sure they had not the machinery for completing studies after announcement, say in January, in time to begin negotiations which could be completed before June 12. I was convinced that Chalkley was actually obeying instructions to “casually mention the subject on some suitable occasion.” I also felt certain that the British must have done some intensive work in preparation for more conversations. However I told Chalkley that without having been present at the previous conversations or at any time informed of exact reasons for delay I could only give a personal opinion, not to mention that I also had no instructions. I said that my personal opinion was that the best “basis” would be conciliation of views and a common purpose in our commercial policies. I had not detected the imminence of the desired rapprochement . Chalkley insisted that he thought we came nearer to seeing eye to eye than we did earlier in the year. I felt sure that Chalkley was aware of the recent memoranda which the Secretary had had presented to Mr. Eden both regarding commercial policy generally and such specific matters as Anglo-Argentine and Anglo-Peruvian negotiations. We did not however dwell long on this broad subject and the conversation ended with Chalkley repeating his reminder of the shortness of time in such a way as to lead me to believe that he would like me in the same “uninstructed” way “on some suitable occasion” to convey to him the true sense of the Department’s present feelings on the general subject. 49 Date of expiration of the Trade Agreements Act. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins) 611.4131/193 [Document 548] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements ( Hawkins ) [ Washington ,] September 29, 1936. Mr. Chalkley was invited to come in to discuss the status of the studies which are being made regarding the prospect of undertaking trade agreement negotiations. It was recalled that on the last occasion when this subject was discussed, it was agreed that we would prepare a tentative list of products on which the United States probably would ask concessions if trade agreement negotiations were undertaken, and an indication in each case of the nature of the concession which would probably be desired. Mr. Chalkley was informed that these studies had now gone far enough so that we could estimate the time which would be required to complete them; that the list would be ready by November 16. It was pointed out to Mr. Chalkley, however, that it is necessary to have both lists (i. e., the list representing our probable requests for concessions by Great Britain and the list representing their probable requests for concessions by us) before a decision could be reached whether a basis for negotiations exists. It is, therefore, desirable that Great Britain’s requests of the United States be ready on November 16 so that the lists might be exchanged on that date. In this connection, it was agreed that if a trade agreement is to be negotiated before the Act under authority of which such agreements are concluded in this country is due to expire, it will be necessary to reach a decision regarding such negotiations not long after November 16. Mr. Chalkley referred to the list which he had given us on June 24 and inquired why this did not meet the requirements. He was informed that the list given to us was too general to permit us to form an adequate idea of the scope of the British requests. Mr. Chalkley also referred to the lack of adequate organization in Great Britain for making the necessary studies in the short time available. In order to assist in this, he was given a copy of the attached table of trade statistics 50 which had been compiled here and which shows in detail the trade situation and tariff treatment of products of which the United Kingdom has been the chief source of importations into this country. Mr. Chalkley was informed that this list is nothing more than it purports to be, namely, a compilation of factual material such as the British Government itself could compile. Since we had already completed this work, no purpose would be served if the British were required to duplicate it, and time would be saved by giving it to them. It was emphasized that this compilation does not represent a list of products on which the United States would consider granting concessions but that, on the contrary, it would inevitably be subject to additions and subtractions in the light of further study and consideration. Mr. Chalkley indicated that with this large amount of factual information already assembled, the task of formulating the British requests would be greatly facilitated and he thought it possible that the list of possible British requests could be given to us on November 16. The procedure after November 16 in reaching a decision as to whether a basis for negotiations exists was then discussed. It was agreed that each Government would consider the requests of the other, make up its mind in general how far it would probably be able to go in meeting these requests, and would advise the other Government in this regard. Each Government would, of course, postpone giving any final decision on any point until it had full opportunity for consideration in the light of views presented by domestic interests after negotiations had been announced. If each felt that the other could probably go sufficiently far in meeting its requests, negotiations could then be undertaken. It was again reiterated on both sides that the present discussions are purely informal and personal and involve no commitments of any kind. It was also agreed that no publicity whatever should be given to these exploratory discussions or the fact that they are taking place. If either Government finds it necessary to obtain information from the trade in connection with the formulation of its tentative list of requests, care should be taken to avoid making known the reasons why such information is sought. 50 Not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.4131/195 [Document 549] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] October 22, 1936. The British Ambassador came in to pay his respects on his return from two and one-half months’ absence in Great Britain. In some manner the European economic, military, and peace questions came up for comment. I repeated what a noted Britisher had recently said to me, to the effect that Great Britain had no particular objective in foreign policy just now except to arm heavily for defensive purposes and await a possible military explosion in central Europe within another year or two. I then inquired whether the British statesmen had any alternative in mind for this unthinkable military possibility ahead? He definitely indicated that they did not have, deeply in mind at least, any alternative. I replied that this country for some time has had a very definite alternative policy and program in mind and of course has most earnestly sought to impress its merits upon the statesmen of every important nation; that it comprises our program for world economic and peace rehabilitation as a substitute for the one alternative course in the direction of militarism and predatory movements up and down the earth by militaristic rulers and governments, supported by their respective armies and navies, for purposes of territorial aggression; that two things are as inevitable as fate within another two or three years, and one is that if a great trading country like Great Britain and another great trading country like the United States should become static and inert and undertake further self-containment alone, such countries as Japan, Germany and Italy, with their armies and navies, would, within two or three years as stated, dominate nearly every square foot of trade territory other than that under the immediate ownership or control of Great Britain and the United States, and that that would leave our two countries in an amazingly disadvantageous situation,—and, secondly, that under this same course of further isolation of our two countries nothing in the future can be more certain than that food and raw-material producing countries would be driven to the establishment of their own crude manufacturing plants as a permanent policy and the production at several prices of their manufacturing necessities,—while the industrial countries, especially of Europe, would be desperately attempting to do their own farming at five to ten prices of cost of production, with the inevitable result that the world would find itself in the most uneconomic condition it has been in within two hundred years. The unthinkable effects in the way of reduced production, lower living standards and national decadence generally, would manifest themselves everywhere, while a few desperado nations, including the so-called “have nots”, would be meandering up and down the earth taking by force what the necessities of their own nationals would require. I said, “What rational person anywhere imagines that the 65 million German population, without enough food or enough clothing or enough materials to work with, will sit there in that state of distress and deterioration indefinitely?” I stated that this was a fair illustration of the two big points I was seeking to drive home. I made it very clear that I consider our Anglo-Saxon people of both countries in the same boat as far as the dangerous future is concerned and that we cannot avoid leadership with a program that will encourage and induce other countries to awaken and again revitalize the spirit of peace and of fair dealing with each other along peaceful lines, instead of pursuing further the opposite road of militarism and military aggression. The Ambassador had already spoken of the improved state of public sentiment in this country in support of our joint peace and trade restoration program, and I replied that the opposition sentiment in this country has been far greater than it could possibly be in Great Britain; that we have an immeasurably more difficult undertaking than they have over there and that in these circumstances I am still hoping that the statesmen of Great Britain will realize that the Anglo-Saxon people can and must offer to the world an alternative program and course other than the course of militarism with inevitable war as a strong possibility within the not indefinite future. The Ambassador indicated at various times that he was wholeheartedly in agreement with my views and objectives. He then said that only four or five persons among the high officials of his Government were really factors in this matter. He mentioned first Foreign Minister Eden, whom he said was more or less sympathetic and friendly to this program, but he added that Eden had been so completely engrossed with European emergency problems he has not gotten down into the full merits of this program, he having been more or less of a specialist before coming to the Foreign Office as Foreign Minister. He said that Prime Minister Baldwin is not recovering as rapidly as had been expected, but, in response to my inquiry, he added that he was not seriously afflicted. I expressed my admiration for Baldwin and my great satisfaction at the prospect of his certain recovery. The Ambassador then definitely indicated that Baldwin would go out at no distant date and that Neville Chamberlain would be his successor. In all the conversation, the Ambassador said that he was speaking solely as man to man and not as government to government, and I assured him that I would so treat the conversation. He then brought up Neville Chamberlain and first referred to a luncheon which Chamberlain said was given to him by Bingham and Phillips, and that he was expecting Phillips to say something about the economic situation, but that nothing was said until about the end of the luncheon, when Phillips suddenly inquired whether they would be disposed to enter into a trade agreement with this country and Chamberlain promptly indicated a generally favorable attitude, at which Phillips seemed to be surprised. I suspected that the Ambassador made this reference more to lessen my opinion of Chamberlain’s reactionaryism and embargo tariff proclivities than for any other reason. At any rate, while he offered a few statements tending to indicate that Chamberlain was not wholly indifferent to the importance of economic restoration in a broad way, he did leave the impression that at present Chamberlain is more or less wedded to a static policy of high tariffs and armaments for self-defense without an immediate disposition to move at once in concert with other countries to the attack on excessive trade barriers and obstructions. I expressed my keen disappointment that the dominant statesmanship of Britain is only disposed to pursue the one course which contemplates a military explosion, with no purpose to offer an alternative program the chief object of which would be to deal effectively with the economic difficulties of such countries as Germany and, if humanly possible, to avoid further military objectives. I said that this same static and inert attitude of statesmen in Europe had existed while Japanese militaristic officials moved deeper into eastern Asia, and Mussolini marched his armies into Ethiopia, and Germany marched her armies into the Rhineland. I then emphasized that still worse experiences are ahead for static and inert governments like that of Great Britain and others, and that therefore I, with great deference and respect, desired strongly to urge a further consideration by those statesmen of all the factors in the present grave period through which our countries and the world is passing. I repeated that there is no alternative to this program to promote the joint objectives of peace and economic well-being, except, as some of our British statesmen say, the possibility of a military explosion in Europe along with increasingly heavy armaments by each country. These various points were elaborated upon and illustrated by other physical conditions and actual occurrences. I said that naturally if British statesmen decline to move forward at all in support of an alternative program of peace and trade restoration that fact will inevitably be made known to every other country within the early future, for the reason that this movement must either go forward or perish, and, in either event, the definite attitude of each important country will be made known to the world. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.4131/198 [Document 550] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 3, 1936. During the call of the British Ambassador, I again reiterated, in stronger terms than some days ago, the scope and nature of our economic program for the restoration of normal trade conditions, employment and conditions of peace, and reemphasized the marvelous opportunity for our two countries to assume leadership and go forward, instead of sitting quietly while the world gravitates unerringly down the road of militarism along which it is now travelling at increasing speed. The Ambassador seemed almost enthusiastic about the opportunity, as well as the proposal and program. I believe he will use his best efforts back at London to cooperate. He indicated his belief that Mr. Neville Chamberlain would be disposed to go along with the program, and he referred to the confidential fact that our two governments are exchanging suggestions with the view to ascertaining whether conversations looking towards a trade agreement would be feasible. I expressed my satisfaction at this indicated initial step, and then I added that what is really of equal, if not greater, importance at the same time is the necessity for his country and mine to proclaim the fundamentals of this broad doctrine of economic liberalism which has the twin objectives of restoring economic well-being and conditions of peace. I then added further that a third exceedingly important point in the movement is that each country might indicate its definite purpose gradually to abolish clearing arrangements or other vicious bilateral methods which are holding back and obstructing the entire movement. I illustrated with the Canadian-German Agreement of recent date. 51 C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 51 Signed at Ottawa, October 22, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 311. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Constant Southworth of the Division of Trade Agreements 611.4131/205 [Document 551] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Constant Southworth of the Division of Trade Agreements [ Washington ,] November 16, 1936. Present: Mr. Chalkley and Major Heyward of the British Embassy; Messrs. Hawkins, Ryder, Domeratsky, 52 Minter and Southworth. Mr. Chalkley and Major Hey ward called at Mr. Hawkins’ office on November 16, 1936, in conformity with an informal agreement made on September 29, 1936, that tentative lists of concessions likely to be requested by the United States and the United Kingdom if negotiations were undertaken would be exchanged on November 16. Mr. Chalkley expressed appreciation of our having furnished him statistical data which had made it possible for the British to formulate their list by the date set. He submitted the attached letter and four annexes from the Board of Trade. 53 He asked that paragraph 11 (already stricken out by him) be ignored at least for the present, implying that, in his understanding, the British colonies were not necessarily in the purview of the contemplated negotiations. Mr. Hawkins said that it was satisfactory to us to keep this matter in abeyance at present, but indicated that we on our part also might want later to bring colonial questions into the discussions. Mr. Chalkley asked that we note the request of the British in paragraph 7 of their letter for certain additional statistical material on our imports from Great Britain. He said that henceforth he would appreciate it if six copies of any statistical material furnished the British could be supplied. Mr. Chalkley commented on the annexes. As stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of their covering letter the British list would include all the commodities in the Tariff Commission compilation which was furnished them some weeks ago and, in addition, consideration of items in their attached annexes A and B. * Annex A contains a fairly long list of minor dutiable items not in the Tariff Commission compilation of which the United Kingdom was the principal supplier to the United States in 1934. Annex B includes items in the free list which the British would desire to have bound. Annex C contains four dutiable items of which the United Kingdom is the principal supplier but on which the duty has already been reduced by the maximum allowable. The United Kingdom would desire that the duties on these items remain as at present. In addition it is pointed out in paragraph 9 of the letter that the British might also want concessions on a relatively few items not yet named of which the United Kingdom is not the principal supplier. Annex D, Mr. Chalkley said, is merely a record for our information of complaints received and does not necessarily mean either that the United Kingdom has been the principal supplier of the items referred to or that the United Kingdom would insist on concessions on them. Mr. Hawkins handed Mr. Chalkley the attached American list 54 and covering statement. Major Heyward remarked that he was a little surprised to see glacé kid on our “must” list † because on a boat not long ago he ran into an American manufacturer of glacé kid who said that as long as the duty remained at 10 per cent he was not handicapped in exporting to the United Kingdom. What this manufacturer was afraid of, according to Major Heyward, was that the duty would be increased, in which case the manufacturer anticipated very bad results to his business. Mr. Domeratsky pointed out that this manufacturer may not have been representative and that other American manufacturers may have been adversely affected by the 10 percent duty. Mr. Chalkley said that he feared that if we insisted on our “must” list for improvement of treatment we would get no trade agreement. He emphasized that the British had placed no “must” items on their list, although he remarked that there were certain products without concessions on which a trade agreement would not be worth while to the British. Both Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Ryder stated flatly that we could not recede from our position on the “must” list and that, in the light of further study and contacts with the trade, additional products are certain to be added to it. Mr. Chalkley emphasized that in view of the contrast between the Hawley-Smoot rates in the United States and the moderation of the British tariff rates it was generally considered in the United Kingdom that we could expect little beyond bindings. Only in a few special cases had Empire preference harmed our trade and therefore only in a few instances could reduction of preference even be considered. It was pointed out to him that certain preferences might hurt our trade in the future even if for the sake of argument it was granted that they had not been harmful in the past, but he seemed unwilling to grant this point. In any case, he said, the United Kingdom would be compelled to obtain the Dominions’ consent to any reduction in preference. At this juncture he asked, for his own information, when the United Kingdom’s trade agreements with the Dominions expired and he was informed that it was in August 1937. Mr. Domeratsky pointed out that India had already denounced its trade agreement with the United Kingdom. Mr. Chalkley spoke especially of tobacco as involving a problem of revenue. A concession on tobacco would be likely, he said, to reduce revenue much needed in a year when a budget deficit is anticipated. He remarked that to the extent that improvement in quota treatment should be granted by the United Kingdom it would be at the expense of other countries. Mr. Hawkins rejoined that we were not seeking preferential treatment on quotas; that our requests could be met by increasing global quotas. Mr. Chalkley asked us to examine the British list, let him know our reaction and he would then send it back to London, together with our list. We indicated that we did not intend to pass hasty judgment and therefore, to save time, would prefer that he send our list on immediately for consideration in London. This he agreed to do, while adhering to the belief that London would prefer to receive both at the same time. Mr. Chalkley asked if he might hold our list at any rate until the latter part of the following day before sending it to London, in anticipation of a telephone call from Mr. Hawkins to the effect that we had receded from our position on the “must” list. He indicated that perhaps in the light of the fact that the British presented us no “must” list and in the light of what he said about the probable dampening effect of our “must” list on British willingness to negotiate an agreement, we might want to shorten our “must” list. Mr. Hawkins said that this would be unnecessary as we could tell him our position at once. Others endorsed Mr. Hawkins’ stand. Mr. Chalkley then said that he would send our list to London immediately. We agreed to study the British requests and to present our comments on them as soon as possible. It was agreed that each side in preparing its comments on the other’s proposals would proceed on the assumption that its own proposals in their main substance and significance will be accepted. Mr. Chalkley’s only comment on our main list was that it seemed a long one. As he thumbed it over he evinced no enthusiasm over it. It was reiterated by both sides that everything said to date is said informally and personally and without official commitment of any kind; also that publicity will be avoided. [Annex 1] 55 The British Board of Trade to the Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy ( Chalkley ) [ London ,] 2 November, 1936. Dear Chalkley : We should be glad if you would thank the United States authorities most warmly for the statement which they provided, and without which it would have been impossible to comply with their request for a general statement of our desiderata by the 16th November. 2. We understand that it is agreed on both sides that the purpose of the present exchanges of view is solely to enable both Governments to decide whether a basis for negotiation exists, and that until a joint decision on this point has been arrived at no announcement will be made either in the United States or in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile we trust that every effort will be made to avoid public attention being drawn to the question. 3. We note that the United States authorities do not expect us at the present stage to suggest any actual rates of reduction of duties or the re-classification of particular commodities. We find on examination of the American statement that it would be impossible to do so without consulting the trade interests concerned. In view of the need for secrecy, which we too feel, all that we can do is to give a general indication of the concessions for which we should look, on the understanding that, if negotiations ensue, more precise requests would be formulated after such consultation. We have done our best in the time available to give below as comprehensive a statement of our desiderata as possible, but there may be omissions which we should have to rectify in the course of negotiations if they are initiated. To give only one example, we have, as you will see from paragraph 7, been forced to confine our attention to statistics for 1934. Any announcement of negotiations might give rise to requests for concessions on a number of commodities which are of importance to our trade, but of which we were not the principal supplying country in that year. This contingency is all the more likely because there is reason to think that a great many exporters have probably come to the conclusion in the light of past experience that it is useless to press for reductions in the United States tariff. Their desire to recover a footing in so important a market would evidently be stimulated by any prospect of obtaining concessions, and many would no doubt produce a very strong case. We must therefore reserve the right to ask for consideration of items to which, for this or other reasons (not excluding clerical errors), we are making no reference in this letter, should it appear necessary at a later stage. 4. It is of course possible that the announcement of negotiations may move industrial or other interests to suggest the inclusion in the discussions of subjects not contemplated in this correspondence. This may happen in the United States as well as in the United Kingdom. Doubtless, therefore, both sides will wish to reserve liberty to include other subjects for discussion should the case arise. 5. Having regard to the terms of the reciprocal trade agreements already concluded by the United States and to repeated official pronouncements by their spokesman, we assume that any agreement with us would provide explicitly for unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment as between the United Kingdom and the U. S. A. 6. As regards the tariff we should in the first place seek concessions on the items included in the American statement. As you point out, several of the tariff classifications which appear in it are subdivided and in some of the sub-divisions the interest of the United Kingdom appears to be small. It may be that in a number of such items we should be able to limit our requests to the sub-divisions in which the figures indicate that our interests are predominant. It may also be that there are some items on which we should not, on further consideration, wish to press for any concession. But there are few, if any, that we could eliminate without consulting the trades concerned. Similarly it is impossible without reference to the trades to suggest what new sub-classifications would be necessary to limit concessions to United Kingdom goods, or what changes from ad valorem to specific rates of duty and vice versa might be desirable. 7. We notice that the United States statement omits a number of items of which the United Kingdom was in 1934 the principal supplying country. A list of the more important items on which we should wish to ask for concessions will be found in Annex A. This has necessarily been compiled from the United States Trade Returns for 1934, which owing to the slump is perhaps hardly a representative period. There has not been time to extract comparable figures for earlier years, since as you are aware, the statistics for the years prior to 1934 were compiled on a different basis, and figures for 1935 are not yet available. This being so, perhaps the American authorities could furnish further statistical information in the same form as in the statement already supplied in respect of the items in Annex A, or at least in respect of those for which they would be ready to entertain proposals. While the number of items in Annex A is considerable, the actual amount of trade covered by the Annex is not very large. 8. Neither the American statement nor Annex A contains any items which are at present on the free list. Some of these are of importance to United Kingdom trade and we should wish the American authorities to consider certain conventionalisations of free entry, or, if that has already been given, re-conventionalisation. The items we have in mind are given in Annex B, but it might be necessary after consulting trade interests to add to this list. There are also certain dutiable items of which the United Kingdom is the principal supplying country, but on which the maximum reductions allowed by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act have already been made. In these cases, particulars of which are given in Annex C, we may wish to ask for conventionalisation or re-conventionalisation. 9. Then there are certain commodities of which the United Kingdom is not the principal supplying country, but which are of considerable importance to the United Kingdom. We note that the United States do not wish us to introduce such items, as it is contrary to their policy to make concessions on them. But we observe that trade agreements which they have concluded with other countries have covered a number of items of which those countries are not the principal sources of supply, e. g. gin in the Netherlands agreement. We hope, therefore, that they would not exclude consideration of any requests that we might wish to put forward under this head in the light of such representations as we may receive if negotiations are opened. We do not anticipate that the list would be very substantial. 10. We also attach as Annex D particulars of various recent complaints which have been received from United Kingdom traders about the United States tariff: some of them are already covered by the other annexes. You will notice that these include a number of cases in which traders complain of appraisals or classifications made by the United States Customs. Considerable difficulties have also arisen from the rigid enforcement of Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930 55a (Marking of Imported Articles). We are uncertain whether any remedy is available under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. We put forward the Annex only as illustrating the sort of cases our traders are likely to bring to our notice if and when trade negotiations are announced. 11. Finally we should wish to ask the American authorities to consider certain requests on behalf of Newfoundland and the Colonial Empire. Certain items, such as tea, are already included in the enclosures to this letter, but there are others, notably oilseeds and nuts and vegetable and marine animal oils for consideration. We are not yet in a position to provide a detailed statement, but the possibilities are being examined. It is not proposed, of course, to cover every individual item of Colonial and Newfoundland trade, and it is expected that the Colonial items to be put forward would be relatively few in comparison with those put forward on behalf of the United Kingdom. We do not anticipate therefore that their inclusion would make our desiderata unmanageable in number. 12. To summarise, the United States statement covers most of the ground on which we should seek concessions, but there is some further ground which we should hope the United States authorities would also be prepared to cover. 13. There are, of course, two sides to every trade arrangement and, in the absence of knowledge as to the United States desiderata, we cannot form a judgment of the possibilities of a successful negotiation. We think it only right, therefore, to draw attention to the fact that there is probably not much we could contribute in the way of positive concessions. Generally speaking, our protective tariff is relatively low and the grant of tariff reductions in this field would therefore be a matter of great difficulty, As regards non-protective items, it would be very difficult in present circumstances to consider concessions which would involve loss of revenue (and it must be borne in mind that the whole purpose of the revenue duties would be nullified if they were pitched at such a level as to restrict unduly importations of the goods concerned); while as regards the duties and preferences imposed under the Ottawa Agreements, we are not in a position to make adjustments except with the consent of the Dominions concerned. We mention these points only because we do not want to mislead the United States authorities as to the possibilities of positive concessions. On the other hand, there is probably a very considerable field in which we should be able to consider an undertaking not to increase existing low duties or not to impose duties on goods at present free of duty, thus preserving important features of a tariff under which U. S. A. exporters have been able to maintain so valuable an export trade to the United Kingdom. Yours sincerely, A. E. Overton [Annex 2] American Statement Regarding Concessions [ Washington ,] November 16, 1936. The attached list of products 56 includes those on which concessions in the form of an improvement in, or a binding of, the present treatment will be requested. The list is tentative. If it is decided to enter into negotiations, further studies and contacts with the trade, as well as the public hearings required by law, will be necessary. On the basis of such studies and contacts and hearings additions to and subtractions from the list would undoubtedly prove necessary. It is known now, on the basis of present information and in advance of public hearings, that among the articles included on the list on which an improvement in the present treatment will be essential are products included under the following commodity headings. Hog products, including lard Barley Rice Fresh fruits, particularly Apples, Pears, Grapefruit, Oranges (seasonal) Dried fruits Canned fruits Tobacco Softwood lumber Leather, especially patent leather and glacé kid 52 Louis Domeratsky, of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 53 Annexes not attached to letter in files. * The Tariff Commission compilation referred to covered all commodities imported into the United States in substantial amounts of which the United Kingdom is the principal supplier. It was the basic compilation from which the Tariff Commission later selected certain items for a tentative list of commodities on which reduction of duty to the United Kingdom might be considered. At no time hitherto has the possibility of granting concessions to the British on all the items in this over-all compilation been considered. [Footnote in the original.] 54 Not printed. † The short list of commodities contained in our covering statement on which we said that improvement in present treatment would be essential. [Footnote in the original.] 55 Filed separately under 611.4131/205a. 55a 46 Stat. 590. 56 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 641.0031/77: Telegram [Document 552] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , November 20, 1936—8 p.m. [Received November 20—5:30 p.m.] 552. 1. I presented the Foreign Secretary today with a copy of the memorandum contained in your 406, November 16, 4 p.m. 57 and at the same time made the suggested plea. All arrangements had been made to comply with the Department’s instruction “in company with” the Canadian High Commissioner; at the last moment his office telephoned the Embassy that “a question had arisen on a matter of procedure which made it impossible for Mr. Vincent Massey to keep the appointment.” 2. The Foreign Secretary referred to the West African tobacco question (Department’s 379, October 23, 7 p.m. 58 ) and the Australian commercial policy question (Department’s 376, October 16, 3 p.m. 59 ) and said he was not prepared to make a statement on the former at this time but he would like to assure me that no steps would be taken such as were apprehended without further consultation. As regards the latter he said that although the British Government greatly desired satisfactory relations on all matters between the United States and the component parts of the Empire, the Australian Commonwealth was entirely independent. However, the British Government was glad to use its good offices as far as was practicable; that he had taken up the matter with the representative of the Australian Government and that their position was that the United States had a large favorable balance of trade with Australia; that the Australian Government had sought to procure an agreement which would relieve this situation; that negotiations had not matured and that there seemed to be no inclination on the part of the United States Government to undertake them. Consequently the Australian Government had felt it necessary to impose the license restrictions now in existence. Therefore there was nothing more that the British Government could do in this connection. 3. At the same time Eden handed me a memorandum on British trade policy which is the reply to that based on your 824, September 3, 6 p.m. and which I am telegraphing in view of your 179, May 26, 4 p.m.: 60 “The memorandum 61 which Your Excellency left with me on the 19th September on the subject of the international trade situation and trade policies has been very carefully studied by myself and my colleagues. Shortly after that date our two Governments joined with the French Government in issuing the declaration of the 26 September 62 which reasserted the conviction that it is of cardinal importance to improve the chances of maintaining peace by increasing international trade. It was a source of particular satisfaction to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to join in this way with the United States Government in making a declaration which made it clear yet again that the objective of our national policy is to restore international trade and to secure a lowering of trade barriers. His Majesty’s Government warmly appreciate the fact that in recent years the United States Government by their policy of bilateral trade agreements have taken a step towards lowering the barriers to international trade which were constituted by the high protective tariffs which the United States Government had imposed. His Majesty’s Government are glad to recognize that the untiring and far-seeing efforts made by the Secretary of State to negotiate these trade agreements constitute a valuable practical contribution to the objectives which both Governments have in common. His Majesty’s Government for their part feel entitled to claim that the bilateral agreements which they themselves have concluded also constitute a practical contribution to these same objectives. These trade agreements have served the double purpose of increasing directly trade between the United Kingdom and the countries concerned and of contributing to the lowering of barriers to international trade generally. The markets of the United Kingdom have, as the United States Government recognise, been kept open in very full measure to the products of other countries. The net imports of the United Kingdom in 1933 amounted to £626,000,000, in 1934 to £680,000,000, in 1935 to £702,000,000; while comparing the first 9 months of 1935 and 1936 they have increased from £499,000,000 to £562,000,000. The average imports into the United Kingdom to-day represent £15 per head of the population a figure which is 2½ times that of France, 3 times that of Germany, and nearly 5 times that of the United States. The above figures provide in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the correct background for an unprejudiced estimate of the policy followed in their recent trade agreements; and in this connection they would reiterate the statement made by the President of the Board of Trade in his speech in the House of Commons on the 15th July last that ‘our policy is founded on equality of opportunity for all nations and is qualified only by the duty of other nations to play their part in the same general scheme.’ In this connection His Majesty’s Government desire to emphasise one important consideration which has not perhaps received adequate recognition. Faced as they were in 1931 with an increasing adverse balance of merchandise trade and a greatly reduced balance of payments they decided to concentrate on a policy of encouraging exports and their trade and payments agreements have been directed to that end. This course appeared to them to be not only the most advantageous to this country but also to be free from the danger of causing the further dislocation and restriction of international trade which might have resulted from the adoption of a policy based mainly on the restriction of imports or on the progressive depreciation of sterling. His Majesty’s Government fully agree with the United States Government that the immediate objectives of national importance which necessarily have to be taken into account in all trade negotiations must never be allowed to obscure the wider ultimate aims which both Governments have in common. The ‘rigid controls and nationalistic policies of other countries’ are as the United States Government recognise especially harmful to the United Kingdom to which foreign trade is more vital than to any other country. The aim of His Majesty’s Government has in all cases been to mitigate by mutual concessions the rigidity of such controls and thus to promote that liberalization of international trade which has been the constant aim of both Governments.” In discussing his memorandum, I emphasized the distinction between the British and the American “bilateral” treaties and referred to the Prime Minister’s statement at the Lord Mayor’s banquet on November 9th 63 and called his attention to the fact that his freer trade reference was sandwiched between those relating to the concluded Anglo-Italian 64 and contemplated Anglo-Argentine specifically bilateral agreements and urged again the importance of the British Government taking a bold and broad view. Eden expressed himself as being personally in favor of going as far as possible in this direction and assured me that he would continue his efforts with renewed vigor. 4. The Foreign Secretary asked me especially to convey the grateful appreciation of his Government for the position we had taken in reference to the five C-class cruisers adding that he had made a statement to the Cabinet yesterday pointing out this generous and friendly action and had been authorized to express on behalf of his Government their appreciation. Bingham 57 Foreign Relations , 1937, vol. ii , p. 185 . 58 post , p. 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] . 59 Post , p. 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] . 60 Telegram No. 179 not printed. 61 See telegram No. 324, September 3, 6 p.m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] . 62 For correspondence regarding the Tripartite Financial Stabilization Agreement, see pp. 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 440 ] ff. 63 The London Times , November 10, 1936, p. 21. 64 Signed November 6, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxvii , p. 183. Memorandum by the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) of a Conversation With the President of the British Board of Trade (Runciman), December 18, 1936 611.4131/216 [Document 553] Memorandum by the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) of a Conversation With the President of the British Board of Trade ( Runciman ), December 18, 1936 65 December 18, 1936 Upon the understanding that I might be going to see Mr. Hull some time early in the new year, Mr. Walter Runciman asked me to call upon him at the Board of Trade prior to his departure for the Christmas holidays. He said to me that in the preliminary conversations conducted by technical representatives of the British and American Governments with reference to the execution of a trade agreement, the American representatives had begun by making proposals which ran counter to the Ottawa Agreement to which the British Government was pledged. He said he had no word of criticism for our representatives but realized that they were active and enthusiastic, as no doubt the representatives of the British Government were. He stated, however, that while his Government could not go into an agreement which violated the terms of the Ottawa Agreement, he believed an agreement could be made between the British and American Governments along the lines of the agreement between the American and Canadian Governments. Not only did he believe this could be accomplished but he thought it ought to be accomplished. This is the most definite and concrete statement so far made by a responsible Government official here and expresses a deliberate conclusion after a long period beginning with opposition, advancing to doubt and hesitation and now arriving at a point which represents progress in the British attitude and very likely the limit to which the British Government will go at this time. R. W. Bingham 65 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 2741, December 30, 1936; received January 12, 1937. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) 611.4131/214 [Document 554] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Sayre ) [ Washington ,] December 19, 1936. Sir Ronald Lindsay called to see me this morning to say that he had received despatches from London saying that the British Foreign Office is giving careful consideration to the matter of our trade agreement and that they hoped to send us a definite reply at an early date. When I asked Sir Ronald what this might mean and how soon we might expect a reply, he said he thought certainly by Christmas. I entered into a rather intimate conversation with Sir Ronald about the whole situation. I suggested that we hoped to secure the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act in the early winter and that in my personal opinion the Administration would be in a stronger position to negotiate with the United Kingdom this winter than probably for some time to come, because we would be backed by the overwhelming vote for President Roosevelt and would have not only this prestige but a fresh mandate from Congress if the Act is renewed without amendments, as I hope it will be. In other words, I suggested that we would be in a stronger position to negotiate and could do more in a trade agreement with the United Kingdom if negotiations were pushed this winter than at any other time. I asked Sir Ronald whether his despatches were encouraging or otherwise. He said that they were not encouraging. He said that the list of our requested concessions hit the Ottawa Agreements in the solar plexus and he added that although the Ottawa Agreements might conceivably be modified, he believed that the system of imperial preferences was a permanent one which England would not give up. He also spoke of the pressures in London due to the constant fear of war. I again said to the Ambassador what I have said on former occasions—that a man like Secretary Hull did not become Secretary of State often and that, as he has the full backing of President Roosevelt, the opportunity offered to Great Britain for a close understanding and commercial rapprochement between our two Anglo-Saxon countries was a rare one which it would seem tragic not to embrace,—for such a chance would not come again probably in our generation. The Ambassador expressed himself as in personal agreement with all that I had said. F. B. Sayre Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins) 611.4131/215 [Document 555] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements ( Hawkins ) [ Washington ,] December 26, 1936. Conversation: Mr. H. O. Chalkley, Commercial Counselor, British Embassy; Mr. Hawkins; Mr. Hickerson. 66 At Mr. Chalkley’s invitation, we called at his residence Saturday evening, December 26, to discuss instructions he had received regarding the basis for a trade agreement. Mr. Chalkley said that our tentative proposals which had been given to him informally on November 16 had been transmitted to the United Kingdom and had been carefully studied by various officials there including members of the Cabinet. He indicated, therefore, that what he had to say represented not only his own personal views, but the attitude of the British Government. He said that his Government definitely wanted to negotiate a trade agreement with the United States. It is anxious, however, that a mutually acceptable basis be found before negotiations are undertaken in order to insure that such negotiations would not fail. In the opinion of his Government any such failure would be seriously harmful and should be avoided at all costs. We replied that this Government is also anxious to conclude a trade agreement and shares fully the view of the British Government as to the desirability of finding a basis which would insure the successful outcome of negotiations once they are instituted. In the course of the general discussion, Mr. Chalkley referred to the extent to which Empire relations are involved in connection with our so-called “must” list. He stressed the importance of such relations at this time when the political situation in Europe is so uncertain. He said, among other things, that in the event of war, the United Kingdom might be denied access to supplies in the United States by our neutrality policy; that British policy must be influenced by the fact that the United Kingdom itself and the Dominions represent the only assured sources of supply in time of war and that the fostering of such sources must be promoted in time of peace. Turning specifically to our “must” list, Mr. Chalkley stated that very little could be done to meet our requests as the consent of the Dominions would, in most cases, be necessary before these duties could be reduced. He thought that something might be done in the case of some products such as lumber, but indicated that this would have to be effected by a tri-partite arrangement by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The possibility of doing something on lumber apparently arises from the fact that the United Kingdom duty is bound only to Canada, whereas the rates on most of the other products are bound to several Dominions. Mr. Chalkley also indicated that some reduction in the duty on leather might be possible. On lard, he pointed out that, while the rate on this product is not bound to any dominion, the duty is so low (10 percent) that we could hardly expect a reduction. In general, Mr. Chalkley made it clear that the difficulty of meeting our requests lies in the commitments by the United Kingdom to the Dominions and the fact that the consent of the latter would have to be obtained. He indicated that the only means of getting what we want on our “must” list would be for us to negotiate with the Dominions and in return for such concessions as we might be able to offer, obtain the relinquishment by them of a part of their preferences in the United Kingdom. He said that the United Kingdom might agree to include in an agreement with the United States a provision whereby the preferences would be modified whenever and to the extent that the consent of the Dominions was obtained. Mr. Chalkley kept repeating that the difficulty of our “must” list lies in the fact that we ask for “improved” treatment. He implied that the binding of present rates would create no serious difficulty. In this connection, he referred to our large agricultural exports to the United Kingdom and asked whether our Department of Agriculture did not attach a great deal of importance to preserving our present trade. His inference was, of course, that we could protect this trade by an agreement under which present treatment would be bound, but that if no agreement were concluded we might, as a result of increases in British trade barriers, lose a large part of the trade we now have. Mr. Chalkley said that our Department of Agriculture should be asked to consider this question very carefully. We stated that inasmuch as Mr. Chalkley had indicated that there are some respects in which the British could meet our requests on the “must” list, the next step in our exploratory work would seem to be for him to indicate specifically and in detail exactly how far the British could go. Mr. Chalkley agreed to submit such a statement in writing in a few days. 67 66 John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs. 67 Transmitted December 29, 1936; not printed. Informal discussions regarding proposed restriction of trade between Australia and New Zealand to British shipping Informal discussions regarding proposed restriction of trade between Australia and New Zealand to British shipping [556] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, February 10, 1936. [Received March 10.] 811.71247H/54 [557] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] February 24, 1936. 811.71247H/53 [558] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, April 29, 1936. [Received May 20.] 811.71247H/60 [559] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, October 26, 1936. [Received December 3.] 811.71247H/71 [560] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 28, 1936. 811.71247H/64a [561] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 3, 1936. 811.71247H/69½ [562] The Consul at Sydney (Preston) to the Secretary of State Sydney, December 3, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 3—9:05 a.m.] 811.71247H/70: Telegram The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 811.71247H/54 [Document 556] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State No. 124 Sydney , February 10, 1936. [Received March 10.] Subject: Australia and the Matson Line. Sir : Pressure throughout Australia to limit the activities of the Matson Line, referred to in my despatches Nos. 29 of October 14 and 84 of December 30, 1935, 68 has now reached a point where the Cabinet has in principle determined on two courses of action: (1) to reverse its earlier attitude and join with the other interested members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (New Zealand, Canada, and, possibly, Great Britain) in subsidizing a British trans-Pacific service; and (2) to reserve the trans-Tasman trade to British shipping. In the course of a conversation at Canberra last week, the Prime Minister (Mr. Lyons) outlined the situation as he and his Government saw it, with utmost frankness. For many months he had been hoping that an amicable solution might be reached that would equalize the competition between the Matson Line and the Union Line, but without avail. He felt that the time had now come when he must ask me to send a despatch to Washington pointing out that action on the part of Australia was imminent. “When I say imminent,” he added, “I do not mean today or tomorrow or next week, though that is what many people would like to see. Nothing will be done until after Messrs. Menzies 69 and Page 70 have had a chance to talk things over in England, say late March or early April, but since I saw you last we have just about decided that we will have to follow your example by giving a subsidy and by reserving the trans-Tasman trade to British ships. If we give a subsidy (and I do not know yet whether Great Britain will join us in making a contribution), I do not want it merely to keep the present second-rate ships running; the British flag should fly over ships that are on a par with yours, so as to create a real competition and not merely pay the expenses of a proposition that can’t compete in services.” In the course of the next few weeks Mr. Lyons said that he was planning to write a personal letter either to the President or to Mr. Hull, recalling their conversations of last summer 71 and the high hopes he had entertained that something might be done to ease the situation. There had been no change, however, and meanwhile British shipping was being driven off the Pacific. The main purpose of writing, however, would be to give an assurance that if he now had to take counter-measures it was not to hurt the American service, but to preserve the British lines on the Pacific, which Australia regarded as essential from the point of view of Imperial communications and defense. Mr. Lyons was well aware of the difficulties which the reservation of the Tasman traffic might entail, but he claimed that the situation admitted of no choice. Great Britain, which had in the past opposed this step, no longer raised objection and seemed indifferent to possible retaliatory measures. In New Zealand the former Government had been fearful that if action were taken the Matson Line would drop Auckland from its schedule and thus destroy the tourist trade which New Zealand was building up; accordingly its influence had been in the direction of procrastination. The new Labor Government, on the other hand, had now informed Mr. Lyons that they were ready to move. An additional consideration which had weight with both Australia and New Zealand was their common fear that Japan was about to put some ships on the Tasman run; some years ago they had tried it out with a freighter, but the New Zealand longshoremen had put a stop to the scheme by entirely extra-legal methods; Australia and New Zealand could not admit for an instant letting the Japanese into this trade, and yet desired not to give Japan offense by blocking her shipping alone. I told the Prime Minister that while we considered the giving or withholding of subsidies a domestic matter, I remained seriously concerned lest restrictions imposed upon traffic between the two self-governing dominions, each with its own tariff and coastwise laws, might have repercussions in parts of the world far removed from the Tasman Sea. I went over one by one the familiar arguments, but his attitude remained clear that if he accepted the cogency of my reasoning or was deterred by the possibility of untoward consequences, British shipping would once and for all disappear from the Pacific. It is, of course, possible that neither the American Government nor the Matson Line feels that it desires to make an issue of the reservation of the Tasman trade. But if a last endeavor should be made to stop adverse legislation, I am convinced that there are only two possible ways to do it: the first would be to convince the New Zealand Government, if such indeed are the intentions of the Matson Line, that upon passage of legislation reserving the trans-Tasman traffic to British shipping, Auckland will be dropped as a port of call, thus killing the American tourist trade. The other possibility would be to have a frank talk with the British as to what specific results might ensue for British shipping in relatively unrelated fields. Policy can only be determined in Washington. My task in Sydney is to inform the Department that in my considered judgment Mr. Lyons is not bluffing and that the time element for possible action is not unlimited. Respectfully yours, Jay Pierrepont Moffat 68 Neither printed. 69 Robert G. Menzies, Australian Attorney General and Minister for Industry. 70 Earle C. G. Page, Australian Minister for Commerce. 71 See memorandum by the Secretary of State, July 9, 1935, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , p. 13 . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs 811.71247H/53 [Document 557] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs 72 [ Washington ,] February 24, 1936. This conversation related to the position of the Matson Line in Australia and New Zealand. It will be recalled that previous memoranda 73 emanating from this Division and the Trade Agreements Division carried an expression of opinion that a frank talk with British officials might have the effect of forestalling action by those Dominions which would open up an orgy of shipping legislation which would be disastrous. The Secretary had approved of some kind of informal representations but had instructed that it be done by some other office. Accordingly, Mr. Dunn requested Mr. Chalkley to come to see him on February 21, 1936. Upon learning the subject of discussion, Mr. Chalkley said that if he had known what was to be discussed he probably would have approached the Department with a feeling of hope that we were now prepared to offer some suggestion which might be helpful to them. He said that there had been continuous discussions between British and Dominion governments since the first plenary conclave at the Ottawa conference. He said that in the interest of Empire shipping, generally, the British had through friendly conference been able to persuade the Dominions to take no action which would stir things up. They realized that the United Kingdom now had no constitutional right to interfere, and Mr. Runciman 74 had capitulated last summer when, faced with rather frantic appeals from the Dominion Prime Ministers and a rather definite ultimatum from the P. and O. group, 75 as well as a threat from Canadian-Pacific headquarters, he told Mr. Lyons that as far as the British Government was concerned the Dominions may now consider themselves to have a free hand in the matter. Mr. Chalkley said that the British Government is still opposed to any action which would make British shipping vulnerable to retaliatory attack in other parts of the world. Mr. Dunn had, of course, told Mr. Chalkley that he did not call him here to offer any helpful suggestion. He did feel, however, that it was not only a friendly act but that it might be considered as helpful for the British Government to be told that all the officials of this Department entertained very grave fears of the result of action by New Zealand and Australia to exclude the Matson Line via legislation. We had no quarrel with the alternative suggestion of financial assistance to the British lines to enable them to compete with the American line, and we did not believe that our Congress could find reason to take umbrage. We did feel, however, that in the wake of such Dominion legislation a new and irresistible effort to pass excluding legislation in this country would probably be successful. Mr. Dunn recalled the numerous bills which had been presented and defeated, but which were not yet dead. Their revival and possible passage awaited only some good provocation, and we believe that Dominion legislation pointing at one American line would be that provocation. Mr. Chalkley said that they had been fully aware of the danger underlying such action by the Dominions and that he appreciated our telling him about our latest fears. He said that of course legislation was an alternative plan. Mr. Dunn said that we realized that, but that in view of the budget situation in those Dominions and recent utterances by the two Prime Ministers it would appear that they were falling back on legislation. Mr. Chalkley then hinted that the British Government was perhaps expected to bear the chief financial burden if financial assistance were decided upon, and I think this hint throws light upon the present attitude of the British Government, which probably realizes that it would be the British Exchequer and not the Dominions’ Exchequers which would be tapped to “save” the British lines in the Pacific trade. In his somewhat indifferent manner Mr. Chalkley said that he would make a note of what had been said. Shortly thereafter, however, it was revealed to him that certain lobbyists were now contemplating pressing for a Congressional resolution which would take cognizance of the proposed Dominion action and which would so widely advertise it that the doors would undoubtedly be open for the passage of harmful legislation here. This information obviously startled Mr. Chalkley and caused him to indicate by tone and text that he would do more than merely “make a note of what had been said.” He asked us by all means to keep in touch with him on this resolution proposal and closed the conversation by saying that he would inform his Government and suggest that it inform the Dominion governments. 72 Conversation between James Clement Dunn, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, and Harry Owen Chalkley, Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy. 73 None printed. 74 Walter Runciman, President of the British Board of Trade. 75 Peninsular and Orient Steam Navigation Co. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 811.71247H/60 [Document 558] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State No. 183 Sydney , April 29, 1936. [Received May 20.] Sir : As foreshadowed in my despatch No. 124 of February 10, 1936, conversations are proceeding in London between the representatives of the British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Governments as to ways and means whereby it may be made possible for British shipping successfully to compete in the Pacific with the Matson Line. The Embassy in London is undoubtedly keeping the Department fully informed of the tenor of the discussions. For better or worse, the decisions reached at London will guide the shipping policies of the Dominions, and in the last analysis it will undoubtedly be Great Britain’s final stand that will govern the decisions reached in London. This despatch, therefore, can only present one section of a much larger picture, namely, the reaction in the Antipodes to news items on the Conference which have been emanating from London. Australia has by now definitely made up its mind that it will have to participate in subsidies, alike in assisting to build two new trans-Pacific liners comparable to the Mariposa and the Monterey , and to meet their running expenses. Australia assumes that Canada and New Zealand will join her in making a contribution to such subsidies, but she has been somewhat concerned at the hesitancy of the British Government to participate. In the middle of the negotiations the Union Steamship Company announced the dates of withdrawal from service of the Makura and Maunganui on the Sydney-New Zealand-Tahiti-San Francisco service. The timing of this announcement was undoubtedly designed—( a ) to take advantage of the anticipated anti-American feeling induced by the Government’s announced policy of restricting or diverting American trade, and ( b ) to increase the pressure on the British Government from Australia and New Zealand in favor of immediate subsidies. The announcement proved rather a boomerang, as despatches from London promptly carried the news that the British Government would not be stampeded into ill-considered action, and the New Zealand Government threw a monkey wrench into the discussions by announcing that if the New Zealand Government gave the Union Line a subsidy it would ipso facto require the exercise of some control over the Service:—“where the Government’s money goes”, said Mr. Savage, the Prime Minister, “the Government will want to have some say.” Editorials throughout Australia on the shipping situation, while less numerous than I would have expected, have one and all followed the same general pattern. They start with the premise that because Great Britain has been running trans-Pacific liners for forty or fifty years it has a vested interest which should not be challenged. They consider American competition unfair, both because we subsidize our shipping and because we exclude foreign shipping from the Hawaii-San Francisco run. They refuse to see any distinction between reserving trade between San Francisco and Hawaii, which is an integral part of our territory, and reserving trade between two self-governing Dominions, each of which has its own coastwise laws and customs barriers. They preach the doctrine that it is unpatriotic for a British subject to sail under any but the British flag, and finally they are so engrossed with the immediate problem of trans-Pacific shipping that they are indifferent to possible retaliation against British shipping in other parts of the world. Respectfully yours, Jay Pierrepont Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 811.71247H/71 [Document 559] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State No. 312 Sydney , October 26, 1936. [Received December 3.] Sir : 1. In my Despatch No. 124 of February 10, 1936, entitled “Australia and the Matson Line”, I reported the decision which the Australian Government had reached in principle to join with New Zealand in taking measures to “preserve British shipping lines on the Pacific”, including the reservation of the Tasman trade. Shortly thereafter the subject temporarily dropped from view while Australian and New Zealand Ministers were attempting to reach a meeting of minds with London on the various possible courses of action,—notably the allocation of a subsidy to British Pacific shipping by the interested Governments. Publicity on the reservation of the Tasman trade had pretty well died down until the recent arrival in Tasman waters of the S. S. Awatea . As far as I can ascertain the Union Steamship Company informed the Australian and New Zealand Governments that it would not maintain so expensive a vessel in the Tasman trade unless protected either by the exclusion of American shipping between Australia and New Zealand or by a subsidy distinct from that which would be given the Union Line to maintain a trans-Pacific service. 2. The first intimation received that a move in the direction of reserving the Tasman trade was imminent came on October 22nd in the form of a press despatch from London. A few hours later the New Zealand Government introduced enabling legislation to this effect, and later that same evening the Australian Government announced that it would soon follow New Zealand’s lead and introduce parallel legislation. It later appeared that the original idea had been for both Canberra and Wellington to move simultaneously on the reservation of the Tasman trade and the granting of subsidies to British shipping; however, the delay of the Imperial Shipping Committee in formulating its report caused New Zealand to abandon this plan and to seek legislation to meet the first phase of the problem before its Parliament adjourned. 3. In form at least the legislation will be “enabling”. The New Zealand Government has announced that it would not be applied until the United States had had an opportunity to comment, while the Minister of Commerce in Australia similarly intimated that a last opportunity would be given the United States to admit British shipping to the Hawaii–San Francisco trade. Some publicity coming from America expresses the conviction that the Dominions will not promulgate the legislation even when it is on the Statute book. I hope that the Department does not cherish this illusion. The two Governments would never have stirred up public opinion as they have done if they had not intended to carry through their plans. Furthermore, the influences which are in a position to exert pressure here, notably the Union Steamship Company and the related P. & O. Company, will lose no opportunity to press their advantage. The utmost I feel that we can hope for is a relatively short delay while conversations are going on—possibly until such time as our Congress is again in session. 4. The press states it as a fact that the British Government approves the plan of reserving the Tasman trade. In any event, the Prime Minister told me last year that London had withdrawn any opposition thereto,—an attitude which presumably represents the situation today. The move is motivated upon an alleged similarity between the Hawaii–American trade and the Australia–New Zealand trade. Both the Government and the press refuse to see, much less to acknowledge, any difference between coastwise traffic within the actual administrative territory of one party and between two political entities, each of which claims to be self-governing and each of which has a mutually exclusive set of coastwise regulations and tariff regulations. This is not the first time that the Australian Government has tried to claim all the advantages accruing from being merely a part of the British Empire, and at the same time to surrender none of the advantages to be derived from being a self-governing Dominion. It expects outside nations, including the United States, calmly to accept Australia’s selecting either the Empire rules or the Dominion rules by which to play the game according as she stands to profit by one set or the other. 5. We must face the fact that the idea of reserving the Tasman trade is extremely popular with all shades of political opinion in Australia. In fact, it is one of the few issues on which the Conservative and the Labor elements agree, the former because of their pro-British Tory leanings, the latter for considerations affecting the employment of Australian labor. Moreover, Australia realizes that no matter what happens, her individual interests cannot suffer. Should the Matson Line cut out New Zealand and make a three-week instead of a fourweek service from San Francisco to Sydney, Australia would profit by many American tourists coming to Australia instead of to New Zealand. Similarly, if as a Government we adopted any one of the various retaliatory measures open to us it would be English, but not Australian, shipping that would suffer. 6. The conclusion which flows from the foregoing is that the present move is an integral part of a tendency (visible in many fields) to exclude as far as possible from the self-governing Dominions all non-British competition. As such, I hope the Department will not analyze it in terms of a local Antipodean problem, but as a challenge from British shipping, which should be met in kind. 7. Meanwhile may I point out that the publicity emanating from the United States to date has not been of the best. Instead of explaining the issue the situation has been made more confusing. I enclose a copy of a Washington despatch found in today’s Telegraph as an instance in point. I likewise enclose, as typical of the general editorial comment, a leader from this morning’s principal Sydney newspaper, the Sydney Morning Herald. 76 Respectfully yours, Jay Pierrepont Moffat 76 Enclosures not reprinted. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 811.71247H/64a [Document 560] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] October 28, 1936. During the call of the British Ambassador, I brought up the New Zealand shipping question and stated that I had examined the written note, which he had left at the instance of his government and which has not been made of record, under date of October 23rd, 77 in which the views and probable purposes of the New Zealand Government were set forth. The idea seemed to be to preclude the American shipping line from touching at Australian and New Zealand ports. This might rest upon the brand new theory of enacting a coastwise shipping law applicable to two separate independent communities of the Empire, or to exclude the American shipping line upon the ground that it is subsidized to a wholly unfair extent and virtually driving out British shipping. I suggested to the Ambassador that I could visualize these initial utterances and actions as affording the makings for possible controversy between our two governments; that the matter presented a situation where private shipping interests of both countries were probably expecting to utilize their respective governments to start a controversy which could easily spread into retaliation of different kinds, inevitably seriously affecting the shipping interests first of one country and then of the other; that this government has created a new shipping organization with authority to consider our subsidy situation and to readjust subsidies when in its judgment the facts so warrant or suggest; that the appropriate step would be for the British shipping interests in New Zealand to cause complaint to be presented to the Shipping Board and let the controversy remain between this group of British shipping interests and the opposing group of American shipping interests, instead of permitting them to drag our governments into the controversy; that I myself, of course, have long stood for fair and friendly trade methods and for the removal of all excessive or unreasonable obstructions to international finance and commerce, including the substitution of equality for discrimination. I then said that if our two governments are to be plunged into a controversy which may not prove to be very sound on either side or from any available standpoint under the issues as raised, it would be a simple matter for congressional committees in my country to get hold of the written correspondence that the British note of October 23rd suggests, with the result that nothing would be much easier than for some retaliatory action to be instituted over here, and that this in turn would call for retaliation by the British. I said that these unfortunate possibilities would be developing at the very time that our two governments should be working wholeheartedly together in support of fair dealing and equality; that I could not assume that the British central government at London is now proposing to embark upon a policy of coastwise shipping throughout the Empire and among all of its separate and independent communities, to the exclusion of all foreign shipping; that this is an illustration of the possibilities of controversy that could well arise if this small dispute between two local shipping groups should be pushed on our two governments and espoused by them in the manner already referred to. The Ambassador said that he did not desire to be understood as expressing the view that his government at London is favorable towards such a coastwise shipping law for the Empire as I had just referred to. I replied that when the government at London transmits for New Zealand a proposal of this kind, without any adverse comment by the government at London, there are certain implications to the effect that the Government of Great Britain is not at least looking in that direction. The Ambassador again held out the view that the government was not committing itself on the question by this mere transmittal action. He argued somewhat against the possibility of withdrawing the note and conducting such communications as might take place orally instead of in writing. The Ambassador finally appeared to be impressed somewhat with the viewpoint I expressed, and he proceeded repeatedly to suggest that he felt disposed to take this matter up with his government in its different essential phases and advise me of such reply as he might receive. To this I expressed my hearty approval. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 77 Note withdrawn on November 3. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 811.71247H/69½ [Document 561] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 3, 1936. The British Ambassador came in and referred further to our conference of some days ago, in regard to the shipping question in the Australian-New Zealand area which has arisen between certain American and certain British lines. The Ambassador said that his Government, on his recommendation, was prepared to comply with my suggestion, made in the form of an inquiry during the course of our last conversation, to withdraw the written communication which the British Government as the intermediary of New Zealand had handed to the State Department. This he said, would permit the entire matter to be conducted orally, but naturally in the same manner and, if desired, to the same extent as if it were in writing. I expressed my satisfaction and gratification. The Ambassador said he would call on Mr. Dunn, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, and receive from him the instrument of writing and withdraw it. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Consul at Sydney (Preston) to the Secretary of State 811.71247H/70: Telegram [Document 562] The Consul at Sydney ( Preston ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , December 3, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 3—9:05 a.m.] Referring to my telegram of October 23, 11 a.m., 78 enabling legislation introduced in Parliament today to exclude American vessels from Tasman trade. Bill based on similar New Zealand legislation. Probably no final action until after Christmas recess and indications are it will pass by substantial majority. I will send copy of bill as soon as received. Preston 78 Not printed. Supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property, signed May 27, 1936 Supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property, signed May 27, 1936 [563] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 27, 1935. [Received January 9, 1936.] 711.4121/280 [564] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, January 27, 1936. [Received February 6.] 711.4121/283 [565] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) Washington, February 15, 1936—1 p.m. 711.4121/283: Telegram [566] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, April 2, 1936—11 a.m. [Received April 2—7:33 a.m.] 711.4121/289: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 711.4121/280 [Document 563] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State No. 1888 London , December 27, 1935. [Received January 9, 1936.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 1047 of December 10, 1935, 78 requesting the Embassy to submit a report concerning the status of the Department’s previous instruction No. 65 of August 23, 1933, 79 concerning the draft convention to extend to outlying territories of both countries the application of the Convention between the United States and Great Britain signed at Washington March 2, 1899, relating to the disposal of real and personal property. 80 On receipt of the instruction last above referred to, the Embassy addressed a note to the Foreign Office, No. 145 of August 31, 1933, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, 81 to which no formal reply has yet been received. In reply to inquiries as to when an answer to the Embassy’s note might be expected, the Foreign Office has stated that the matter was still under consideration. The Embassy has to-day addressed a further note to the Foreign Office making a similar inquiry. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Ray Atherton Counselor of Embassy 78 Not printed. 79 Foreign Relations , 1933, vol. ii , p. 16 . 80 Ibid. , 1916, p. 287 . 81 Not printed. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 711.4121/283 [Document 564] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State No. 1933 London , January 27, 1936. [Received February 6.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1888 of December 27, 1935, enclosing a copy of a note to the Foreign Office, No. 145 of August 31, 1933, 81 concerning the draft convention to extend to outlying territories of both countries the application of the Convention between the United States and Great Britain signed at Washington on March 2, 1899, relating to the disposal of real and personal property. The Embassy is now in receipt of a reply from the Foreign Office, No. A 296/296/45 of January 24, 1936, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, transmitting a copy in draft form 82 of the proposed Supplementary Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand, but not the Union of South Africa for the reasons touched upon in the covering note. Respectfully yours, Ray Atherton [Enclosure] The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Eden ) to the American Chargé ( Atherton ) No. A 296/296/45 London , 24 January, 1936. Sir : I have the honour to invite reference to a note No. 145, which Mr. Bingham was good enough to address to Sir John Simon on the 31st August, 1933 and further to his note No. 1512 of the 27th December last 83 regarding the proposed Supplementary Convention to regulate the application of the Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington on the 2nd March, 1899, relative to the disposal of real and personal property. Mr. Bingham was good enough to request the views of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom regarding certain points raised by the United States Government with respect to the application of the Draft Convention to the territories administered under mandate by His Majesty’s Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand or the Union of South Africa. 2. His Majesty’s Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand have now intimated that they are prepared to become parties to the proposed Convention. His Majesty’s Government in the Union of South Africa on the other hand have come to the conclusion that having regard to all the circumstances, it is not a matter of importance that the Convention of 1899 should be extended to the mandated territory of South West Africa; should, however, the United States Government regard the matter as important, the Union Government would be prepared, on receipt of a direct request from them to this effect, to give consideration to the question of the conclusion of an agreement providing for this extension. 3. His Majesty’s Government in the Union of South Africa have also given consideration to the position of Natal, now part of the Union of South Africa, to which the 1899 Convention was not applied, and have intimated that their attitude in this case is the same as in the case of South West Africa. 4. I have the honour to enclose a copy in draft form of the proposed Supplementary Convention, the wording of which has now been revised in view of the considerations set out in the previous paragraphs of this note. You will observe that in addition to a reference to mandated territories administered by His Majesty’s Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand, the new Article 4 also contains the words “nor to any other territory administered under the authority either of His Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or of his Government in the Commonwealth of Australia, or of his Government in New Zealand”, which have been inserted directly after The King’s title. This addition is suggested in order to meet the wish of the United States Government that provision should be made for the widest possible extension of the Convention of 1899. I have [etc.] (For the Secretary of State) J. M. Troutbeck 81 Not printed. 82 Draft form not printed; it is the same as the text of the treaty as signed. 83 Neither printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) 711.4121/283: Telegram [Document 565] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) Washington , February 15, 1936—1 p.m. 55. Your despatch No. 1933, January 27. Draft Convention approved. Advise whether full powers will be forwarded soon so convention can be sent to Senate during present session. Inquire whether Foreign Office agrees with the Department that notices of adherence given by the two Governments under the Convention of 1899 as supplemented by the Convention of 1902 84 will remain unaffected by the coming into operation of the present Convention. Hull 84 Signed January 13, 1902, Foreign Relations , 1916, p. 289 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 711.4121/289: Telegram [Document 566] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , April 2, 1936—11 a.m. [Received April 2—7:33 a.m.] 171. Department’s 55, February 15, 1 p.m. Foreign Office hopes full powers for the signature of the Convention in respect of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand will be ready for despatch to British Ambassador, Washington, early next week and agrees that accessions to the original Convention of 1899, as supplemented by the Convention of 1902, will remain unaffected by the coming into operation of the supplementary Convention. Atherton [For text of supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property, signed at Washington, May 27, 1936, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 964, or 55 Stat. 1101.] Reciprocal arrangements effected by the United States with the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for trans-Atlantic air service Reciprocal arrangements effected by the United States with the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for trans-Atlantic air service 85 85 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. i , pp. 510 ff. [567] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, April 30, 1936—1 p.m. 811.79640/234a: Telegram [568] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, June 29, 1936—4 p.m. [Received June 29—2:35 p.m.] 811.79640/278: Telegram [569] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 9, 1936—7 p.m. 811.79640/278: Telegram [570] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 18, 1936. [Received August 24.] 811.79640/301 [571] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, October 9, 1936. [Received October 16.] 811.79640/328 [572] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 30, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 30—1:40 p.m.] 811.79640/343: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 811.79640/234a: Telegram [Document 567] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , April 30, 1936—1 p.m. 141. You are instructed immediately to deliver the following note to the British Foreign Office. “Under instructions from my Government I have the honor to refer to the negotiations conducted in Washington in December, 1935, between representatives of the British, Irish Free State and Canadian Governments and representatives of the United States with reference to the question of the establishment of a transatlantic air service. Specifically, I desire to refer to two letters addressed by the Secretary of Commerce to the Secretary of State 86 which appear in the minutes of the meeting of December 12, 1935, as transmitted to and now in the possession of the Air Ministry. My Government regrets that owing to certain questions which have arisen as to the extent of the authority of certain officials of the United States it has not been possible to conclude the arrangements by May 1, 1936, the date referred to in the before-mentioned letters from the Secretary of Commerce to the Secretary of State. My Government is, however, anxious, now that these legal questions have been resolved, to designate suitable airways within the United States territory and to approve the applications of Imperial Airways, Limited, provided your Government is in accord with the Government of the United States on the following points, confirmation of which I should be glad to receive from you: 1. Reciprocity . Such approval to be subject to the other Governments concerned granting full reciprocal privileges in all respects including routes, period and frequencies of service to an air line company of the United States acceptable to the proper authority of the United States. 2. Applicable laws and regulations . Such approval to be subject to the adherence by any applicant air line company of other countries to the applicable laws and regulations of the United States but it is hereby understood that the Secretary of Commerce under existing law may exempt the foreign aircraft concerned from establishing their conformity to the usual domestic regulations as to airworthiness and airman-competence, though not from conformity to the air traffic rules. Furthermore, no authority can be given to engage in interstate or intrastate commerce over United States territory. 3. Airways and service . Though the Secretary of Commerce has, of course, no power internationally and no authority by domestic law to designate airways in any region other than that within the jurisdiction of the United States, yet, naturally, in proceeding to make a designation of a particular airway within the United States, he may appropriately take into consideration the respective approaches and connections of possible airways outside the United States jurisdiction with those within it. 4. Transatlantic airway . The Government of the United States therefore, having in view the best interests of all parties as affecting air commerce to the United States, would wish to have it understood that it is willing to approve such application to land at and take off from one of the following airports on the Atlantic seacoast; viz., New York City, New York, or Baltimore, Maryland, Norfolk, or Cape Charles, Virginia, or Charleston, South Carolina, when coming from any port in England; via the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, or Canada; or via Bermuda and other countries on a frequency not to exceed two round trips per week. My Government is not disposed at this time to designate in the United States a separate airway leading to Bermuda but prefers to regard the route between one of the aforementioned ports and Hamilton, Bermuda, as a leg of the proposed transatlantic airway described above. Temporary authority to land at and take off from one of the said ports when coming from or going to Port Hamilton, Bermuda, on a frequency not to exceed two round trips per week, will be issued on a reciprocal basis, however, to a British air line, or air lines, satisfactory to the Government of Great Britain pending the establishment of regular through-service from points outside Bermuda to the United States on the proposed transatlantic airway. It is the belief of my Government that when the arrangements for the transatlantic air route and service between New York and London are concluded that, if agreeable to both Governments, the service on the Bermuda-United States leg of the transatlantic route can, if the traffic warrants, be increased over that on the through transatlantic service on said route, but it would be required that the local traffic between Bermuda and the United States should be transported on aircraft restricted to that leg of the route and that traffic destined for through service beyond Bermuda should be restricted to aircraft operating in such through service. The routes and services to be subject to alteration by mutual consent of the Governments concerned from time to time as conditions may warrant. 5. Non-exclusiveness . Approval of the permits shall be on a nonexclusive basis and the air transport companies flying the services herein provided must at all times have the approval of their respective Governments. 6. Right of revocation . Because of limitations of law on the authority of any agency of the Government of the United States to issue an irrevocable permit the Government of the United States desires to have it understood that any Government concerned may, for important reasons of public policy and upon due notice, withdraw at any time any approval already given by it. If your Government is in accord with the Government of the United States on the foregoing points I should be pleased to be so informed in order that my Government may address similar communications to the Government of Canada and to the Government of the Irish Free State. I should likewise be pleased to be informed concerning the routes over which your Government proposes to accord permission to fly. Upon receipt of satisfactory information on the above points from the Governments concerned my Government will be pleased promptly to approve the pending application of Imperial Airways.” Hull 86 Dated December 12, 1935; neither printed. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 811.79640/278: Telegram [Document 568] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State London , June 29, 1936—4 p.m. [Received June 29—2:35 p.m.] 328. Embassy’s 325, June 26, 5 p.m. 87 Following just received from the Foreign Office: “Sir, I have the honor to refer to the note number 1738 88 which Mr. Bingham was so good as to address to me on the 1st May, on the subject of the establishment of trans-Atlantic air services. 2. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have no comments to offer upon those portions of Mr. Bingham’s note which deal with reciprocity and applicable laws and regulations, with which they are in full agreement. You will recall that during the Conference held at Washington in December last between representatives of His Majesty’s Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State and the United States Government, the United Kingdom Director General of Civil Aviation was informed that Pan American Airways were acceptable to the United States Government for the purpose of the trans-Atlantic services. In view of this assurance he has, I understand, already informed the president of Pan American Airways that His Majesty’s Government are prepared to issue to that company permits for landing rights in the United Kingdom, Newfoundland, and Bermuda, in the terms that were agreed at the Conference. These terms, and the terms of the permits to be issued by the United States Government to Imperial Airways (or a company in which Imperial Airways hold a controlling interest) were drawn up at the Washington Conference with the intention that they should constitute an agreed text giving effect to the understandings reached in the course of discussion. Provision was made in them for complete reciprocity and for adherence by the respective companies to the applicable laws and regulations of the Governments issuing the permits. 3. His Majesty’s Government desire to make clear that the permits for which applications were made by Imperial Airways relate to two distinct and separate services namely: (1) The trans-Atlantic service from London to New York, either via Newfoundland or via Bermuda, (on a frequency not exceeding two round-trips per week unless additional services are authorized by the Governments concerned). (2) The local service from Bermuda to New York, (on a frequency not exceeding two round-trips per week). His Majesty’s Government are unable to regard the regular local service which they desire to see operated between Bermuda and New York as forming one leg of the trans-Atlantic service, because it is not expected that the latter service will be regularly and continuously operated via the Azores and Bermuda. One of the main principles adopted during the discussions at Washington was that the trans-Atlantic service should be operated via Newfoundland whenever possible, as being shorter and more economical. The connection of the Bermuda–New York local service with the trans-Atlantic service does not appear therefore to be fundamental, and His Majesty’s Government find no difficulty in agreeing that aircraft employed on the Bermuda–New York local service should be separate from and independent of those employed on the trans-Atlantic service. 4. In this connection His Majesty’s Government while they naturally cannot agree to restrict themselves in their own use of territories under the sovereignty of the British Crown desire nevertheless to assure the United States Government that they have never intended nor do they intend to use the local service between Bermuda and New York as a means of creating a separate trans-Atlantic service additional to that provided for in the draft permits now under consideration. Though it is not entirely clear from the note under reference His Majesty’s Government assume that the United States Government recognize that neither Government has the legal or practical power to designate an airway or a route to be followed over territories or waters outside its own juridical control. 5. The records of the Washington discussion contain a reference to the non-exclusiveness of these arrangements, with which His Majesty’s Government are in full agreement. It is also agreed that the air transport companies operating the services concerned must at all times have the approval of their respective Governments. 6. As regards the suggested right of revocation His Majesty’s Government appreciate the limitation which prevents the United States Government from issuing an irrevocable permit. They themselves feel strongly that the conditions of tenure under which the companies undertake this important enterprise should be such as will encourage them to develop the service by all means at their disposal. Considering the heavy capital expenditure which will be involved in the organization and establishment of the service His Majesty’s Government conclude that it is only with the advantage of a reliable long term tenure that the undertaking can be expected to produce fully and effectively its inherent benefits for the trade and traffic of the countries concerned. His Majesty’s Government on their part are willing to grant a permit of 15 years’ duration (under the usual terms of satisfactory observance) to Pan American Airways, so soon as the questions still at issue have been resolved. They have been officially informed that this company is acceptable to your Government and so far as they are aware it is the only United States company possessing an extensive practical experience of commercial flying overseas. It has been engaged in close and friendly cooperation with Imperial Airways for over 6 years with advantages to both and you will no doubt recollect that it was largely with the object of enabling this beneficial association between the companies to continue that the proposed northern trans-Atlantic service which could always be operated as a purely British Commonwealth airway (and indeed was originally so designed) was extended from Montreal to New York. 7. In this connection I would remind you of the long-term permits which have been granted to Pan American Airways in respect of their services through British possessions in the West Indies. 8. If the United States Government wish, however, to include a revocation clause in the permits, His Majesty’s Government suggest that it should be agreed that resort should not be had to revocation except for the highest reasons of public policy necessitating the complete suspension of all trans-North Atlantic air services to and from the United States and that prior communications should take place between Governments before notice is given to the company concerned. It would appear to them equitable that revocation should take effect 2 years after such notice. They would be glad to receive as soon as possible a draft of the clause proposed for the Imperial Airways permits, in order that they may arrange for the reciprocal provision to be made in those granted to Pan American Airways. Subject to this clause, His Majesty’s Government trust that it will be found possible to grant 15-year permits to Imperial Airways (or a company in which Imperial Airways hold a controlling interest). 9. It is the earnest hope of His Majesty’s Government that on receipt of the above explanations the United States Government will be willing to issue to “Imperial Airways or a company in which Imperial Airways hold a controlling interest” the permits in respect of the trans-Atlantic service and the Bermuda–New York service in exchange for those which they, on their part, are prepared to issue at once to Pan American Airways, and which His Majesty’s Government are prepared to agree should become operative as from 1st June. 10. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom note that the United States Government propose to communicate with His Majesty’s Governments in Canada and the Irish Free State with regard to the permits to be issued to Pan American Airways by those Governments. I have, [etc.].” Atherton 87 Not printed. 88 See supra. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 811.79640/278: Telegram [Document 569] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , July 9, 1936—7 p.m. 245. Your No. 328, June 29, 4 p.m. Please communicate the following immediately to the British Foreign Office: “I have the honor to refer to the note of the Foreign Office of June 29, 1936, in regard to the establishment of the proposed transatlantic air services and to state that my Government has given careful consideration to the contents of that note and has instructed me to communicate the following reply to His Majesty’s Government. Separate Services. My Government has given most careful consideration to your comments with reference to the United States–Bermuda service, and have noted that His Majesty’s Government agree that aircraft employed on the United States–Bermuda local service should be separate and independent from those employed on the transatlantic service. My Government has likewise noted your assurance that His Majesty’s Government have never intended, nor do they intend, to use the local service between Bermuda and the United States as a means of creating a separate transatlantic service, additional to that provided in the draft permit now under consideration. Subject to the above conditions, my Government agrees to regard the operations confined to the United States-Bermuda route as a separate local service, with the understanding, however, that the permits for this service shall run concurrently with the permit for the transatlantic service, but shall lapse if such local service connects with or becomes a part of any through service. Information as to Airports and Airways or Routes. My Government respectfully invites His Majesty’s Government’s attention to the fact that it indicated in the note of the American Embassy of May 1, 1936, a series of airports on the Atlantic coast for use by the proposed services, and is prepared, within its own territory and territorial waters, to designate routes leading thereto. Maps indicating such routes will be forwarded to London within a few days for delivery to His Majesty’s Government. My Government now desires to be informed as to the airports which will be made available to the American company operating the services in the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Bermuda and as to the airways or routes leading thereto. Communication with the Governments of Canada and the Irish Free State. Although it was stated in the note of the American Embassy of May 1, 1936, that my Government had indicated its intention of communicating with the Governments of Canada and the Irish Free State, my Government now believes that it might be more expeditious, if no objection is perceived, for His Majesty’s Government to approach the Canadian and the Irish Free State Governments with a view to having them furnish the desired information as to airports and airways or routes within the territorial jurisdiction of those Governments. As Canadian territory is adjacent to the United States and as the air routes must necessarily connect, my Government, in order to avoid delay, is also furnishing the Canadian Government directly with information in regard to the proposed routes in United States territory. Right of Revocation. With reference to the right of revocation, my Government desires that His Majesty’s Government be informed in response to specific inquiry that it proposes to include in the permits to Imperial Airways, Limited, or a company in which Imperial Airways hold a controlling interest, the following provision: ‘This permit may be withdrawn upon notice for important reasons of public policy when the conditions thereof or the actual practice thereunder is no longer regarded by the Government of the United States as being in its interest. Such notice shall be sent to your company only after consultation between the two Governments concerned for a period of at least 60 days. Withdrawal will take effect 2 years after such notice has been sent.’ Texts of Permits. My Government will within a few days telegraph for transmission to His Majesty’s Government the complete texts of the proposed permits. Conclusion. My Government earnestly hopes that the considerations set forth above will be acceptable to His Majesty’s Government and that it will be possible for both Governments to issue the permits, valid as of June 1, 1936, at an early date. My Government desires to add that it is prepared to extend the most complete cooperation possible in any arrangements for the conduct of preliminary experimental flights.” Please communicate to the British Foreign Office simultaneously with the above, a further note in the following language: “I have the honor to refer to previous correspondence concerning the establishment of transatlantic and United States–Bermuda air services. With reference to the acceptability of Pan American Airways Company for the proposed services my Government is pleased to inform His Majesty’s Government that the fundamental data referred to in the letter of the Acting Secretary of Commerce of December 15 [ 13 ], 1935, 89 addressed to the Director General of Civil Aviation in Great Britain, have been submitted by Pan American Airways Company, and that the company is acceptable to the United States Government and is hereby approved for the proposed services, which approval shall remain in force and effect so long as there is no violation of present or future laws of the United States and the company continues to provide a reasonably efficient air transport service.” Hull 89 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 811.79640/301 [Document 570] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State No. 2464 London , August 18, 1936. [Received August 24.] Sir : Pursuant to the Embassy’s telegram No. 404 of August 18, 5 p.m., 90 concerning the proposed trans-Atlantic air services, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a note, No. W 8742/186/27 of August 17, 1936, received to-day from the Foreign Office, together with a single copy of its enclosure, a draft of the permits which it is proposed to issue to the Pan-American Airways in respect of the services under consideration. There has not been sufficient time before the closing of to-day’s pouch to have additional copies made of the enclosure to the note. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Herschel V. Johnson First Secretary of Embassy [Enclosure] The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Eden ) to the American Ambassador ( Bingham ) No. W 8742/186/27 [ London ,] 17 August, 1936. Your Excellency : I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency’s notes Nos. 1890 of the 10th July and 1915 of the 18th July, 1936, regarding the proposed trans-Atlantic air services and the proposed local service between the United States and Bermuda. 2. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are in full agreement with the text of the permits proposed to be issued to Imperial Airways, subject to the following considerations. In particular they note that the interpretation of the permits is made subject to exchanges of notes between our two Governments. ( a ) His Majesty’s Government assume that paragraph (2) of the Bermuda permit, which is referred to in the second and third paragraph of Your Excellency’s note of the 10th July, is intended as an interpretation of the assurances set out in paragraph (4) of the note which I had the honour to address to Mr. Atherton on the 29th June last and indicates merely the consent of His Majesty’s Government not to use the New York–Bermuda local service as a means of creating a separate trans-Atlantic service from the United Kingdom to the United States, but does not imply that His Majesty’s Government accept any restriction upon their own use of territories under the sovereignty of the British Crown. ( b ) His Majesty’s Government would suggest that in paragraph (2) of the Bermuda permit the words “by either Company, unless additional frequencies are authorised by agreement between the two Governments”, should be inserted after the words “not to exceed two round trips per week”, in order to conform with conditions ( a ) and ( e ) of the first paragraph. 3. In conclusion I transmit for the information of Your Excellency’s Government a draft of the permits 93 which it is proposed to issue to Pan-American Airways in respect of the services under discussion. I have [etc.] (For the Secretary of State) P. Leigh-Smith 90 Not printed. 93 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 811.79640/328 [Document 571] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State No. 2569 London , October 9, 1936. [Received October 16.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of the Embassy’s note to the Foreign Office No. 2085, of October 9, 1936, sent pursuant to the Department’s telegraphic instruction No. 366, October 8, 7 p.m. 93 Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Ray Atherton Counselor of Embassy [Enclosure] The American Ambassador ( Bingham ) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Eden ) No. 2085 [ London ,] October 9, 1936. Sir : I have the honor to refer to your note of August 17, 1936 regarding the proposed trans-Atlantic air services and the proposed local service between the United States and Bermuda. My Government accepts entirely the assumption and suggestions set forth in paragraph 2 of your note under acknowledgment, and will alter the proposed Bermuda permit accordingly. My Government also desires to add at the end of paragraph 1 ( b ) of the proposed Bermuda permit the following: “(as to the United States mail, such of the same as may be authorized by the United States Post Office.)” This simply amends the Bermuda permit to accord with the trans-Atlantic permit in this regard. With these slight modifications the United States and the British permits for the Bermuda service appear to be satisfactory. The text of the proposed permit for Pan American Airways to conduct a trans-Atlantic service, enclosed with the note under acknowledgment, has received the most careful consideration of my Government, which finds it satisfactory with the exception of paragraph ( e ). 94 If this paragraph can be eliminated apparently both United States and the British permits for the trans-Atlantic service are also satisfactory. The United States Government is therefore prepared to issue to Imperial Airways the permits for the local Bermuda service and for the trans-Atlantic service in the forms now proposed simultaneous with the issuance to Pan American Airways Company by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the Bermuda permit in the form proposed and the trans-Atlantic permit in the form proposed omitting paragraph ( e ) referred to above. It is further understood by my Government that upon the designation by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the customs airport serving London to be used by Imperial Airways and Pan American Airways Company referred to in paragraph ( b ) of the proposed trans-Atlantic permit to be issued to Pan American Airways Company my Government will be furnished with information as to the designation of such airport, together with maps and flying directions showing entrance thereto to be used in the operation of the trans-Atlantic service contemplated in the exchange of notes. It is of course assumed as a necessary condition to the commencement of the trans-Atlantic service that Pan American Airways will receive permits from the Governments of the Irish Free State and Canada satisfactory to my Government. I have [etc.] For the Ambassador: Ray Atherton Counselor of Embassy 93 Not printed. 94 Paragraph ( e ) reads: “That Imperial Airways, or a company in which Imperial Airways has a controlling interest, is authorized concurrently by the United States Government for a similar period to conduct similar reciprocal civil air transport service of the same frequency and under similar conditions between Bermuda and the United States, using therein the customs port used by Pan American Airways as the United States terminal.” The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 811.79640/343: Telegram [Document 572] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State London , December 30, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 30—1:40 p.m.] 633. Embassy’s despatch 2569, October 9. Foreign Office note in reply just received. Generally favorable except as regards concluding paragraph of my note of October 9. Reply reads: “The United Kingdom Government regret that for their part they are unable to accept the assumption that the receipt by Pan American Airways of permits from the Governments of Canada and the Irish Free State satisfactory to the United States Government is a necessary condition to the commencement of the trans-Atlantic service. It appears to them that as between the United Kingdom and United States Governments the necessary conditions are fulfilled by the grant of the requisite permits by the two Governments to Pan American Airways and Imperial Airways respectively”. Copies 95 by pouch on the steamer Washington tomorrow. Bingham [Reciprocal exchanges of permits were effected in 1937 by notes dated February 9 and March 11 from the Irish and Canadian Ministers, respectively, in the United States, and a British note of March 4, transmitted in despatch No. 2904, March 5, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and by three notes, each dated April 20, from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, the Canadian Minister, and the Irish Minister, transmitting letters dated April 17 from the Department of Commerce for delivery to the three interested Governments.] 95 Not printed. Refusal of the British Government to recognize the right of the United States to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying the British flag, except as provided by treaty Refusal of the British Government to recognize the right of the United States to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying the British flag, except as provided by treaty [573] The British Chargé (Mallet) to the Secretary of State Washington, September 21, 1936. 611.00244/140 The British Chargé (Mallet) to the Secretary of State 611.00244/140 [Document 573] The British Chargé ( Mallet ) to the Secretary of State 96 No. 305 Washington , September 21, 1936. Sir : I have the honour to inform you, on the instructions of His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the attention of His Majesty’s Government has been drawn to the terms of the Act—Public No. 755—74th Congress which was approved on the 22nd June last, 97 defining the jurisdiction of the United States coastguards. 2. It is observed that under the terms of the Bill United States coastguards are authorized “at any time to go on board of any vessel, subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, to address enquiries to those on board, to examine ships’ documents and papers, and to examine, inspect and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.” In order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding I have been instructed to place on record that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom cannot recognize the right of the United States authorities to exercise any of the powers in question outside territorial waters proper over any vessel flying the British flag, except as provided for by the Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States of January 23rd, 1924. 98 I have [etc.] V. A. L. Mallet 96 By note dated September 28, 1936, the Secretary of State acknowledged receipt of this communication. 97 49 Stat. 1820. 98 Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. i , p. 158 . Informal representations against proposed preferential tariff rates in certain British West African colonies favoring Empire trade Informal representations against proposed preferential tariff rates in certain British West African colonies favoring Empire trade 99 99 Informal representations were also made to the French Government with respect to the French West African colonies (648L.113/10c, 11). [574] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, August 18, 1936. [Received August 24.] 648L.003/24 [575] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] September 21, 1936. 648L.113/12 [576] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, October 13, 1936. 648L.113/10a [577] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, October 23, 1936—7 p.m. 648L.113/10b: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State 648L.003/24 [Document 574] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State No. 2466 London , August 18, 1936. [Received August 24.] Subject: Proposed Preferential Margin of Duty on Tobacco Imported into Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum prepared by the Agricultural Attaché regarding the possible imposition by the Governments of Nigeria and the Gold Coast of a preferential margin of duty on tobacco equal to 25% of the full rate, with a minimum of 3d. per pound, to be allowed on tobacco leaf of British Empire origin imported into those countries. It will be noted that American tobacco exports might be adversely affected by such action, and that Dr. Taylor states that “the near approach of the time when these preferential duties may be imposed, namely October 1936, suggests the advisability of an early attempt to forestall such action”. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Herschel V. Johnson First Secretary of Embassy [Enclosure—Memorandum] The Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom ( Taylor ) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Reference is made to the interview yesterday with Mr. E. J. O’Brien, Jr., representing Edward J. O’Brien and Company, Leaf Tobacco Brokers, of Louisville, Kentucky, concerning the threatened imposition of preferential tobacco tariffs in two British West African Possessions, namely Gold Coast and Nigeria. The situation seems to be that the United States has an annual export trade of about 10,000,000 pounds of tobacco exported to West Africa, of which about 5,000,000 pounds are sent to British Possessions. Since April, 1932, Cambia has had a duty of 1s. 3d. on unmanufactured tobacco from foreign sources compared with 1s. if from Empire sources. Since the same date Sierra Leone has had a duty of 1s. 6d. on foreign unmanufactured tobacco and 1s. 2d. if from Empire sources. Gold Coast, since 1928, has had a duty of 2s. 3d. and Nigeria, since 1924, a duty of 2s. per pound without preference to Empire sources. Last October France gave 12 months’ notice of termination of its treaty with the United Kingdom 1 guaranteeing, among other things, equality in duties on French and British goods imported into the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The Tobacco Federation of the British Empire on April 30, 1936, submitted the following request to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: “The Tobacco Federation understands that the French Government may decide not to renew the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 relating to the equality of fiscal treatment for English and French products imported into certain English and French West African territories. In which event the Tobacco Federation asks that the Secretary of State for the Colonies may recommend to the Governments of Nigeria and the Gold Coast that a preferential margin of duty equal to 25% of the full rate, with a minimum of 3d. a pound, be allowed by them on tobacco leaf of British Empire origin imported into Nigeria and the Gold Coast.” Most of the tobacco now entering the Gold Coast and Nigeria is of Black Fat and Dark African types originating in the United States. The value is relatively low so that a 25 percent preference would provide a substantial opportunity for the entry of tobacco of similar types from Nyasaland and other British producing countries. The near approach of the time when these preferential duties may be imposed, namely October, 1936, suggests the advisability of an early attempt to forestall such action. Tables are attached 2 showing total imports of unmanufactured tobacco into Sierra Leona, Gold Coast and Nigeria for the years 1925 to 1934, and exports by types from the United States to these countries in 1934 and 1935. Respectfully, C. C. Taylor 1 The Anglo-French Convention of June 14, 1898, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. xci , p. 38. 2 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs 648L.113/12 [Document 575] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] September 21, 1936. [Present:] Mr. Dunn, 3 Mr. H. O. Chalkley, British Commercial Counselor, Mr. Minter. On the occasion of Mr. Chalkley’s visit to the Western European Division on another matter we took the opportunity to relate to him the information we had received regarding the proposal to establish preferential duties in favor of Empire grown tobacco sent to Nigeria and the Gold Coast after the termination on October 22, 1936, of the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 which had provided for equal fiscal treatment in certain West African colonies. We told Mr. Chalkley that the rehandling factories in Kentucky had built up over the past ten years a trade with those colonies now representing nearly $2,000,000 yearly. The present equipment was erected exclusively to accommodate the native trade there. The proposed differential would amount to from 12 to 14 cents per pound on this cheap tobacco. Our agricultural economists had informed the Department that such differential would definitely put these plants out of business. We hope, therefore, that some consideration will be given to the fatal effect which such differential would have upon those who had accommodated that trade for so many years. 3 James Clement Dunn, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 648L.113/10a [Document 576] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) No. 1460 Washington , October 13, 1936. Sir : With reference to the Embassy’s despatch No. 2466, dated August 18, 1936, entitled “Proposed Preferential Margin of Duty on Tobacco Imported into Nigeria and the Gold Coast” there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Dunn and Mr. H. O. Chalkley, British Commercial Counselor held September 21, 1936, 4 on the same subject. There is also enclosed a copy of a memorandum prepared in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, 5 and dealing with the West African trade in tobacco. You are requested, if opportunity presents itself, to supplement by informal reference to the subject the expression of concern which has been conveyed through Mr. Chalkley, and to report to the Department on the results thereof, and to submit any other available information on the whole question. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore 4 Supra . 5 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 648L.113/10b: Telegram [Document 577] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , October 23, 1936—7 p.m. 379. Department’s instruction No. 1460, October 13, 1936. Although tobacco manufacturers appear to be the most vitally interested in a proposed change in tariff policy in British West African Colonies following termination of the Anglo-French Convention of 1898, and although the flour millers have subsequently made equally strong appeals for assistance, we believe that the whole principle of imposing new duty differentials calculated to destroy long standing trade is one which may be attacked by us on the ground of: ( a ) Such would be wholly out of line with recently expressed policies and completed acts by the great trading nations in the direction of rehabilitation and rationalization of world trade and ( b ) Since we have made clear to the British that the conclusion of a trade agreement with the United Kingdom (including the Colonies later, if not at once) would be almost impossible without some narrowing of duty differentials on the part of the British, 6 any new differentials which would have eventually to be negotiated away would be considered by us as somewhat in the nature of “tariff padding”. We, therefore, request that you represent our general concern (naming, if you think advisable, tobacco and flour as specific examples) along the following lines: (1) Under the regime of equality of treatment which has always been in force in the United States and for nearly 40 years in the British West African Colonies of Nigeria and the Gold Coast, trade between the United States and those Colonies has flourished. Within the United States large capital investments have been made to manufacture and deliver to those Colonies articles which have been well received and purchased in increased quantities. On the other hand, the United States has become by reason of public demand and freedom of opportunity a substantial and apparently permanent market for a number of West African products. (2) The Government of the United States is greatly concerned over rumors which have come to it that consideration may be given to such alteration in the tariff policy of the West African Colonies as might destroy the flourishing trade from the United States to those Colonies, built up under this regime of equality of treatment. It, therefore, feels constrained to urge that due consideration be given to the inequity inherent in a system which would hamper or stop the importation of American goods into those Colonies and cause loss of investment and income to American manufacturers and shippers, especially while the trade continues to flourish in the other direction, and to request that there shall continue to be accorded equality of treatment to American goods entering those Colonies. (3) The Government of the United States considers that it would be particularly unfortunate if such action were taken at a time when the world is beginning to move away from the destructive commercial policies which have done so much damage to international trade in recent years. Any such action would have the appearance of inconsistency with recently expressed policies by the Governments of Great Britain and other leading trading nations. Hull [In paragraph 2 of his telegram No. 552, November 20, 1936, 8 p.m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom stated that the British Foreign Secretary had “referred to the West African Tobacco question (Department’s 379, October 23, 7 p.m.) … and said he was not prepared to make a statement … at this time, but he would like to assure me that no steps would be taken such as were apprehended without further consultation.” For full text of telegram No. 552, see page 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 552 ] .] 6 See pp. 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 513 ] ff. Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 7 7 41 Stat. 437. [578] The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State Washington, December 30, 1935. 841.6363/412 [579] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lindsay) Washington, June 3, 1936. 841.6363/422 [580] The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State Washington, 6 July, 1936. 841.6363/423 [581] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lindsay) Washington, July 20, 1936. 841.6363/425 The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State 841.6363/412 [Document 578] The British Ambassador ( Lindsay ) to the Secretary of State No. 367 Washington , December 30, 1935. Sir : I am directed by His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the Secretary for Mines has received from the Anglo-American Oil Company a number of applications for oil prospecting licenses under the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 8 covering in the aggregate several hundred square miles. The Anglo-American Oil Company, which is controlled by the Standard Oil Export Corporation of New York, have also expressed their desire to have assigned to them in due course a licence which has been applied for jointly by two British nationals, and which it is expected will shortly be issued to them. 2. This Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, vested in the Crown the property in petroleum existing in its natural condition in strata in Great Britain and gave power to the Board of Trade to grant licences to search for and get petroleum under the conditions contained in Regulations to be made under Section 6 of the Act. These conditions are contained in the Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1935, to which are scheduled the model clauses to be incorporated in licences. Copies of the Act and Regulations are enclosed herewith. 9 3. With regard to the question of the nationality of applicants or licensees, the following is the substance of the main provisions of the Regulations:— ( a ) In the case of aliens and Companies incorporated outside Great Britain or Northern Ireland it is a condition that an operating Company must be formed and registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland for the purpose of receiving the grant of, and exploiting, any licence (Regulation 2 (3)). ( b ) The Licensee may not assign the rights granted by the licence to any person other than a British subject or a Company incorporated in Great Britain or Northern Ireland (page 9—“Assignment of Licence”). ( c ) In the event of a licensee being controlled by an alien or a Company incorporated outside Great Britain or Northern Ireland, or if a licence is assigned to a foreign controlled Company at least one of the Directors of the Company and a majority of the persons employed in connection with operations under the licence must be British subjects (“Special clause” on pages 10 and 11). ( d ) A licence may only be held by nationals of those countries, the laws and customs of which accord comparable rights to British nationals (page 11). 4. The Secretary for Mines is prepared to grant the licences for which the Anglo-American Oil Company has applied, subject to the completion of formalities and to his being satisfied on the question arising on “( d )” above. For this purpose it will be necessary to ascertain the present position regarding the grant of oil concessions in the United States to persons who are not nationals of that country. 5. The position is apparently governed by the Mineral Leasing Act, 1920, as amended by an Act approved on the 21st August, 1935 (Public No. 297½—74th Congress—S. 3311). 10 A proviso to Section 1 of the original Act reads as follows:— “And provided further, that citizens of another country, the laws, customs, or regulations of which deny similar or like privileges to citizens or corporations of this country, shall not by stock ownership, stock holding, or stock control own any interest in any lease acquired under the provisions of this Act.” 6. I am therefore directed to enquire whether, having regard to the new Regulations now in force in Great Britain, that country is regarded, under the Mineral Leasing Act, 1920, as a reciprocal country, so as (in the wording of the “Special clause”) to permit British subjects or Companies incorporated in Great Britain or Northern Ireland or Companies incorporated in the United States controlled directly or indirectly by British subjects or Companies incorporated in Great Britain or Northern Ireland to acquire, hold and operate petroleum concessions, where the grant of such concessions is within the power, or subject to the approval of, the United States Government, on conditions which are reasonably comparable with the conditions upon which such rights are granted to nationals of the United States with the addition of conditions corresponding to those imposed by the clause entitled “Special clause”. I have [etc.] R. C. Lindsay 8 24 and 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36. 9 Not attached to original in files. 10 49 Stat. 674. The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lindsay) 841.6363/422 [Document 579] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Lindsay ) Washington , June 3, 1936. Excellency : Reference is made to your note of December 30, 1935, and subsequent correspondence with respect to the status of Great Britain under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920. An opinion establishing the determination of this status has now been rendered by the Attorney General indicating that under certain conditions Great Britain is to be regarded as a reciprocal country under the Act referred to. A copy in duplicate of the Attorney General’s opinion which is contained in a letter dated May 25, 1936, addressed to the Secretary of the Interior is enclosed herewith. Accept [etc.] Cordell Hull [Enclosure] The Attorney General ( Cummings ) to the Secretary of the Interior ( Ickes ) Washington , May 25, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I have the honor to comply with your request of April 25 for my opinion upon a question requiring interpretation of the Mineral Leasing Act, approved February 25, 1920, c. 85, 41 Stat. 437, 438 (U. S. C., Title 30, Sec. 181), and arising in connection with the following inquiry, addressed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador. [Here follows the text of note No. 367, December 30, 1935, from the British Ambassador, printed on page 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] .] The Petroleum (Production) Act (July 12, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36; Halsbury’s Statutes of England, v. 27, p. 442) contains no express provision regarding the issuance of licenses to aliens. Section 2 authorizes the Board of Trade to grant licenses to “such persons as they think fit,” and Section 6 requires the Board to prescribe by regulation “the manner in which and the persons by whom” applications for licenses may be made. Under the latter section the regulations are required to be laid before each House of Parliament, with power in either House to annul them by resolution within twenty-eight days. Therefore the matter is controlled by the regulations, apparently of statutory force. I quote below the pertinent portions of the regulations, which are paraphrased and interpreted (in part) in the Ambassador’s communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Your Department has adopted the tentative view that Great Britain is a reciprocal country within the contemplation of the Mineral Leasing Act, and you so informed the Secretary of State, in response to an inquiry, but suggested that the matter should be referred to me, and you have now requested my opinion. The applicable provision of the Act of February 25, 1920, is contained in Section 1 thereof, which reads as follows: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This statute authorizes the granting of leases to American citizens and corporations, but recognizes the fact that stock in such corporations may be held by nationals of foreign countries, and forbids it only as applied to citizens (including corporations) of other countries whose laws, customs or regulations deny similar or like privileges to citizens or corporations of this country. The British requirements are generally comparable in that, while they appear to authorize the holding of licenses only by British subjects and corporations, they permit stock ownership in such corporations by citizens and corporations of countries which accord comparable rights to British nationals. Our statute contains nothing corresponding with the provision of the British regulations that, in the case of corporations controlled by aliens, at least one of the directors shall be a British subject and a majority of the persons employed in or about the licensed area shall be British subjects, but I do not regard the British requirements in this respect as affecting the status of Great Britain as a reciprocal country within the contemplation of the statute. The requirements are not unduly restrictive or harsh, and some such provisions, particularly with respect to directors, may be found in the corporation laws of our States. The state laws have no direct connection with the right to remove mineral deposits from the public domain of the United States, but have a practical bearing to the extent that persons who invoke the laws of a particular State must meet the requirements of those laws, at least in matters relating to organization and affecting the right to exist as a body corporate. To undertake an examination of the corporate organization laws of the several States and Territories in this connection would be impracticable and would serve no useful purpose. They are either restrictive or liberal in varying degrees and in different particulars, but a corporation organized under any of them may obtain a lease under the Federal statute. The legislative history of the Mineral Leasing Act has been examined, but nothing therein warrants particular mention. I have also inquired into the practice during the sixteen years that the Act has been effective and find that the question of eligibility of nationals of particular countries has received the attention of the Department of State and of the Department of the Interior in only a limited number of instances. The question does not appear to have arisen heretofore in connection with nationals of Great Britain, as distinguished from nationals of outlying portions of the British Empire. Leases have been issued to corporations controlled by citizens of some of the Provinces of Canada, but involving statutes other than the British Petroleum (Production) Act. It is sufficient to say that no ruling heretofore made and brought to my attention bears adversely upon the question of the status of Great Britain as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act. Considering the foregoing, it is my opinion that Great Britain is to be regarded as a reciprocal country under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, provided that the Petroleum (Production) Act and the regulations made thereunder are so construed and applied by the British authorities as to permit participation by American citizens and corporations under conditions no less favorable than those hereinbefore indicated, based upon my understanding of the statute and regulations and the statements of the British Ambassador, and assuming that the matter is not adversely affected by other British statutes, regulations, or amendments which have not come to my attention or may hereafter be adopted. I am sending a copy of this opinion to the Secretary of State because of his interest and since he also has submitted the matter for my consideration. Respectfully, [ Homer Cummings ] The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State 841.6363/423 [Document 580] The British Ambassador ( Lindsay ) to the Secretary of State No. 203 (C. 277) Washington , 6 July, 1936. Sir : I have the honour to refer to your note of June 3, 1936, with which you forwarded to me a copy of an opinion by the Attorney General indicating that under certain conditions Great Britain is to be regarded as a reciprocal country under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920. 2. I have now received telegraphic instructions from His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, of Great Britain and the Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1935, made thereunder are construed as permitting participation by United States citizens and corporations under conditions no less favourable than those indicated in the Attorney General’s letter. The matter is not adversely affected by any other statutes, regulations or amendments in Great Britain. In these circumstances the Secretary for Mines is prepared to grant the application of the Anglo-American Oil Company for prospecting licences over certain areas in Great Britain and to proceed with the issue of licenses to the company. Before doing so however he desires to obtain confirmation that in view of these further explanations the United States Government does in fact regard Great Britain as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act, 1920. 3. I am instructed to communicate the above considerations to the United States Government and to enquire whether they enable the required confirmation to be given. I have [etc.] R. C. Lindsay The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lindsay) 841.6363/425 [Document 581] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Lindsay ) Washington , July 20, 1936. Excellency : Reference is made to your note of July 6th, requesting confirmation that the Government of the United States does in fact regard Great Britain as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. I have the honor to inform you that the Department of the Interior is now prepared to recognize Great Britain as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. A copy of the letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior in this connection is enclosed. 11 Accept [etc.] Cordell Hull 11 Not printed. Unsatisfactory trade relations between the United States and Australia Unsatisfactory trade relations between the United States and Australia 1 1 For previous correspondence regarding trade with Australia, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 9 ff. [582] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, March 4, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 4—12:30 p.m.] 611.4731/141: Telegram [583] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, March 6, 1936—3 p.m. 611.4731/141: Telegram [584] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, March 16, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 16—5:23 a.m.] 611.4731/142: Telegram [585] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, April 2, 1936—2 p.m. [Received April 2—6:19 a.m.] 611.4731/143: Telegram [586] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, April 6, 1936—4 p.m. [Received April 6—9:45 a.m.] 611.4731/144: Telegram [587] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, April 10, 1936—6 p.m. 611.4731/144: Telegram [588] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, April 24, 1936—noon. [Received April 24—10:35 a.m.] 611.4731/155: Telegram [589] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, May 7, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 7—10:50 a.m.] 611.4731/158: Telegram [590] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, May 21, 1936—10 a.m. [Received May 20—11 p.m.] 611.4731/160: Telegram [591] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, May 22, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 22—9:15 a.m.] 647.006/51: Telegram [592] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, May 23, 1936—4 p.m. [Received May 23—5:18 a.m.] 647.006/52: Telegram [593] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, May 27, 1936—5 p.m. 647.116/135a: Telegram [594] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, May 29, 1936—noon. [Received May 29—1:22 a.m.] 647.116/136: Telegram [595] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Melbourne (Dye) Washington, June 1, 1936—2 p.m. 647.116/147a: Telegram [596] The Consul at Melbourne (Dye) to the Secretary of State Melbourne, June 1, 1936—6 p.m. [Received June 1—8:20 a.m.] 647.116/139: Telegram [597] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, June 4, 1936—noon. 647.116/148a: Telegram [598] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, June 5, 1936—5 p.m. [Received June 6—2:13 p.m.] 647.006/54: Telegram [599] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, June 5, 1936—6 p.m. 647.116/152a: Telegram [600] The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Pearce) to the American Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Canberra, 6 June, 1936. 647.116/188 [601] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, June 10, 1936—11 a.m. [Received 2 p.m.] 647.116/153: Telegram [602] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, June 24, 1936—11 a.m. 647.116/153: Telegram [603] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, June 25, 1936—7 p.m. [Received June 25—10:10 a.m.] 647.116/181: Telegram [604] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, June 27, 1936—10 a.m. [Received June 27—6:47 a.m.] 647.116/182: Telegram [605] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, June 29, 1936—6 p.m. 611.473/22a: Telegram [606] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, August 7, 1936. [Received September 9.] 647.116/235 [607] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 26, 1936. 611.0031/2419 [608] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, October 10, 1936—noon. 611.4731/188a: Telegram [609] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, October 12, 1936—7 p.m. [Received October 12—1 p.m.] 611.4731/190: Telegram [610] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, October 16, 1936—3 p.m. 611.4731/192a: Telegram [611] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, October 27, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 28—7 a.m.] 611.4731/194: Telegram [612] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, October 31, 1936—2 p.m. 611.4731/194: Telegram [613] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, November 5, 1936—noon. [Received November 5—11:15 a.m.] 611.4731/196: Telegram [614] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, November 18, 1936—6 p.m. 647.116/249a: Telegram [615] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, November 19, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 19—10 a.m.] 647.003/326: Telegram [616] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, November 20, 1936—noon. [Received November 20—9:20 a.m.] 647.116/250: Telegram The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/141: Telegram [Document 582] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , March 4, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 4—12:30 p.m.] Sir Henry Gullett 2 telephoned me from Melbourne this morning asking me to inform you of the serious position in which the Commonwealth Government is finding itself as a result of the very great increase of exports into Australia, one effect of which has been to reduce available balances with which to meet its overseas obligations. The fact that imports from the United States are continuing to advance while exports to America are increasing only slightly, if at all, is causing the Commonwealth Government acute embarrassment. In the circumstances he asked me to telegraph his request that the United States should now send a delegate to Australia to initiate trade negotiations or else empower me to negotiate with him; he just did not have the staff to send any one to America. I said that I would naturally transmit his request but that I felt it only fair to point out (1) our disinclination to negotiate elsewhere than in Washington (2) the difficulties of making concessions on competitive products at this stage of our trade agreement program, and (3) the fact that Australia had as yet shown little inclination to talk about reciprocal concessions even if not evenly balanced. He answered that Australia had been very patient and had recognized our political difficulties by not pressing us since 1934 but that now he felt that we should recognize Australia’s serious position. He indicated that the pressure on the Government artificially to restrict American imports was growing stronger in proportion as Australian balance of payments was becoming less favorable. It is only recently that even insiders have begun to appreciate that despite the almost record year for exports the local boom fostered by the banks has resulted in increased imports to a point where Australia’s London funds are being depleted. In all probability steps will soon have to be taken to check the boom and thus reduce imports. I cannot believe that the Australian Government really expects to reach an agreement with us soon but I do think that it is very anxious for political reasons to initiate formal negotiations. Moffat 2 Australian Minister in charge of trade treaties. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 611.4731/141: Telegram [Document 583] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , March 6, 1936—3 p.m. Your March 4, 5 p.m. Please inform Gullett that we have had constantly in mind the Australian proposals of 1934 3 and have not ceased to hope that we would eventually be able to negotiate on a reciprocal basis. We regret to inform him, however, that conditions surrounding the products in which Australia is interested have not changed to a point where we could at this time make any undertakings in respect of duty reductions or guaranteed quantities. Consequently, and in view also of Australia’s manifest inability to offer concessions on our products, we fear we shall have to postpone the suggested serious step towards negotiating an agreement. Please do not fail to enlarge upon the reference to ultimate benefits to Australia from generalization which was made in our January 15, 8 p.m., 1935, 4 and to point out that there is after another year of our program even stronger ground for our asserted beliefs about those benefits. It should not be overlooked that increased purchases by the United States in other countries creates credits some of which are used to purchase Australian products in increased quantities. Our program looks ahead to normal multilateral trading which cannot be attained by the abortive bi-lateral stop gaps now so prevalent in the world. Hull 3 See Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 831 ff. 4 Ibid. , 1935, vol. ii , p. 9 . The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/142: Telegram [Document 584] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , March 16, 1936—6 p.m. [Received March 16—5:23 a.m.] Department’s telegram of March 6, 3 p.m. Gullett was obviously greatly disappointed by the tenor of the Department’s telegram. He hoped that our unfavorable answer was not the result of the proposals contained in the Australian note of June, 1934, 5 which he definitely withdrew. I found the members of the Government in Canberra increasingly worried by the present precarious position of Australia’s London funds and was assured by Gullett that such measures as may have to be taken in the near future to limit imports will be due primarily to financial and only secondarily to commercial reasons. In such a process our trade position is, of course, the most vulnerable, and in view of our refusal to negotiate at this time Gullett foresees that the Government may soon be forced to yield to growing political pressure and introduce measures artificially to restrict and possibly even to divert American trade. He recognizes that our program is the best designed to restore world trade but maintains that the long term considerations we advance cannot prevail against the immediate importance of keeping Australia’s financial credit intact. Full memorandum [of] conversation by air mail via London. 6 Moffat 5 See telegram of June 5, 1934, 4 p.m., from the Consul General at Sydney, Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 841 . 6 Despatch No. 154, March 16, 1936; not printed. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/143: Telegram [Document 585] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , April 2, 1936—2 p.m. [Received April 2—6:19 a.m.] Carrying one stage further his threat to restrict or divert to better customers American imports into Australia (reported in my March 16, 4 [ 6 ] p.m.) Gullett yesterday announced in Parliament that special subcommittee of the Cabinet had been appointed to explore every avenue which seemed to have some possibility of correcting the present adverse trade balance. The Prime Minister 7 later announced that the Government hoped soon to formulate its policy vis-à-vis American trade and would announce it after the Easter recess. The debate in Parliament showed great bitterness notably on the part of the Government’s supporters at the extent of American imports, and the Government was pretty generally accused of weakness in dealing with the United States. While I am still hopeful that the Government will be unable seriously to dislocate the more essential items of our trade with Australia, nevertheless I do not believe that Lyons and Gullett are any longer bluffing. I think that we must look forward to some formal adverse action (probably discriminatory) if for no other reason than that the Government must try to shift on to other shoulders the blame for a condition of affairs where imports have increased to a point which is causing concern as to the future of Australia’s financial credit. Moffat 7 Joseph A. Lyons. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/144: Telegram [Document 586] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , April 6, 1936—4 p.m. [Received April 6—9:45 a.m.] Since my April 2, 2 p.m. there have been several developments which lead me to believe that the Australian Government will probably advocate the enactment of legislation which would affect our trade more drastically than I had previously anticipated. The Prime Minister who has heretofore remained in the background has now definitely associated himself with this movement. Commenting on Grady’s 8 conciliatory statements in Washington, Lyons gave out an interview the gist of which was that the United States is indifferent to Australia, that he had made it clear to the authorities in Washington last summer that if something were not done to ameliorate the trade balance Australia would take independent steps to correct it and that it was evident that we were unwilling to underrate [ sic ] Australia’s position or help. The conservative press is taking its cue from this interview and is creating a psychological atmosphere in favor of drastic action. I have naturally been thinking over ways and means to counteract this trend; on the one hand I assume that we cannot afford to initiate trade negotiations as an answer to threats to curtail our imports; on the other hand if trouble is to come we should try to place on Lyons the onus of refusing a further opportunity to talk matters over. With these points in mind I respectfully submit for your consideration the possibility of the Secretary sending directly to Lyons a telegram making inter alia the following points. (1) That it is clear from reports reaching the Secretary of recent statements in Parliament and elsewhere that there still exists in Australia an inadequate understanding of the purposes and progress of our trade agreement program. (2) That the last thing that could be claimed of America’s attitude toward Australia is that we are indifferent to its welfare. (3) The fact that certain erroneous impressions persist is probably due to the absence of diplomatic representatives with whom constant contact could be maintained and who could currently explain our respective points of view. (4) That since the inception of our trade agreement program Australia has had no accredited representative stationed in America and serious misunderstanding has resulted. (5) That we would welcome a decision on the part of Australia to exchange diplomatic representatives with us and that we believed an Australian Minister in Washington could through his presence do much toward clearing up the existing misunderstanding and preventing new ones from arising. (6) That we hoped the suggestion would commend itself, as it would be nothing less than tragic if meanwhile either country should take a stand which might embitter the feelings of genuine friendship now existing. Lyons is leaving on Wednesday to spend the Easter holidays in Tasmania but is returning to Canberra early next week when the Cabinet subcommittee is expected to submit the preliminary report to him. My telegram allotment already exceeded; respectfully request the allocation of an additional $750 as telegraphing is bound to be heavy and is exceptionally expensive. Moffat 8 Henry F. Grady, Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 611.4731/144: Telegram [Document 587] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , April 10, 1936—6 p.m. Your April 6, 4 p.m., and previous. I appreciate the good efforts you have made to present our point of view to the proper people there. I am, of course, disappointed that in spite of their expressed recognition of the soundness of our program they still feel that they should take drastic action singling out our commerce. I quote for your consideration a communication from me to the Prime Minister which you may transmit if you think it will be helpful: “My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have been exceedingly concerned at press reports of recent statements in the Australian Parliament and elsewhere which indicate that there exists in Australia a feeling that the United States Government is indifferent to the welfare of Australia. I believe that the last thing that can be said of America’s attitude toward Australia is that we are indifferent to its welfare, and I want you to know that although compelling circumstances have made a trade agreement between the two countries not feasible up to the present I have hoped that our general program of gradually lowering trade restrictions would in many indirect ways benefit Australian commerce—a result I would welcome. First of all, I am sure you will recognize that the development of our trade agreements program, because of the breadth of its aims, must unfortunately be a comparatively slow process. The conclusion of each agreement in strict conformity with the Act of June 12, 1934, 9 entails an enormous amount of work by a large staff of experts. It was obviously impossible to negotiate with 65 countries at the same time. We have already concluded 11 agreements, with several more in the final stages. We feel we have made considerable progress with the program of extending trade agreements on the most-favored-nation basis and have been very much encouraged by the increasing recognition given to the basic soundness of the plan to increase trade by the removing of barriers and restrictions and making possible the wider extension of the beneficial effects of such increased trade. It is in the persistent extension of these trade agreements that the circumstances of triangular and multilateral trade naturally come into play. That is to say, it is found most profitable to both seller and purchaser for this country, for example, to sell more to industrial Europe than it buys from Europe while at the same time buying more from South America than it sells to South America, and for Europe to sell more to South America than it buys. The results are mutually profitable purchases and payments in this triangular manner. I feel sure you recognize that the test of profitable relations between nations is not found in a balancing bilateral arrangement between every two nations trading with each other. This negatives and eventually destroys the triangular and multilateral trade methods and the immense volume of trade thus carried on, and I am convinced that the foodstuff and raw material countries have learned by experience that these broader multilateral trade methods are the most profitable means of disposing of their surpluses to the industrial parts of the world and securing payment therefor. The agreements we have already made have gone a long way toward removing various trade restrictions in a number of countries, which lessening of restrictions should facilitate the sale of Australian goods. Furthermore, the increases in trade arising from the new American commercial agreements create greater purchasing power for Australian products which should be reflected in Australian trade with other countries. At this crucial and critical stage of the contest between extreme economic nationalism and sane, practical international economic cooperation, the United States Government feels that having undertaken a vigorous initiative in the fight for liberal commercial policy, for the substitution of the principle of equality for that of discriminations as the cornerstone of its own and of world commercial policy, it has real ground to appeal to other great surplus-producing countries, such as Australia, to recognize the broad objective of economic liberalism and its mutual benefits to all nations. I hope that instead of feeling disposed to restrict our trade, Australia will see her way clear to join in this great undertaking in that broad and liberal spirit which is the chief characteristic of our present combined domestic and international economic program. Cordell Hull.” I appreciate your suggestions with regard to exchange of diplomatic missions. As we have already signified our willingness to do so I do not feel I should take any further steps along those lines at this time nor do I feel that that would be any real solution to the immediate problem which your April 9, 2 p.m. 10 indicates has improved. If you have any further suggestions respecting the substance or phraseology of my message, please telegraph them at once. Hull 9 48 Stat. 943. 10 Not printed. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/155: Telegram [Document 588] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , April 24, 1936—noon. [Received April 24—10:35 a.m.] My telegram of April 15, 10 a.m. 10 While I do not want the Department to gain the impression that the threat to restrict our trade with Australia is no longer acute, nevertheless it begins to look as though drastic action may be postponed until the next session of Parliament. There are four principal reasons for this improved outlook. 1. Continuing unfavorable press reaction. 2. Successful lobbying on the part of Australian industrialists who seem to have convinced even the most hostile members of the Government that effective restrictions against the more important items of American trade (notably chassis, petroleum, tobacco, and machinery) would seriously affect established Australian industries, with repercussions on employment. 3. A deadlock in Australia’s trade negotiations with Japan. Acting apparently under pressure from British manufacturers, Australia has told Japan that she must either limit her rayon consignments to a fraction of her 1935 figures or else be faced with prohibitive duties or quotas; Japan has countered by threatening to retaliate against Australian wool to the extent she feels able. 4. A natural disinclination to make any move which might embitter us until Australia has decided whether she will back down or risk a trade war with Japan. I have just had a message from the Prime Minister to the effect that he is preparing a reply to your personal letter which he will forward at an early date. Moffat 10 Not printed. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/158: Telegram [Document 589] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , May 7, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 7—10:50 a.m.] Your telegram of April 10, 6 p.m. The Prime Minister has requested me to transmit to you the following reply to your personal letter. In view of its length I am not telegraphing the introductory paragraphs in which Mr. Lyons welcomes your assurances that America is not indifferent to Australia’s welfare and refers to the friendship felt in Australia for the United States. The letter continues: “Where friendship exists, frankness is permissible. Therefore permit me to speak frankly and to say that there is a growing feeling in this country that in so far as economic questions are concerned we have not received from the United States that measure of practical reciprocity which the high position Australia has always held as an overseas market of the United States entitles us to expect. In this country your great fight for economic liberalism has been [viewed] with admiration, and I need scarcely say that the activities of the United States Government in the negotiation of trade agreements have been watched with close interest by the Australian Government. We had hoped that through the extension to Australia of the duty reduction effected under these agreements some tangible benefits to Australian commerce would have resulted. It is with regret, however, that we have observed that the agreements concluded to date have neither directly nor indirectly ameliorated our trading difficulties.” Next follow three long paragraphs ( a ) sympathizing with the principle of multilateral trade and equality of commercial treatment, ( b ) recounting the tariff reductions made by the Lyons government since it assumed office, and ( c ) pointing out that Australia notwithstanding its overseas interest, still buys abroad more than 11 pounds per head of population. The letter continues: “Notwithstanding this policy, several former important outlets for our exportable surplus have been severely curtailed owing to the application to our trade of the principle of bilateral balancing or other equally restrictive measures—restrictions which the Australian Government feels are not wholly unconnected with the failure of the great creditor nations of the world to adjust their economic policy to their creditor status. Our exports, upon which we must rely to pay for our imports and service our recurring interest and other overseas financial commitments, have not kept pace with our imports and, in order to preserve equilibrium, we are forced to a reconsideration of our economic policy particularly our position vis-à-vis those countries which do not afford this country facilities to cover its trading transactions by exchange of goods. It will, I am sure, be apparent to you that, while our former ‘good customer’ countries apply the bilateral principle to our commerce, we cannot continue to buy increased quantities of goods which are not absolutely essential to the national welfare from countries which do not allow payment to be made in Australian goods. Instead we must either obtain our requirements—possibly at a somewhat higher cost—from nations which will accept payment in the only form in which it is possible to effect settlement, or alternatively produce them at home where the same considerations in regard to payment do not enter. I should like you to appreciate that the problems which face my Government are urgent and pressing and any measures that do not offer some amelioration in the immediate future would not be of utility. There is no need to remind you that this country is emerging from a very serious financial depression of some years duration throughout which the greatest hardship and loss were suffered by very many of our people. Our economic and financial position has to be watched most carefully and every expedient adopted to restore our nation to a condition of greater prosperity. The considerations which prompt my Government to apply restrictions against the free flow of imports from the United States and other countries which fail to afford reasonable opportunities for making payment by the exchange of goods are not actuated by any spirit of unfriendliness but are dictated solely by the existing situation. My colleagues and I are conscious of, and are deeply appreciative of, the affinity which does, and I hope always will, prevail between our two peoples and I trust that no steps that we may be obliged to take will in any way disturb our cordial relationship. Yours sincerely, J. A. Lyons.” Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/160: Telegram [Document 590] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , May 21, 1936—10 a.m. [Received May 20—11 p.m.] The Prime Minister has now indicated that he will present to Parliament Friday afternoon or evening an amending tariff schedule designed to correct to some extent the adverse balance of trade with America. The new duties will become effective as soon as tabled but must be validated by Parliament within 6 months in order not to lapse. Although the new schedule is a closely guarded secret the best opinion available is that the “general tariff” rather will be substantially increased on a selected list of items of which we are the predominant supplier, with emphasis on luxury and semi-luxury products. Throughout the past 6 weeks editorial opinion has continued to caution against action directed exclusively at our trade; the Government’s supporters in Parliament on the other hand have been almost unanimous in pressing Lyons to take drastic action. Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.006/51: Telegram [Document 591] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , May 22, 1936—8 p.m. [Received May 22—9:15 a.m.] The Government this afternoon imposed a series of drastic measures designated to improve its trade situation. Not only were higher duties imposed on certain products but the importation of a long list of items from countries outside the British Empire was prohibited except under license issued by the Minister of Customs. The announced purpose was (1) to divert a certain amount of Australia’s imports from countries which were poor customers either to Australian secondary industries or alternately to Australia’s good customers; and (2) to curtail the importation of Japanese textiles upon which it had not been possible to reach a gentleman’s agreement covering the quantities to be imported. The list of goods for which import licenses will be required includes inter alia the following: motor chassis bodies and parts, motorcycles and parts, plate glass, linoleum and floor coverings, cosmetics, stationery, iron and steel sheets and plates, radio valves, vacuum cleaners, typewriters and parts, sewing machines, electric clothes washing machines, electric heating and cooking appliances, metal working machinery, etc. The most serious and entirely unexpected development was an announced purpose to create a local manufacture of motor engines and chassis. To this end various measures are to be taken concerning which I shall telegraph later. Negotiations will be entered into with Canada designed to bring about an arrangement whereby unit supply of imports of goods subject to license would not be diverted from their present source of origin to Canada; if friendly arrangements cannot be made Gullett announced that the Australian Government will have to consider this phase of the matter further. One effect of these measures upon our trade will be to encourage American firms to manufacture in Australia; other effects will depend upon the way in which the measures are to be administered. For the moment at least it looks as though the Government would make a determined attempt to divert our trade in the hope of blackmailing us into trade negotiations and concessions. I shall telegraph again as soon as we have had time more thoroughly to analyze the situation. Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.006/52: Telegram [Document 592] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , May 23, 1936—4 p.m. [Received May 23—5:18 a.m.] My May 12 [ 22 ], 8 p.m. A preliminary analysis of the Government’s new trade measures leads to the conclusion that about 80 percent of our total exports to Australia can maintain their position but that some 20 percent may be lost through artificial diversion, chiefly to British competition. These last, despite the advantages given them in the preferential tariff, primage tax, currency valuation for customs purposes, plus a natural predisposition of the Australian to buy British, have been pressing for further advantages. In fact Gullett stated that as the tariff policies of foreign countries had operated against Australian primary produce and as there was no immediate prospect of increasing sales in markets other than the United Kingdom, more must be sold there and to do that Great Britain must be given a greater market in Australia. Of the pounds 2,290,000 which the Government estimates will be diverted, Australian manufacturers are expected to benefit by pounds 845,000, good customer foreign countries by pounds 135,000 and the United Kingdom by pounds 1,310,000. In explaining the Government’s policy of licensing, Gullett announced that licenses would be freely granted in respect of imports from all countries from which Australia had a favorable balance of trade or where the Commonwealth was satisfied with the trading position. In the case of countries from which imports would be restricted the Government would be prepared to consider a modification of the restrictions in proportion to increased purchases from Australia which such countries might make from this time forward. There is a certain amount of local criticism of the Government for bringing forward such drastic changes in its policy as a complete surprise to the commercial community. There is considerable worry on the part of the pastoralists at the possibility of Japanese retaliation against Australian wool. As far as we are concerned there would be no surprise at our withdrawing from Australia generalization of duty free reductions but there is a distinct undercurrent of anxiety lest the new Australian policy may bring about a coolness in relations with the United States and less cooperation in the Pacific. The wisdom of striking simultaneously at American and Japanese trade is seriously questioned. Moffat The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 647.116/135a: Telegram [Document 593] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , May 27, 1936—5 p.m. Please convey the following formally to the Government of Australia unless you doubt the wisdom of all or any part: “A list, released by the Australian Customs Representative in New York, contains numerous items of interest to the United States to which the customs representative states that certain import restrictions will be applied by the Government of Australia under a tariff measure tabled May 22, 1936. The Government of the United States recognizes the right of every nation to determine its commercial policy and to enact measures and administer them in any way which the Governments concerned see fit for the purpose of carrying out these policies. Nevertheless, in view of the conviction which it has frequently urged upon other governments that only a mitigation of existing trade barriers can restore an adequate volume of international commerce for the benefit of all nations, the Government of the United States deplores the fact that the Government of Australia has seen fit to impose new and substantial restraints upon its import trade. Even more deeply does the Government of the United States deplore the fact that the Government of Australia has announced to the people of Australia and to the world that one of the primary purposes of the new measure is to restrict imports from the United States or to divert some of them to other countries. In various communications to the Government of Australia and to other Governments, the Government of the United States has pointed out that it attaches the greatest importance, in any program for a revival of world trade, to the establishment of a regime of equality of treatment in international commercial relations as a foundation for a broad and constructive commercial policy. This Government has, accordingly, adopted the policy of giving equal treatment to the commerce of all nations which do not discriminate against its commerce. Fourteen trade agreements have been concluded by the President of the United States under the authority granted to him by the Act of June 12, 1934, the text and purport of which must now be entirely familiar to the Government of Australia. The concessions made in the trade agreements which have been concluded have been extended to Australia without qualification and it is the intention of the United States Government to continue this practice so long as it is able, under a reasonable interpretation of the Act of June 12, 1934, to determine that United States commerce continues to enjoy equal treatment at the hands of the Government of Australia. The Government of the United States will therefore assume, until there is evidence to the contrary, that the import control system established by the recent action of the Government of Australia will be applied without discrimination against the commerce of the United States. Both the Government and the people of the United States have at all times entertained genuine feelings of friendship toward the Government and people of Australia and in the best of faith have been governed by such friendship in all relations between the two countries. Naturally, no two nations in the world undertake to maintain a strict balance of trade between themselves. There could not possibly arise in this connection, therefore, any relation whatever between trade balances and the friendly relations between such two countries. This is especially true in the light of the principle of trade equality which this Government applies to trade between the two countries. The Government of the United States would not be frank, therefore, if it did not express its surprise and disappointment that the Australian Government in presenting its case to the Parliament and to the people left the impression that there exists on the part of the Government and people of the United States an unsympathetic feeling born of indifference toward Australia’s present difficulties. It is not conceivable that in giving expression to these utterances there was any intention to give offense either by questioning the friendship of the American people or their good faith in its observance.” Hull The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.116/136: Telegram [Document 594] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , May 29, 1936—noon. [Received May 29—1:22 a.m.] Your May 27, 5 p.m. Members of the Cabinet have scattered for the Parliamentary recess and there is not a Minister in Canberra. Pearce, 12 Gullett are both in Melbourne; I am therefore proceeding there tomorrow and shall deliver your note on Monday. I am under no illusion that it will deter the Government from the discriminatory policy it has announced and which according to all indications will be applied against us as drastically as possible without self injury. I feel, however, that the public does not yet appreciate the degree to which such a policy is resented in America or its possible repercussion on our attitude. I hope that the Department will telegraph me at the Melbourne Consulate its wishes with regard to publicity. Moffat 12 Sir George F. Pearce, Australian Minister for External Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Consul at Melbourne (Dye) 647.116/147a: Telegram [Document 595] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Melbourne ( Dye ) Washington , June 1, 1936—2 p.m. For Moffat. You may use the sense of my May 27, 5 p.m. in any conversations you have but not for publication at the present time. You may, however, keep the idea in mind and let us have any suggestions you may have with regard to publicity if you consider it advisable. Hull The Consul at Melbourne (Dye) to the Secretary of State 647.116/139: Telegram [Document 596] The Consul at Melbourne ( Dye ) to the Secretary of State Melbourne , June 1, 1936—6 p.m. [Received June 1—8:20 a.m.] From Moffat. I presented note to Sir George Pearce this morning. Although he recognized the drawbacks and risks inherent in a deliberate attempt to divert trade, he held out no hope of any modification of the Government’s policy or of nondiscrimination in its application. Details of conversation by despatch. 13 Returning to Sydney, due Wednesday evening. [Moffat.] Dye 13 Despatch No. 215, June 3; not printed. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 647.116/148a: Telegram [Document 597] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , June 4, 1936—noon. Please communicate with the Government of Australia in the following sense: The Department has received directly from business men and indirectly through members of Congress an indication that American exporters who for many years have supplied the needs of Australian customers are alarmed about the possible results of the recent action of the Government of Australia. It appears that some agents in Australia have informed their principals that there is a complete embargo on all American products. Others have peremptorily cancelled all existing orders, while some who seem to have a better grasp of the situation nevertheless apprehend a far greater restriction on their trade than the Australian Government apparently proposed to effect. We do not believe that it was the intention of the Australian Government to cause widespread alarm and uncertainty and we feel that that Government will therefore wish to broadcast sufficient information to enable the business world both there and here to grasp the true implications of its recent action. We hope, therefore, that immediate steps will be taken to the end that such alarm be allayed and such uncertainty removed. Send Wellington a copy of my May 27 with explanations. Hull The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.006/54: Telegram [Document 598] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , June 5, 1936—5 p.m. [Received June 6—2:13 p.m.] Recent Ministerial speeches taken in conjunction with customhouse communiqués have now clarified the procedure in applying the Government’s new restrictive measures to point where there can be no further misunderstandings on the part of the business community. For us to request a more formal broadcasting might hereto only result in an uncompromising statement of intentions which would make an eventual liberalization of procedure more difficult. In order that the Department may have a brief summary of the situation insofar as it affects American trade which could be made available to business interests in the United States I submit the following: “1. Only such American goods as are on the so-called prohibited list which has been released by the Australian customs representative in New York require an import license. 2. Licenses will be granted for goods on the prohibited list which were ordered before May 22nd and are in transit on or before June 30th. 3. Two items on the prohibited list receive special treatment, namely, chassis and typewriters. Licenses for import from the United States will be issued for the year ending April 30, 1937, on a quota basis (100 percent for chassis, 75 percent for typewriters) calculated on the number imported from the United States during the year ended April 30, 1936. Licenses will be rationed out to importers in proportion to each one’s individual imports during that period. 4. Collectors of customs have received instructions to refuse and are automatically refusing licenses to import from the United States all other items on the prohibited list unless applications are accompanied by documents setting forth that they are unprocurable except at greatly increased cost from countries with which the balance of trade is in Australia’s favor or not heavily adverse to Australia. 5. Applications which are accompanied by such documents are being referred to Minister of Trade and Customs at Canberra who will consider whether the goods are essential goods of a kind unprocurable to better advantage elsewhere and will rule on each case individually.” Moffat The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 647.116/152a: Telegram [Document 599] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , June 5, 1936—6 p.m. Your June 4, 4:00 P.M. 14 Unless you preceive objection, please address a formal communication to the Government of Australia in the following sense: “The Government of the United States has been informed that the Customs Collector at Sydney is granting permits for importations from many countries while returning refused all applications relating to United States products not ordered before May 22, 1936 excepting those which cannot be procured in so-called approved countries. “The Government of the United States has not been officially informed by the Government of Australia of the policy it proposes to pursue in administering the tariff measure which was tabled in the Australian Parliament on May 22, 1936. The United States Government would therefore be grateful if it could be informed by the Government of Australia whether the Customs Collector at Sydney is acting under instructions from the Minister of Customs and if so whether this action should be taken as an indication of the policy which the Australian Government proposes to pursue toward the commerce of the United States.” We of course prefer to receive a written reply to the above communication, but if it appears that there will be delay or difficulty in securing the same an oral reply should be obtained. After full consideration the Department is inclined in the event that the Australian Government’s reply is unfavorable to suspend at once the application of the trade agreements rates to Australian products. This would be done in a routine manner and without further communication with the Australian Government. I should be very glad to have your views regarding this plan and any other comments or suggestions which may occur to you. Hull 14 Not found in Department files. The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Pearce) to the American Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 647.116/188 [Document 600] The Australian Minister for External Affairs ( Pearce ) to the American Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) 15 Canberra , 6 June, 1936. Sir : The Government of the Commonwealth has given full consideration to the representations of your Government as set out by you in your written communication of the 29th May, 16 and handed to me personally on the 1st instant. At the outset of my reply I should like to clear up one most unfortunate misapprehension which exists in the mind of your Government. In the speech in which the new licensing measure was introduced to Parliament there was neither word nor inference calculated to indicate that the Government of the Commonwealth was under the impression “that there exists on the part of the Government and the people of the United States an unsympathetic feeling born of indifference towards Australia’s present difficulties.” Such a thought has never occurred to the Government of the Commonwealth. In this regard, I would draw your attention to the Prime Minister’s letter to Mr. Cordell Hull, dated 6th May, 1936. 17 We have observed with anxiety the development of Australia’s adverse trade balance with the United States, but we have not associated it with any unfriendly thought in the mind of your Government or people. In principle we accept this continuing adverse balance as an outstanding example of the disequilibrium in the trade of two countries of a kind with which we have long been familiar. I would add that it was with very real regret that the Government of the Commonwealth felt itself compelled to place a limited number of imports under the operations of the new licensing system. The Government of the Commonwealth is in principle in agreement with the views as to the rehabilitation of international trade as expressed by the Government of the United States, but in the exceptional circumstances in which we find ourselves with respect to finance and trade we find it difficult, if not impossible, to put those principles fully into immediate effect. Nevertheless, I would point out that the present Government, commencing in the depth of the depression, has reduced the tariff level upon more items than probably any other Government in the world. Over some four years the Government has persistently revised its tariff downward. I mention this as evidence of the deep reluctance with which we entered upon the present licensing system. Our position may be summed up in a few sentences: We are at the same time a heavy debtor nation (as is common with most young countries in the development stage) and a heavy surplus producer of a wide range of primary produce. We are obliged therefore to arrange our overseas trade so that it will not only pay for our imports, but also provide us with a balance to the extent of at least £26,000,000 sterling to meet our annual interest and sinking fund commitments. Needless to say, the prestige of our overseas credit takes first place in our national policy. The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia has invariably and promptly met its overseas obligations—and is determined to continue to do so—but with foreign markets progressively and in some cases decisively closing against us, as they have been very generally in recent years, the maintenance of the essential overseas balance of payments presents some difficulties for the future to which we cannot be indifferent. In short, our position is that we are obliged to confine our imports to a total that, after allowance for the value of our exports, enables us to meet the service of our oversea debt. After prolonged investigation and consideration of these difficulties we were forced to conclude that any efforts we might make to keep the overseas financial position completely sound must be frustrated if we permitted a few great and rapidly growing adverse trade balances to continue uncurtailed. In addition to this vital financial phase of our problem there is the fact that if Australia is to make healthy national progress, and build sufficient strength to ensure its safety against all emergencies, we must as a first step further increase primary production. This can only be achieved by further exports. To obtain further exports we must take more imports from actual and potential buyers of our commodities. In some limited measure at least we must endeavour to control some part of our import trade from countries which, owing to circumstances, are unable to increase their purchases from the Commonwealth. The Government of the Commonwealth would point out that in the application of the licensing system it is not proposed to cut deeply into the total Australian import from any particular country. Measured by the present flow of trade, your country, even under the licensing system, will enjoy a favourable trade balance with Australia of many million pounds sterling per annum. I submit that this cannot be taken as in any sense harsh action against the United States. We have found it necessary to restrict the import of motor car chassis from the Dominion of Canada equally with those from the United States, and in the development of the manufacture of chassis within Australia which has been decided upon, we shall within a very few years be cutting across the import of chassis from the United Kingdom. With respect to your Government’s reference to potential benefits to Australia arising out of the application of most-favoured-nation treatment in its treaty making, I would point out that these benefits, so far as the Commonwealth is concerned, are more theoretical than real, and have not contributed to an amelioration of our economic difficulties. It appears to the Government of the Commonwealth that so long as the Government of the United States bases its trade agreement policy on the principle that in its bilateral trade negotiations with individual countries concessions are made only on those commodities which are supplied mainly by each treaty country, and at the same time is loth to enter into negotiations with Australia, the Government of the Commonwealth can hope for no real alleviation from the heavy duties which are imposed in the United States against the commodities which Australia exports. As evidence that Australia does not and never has subscribed to the principle of bilateral trade balances, we would direct your attention to the trade balance existing between the United States and the Commonwealth in the years immediately prior to 1929. You will find that over the five years ending with our financial year 1929/30, the Australian adverse merchandise balance with the United States was £29,000,000 sterling per annum. For the ten years ended 1934/35 our average adverse merchandise balance was £18,000,000 sterling per annum. It is appropriate also to mention that the annual service of our dollar loans entails remittances of over £3 millions sterling. The Commonwealth Government of today contains a number of members of the Government in power during those years, but we then took no steps whatever towards adjustment. The simple fact is that we have been most unwillingly forced into the present action by abnormal trading conditions, and especially by the rapidly progressive exclusion of our exports, as I have already said, by many countries, and not least by the United States. Within the past few months your Government, in our view, has imposed discriminatory dumping duties upon Australian butter and has raised duties against tallow. Moreover, obstacles have been placed in the way of the importation of barley malt. In our view it matters little whether exclusion is brought about by licensing, quotas, or prohibitive duties. The effect is the same, and we in particular have been sufferers. Under all the circumstances we hope that, while the Government of the United States may not be able to look with approval upon the introduction of the licensing system which we have been obliged to adopt, your Administration will appreciate that the limited curtailment which we have imposed upon imports has been imperative in our national interest, and that the step would not have been taken except after the most profound consideration. We greatly trust that this policy will in no way impair the exceptionally cordial relationship which has always existed between the Governments and the peoples of our two countries. I should be obliged if this communication could be regarded as completely confidential as between our two Governments. I am [etc.] R. G. Casey For the Minister for External Affairs 15 Transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Sydney in his despatch No. 223, June 8; received July 2. 16 See telegram of May 27, 5 p.m., to the Consul General at Sydney, p. 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] . 17 See telegram of May 7, 6 p.m., from the Consul General at Sydney, p. 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 589 ] . The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.116/153: Telegram [Document 601] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , June 10, 1936—11 a.m. [Received 2 p.m.] Your June 5, 6 p.m. It will probably take several days longer to obtain a reply to our note. In transmitting this I took the liberty of omitting the last clause, as the Australian note of June 6th (see my June 8, 5 p.m. 18 ) which crossed the Department’s instruction, had already outlined the Government’s intended policy toward American trade. Once we obtain written confirmation that the Collector of Customs is acting under instructions I do not see how we can any longer postpone the routine suspension of our trade agreement rates to Australian products; beyond that step, however, I can see no move we could make in the field of trade without risking still further measures of restriction. The public for the moment is paying little attention to possible American reaction to the Government’s new policy as it is genuinely alarmed over Japanese threats to retaliate against Australian wheat, flour and wool. If this retaliation should materialize on a large scale there might well be serious repercussions hereof. Moffat 18 Not printed; it transmitted a summary of the note of June 6, supra . The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 647.116/153: Telegram [Document 602] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , June 24, 1936—11 a.m. Your June 10, 11 a.m. We contemplate recommending to the President suspending application of trade agreement concessions to Australian products without waiting for a reply to our note. It is essential before taking such action that we have clear evidence that there is actual discrimination against American trade. The Commercial Attaché’s telegraphic report of June 4 19 states that the Sydney Customs Collector was granting permits for importation to many countries, but was returning refused all applications relating to American products. Please report by telegraph: (1) whether this practice is being continued, (2) whether other customs collectors are following the same practice, and (3) whether this practice applies to all or the greater part of the items on the prohibited list. Please cite specific instances in which licenses for American products have been refused while licenses for like products of other foreign non-British origin have been more or less concurrently granted. Also please indicate whether you see any objection to suspending generalization without waiting for a reply to our note referred to in your telegram of June 10. Phillips 19 Not found in Department files. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.116/181: Telegram [Document 603] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , June 25, 1936—7 p.m. [Received June 25—10:10 a.m.] Your June 24, 11 a.m. Replying seriatim to your questions: (1) The Collector of Customs here is continuing to refuse licenses for the importation of goods on the prohibited list from America while granting them for import from other countries. (2) Other collectors of customs are following the same practice under rules laid down by the Ministry of Trade and Customs. (3) This practice applies to practically all items on the prohibited list and individual exceptions for special reasons [appear?] to be almost negligible. (4) To cite specific cases: we have seen identical applications made by Richardson Orr and Company of Sydney to import lighting fixtures, lamps, radio valves, et cetera, refused in respect to America on June 2nd; granted in respect to Germany on June 3rd. Likewise identical applications made by Gregory and Collins of Brisbane to import drills, lamps, radio valves, scales, et cetera refused (at Brisbane) in respect to America on June 16th; granted in respect to Germany on June 22nd. (5) I do not see how we can wait indefinitely for a reply to our note of June 6. I have twice pressed orally for an answer but the matter is held up in the Department of Trade and Customs. I hope that after the President has acted we promptly inform the Australian Government that under any possible interpretation the application of the licensing system was discriminatory to our trade and that accordingly we had no choice but to suspend the generalization of trade agreement concessions to Australian products. Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.116/182: Telegram [Document 604] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , June 27, 1936—10 a.m. [Received June 27—6:47 a.m.] Your June 24, 11 a.m. I have just received a 400-word reply to my note of June 6th. This reiterates Australia’s inability any longer “to accept with equanimity the heavy disequilibrium in the trade of the Commonwealth with the United States” with the resulting decision “to check imports from those countries which find it impossible to trade on a reasonable basis of [practical] reciprocity.” The key sentence reads: “Collectors of Customs in declining to issue permits for the importation of these commodities are acting under instructions and in accordance with the policy of the Government.” Text by air mail. 20 Moffat 20 Enclosure to despatch No. 238, June 27, 1936; not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 611.473/22a: Telegram [Document 605] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , June 29, 1936—6 p.m. The President has directed the Secretary of the Treasury to withhold beginning August 1st next the extension to imports from Australia of the reductions in duties granted by this Government in the trade agreements entered into under the trade agreements act. Although this step will probably not become public until the Secretary of the Treasury issues instructions to collectors of customs about July 1st, you may, if you see no objection, inform the Australian authorities that this Government, in view of the discriminatory application of the recent Australian legislation felt obliged in pursuance of the policy laid down in our trade agreements act to withhold from Australia the generalization of tariff reductions made under that act. It is a matter of deep regret to us that this action became necessary as we are approaching every country in a friendly spirit and it is in that spirit we approached Australia. Continuing as heretofore our trade agreements policy of most-favored-nation treatment, we desire to continue to urge the Australian Government to abandon its policy of discrimination which we consider unequal and unfair and to give us a chance to extend to it the most-favored-nation policy. Phillips The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.116/235 [Document 606] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State No. 278 Sydney , August 7, 1936. [Received September 9.] Sir : Two and a half months have now elapsed since the Australian Government moved against American trade by making the import of some eighty items in which we are interested subject to ministerial license. Experience has now indicated, beyond peradventure of doubt, that in the application of its policy, not only is the Australian Government diverting some £2,000,000 of our trade, but is avowedly, even exultantly, discriminating against us; furthermore, on the part of certain officials … there have been evidences of considerable anti-American animus. In fact, having once tasted blood, there is always the possibility that the Government’s appetite for further restrictive measures may increase. In the circumstances, I feel that the time has come when we must decide upon a policy to be pursued after our elections in November. In other words, are we prepared to initiate trade negotiations with Australia then (providing she suspends her discriminatory trade practices for the duration of the negotiations), or are we not? 1. If we are prepared to negotiate, it would seem to me that we must first come to an understanding with Canberra on three questions: ( a ) Is the Australian Government prepared to negotiate within the framework of M. F. N. treatment? Would it, for instance, consider the general provisions contained in the Canadian Trade Agreement 21 as a basis for agreement, subject only to modification of detail? ( b ) Would the Australian Government during negotiations for a period of four to six months agree to suspend its discriminatory treatment of American trade at least to the extent of granting licenses for American imports of the prohibited items equivalent to 100 percent of the figures during the corresponding period in early 1936, while we in turn would restore the privileges of generalization of trade-treaty rates to Australian products. This should be confirmed by exchange of notes. ( c ) Where should negotiations be held? Although it might be possible to discuss the general provisions here, I feel we should insist on the negotiations of the schedules in Washington. I am by no means certain that Australia in her present mood would agree to these preliminary conditions, as the impression is being fostered for local political reasons that Australia stands to gain more from England as a reward for diverting our trade to her than she could from even successful negotiations with ourselves. (As an example of the foregoing I enclose excerpts 22 from a recent speech of the Acting Minister of Commerce.) However, I incline to feel that even though the injured party we are none the less big enough to make the first move, provided that nothing occurs during the debates in Parliament during September or October to make an advance on our part seem infra dig or subject to misinterpretation. If made, we should time an approach for the first half of November in order to start any possible negotiations as soon as possible, partly because the nearer we come to the Australian elections in December, 1937, the more intransigent the Australian will become, and partly because the Prime Minister and his colleagues will be leaving Australia in early April for a visit of several months to attend the Coronation celebrations. 2. If on the other hand we are not ready to negotiate after the elections we should be laying our plans accordingly. We must be prepared for the possibility of an extension of the prohibited list and the loss of a lucrative export market in yet other lines of our exports. Furthermore, the Lyons Government, while many of its members are not inherently anti-American, has as a result of ( a ) British pressure, and ( b ) political opportunism, burned its bridges to a point where we can expect nothing further from them, unless they are driven to it by the pressure of public opinion. The essential thing for us is tactfully to dissipate the idea which is much too prevalent, alike in Canberra and among the general public, that America accepts the justice of the Australian contention with regard to two-way trade, and does not really resent Australia’s discriminatory policy. There is a rather naif belief that Australia can be deliberately anti-American in matters of trade and yet count on American political assistance and cooperation. I can see several possible ways by which this assumption might be counteracted,—for instance, ( a ) by an attempt to arouse the concern of Mr. Eden 23 (who is very close to Mr. Bruce 24 ) at an Australian policy which can only tend to drive the United States and the British Empire apart at the very moment Britain desires to see a closer understanding in the Pacific; or ( b ) by the inclusion in some important speech on our Trade Agreements Program of the whole story of Australian-American trade; or ( c ) by the publication of the correspondence beginning with the Australian note of 1934. Other and doubtless far more effective ways will undoubtedly occur to the Department. 3. Until we make up our minds as to which course to pursue, we are letting the situation drift. Of course, the decision involves a question of high policy which must receive careful consideration in Washington. On the one hand, by agreeing to negotiate, we might be accused of putting a premium on discriminatory measures against us, even though our insistence on a suspension of their application during negotiations would probably suffice to answer such an accusation. On the other hand, a continued refusal on our part to negotiate with Australia, particularly with the elections behind us and with the prestige of a vote of confidence in our trade agreement program might result in further losses in one of our valuable export markets. Respectfully yours, Jay Pierrepont Moffat 21 See Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 18 ff. For text of agreement, signed November 15, 1935, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 91, or 49 Stat. 3960. 22 Not printed. 23 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 24 Stanley Melbourne Bruce, High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.0031/2419 [Document 607] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 26, 1936. The British Chargé d’Affaires came in with Premier Stevens, of New South Wales, who desired to make a courtesy call on his way back home from Europe. The conversation related entirely to international trade and finance. The Premier was not here, however, on any official mission in that or in any other connection, and hence the conversation was entirely individual and informal. He began by stating that most of Europe is disposed at present to move steadily and straight in the direction of autarchy, despite the wisdom of the economic program which the United States and other countries are proposing and urging. I replied that evidently Europe is still bent on economic suicide, together with the political difficulties bred by cutthroat economic bilateralism; that their evident purpose is to drive the world straight towards the most uneconomic condition it has experienced during the past two hundred years; that this will mean lower living standards, increasing unemployment of millions, economic destitution, and consequent political and military uprisings followed by military dictatorships in steadily increasing numbers; that it surpasses the imagination that Western civilization, with eyes open, is disposed to move straight in this direction; and the fact that the English-speaking people, especially, would do so is very surprising to me. I then set forth the essential phases and the objectives of our trade agreements program, and added that statesmen in every capital now agree that it is sound and that it is the only long-time planning at all worthwhile. I expressed my deep disappointment that thus far the important trading nations are floating along with no objective except the narrow bilateral trading method, based solely on discriminations and increasingly on barter transactions, while they are neglecting or refusing to give utterance to any kind of long-time or permanent economic policies and objectives; that the United States while less interested in dollars and cents than any of the important trading nations is thus far fighting their commercial battles for them without virtually any assistance; that I am disappointed that our British friends are not more actively in support and furnishing their powerful moral influence. I then added that I was amazed at our Australian friends, whose commercial battles this country is likewise fighting in that we seek to lower excessive trade barriers everywhere so that vastly increased purchasing power can be developed—and the Australians, for example, are thereby enabled to find markets everywhere for their wool and meats and dairy products and other foodstuffs—on suddenly learning that they, for whom we have entertained the warmest friendship, are putting a knife to our throat and bending every effort to obstruct and prevent this great beneficial trade program of ours from being carried forward; that more surprising still, our Australian friends, who expect us to continue to be their friends presumably, deliberately place their effort to block and injure the progress of our trade program, upon the ground that we are not buying as much from them as they from us, while at the same time they have had the identical proposition up with Japan in precisely reverse form. I said that I was commenting in a spirit of friendliness, but that I was utterly unable to understand the theory of statesmen of surplus-producing countries who are strenuously striving not only to obstruct and break down our liberal trade agreements program with its great peace and business prosperity objectives, but as earnestly are striving to push and drive the world straight to an unprecedented, uneconomic condition, with the inevitable disastrous effects upon peoples, their welfare, and their civilization. The Minister had little to say in return. He did undertake in a way to agree with me in principle. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 611.4731/188a: Telegram [Document 608] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , October 10, 1936—noon. We contemplate asking Ambassador Bingham 25 to hand Mr. Eden a message to be transmitted to the Government of Australia. The draft text of that message is submitted to you below with request for telegraphic suggestions from you as to both text and channel of communication. “The Government of Australia in communicating to the Government of the United States its reasons for discriminating as between imports from the United States and those from other foreign countries stated in summing up that it was compelled to do so because of conditions which threatened the Australian financial position. Its communications contained also assurances of friendship which transcend economic considerations and expressed the hope that its point of view would be sympathetically understood. “The Government of the United States has therefore entertained the fullest confidence that the Government of Australia would make its expression of friendship more articulate by more favorable treatment of American commerce when it became evident that the economic crisis which was then apprehended shall have been safely passed. “Since it had then as always the most implicit confidence in the economic and financial stability of Australia, the American Government is particularly gratified now to be able to point to new conditions which must indeed have already caused the Government of Australia to reconsider its policy. “First of all the present satisfactory price of wool and the substantial rise in the world price of wheat should have contributed appreciably to security against pressure upon Australia’s balance of international payments. “In the second place, the Commonwealth budget statement of September 10, 1936, contains gratifying evidence of the healthy condition of Australian national finance. The Government of the United States notes with interest that both the figure for estimated excess of receipts over expenditures and the figure for remission of taxes far exceed the figure of £2,290,000 which appeared to the Australian Government in May to be so vital to Commonwealth finance as to have been the cause of drastic discriminatory action against the commerce of the United States. “But the most important of all recent developments from the point of view of assurance as to Australia’s economic future is the issuance of the recent statements by the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States regarding international monetary policies, 26 and the rapid succession of adherences to these policies by other nations. No areas in the world stand to benefit relatively more from efforts to place the principal currencies upon a sound and more stable basis than do those devoted to the production of staple raw materials, whose markets are closely affected by world monetary conditions. “The attention of the Government of Australia is drawn particularly to that part of the British statement which is similar to those of the other governments jointly initiating this move, which urges strongly that action be taken without delay to relax progressively the present system of quotas and exchange controls with a view to their abolition. “The Government of the United States takes this occasion to express its gratification that the representative of Australia at the League of Nations, in supporting a draft resolution under discussion before the Second Committee on October 6, 27 expressed faith in the economic policies and aims of the Government of the United States, and its hope that Mr. Bruce’s declaration represents the present sense of the Government of Australia.” Carr 25 Robert W. Bingham, Ambassador in the United Kingdom. 26 See pp. 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 440 ] ff. 27 League of Nations, Official Journal , Special Supplement No. 157, pp. 55, 60. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/190: Telegram [Document 609] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , October 12, 1936—7 p.m. [Received October 12—1 p.m.] Department’s telegram of October 10, noon. Even though I think it is still too early to anticipate a change in Australia’s trade policy toward the United States I am glad that the Department contemplates pointing out that the discriminatory features of this policy are inconsistent with Mr. Bruce’s declarations and with the trade policy advocated by the British Government. 1. As to substance I entirely concur in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8 of the Department’s draft. The three intermediate paragraphs, however, seem predicated on a misunderstanding of the Australian position. It has never been the local financial or budget position that has been worrying Canberra but the question of balance of international payments and the difficulties of meeting commitments abroad. For us to discuss Australia’s present financial position would enable her to come back with counter arguments that there has been little or no improvement since May as ( a ) during the last fiscal year she just maintained her overseas funds by the influx of new capital but was not able to increase them; ( b ) the export figures for July and August show a less satisfactory picture than last year; and ( c ) as a result of the current drought the estimated yield of wheat this year has dropped well below last year’s figures. More important, however, I feel that the whole emphasis in our note should be placed on the three new international factors, as found in the last three paragraphs and not be weakened by the introduction of secondary and controversial issues. 2. In the circumstances I respectfully suggest substituting for paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 one short paragraph along the following lines: “During the past few months there have been several developments both within Australia and elsewhere in the world which have so confirmed the favorable outlook for Australian economic and financial stability as to lead the American Government to hope that the time has now come for reconsideration of Australia’s policy of discrimination against the United States. By far the most important of all recent developments” and so through paragraph 6 to the end of the note as given in the Department’s telegram. 3. As to channels of communication I have long felt that the best hope of an ultimate modification of Australia’s attitude would be in response to pressure from the British Government. Thus far such pressure as has come from British sources has been encouraging to her policy of artificial diversion but this no longer seems consistent with official British pronouncements. If Mr. Bingham when presenting the note makes a vigorous plea for active British support of our thesis and continues this pressure until we know where the British Government stands, then I favor presenting the note to London. If, however, the Department’s idea is merely to hand the note to Mr. Eden for transmission then I feel there would be no gain to counterbalance the resentment that may be felt here at an attempt to circumvent normal channels of communication between Washington and Canberra. Moffat The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) 611.4731/192a: Telegram [Document 610] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Bingham ) Washington , October 16, 1936—3 p.m. 376. From a perusal of Confidential Bulletin No. 111, dated August 12, 1936, 28 you will observe that an exchange of views between the two Governments has been interrupted pending the search for a new approach to the Government of Australia. We now believe that during the past few months several developments both within Australia and elsewhere have so confirmed the favorable outlook for Australian financial and economic stability as to lead us to feel that reconsideration of Australia’s policy, stated to have been based on fear of its financial position, should now be undertaken. We wish to call these developments to the attention of that Government, pointing out that the most important of all recent developments from the point of view of pastoral and agricultural raw material countries, has been the move for currency stability. We would point to the British Government’s part in this move and its admonition to other nations to make it effective by relaxation and abolition of restrictive measures and also to Mr. Bruce’s statement on October 6 before the Second Committee when he expressed faith in our policies. The message would go through Moffat as usual and would include a reminder to Australia of its expressed friendship which we hope might now be made articulate by removal of those restrictions alleged to have been necessary because of an outlook which has now been substantially brightened. We have felt and Moffat has concurred in the opinion that British Government support of our appeal to Australia would help to effect a change of heart in the Lyons Cabinet. We all believe that any British pressure upon Canberra in the past few months must have been encouraging to its policy of artificial diversion. If this is true it might be harder to obtain British support in the direction of an immediate reversal of policy, but in view of recent British appeals to foreign countries we feel that there is some hope that a special general appeal might be made by the British Government to members of the British Commonwealth, if not a special appeal to Australia in this specific matter. We submit to you therefore the suggestion that you call upon Eden and talk to him along the following lines: ( a ) We propose to send the Australian Government a note as outlined above. ( b ) We recognize the independent status of Australia in the conduct of its foreign affairs, but we cannot help but feel that its defection from a general commercial policy calculated to rehabilitate world trade must be of such concern to the British Government as to justify its proffering friendly advice to Mr. Lyons. We feel that such an appeal would be wholly in line with the British action in sending special appeals to Scandinavian and other countries equally independent in the formulation of commercial policy. Please telegraph what attitude Eden displays toward the request that he approach the Australian Government, and your own estimate of his general attitude regarding the British Government’s interest in the commercial policies of the independent units of the British Commonwealth and of Australia in particular. 29 Hull 28 Not printed. 29 For reply to this inquiry, see paragraph 2, telegram No. 552, November 20, 8 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 552 ] . The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/194: Telegram [Document 611] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , October 27, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 28—7 a.m.] Government’s trade diversion is to be debated in Parliament November 4th and 5th. Every indication points to approval by substantial majority. Moffat The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 611.4731/194: Telegram [Document 612] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , October 31, 1936—2 p.m. Your October 12, 7 p.m. We have conveyed to Ambassador Bingham on October 16 the complete sense of the note which we propose to send to the government of Australia, Final decision to send through you was reached after consideration of last paragraph of your October 12, 7 p.m., and other possibilities. The Ambassador was instructed to call upon Mr. Eden to inform him of the sense of the note we propose to send, and to urge that the British Government join us in an appeal to Australia to alter its policy. Mr. Bingham’s telegram of October 26 30 indicated that he found Mr. Eden uninformed on this subject but that Eden promised to take up the matter promptly with the expectation of being able to give a reply within the next 2 or 3 days. Failing receipt of that reply and in view of your October 27, 11 a.m., we believe we should go ahead with delivery of the note and have you say that we are handing it to the press. The note would be as in Department’s October 10, noon, with modifications exactly as suggested in your October 12, 7 p.m. For your information, we do not propose to publish any other communication, since the present one contains sufficient recapitulation of the contents of past communications. Please telegraph immediately whether you perceive any serious objection to this procedure, chiefly as to timeliness and utility of publicity. You will, of course, be informed promptly of Eden’s reply when it is received, but we believe his promise to help need not necessarily be awaited before taking independent steps. Carr 30 Not printed. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 611.4731/196: Telegram [Document 613] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , November 5, 1936—noon. [Received November 5—11:15 a.m.] Your October 31, 2 p.m., and November 2. 31 I delivered your note in Canberra Tuesday evening. It will be considered by the full Cabinet next week when Lyons and several other senior Ministers return. Meanwhile I had a long but unproductive talk with Benett. 32 He tells me that Australian and oversea credits problem is potentially as serious as ever and that the London funds have shown virtually no increase despite highly favorable exports. He personally believed that until Australia had adequately built up reserves which would assure her solvency in the event of adverse conditions she could not afford to abandon her present trade diversion policy which to some extent at least is relieving the pressure. He continues to feel just as strongly that we are indifferent to Australia’s difficulties and unwilling to help her by reciprocal trade in a period of stress as we feel that Australia is indifferent to the implications of a policy of discrimination against us. The debate on Australia’s trade diversion program which has not yet begun may drag on for some time. Since the recent sharp rise in the price of wool the Government feels that the wind has been taken out of the opposition’s sails. Moffat 31 Latter not printed. 32 Presumably Henry Gordon Bennett, member of the Council of the Associated Chambers of Manufacturers of Australia. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 647.116/249a: Telegram [Document 614] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , November 18, 1936—6 p.m. Representative Maas of Minnesota has brought to me a letter from Brandtjen and Kluge regarding shipments of printing presses which have arrived at Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide and stating that their agents, S. Cooke Proprietary Limited of Melbourne, have been unable to obtain entry permits. I would like your opinion whether the special circumstances of these machines having already been unladen in Australia might not, upon special representations being made by you, be given consideration. In general, do you think that special representations in specific cases would be of avail in securing import permits. Moore The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.003/326: Telegram [Document 615] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , November 19, 1936—5 p.m. [Received November 19—10 a.m.] All tariff increases tabled May 22nd have been temporarily validated until December 1st. Meanwhile the Government has once again postponed the debate on its trade diversion program 33 as it believes that within the next few days it will be able to announce a satisfactory settlement of its dispute with Japan. Moffat 33 In his telegram of December 4, 1936, 9 a.m., the Consul at Sydney informed the Department that the Australian Government’s trade diversion policy had been passed through all stages by both Houses of Parliament (647.006/58). The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 647.116/250: Telegram [Document 616] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , November 20, 1936—noon. [Received November 20—9:20 a.m.] Your November 18, 6 p.m. Shortly after the licensing system went into effect last May, I discussed not only with our Trade Commissioner but with a number of leading importers of American goods the question of whether special representations by the Consulate General in specific cases involving hardship would be of help. All agreed that such representations would not only be of no avail but would encourage the Government to feel that its policy of discrimination against us was creating a pressure which would force the United States to make unilateral concessions to Australia. Further it seemed that for various reasons to make individual representations would constitute a tacit acceptance of Australia’s trade diversion policy and weaken our position in trying to effect a general recommendation. I have accordingly been careful to limit any recommendations at Canberra to problems involving American trade as a whole and have confined myself to individual cases to conferring with local importers as to ways and means for them to approach the licensing authorities. In the case of the printing presses referred to the contention of the Government seems to be that an Australian firm endeavored to circumvent the licensing regulations by confronting the Government with a fait accompli . The presses are now in bond while discussions between importer and Government are continuing. I am convinced that any appeal by us would be futile the more so as the argument that the goods were already unladen has been rejected by Canberra in other cases as a reason for granting entrances. Moffat Informal arrangements between the United States and Australia respecting the importation of American aircraft and aircraft parts into Australia Informal arrangements between the United States and Australia respecting the importation of American aircraft and aircraft parts into Australia [617] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, December 21, 1935—11 a.m. [Received December 24—7 p.m.] 847.7961/31: Telegram [618] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, February 1, 1936—2 p.m. 847.7961/37: Telegram [619] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, February 10, 1936—3 p.m. [Received February 10—4:40 a.m.] 847.7961/40: Telegram [620] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, February 12, 1936—5 p.m. [Received February 12—6:33 a.m.] 711.4727/45: Telegram [621] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, March 13, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 13—10:50 a.m.] 711.4727/50: Telegram [622] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, March 30, 1936—2 p.m. 711.4727/51: Telegram [623] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) Washington, July 24, 1936. 711.4727/56 [624] The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State Sydney, January 5, 1937. [Received February 18.] 711.4727/61 The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 847.7961/31: Telegram [Document 617] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , December 21, 1935—11 a.m. [Received December 24—7 p.m.] The following is a short summary of a formal note dated December 16th just received from the Minister of External Affairs in Canberra. 1. Customs proclamation which prohibits importation into Australia of American aircraft will be amended shortly to permit importation under licenses issued by Controller of Civil Aviation. The Australian Government does not intend to give a general definition of the circumstances under which licenses to import American planes will or will not be granted, each case will be considered on its merits and a separate license will be required for each individual aircraft. 2. To permit acceptance of individual aircraft for which license has been issued the authorities will require an American certificate to accompany the aircraft setting forth ( a ) that it is new, i. e., has not flown for more than 50 hours before date of shipment to Australia; ( b ) that detailed particulars of the type and ( c ) of the individual aircraft have been despatched to the Controller of Civil Aviation; and ( d ) that aircraft fully complies with Commonwealth airworthiness requirements for the present at least based on latest printed edition of American airworthiness requirements. Points ( b ), ( c ) and ( d ) are set forth in considerable technical detail. 3. Note requests that Controller of Civil Aviation be supplied with the copies of all amendments that have been or may be issued subsequent to aeronautics bulletin 7, ( a ), dated October 1, 1934, ( b ), full particulars of any modifications prescribed in the United States for aircraft of any type operating in Australia and, ( c ), several pro forma copies of all documents which the United States proposes to issue to meet Australian requirements. 4. Australian Government suggests that questions of procedure involved and of matters of airworthiness be the subject of direct correspondence between the competent American authorities and the Controller of Civil Aviation. Full text being mailed. 34 Squire 35 requests that Commerce be kept informed. Moffat 34 Despatch No. 83, December 23, 1935; not printed. 35 E. C. Squire, American Trade Commissioner at Sydney. The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 847.7961/37: Telegram [Document 618] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , February 1, 1936—2 p.m. Your despatch No. 83, December 23, 1935. 36 This Government considers as unreasonable the conditions outlined in the note of December 16, 1935, addressed by the Minister for External Affairs to the Consulate General, upon which the Australian Government is prepared to permit the importation into Australia of American aircraft. The following are some of the reasons for its view: 1. Paragraph 4 of the Minister’s note of December 16, 1935, appears to imply that even in the event of compliance with the voluminous specifications set forth in the ensuing paragraphs, the Australian Government will not undertake to guarantee acceptance unless it chooses to do so in specific instances. 2. Paragraph 5 of the note calls for such a large volume of technical data as to be entirely unreasonable. The extent and nature of these data is such that it would in most cases make Australian trade unprofitable for American manufacturers. 3. The clause contained in paragraph 7 of the note with reference to the possible refusal of Australian authorities to accept aircraft built in accordance with future amendments, without their prior approval of each such amendment, is objectionable and indicates, as does the entire note, a refusal to accept the findings of the United States Air Regulations authorities. 4. Should this Government accede to all of the terms outlined in the Minister’s note, it would doubtless be at a serious disadvantage in attempting to negotiate satisfactory arrangements with other foreign governments. The proposals set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Minister’s note are acceptable to this Government. Copies of the documents referred to in paragraph 7 of the Minister’s note are being mailed to you. It is desired that you again endeavor to persuade the Australian authorities to accept the procedure outlined in the arrangement in force between the United States and Great Britain. 37 Hull 36 Not printed; see telegram of December 21, 1935, supra. 37 Arrangement effected by exchange of notes of March 28 and April 5, 1935, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 76, or 49 Stat. 3720. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 847.7961/40: Telegram [Document 619] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , February 10, 1936—3 p.m. [Received February 10—4:40 a.m.] [Your] February 1, 2 p.m. While in Canberra I discussed in considerable detail the problem of the admission of American aircraft and urged the authorities to accept to [ the? ] procedure outlined in our agreement with Great Britain. I found them quite perturbed that we had read their proposals in the light of a refusal to accept the findings of the American air authorities; the purpose, as they explained it was to obtain additional data on types and individual aircraft over and above what was normally given other countries as owing to their distance and the slowness of communications they felt they needed such data to supervise repairs and maintain unimpaired our standards of airworthiness. In view of our observations, however, they are going to reconsider their suggested procedure and will approach me later. Frankly I am not hopeful of Australia being willing to exchange notes with us along the line of the present British-American agreement as it is hard to see how this could be reconciled with their governmental policy of giving licenses only to types of airplanes which they feel would suit their needs and above all only to new airplanes. On the other hand, I am reasonably hopeful that they may modify their suggested procedure to bring it more into line with that of other countries. Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 711.4727/45: Telegram [Document 620] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , February 12, 1936—5 p.m. [Received February 12—6:33 a.m.] Your February 1, 2 p.m. I had a long talk today with Captain Johnston, Director of Civil Aviation, who came up from Melbourne. In the first place he stated definitely that a reciprocal exchange of notes was not possible under the considered Government policy admitting only new planes to suit Australia’s needs. Australia accordingly feels it must make a unilateral proposal covering its requirements, though as to form or a separation into component elements it is prepared to consider any suggestion which would best suit the convenience of the American Government. 1. By way of explanation he emphasized that license to import an individual plane will be issued before the American Government need take any action whatever and entry is then assured, subject to compliance with the conditions agreed upon. 2. With regard to airworthiness Captain Johnston pointed out that Australia validates no foreign certificates, even British, but issues its own certificates. The Australian Government’s intention [is?] to accept American certificates of airworthiness for export to Australia as unquestioned evidence for the issue of the Australian certificates, subject only to visual examination and flight of machine upon arrival. Captain Johnston assumes that such a certificate will be issued only to new aircraft as proposed, and that (following the line of the British note) it will with its accompanying documents cover the points raised in sub-paragraphs 3 ( b ) and ( c ) of the Australian note of December 16th and in sub-paragraph 4 which provides for supplementary requirements to meet Australian national standards, with amendments from time to time. This would meet his suggestion expressed in paragraph 7 of the note of December 16th which he feels was misconstrued by the Department. That leaves as a question not connected with original airworthiness the matter of additional data on type which Captain Johnston feels Australia needs for reasons explained in my telegram of February 10. He is not clear whether objections expressed by the Department are due to the unwillingness of the American air authorities to collate or assume the responsibility for the information requested, to its detailed nature, or to the disinclination of authorities or manufacturers to place this information in his hands. He would appreciate some countersuggestion to meet his desire to obtain adequate information properly to ensure that all maintenance, repairs or modifications comply with original standards of airworthiness. I have shown this text to Captain Johnston. Moffat The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 711.4727/50: Telegram [Document 621] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State Sydney , March 13, 1936—4 p.m. [Received March 13—10:50 a.m.] In two further conversations with Johnston I have endeavored without success to persuade him to agree to an informal temporary arrangement to cover the cases of planes already ordered which would contain the “exact acquisitive terms” of the British arrangement. He maintains unchanged his opinion, reported in my telegram of February 12, 5 p.m., that such an arrangement whether permanent or temporary would not be in accordance either with the principles laid down by the Commonwealth Government or with the Australian practice of issuing their own certificates to foreign aircraft registered in Australia (as opposed to British practice of validating foreign certificates). In an attempt to meet our position as far as he feels he possibly can, he has now written me a letter modifying in respect of the aircraft already ordered the proposals contained in the Australian note of December 16th. The modification is predicated on his belief, (1), that the present difficulty must be largely, if not entirely, associated with the Australian desire to be supplied with drawings and stress data (in the case of the latter he will be content with a summary the form of which can be left to subsequent discussion if agreed to in principle) and, (2), that very possibly the American authorities are reluctant to assume responsibility of checking and franking the drawings and data supplied by the manufacturers. “If this should be the only obstacle to early agreement,” his letter concludes, “we would be content in the cases of the aircraft ordered to date, viz., products of the Douglas, Stinson and Waco Companies, to accept for the time being the assurances of these firms that the desired information had or was being despatched and covered our requirements pending further discussion as to procedure to apply. That arrangement would enable aircraft ordered to date to enter the Commonwealth without hitch upon production of the documents specified in sections ( a ), ( b ), and ( c ) of subclause 3 of clause 5 of the Department of External Affairs’ letter of December 16th. It is assumed that the certificate of airworthiness for export to Australia would be issued only to new aircraft complying with conditions detailed in subclause 4 of paragraph 5. These documents and requirements resemble closely those stated in the British agreement and the complementary assurance from the manufacturers regarding supply of drawings and data could be given by cable. The arrangement suggested to cover aircraft already ordered is therefore virtually an adoption of the British requirements plus an assurance of the supply of drawings and data from the manufacturers.” Moffat The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 711.4727/51: Telegram [Document 622] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , March 30, 1936—2 p.m. Your March 13, 4 p.m. The question of furnishing technical data to the Australian authorities was discussed at some length with American aircraft manufacturers. After consideration this Government is prepared, in view of the slowness of communication between the United States and Australia, to furnish the Australian authorities more data with airworthiness certificates for export than is normally furnished other countries. To this end and in response to Captain Johnston’s request for a counterproposal this Government will agree to furnish the following documents and data which will be collected and certified to by the Bureau of Air Commerce upon receipt of a note from Australia that an import license has been issued: [The list of documents and data has been omitted. Also omitted is a list of the information to be obtained, either by the purchaser or the Australian authorities, directly from the manufacturer without certification by the Bureau of Air Commerce.] It is believed that the documents and data referred to above will provide the Australian authorities with adequate information for handling all normal operating, repair and maintenance problems. This Government is prepared to render every possible assistance to the Australian authorities in the event that some specific matter of an unusual nature should require information not in their possession. In accordance with the wishes of the Australian authorities, certificates of airworthiness for export to Australia will be issued only to new aircraft. Confirmation of this telegram and copies of forms being sent by mail. Hull The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) 711.4727/56 [Document 623] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) Washington , July 24, 1936. Sir : I refer to your despatch No. 196 of May 11, 1936, 38 informing me that the Australian Government, although not entirely satisfied with this Government’s counter-suggestions set forth in the Department’s telegram of March 30, 1936, 2 p.m., is prepared to enter into an arrangement providing for the acceptance of American airworthiness certificates which is based upon those counter-suggestions. With reference to Captain Johnston’s request that some form of a certificate be issued by the Bureau of Air Commerce in respect of each aircraft exported to Australia, setting forth that the Australian special requirements have in fact been complied with and the documents, which the Government of the United States has expressed a willingness to furnish, have actually been despatched, the Bureau of Air Commerce will issue and forward such document directly to the Australian importer. The document will be similar to the draft enclosed in Captain Johnston’s letter of May 8, 1936, to the Consul General. The Bureau of Air Commerce understands that the certificate referred to above is intended to cover the data and documents listed under Sections A and B only of the letter of April 2, 1936, addressed by the Consul General to Captain Johnston, and that the purpose of such certificate is to facilitate the passing of each particular aircraft through the Australian Department of Customs. The third paragraph of Captain Johnston’s letter of May 8, 1936, reads as follows: “I feel therefore, that the agreement may be based on your Government’s proposals, provided that, should experience indicate that the conditions require alterations or additions the agreement may be revised at any future date.” Should changed conditions require alterations in or additions to the proposed arrangement, it is felt that at least sixty days notice of the contemplated alterations or additions should be given this Government by the Australian authorities. Such notice would afford some protection to American manufacturers engaged in building planes and parts of planes for export to Australia. You should endeavor to have Captain Johnston agree to give such notice before effecting any alteration in or addition to the proposed arrangement. With reference to the query in the last paragraph of your despatch No. 196, this Government would prefer to have an arrangement effected by an exchange of notes. However, if this is not possible, it will be satisfactory to this Government if Australia merely publishes its own regulations containing the requirements agreed upon for the admission of American planes. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Francis B. Sayre 38 Not printed; it transmitted copies of the Consul General’s note of April 2, 1936, to Captain Johnston and Captain Johnston’s reply of May 8, 1936. The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State 711.4727/61 [Document 624] The Consul General at Sydney ( Moffat ) to the Secretary of State No. 345 Sydney , January 5, 1937. [Received February 18.] Sir : 1. I have the honor to transmit herewith text of a letter dated December 30, 1936, 39 from Captain E. C. Johnston, Controller-General of Civil Aviation, in reply to two letters I had addressed him some months previously, based on the Department’s instructions of July 24 and August 5, 1936. 40 2. Captain Johnston’s letter really deals with two separate subjects. The first deals with the importation of American aircraft into Australia. His letter, which accepts the Department’s point of view that a period of sixty days notice of contemplated alterations and additions to the conditions in force is reasonable, would seem to complete the understanding between the two Governments,—negotiations toward which began nearly a year ago with the Australian Government’s note of December 16, 1935. With reference to the last paragraph of the Department’s instruction of July 24 indicating that the American Government would prefer to have the understanding reached between the two Governments crystallized in the form of an exchange of notes, I feel quite strongly that it would be a mistake for us to make such a suggestion at the present time. Although still entirely informal, the system evolved is actually working and a greater number of American planes have entered Australia during the calendar year than I had believed possible. This result has been achieved despite the declared policy of the Government to divert trade from America to Great Britain and other “good customers” of Australia, and is due in large measure to the conviction of the Australian civil aviation authorities that American aircraft is best suited for Australian needs. Should we now suggest a formal exchange of notes, the whole subject would come up for review by the Cabinet and it is not impossible that instructions might be given civil aviation authorities to slow down on the purchase of American planes. In the circumstances I feel strongly that the path of wisdom is to leave a satisfactory situation alone and not risk a possible modification by attempting to cross the “t’s” and dot the “i’s”. 3. The second subject discussed in Captain Johnston’s letter deals with the importation into Australia of American aircraft engines, parts and materials. Here, too, any difficulties which may have existed with regard to the importation of American aircraft engines seem to have been disposed of. With regard to parts imported for use of aircraft other than those imported from the United States, Captain Johnston has certain further observations to offer. The same holds true with regard to the importation of instruments and materials. Captain Johnston would be glad in due course to receive the comments of the American authorities on his suggestions with regard to these secondary points still at issue. Respectfully yours, Jay Pierrepont Moffat 39 Not printed. 40 Instruction of August 5 not printed. Informal discussions between officials of the United States and Canada with respect to trade relations Informal discussions between officials of the United States and Canada with respect to trade relations 1 1 For previous correspondence regarding trade relations between the United States and Canada, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 18 ff. [625] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] June 4, 1936. 611.4231/1815½ [626] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 3, 1936. 611.0031/2565 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 611.4231/1815½ [Document 625] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] June 4, 1936. I enclose two memoranda 2 covering conversations which I had with the Prime Minister in Ottawa last month. In the present statement I wish to elaborate a little bit on one or two matters which are not covered in these memoranda. General World Trade Situation I told the Prime Minister that the Secretary has the feeling that the United States is engaged in too much of a “lone fight” against trade barriers. I told him that in particular he felt that certain policies of the British Government were not on all fours with what we are trying to do; in particular I mentioned British clearing agreements which, in the final analysis, boil down to bilateral trade balancing. (I left with Mr. Armour 3 a copy of our memorandum to the British and copies of the Secretary’s memoranda of conversations with the British Ambassador on this subject 4 with the suggestion that he acquaint the Prime Minister in detail on this subject whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself; I stressed to Mr. Armour the fact that we do not wish to ask the Prime Minister to do anything, but merely keep him informed of our point of view.) I told the Prime Minister that the Secretary’s position would be so much stronger vis-à-vis our own critics in this country if a number of other countries were engaged in programs similar to ours. I said that the Secretary had in particular expressed the hope that Canada could “see her way clear to get in the fight on trade barriers on a broad front.” British Preferences In the course of my conversation with the Prime Minister I touched on our attitude in respect of imperial preferences within the British Commonwealth. I recalled that in the Canadian agreement 5 we had recognized the principle of imperial preferences and went on to say that in general it was the Secretary’s feeling that nobody could question the legal or moral right of the various parts of the Empire to grant nominal preferences to one another to demonstrate to the world their political solidarity. I added that the Secretary felt very strongly, however, that when a preference was substantial enough to cause an artificial diversion of trade from a foreign source to an Empire source it was not only unsound but unwise and in the final analysis would reduce the sum total of world trade. I ventured the personal opinion that in the final analysis preferences of this sort would prove injurious to the British Empire as well as to the rest of the world. (I believe that the Prime Minister nodded slightly as if in agreement with the views I was expressing.) Canada -U. K. Trade Negotiations The Prime Minister told me that Canada proposed to open negotiations with the United Kingdom this summer for a trade agreement to replace the one which will expire in August, 1937. He indicated that in various respects, which he did not specify, he desired changes in this agreement. It was largely because of his general statement that I ventured the above-mentioned comments on the British preferences. Canada -U. S. Agreement I told the Prime Minister that we hoped very much not only to make our recent trade agreement with Canada the cornerstone of our economic relationship with the Dominion, but also a stepping stone to a broader and more comprehensive trade agreement. I stated that if the present agreement works as we hoped it will and expect it to, it was my personal hope that before long it would be possible to elaborate upon it. I stressed the fact that our trade agreement will be under fire in a number of congressional districts in the campaign and that the extent to which Canada finds it possible to give the broadest possible interpretation to the agreement to that extent will our chances of building on the agreement in future negotiations be improved. John D. Hickerson [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) of a Conversation With the Canadian Prime Minister ( King ) [ Ottawa ,] May 20, 1936. At lunch yesterday I had a chance to talk at some length to the Prime Minister in regard to the Trade Agreement. The Prime Minister stated at the outset his very great appreciation for the efforts of Mr. Hull, Mr. Phillips, and the people of the Department of State generally, in achieving the satisfactory settlement of the whiskey embargo question. 6 He said that he had been very worried over the whole situation and that he was frankly delighted that the matter was settled. I told the Prime Minister that the Secretary had asked me to speak to him in a purely personal way about one or two aspects of the Trade Agreement. I stated that Secretary Hull is leading a very gallant fight against trade restrictions all over the world, and in so doing is having to face a large amount of hostile criticism. I went on to say that it is the Secretary’s belief that gradually a momentum will be developed to our trade agreement program which will gain adherents very rapidly once the people of the country begin to see that our trade agreements are helpful rather than injurious. I stated that the extent to which other countries find it possible to cooperate in this fight against trade restrictions all over the world is naturally a matter of paramount interest to us. I added that Mr. Hull is fighting hard, not only to see that the letter and spirit of all of our trade agreements are fully observed, but that even other matters not definitely bound in our trade agreements are not complicated by burdensome restrictions, which would add to the existing network which is stifling world trade. I stated that in these circumstances the Secretary had observed with some concern the application of certain arbitrary advances for customs purposes against American vegetables. I went on to say that we fully appreciate the fact that Canada reserved her right under the Trade Agreement to impose in certain instances these arbitrary advances, but that we had been assured in the negotiations that we “would have nothing to worry about” in the actual administration of the system. We therefore had hoped that, whereas it was necessary, perhaps for reasons of policy, for Canada to reserve the right to impose these advances, in actual practice this authority might be made use of very sparingly, and with the realization that its use would complicate the task of the American Government in convincing our agricultural producers that real benefits were obtained for them in the Canadian agreement. The Prime Minister was good enough to suggest that Mr. Armour and I come to his office later in the afternoon and discuss this matter in further detail with the Minister of National Revenue, Mr. Ilsley, and himself. This we did. Throughout we made it perfectly clear that we recognized the legal right of Canada, under the Agreement, to impose such advances in cases where such authority was reserved; we stressed the fact that it was our hope that the Canadian Government would find it possible, in the interest of a broader, sounder trade, to avoid the use of this authority except in cases of real necessity and that even then the full 80% advance, if possible, not be made. We expressed the hope that if the present Trade Agreement works out as well as we confidently expect it to, it will become a corner stone in a sounder economic policy as between our two countries, and that it may be possible in due course to expand the scope of this Agreement. 2 Only one enclosure found in Department files. 3 Norman Armour, American Minister in Canada. 4 For correspondence concerning efforts of the Secretary of State to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program, see pp. 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 513 ] ff. 5 For text of agreement, signed November 15, 1935, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 91, or 49 Stat. 3960. 6 See pp. 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 631 ] ff. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 611.0031/2565 [Document 626] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 3, 1936. The Canadian Minister, 7 accompanied by Mr. Wrong, Counselor of the Legation, came in upon my invitation. I commenced the conversation by stating that I expected to leave for South America later in the week; that Prime Minister Mackenzie King will probably not return from abroad prior to my departure, and that before leaving I felt I might invite the Minister to come in and to transmit to Prime Minister King my greetings and good wishes; that also I might comment on or rather sum up briefly the present and prospective status of the reciprocal trade program, together with the general program for economic rehabilitation and thereby the establishment of conditions of permanent peace. I then said that while we are still in the beginning stage with this general movement, I do feel that surprising progress, really surpassing original expectations has been accomplished; that of course the success of the program depends upon its steady, even though gradual, progress and its support by an increasing number of important countries, especially during the six to twelve months ahead; and that unless this program and movement is thus sufficiently supported and advanced during coming months it will probably be too late for its success. I then referred to the gravitation of most continental European countries straight in the direction of increasingly uneconomic conditions, steadily narrowing economic policy, and rapidly increasing armaments, upon the theory of either self-defense or of self-preservation from economic stress and ultimate war. In this connection, I emphasized the fact that few if any statesmen in Europe appear to be either considering or seeking any other alternative for this direct road to political, military, and economic suicide; that this country and Canada and others on this continent have offered a very definite and comprehensive alternative course; that the problem is whether adequate support can be secured for it within sufficient time to prevent either a military catastrophe in Europe, or, if not that, an economic catastrophe, which will be inevitable within another year or two under the wholly uneconomic policies that are being practiced, with unproductive war supplies constituting the largest single factor in commerce and in employment; that it is all-important that nations friendly to the program to restore economic peace and military peace should bestir themselves and render almost indispensable aid in three vitally important questions without unusual delay:—that one step, of course, is the entering into mutually profitable trade agreements based upon the doctrine of equality or the favored-nation policy—the second, which is more important at this stage than the dollars and cents involved in trade agreements by themselves, is the great necessity for friendly nations to preach on every possible occasion the soundness and the need for the adoption of our program of economic liberalization, without running serious risk of fatal delay, as stated—and third, that each friendly government should by all means keep its twin objective of the restoration of conditions of economic well-being and of peace before its own people and the peoples of other countries;—and to that end it would be severely handicapping if these very same countries should pursue the narrow, cut-throat methods of bilateral trading alone, so as to impair, if not to discredit, the whole long view movement and program to promote economic welfare and peace; that, furthermore, if one or two more years go by with entire inaction by such countries as Great Britain and others and with corresponding obstruction of such efforts as the United States might make, it must be patent that such countries as Japan, Italy and Germany, with either actual or implied force behind their movements, would be dominating virtually all phases of international finance and commerce; and that, therefore, it is extremely urgent that friendly nations should go forward as nearly simultaneously as possible. I then said that I recalled how zealously the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, expressed himself along these lines and that I assumed the Canadian Government was still as much interested in this program of economic liberalism as it was when our trade agreement was signed. The Minister, who had kept quiet up to this time, promptly spoke and in the most earnest terms reiterated the interest of his Government and his statesmen in this movement, and he repeatedly said that if he had been in my chair he could not have stated the situation more to his exact notion than as I had just stated it; that he felt this was the earnest view of his Government and that he desired to assure me that if any act or utterance of his Government at any time should not be in exact harmony with this policy and program it would be on account of extreme exigencies and of the most temporary nature. The Minister was thus referring to what he knew I had in mind, namely, the recent obnoxious and objectionable bilateral trade arrangement entered into between Canada and Germany. 8 I stated that I knew the Canadian Prime Minister and his Government were of course continuing to adhere strongly to this economic program; that I feared, however, there were two dangers attending the situation and its future progress,—one of which might be a tendency on the part of the various nations supporting this program to make too many exceptions to the policy involved, thereby impairing if not discrediting the integrity of the whole movement; second, that, as stated, a few months of undue and unnecessary delay, while this whole program and movement are hanging in the balance, could prove disastrous. The Minister again made elaborate protestations in behalf of Mackenzie King and in behalf of the Canadian Government, reasserting the strongly favorable attitude of both to the program, and I again thanked him and expressed my gratification. I then said that a number of countries abroad had, I feared, been more or less seriously impairing the program’s integrity and obstructing its progress by failure both to observe it and to preach it and thereby keep it alive; that many of us in this country for two years have been desperately striving to preserve the life of the whole program, as a substitute for militarism and big armaments and possible war; that, unfortunately, we have not had any too much aid and cooperation; and that we cannot go along indefinitely without wider cooperation. The Minister again assured me of the strong support of the Canadian Government and its deep interest in the program’s success. I then remarked that, of course, the Minister knew that, along with other governments which have been offending in numerous instances, I could not help but have in mind the recent purely bilateral agreement entered into between Canada and Germany, which constituted the most aggravated form of narrow bilateralism and which is just the opposite of the central policy of equality on which our program of economic restoration is bottomed; and that I, of course, was rather surprised and really seriously disappointed when I read an account of this agreement in the Canadian press some days ago. I said that, as the Canadian officials knew, we have had a desperate fight in this country against the powerful forces of extreme economic nationalism and embargo tariff and that it has revolved around the Canadian Treaty and our concessions therein, especially relating to cattle; that just at the crisis of this fight, when the opposition forces are seeking to unify the farm belt against the Canadian Treaty, the Canadian Government’s entering into the worst form of a bilateral arrangement has placed us in a difficult attitude, for the reason that our critics throw in our faces the statement that even our nearest neighbor is no more interested in the reciprocity program than to accept its benefits, while rejecting its burdens or responsibilities, although all the while proclaiming its support of the program; that our fight is so difficult and so close that one or two occurrences such as this Canadian-German agreement could very easily tip the scales in favor of the embargo tariff forces in this country, to say nothing of the unfortunate psychological effects in other countries upon this entire movement. I referred to the fact that this country has probably sacrificed opportunities for $100,000,000 of trade by purely bilateral methods entirely repugnant to the favored-nation and other policies embodied in our program; that if, as stated, many of the countries favorable to the program persist in the pursuit of these bilateral practices wholly repugnant to the program, its success would naturally either be imperiled or destroyed. I from time to time expressed my admiration for Mackenzie King and my certain knowledge that he was as much interested in this program as I am and that his Government is wholeheartedly for it, but, I added, that the Canadian Government and her statesmen favorable to this program might not know or appreciate the dangerous fight we are obliged to carry on in this country, and they might not have fully appraised the dangers of too many exceptions and violations of the favored-nation and other policies on which our program is based. I think upon the whole that the Canadian Minister and his associate, Mr. Wrong, felt rather uncomfortable throughout the conversation. The conversation, so far as I could judge, was in the best of good nature and good humor, with no sort of disposition on the part of either of us to impugn motives or to express ourselves to the point of provoking any real argument. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 7 Sir Herbert Marler. 8 Signed at Ottawa, October 22, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 311. Convention between the United States and Canada respecting income taxation, signed December 30, 1936 Convention between the United States and Canada respecting income taxation, signed December 30, 1936 [627] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] October 26, 1936. 811.512342 Double/11 [628] The Canadian Legation to the Department of State undated 811.512342 Double/14 [629] Memorandum by Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf of the Treaty Division [Washington,] November 28, 1936. 811.512342 Double/15 [630] The Canadian Legation to the Department of State Washington , December 14, 1936. 811.512342 Double/18 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs 811.512342 Double/11 [Document 627] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] October 26, 1936. Mr. Hume Wrong, Counselor of the Canadian Legation, telephoned Mr. Hickerson 10 this morning to say that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed with the negotiation of a treaty on taxation in accordance with the terms of the Tax Bill passed by Congress last session. 11 Mr. Wrong was anxious to proceed with the negotiations at once in order that the treaty can be completed for presentation to the Senate as soon as it convenes. After discussing the matter with Mr. Otterman, of the Treaty Division, I informed Mr. Wrong that we would like very much to delay negotiations until the return of Mr. de Wolf of “TD”, and Mr. King of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of whom will land in New York November 12. I said that Mr. King, in particular, had asked that the negotiations be delayed until his return. Mr. Wrong said that it would be perfectly alright to wait until November 12 on the assumption that negotiations would begin immediately thereafter. The Canadians have prepared an informal draft which Mr. Wrong will bring to the Department in the near future in order that it may be given preliminary study. He said that if the treaty has to receive the advice and consent of the Senate, which seems probable, it was the intention of the Canadians to press for a more comprehensive treaty than was envisaged in our Tax Bill. He added, in confidence, that if the treaty did not have to be referred to the Senate he thought he could persuade the Canadian Government, for the sake of speed, to confine the treaty to the points set forth in our Tax legislation and take up the additional questions later on when the Tax Bill comes up for amendment. I said that we would be very glad to have the Canadian draft to look over but that I was not at all sanguine that we would be prepared to consider a treaty beyond the scope of the Tax Bill even if the treaty had to be referred to the Senate. 10 John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs. 11 Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648. The Canadian Legation to the Department of State 811.512342 Double/14 [Document 628] The Canadian Legation to the Department of State 12 undated Memorandum There is submitted herewith a draft of a proposed agreement between the Governments of the United States and Canada, 13 the purpose of which is to prescribe maximum rates of taxation to be levied by either government on income paid to individuals and corporations of the other country. Form of Agreement . The draft does not indicate what form the agreement should take. In this connection the matter of importance to the Canadian Government is that the arrangement should be concluded with as little delay as possible, so that the maximum rates of taxation prescribed in the agreement should become effective in both countries at the earliest moment. An executive agreement might be the most satisfactory way of handling the matter; if this is not acceptable, an inter-governmental agreement or a convention between the President and His Majesty in respect of Canada could be resorted to. The Canadian Government can bring into effect any arrangement which may be concluded without waiting for Parliamentary approval. It is hoped that it will be found possible for the United States to take similar action, so that the application of the new rates need not await approval of the agreement by the Senate. Article I ( a ). This paragraph provides reciprocally for a maximum tax of 5 per cent in respect of income received by resident individuals in one country from sources in the other country. It follows the language inserted at the end of Section 211 ( a ) of the Revenue Act of 1936. The present Canadian rate of tax is 5 per cent, but the tax is not so comprehensive in its application as the similar tax imposed at the rate of 10 per cent by the United States. Article I ( b ). This paragraph similarly proposes that nonresident corporations should not be taxed by either country at a rate higher than 5 per cent in respect of all income which they receive from the other country. The present United States rates are 10 per cent on dividends and 15 per cent on income from other sources. The present Canadian rate is 5 per cent, with, however, the important qualification that dividends paid by subsidiary companies to their parent corporations in the United States are exempt from tax. Section 231 ( a ) of the Revenue Act of 1936 made provision for the reciprocal reduction of the 10 per cent rate on dividends to 5 per cent, following the conclusion of treaties with contiguous countries, but the proposal did not extend to income other than dividends. It seems logical and consistent, however, that the proposed agreement should permit a 5 per cent rate on all classes of income. It is not known why a distinction was made in the Revenue Act between the kinds of income received by non-resident corporations when no such distinction was made between the kinds of income received by non-resident individuals. There is no similar distinction in the Canadian Act. Article I ( c ). This paragraph proposes that the maximum rate to be levied on resident alien corporations in both countries should be 17 per cent. Under Section 231 ( b ) of the Revenue Act of 1936 a flat tax of 22 per cent was imposed on the income derived from the United States of these corporations. The rate provided in the Canadian Act on United States resident corporations is 15 per cent. The proposal in this paragraph was not directly contemplated by the language of the Revenue Act of 1936, but it is believed that resident corporations in both countries might benefit by the provisions of the proposed agreement just as reasonably as non-resident individuals and corporations. Article I ( d ). This paragraph makes it clear that either country is at liberty to increase the rates of taxation prescribed in ( a ), ( b ), and ( c ) on the understanding that such action releases the other country from its obligations. In this way the elasticity of the revenue systems of both countries can be fully preserved. It is not considered advisable that rates of taxation should be bound by the agreement. Article I ( e ). This paragraph would bring into effect the changes in rates consequent on the agreement as from June 22nd, 1936, the date on which the United States Revenue Act of 1936 came into effect. Article II . It is believed that it would be advantageous to include in the agreement a general article along these lines stating the principles upon which fiscal administration in the two countries is based, with respect to the taxation of income arising within each country and with respect to the avoidance of double taxation. The proposal involves no change in law or administrative practice in either the United States or Canada, but its inclusion might facilitate the treatment of a wide variety of items on a uniform basis in both countries. It is suggested that the negotiation of the agreement should be proceeded with as soon as possible, so that it may be brought into effect at the earliest possible date. 12 Left at the Department of State on November 4, 1936. 13 Not printed. Memorandum by Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf of the Treaty Division 811.512342 Double/15 [Document 629] Memorandum by Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf of the Treaty Division [ Washington ,] November 28, 1936. A meeting took place at eleven o’clock on Friday November 27 in the office of Special Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Eldon P. Bang, to discuss informally the proposed draft treaty on taxation between the United States and Canada. There took part in that meeting Sir Herbert Marler, the Canadian Minister, Mr. Hume Wrong, Counselor of the Canadian Legation and Mr. Ronald Macdonnell, Third Secretary of the Canadian Legation. The Department was represented by Mr. Bonbright of WE and Mr. De Wolf of the Treaty Division. The Treasury Department was represented by Mr. King, Mr. Siegrist, Records Division, Mr. Armstrong, attorney in General Counsel’s office and Mr. Lusk, head of the Division of Legislation and Regulations. A copy of the Treasury Department’s counter draft of the proposed treaty was given to the Canadian representatives and it was explained to them why it was thought preferable to conclude a convention on the basis of the Treasury draft rather than that of the Canadian Legation. The Treasury draft follows exactly the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1936 with regard to a treaty with Canada i. e. Section 211 provides that the withholding rate in the case of a resident of Canada could be reduced from ten to five percent and Section 231 provides that the withholding rate on dividends paid to nonresident foreign corporations in the case of Canadian corporations could be reduced from ten to five percent. The Canadian draft on the other hand contained several reductions which were not contemplated in the Revenue Act. It was pointed out to the Canadian representatives that the Executive has the power to conclude a treaty going further than was contemplated in the above-mentioned Sections of the Revenue Act especially in view of Section 22 ( b ) (7) of the Revenue Act which exempts from taxation “income of any kind to the extent required by any treaty obligation of the United States”. In view of the fact, however, that the Canadian Government is anxious to conclude the treaty as soon as possible to obtain the reduced rates for Canadian interests as well as refunds for taxes already paid, it is believed that it would be much easier to get a treaty through the Senate at this time which would not depart from Sections 211 and 231 of the Revenue Act. After some discussion on this point the Canadian representatives concurred in this point of view and accepted the Treasury draft with practically no changes. They are transmitting this draft to the Government in Ottawa and expect to have its answer within the next three weeks. There are attached herewith the original Canadian draft 14 and the Treasury draft to which reference is made in this memorandum. The text of Sections 211 and 231 of the Revenue Act will be found on the first page of the copy of the memorandum of October 26, 1936, also attached. [Annex] Draft of Proposed Tax Treaty with Canada Article I The High Contracting Parties mutually agree that the income taxation imposed in the two States shall be subject to the following reciprocal provisions:— ( a ) The rate of income tax imposed by one of the contracting States, in respect of income derived from sources therein, upon persons residing in the other State, who are not engaged in trade or business in the taxing State and have no office or place of business therein, shall not exceed five per centum so long as an equivalent or lower rate of income taxation is imposed by the other State upon persons residing in the former State and who are not engaged in trade or business in such other State and have no office or place of business therein. The term “persons” as used in this paragraph means individuals, fiduciaries, and partnership (composed entirely of residents of the other contracting State). ( b ) The rate of income tax imposed by one of the contracting States, in respect of dividends derived from sources therein, upon nonresident foreign corporations organized under the laws of the other State, which are not engaged in trade or business in the taxing State, and which have no office or place of business therein, shall not exceed five per centum, so long as an equivalent or lower rate of income taxation on dividends is imposed by the other State upon corporations organized under the laws of the former State and not engaged in trade or business in such other State and having no office or place of business therein. ( c ) Either State shall be at liberty to increase the rate of taxation prescribed by paragraphs ( a ) or ( b ) of this article, and in such case the other State shall be released from the requirements of the said paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ). ( d ) Effect shall be given to the foregoing provisions by both States as and from the 1st day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six. ( e ) The provisions of this treaty shall not apply to citizens of the United States resident in Canada. 14 Not printed. The Canadian Legation to the Department of State 811.512342 Double/18 [Document 630] The Canadian Legation to the Department of State Memorandum There is attached hereto a revised draft of the proposed fiscal agreement or convention between the Governments of Canada and the United States. 15 This draft is identical with the United States draft which was handed to the Canadian Minister on November 27th, with the following exceptions: (1) There have been added a preamble, an article providing for ratification, and a concluding clause. (2) There has been added at the conclusion of Clause ( a ) of Article I language intended further to clarify the persons covered by this clause. There are persons resident in Canada who are members of trusts and partnerships, which are not composed entirely of residents of Canada, but which may include either residents of the United States or residents of other countries. The clause ( a ) as drafted seems to be somewhat ambiguous in so far as their treatment is concerned. The clause is very properly intended to draw a distinction between the individual as such and the individual regarded as a member of a trust or partnership. The revision submitted is designed to remove ambiguity, and to make this point clear. Such an individual, in so far as he was a member of the trust or partnership, would be subject to the higher rate of taxation, but would, regarded as an individual and in respect of his holdings as such, be entitled to the five per cent. rate. A similar result would be reached in the many instances in which United States Citizens are members of ordinary international firms or partnerships on the one hand, or international firms or partnerships including Canadian members. They would be treated by the Canadian fiscal authorities as having two severable capacities. It is hoped that this addition to the United States draft will meet with approval, and that the agreement may be signed in the near future. Washington , December 14, 1936. [For text of the convention between the United States and Canada, signed December 30, 1936, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 920, or 50 Stat. 1399.] 15 Draft not printed. It is essentially the same as the convention signed on December 30, 1936, except that the sentence at the conclusion of clause ( a ) of article I of the draft does not appear in the signed convention. The sentence reads: “The term ‘persons’ as used in this paragraph means individuals, fiduciaries, and partnerships (composed entirely of residents of the other contracting State), and includes individuals in their personal capacities and in respect of their personal incomes, notwithstanding that they are members of fiduciaries or partnerships which are not composed entirely of residents of the other contracting State or which are engaged in trade or business in the contracting State.” Protests of the Canadian Government against certain provisions of the liquor tax bill; settlement of United States claims against Canadian distillers Protests of the Canadian Government against certain provisions of the liquor tax bill; 16 settlement of United States claims against Canadian distillers 16 H. R. 9185, introduced in the House of Representatives on August 20, 1935; for text, see Congressional Record , vol. 79, pt. 13, p. 14114. [631] The Assistant Secretary of State (Moore) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) Washington, January 13, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5040a [632] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] January 18, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5040½ [633] The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State Washington, January 20, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5041 [634] Memorandum by the Economic Adviser (Feis) [Washington,] January 20, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5041½ [635] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] March 12, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50554/7 [636] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 12, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50555/7 [637] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary to the President (McIntyre) Washington, March 18, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50612/6a [638] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 19, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50612/6 [639] President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) Miami, Florida, March 23, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50613/6: Telegram [640] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 24, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50614/6 [641] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 25, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50671/7 [642] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) [Washington,] March 25, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50672/7 [643] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) [Washington,] March 26, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5060 [644] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 27, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5062 [645] The Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Taylor) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 28, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5068½ [646] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] March 28, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5071½ [647] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 30, 1936 [Washington,] March 31, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5065 [648] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 31, 1936 [Washington,] April 1, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50821/11 [649] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] April 1, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5081½ [650] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) [Washington,] April 11, 1936. 811.114 Canada/50827/11 [651] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] April 15, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5076 [652] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, April 27, 1936—5 p.m. 811.114 Canada/5077a: Telegram [653] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] April 27, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5083½ [654] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] April 29, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5074¼ [655] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] May 9, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5084 [656] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) [Washington,] May 12, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5074½ [657] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) [Washington,] May 13, 1936. 811.114 Canada/5092 The Assistant Secretary of State (Moore) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) 811.114 Canada/5040a [Document 631] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Moore ) to the Secretary of the Treasury ( Morgenthau ) Washington , January 13, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : Reference is made to HR 9185 (A Bill to Insure the Collection of the Revenue on Intoxicating Liquor, etc.), which is now pending in the Senate. The Canadian Chargé d’Affaires on Saturday called at the Department and expressed, on instructions from his government, objection to Section 403A of this Bill. The Chargé stated that it was the understanding of his government that the effect of Section 403 of this Bill would be to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to declare an embargo against the importation of the liquor produced by individual foreign manufacturers against whom the United States Government has a claim based upon customs or internal revenue laws unless and until two things happened: that is, first, the foreign firm submits to the jurisdiction of the court of the United States in which such proceeding has been instituted and second, the foreign firm furnishes to the Secretary of the Treasury such security as he may require not in excess of double the amount of the claim. As regards these two requirements mentioned above, the Canadian Chargé stated that he had no doubt that because of the extensive assets of the principal Canadian distillers in the United States they would find it necessary to submit to the jurisdiction of the appropriate courts anyway, but he stated that even if they did voluntarily submit to our jurisdiction it would appear that the requirement of security up to double the amount of the claims might effectively prevent the operation of certain Canadian firms in the United States. In this regard he mentioned the fact that he understood that the claim against one Canadian distiller was $30,000,000, and he raised the question of whether it would be possible for this firm to continue in business in the face of the requirement for a $60,000,000 bond to the United States Government. Aside from the foregoing, the Canadian Chargé expressed on behalf of his government, certain objections on the ground of principle, to Section 403 of the proposed Bill. These objections might be summarized as follows: (1) He stated that the proposal seemed to be designed to enable pressure to be brought against Canadian distillers to compel them to submit to exactions not now provided for in existing legal processes. He stated that he understood the Canadian distillers had for some time been ready to negotiate a settlement with our Treasury Department, and that in any event it was, of course, open to the Treasury Department to bring actions in court in the usual manner. The proposed procedure, he added, seemed to be designed to overcome present rules of law in the matter of jurisdiction which are based on fundamental justice. (2) The Canadian Chargé stated that the proposed measures would seem to involve unjust discrimination against Canadian distillers. He pointed out that while the terms of this measure are general in application only Canadian firms would be affected. (3) The Canadian Chargé stated that it was the hope of his government that the United States authorities will not overlook the cooperation which Canada has extended to the United States in the prevention of smuggling. He referred particularly to the cooperation which Canada gave us during the prohibition era, mentioning the Anti-Smuggling Treaty of 1924, 17 the large amount of information respecting smuggling activities which Canada furnished us under this convention, and he referred particularly to legislation which Canada passed in May 1930, under which export clearance was denied to liquors destined to countries where their importation was illegal. He pointed out that this legislation enacted following long representations from the United States, 18 cost the Canadian Government millions of dollars in public revenue. The Chargé stated that it was the view of his government that it would not be in accordance with this spirit of cooperation which has been shown by Canada, to compel Canadian firms by this proposed measure to pay exactions which might not be recovered by ordinary processes of law. (4) Finally, the Chargé referred to the Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States 19 which went into effect on January 1st. He stated that the adoption of this proposed measure might nullify completely the concession on whiskey in this Agreement for which Canada had given advantages for American trade. In this regard the Chargé referred particularly to Article XI of the Agreement which provides that in the event the government of either country adopts any measure, which though it does not conflict with the terms of this Agreement, is considered by the government for the other country to have the effect of modifying or impairing any object of the Agreement, the government which has adopted any such measure shall consider such representations and proposals as the other government may make with a view to effecting a mutual satisfactory adjustment of the matter. As regards this fourth objection I may say that an officer of this Department, prior to the signature of the Trade Agreement, read to the Canadian Chargé and to the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs the expression of the Treasury Department’s views set forth on the enclosure to your letter of November 11, 1935. 20 The foregoing, of course, relates almost wholly to the objections expressed by the Canadian Chargé in pursuance of an instruction from his government. I think it appropriate to add that this Department, on broad grounds of general principle, has from the beginning entertained serious doubts as to the propriety of Section 403 of this proposed measure. In a letter to the Attorney General, dated January 5, 1935, 20 the Secretary of State wrote in part as follows: “… You are advised that the adoption of the contemplated order involves imponderable consequences which only future events can resolve. I am of the opinion that the present is a particularly inopportune time to devise new procedures for bringing foreign enterprises and their property within the jurisdiction of the United States by placing restrictions on international trade. The possible effects of retaliation in certain foreign countries in regard to American concerns might lead to disastrous effects on our international trade. It would be difficult if not impossible for this country to protest against similar action by foreign countries should we set the precedent. I consequently still entertain grave doubts as to the effectiveness of the proposed measure when all the circumstances and possibility of retaliation are taken into consideration.” Sincerely yours, R. Walton Moore 17 Signed June 6, 1924, Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. i , p. 189 . 18 See Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , pp. 488 ff. 19 Signed November 15, 1935; for text, see 49 Stat. 3960, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 91. 20 Not printed. 20 Not printed. Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs 811.114 Canada/5040½ [Document 632] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] January 18, 1936. Mr. Armour 21 telephoned from Ottawa this morning to say that a day or two ago the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie Bang, had spoken to him very forcibly with regard to Section 403 of the Treasury’s proposed liquor bill. Mr. King said that if this Section was passed, Canada would be severely penalized and that our liquor concession would be very largely nullified as far as Canada is concerned and the benefit thereof would only accrue to Great Britain. He felt particularly strongly about it because of the cooperation which his own former administration (1921–30) had shown in helping us enforce our liquor laws in the prohibition era, and referred especially to his Government’s amendment of the Canadian Export Act in 1930 (which forbade the issuance of clearance papers to vessels carrying liquor destined to countries into which the importation of liquor was prohibited by law) and to his assistance in getting the British to consent to the twelve-mile limit. Mr. King felt that if Congress passed the present bill with Section 403 left in it we would be making a very poor return for his previous kindness. 21 Norman Armour, Minister in Canada. The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Canada/5041 [Document 633] The Secretary of the Treasury ( Morgenthau ) to the Secretary of State Washington , January 20, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I have given careful consideration to the letter of your Department dated January 13, 1936, relating to Section 403 ( a ) of H. E. 9185, which would authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to declare an embargo against the importation of liquor in certain cases where the United States has a claim arising under the customs and internal-revenue laws. With reference to the objection of the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires to the provision of that section requiring security, I am pleased to advise that this Department will recommend to the Congress that the provision be modified so as to limit the security requirement to a bond in the amount of the claim, together with interest and court costs. It will also be suggested that the provision be further modified to permit the giving of a lien on personal or real property situated in the United States in lieu of the furnishing of a bond. I must, of course, take exception to the reference made by the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires to “exactions not now provided for in existing legal processes,” since the proposed legislation contemplates no recovery except by the usual judicial processes under a system of jurisprudence common to both countries. The cooperation of the Canadian Government in the prevention of smuggling is appreciated, and I think this government may assure Canada that, in the instant case, it seeks no advantage which the Canadian Government should not have if the position of the two countries were reversed. The reference to the trade agreement is, as the letter of your Department indicates, covered by the statement which was read to the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires and the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affaires prior to the signing of the trade agreement. It will be recalled that, prior to the submission of this legislation to the Congress, the provision in question was the subject of extensive discussion among representatives of the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the Treasury Department. Since the Treasury Department is the department of the government primarily concerned with the proposed legislation, I shall be grateful if you will afford me an opportunity to discuss the matter personally with you in the event that you should decide to take any step which might retard the enactment of this legislation. Very truly yours, H. Morgenthau, Jr. Memorandum by the Economic Adviser (Feis) 811.114 Canada/5041½ [Document 634] Memorandum by the Economic Adviser ( Feis ) [ Washington ,] January 20, 1936. When Mr. Wrong, the Canadian Chargé, and the Secretary of the Treasury had completed their exchange of views about monetary matters, Mr. Wrong stated that though there was no connection except in point of time, and though he did not in any way want to establish any connection, he might well find when he got up to Ottawa that the attitude of the Canadian Government would be affected by the problem that had arisen in regard to the liquor tax in certain legislation now under consideration at the Capitol. Mr. Wrong said that it was not this action itself that was disturbing the Canadian authorities as much as the inherent precedent. The Secretary of the Treasury answered that the Treasury was responsible for this and emphasized that the Treasury was handling the matter, not the State Department. He then stated that he would be regretful if it caused difficulties between the two governments; his whole wish was to improve relations between the two countries, not the contrary; therefore, he said that if the Canadian Government wished to send someone down with Mr. Wrong when he returned from Ottawa, in order to discuss the question directly with the officials in the Treasury who were handling it, he would welcome such a visit and such an opportunity to take the matter out fully and carefully. Mr. Wrong stated that he would convey this suggestion to his Government. H[ erbert ] F[ eis ] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs 811.114 Canada/5055 4/7 [Document 635] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] March 12, 1936. Mr. Armour telephoned this afternoon to say that he had had a conversation with Dr. Skelton 22 before lunch with regard to our proposed liquor tax bill. In emphasizing the sacrifice made by the Canadian Government in 1930 in prohibiting the granting of clearances to vessels carrying liquor destined for the United States, Dr. Skelton wanted Mr. Armour to know that this legislation cost the Canadian Government the estimated sum of $17,000,000 a year. He added that so important was this question considered and so strong was the general opposition to it that both Mr. Mackenzie King and Mr. Bennett 23 had to take the question up in party caucus and both threatened to resign their positions if their respective parties did not support the legislation. Mr. Armour thought that this information, particularly the part about Mr. Bennett and Mr. King, was so important that it should be known to our authorities before a decision was reached on the Treasury’s impending bill. 22 Oscar D. Skelton, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. 23 Richard B. Bennett, Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, 1930–35. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5055 5/7 [Document 636] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 12, 1936. Following the conference with Senators Harrison and King of the Finance Committee of the Senate in regard to Section 403 ( a ) of the Liquor Tax Administration Act, I called up Mr. Hume Wrong on the telephone and explained to him our efforts to prevent the adoption of this section by the Committee at this afternoon’s meeting. I said that I had not heard whether the Committee had taken any action or not, but that my guess would be that the matter would be postponed and, in the circumstances, I did not think it would be particularly necessary for him to seek an audience with the President and that perhaps it might be better to hold this step in abeyance for the present. Mr. Wrong entirely agreed and said that his instructions were to take this step only as a last resort; he expressed himself as very appreciative of our efforts and said that he would communicate at once with his Government. William Phillips The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary to the President (McIntyre) 811.114 Canada/5061 2/6 a [Document 637] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary to the President ( McIntyre ) Washington , March 18, 1936. Dear Mr. McIntyre : Mr. Armour has just telephoned to me this afternoon to say that questions had been asked in Parliament this afternoon with regard to Section 403 of the Liquor Tax Administration Act. The Minister of Trade and Commerce arose to say that this section “virtually nullified the trade agreement”. On further questioning the Prime Minister himself stated that in the event of legislation of this character going through, he would reopen the discussions with the United States under Article 11 of the trade agreement, which provides for consultation, and if this failed of effect, he would make use of the escape clauses by which the Canadian Government could rescind the entire trade agreement. These questions and answers have only just occurred in the Canadian Parliament and we shall not know the precise language employed until tomorrow afternoon. Appreciating fully the desire of the President that the State and Treasury Departments should harmonize the situation and reach an agreement, Judge Moore, Mr. Hackworth, Mr. Hickerson and I have been working almost continually with a number of Mr. Oliphant’s 24 assistants, Messrs. Klaus, Hester, Graves and Frank, who seem to have sole authority and responsibility for the bill. It is true that the Treasury has come down considerably in their demands, but the Section in its new form is highly dangerous and will not, in my opinion, be acceptable to the Canadian Government. In agreement with the Treasury I have this afternoon handed copies of the section, as redrafted, to the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires, who expressed keen disappointment that the principle,—the embargo, still remained in the measure and he promised to give me Mr. Mackenzie King’s viewpoint by tomorrow afternoon. I would not bother you with this matter were I not alarmed at the prospects of the Canadian Government denouncing the trade agreement, and my feeling of special responsibility in view of the absence of Secretary Hull, who, I know, is greatly exercised at the danger of the actual situation. Sincerely yours, William Phillips 24 Herman Oliphant, General Counsel for the Treasury Department. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5061 2/6 [Document 638] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 19, 1936. The Canadian Chargé d’Affaires reported to me this morning that he had received a reply to the representations which we had made to him yesterday afternoon. The substance of the two drafts I had handed to him he had telephoned to Dr. Skelton; Dr. Skelton had referred them to the legal authorities of the Department of External Affairs, and thereafter to the Prime Minister himself. The reply, therefore, represented the attitude of all three. In the first place, the Prime Minister held that the drafts while improving on the original Section 403, were highly unsatisfactory for the following reasons: (1) The proposed legislation was still retroactive in effect; (2) in effect it was an attempt to assert jurisdiction against Canadian companies in Canada by indirect means; (3) it was discriminatory against Canadian companies; (4) the whole thing was an effort to drag up old claims, and it was certainly not in accordance with the present spirit of cooperative effort between the two countries; (5) we were reminded again that during the years 1930 to 1933, the Canadian Government had voluntarily abandoned about $20,000,000 worth of business owing to the ban which they had placed upon distilled liquors, merely at the request of the United States Government. Mr. Hume Wrong said that the feeling of the entire cabinet is that this proposed legislation should be postponed until there could be fresh discussions between responsible representatives of the distillers and the American Treasury and Justice Departments. He reminded me that Seagram, Incorporated, had made various efforts to negotiate with the Treasury; that they were constantly put off by the Treasury officials until finally in October last they were told that they would be heard, but from then on there had been no developments and no suggestion for negotiations from the Treasury. Mr. Wrong said that Mr. King could not differentiate between the two drafts, since both were unsatisfactory in a broad sense. Mr. Wrong then made his own personal comment. He said that now that the matter had been publicized in Parliament the situation surrounding the entire trade agreement was involved. He regretted that this was so, but it must be recognized as a fact nevertheless. He said that later on in the afternoon he would have the text of his Government’s reply to our proposal, which had not yet been deciphered. The above representations were merely based on his telephonic communication from Ottawa. William Phillips Later 4 P.M. Mr. Wrong handed me a copy of his instructions just received from the Prime Minister. 25 W. P. 25 Not printed. President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5061 3/6 : Telegram [Document 639] President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) Miami, Florida , March 23, 1936. I have spoken with Mr. Oliphant about the Canadian liquor matter. Here is my suggestion as a minimum of what we should require of Canada. First, if the companies can give some practical assurance that they will come into court and that any judgment which may be obtained against them will be paid, no legislation is necessary at this time. Second, your statement that the Treasury only had proof in one case is definitely denied by the Treasury. They have a number of cases pending but are only ready to go to trial at this time with filing one case. I repeat what I told you the other day, that if these people were American citizens we could levy against their imports to satisfy a judgment. Therefore Canadians against whom we obtain judgment ought to assure us that we can make collection. If the representatives of the Canadians would give better evidence to the Treasury that they would go through with a proper agreement on legislation, I believe an agreement could be made, but so far the Canadian’s representatives have been a little too vague and their assurance unsatisfactory. Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5061 4/6 [Document 640] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 24, 1936. I called up Assistant Secretary Wayne Taylor of the Treasury this morning and read him the President’s memorandum which I had just received. I re-read the President’s first point three times so that there might not be any misunderstanding in this regard. I told him that I proposed to send for the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires and put the question to him as to whether the companies would give some practical assurance that they will come into court and that any judgment which may be obtained against them will be paid. Mr. Taylor made no unfavorable comment to this procedure and, accordingly, I received the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires and put the questions to him as indicated. I also sent Mr. Taylor a copy of the President’s memorandum. I told Mr. Hume Wrong that I had received a message from the President and I read to him the first point contained in the President’s memorandum; I added that the President felt that the Canadians against whom we obtained judgment ought to assure us that we can make collection; I reminded him that the matter was urgent, that action on the Treasury Bill, which was a very lengthy one, had been postponed four times and we could not ask them to postpone it much longer; I hoped, therefore, that we could get a very early reply. Mr. Wrong was not especially pleased with the proposal which I put up to him; it was in the form, he said, of compulsion in that legislation would be enacted in the event that the Canadian companies would not come forward as demanded. I replied to this that we were not discussing legislation at the moment, but were merely trying to find a way out of the impasse, that he must realize that the President was in an embarrassing position and would be severely criticized if these smugglers were allowed to get off scott free merely because they had no assets in this country which could be seized; that it was up to him and to me to try to find ways out of the present difficulties and that I was going to rely upon him for his help. Mr. Wrong seemed to feel that it would be difficult to obtain the assent of all the companies, that some of them were small and had practically gone out of business and he felt sure, therefore, that nothing definite could be obtained from them. I replied that, for the moment at least, we should consider two or three of the large companies against whom we had the most important claims and that we could leave the question of the other companies in abeyance for the time being. Mr. Wrong promised to do the best he could, but did not appear to be particularly optimistic that his efforts would meet with success. William Phillips Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5067 1/7 [Document 641] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 25, 1936. I called up Mr. Norman Armour this morning to put him in a position to follow up, if he had an opportunity, the representations which we made to Mr. Hume Wrong yesterday afternoon with respect to the Canadian disturbance. I said I appreciated the probability that the Canadian Government would not particularly welcome the inquiries which we put to them yesterday afternoon, but, nevertheless, Mr. King and Dr. Skelton should appreciate that the legislation which Canada so strongly objected to had passed the House and also the sub-committee of the Finance Committee of the Senate and was on the point of being reported out and passed in the Senate and that only with great difficulty had we been able to persuade the full Committee to postpone any such action; we, therefore, were doing the best we could to find a remedy to the situation and we earnestly hoped that the Canadian Government, appreciating our difficulties, would do the best it could to give help in the circumstances; I reminded Mr. Armour that the Canadian Government had itself suggested negotiations as the proper course and the step which we were now taking, if it could receive the support of the Canadian Government, might well lead towards satisfactory negotiations. I also reminded Mr. Armour that there were presumably seven companies against whom the Treasury desired to proceed, that while there were two companies, the Hiram Walker and Seagram Companies, which probably would be willing to agree to come into our courts and to follow the procedure requested, we hoped very much that the other companies could also be persuaded to act likewise; it would be highly desirable to include all the companies in the picture. Mr. Armour said that he would at once seek an interview with Dr. Skelton and might even be able to see Mr. King and he would telephone me as soon as he had anything further to say on the subject. William Phillips Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) 811.114 Canada/5067 2/7 [Document 642] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) [ Washington ,] March 25, 1936. Mr. Norman Armour called me on the telephone this afternoon to say that he had had a conversation with Doctor Skelton since my telephonic communication of this morning; Doctor Skelton was puzzled with regard to the words “practical assurance” in our inquiry sent through Hume Wrong; Doctor Skelton seemed to think that the best procedure would be for the Treasury to have a conference with representatives of the distillers so that the distillers would know precisely what was expected of them; I expressed some doubt as to whether this would be agreeable to the Treasury or conducive of settlement unless there was added to the procedure an agreement by the companies that they would come into our courts if an agreement resulting from the conference methods failed; the words “practical assurance” undoubtedly related to a reasonable bond, but the Canadians, of course, have no idea what the Treasury has in mind in this respect. Mr. Armour told me that the Canadian Government would probably telegraph Hume Wrong tomorrow in the nature of a reply to my inquiries. I expressed the hope that Mr. Armour could follow up the matter before these instructions were sent forward, in order to make certain that they were helpful and would be a step forward, indicating a desire to cooperate rather than the reverse and that, in order to delay further Senatorial action on the bill, it was absolutely necessary to show a desire to cooperate from Canadian sources. Mr. Armour said he would endeavor to do as requested. Doctor Skelton also said that he would like very much to have the names of the distilling companies against whom the Treasury desired to proceed and, inasmuch as Mr. Wrong has not this list, he suggested that we hand it to Mr. Wrong. William Phillips [Annex] Canadian Firms Against Which the Treasury Department Has Claims Distillers Corporation, Ltd. Melchers Distilleries, Ltd. Consolidated Distillers, Ltd. Gooderham & Wortz, Ltd. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Ltd. Hiram Walker & Sons, Ltd. United Distillers, Ltd. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) 811.114 Canada/5060 [Document 643] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) [ Washington ,] March 26, 1936. After handing Mr. Phillips a memorandum 26 urging the desirability of a conference at the earliest possible date between the Canadian distillers and the Treasury Department, Mr. Wrong informed Mr. Phillips orally that the matter of practical assurances guaranteeing that Canadian distillers would submit to our jurisdiction in the event a settlement could be reached with the Treasury Department had also received consideration. Mr. Wrong said that it was the view of his Government that it was so eminently desirable to settle these claims at once by negotiation between the Treasury Department and the distillers that they felt that every possible means should be exhausted to that end. He added that his Government had been informed by the distillers that, should it prove impossible to reach a settlement with the Treasury on the occasion of their proposed conference, the distillers would be prepared to discuss with the Treasury the terms on which they would give practical assurances that they would submit to our jurisdiction. John Hickerson 26 Not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 811.114 Canada/5062 [Document 644] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] March 27, 1936. The Chargé d’Affaires of Canada called upon his request and took up the pending matter under discussion between the Treasury Department and our Government and the Canadian Government pertaining to the claims for taxes on liquors smuggled into this country from Canada, which the Treasury had immediately in charge. He said that he would like to refer to the broader aspects, which, however, did not seem to me to present any particularly new facts or views. He then reviewed the reports of the Alcohol Bureau here in Washington for the years during the prohibition period pertaining to the smuggling of liquors into this country, in which the view was expressed that not over two percent of our domestic consumption was being smuggled in from all parts of the world. He reasoned from this that Canada could not have furnished more than one and one-half percent or less of this amount, and hence it was too small an amount on which to base claims of hundreds of millions of dollars for taxes due the United States Government. He referred to the cooperative efforts of the Canadian Government at much expense to aid the United States against smuggling from Canada. He said that, in his judgment, the Canadian liquor owners were too astute to make themselves liable for liquor taxes in this country in connection with rum running during the years in controversy; that, with possibly scattering exceptions, they were not in collusion with rum runners, and that those exceptions could only have related to an individual here and there. He added that after the Canadian Government intervened in cooperation with us, any liquors sent from Canada to points on the ocean, such as the island of St. Pierre, probably changed hands two or three times. I stated to the Chargé that I was not quoting on any general comment which he might see fit to make concerning the foregoing. I then went on to say that Messrs. Phillips, Hickerson and Moore were taking up the matter further with the Treasury in the light of the memorandum received yesterday from the Canadian Government through the Chargé; also, that Mr. Phillips had taken up with Senator King, who seemed to be Acting Chairman of the Subcommittee in charge of the proposed legislation in controversy, the question of further postponing consideration of this legislation, pending efforts to deal with the entire matter through negotiation, and that Senator King was conferring with his associates sympathetically in regard to that request. I told the Chargé that he would be made acquainted by us with any and all developments respecting the entire matter. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Taylor) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Canada/5068½ [Document 645] The Acting Secretary of the Treasury ( Taylor ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] March 28, 1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The Department has considered a copy of the memorandum left with the Under Secretary of State on March 26, 1936, 27 by Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Chargé d’Affaires, with reference to the legislation now pending in the Senate which would have the effect of imposing certain limitations upon the importation of liquor from Canada. It has also considered a copy of Mr. Hickerson’s memorandum of March 26, 1936, setting forth the statements made verbally by Mr. Wrong at the time of the delivery of the Canadian memorandum. As regards the specific suggestions set forth in the memoranda, it will be recalled that the President, in his telegram of March 23, 1936, to Under Secretary Phillips, indicated that, as a minimum, the Canadian Government should be required to give the practical assurances of the Canadian companies not only that they would submit to the jurisdiction of our courts, but also, to quote his words, that they give “practical assurance … that any judgment which may be obtained against them will be paid.” The memoranda of the Canadian Government make no reference to practical assurances of the latter sort. The Canadian Government refers to the possibility of negotiations or conferences looking to compromise or settlement. The Department, however, cannot undertake to enter into discussions directed to compromise or settlement, and no reference thereto is made by the President in his instructions. If practical assurances of the two sorts mentioned by the President can in fact be given the Treasury will be glad to discuss this twofold matter. The Department must insist, however, that, if these companies propose to hold such a conference they do so at once for the Department cannot jeopardize the pending legislation by further delay. Yours very truly, Wayne Taylor 27 Not printed. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5071½ [Document 646] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] March 28, 1936. I read to Mr. Hume Wrong over the telephone and later sent him a copy of the accompanying message, 27 which is based on the Acting Secretary of the Treasury’s letter to the Secretary of State of today’s date. Mr. Wrong expressed himself as highly disappointed at the reply; he said it got nowhere and he himself could not recommend that the representatives of the companies come to Washington for such a conference: he described the message as another threat of impending legislation unless the Canadians did precisely what the Treasury desired. I took exception to this remark and recounted my many efforts with Senator King with a view to delay; I told him of my conversation with Senator King yesterday, which had special reference to the Canadian Government’s last memorandum, that Senator King had told me, in view of the many delays already, that he could not himself take responsibility for further postponement, but that he would consult his colleagues; two hours later he called me back after such consultation and said that further postponement would be granted; at the same time he requested me to hasten the proceedings with the Canadians as much as possible in order to avoid any further protracted postponement. Mr. Wrong, however, seemed highly dissatisfied with the Treasury reply and again expressed his doubts whether the meeting contemplated would be worth while under the conditions laid down by the Treasury. William Phillips 27 Not printed. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 30, 1936 811.114 Canada/5065 [Document 647] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 30, 1936 [ Washington ,] March 31, 1936. The following persons were present: Treasury Department: Acting Secretary Wayne Taylor (in whose office the conference was held) Mr. Harold Graves, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury Mr. Eli Frank, Assistant to the General Counsel, Treasury Department. Department of State: Assistant Secretary R. W. Moore Mr. Green H. Hackworth 28 Mr. John Hickerson Canadian Representatives: The Canadian Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Hume Wrong Mr. Lazarus Phillips and Mr. Sam Jacobs, representing Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Ltd., and the Distillers Corporation, Ltd. (these companies comprising the so-called Bronfman interests). Mr. Jack Lash, of Toronto, representing Hiram Walker and Sons, Ltd., Gooderham and Wortz, Ltd. Colonel J. L. Ralston and Mr. Forsythe, representing Canadian Industrial Alcohol, Ltd. (of which the Consolidated Distillers, Ltd., is a subsidiary). After a few introductory remarks by Acting Secretary Taylor and Mr. Wrong, Mr. Frank, of the Treasury Department, stated that he thought that the representatives of the Canadian companies understood the nature of the claims which the Treasury Department was asserting against them; that is, a claim for $5.00 import duty and $2.00 excise tax per proof gallon of spirits introduced into the United States during 1933 and earlier years of the prohibition era, to say nothing of possible income tax claims. Mr. Forsythe, representing Canadian Industrial Alcohol, stated that the company which he represented had a new president, who assumed office in 1934, the Board of Directors had changed completely since 1933, and there had been great changes in lists of stockholders. He went on to say that he found it difficult to understand how the management of the company as now constituted could be said to be responsible in any way for any alleged actions on the part of their predecessors, actions of which Mr. Forsythe stated he was totally ignorant and about which he could express no opinion. He and Colonel Ralston expressed the thought that the pending legislation is unfair and unprecedented. They stated that they had never heard of legislation which in effect gave an executive official power to force a private company in a friendly country to withdraw from business on the assertion of a claim against it; they stated that this was prejudging the merits of the claim and giving the company virtually no recourse. The representatives of the Treasury Department insisted that the Canadian companies misunderstood the nature of the proposed legislation. There then followed a brief discussion of the legislation, inconclusive in nature, until someone suggested that the purpose of the meeting being to devise a means to make the legislation unnecessary, the discussion of the legislation was perhaps out of place. Acting Secretary Taylor thereupon stated that this was true and that the discussion might well be confined to practical assurances on the part of the Canadian concerns that they would appear in court to contest any suits which the Government brought against them and give guarantees that the United States Government would be enabled to collect any judgment which it might obtain. At this point Mr. Forsythe stated that, notwithstanding his earlier comments about the complete ignorance of his company in respect of any alleged infractions of American law on the part of their predecessors, at the request of the Canadian Government his firm had sent him to Washington to discuss the whole question with the Treasury Department. He said that he was completely in the dark and would find it difficult to discuss “practical assurances” until he knew the amount of the American Government’s claim against his company and the nature of the charges. The representatives of the Treasury Department indicated that they were not in a position at this time to reveal the amount of the claim. There was much discussion over the point of whether practical assurances could be given by the companies until they knew the amounts of the Treasury’s claims. Mr. Lash, representing the Hiram Walker interests, and Mr. Phillips stated that they were of the same mind as Mr. Forsythe about the necessity for information respecting the amounts of the claims. Mr. Lazarus Phillips, representing the Seagram interests, stated that he and other legal representatives of his company had seen various references in the American press to possible claims by the Treasury Department against their company and had at various times last year discussed the question informally with legal representatives of the Treasury Department. He indicated that then, as now, his company was prepared to discuss a settlement out of court; if this could not be achieved he was, he said, even though his company considered the Treasury claim without merit, prepared to discuss practical assurances that his company would contest the suits in our court and pay any judgments obtained against them. He stated, however, that he regretted to see the haste with which the Treasury Department desired to proceed in the matter of the pending legislation. He urged that the Treasury Department drop Section 403 in the pending bill in order that the enactment of the general liquor tax bill at the earliest possible date be facilitated. He stated that he was sure that the other Canadian companies would be prepared to discuss their cases fully and frankly with the Treasury Department and that, should it not be possible in the next month or six weeks to obtain settlements or satisfactory assurances that the companies will submit to our jurisdiction and pay judgment obtained against them, the Treasury could then very easily obtain either this legislation which is now pending or a modified version of it. He made it clear that he considered the legislation unfair but indicated that he believed that the Treasury Department might find that it was unnecessary. Acting Secretary Taylor, after about an hour and a half of conversation along the above-mentioned lines, suggested that the meeting be adjourned and that the representatives of the Canadian companies discuss their cases either individually or collectively with representatives of the Bureau (presumably the Bureau of Customs). This was agreed to, and Judge Moore, Mr. Hackworth, and Mr. Hickerson left the meeting. John Hickerson 28 Legal Adviser. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 31, 1936 811.114 Canada/5082 1/11 [Document 648] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 31, 1936 [ Washington ,] April 1, 1936. At 2:30 p.m. Mr. Hackworth and I went to the office of Acting Secretary Taylor of the Treasury Department to continue the conversations with the Canadian distillers. A stenographic transcript of the conference is being made and we will be furnished with a copy, probably today. The following high spots in the conversations may, however, be of immediate interest. Colonel Ralston, speaking on behalf of the distillers as a whole, made a long statement urging that the legislation be dropped on the grounds that it was unfair and inequitable, and that it would accomplish neither of its two purposes, which he understood were (1) to compel the firms to submit to our jurisdiction, and (2) to provide security for the United States against which it could recover if judgments were obtained in the courts. As regards the question of jurisdiction, Colonel Ralston said that one of the most serious aspects of this legislation would be that it would say in effect to his company that they could not continue to ship whiskey to this country unless they produced in the American court, in response to a summons, a stockholder who had what the Secretary of the Treasury deemed “a substantial interest” in the corporation. He said that his company would have no earthly means to force such an individual to appear to answer our jurisdiction, and that under the terms of this proposed legislation they could not do business unless they did force him to appear. As regards (2) he stated that he had explained in some detail in a conversation with representatives of the Treasury Department how his company at least, and perhaps some of the others, could not provide enough built-up security against which the United States Government could proceed under the terms of this legislation. Colonel Ralston therefore made the following proposal on behalf of the Canadian distillers. Mr. Lash and Mr. Phillips associated themselves with this proposal: (1) The Treasury Department would, for the present at least, agree to drop the entire embargo section of H. R. 9185 for “a month or six weeks at least”, and if at all possible until next January, with the understanding that it must be used as a last resort in the event they could not obtain satisfactory settlement or commitment out of the Canadian companies. (2) The Canadian distillers would, on their part, give commitments not to take advantage of this situation by increasing their exports of whiskey to New York over the present volume, making some allowance for normal increase in business. In this way, they pointed out, even if the Treasury Department found it possible to postpone this legislation until next January, only 10 to 20 percent of the present stocks of whiskey would be exported to the United States in the remaining months of the year, and there would thus be an ample quantity of whiskey against which the Treasury Department could proceed if necessary. (3) The Canadian distillers would give commitments not to dispose of their stocks of American type whiskey elsewhere so that there would be no dissipation of any of the security against which the Treasury Department might ultimately have to proceed. (4) The Canadian distillers would give commitments to come to Washington immediately on being summoned by the Treasury Department, sit down around a table and discuss the Treasury Department’s claims against them, with the view to ( a ) reaching an amicable settlement out of court, or ( b ) discussing terms, conditions and practical measures in respect to their submitting to our jurisdiction and protecting the United States Government against any losses on judgment which might be obtained against the company. Mr. Phillips, representing the Seagram interests, pointed out that the distillers were under a considerable obligation to the Canadian Government for taking up their case with the United States Government, and for making arrangements for the present conference. He added that he felt certain that the Canadian Government would be glad to associate itself with such an undertaking and to do everything it could to bring about an honest fulfillment of these conditions. Acting Secretary Taylor thanked the representatives of the Canadian distillers for coming to Washington, and stated to them that a careful study would be made of their representations, and that perhaps by the end of the week he would be able to give Mr. Wrong, the Canadian Chargé, either through the State Department or directly, the decision of the Treasury Department. J[ ohn ] D. H[ ickerson ] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5081½ [Document 649] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] April 1, 1936. The Canadian Chargé d’Affaires left with me this morning the accompanying memorandum 29 summary of discussions between representatives of the Canadian distillers and the representatives of the Treasury, which had been prepared by the distillers’ representatives before their departure from Washington yesterday. He pointed out that the final paragraph on page four, beginning with “It was suggested that the legislation etc.” stated the position of the companies’ representatives, which in brief is to the effect that the Treasury legislation be not proceeded with and that the individual companies endeavor to reach with the Treasury settlement of the alleged claims and that during this time the companies will continue to operate only their normal business with the United States and will not dispose of their assets in such a way as to affect the present position of the Treasury Department. Mr. Hume Wrong said that there was one point which he regretted that he had not brought out at the meeting with the Treasury officials, but which he had already explained to us, namely, in connection with the Reifel case, which had already been disposed of out of court. The Treasury’s complaints against this company were probably far more substantial than that against any other Canadian company; the claim had amounted to $17,250,000 but had been disposed of for $500,000 in cash. If, therefore, the present legislation went into effect against the other seven companies, thus prohibiting them from continuing to do business with the United States, the Reifel company would be the beneficiary; this, he felt, was a highly inequitable situation. Mr. Wrong asked me what the prospects were with regard to continuing the delay in the Senate. I told him that we were preparing a despatch for the President and certainly that nothing would be done in that respect until we had received the President’s reply. I added, however, that personally and quite frankly, I was not feeling particularly optimistic this morning with regard to his desire that Section 402 should be dropped from the legislation. William Phillips 29 Not printed. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) 811.114 Canada/5082 7/11 [Document 650] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) [ Washington ,] April 11, 1936. Mr. Wrong, Canadian Chargé, called at the Department at five o’clock yesterday afternoon at the request of Mr. Phillips to discuss the liquor embargo legislation. Mr. Phillips explained to Mr. Wrong that the Secretary, he, Judge Moore, Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Hickerson had all devoted a very large amount of their time to this question during the past three months with the view to bringing about some adjustment which would meet the wishes of the Canadian Government and permit our Treasury Department without the proposed legislation to proceed with its claims against the Canadian distillers. He explained that in particular we had faced a difficulty in respect to amicable settlements out of court; he commented that the Canadian Government in its two written communications to us on the subject and Mr. Wrong in all of his conversations with officials of the Department had urged the desirability of settlements out of court while the Treasury Department had been in the past adamant on the subject. He stated that the Treasury Department had felt that these claims ought to be adjudicated in court, particularly in view of the fact that the amounts claimed are large and that the responsibility for any reduction in the amounts should rest upon the court. Mr. Phillips went on to say that he was therefore happy to be able to give Mr. Wrong what he considered some very good news. He thereupon handed Mr. Wrong the attached memorandum which he went over with him point by point. Mr. Phillips stated that Mr. Wrong will, of course, observe that the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice, which has now come into the picture, have finally acquiesced in the request of the Canadian Government that efforts be made to settle these cases out of court. He stated that moreover the attached proposal incorporated a proposition put forward by representatives of the Canadian distillers in Washington recently that the proposed legislation be delayed for at least a month and then proceeded with only if the Canadian distillers are found unwilling to negotiate settlements or to give satisfactory commitments to contest these suits in court and to protect the United States Government from loss in the event judgments are rendered in its favor. Mr. Phillips explained that the present proposals represented the result of a tremendous amount of work on the part of officers of this Department and of the Treasury Department and that he felt that the way is now prepared for an amicable settlement of the whole question provided the Canadian distillers really desire settlements. He added that if settlements out of court cannot be achieved, the Treasury Department is prepared to discuss on a purely realistic basis with the distillers commitments for them to appear in court and to protect the United States Government from loss in the event favorable judgments are rendered. He added that in these circumstances the Department of State had done everything that it could do and that the matter was now up to the Canadian Government and the Canadian distillers; that if settlements of some sort could not be arranged in the next thirty days, the Department could take no further action. Mr. Wrong raised several points in connection with the memorandum. He was particularly interested in paragraph four (page three) and the statement that the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice will be free to proceed with the proposed legislation if the negotiations with any one of the four principal distillers are fruitless. He stated that he hoped this did not mean that the Canadian Government was expected to acquiesce in the legislation even though the negotiations failed because it could not do this. He raised the question of the omission of Melchers Distillery. Mr. Hickerson explained that the Treasury Department officials had advised him that the omission of Melchers from this list does not mean that the Treasury Department is abandoning its claim against Melchers but that the Treasury is not yet in a position to proceed against Melchers and that they therefore did not wish to make a settlement with Melchers a condition for dropping the legislation. He added that the claim against Melchers will be in the same category as the claims against liquor producers in certain other countries. Mr. Wrong stated that he would communicate with his Government as soon as possible and let us have their answer. John Hickerson [Annex] The Department of State to the Canadian Legation 30 Memorandum (1) The Canadian distillers will give commitments not to increase their exports of whiskey to the United States over the present volume during the period which is to be set aside for negotiating settlements; some allowance may be made for normal increase in business. (2) The Canadian distillers will give commitments not to dispose of their stocks of American type whiskey elsewhere. (3) The individual companies will give commitments to “sit down with Treasury officials and discuss the nature and quantum of the claims alleged to exist with a view to reaching some solution”. This proposal is understood to mean ( a ) reaching an amicable settlement out of court, or failing this, ( b ) discussing terms, conditions and practical measures in respect to the companies’ submitting to the jurisdiction of the American courts and protecting the United States against losses on judgments which might be obtained. Officials of the Department of Justice will take part in the conversations. Subject to the above mentioned conditions, the Treasury Department will agree to a delay not exceeding one month (dating from April 13) in the pending legislation, during which the following steps will be taken with a view to obviating the necessity for the legislation if possible. (1) The Treasury and the Department of Justice, acting jointly, will receive representatives of the Canadian companies individually and undertake to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the United States Government’s claims against them, subject to the condition that the two Departments will state the amount, as at present calculated, of the Government’s claim against each company but will not be required either to disclose the particulars of the claim or to discuss the facts or laws supporting it. (2) In the event of the failure of the parties to agree on a settlement, they will undertake to make an arrangement which will bind the companies to submit to the jurisdiction of the United States courts so that the claims may be litigated on their merits, and to provide satisfactory security for the payment of any judgments which may be rendered in favor of the United States Government. (3) The Canadian companies are to be informed that any persons designated to represent them in conferences with the two Departments must be fully empowered then and there to bind their principals with respect to the points covered above. (4) If the negotiations with the companies carried on in accordance with the foregoing should be fruitless as to any one of the following companies, namely: Distillers Corporation—Seagrams; Hiram Walker—Gooderham and Worts; Consolidated Distillers; and United Distillers, the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice will be free to proceed with the proposed legislation. 30 Handed to the Canadian Chargé on April 10, 1936. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5076 [Document 651] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] April 15, 1936. The Canadian Chargé d’Affaires handed me this afternoon the accompanying memorandum 31 containing the substance of the replies of the Canadian distillers to the proposals for a conference submitted to the Canadian Government in our memorandum of April 10th. Mr. Wrong pointed out that in substance the companies had agreed to accept these proposals. At the same time they make certain observations, which Mr. Wrong does not believe of any material importance. I pointed out that in paragraph ( c ), page 2, there was some danger in the words “after the conclusion of the conference”, since it seemed to give approval to the idea that the conference could break up without definite conclusions being reached. After some further conversation Mr. Wrong agreed to omit the words “after the conclusion of the conference”, and said that in sending over the memorandum to the Treasury he would authorize us to omit the phrase. William Phillips 31 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 811.114 Canada/5077a: Telegram [Document 652] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) Washington , April 27, 1936—5 p.m. 37. From Phillips. As you know, representatives of our Treasury Department and Department of Justice received on Monday of last week representatives of the four principal Canadian distillers to negotiate settlements or agreements to obviate the necessity of legislation dealing with imports of liquor. I am somewhat concerned at the reports which have been made to me today by our representatives at the lack of more definite progress in these conversations. I am told that the representative of Seagrams submitted an offer amounting to a little less than two (2) cents on the dollar for the settlement of the claim against his company which offer was promptly rejected as being wholly inadequate. I understand that in particular the representatives of the two largest Canadian concerns have made no offer to submit to the jurisdiction of our Court to litigate these suits on their merits provided an agreement could be obtained on the amount of security to be given the United States Government and that in general there has been a disinclination on the part of the representatives of the distillers to make positive offers in respect to security. Our officials are prepared to discuss such security on a realistic basis but they insist that definite offers must be forthcoming from the Canadian representatives. I believe that it might be well for you to see Skelton and to urge upon him the desirability of endeavoring to press upon the Canadian distillers the importance of coming to grips at once with the problem of making definite proposals in respect to security in the event it is not possible to make settlements with our representatives out of court. I am discussing this matter with Wrong in the same sense. [Phillips.] Hull Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5083½ [Document 653] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] April 27, 1936. I sent for Mr. Hume Wrong this afternoon and read to him the message which I had just sent to Mr. Armour, asking him to see Doctor Skelton and urge the desirability of endeavoring to persuade the Canadian distillers to come to grips with the problem and make definite proposals in respect to security, in the event that the cases could not be settled out of court; I told him that we were all greatly disappointed that after all our efforts the distillers apparently were not in a position to make any reasonable offers and that I was afraid that, unless there was a change of attitude on their part, the negotiations would break down and we would be up against the legislative problem; I hoped, therefore, that Mr. Wrong himself would do what he could through Doctor Skelton. In reply Mr. Wrong said that he, too, was very much discouraged, that this week would, in his opinion, see the breakdown of the negotiations; he felt that the Treasury and Justice officials had been wholly unreasonable; that there had been no change of attitude on their part, which I had assured him would be the case; that they were still insisting upon a bond approximating the total claim and that this, of course, was impossible for the distilling companies to accept. We discussed at some length this aspect of the case; I said that I had not understood that the Treasury was still maintaining that the security must approximate the total value of the claim and that I thought the Treasury was merely demanding a reasonable security. Mr. Wrong insisted that the companies did not understand this to be the case; he said that he had recently returned from Ottawa, where he had conferred with the Prime Minister; that with considerable difficulty the Canadian Government was restraining its irritation, but that when the negotiations failed there would be a wave of irritation and criticism. At this point in the conversation I told Mr. Wrong of the report which I had just received to the effect that the Seagram Company had invited the so-called “Little Congress” (composed of secretaries and employees of members of Congress) to be their guests on a trip to Baltimore last Saturday to inspect their distillery; the company is said to have given a dinner in honor of the group and to have provided them rather liberally with refreshments, including a quart of whiskey to be brought home by each person. I added that this would seem to be an effort on the part of Seagrams to influence the legislation and was not a pleasant thought. Mr. Wrong was frankly horrified and expressed his disbelief that the company, as such, could have done anything as utterly stupid; possibly the local manager had conceived the idea, which admittedly was a very unfortunate one. Mr. Wrong reaffirmed his position that the Treasury and Justice Departments had not changed their original position, which was wholly unreasonable and that the companies would of necessity prefer to submit to the proposed legislation rather than to be obliged to come across to the extent demanded by the two departments; in his opinion, the stand of our representatives, if continued, would end in a complete disruption of the negotiations. After the above conference with Mr. Wrong, I called up the Legation in Ottawa and told them of the telegram which was under way and suggested that, in taking the matter up with Doctor Skelton, it might be a good plan to inform Doctor Skelton confidentially of the Seagram party to the “Little Congress” last Saturday; I briefly sketched this party. William Phillips Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs 811.114 Canada/5074¼ [Document 654] Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] April 29, 1936. In the course of a telephone conversation with the Legation at Ottawa this morning Mr. Armour told Mr. Hickerson that he had recently seen both the Prime Minister and Dr. Skelton with regard to the liquor situation. Both were apparently very much upset to hear of Seagram’s party for the “little Congress,” referred to in Mr. Phillips’ telegram to Mr. Armour. From Mr. Armour’s remarks it was obvious that what he had heard from Dr. Skelton on the subject was based entirely upon Mr. Wrong’s pessimistic reports from here. The Canadians are apparently very much discouraged over the way the conversations between the distillers and our Treasury and Justice representatives are proceeding. So much so that Dr. Skelton even expressed the opinion that the Canadian Government might as well withdraw from the whole thing. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State 811.114 Canada/5084 [Document 655] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] May 9, 1936. The negotiations between our Treasury Department and the Department of Justice on the one hand and the Canadian distillers on the other have now reached a critical point. The United States Government conferees, Mr. Graves of the Treasury Department and Mr. Whittaker of the Department of Justice, regard the offers on the part of the Canadian distilleries as unacceptable and if better offers are not received are going to recommend to their principals that the Senate Finance Committee be asked to proceed with the impending embargo legislation. In this regard I should point out that the conferees feel that two of the Canadian companies (Consolidated Distillers and United Distilleries) have made genuine efforts to make settlements and have offered about all which their weak financial positions make possible. I am told that the Government conferees would not hold up a settlement of this matter because of the offers on the part of these two companies, but they insist that the other companies, Hiram Walker and Seagram Distilleries, must substantially increase their offers. The following table shows the amount of the Government’s claim and the amount of the offers made to date: Name of Distiller Amount of Claim Offer to date Seagram’s $25,000,000 $1,200,000 Hiram Walker 19,000,000 800,000 Consolidated 4,500,000 237,500 United Distilleries    4,000,000    225,000 Totals $53,000,000 [ sic ] $2,462,500 At the request of Messrs. Graves and Whittaker, I talked to Mr. Wrong, the Canadian Chargé, twice yesterday to inform him of the status of the negotiations and to urge upon him the desirability of the Canadian Government’s trying to get the two larger companies to increase their offers. Mr. Wrong spoke with great feeling on the difficulty in which such a request placed the Canadian Government. He said that it was true that the Treasury Department had insisted from the start of the negotiations that they could not reveal the nature of their evidence, but that the Canadian Government had hoped that in the discussions the companies would be able to obtain some information regarding the makeup of the claim (that is, amount for import duties, excise taxes, income tax, etc.) and the years covered. None of this information, he said, had actually been furnished the companies and they were completely in the dark as to what kind of claim they were being asked to pay. He added that the companies had stalwartly claimed that they had violated no American law and that they regarded any payments as a tax to permit them to continue doing business in the United States. Mr. Wrong stated, however, that he believed that the Seagram Company could probably, on the basis of present information, be induced to increase its offer to $1,500,000, and that the Hiram Walker Company might go as high as $1,000,000. He made it clear that he did not know this to be the case as regards either company, but that he was merely expressing an opinion, indicating at the same time that he thought Walker’s increase would be more difficult to obtain than Seagrams. If the offers of the Canadian distillers were increased, as suggested by Mr. Wrong, the resulting amount would be a few thousand dollars short of $3,000,000, or to be exact, $2,968,500. The Government conferees, Messrs. Graves and Whittaker, have indicated to me that they would be willing to recommend acceptance of the offers of the two small companies on the present basis, but that they would insist that the two larger companies offer not less than 10 cents on the dollar, or $2,500,000 for Seagrams and $1,900,000 for Walker, making a total of $4,400,000 for the larger companies. You will observe that this is only $1,900,000 in excess of the offers which Mr. Wrong believes the companies might be induced to make. As you know, there will be a perfectly dreadful situation in our relations with Canada if this legislation is proceeded with, and to let $1,900,000 stand in the way of dropping this legislation is to my way of thinking little short of pathetic. Prime Minister King has discussed this matter at considerable length on several occasions recently with Mr. Armour, stressing the exceedingly difficult political situation in which he would be placed were this legislation to be pressed. The Prime Minister points out that he took his political life in his hands in effect in 1930 by forcing through legislation to stop the smuggling of liquor into the United States and that he cannot believe that the American Government now gives as much consideration as they should to this cooperative action on his part. The Prime Minister points out that the legislation might lead to the complete nullification of one of the products on which Canada was granted a concession in the trade negotiations, even if the legislation did not violate the terms of the agreement (which we insist that it does not technically, although there can be no doubt that it is a violation of the spirit of the agreement). The Prime Minister has indicated that he would like to write a letter to the President or talk to him about this whole matter, stressing the seriousness of the situation as regards American-Canadian relations. Mr. Wrong, the Canadian Chargé, has also asked to see the President before a decision is reached to press for this legislation. Mr. Wrong has stated that he wishes most emphatically to urge upon our Government that it will necessarily have to assume the responsibility for this blow to American-Canadian relations if we allow a small sum to stand in the way of a settlement of these troublesome cases out of court. John D. Hickerson Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) 811.114 Canada/5074½ [Document 656] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Phillips ) [ Washington ,] May 12, 1936. At seven o’clock this evening the Secretary of the Treasury called me on the telephone from the White House to say that he had just had a conference with the President with regard to our claims against the Canadian distillers. He said that the Treasury felt that they were entitled to the sum of $6,000,000 to justify them in discharging their claims against the distillers; the President, however, indicated that he would accept $3,000,000 and that he did this as an act of friendship and goodwill towards the Government and people of Canada. Mr. Morgenthau went on to say that the President had asked him to communicate these facts to me immediately and to say that it was the President’s wish that I should immediately get in touch with the Canadian Legation and ascertain whether $3,000,000 would be acceptable from the point of view of the Canadians. After communicating this information to Secretary Hull, I called up Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Chargé d’Affaires, and told him that, as an expression of friendship and goodwill towards his Government and the Canadian people, the President had decided to accept $3,000,000 as an offset to our claims against the distillers. I added that I should like to know before 12 o’clock tomorrow, if possible, whether the distillers agreed, in fact, to pay the sum mentioned by the President. Mr. Wrong was delighted to have this information; he expressed the utmost confidence that $3,000,000 would be forthcoming from the companies and he said that he hoped he would be able to convey to me the views of the distillers before noon tomorrow. 31a William Phillips 31a Subsequently, the representatives of certain Canadian distilling companies against which claims had been advanced by the American Government indicated a readiness to settle the claims for a total payment of $3,000,000. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) 811.114 Canada/5092 [Document 657] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) [ Washington ,] May 13, 1936. In connection with the proposed settlement of the United States Government’s claim for tax evasion against four Canadian distilleries, Mr. Sam Whitaker of the Department of Justice called me on the telephone today and said that Mr. Lazarus Phillips, representative of the Seagram interests, had indicated that he would like to receive certain assurances through the State Department and the Canadian Legation in respect to the criminal aspects of these cases. Mr. Whitaker explained to me that the settlements which are now being negotiated deal only with the civil cases and have no bearing on any criminal aspects, but that the United States Government does not intend to proceed with the criminal cases and regards the cases as closed. He said he would be glad to have me communicate this statement to Mr. Wrong orally and make a record of the conversation. I immediately called Mr. Wrong on the telephone and communicated with him in this sense. John Hickerson Negotiations respecting the revision of the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea Negotiations respecting the revision of the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea 32 32 For text of the convention, signed May 9, 1930, see Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , p. 518 . [658] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, March 5, 1936. 711.428/1920a [659] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, May 8, 1936—4 p.m. 711.428/1949a: Telegram [660] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, May 14, 1936—11 a.m. [Received May 14—12:50 p.m.] 711.428/1953: Telegram [661] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Canada (Palmer) Washington, July 21, 1936. 711.428/1985 [662] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, September 28, 1936. [Received October 1.] 711.428/2014 [663] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, November 27, 1936. 711.428/2039a The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 711.428/1920a [Document 658] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) No. 267 Washington , March 5, 1936. Sir : On January 23, 1936, the International Fisheries Commission, established by the Convention between the United States and Canada for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, submitted a report to the Department 33 proposing revision of the Convention which is now in force. It is understood that all the commissioners of the International Fisheries Commission believe that the proposed revision is necessary and urgent. The proposed revised convention differs from the one now in force in two principal regards. The first is a provision in Article I that halibut taken incidental to fishing for other species of fish may be retained and sold. The other principal change is to provide, under Article III, a better means of closing the fishing season by setting a date of last clearance for the Banks rather than a date for the cessation of fishing. Both of these proposed changes have originated with the fishing fleet as being desirable to facilitate their operations and enforcement of the law. There are certain other changes in the proposed convention which are required by the insertion of the abovementioned new provisions or which have been made in the interest of clarifying the meaning of provisions which are contained in the present Convention. A memorandum is enclosed 34 which consists of a statement taken from the Commissioners’ report discussing the changes made in the proposed new Halibut Convention. The Department has given consideration to the report of the International Fisheries Commission and favors the suggested changes in the present Convention. To the text of the draft submitted to the Department by the Secretary of the International Fisheries Commission, which doubtless also is in the hands of the interested Canadian officials, the Department has added a preamble and a concluding paragraph and has made several textual changes, as follows: [Here follows list of textual changes.] There is accordingly enclosed a draft of a new halibut convention between the United States and Canada. You are instructed to transmit a copy of the draft to the Dominion authorities for their consideration, this Government of course reserving the privilege of making suggestions for changes therein while the Canadian Government has it under consideration. If and when final agreement is reached, the Department will request the President to issue full powers for the signing of the Convention at Ottawa. It is hoped that the Canadian Government will be in a position to give the enclosed draft prompt attention and that the Convention may be agreed upon and signed in the near future so that it may be transmitted to the Senate during the present session for its advice and consent to ratification. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore [Enclosure] Draft of New Halibut Convention Between the United States and Canada The President of the United States of America, And His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of the Dominion of Canada, Desiring to provide more effectively for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, have resolved to conclude a convention revising the convention for the preservation of that fishery signed on their behalf at Ottawa on May 9, 1930, and have named as their plenipotentiaries for that purpose: The President of the United States of America: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . His Majesty, for the Dominion of Canada: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles: Article I The nationals and inhabitants and fishing vessels and boats of the United States of America and of the Dominion of Canada, respectively, are hereby prohibited from fishing for halibut ( Hippoglossus ) both in the territorial waters and in the high seas off the western coasts of the United States of America, including the southern as well as the western coasts of Alaska, and of the Dominion of Canada, from the first day of November next after the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Convention to the fifteenth day of the following February, both days inclusive, and within the same period yearly thereafter. The International Fisheries Commission provided for by Article III is hereby empowered, subject to the approval of the President of the United States of America and of the Governor General of the Dominion of Canada, to suspend or change the closed season provided for by this Article, as to part or all of the convention waters, when it finds after investigation such suspensions or changes are necessary, and to permit, limit, regulate and prohibit in any area or at any time when fishing for halibut is prohibited, the taking, retention and landing of halibut caught incidentally to fishing for other species of fish, and the possession during such fishing of halibut of any origin. It is understood that nothing contained in this Convention shall prohibit the nationals or inhabitants or the fishing vessels or boats of the United States of America or of the Dominion of Canada, from fishing in the waters hereinbefore specified for other species of fish during the season when fishing for halibut in such waters is prohibited by this Convention or by any regulations adopted in pursuance of its provisions. It is further understood that nothing contained in this Convention shall prohibit the International Fisheries Commission from conducting fishing operations for investigation purposes at any time. Article II Every national or inhabitant, vessel or boat of the United States of America or of the Dominion of Canada engaged in halibut fishing in violation of this Convention or of any regulation adopted under the provisions thereof may be seized except in the territorial waters of the other party by the duly authorized officers of either High Contracting Party and detained by the officers making such seizure and delivered as soon as practicable to an authorized official of the country to which such person, vessel or boat belongs, at the nearest point to the place of seizure, or elsewhere, as may be agreed upon. The authorities of the nation to which such person, vessel or boat belongs alone shall have jurisdiction to conduct prosecutions for the violation of the provisions of this Convention, or any regulations which may be adopted in pursuance of its provisions, and to impose penalties for such violations; and the witnesses and proofs necessary for such prosecutions, so far as such witnesses or proofs are under the control of the other High Contracting Party, shall be furnished with all reasonable promptitude to the authorities having jurisdiction to conduct the prosecutions. Article III The High Contracting Parties agree to continue under this Convention the Commission as at present constituted and known as the International Fisheries Commission, established by the Convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery, signed at Washington, March 2, 1923, 35 and continued under the Convention signed at Ottawa, May 9, 1930, consisting of four members, two appointed by each Party, which Commission shall make such investigations as are necessary into the life history of the halibut in the convention waters and shall publish a report of its activities from time to time. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall have power to fill, and shall fill from time to time, vacancies which may occur in its representation on the Commission. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall pay the salaries and expenses of its own members, and joint expenses incurred by the Commission shall be paid by the two High Contracting Parties in equal moieties. The High Contracting Parties agree that for the purposes of protecting and conserving the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, the International Fisheries Commission, with the approval of the President of the United States of America and of the Governor General of the Dominion of Canada, may, in respect of the nationals and inhabitants and fishing vessels and boats of the United States of America and of the Dominion of Canada, from time to time, ( a ) divide the convention waters into areas; ( b ) limit the catch of halibut to be taken from each area within the season during which fishing for halibut is allowed; ( c ) prohibit departure of vessels from any port or place, or from any receiving vessel or station, to any area or areas for halibut fishing, after any date when in the judgment of the International Fisheries Commission the vessels which have departed for that area prior to that date or which are known to be fishing in that area shall suffice to catch the limit which shall have been set for the said area under section ( b ) of this paragraph; ( d ) fix the size and character of halibut fishing appliances to be used in any area; ( e ) make such regulations for the licensing and departure of vessels and for the collection of statistics of the catch of halibut as it shall find necessary to determine the condition and trend of the halibut fishery and to carry out the other provisions of this Convention; ( f ) close to all halibut fishing such portion or portions of an area or areas, as the International Fisheries Commission find to be populated by small, immature halibut. Article IV The High Contracting Parties agree to enact and enforce such legislation as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of this Convention and any regulations adopted thereunder, with appropriate penalties for violations thereof. Article V The present Convention shall remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until two years from the date when either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its desire to terminate it. This Convention shall, from the date of the exchange of ratifications be deemed to supplant the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery signed at Ottawa May 9, 1930. Article VI This Convention shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged at . . . . . . . as soon as practicable, and the Convention shall come into force on the day of the exchange of ratifications. In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate, and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done at . . . . . . . on the . . . . . day of . . . . . . ., in the year one thousand nine hundred and . . . . . . . 33 Not printed. 34 Not printed. 35 Foreign Relations , 1923, vol. i , p. 468 . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 711.428/1949a: Telegram [Document 659] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) Washington , May 8, 1936—4 p.m. 41. Department’s instruction No. 267 of March 5, 1936, in regard to Halibut Fishery Convention. Please inform the Department of any changes in draft which may be desired by the Canadian Government. Department would like to have consideration given to inserting the words “except when such violation is committed in the territorial waters of the other party” in line 16 of Article II after “provisions”. If agreement be reached and it be agreeable to the Canadian Government the Department will request the President to issue full power to you to sign the convention at Ottawa. Hull The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 711.428/1953: Telegram [Document 660] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State Ottawa , May 14, 1936—11 a.m. [Received May 14—12:50 p.m.] 62. Your telegram No. 41, May 8, 4 p.m. Canadian Government views with favor revisions recommended and is considering alterations suggested with probable formal alterations of its own. While desiring to expedite signature, Government states that full power probably cannot be obtained in time for action prior to the adjournment of Congress and that “it is most likely that objections would be raised in Parliament to the Government taking action on these further proposals concerning fishing in the Pacific so long as the final steps to bring the Sockeye Salmon Agreement 36 into force remain outstanding and I am not convinced that such a situation would be helpful in the general interest.” Despatch follows. 37 Armour 36 Signed May 26, 1930, Foreign Relations , 1930, vol. i , p. 505 . 37 No. 673, May 14, 1936; not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Canada (Palmer) 711.428/1985 [Document 661] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Canada ( Palmer ) No. 466 Washington , July 21, 1936. Sir : The receipt is acknowledged of your despatch No. 760 of June 16, 1936, enclosing a copy of a note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs dated June 15, 1936, 38 suggesting certain alterations in the proposed draft for a revision of the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fisheries of the northern Pacific Ocean. 1. The Department finds entirely acceptable the suggestion for the substitution of the word “Canada” for the words “the Dominion of Canada”, in the five places listed in Mr. Skelton’s 39 note. 2. Consideration has been given to the suggestion of the Canadian Government that the phrase “on the high seas” be inserted after the word “engaged” near the beginning of Article II and that the phrases “except within the territorial waters of the other party” and “except when such violation is committed in the territorial waters of the other party”, appearing subsequently in that article be deleted. This Government understands the treaty as providing for the regulation of halibut fishing in territorial waters as well as on the high seas by agreement between the two countries and the first of the two phrases which the Canadian Government proposes to omit as making clear with respect to such regulation that the authorities of one country are not given power to make arrests in the territorial waters of the other country. In view of the provisions of Article I it seems to be important that this exception be expressed. The language of the draft now under negotiation is the same in this particular as the language of the treaties of 1923 and 1930. The object of the second of these phrases, as recently proposed by this Government, is to make clear that one country is not required to surrender the vessels, nationals or inhabitants of the other country, if taken in its own territorial waters for fishing made illegal under the treaty, a construction to which the article might be susceptible if the phrase is not included. These objects, it is believed, are not achieved by the addition of the phrase “on the high seas” at a point in the article where it merely describes the place where the fishing is done. It must be pointed out, moreover, that the article without the phrase “on the high seas” will be broad enough to provide for the enforcement of the convention and the regulations of the commission in territorial waters, whereas the insertion of those words would remove the territorial waters entirely from the scope of the article. It is believed that the Canadian Government, no less than this Government, desires to retain complete jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute for offenses by any persons committed within its territorial waters, notwithstanding that the laws and regulations which may be violated are established jointly by the two governments. The meaning desired, it is believed, is clearly expressed in the wording proposed by this Government. 3. The Department agrees to the deletion of the words “or areas” in the third line of Article III, second paragraph, sub-paragraph ( c ) and the change in the eighth line from the words “the said area” to “that area”. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Francis B. Sayre 38 Neither printed. 39 Oscar D. Skelton, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 711.428/2014 [Document 662] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State No. 967 Ottawa , September 28, 1936. [Received October 1.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 466 of July 21, 1936, (file number 711.428/1985), with regard to certain alterations suggested in the proposed draft for a revision of the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fisheries of the northern Pacific Ocean. Under date of July 28 in the Legation’s note No. 250 the considerations of the Department as set forth in the instruction under reference were presented to the Department of External Affairs, and a reply has now been received, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. [Here follow extracts from this note printed infra .] Respectfully yours, Norman Armour [Enclosure] The Canadian Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to the American Minister ( Armour ) No. 120 Ottawa , September 21, 1936. Sir : I have the honour to acknowledge your note of July 28th, 1936, No. 250, relative to the proposed draft for a revision of the Convention of 1930 for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. It is now apparent that both our Governments are agreed upon the draft at all points, excepting only the wording of Article II suggested in paragraph (2) of my note of June 15th, No. 68, and dealt with in paragraph (2) of your note under reply. As to that, there appears to be no difference of intention; it seems simply a question of finding the most suitable text. The Canadian Government have had no intention of questioning the necessity to provide for the regulation of the halibut fishery in territorial waters as well as on the high seas. They believe the first sentence of Article I to be entirely clear upon that point. From the drafting point of view it would seem that Article I should be regarded as the substantive definition of the offence or object aimed at. Article II, on the other hand, provides for the means and procedure of enforcement, and here two aspects arise: procedure for territorial waters and procedure for the high seas. As regards territorial waters, once the offence has occurred, the authority to seize the offender or the offending vessel, whatever its nationality, would seem to rest not on treaty but on territorial law. The seizure could be made only by the officers of the country in whose waters the offence occurred, and the prosecution would have to be conducted in the courts of that country. As regards the high seas, agreement would seem necessary to authorise the officers of the one country to seize and turn over an offender having the nationality of the other country. It is suggested that a possible confusion and awkwardness might be removed if Article II were so drafted as to recognise more explicitly and directly the distinction between the two cases. Though doubtless not intended, the text as proposed in your notes of March 11, 1936, No. 158, and May 11, 1936, No. 196, seems to admit the possibility that, for example, a Canadian offender seized by United States officers for an offence in United States territorial waters might be turned over to Canadian authorities for prosecution, and yet the latter would of course have no jurisdiction to deal with such an offence. The draft of Article II, as proposed in my note of June 15th, No. 68, was submitted in the belief that it would obviate such a textual awkwardness. It is believed, also, that this draft corresponds to the method of drafting adopted in the similar case of Article IX of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Convention of May 26th, 1930. In order to clarify the matter further in the sense of the foregoing observations, it is suggested that there might be added, either as a new Article or as an extension of Article II (as proposed in my note above referred to), a provision to the following effect: “Each High Contracting Party shall be responsible for the proper observance of this Convention, or of any regulation adopted under the provisions thereof, in the portion of its waters covered thereby.” Accept [etc.] Laurent Beaudry for Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 711.428/2039a [Document 663] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) No. 591 Washington , November 27, 1936. Sir : Reference is made to the Legation’s despatch No. 967 of September 28, 1936, relative to the negotiation with Canada of a revised Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fisheries of the Northern Pacific Ocean and enclosing a copy of note No. 120 of September 21, 1936, from the Department of External Affairs. The Department is disposed to agree with the views of the Canadian authorities regarding the need for clarifying the text of the provisions of Article II. The changes along this line suggested in the Canadian note No. 68 of June 15, 1936, by the addition of the phrase “on the high seas” and the elimination of the following phraseology appearing in the article “except within the territorial waters of the other party”, and “except when such violation is committed in the territorial waters of the other party”, are acceptable to this Government if the extension to the article is made as was suggested in the Canadian note No. 120 of September 21, 1936. These changes have been incorporated in the enclosed draft. 40 You are authorized to present the enclosed draft, which has the approval of the Department, to the Department of External Affairs. Your full power to sign the convention is enclosed herewith 41 and you are authorized to proceed to the signature thereof if the enclosed draft is acceptable to the Canadian Government. Very truly yours, For the Acting Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore 40 Draft not printed; the text is the same as the convention signed January 29, 1937, Department of State Treaty Series No. 917, or 50 Stat. 1351. 41 Not printed. Proposed negotiation of a new treaty to deal with the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin as a whole, including the Niagara Falls Proposed negotiation of a new treaty to deal with the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin as a whole, including the Niagara Falls 42 42 For previous correspondence regarding preservation and improvement of Niagara Falls and regarding the St. Lawrence Waterway, see Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. ii , pp. 89 ff., and ibid. , 1934, vol. i , pp. 967 ff. [664] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Robbins) Washington, February 21, 1935. 711.4216Ni/316 [665] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, January 20, 1936. 711.4216Ni/333b [666] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) Washington, February 25, 1936. 711.4216Ni/337 [667] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, February 26, 1936. [Received March 2.] 711.4216Ni/339 [668] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, March 10, 1936. [Received March 13.] 711.4216Ni/342 [669] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, March 11, 1936. [Received March 14.] 711.42157SA29/1390 [670] Memorandum by the Minister in Canada (Armour) [Ottawa,] May 19, 1936. 711.42157SA29/1402½ [671] The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State Ottawa, December 7, 1936. [Received December 11.]| 711.42157SA29/1429 The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Robbins) 711.4216Ni/316 [Document 664] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Robbins ) No. 638 Washington , February 21, 1935. Sir : Reference is made to the Legation’s despatch No. 871, dated February 28, 1929, 41 regarding the convention and protocol for the preservation and improvement of Niagara Falls, which was signed at Ottawa on January 2, 1929, 43 and which passed both Houses of Parliament in that year. In February, 1931, the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate held hearings and voted against reporting the Treaty favorably to the Senate, which has not acted on the Treaty. During the Senate hearings it was manifest that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were in hearty accord with the proposal to construct compensating works to preserve the beauty of the Falls but that they felt that the Treaty conferred unusual and unwarranted advantages upon a private American hydroelectric company, which would receive the benefit of the additional diversion on the American side in return for defraying the American share of the costs of the proposed compensating works. The Treaty was based on a report dated May 3, 1928, by a Special International Niagara Board established in 1926 by Canada and the United States. The Board’s final report, submitted under letter December 11, 1929, is printed as Senate Document No. 128, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, entitled “The Preservation and Improvement of the Scenic Beauty of the Niagara Falls and Rapids”. You doubtless have a copy of this document. The present composition of the Board consists of, for the American members, the District Engineer at Buffalo, at present Lieutenant Colonel James A. O’Connor, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, and Doctor J. Horace McFarland, past President of the American Civic Association and Chairman of the National Parks and Roadside Development Committees, Harrisburg, and for the Canadian members, Mr. J. T. Johnston, Director of the Dominion Water Power and Reclamation Service, Department of the Interior, and Doctor Charles Camsell, Deputy Minister of Mines. On January 17, 1931, there occurred a fall of rock in the American Fall, on which the Board submitted a Supplementary Report dated November 10, 1931. On August 13, 1934, a rock slide took place on the American side of Horseshoe Fall, followed by a further slide on December 5, 1934, from the Canadian side of the Horseshoe Fall. This Government considers that the remedial works proposed by the Board are urgently needed for the restoration and enhancement of the beauty of Niagara Falls. It is believed that a material improvement of the present scenic conditions would follow their construction. The impairment by erosion has been forcibly brought to our attention by the recent falls of rock, and the bared flanks of the Horseshoe Fall and the thin flow over the American Fall are striking witnesses to the need for prompt betterment of existing conditions. The Board has stated that the purposes sought to be accomplished by the proposed works are as follows: “The results to be anticipated from the construction of the works on the two flanks of the Horseshoe Falls will be the insurance at all seasons of an unbroken crest line from shore to shore, the maintenance of the present blended green and white colour effects of the Horseshoe Falls and, in some proportionate measure, a modification of the rate of erosion in the bend. The works in Grass Island pool will ensure an adequate flow in the American rapids and falls and between the Three Sister Islands.” There appears to be no likelihood whatever that the Convention of January 2, 1929, will be approved by the Senate and, moreover, the power aspects of the Convention are unsatisfactory to the President. In these circumstances, a different approach to the problem of the beautification works will have to be made if their construction is to be undertaken at an early date. We feel that it is urgently necessary for these works to be undertaken without further delay. Therefore, I desire at this time to request the consideration of the Canadian Government of an arrangement for the joint construction of the planned remedial works to preserve the beauty of Niagara Falls independently of additional diversion of water for power purposes. I hope that this can be done by an exchange of notes, in which mention will be made that it is clearly understood by both parties that no permanent allocation of water rights is effected thereby nor is there authorized any additional use of water by power companies, public or private, on either side of the Falls. The works could proceed under the supervision of the existing Board and subject to such modifications or changes from its original recommendations as may be acceptable to the two Governments. It may, of course, be desirable at this time to give to the Board instructions for further consideration of the matter. If so, this Government will be glad to exchange views with the Canadian Government in the matter. You are instructed to present to the Canadian authorities a note in the sense of the foregoing. For your information, it may be stated that the question is at present receiving considerable attention in the United States; the President, the Secretary of War, the two Senators from the State of New York and Representatives from Buffalo are actively interested. A copy of proposed legislation introduced during the present session of Congress is enclosed for your information. 45 In addition to sending your note please express orally to the Prime Minister our hope that the Canadian Government will find it possible to reply favorably in this matter. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull 41 Not printed. 43 Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. ii , p. 94 . 45 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 711.4216Ni/333b [Document 665] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) No. 201 Washington , January 20, 1936. Sir : Reference is made to the Department’s instruction No. 638 of February 1 [ 21 ], 1935, directing the Legation to seek the consent of the Canadian authorities to provide, through an exchange of notes, for the construction of remedial works in the Niagara River, with a view to preserving the scenic beauties of Niagara Falls. Reference is also made to the Legation’s despatch No. 1258, of May 15, 1935, 45 reporting, in the absence of the then Prime Minister, the reaction of Dr. O. D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the proposal. For your information I am enclosing a copy of a letter dated January 7, 1936, addressed to the President by Representative W. G. Andrews, of Buffalo, New York, 46 indicating the continued interest of several Congressmen in the preservation of Niagara Falls through the construction of remedial works. Mr. Andrews is being informed that the question is still under consideration by the two governments. You are requested to draw the Prime Minister’s attention to the representations which were made to the late Government and which have never been formally answered. An early report on Mr. King’s views will be appreciated. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: R. Walton Moore 45 Not printed. 46 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Armour) 711.4216Ni/337 [Document 666] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) No. 262 Washington , February 25, 1936. Sir : The President has given a great deal of thought to the St. Lawrence Waterway project and the most practicable means of bringing about approval of a treaty in the United States and Canada looking to the inauguration of actual construction work on this development. As you know, the President sent a strong message to the Senate at its first regular session after he assumed office, urging immediate approval of the Treaty of July 18, 1932; 47 the President, moreover, made personal appeals to a number of Senators in an endeavor to bring about the approval of the treaty by the Senate. Notwithstanding these efforts, the treaty did not obtain the necessary two-thirds majority of the Senate and thus failed of approval. Our present concern is to endeavor to devise a means whereby a treaty looking to this development can be brought into effect. I sent your predecessor an instruction dated February 21, 1935, dealing with the Convention and Protocol for the preservation and improvement of Niagara Falls, which was signed at Ottawa on January 2, 1929, and which has been approved by both houses of the Canadian Parliament. In that instruction I stated that during the Senate hearings of 1931 on the Niagara Falls Convention it became manifest that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were in hearty accord with the proposal to construct compensating works to preserve the beauty of the Falls. I added, however, that the Committee apparently felt that the Convention conferred unusual and unwarranted advantages upon a private American power company, which under the Convention would receive the benefit of the additional diversion on the American side in return for defraying the American share of the cost of the proposed compensating works. On that account, I further stated that there appeared to be no likelihood that the Convention of January 2, 1929, will be approved by the Senate. The President feels that there would be obvious advantages to both the United States and the Canadian governments in negotiating a new treaty to deal with the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin as a whole, including the problems relating to Niagara Falls. You are, accordingly, requested to discuss this whole question with the Prime Minister at the earliest possible moment, in order that his views may be obtained. If the Prime Minister is agreeable to the suggested procedure, it is the President’s intention to withdraw at once from the Senate the present St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty of 1932 and the Niagara Falls Convention of 1929. We would be prepared to institute negotiations looking to a new treaty at once. Very truly yours, Cordell Hull 47 Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. ii , p. 69 . The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 711.4216Ni/339 [Document 667] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State No. 441 Ottawa , February 26, 1936. [Received March 2.] Sir : With reference to the Department’s instruction No. 262 of February 25, 1936, (file No. 711.4216 Ni/337) regarding the question of the St. Lawrence waterway project and the possibility of having the St. Lawrence Treaty and Niagara Falls Convention withdrawn from the Senate and a new treaty embodying the principles set forth in these two conventions negotiated with the Canadian Government, I have the honor to inform the Department that I called this afternoon on the Prime Minister and took up with him the matter dealt with in the instruction under reference. A copy of the memorandum of this conversation is enclosed herewith. 48 I left with Mr. King an informal memorandum based upon the above instruction. As the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs 49 had telephoned me with regard to this matter and had given me the substance of the instruction and informed me of the urgency of the matter, I felt it best to seek an early interview with the Prime Minister without even awaiting the arrival of the instruction itself. Although Mr. King was in the midst of the debate on the Trade Agreement 50 and had himself in fact finished a three-hour speech in support of the resolution which he completed only last night, he was good enough to see me in his small office off the Chamber early this afternoon. While Mr. King did not enter into a discussion of the merits of either treaty, he made it very clear that the announcement of the negotiation of a new treaty dealing with these questions at this time would, he felt, be embarrassing to him. He also indicated that he was not at all convinced that the waterways portion of the treaty would be of benefit to Canada at the present, fearing particularly its effect on the Canadian National Railways at any rate, which are already in a difficult position. (In this connection see the Legation’s strictly confidential despatch No. 400 of February 14th last, 51 reporting a conversation with the Minister of Railways, Canals and Marine, Mr. C. D. Howe.) Mr. King admitted that of course the power phase of the St. Lawrence Treaty was something to be considered, but did not go so far as to admit that he felt this would be sufficient to change his opinion. As regards the Niagara Falls Convention, it will be noted that he expressed understanding of our Government’s position as to the inadvisability of conferring unusual and unwarranted advantages upon a private American power company, but whether deliberately or not he did not go so far as to indicate that he would be willing to see the scenic aspect of the Convention separated from the power aspect and a separate treaty with regard to the former concluded. Mr. King expects to be able to give me a more definite expression of his views within the next two or three days after he has had an opportunity to consult with his colleagues. Respectfully yours, Norman Armour 48 Not printed. 49 John D. Hickerson. 50 Signed at Washington, November 15, 1935, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 91, or 49 Stat. 3960. 51 Not printed. The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 711.4216Ni/342 [Document 668] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State No. 474 Ottawa , March 10, 1936. [Received March 13.] Sir : Referring to the Department’s instruction No. 262 of February 25, 1936, and to the Legation’s despatches No. 441 of February 26th, 1936, and No. 443 of February 29th, 1936, 52 with regard to the possible withdrawal of the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty and of the Niagara Falls Convention from the Senate and their replacement by a new treaty dealing with the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin as a whole, including the problems relating to Niagara Falls, I have the honor to confirm my telephone conversation with the Assistant Chief of the Western European Division on Saturday morning, March 7th, reporting the publication in the Canadian press of an Associated Press despatch, bearing a Washington dateline of March 8th, reporting that— “A new drive by the United States Government for ratification of the St. Lawrence Waterway treaty with Canada—aimed at approval of the pact at the next congressional session—was intimated today in reliable Senate quarters.” It will be noted that the despatch continues by quoting Senator Pittman 53 directly as saying that “he would have some surprises to disclose” in the speech that he will make at Detroit on March 11th next, at the conference of the Great Lakes Waterway Association. The writer of the article interprets Senator Pittman’s words as indicating that the Administration may be thinking of some concessions to the opposition in our Senate, and quotes him directly as having said that he feels that thirteen Senators can be persuaded to change the stand they have hitherto taken but that “nothing will be done this session, but there is a chance for ratification next session”. As reported in the Legation’s telegram No. 24 of March 9, 10 a.m., 54 on Saturday last, March 7th, I attempted once more to see the Prime Minister, but having been unable to do so owing to Mr. King’s absence from his office I had a talk with his Private Secretary. I reminded Mr. Henry that the Detroit meeting at which a Government spokesman would be expected to make some statement with regard to the waterways question would take place on March 11th and that we would appreciate very much some word from the Prime Minister indicating the Canadian Government’s position on the matter as submitted. I explained that such answer as they might give need not necessarily represent their final decision: that I felt sure that my Government would not wish to hurry Mr. King and would much prefer to have careful consideration given to the whole question, and that all we really wanted was a general indication as to their reaction to the proposal. Mr. Henry later telephoned me to say that he had seen the Prime Minister for a moment just before the Council meeting and that he had sent the following message: that after talking the matter over with the members of the Cabinet he did not feel that it would be wise to raise the matter at the present time. Mr. Henry seemed to feel that this language of Mr. King referred to the whole question and not merely to the question of the Detroit speech. However, in speaking with Dr. Skelton later he told me that he felt sure that Mr. King merely intended to say that he thought it would be inadvisable to make any public announcement as to withdrawal of the treaties from the Senate, and that while he (Dr. Skelton) was not over-sanguine as to the possibility of working out a solution along the lines indicated, nevertheless it was, he felt, a matter which merited further study and that he felt sure that Mr. King would wish to go into the whole question from every angle before reaching a final decision. In the meantime, there can be no disguising the fact that the interview attributed to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate has accomplished just what Mr. King apparently desired to avoid; namely, publicity directed towards reopening the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty at this time, with a view to altering it. While I have not yet been able to see Mr. King, I have spoken with Mr. Henry and informed him that my understanding is that Senator Pittman’s statement was made without prior consultation with the State Department. The present plan is, I told him, for the Administration’s point of view to be set forth in a message from the President which will be read by Senator Pittman. In the meantime, according to the press, the Canadian Government has stated that its “attitude to a new drive in the United States for ratification of the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty will not be made known at least until Senator Pittman has spoken in Detroit next Wednesday”. The Prime Minister spent yesterday in Toronto and it is quite possible that he may have seen the Premier, Mr. Hepburn, in which event he may have something to say to me when I see him with regard to this question, and more particularly Mr. Hepburn’s attitude towards it. In the House of Commons this afternoon Mr. Church, the independent-Conservative Member from Toronto, put the following questions to the Minister of Railways, Canals and Marine (Mr. Howe): (1) Is the meeting of the Great Lakes Waterways Association which is being held in Detroit tomorrow official and, if so, will the Canadian Government be represented; and (2) Have any new negotiations taken place with the United States in connection with the St. Lawrence Treaty? To the first question the Minister replied that the meeting was not official and that no official Canadian representative was being sent. To the second question he replied (I quote from memory): “So far as I am aware the Government has received no recent communication on the question of the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty.” As the Minister of Railways, Canals and Marine, in replying, intimated that he had received these two questions some ten minutes before and as the Prime Minister was in the House at the time, I think it probable that Mr. Howe consulted Mr. King before making his reply. In this event it would seem a logical inference to draw that Mr. King does not desire to have any publicity given to the recent approach made to his Government on this question. Clippings from the Ottawa Journal, Ottawa Citizen , Montreal Gazette and Toronto Globe of March 9th, together with a leading editorial from the Montreal Gazette , on this question, are enclosed herewith. 55 Respectfully yours, Norman Armour 52 Despatch No. 443 not printed. 53 Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. 54 Not printed. 55 None reprinted. The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 711.42157SA29/1390 [Document 669] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State No. 481 Ottawa , March 11, 1936. [Received March 14.] Sir : With reference to my strictly confidential despatch No. 474 of March 10, 1936, regarding Senator Pittman’s forthcoming speech before the meeting of the St. Lawrence Waterways Association at Detroit today, I have the honor to inform the Department that I saw the Prime Minister last night and discussed this matter with him. Mr. King said that he had read the Associated Press telegram in one of the Toronto papers, where he spent Monday. Dr. Skelton, he said, who was with him, seemed to be particularly apprehensive regarding that portion of the statement attributed to Senator Pittman in which it was said that “his words contained an indication that the Administration may be thinking of some concessions to the opposition which thus far has fought the pact successfully”. Dr. Skelton had interpreted this as meaning that the concessions would necessarily be at the expense of Canada, and that he had suggested to Mr. King—Dr. Skelton stayed over in Toronto after Mr. King’s departure—that it might be well to telephone to me and suggest that a word of caution be sent to Washington on this point. I told the Prime Minister that I understood that not only had the State Department not been consulted with regard to the statement but that it apparently had no advance knowledge that Senator Pittman had intended to give such an interview. I said that I had been in the House that afternoon when one of the members—Mr. Church, of Broadview—had put the question to Mr. Howe, the Minister of Railways, Canals and Marine, as to whether “the Government will be represented at the annual convention of cities and towns and harbors of the Great Lakes in reference to the St. Lawrence waterway; also whether he will be shortly in a position to inform the House if there are any negotiations going on between the two countries for the seaway, so that when the depression is over there will be a basis of agreement”. Mr. King said that it was unfortunate that the question had been put to Mr. Howe, who had risen to reply before he, the Prime Minister, had had an opportunity to do so. As a matter of fact, our latest proposals had not been discussed in Cabinet meeting. Mr. King had merely talked the matter over with one or two of his colleagues, and it so happened that Mr. Howe had been away and he had not had an opportunity to explain the matter to him. It was, therefore, in perfect good faith that Mr. Howe had replied as he did: “That, so far as we are aware the meeting is entirely unofficial” and, “In reply to the second question, I may say that I know of no communication of recent date between Canada and the United States in the matter of the St. Lawrence waterway.” With regard to our proposals, Mr. King still felt that the time was not propitious for a reopening of the question. He reiterated his objections as set forth at our last talk, adding that I had probably seen that Mr. Hepburn had again come out, since the elections, as opposed to the St. Lawrence Treaty. I told Mr. King that I had telephoned Washington the nature of Mr. Howe’s reply and had suggested that in view of it, it might be a wise precaution to see that no reference be made in the speech at Detroit to the fact of our informal talks, as this might cause some embarrassment to the Canadian Government. Mr. King said that he was very glad that this had been done, as reference to the negotiations to date might cause some misunderstanding. I had a talk with Dr. Skelton this morning and told him of my talk with Mr. King. Dr. Skelton said that he felt that any concessions or changes in the present treaty would necessarily be at the expense of Canada; such changes as had been proposed, e. g. the diversion of water at Chicago, etc., came within this category. Dr. Skelton also referred to Mr. Howe’s reply in the House yesterday, saying that he thought it was unfortunate that the Prime Minister had not himself answered the question, but supposed that was because Mr. Church had addressed his question to the Minister of Railways, Canals and Marine personally. In view of the answer made by Mr. Howe, Dr. Skelton said that he was very glad that Washington had been notified with a view to obviating any misunderstanding through reference in the speech at Detroit to the preliminary talks which had already taken place. Dr. Skelton confirmed what he had said on an earlier occasion, that he felt it would be useful to examine the whole question anew, although he was not sanguine as to finding a solution acceptable to both sides, particularly at the present time. Respectfully yours, Norman Armour Memorandum by the Minister in Canada (Armour) 711.42157SA29/1402½ [Document 670] Memorandum by the Minister in Canada ( Armour ) 56 [ Ottawa ,] May 19, 1936. During a conversation this afternoon with the Prime Minister, arranged for the purpose of enabling Mr. Hickerson in Mr. Bang’s presence to take up certain angles of the valuations question with Mr. Ilsley, the Minister of National Revenue, 57 the subject of the St. Lawrence Waterways was touched upon. I asked Mr. King whether there was anything new since our last talk. He rather indicated that there was nothing and gave the distinct impression that he hoped that the matter might be allowed to remain where it was. Mr. Hickerson stressed the President’s continued interest in the whole waterways question, notably the power angle of it, and said that he hoped very much that the Canadian Government might at least see its way clear to get around the table with us and talk over the possibilities of combining the two treaties; that is, the Niagara Falls Power and Science Treaty with the St. Lawrence Waterways Treaty. Mr. Hickerson said that there was no hope of having the Niagara Falls Treaty put through the Senate in its present form and that he thought that if some changes could be made and the two treaties combined a good deal of the objection in Ontario might be overcome, as he understood that Ontario did want more Niagara Falls power. Mr. Hickerson added that he felt sure that during his visit to Ottawa the President would take up the matter with the Prime Minister. While Mr. King admitted that he supposed there would be no objection to discussing the matter informally he had a very strong feeling that far from gaining ground the sentiment in favor of a St. Lawrence treaty was on the wane, and that most people felt the need for it past, if it ever had existed. He stressed the opposition to it in Quebec as well as in Ontario, and in general showed little enthusiasm for the project. N[ orman ] A[ rmour ] 56 Copy received in the Department May 28, 1936. 57 See memorandum of May 20, 1936, p. 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 625 ] . The Minister in Canada (Armour) to the Secretary of State 711.42157SA29/1429 [Document 671] The Minister in Canada ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State No. 1058 Ottawa , December 7, 1936. [Received December 11.]| Sir : With reference to the Department’s telegram No. 118 of November 18, 7 p.m., 58 regarding the prospective visit to Ottawa of Mr. Frank P. Walsh, Chairman, Power Authority of the State of New York; Mr. Leland Olds, Executive Secretary of the Power Authority and Mr. Basil Manley, Vice Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, accompanied by Mr. J. D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, I have the honor to inform the Department that the gentlemen in question arrived in Ottawa at noon on Friday, December fourth. That afternoon a meeting was held at the Legation at which, in addition to the above named, the Counselor of the Legation and myself were present. At this time the various phases of the waterways question were discussed and the method of procedure to be followed at the meeting which had been arranged for that evening with the Prime Minister and certain members of his Cabinet was gone over. In general the presentation by Mr. Walsh and the other members of the delegation followed the lines set forth in the Department’s instruction No. 262 of February 25th last, the substance of which was, as the Department is aware, brought to the attention of the Prime Minister by me in a personal interview on February 26th last. That evening the above-named dined with the Prime Minister informally at his house. As Mr. King had previously told me he had planned to do there were also present at the dinner the Minister of Justice, Mr. Lapointe (who in the absence of Mr. King acts as Prime Minister); the Minister of Finance, Mr. Dunning; the Minister of Transport, Mr. Howe, the Minister of Public Works, Mr. Cardin; the Postmaster General, Mr. Elliott; the Minister of Labor, Mr. Rogers; and Dr. Skelton, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Palmer and myself were also invited to attend. After dinner we all adjourned to Mr. King’s library where the whole question was informally discussed along the lines indicated above. The following day, Saturday December 5th, Dr. Skelton asked Mr. Walsh and his associates, as well as Mr. Palmer and myself, to attend a meeting in his office, at which he had arranged for certain of the technical experts to be present. At this meeting, in addition to Dr. Skelton himself and Mr. Laurent Beaudry, his assistant, there were present Mr. Loring C. Christie, Counselor of Legation, Department of External Affairs; Mr. J. T. Johnson, Controller of the Dominion Water and Power Bureau, Department of Mines and Resources; Mr. D. W. McLachlan, Engineer of Design and Capital Construction, Department of Transport; and Mr. Guy Lindsay, Engineer in charge of General Engineering, Department of Transport. Here again the question was gone into from various angles, the more technical aspects of the work being discussed. After Dr. Skelton had sketched the discussions of the evening before for the benefit of those who had not been present, the various phases of the question were presented by the experts; Mr. Olds for the American side and Mr. McLachlan followed by Mr. Johnson for the Canadian side. I think that Mr. Walsh and his associates felt that the visit accomplished the purpose for which they had come up, namely, to explore the various possibilities and to ascertain in a general way the reaction of the Canadian Government to reopening the whole question on a broader basis to include the whole St. Lawrence basin. I should state in conclusion that in all the conversations with Canadian officials Mr. Walsh and his colleagues stressed the entirely unofficial nature of their visit and the fact that they were in no way speaking for the President or our Government. Respectfully yours, Norman Armour 58 Not printed. Irish Free State: Irish Free State: Contents Disinclination of the United States to enter into a trade agreement with the Irish Free State (Documents 672-673) Disinclination of the United States to enter into a trade agreement with the Irish Free State Disinclination of the United States to enter into a trade agreement with the Irish Free State 1 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , pp. 61 ff. [672] Memorandum by the Economic Adviser (Feis) [Washington,] August 3, 1936. 611.41D31/43 [673] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins) [Washington,] August 5, 1936. 611.41D31/44 Memorandum by the Economic Adviser (Feis) 611.41D31/43 [Document 672] Memorandum by the Economic Adviser ( Feis ) [ Washington ,] August 3, 1936. Mr. Brennan 2 telephoned to inform me that his Government has instructed him to ascertain whether the American Government might now be willing to consider the negotiation of a commercial agreement. A similar approach had been made to us some months in the past. The Irish Government had been informed that in view of the burdensomeness of the negotiation schedule at that time this Government could not consider additional negotiations. Now, however, his Government thought we might be able to negotiate. He stated that his Government’s desire arose from the fact that the purchases of the Irish Free State of American goods so greatly exceeded American purchases of their goods. Mr. Brennan cited the following figures: Exports from the United States to the Irish Free State in 1935 £2,350,000 Imports into the United States from the Irish Free State in 1935 £157,000 I told him that I did not believe this Government could begin negotiations immediately, but that I was sure the Department was disposed to talk over the matter informally with him. I also told him a talk would be arranged with the head of the Trade Agreements Division. In discussing the figures cited, I stated that we would naturally wish to check them with the American figures. Furthermore, there was a very considerable amount of dollar exchange made available by immigrant remittances and tourists’ expenditures. H[ erbert ] F[ eis ] 2 Robert Brennan, Secretary and Chargé of the Irish Legation. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins) 611.41D31/44 [Document 673] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements ( Hawkins ) [ Washington ,] August 5, 1936. Conversation: Mr. Robert Brennan, Secretary of the Irish Free State Legation, Mr. Harry Hawkins, Mr. Samuel Reber. 3 At various times since the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act, 4 the Government of the Irish Free State has indicated a very strong interest in negotiating a trade agreement with the United States. This interest arises from the fact that American exports to the Irish Free State exceed by a very wide margin our imports from that country. On the occasion of Mr. Sayre’s conversation with Mr. De Valera in Dublin on August 29, 1935, 5 Mr. De Valera spoke of the large excess of imports into Ireland from the United States and indicated that the negotiation of a trade agreement was essential in order to correct this situation. When asked by Mr. Sayre regarding the concessions which the Irish Free State would seek in the American tariff, Mr. De Valera mentioned beer (stout), whiskey, horses and cattle as being of primary interest. The interest of the Irish Free State in negotiating a trade agreement was followed up on subsequent occasions but these overtures met with the response that this Government was fully occupied with numerous other negotiations. The experience of Germany in negotiating with the Irish Free State indicates clearly that we should avoid any such negotiations, the sole purpose of which from the standpoint of the Irish Free State would be to modify the present favorable balance of trade between the United States and that country. The purpose of Mr. Brennan’s call was to remind us again of his Government’s desire to negotiate a trade agreement with us. He again stated that such negotiations were imperative in view of the fact that the trade balance between the two countries is so heavily adverse to the Irish Free State. He submitted the following statement showing the trade between the two countries since 1931: “ Balance of Trade Between Saorstat Eireann and United States of America “According to Irish Free State published statistics the balance of trade has for many years been heavily in favor of the United States of America. Imports from U. S. A. to Irish Free State Exports from Irish Free State to U. S. A. £ £ 1931 2,044,359 393,437 1932 1,320,211 103,282 1933 1,054,404 153,219 1934 1,863,826 122,073 1935 2,353,000 177,000 1936 (5 months) 1,365,000 90,000 “Up to the 31st March, 1935, the above figures are compiled on the basis of country of consignment. Subsequently to the 31st March, 1935, they are compiled on the basis of country of origin.” After some inconclusive discussion as to the accuracy of these figures, particularly in view of the substantial proportion of our trade with the Irish Free State which passes through the United Kingdom and is credited in the statistics to the latter country, it was pointed out to Mr. Brennan that whatever the situation may be as regards the balance of trade in merchandise, a very misleading picture of the situation is obtained if only the visible items in the balance of payments are taken into account. In 1935 our statistics show on our credit side merchandise exports of $7,260,000. On the debit side two items account for nearly twice that amount, namely, expenditures of American tourists in the Irish Free State, $2,000,000, and immigrant remittances to that country, $11,000,000. These figures are taken from the United States Department of Commerce Publication, “The Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1935”, a copy of which was sent to Mr. Brennan. He indicated that he was not familiar with the above facts and seemed to realize that they give the situation a rather different complexion than that which he presented. We pointed out to Mr. Brennan, however, that from the standpoint of American commercial policy the balance of payments situation is not significant; that it is not our policy to seek to bring about a balance with each country; that the state of the merchandise balance results from natural factors; that artificial adjustments tend to be effected merely by scaling down the excess exports with a consequent reduction in the total trade; and that our policy is designed to promote multi-angular trade as the only means of bringing about an expansion of world trade. We reminded Mr. Brennan that in negotiating trade agreements the established policy of this country is to grant concessions only on products of which the country concerned is the chief source of importations into the United States. It is necessary to follow this policy because the granting of concessions to countries which are secondary sources would impair the basis for bargaining with the countries which are the principal suppliers. We pointed out that there are very few if any products of which the Irish Free State is the chief source. Consequently the concessions which could be granted would be very limited indeed. However, countries which are secondary suppliers of the American market (such as the Irish Free State) nevertheless stand to gain substantially from our trade agreements program in consequence of our policy of extending to such countries which do not discriminate against our commerce the benefit of the concessions which we make to the principal suppliers. We pointed out that the Irish Free State has already received substantial benefits from this policy. It has obtained concessions on all four of the items which Mr. De Valera had indicated to Mr. Sayre as being of prime importance to the Irish Free State. Subsequent to the discussion referred to the duty on whiskey was reduced by fifty per cent in the Canadian agreement 6 and extended to the Irish Free State. The duties on cattle, including dairy cows, and horses were also reduced in the Canadian agreement and extended to the Irish Free State. The duty on beer (stout) had been reduced by fifty per cent under the flexible provision of the Tariff Act 7 not long before Mr. Sayre’s visit to Dublin. In addition to these benefits which the Irish Free State is receiving under the operation of the most-favored-nation principle, concessions of some interest to that country which have been made in trade agreements with other countries include pickled herrings, certain kinds of cheese and certain textiles. It was pointed out to Mr. Brennan that these benefits and all concessions made under future trade agreements, which in all probability will include a number of interest to the Irish Free State, will continue to be extended to that country as long as it grants nondiscriminatory treatment to American commerce. We stated that the above considerations seem to indicate that the best procedure would be for each country simply to continue to give most-favored-nation treatment to the other, rather than to attempt to negotiate a trade agreement. In this way the Irish Free State would continue to enjoy the concessions which it has already obtained and would benefit from all concessions made by the United States in trade agreements with other countries on other products in which the Irish Free State is interested. Mr. Brennan admitted that there was a good deal to be said for the views above set forth. He indicated that he would consider the matter and would call again if there were any further aspects which he thought should be discussed. 3 Second Secretary of the Embassy at Rome, temporarily in the Department of State. 4 Act of June 12, 1934, 48 Stat. 943. 5 See memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Sayre, September 25, 1935, Foreign Relations , 1935, vol. ii , p. 61 . 6 Signed November 15, 1935, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 91, or 49 Stat. 3960. 7 Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590. New Zealand: New Zealand: Contents Representations regarding discrimination against American commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa (Documents 674-674) Representations regarding discrimination against American commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa Representations regarding discrimination against American commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 1003 – 1010 . [674] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, June 5, 1936. [Received June 13.] 611.62M31/96 The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 611.62M31/96 [Document 674] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State No. 2242 London , June 5, 1936. [Received June 13.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 974 of September 26, 1935, 2 on the subject of the New Zealand mandated territory of Western Samoa, and in this connection to forward a copy of a note from the Foreign Office, handed me today in reply to the Embassy’s note No. 618 of August 16 [ 15 ], 1934, 3 reference to which was made in the Embassy’s despatch to the Department No. 895 of that same date. 4 In handing me this note, the Assistant Secretary of State pointed out that although His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom had cognizance of the legal position on which His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand had based their decision, the issue was one between the American Government and His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand and the Foreign Office undertook no more than to transmit the reply which was handed to me. Respectfully yours, Ray Atherton [Enclosure] The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Eden ) to the American Chargé ( Atherton ) No. A4321/11/45 [ London ,] 3 June, 1936. Sir : I have the honour, at the instance of His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand, to invite reference to a note, No. 618, which you were good enough to address to my predecessor on the 16th [ 15th ] August, 1934, in regard to the tariff régime in Western Samoa. 2. His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand have noted that, in view of the passage by the United States Congress of a Joint Resolution, No. 340, approved on the 14th June, 1934, 5 the provisions of United States law restricting to vessels of the United States the transportation of passengers and merchandise directly or indirectly from any port of the United States to another port of the United States are made inapplicable to commerce between the Islands of American Samoa, or between those Islands and other ports under the jurisdiction of the United States Government. They have noted also that it is the desire of the United States Government that United States vessels and United States commerce shall now be permitted to enjoy national treatment throughout the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, on the basis of Article III of the Convention of the 2nd December, 1899, between the United States, Great Britain and Germany, 6 for the adjustment of questions relating to Samoa. 3. Before reaching a decision in this matter, His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand have most carefully considered it in the light of its previous history. As the United States Government are aware, the Merchant Marine Act was introduced into Congress in November, 1919, and was passed on the 5th June, 1920, 7 applying the coastwise laws of the United States to the islands, territories and possessions of the United States, including American Samoa. On the other side, His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand issued an Order in Council on the 20th April, 1920, instituting a preferential rate of duty on goods of British origin imported into Western Samoa. 4. The above course of action on both sides amounted, in the view of His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand, to a tacit abrogation of Article III. In spite, however, of this mutual disregard of the Article, His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand expressed in 1924 their willingness to consider the request of the United States Government for national treatment for their commerce in Western Samoa, provided that the United States Government, on their part, were willing to give a specific assurance of their understanding that Article III of the Convention ensured to British Commerce and commercial vessels national treatment in that part of Samoa under United States administration. A communication to this effect was made to the United States Ambassador in a note dated the 30th June, 1924, (A 3920/2287/45). 8 5. No reply to this note was ever received, nor did the United States Government make any further observations on the matter until, after a lapse of ten years, you addressed to my predecessor your note of the 15th August, 1934, under reference, in which you drew attention to the offer made in 1924 by His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand. The New Zealand Government feel sure, however, that the United States Government will understand that that offer cannot be regarded as remaining open indefinitely, and that, in view of the time which has elapsed since it was made, the New Zealand Government must regard it as having lapsed. During the whole of this period, until the passage of the recent Resolution, as the United States Government will realise, Article III has been disregarded on both sides; the existing tariff policy in Western Samoa has become an established feature of the economy of the territory and it would not now be possible to alter it in the sense desired by the United States Government without causing great practical inconvenience. 6. The resulting situation, as it appears to the New Zealand Government, is that an offer made in 1924 to renew the operation of a provision which was being disregarded by both parties, was not accepted and has lapsed; and they think that neither party can now claim from the other compliance with the provision in question. In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand can only express their regret that they are unable to afford national treatment to United States vessels or goods in Western Samoa. I have [etc.] (For the Secretary of State) R. L. Craigie 2 Not printed. 3 See instruction No. 506, August 3, 1934, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , p. 1003 . 4 Ibid. , p. 1005 . 5 48 Stat. 963. 6 Foreign Relations , 1899, p. 667 . 7 41 Stat. 988. 8 Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. ii , p. 243 . Union of South Africa: Union of South Africa: Contents Efforts to meet complaints from South Africa that American import regulations unduly restricted South African exports to the United States (Documents 675-691) Efforts to meet complaints from South Africa that American import regulations unduly restricted South African exports to the United States Efforts to meet complaints from South Africa that American import regulations unduly restricted South African exports to the United States [675] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) Washington, July 18, 1936—noon. 611.48A6 Liquor/10: Telegram [676] The Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) to the Secretary of State Capetown, July 20, 1936—3 p.m. [Received July 20—10:30 a.m.] 611.48A6 Liquor/11: Telegram [677] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) Washington, July 22, 1936—6 p.m. 611.48A6 Liquor/12: Telegram [678] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) Washington, July 29, 1936—7 p.m. 611.48A6 Liquor/13: Telegram [679] Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conversation Between the South African Minister (Close) and the Assistant Chief of the Division (Culbertson) [Washington,] July 30, 1936. 648A.1112/44 [680] The Secretary of State to the South African Minister (Close) Washington, August 8, 1936. 648A.1112/25a [681] The Acting Secretary of State to the South African Minister (Close) Washington, August 15, 1936. 811.114 Liquor/1159 [682] The South African Minister (Close) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington , 24 August, 1936. 648A.1112/30 [683] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) Washington, August 26, 1936—3 p.m. 811.61248A/75: Telegram [684] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) [Washington,] September 14, 1936. 811.61248A/92 [685] Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] September 14, 1936. 811.61248A/113 [686] The Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) to the South African Minister (Close) Washington, September 18, 1936. 648A.1112/30 [687] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) Washington, September 19, 1936—3 p.m. 811.61248A/87a: Telegram [688] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) Washington, November 13, 1936—5 p.m. 811.61248A/87a Suppl: Telegram [689] The Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) to the South African Minister (Close) Washington, December 19, 1936. 811.61248A/122 [690] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) Washington, January 12, 1937—7 p.m. 811.61248A/126a: Telegram [691] The Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) to the Secretary of State Capetown, January 27, 1937—2 p.m. [Received January 27—9:10 a.m.] 811.61248A/132: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) 611.48A6 Liquor/10: Telegram [Document 675] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown ( De Courcy ) Washington , July 18, 1936—noon. New York Times carries a story under a Capetown dateline to the effect that the South African Wine Growers Association is exhorting its members to buy British automobiles, machinery and household appliances because of its disappointment at being unable to sell South African wines in the United States. It is said that the Association has been trying to enter the American market since the end of prohibition, but has been defeated by the regulations and supplementary regulations which made it impossible to sell a single bottle. It is reported that last week the Association had to cancel a sample consignment at the last minute owing to the publication of more supplementary regulations and that the Association now announces it is closing its New York office. Please investigate and report briefly by telegram whether instances of this nature have come to your attention. Hull The Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) to the Secretary of State 611.48A6 Liquor/11: Telegram [Document 676] The Consul at Capetown ( De Courcy ) to the Secretary of State Capetown , July 20, 1936—3 p.m. [Received July 20—10:30 a.m.] Referring to Department’s telegram of July 18, noon, full report on this situation being submitted airmail today. 1 Wine Grower’s Association is conducting violent propaganda campaign against American goods following closing American office. Campaign, though not justified by facts, is obtaining support from deciduous fruit growers and is having harmful effect American trade. It would be very helpful if Department could ascertain from Department of Agriculture and cable if any revision of BPQ 362 2 along the lines suggested by South African entomologists who were in Washington last October is contemplated. Must discuss situation with Decidious Fruit Exchange Thursday. I have no knowledge wine shipments held up here account regulation. Have consistently sent Association copies all liquor regulation[s] received. De Courcy 1 Not printed. 2 Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine Order 362. The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) 611.48A6 Liquor/12: Telegram [Document 677] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown ( De Courcy ) Washington , July 22, 1936—6 p.m. Your July 20, 3 p.m. Department of Agriculture states that BPQ 362 (May 1, 1934) made provision for entry of grapes from countries where the Mediterranean fruit fly is known to exist if shipments were made in compliance with certain specifications. This method is available to South African shippers as well as to other exporters now sending fruits to the United States. Inasmuch as the South Africans have indicated they could not conveniently use this method experiments were undertaken following exchange of views with the South African entomologists to determine if methods more suitable to their particular needs could be devised. This experimental work is actively in progress but it is difficult to say when results may be expected which would permit a revision of BPQ 362. Hull The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (De Courcy) 611.48A6 Liquor/13: Telegram [Document 678] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown ( De Courcy ) Washington , July 29, 1936—7 p.m. Your July 20, 3 p.m. For your information and such use as you may deem appropriate in answering the charges of discrimination against American goods the following summarizes the information which the Department has been able to acquire concerning the closing of the South African Wine Growers’ Association Office in New York. There appears to be no record in the Department of any complaints by the South African Wine Growers’ Association against regulations making it impossible to import South African wine and brandy in the United States. In 1934 attempts were made by the South African exporters to increase quota allotments, and at that time a permit to cover a shipment of South African wines was refused because the application was not made in time. This appears to be the only case of a complaint on record. Inquiries have been addressed to the Federal Alcohol Administration and the National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers to determine whether they are aware of the situation alleged to exist by the South African Wine Growers’ Association. Both groups have replied in the negative. The Secretary of the Importers’ Association, of which the South African group is a member, states he knows of no case which might have justifiably been made the cause for any complaint, and that there has been no discrimination against South African wine imports, which are subject to the same regulations as similar imports from other countries. In fact, the South African brandy will benefit through the most-favored-nation clause from the reductions on import duties on brandy brought about through the recent trade agreement with France. 3 In reply to an inquiry addressed by the Secretary of the Importers’ Association the Office of the South African Wine Growers’ in New York has replied that the reason for the closing of its office is purely a question of business judgment. It admits that Federal regulations apply equally to all countries and do not discriminate against South African wines. The Association has stated that it is cabling its South African principals to that effect. It appears probable that the Wine Growers’ Association is closing its New York Office through inability to market their product in the United States, rather than because of difficulties experienced with Government regulations or restrictions. Their product is not well known in this country and is directly competitive with similar but better-known brands from other nations. It may be that disappointment over their inability to sell their goods in this country has for local reasons at home caused them to make this charge as an excuse. Keep Department fully and promptly informed. Hull 3 See vol. ii , pp. 85 ff. For text of the agreement, signed May 6, 1936, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 146, or 53 Stat. 2236. Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conversation Between the South African Minister (Close) and the Assistant Chief of the Division (Culbertson) 648A.1112/44 [Document 679] Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conversation Between the South African Minister ( Close ) and the Assistant Chief of the Division ( Culbertson ) 4 [ Washington ,] July 30, 1936. Mr. Culbertson explained that the Secretary had been very much concerned by newspaper articles indicating that the South African Wine Growers Association was withdrawing from the United States in consequence of American regulations which made the sale of South African wines impossible and that an active campaign was being carried on in South Africa for retaliation against American products, even possibly in the form of a boycott. Mr. Culbertson further stated that the Secretary was desirous to have these alleged charges thoroughly investigated as he was most anxious to avoid any disturbing element in relations with South Africa toward which he had always been animated by the most friendly feelings. The Minister then gave a long explanation of what he considered to be the principal factors which were causing certain groups in South Africa to demand that retaliatory action be taken. He said that as in other Dominions there was considerable concern expressed over the adverse trade balance with the United States. This sentiment was being actively supported by dissatisfied groups which for various reasons had been unable to sell their products in the United States. He read several extracts from the local South African press which were distinctly unfriendly in tone and charged that United States regulations for the importation of both wines and fruits were of a political character and intended to keep out their products. Particular dissatisfaction is being shown by the wine exporters and by the fruit growers. As regards the wine question the Minister said that he had received instructions from South Africa to investigate the situation and had been informed by the wine growers in South Africa that constant changes in American regulations made it impossible for them to import wines. They said each time a shipment had been made the regulations had been changed and entry refused. The exporters could no longer continue to ship goods in the face of this obstacle. The Minister did not, however, cite any specific instances of where a change in regulations had been directed against South African products. With reference to the fruit question he said that the South African producers are most anxious to enter the American market and last year had sent two government entomologists to this country to see if they could satisfy the American authorities that methods of shipment employed in South Africa would serve to combat the Mediterranean fruit fly and satisfy the Department of Agriculture requirements with regard to shipments of grapes. They had been informed that experiments would be carried on upon the basis of their recommendations and suggestions, but had heard nothing further as to the results of their experiments. Throughout his explanation the Minister kept reiterating that he was only setting forth the views of the South African producers. The Minister also said that he had had difficulty in obtaining free entry for travel literature coming to this country for the purposes of informing Americans of South Africa and encouraging tourists to travel in that part of the world. The Minister said that Customs regulations had been changed and that he had been informed that the shipment already under way would be subject to a penalty as it was improperly registered for entry. He felt very strongly that his Government should not be subject to a penalty merely because Customs officials decided that the goods should be classified under another heading rather than under the provision under which he had been bringing them into the country for the last three years. In conclusion Mr. Close said he had been considering asking to see the Secretary to discuss these questions with him. When Mr. Culbertson attempted to explain the American position with regard to each of the points raised by the Minister, or to point out that South African products were subject to identic regulations imposed on like shipments from other countries, it was obvious that the Minister was not at all disposed to listen. In fact he kept interrupting and appeared only interested in putting forth his own views although he was full of assurances that he was anxious to find a mutually satisfactory solution. Consequently it was considered advisable on the occasion of this first discussion merely to take note of the Minister’s explanations to say that the whole subject was being thoroughly investigated by the Department and to arrange for a further discussion with the Minister at an early date to be set. In view of the attitude taken by the South African representatives, the Secretary may wish to invite the Minister to the Department, present very fully the information which has been obtained on these three subjects, and to draw his attention to the obvious unfairness and fallacies of the arguments presented by the South Africans. S[ amuel ] R[ eber ] 4 Robert Webster, Secretary of the South African Legation, was also present. The Secretary of State to the South African Minister (Close) 648A.1112/25a [Document 680] The Secretary of State to the South African Minister ( Close ) Washington , August 8, 1936. My Dear Mr. Minister : As you are aware, I have been much concerned over the charges said to have been made in South Africa of alleged discrimination by the United States against South African products, and am most anxious to avoid any disturbing element in the relations of this country with the Union of South Africa, towards which, as you know, I have always been animated by the most friendly sentiments. I understand that the principal difficulties are in connection with shipments of wines and fruits and I have caused a study to be made of the charges raised. The results of this investigation have been embodied in a memorandum which I take occasion to transmit to you with the request that you be good enough to bring it to the attention of your Government. In the interest of finding a mutually satisfactory solution, it might, however, be useful first to discuss these difficulties in the light of the studies, which I understand you have also been making, and of the attached memorandum. I had hoped to have an opportunity to talk with you before leaving for my vacation, but in my absence Mr. Phillips will be glad to see you at your early convenience. I am [etc.] Cordell Hull [Enclosure—Memorandum] The Department of State to the South African Legation The attention of the American Government has been directed to a press campaign in South Africa, which, it is stated, is being carried on against the discriminatory actions of the American Government with respect to the importation into this country of South African products. It is reported that South Africa is disturbed by the complete failure of its Wine Growers Association to market South African wines and brandies in the United States in consequence of American regulations which have made the sale of these products impossible. It is charged that American regulations for the importation of both wines and fruits are solely of a political character and intended to keep out South African products. The wine exporters are said to have claimed that constant changes in American customs regulations have made it impossible for them to import wines, and that for this reason the South African Wine Growers Association is closing its office in the United States and withdrawing completely from business in this country. It is also stated that in the interests of building up an import trade of fruits into the United States the producers of South African fruits had last year sent two Government entomologists to this country to see if they could satisfy the American authorities that the method of shipment employed in South Africa would serve to combat the Mediterranean fruit fly and answer the requirements of the Department of Agriculture with respect to shipments of grapes. Following discussions with the officials of the Department of Agriculture, the South African entomologists were informed that experiments would be carried on on the basis of their recommendations and suggestions; but following their return to South Africa it is said that they have heard nothing further as to the results of these experiments. There appears to be no record in the Department of State of any complaints by the South African Wine Growers Association against regulations making it impossible to import South African wine and brandy into the United States. In 1934, attempts were made by the South African exporters to increase quota allotments and at that time a permit to cover a shipment of South African wines was refused because the application was not made in time. This appears to be the only case of a complaint on record. The Department of State has addressed inquiries to the Federal Alcohol Administration and to the National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers, of which the South African Wine Growers Association is a member, to determine whether they were aware of the situation alleged to exist. Both groups have replied in the negative. The Secretary of the Importers Association states that he knows of no case which might have justifiably been made the cause of any complaint and that there has been no discrimination whatsoever against South African wine imports, which are subject to the identical regulations as are similar imports from other countries. In fact South African brandy will benefit through the most-favored-nation clause from the reduction of import duties on brandy brought about by the recent trade agreement with France. In response to an inquiry addressed by the Secretary of the Association, a representative of the South African Wine Growers Association in New York, has replied that the reason for the closing of its office is “purely a question of business judgment”. He admits that the regulations apply to all countries and do not discriminate against South African wine. It is recognized that various changes have taken place in the regulations from time to time which, owing to the distance between this country and South Africa, have made it difficult in all cases for South African exporters to comply as promptly with American regulations, but it is understood that in the majority of cases these difficulties have been adjusted or were on the point of being adjusted through the assistance of the National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers. Should there have been cases of disagreements and difficulties which might have been regulated through the intervention of this Department, it is to be regretted that its attention was not drawn to these matters before the decision to withdraw was taken. With reference to the problem of importation of fruits from South Africa, it will be recalled that in 1923 an embargo against the importation of fresh fruits into the United States from countries where the Mediterranean fruit fly was known to exist was imposed solely for the purpose of preventing the spread of this insect pest in this country. Following studies carried on by the Department of Agriculture, an order (BPQ 362 May 1, 1934) was issued making provision for the entry of such fruits if the shipments were made in compliance with certain specifications. This method is available to South African shippers as well as other countries who are now sending fruits to the United States. Inasmuch, however, as the South Africans have indicated they could not conveniently use this method, experiments were undertaken following the exchange of views with the South African entomologists last year to determine if methods more suitable to their particular needs could be devised. The Department of Agriculture has assured this Department that the experimental work is actively in progress in Hawaii but, as will be appreciated, such experiments take time and it is difficult to say exactly when results may be expected which would permit a revision of the existing order in favor of South African shippers. Washington , August 8, 1936. The Acting Secretary of State to the South African Minister (Close) 811.114 Liquor/1159 [Document 681] The Acting Secretary of State to the South African Minister ( Close ) Washington , August 15, 1936. My Dear Mr. Minister : Since our pleasant conversation on Wednesday last 5 I have undertaken to inform myself more exactly regarding the period between promulgation and incidence of regulations by the Federal Alcohol Control Administration. I have been informed by responsible officers of the Administration as follows: (1) The Federal Alcohol Administration Act was passed August 29, 1935. 6 It provided that new regulations both for wine and spirits would come into effect March 1, 1936. Public hearings were held in August 1935 and the wine regulations were promulgated December 30, 1935, and those for spirits January 18, 1936. (2) The Administration found that it was a physical impossibility for producers, even in this country, to make the necessary changes in the six to eight weeks remaining before March 1. Accordingly it requested the Congress to prolong the period and by Joint Resolution No. 217, approved February 29, 1936, 7 the grace periods were extended for spirits to August 15, 1936, and for wines to December 15, 1936. (3) Since the first issue of wine regulations December 30, 1935, there has been no amendment whatsoever to these regulations, the only change having been the effective date, which, of course, has been in favor of producers everywhere. The spirits regulations have been amended because of the complexities arising out of the bottled-in-bond section of the act. (4) The Administration does not now perceive any cause for further amendment of any of its regulations. With regard to the importation of South African fruits I wish to assure you that we are genuinely interested in arriving at an early solution of the present difficulties and you may be sure that I shall do all that I can to cooperate with other branches of the Government. Very sincerely yours, William Phillips 5 No memorandum of this conversation of August 12 has been found in Department files. 6 49 Stat. 977. 7 49 Stat. 1152. The South African Minister (Close) to the Acting Secretary of State 648A.1112/30 [Document 682] The South African Minister ( Close ) to the Acting Secretary of State My Dear Mr. Acting Secretary : I have not formally acknowledged the receipt of the letter from Mr. Secretary Hull of the 8th instant though when carrying out the suggestion of that letter in meeting you for our informal conversation on Wednesday, 12th instant, I expressed my sincere appreciation of the very friendly spirit evinced in the terms of that letter. I now formally acknowledge the letter and renew my expressions of appreciation. I now also wish to thank you for your note of the 15th instant and for the information given in it. In writing this note I am still communicating with you informally as I have no instructions as yet as to putting anything officially to the United States Government: and am doing so only in the hope which I know you share that our preliminary informal discussions may clear the ground somewhat, and also doing so in further pursuance of the objects dealt with in Mr. Secretary Hull’s letter above. You will remember how seriously I spoke at what you happily term our pleasant conversation, on Wednesday the 12th instant, as to the picture as it presents itself to those concerned in our large wine and fruit industries: and as to the rising tide of resentment that has developed. As I told you, the expressions of strong feeling are not confined to those interested in these industries only: they are now being seriously taken up in other very influential quarters—Press and otherwise—widely known with us for sanity of view and sound commonsense. What I then told you has been emphasised a good deal by what has reached me in the mails since then. Your representatives in South Africa no doubt have kept you posted on all this—and on the variety of more or less drastic forms of action which are being pressed—ranging from 100% duties to a boycott, and including withdrawal of the Union Representatives from Washington. You and I both wish to bring about a better feeling. I will therefore in this informal note write frankly as to the directions in which a remedy may possibly be sought. Without going into the merits or otherwise of general allegations made in South Africa, I wish to repeat as strongly as possible what I said to you—that even assuming, as I do, that no legal or technical discrimination is made here against South African products as such, there may be factual points in actual practice which in effect do lead to a real discrimination and have virtually the same effect as a legal discrimination. As to Wines and Spirits . The constant changes of regulations are bound to operate very harshly as against producers in a country several thousand miles away. The hardship it is said is intensified greatly by the rapid succession of changes—and by the short notice often given for some of the changes to come into effect. You can see how easily the distant exporter, who quite probably has spent much time and money say on bottles and labels complying strictly with an existing United States of America regulation, can be made to suffer considerable loss by a sudden new amending regulation that simply nullifies everything done in compliance with the regulation hitherto in force and already acted upon in all good faith. In one interview Mr. Kohler, I understand, stated that after putting certain “samples” of K. W. V. 8 products on board a ship for the United States of America—such samples being “of the essence” for trade development—he had to take them off that ship owing to a new change of regulation which came to his notice at the last moment and which made it useless to send the samples though these had complied with the regulations as known at the time of shipping. That he apparently said was the last straw that led to his cancelling the K. W. V. Trade representation here. You will remember that at our conversation I urged strongly that from the Union producers point of view, it would be clear that in the making and changing of regulations here “geography” had not been allowed for: and accordingly that regulations even though otherwise in force, of general application, might and in many instances, would in the case of distant producers operate as a very real discrimination against him. I suggested, therefore, that one way of helping to avoid this appearance of discrimination—that is of this discrimination in fact—would be to consider the advisability of following the principle of allowing time for each change to come into operation, reasonably sufficient to let the distant producer prepare to meet the changes and avoid as far as possible the loss in time, trouble and money which he at present is exposed to. For reasons I gave, I suggested that the authorities might consider a time allowance of at least three months—and better still four. You considered that this idea might be explored. You refer in your note to the Regulations of December 1935: which were apparently intended to consolidate the regulations and stabilise the position. You will remember that I brought these regulations with me and discussed them at our conversation—and that I pointed out then that while the wine regulations seemed to have remained unaltered except for an extension of the date of operation the Spirit Regulations had been materially altered: and, that we were equally much interested in Spirit Regulations in view of our Brandy products. Moreover, I pointed out that at least one alteration—I think the definition of “brandy”—might be of the utmost importance: yet it was to come into effect in a very short time after promulgation. This was a casual but very illuminating illustration of the point as to short notice. Obviously no one can question the right of the United States Administration to make alterations in its laws regardless of consequences. The spirit in which our conversation took place was of course not on that basis: the question before us was whether the exercise of such a indubitable right could be made in such a way as to achieve the objects of allaying the strong feeling in South Africa and so of lessening the force of the demand there that other indubitable rights should be exercised, if the difficulties I have referred to remain unaltered. Whether this should be done depends no doubt on whether it is considered worth while for the United States officials to aim at achieving those objects. You and I in our friendly informal conversation both agreed that it was very desirable that the possibility of achieving those objects should be fully explored. It will probably be very difficult to secure these objects if the distant producer has to continue to face not only actual losses in time, work and money, but to contend with the uncertainty which has been engendered and will otherwise remain constantly in his mind as to what changes will be made—and how and when. That uncertainty means either a paralysis or death of trade. Therefore while I am grateful for the information you give me—I must in this connection refer particularly to one aspect of it. You say that the Administration does not now perceive any cause for further amendments of any of its regulations. But while that is so now, yet if and when it does “perceive cause” then no doubt the necessary further amendment will follow. In view of that—and of the fact that the Administration gives no hint as to a policy of giving any notice at all—I unfortunately do not as yet see any reason for hoping that I can assure my Government, if asked on this point, that any changes will be made on what to the distant producer will appear as reasonable notice. Whether any such assurance can be given I do not know: but without such assurance at least one strong factor in South African feeling will remain with all the possibilities of which you will no doubt have been informed. As to Fruit . I am very grateful for your expression of genuine interest in arriving at an early solution and for your promise of cooperation with other branches of the Government. Here again you will like me to speak frankly as I did at our discussion on Wednesday the 12th: which I believe was pleasant to both of us because the frankness indicated the spirit of mutual desire to arrest the developing troubles. For this reason I repeat what I then said, viz. that I am very uneasy about the Fruit question. Our South African scientific experts came here last November to explain their reasons for holding after full investigation and experiment and tests that the system which had been developed in South Africa had eliminated any danger of the Fruit Fly pest being carried here in our grapes. Rightly they agreed of course that as a scientific matter their tests and conclusions should be investigated by the United States Departmental Scientists for verification or otherwise. They were told this would take some time: and they left the United States of America in good hope of a decision on the tests within possibly six months I think. As nothing had been communicated to us, we wrote informally on the 23rd July last to Dr. Strong the Chief of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine asking when the decision might be expected. The reply was wholly indefinite on this point: except that evidently a long delay is contemplated. Accordingly at the present moment it looks as if the ensuing season for grape export from South Africa—say from middle of December next onwards—will be entirely lost to us: even if the decision of the United States Experts is in our favour. This fact, as you know, will intensify the fruit farmers existing strong feelings. The South African fruit farmers are so confident that our Fruit experts are right that they are at present already voicing views and suggestions of a very strong character as no doubt you know. They too demand retaliatory acts. Again it is largely a question of what is worth while to the United States of America—whether to allay the feeling or not. But as I told you, my personal view is that it will probably be considered by my Government most important to have some decision—and an early one—so that it may know how to act—and act as soon as possible—if it decides to do so. If the United States experts agree with the South African experts then caedit quaestio I suppose: and so our grapes should promptly come in. If they do not agree with ours—as I have no instructions I can only hazard for your own information my own personal forecast—which is that my Government will almost certainly rely on the correctness of our own experts: just as the United States Government will probably act on reliance of its own experts. Then what either side may do is at present speculative: but there are of course possibilities. You may remember that at our conversation I gave you a very apposite illustration of how a regulation of seemingly general application can operate as a practical discrimination. When in April 1934 a regulation was issued by the United States of America permitting the introduction of grapes under certain conditions one of these conditions was as to the “container”. I at once pointed out to you—and then through you personally to scientists in the Department of Agriculture—that I believed this “container” condition would render the permission for the entry of grapes useless for South African Growers however much it might suit, e. g. Spain, owing to the entirely different conditions: distance, kind of grape (ours are of first class but delicate table varieties) and other things. In my letter to you of 11th April, 1936 [ 1935 ], I pointed this out referring to my letter of 27th February, 1936 [ 1935 ]. 9 Our fruit farmers then spoke strongly about this form of practical discrimination: and have lately spoken strongly about it again. For the containers so far approved by the Department of Agriculture here are practically useless for our purposes. Though our fruit farmers have sent several samples of boxes suited for their purpose and they hoped suitable for the Department of Agriculture purposes here, none have met with departmental approval here. That our farmers do not understand: especially as I should point out—as I did at the time—that a long delay in arriving at a decision on one sample took place. If that sample had been approved of, fruit shipments could have come last season. It happens, however, that in the end that sample was not approved of. I am sure you will appreciate my personal position in the matter. My anxiety to remove the causes of irritation matches your anxiety. The only hope of removal is to state in this informal discussion exactly what some of the prominent causes for irritation are. If they can be, and are, removed, that is all to the good. If they cannot be removed—or if by the other authorities whose cooperation you desire, it is not thought worth while to remove them—then you and I will equally, I am sure, deplore the unfortunate possibilities. Very sincerely yours, Ralph Close Washington , 24 August, 1936. 8 Ko-operatieve Wijnbouwers Vereniging van Suid-Afrika, Beperkt. 9 Neither printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) 811.61248A/75: Telegram [Document 683] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( Totten ) Washington , August 26, 1936—3 p.m. 7. The Department has cooperated with the Department of Commerce in the preparation of its most recent instructions to Day 10 regarding efforts to offset false impression created by … Kohler 11 and others and relies upon you and the consular officers to assist him where possible without, however, entering into any public controversy. We suggested that the South African Government, instead of sending costly mission or employing costly surveyors, might instruct its legation to prepare a complete survey, and offered the services of this government to assist it.… We have recently, as in the past, conferred with the Department of Agriculture, impressing upon it the danger of needlessly strict decisions, and are now promised that its experimental work will be expedited. To any inquiries regarding a trade agreement with the United States you may say that, while close study has been and is being given to this question, it has not been found practicable up to this time to invite the Government of South Africa to negotiate an agreement. It should be pointed out again that South Africa benefits directly and indirectly from most-favored-nation treatment and other features of our policies and program. Please inform De Courcy in response to his telegram of August 25 12 that the South African Minister under date of August 24, 1936, has written an informal letter to me discussing both wine and fruit matters. For your confidential information this long letter contains veiled threats that his government may take unfavorable action if the Department of Agriculture does not, after its investigations are completed, accept the South African chilling methods. Hull 10 Samuel H. Day, Commercial Attaché. 11 C. W. H. Kohler, Chairman, Ko-operatieve Wijnbouwers Vereniging van Suid-Afrika, Beperkt. 12 Not printed. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) 811.61248A/92 [Document 684] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Sayre ) 13 [ Washington ,] September 14, 1936. I had asked the South African Minister to come and meet Mr. Strong to hear first hand what the Department of Agriculture is prepared to do toward meeting South African wishes regarding the importation of grapes. After the Minister had reiterated the South African complaint and expressed his fears of the outcome I asked Mr. Strong to take the floor. Mr. Strong repeated what he had said to me on September 12 regarding the willingness of this Department to send experts to England to inspect refrigerating facilities of certain vessels and to Capetown to observe the operation of the precooling plant. The Minister was very pleased and expressed a desire to send a cablegram at once. He hoped that the inspections would not take long because the fruit growers must know in time to order their wooden containers from northern countries. Mr. Strong said that depending upon availability of vessels for inspection he thought it might take about two months (Mr. Strong later agreed in talking to us privately that, of course, vessels could be approved as inspected and an announcement could be made on the basis of say two or three vessels of the nine which it is understood are used in that fruit trade. Thus some time would be saved.) The Minister was anxious to make an early announcement, chiefly because of his personal concern over the effect it would have upon mitigating the boycott movement. Failing early results from the proposed journeys which might have such effect, the Minister thought that some public announcement in South Africa of our present plans would have a happy effect. Mr. Strong objected to any publicity right now for reasons which were obvious to us all. He thought it would be better to make a complete announcement after every angle of the situation had been explored and we were definitely prepared from the date of the announcement to admit grapes under the conditions described. The Minister was not certain that he could agree to withhold from the public every iota of information. He said that he would prepare a cable giving first the facts for the information of his government and secondly a suggestion as to a public announcement. He described a draft telegram to be reviewed by ourselves, and we agreed to do so. Mr. Strong stated that he was ready to send his men at once. The refrigeration expert would go to England as soon as he was informed where and when the ships would be available. The entomologist would go to Capetown as soon as he was informed whether such a visit would be welcome. F[ rancis ] B. S[ ayre ] 13 Memorandum of a meeting in the Office of Assistant Secretary Sayre regarding South African fruits. Present besides Mr. Sayre were the following: the South African Minister; the First Secretary of the South African Legation; Mr. Lee A. Strong, Chief, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Department of Agriculture; and Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs. Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs 811.61248A/113 [Document 685] Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs [ Washington ,] September 14, 1936. The Secretary was visited by Mr. William S. Culbertson who has been retained to represent the South African Reciprocity Committee, a group of exporters interested in developing trade with South Africa. Its present concern is the boycott in South Africa which it hoped to stamp out with official aid. The Secretary referred Mr. Culbertson to Mr. Dunn 14 who asked me to be present. It was explained to Mr. Culbertson that we had on September 14 given the South African Minister encouraging information regarding the plans of the Department of Agriculture ultimately to admit South African fruits. We asked the South African Government for certain non-complicated information which had not yet been received. This information was essential to any further step by the United States Department of Agriculture. Mr. Culbertson said he realized we had done all we could do but suggested that perhaps we may ask our own Minister to expedite. I said that we had just yesterday considered sending Mr. Totten a telegram if there were no developments this week. After Mr. Culbertson’s departure Mr. Dunn suggested that I see the Legation’s Secretary, Mr. Webster, and tell him of our concern. I accordingly arranged to have lunch with him and said the following: The Secretary had been visited by a deputation representing a large group of exporters. These had been confidentially informed of encouraging developments, but wondered why the South African Government had taken no steps to make known to the fruit farmers the cooperative spirit of this Government. The Department was surprised that the South Africans after thirty days had not been able to give us the simple information necessary for the next step. The Department thought that since we had made such a great effort all-round to accommodate the South Africans in this matter it behooved the South African Government to act as quickly as possible to restore our good name among the farmers there. This could best be done by lending its own cooperation to our effort and to dissemination there of the truth regarding the cooperation of this Government. Mr. Webster said he would convey these thoughts to the Minister. I closed by saying that failing to receive an early reply from South Africa we may find it necessary to enlist the aid of our own Minister in securing the desired information. Mr. Webster then said that the Minister had received a telegram but that it did not contain the information we wanted. The Government had not obtained the names of the vessels which would be used for the transport of grapes, and it had become confused by a rumor in South Africa that our Department of Agriculture was planning to send its men at the height of the fruit season in February rather than at once as promised. I asked him whether his Government was accustomed to accepting rumors in preference to direct commitments from another Government. I suggested that they inform Pretoria at once that there is no truth in the rumor and that the experts are prepared to proceed on the first available steamer after obtaining knowledge that their visits would be welcome. He said that the Minister was writing Mr. Sayre a letter. I said that if the letter contained no information there was hardly any use to send it. Mr. Webster called later in the day to make an appointment with Mr. Sayre for the Minister. Informed of Mr. Sayre’s absence a tentative appointment for three o’clock, October 16, was made with the Secretary. 15 14 James Clement Dunn, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs. 15 No memorandum of a conversation of that date found in Department files. The Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) to the South African Minister (Close) 648A.1112/30 [Document 686] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Sayre ) to the South African Minister ( Close ) Washington , September 18, 1936. My Dear Mr. Minister : Upon my return to Washington, which was shortly after Mr. Phillips’ departure, it became my privilege to take up the study of the matters set forth in your letter dated August 24, 1936, to Mr. Phillips. I am glad to say that we have made some headway in a solution of both the wines and spirits question and the grape question. I quote below from a recent letter from the Federal Alcohol Administrator outlining its policy with regard to changes in regulations. “This Administration has learned with deep regret through recent conversations with your Mr. Minter that certain regulations recently promulgated by the Administration, governing the labeling of alcoholic beverages, have worked hardship upon foreign shippers by reason of the fact that these regulations became effective within a very short time after their promulgation and without sufficient time intervening to enable foreign shippers to make the necessary adjustments. “With a view to avoiding occurrences of this nature in the future, the Administration, so far as it is possible to do so under the law, will permit existing labeling regulations to remain in effect and will propose amendments to these regulations only where such amendments appear to be essential to the carrying out of the mandate of Congress. “In cases where amendments to the regulations seem necessary we shall, of course, give notice to all interested parties of the proposed amendments and provide the importers, as well as the domestic interests, with an opportunity to be heard publicly upon these proposals. If the proposals are adopted after public hearing, it shall be the policy of the Administration to give to the industry sufficient notice of such approval in advance of the effective date of the amendments to make the necessary adjustments and corrections.” With regard to the fruit question I quote for your records a portion of a recent letter from the Secretary of Agriculture: “When the South African entomologists were here in the latter part of 1935 entomologists of the Department considered with them the data which had been accumulated by the two groups of workers. Before they left they were told by representatives of the Department that the time temperature studies of the Department then under way would be set aside as quickly as practicable and that the laboratory in Hawaii would take up a study of the particular range of time temperature treatment in which South Africa was most interested. Before this could be done with proper accuracy some new equipment had to be purchased and the large supplies of immature stages of the Mediterranean fruit fly necessary for such a study had to be built up. The Mediterranean fruit fly, as is the case with other insects, fluctuates in abundance in different seasons and preparations for such an undertaking necessarily require time and the nature of the preparations is such that the time required during the more unfavorable seasons of the year can not be materially decreased. These preparations have been made, the work is under way, and we are advised that every effort is being made by the specialists of the Department to expedite the work as much as possible.” You have more recently learned of the results of recent experiments by the United States Department of Agriculture which are coming in rapidly and of the plans which the United States Department of Agriculture now has for concluding its investigations at as early a date as possible. I shall hope to be in constant touch with developments in this matter and you may be assured of my willingness to cooperate in every way in effecting a speedy solution of this whole problem. I take this occasion to express my own appreciation of the attitude which you and your government have held throughout, and I hope that we shall all be rewarded with a happy solution. Very sincerely yours, Francis B. Sayre The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) 811.61248A/87a: Telegram [Document 687] The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( Totten ) Washington , September 19, 1936—3 p.m. 8. The South African Minister has telegraphed his Government the encouraging results of his recent conversations with us and Alcohol Administration and Agriculture officials. The former, to meet the only complaint of the KWV which might conceivably be legitimate, has given expression of its policy with regard to future changes in regulations which contains some assurance that ample time for adjustments before effective dates will be allowed. The latter, having completed some of the tests which they promised Naude and Nel would be made, find substantial confirmation of South African conclusions, and are now ready to consider admitting South African grapes, sterilized outside of the United States, provided they are satisfied that the equipment at Cape Town and on vessels is adequate to maintain the required temperatures. It is planned that a refrigeration expert be sent to Southampton to inspect the vessel equipment and an expert to Cape Town to observe the handling of fruit there. We requested Close to urge that no other public announcement be made at this time than that American officials would undertake the journeys. Hull The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) 811.61248A/87a Suppl: Telegram [Document 688] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( Totten ) Washington , November 13, 1936—5 p.m. 10. Department’s 8, September 19, 3 p.m. We do not believe that the South African Minister, possibly for reasons of economy in toll charges, has given his government sufficient information to enable it to comprehend developments here leading to the ultimate admission of grapes sterilized outside of the United States.… makes it necessary for us to ask you to convey to appropriate officials substantially the following: (1) The experimental work which has been carried on for the past year to the exclusion of much other work and at the expense of progression a broader front was purely as an accommodation to the South African Government. (2) The earliest results of the experiments reached the Bureau in September. These were informally and exclusively recited to the South African representatives here, to whom it was explained that no public announcement could be made at that time because several other governments were interested in the same question. The first results available showed that grapes were safely sterilized after 15 days at 32 degrees. The Chief of the Bureau stated that he fully expected that higher temperatures would prove to be safe. (3) The South African entomologists and the Legation staffs have insisted for some time that sterilization equipment was available on vessels leaving South African ports. In the belief that such information was correct Strong offered to send experts to see this equipment, orally indicating that if it were capable of holding the fruit at 32 degrees for 15 days, his Bureau might be disposed to issue for the first time in its existence and as a further accommodation to the South Africans an order permitting the entry of grapes sterilized outside of the United States. The process of examining the equipment need not be delayed by the experiments in Hawaii, results of which were continuing to come in rapidly. He felt sanguine of higher temperatures but could not then make a definite announcement even orally. (4) During the time between September 14 and the present the results have actually been more favorable and the Bureau has now issued a public order authorizing the entry of grapes which have been sterilized 12 days at 34 degrees. This information was conveyed to Close on November 9, with the additional information that the experts are still awaiting an invitation to view the equipment. (5) It seems regrettable that after repeated insistence that equipment was available there now seems to be doubt that existing equipment is suitable. We feel that the South African Government should make some effort to convey to the complaining farmers that the fault for this and any other recent delays does not rest with the United States Government, which has gone further to accommodate in this particular matter than is customary. (6) If you see no objection you might tactfully suggest that the conclusion of an exclusive contract between the South African Government and any given shipping line for the carriage of South African fruits, might result in some confusion, since importers in this country may have their own ideas regarding the means of transportation of the goods which they are purchasing. It is conceivable to us that an importer, who has the right to state his own conditions, may prefer to have his fruit shipped by direct line. Moore The Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre) to the South African Minister (Close) 811.61248A/122 [Document 689] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Sayre ) to the South African Minister ( Close ) Washington , December 19, 1936. My Dear Mr. Minister : I wish to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your notes dated December 1 and December 15, 1936, 16 the former a recapitulation of telegraphic exchanges with your government and the latter enclosing a copy of a telegram informing us of the names of the Union Castle vessels which it is proposed to equip for carrying grapes to Southampton in transit for New York. I have conveyed all this information to appropriate officials in the Department of Agriculture and I am informed that they are making their plans to send their experts at the appropriate time. I am gratified that we have been able to make some progress in arriving at a settlement of this question. Very sincerely yours, Francis B. Sayre 16 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) 811.61248A/126a: Telegram [Document 690] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa ( Totten ) Washington , January 12, 1937—7 p.m. 1. My November 13, 5 p.m. The first offer of the Department of Agriculture to send an expert to Capetown was conditioned upon inspection of vessels at Southampton having proved satisfactory. All plans had been in abeyance until information was received as to when the vessels’ equipment could be seen at Southampton. Repeated requests for this information were in vain, but we now have a report from the American Consul at Southampton to the effect that the vessels are not yet equipped, but we expect an early report which will enable the expert to proceed there for the original purpose. Meantime, the South African Minister cabled his government on December 5 without qualification that the other expert would be in Capetown at the end of January, although we had tried to make clear that the Capetown visit was contingent upon favorable reports from Southampton. This misunderstanding is partly our fault in that we were perhaps overconfident of the serious intention of the South African Government to push the matter through this season and to supply early last Fall information which would enable the expert to proceed to Southampton. It was never intended that the expert would go to Capetown without such favorable report and we are sorry the Minister was permitted to make his unqualified report of December 5. Please convey the sense of the above to appropriate authorities and say that we hope they will not be embarrassed in Parliament. We are as anxious as they are to settle this matter and are a little surprised that four months have passed without a definite answer to our first request for information which would enable us to go forward. Had arrangements for inspection of vessels been expedited the whole question could have been settled before now. We are disturbed by an apparent inclination on the Minister’s part to feel that officials of this Government have misled him, although we hope that he has not gone so far as to make his reports in that sense. Please impress upon the authorities that our unusual activity in this matter has been at the risk of accusations by other governments of discrimination in favor of South African fruit growers. We would like to have a short telegraphic report from you regarding reaction to the above and to what was conveyed in my November 13. Moore The Minister in the Union of South Africa (Totten) to the Secretary of State 811.61248A/132: Telegram [Document 691] The Minister in the Union of South Africa ( Totten ) to the Secretary of State Capetown , January 27, 1937—2 p.m. [Received January 27—9:10 a.m.] 4. The Department’s January 12, 7 p.m. and January 26, 6 p.m. 17 South African authorities seem to be satisfied American Government now doing everything possible to assist the inauguration shipments. It is difficult to eradicate belief that misunderstandings and delay largely our fault. In spite of full explanation regarding visit experts, South African Department of Agriculture have assumed, probably on information supplied by South African Minister Plenipotentiary, that matter can be arranged in time to make one or two trial shipments this season and are counting on first experimental shipment Athlone Castle March 5. 18 If anything can be done to expedite activities experts it would be appreciated. Totten 17 Latter telegram not printed; it contained the information that an expert would proceed to Southampton on February 10 to inspect ships (811.61248A/131a). 18 On April 9, 1937, the Consul at Capetown telegraphed the Department that an expert had sailed on April 2 with the first shipment of grapes and another was sailing on April 9 with the second shipment (811.61248A/141). Index Index Agreements. See Treaties, conventions, etc. Air Service, trans-Atlantic, reciprocal arrangements effected by United States with United Kingdom, Canada, and Irish Free State, 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] Aircraft and aircraft parts, U.S., importation into Australia, informal arrangements concerning, 774–782 [ Pgs. 774–782 include portions of Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] ; Australian conditions for importation, 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , and Doc. 618 ] , 776–779 [ Pgs. 776–779 include portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] ; U.S. views, objections, and counter-suggestions, 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] , 779–782 [ Pgs. 779–782 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] Airplanes purchased by Turkey from Glenn L. Martin Co., 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] Albania, 312–314 [ Pgs. 312–314 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] Alcohol. See Liquor smuggling into United States, U.S. efforts to suppress . Alcohol Administration Act ( Aug. 29, 1935 ), 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] Anglo-American Oil Co., 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] Anglo-German Naval Accord ( June, 1935 ), 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement ( 1937 ), 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Armament and tonnage limits. See London Naval Conference : Tonnage and armament limits . Arms embargo. See Neutrality legislation, U.S. : State Department views on various proposals . Arms and munitions ( see also Disarmament Conference : Trade in and manufacture of arms ), smuggling of arms and ammunition from United States into Cuba, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 338 ] Australia, 742–782 [ Pgs. 742–782 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property ( May 27 ), supplementary, 716–720 [ Pgs. 716–720 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1936 ), signature and ratification of, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Trade relations with— Canada, 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] Japan, 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 752–753 [ Pgs. 752–753 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] New Zealand, 706–716 [ Pgs. 706–716 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] United States, 742–782 [ Pgs. 742–782 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] Australian views and discriminatory action, 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 743–744 [ Pgs. 743–744 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 749–753 [ Pgs. 749–753 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 757–760 [ Pgs. 757–760 include portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 762–763 [ Pgs. 762–763 include portions of Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc. 606 ] , 772–773 [ Pgs. 772–773 include portions of Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] ; U.S. views and retaliatory action, 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 744–745 [ Pgs. 744–745 include portions of Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , and Doc. 586 ] , 745–748 [ Pgs. 745–748 include portions of Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588 ] , 753–756 [ Pgs. 753–756 include portions of Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , and Doc. 598 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 761–762 [ Pgs. 761–762 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , and Doc. 604 ] , 763–772 [ Pgs. 763–772 include portions of Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] Importation of U.S. aircraft and aircraft parts into Australia, informal arrangements concerning, 774–782 [ Pgs. 774–782 include portions of Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] ; Australian conditions for importation, 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , and Doc. 618 ] , 776–779 [ Pgs. 776–779 include portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] ; U.S. views, objections, and counter-suggestions, 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , and Doc. 619 ] , 779–782 [ Pgs. 779–782 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] Trade between Australia and New Zealand, proposed restriction to British shipping and effect on U.S. shipping (Matson Line), informal discussions and communications regarding, 706–716 [ Pgs. 706–716 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] Austria: Czechoslovak-Austrian Trade Treaty ( Apr. 2 ), 495–496 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 411 ] Ethiopian-Italian conflict, view of, 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Germany, relations with: Austro-German Agreement ( July 11 ), 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 322–325 [ Pgs. 322–325 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 270 ] ; political and economic, 316–321 [ Pgs. 316–321 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 493–494 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 495–499 [ Pgs. 495–499 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] ; principle of non-immixtion accepted by Germany, 317–318 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 256 ] ; threat by Germany, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; views regarding German intentions, 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] Aviation ( see also Aircraft and aircraft parts, U.S., importation into Australia ): Airplanes purchased by Turkey from Glenn L. Martin Co., 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] ; trans-Atlantic air service, reciprocal arrangements effected by United States with United Kingdom, Canada, and Irish Free State, 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] Baltic states: European political situation, 275–277 [ Pgs. 275–277 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] German remilitarization of Rhineland, action taken vis-à-vis, 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Lithuania: German offer of nonaggression pact, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 275–277 [ Pgs. 275–277 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] ; remilitarization of Rhineland, attidue regarding, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 226 ] Memel District, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 179 ] Belgium: Foreign policy, 363–364 [ Pgs. 363–364 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] ; King Leopold’s speech, 366–368 [ Pgs. 366–368 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] ; position with respect to treaties, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 239 ] France, relations with: After First World War, 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] ; estimate of French position in Europe, 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] ; Franco-Belgian Military Agreement ( 1920 ), 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] German-Japanese Accord Against Communist International ( Nov. 25 ), preliminary views of, 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] Germany, relations with: Concerted action against Germany following remilitarization of Rhineland, proposed plan for, 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] ; German diplomatic and military policies, analysis of, 271–272 [ Pgs. 271–272 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] ; German reoccupation of Rhineland, views concerning, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 264–265 [ Pgs. 264–265 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] ; sanctions against Germany, proposed, 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] League of Nations: Mutual assistance of League members, views regarding, 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] ; proposed reform of League, views regarding, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 248 ] Liquor smuggling into United States, negotiations regarding, 407–423 [ Pgs. 407–423 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] Military and political policies, 360–361 [ Pgs. 360–361 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Neutrality policy, 366–368 [ Pgs. 366–368 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] ; Soviet attitude, 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285 ] ; U.S. attitude, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] United Kingdom, relations with: Orientation toward United Kingdom rather than toward France, 298–300 [ Pgs. 298–300 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] ; attitudes toward United Kingdom, 306–307 [ Pgs. 306–307 include portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships, proposed, representations against, 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] Views: European countries related to Rhineland question and Ethiopian-Italian conflict, 287–289 [ Pgs. 287–289 include portions of Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , and Doc. 240 ] ; imminence of war, 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] ; sanctions, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 248 ] Western Pact proposed by United Kingdom to replace Locarno Treaty, Belgian reply, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 298 ] Bermuda, 721–731 [ Pgs. 721–731 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] passim Bulgaria, 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] Canada ( see also Liquor smuggling into United States, U.S. efforts to suppress ): Australia, trade relations with, 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] Convention between the United States and Canada respecting income taxation ( Dec. 30 ), 790–795 [ Pgs. 790–795 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] ; Canadian draft, 791–792 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 628 ] ; U.S. draft, 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 629 ] ; revised draft, 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 630 ] Convention with United States for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, 825–834 [ Pgs. 825–834 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] ; draft, 826–829 [ Pgs. 826–829 include portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] ; draft revisions, 829–834 [ Pgs. 829–834 include portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin and the Niagara Falls, proposed negotiation of new treaty with United States, 834–846 [ Pgs. 834–846 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1936 ), signature and ratification of, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Trans-Atlantic air service, reciprocal arrangements effected by Canada with United Kingdom, Irish Free State, and United States, 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] United States, trade relations with: Informal discussions, 783–790 [ Pgs. 783–790 include portions of Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , and Doc. 627 ] ; U.S. legislation restricting tourist cruises from U.S. ports to U.S. ships, proposed, representations against, 605–608 [ Pgs. 605–608 include portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] ; U.S. Liquor Tax Bill (H. R. 9185) proposed, Canadian protests against certain provisions, and negotiations leading to settlement of U.S. claims against Canadian distillers, 796–825 [ Pgs. 796–825 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] Chadbourne Agreement ( May 9, 1931 ), 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] China, German-Japanese Accord, reaction, 405–406 [ Pgs. 405–406 include portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Commerce and finance, international, U.S. policy for restoration of, 486–502 [ Pgs. 486–502 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] Communications Act of 1934 , 619–624 [ Pgs. 619–624 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , and Doc. 511 ] Communist International, German-Japanese Accord against ( Nov. 25 ). See Treaties, conventions, etc. : German-Japanese Accord . Conferences ( see also Disarmament Conference ; London Naval Conference ): Drugs: Conference for the suppression of the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs, Geneva ( June 8–26 ), U.S. participation in, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of General: ] Herdbooks: Conference for the standardization of the keeping and operation of herdbooks, Rome ( Oct. 12–14 ), U.S. participation in, 626–627 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 512 ] London (World) Monetary and Economic Conference ( June 12–July 27, 1933 ), 663–664 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] Montevideo Conference ( 1933 ), 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 381 ] Sugar: International Sugar Conference, preliminary discussions with respect to, 521–534 [ Pgs. 521–534 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] Consolidated Distillers, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] Conventions. See Treaties, conventions, etc. Cuba: Export of sugar to United States, 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 437 ] ; liquor smuggling into United States, negotiations regarding, 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] ; smuggling of arms and ammunition from United States, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 338 ] Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovak-Austrian Trade Treaty ( Apr. 2 ), 495–496 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 411 ] Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance ( 1935 ), 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 292 ] Germany, relations with: General, 376–379 [ Pgs. 376–379 include portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] ; German attitude, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] ; German threat to Czechoslovakia, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] ; remilitarization of Rhineland, Czech reaction, 246–247 [ Pgs. 246–247 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] ; views, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 341–342 [ Pgs. 341–342 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Versailles Treaty (Part XII), German denunciation of: Effect on Czechoslovakia, 373–374 [ Pgs. 373–374 include portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] ; protest against German denunciation, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Views of various countries ( see also Germany, relations with , supra ): General European conditions, 290–295 [ Pgs. 290–295 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] , 326–327 [ Pgs. 326–327 include portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 328–330 [ Pgs. 328–330 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] ; Hungary, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] ; Italy, 340–341 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 292 ] ; Poland, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] ; Rumania, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] ; United Kingdom, 339–340 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 269 ] ; Yugoslavia, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] Danzig, 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] Dardanelles Agreement (Montreux Convention, July 20 ), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 268 ] Denmark: Extradition treaty with United States, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] ; London Naval Conference, bilateral conversations, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] ; reconvening of League of Nations Third Committee, support of, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] ; remilitarization of Rhineland, position concerning, 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] ; sanctions against Germany, views concerning, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] ; U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships, proposed, representations against, 621–622 [ Pgs. 621–622 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , and Doc. 509 ] Disarmament Conference, 1–21 [ Pgs. 1–21 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] British views regarding resumption of disarmament discussions, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 12–20 [ Pgs. 12–20 include portions of Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] passim Budgetary publicity, 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , and Doc. 6 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] ; Technical Committee of the National Defence Expenditure Commission, 5–9 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] Bureau of the Disarmament Conference, 5–7 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 13–21 [ Pgs. 13–21 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] passim; Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions, 5–6 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] Committee on Reduction of Armaments. See Third Committee , infra . European conference proposed, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] European political events, relation to, 191–192 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 170 ] French views regarding resumption of disarmament discussions, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 12–20 [ Pgs. 12–20 include portions of Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] passim Hoover Plan, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 170 ] League of Nations Assembly meeting ( Sept. 21 ), proposed postponement, 2–4 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1936 ), proposed extension of principles to other naval powers, 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Naval Commission, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 1 ] Permanent Disarmament Commission, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] Permanent Peace Conference, Soviet proposal for, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] Third Committee (League of Nations), proposed reconvening, 1–5 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] ; reconvened, 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] Trade in and manufacture of arms, 4–15 [ Pgs. 4–15 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , and Doc. 6 ] passim , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] ; Special Committee, proposed session of, 4–9 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] Distillers Corporation, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] Economic and Monetary Conference, London (World) ( June 12–July 27, 1933 ), 663–664 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] Economic cooperation, efforts of League of Nations to promote, U.S. interest in, 453–485 [ Pgs. 453–485 include portions of Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] Egypt, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Embargo ( see also under Neutrality legislation, U.S. : State Department views on various proposals ; also League of Nations : Sanctions ), embargo on exports of war materials from France, 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] England. See United Kingdom . Estonia, 275–277 [ Pgs. 275–277 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Ethiopian-Italian conflict: Austrian views, 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] British policy, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Hitler’s views, 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] League of Nations’ analysis of Italian policy, 284–286 [ Pgs. 284–286 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] London Naval Conference, relation to, 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Sanctions against Italy by League of Nations, 184–186 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 181 ] ; Belgian view, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 248 ] ; Swiss view, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 218 ] ; Yugoslav position regarding, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] European political events ( see also specific subject headings ), 180–389 [ Pgs. 180–389 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , and Doc. 300 ] Analyses by U.S. diplomatic missions, reports from— Albania, 312–314 [ Pgs. 312–314 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] Austria, 219–227 [ Pgs. 219–227 include portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189 ] , 316–321 [ Pgs. 316–321 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] Belgium, 247–249 [ Pgs. 247–249 include portions of Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , and Doc. 211 ] , 264–265 [ Pgs. 264–265 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 271–272 [ Pgs. 271–272 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 287–289 [ Pgs. 287–289 include portions of Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , and Doc. 240 ] , 298–300 [ Pgs. 298–300 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 363–364 [ Pgs. 363–364 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] , 366–368 [ Pgs. 366–368 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] , 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , and Doc. 292 ] , 384–387 [ Pgs. 384–387 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Czechoslovakia, 181–183 [ Pgs. 181–183 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 246–247 [ Pgs. 246–247 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] , 290–295 [ Pgs. 290–295 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] , 326–327 [ Pgs. 326–327 include portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 328–330 [ Pgs. 328–330 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 339–342 [ Pgs. 339–342 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 375–379 [ Pgs. 375–379 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Egypt, 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] Estonia, 275–277 [ Pgs. 275–277 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] France, 202–204 [ Pgs. 202–204 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] , 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 216–218 [ Pgs. 216–218 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 228–229 [ Pgs. 228–229 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 353–355 [ Pgs. 353–355 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 356–359 [ Pgs. 356–359 include portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] , 359–360 [ Pgs. 359–360 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] , 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 300 ] Geneva, U.S. Consul in, 230–232 [ Pgs. 230–232 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 282–286 [ Pgs. 282–286 include portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] Germany, 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 188–196 [ Pgs. 188–196 include portions of Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , and Doc. 172 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 207–209 [ Pgs. 207–209 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 218–219 [ Pgs. 218–219 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 233–234 [ Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 249–252 [ Pgs. 249–252 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] , 252–253 [ Pgs. 252–253 include portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , and Doc. 215 ] , 254–255 [ Pgs. 254–255 include portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , and Doc. 218 ] , 258–260 [ Pgs. 258–260 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 263–264 [ Pgs. 263–264 include portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 278–282 [ Pgs. 278–282 include portions of Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 310–312 [ Pgs. 310–312 include portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , and Doc. 253 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , and Doc. 256 ] , 322–325 [ Pgs. 322–325 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 335–338 [ Pgs. 335–338 include portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 347–353 [ Pgs. 347–353 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , and Doc. 275 ] , 355–356 [ Pgs. 355–356 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] , 370–374 [ Pgs. 370–374 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] ; reply of U.S. State Department, 332–334 [ Pgs. 332–334 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] Italy, 204–206 [ Pgs. 204–206 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , and Doc. 177 ] , 210–211 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Latvia, 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] Lithuania, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 226 ] Mexico, 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] ; U.S. reply, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Netherlands, 260–262 [ Pgs. 260–262 include portions of Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , and Doc. 221 ] , 360–362 [ Pgs. 360–362 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Norway, 253–254 [ Pgs. 253–254 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 262–263 [ Pgs. 262–263 include portions of Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] Poland, 239–241 [ Pgs. 239–241 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , and Doc. 203 ] , 273–275 [ Pgs. 273–275 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 387–388 [ Pgs. 387–388 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Rumania, 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] , 368–370 [ Pgs. 368–370 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] Soviet Union, 200–202 [ Pgs. 200–202 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 300–303 [ Pgs. 300–303 include portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 306–309 [ Pgs. 306–309 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285 ] Switzerland, 183–187 [ Pgs. 183–187 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 255–257 [ Pgs. 255–257 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] United Kingdom, 196–199 [ Pgs. 196–199 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173 ] , 213–214 [ Pgs. 213–214 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] , 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] , 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 241–244 [ Pgs. 241–244 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 268–269 [ Pgs. 268–269 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 296–298 [ Pgs. 296–298 include portions of Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 304–306 [ Pgs. 304–306 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 321–322 [ Pgs. 321–322 include portions of Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] ; replies of U.S. State Department, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Yugoslavia, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] , 289–290 [ Pgs. 289–290 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] British plan for dealing with European conflicts, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] Relation to— Disarmament Conference, 191–192 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 170 ] London Naval Conference, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 172 ] Exchange control. See League of Nations : Economic Cooperation . Extradition treaties, supplementary, between United States and certain other countries, citation to texts, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] Finance and commerce, international, U.S. policy for restoration of, 486–502 [ Pgs. 486–502 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] Financial Stabilization Agreement ( Sept. 25 ). See under Treaties, conventions, etc. Finland: Reconvening of League of Nations Third Committee, support of, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] ; Soviet Union, relations with, 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] Fisheries. See under Treaties, conventions, etc. France ( see also under Disarmament Conference ; London Naval Conference ): Belgium: Franco-Belgian Military Agreement ( 1920 ), 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] ; views of European situation, 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Economic conference proposed, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Economic conversations, French proposal for, 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] ; British and U.S. reactions, 471–476 [ Pgs. 471–476 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] Financial Stabilization Agreement ( Sept. 25 ). See under Treaties, conventions, etc. Franco-Polish Alliance, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 232 ] ; French view, 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] ; Polish view, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance ( 1935 ). See under Treaties, conventions, etc. Germany, relations with: General, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] ; German attitude toward France, 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] ; German strategy vis-à-vis Soviet Union, French view of, 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] ; Germany’s colonial aspirations, French views regarding, 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 275 ] ; sanctions against Germany proposed, 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] ; U.S. analysis, 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 235 ] German reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, French attitude concerning, 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 249 ] ; French attitude vis-à-vis British position, 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , and Italian position, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 184 ] ; French demand for withdrawal of German troops, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 198 ] ; French plan to create permanent international force in Rhineland, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , and German reaction, 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] International economic conference, proposed, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Italy, views regarding, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 275 ] Liquor smuggling into United States, negotiations regarding, 428–436 [ Pgs. 428–436 include portions of Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] Little Entente, pressure by France to extend mutual defense obligations to include defense against Germany, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 300 ] Naval limitation, views regarding, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 84–85 [ Pgs. 84–85 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Rubber, agreement between France, the United Kingdom, India, the Netherlands, and Siam, to regulate production and export of rubber ( May 7, 1934 ), 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 424 ] Soviet views of French policies, 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Spain, French embargo on exports of war materials to, 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] United Kingdom, relations with: Anglo-French cooperation, need for, 296–297 [ Pgs. 296–297 include portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 308–309 [ Pgs. 308–309 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] ; bilateral naval negotiations, 948; German reoccupation and remilitarization of Rhineland, 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] ; Western Pact proposed by British to replace Locarno Treaty, French reply concerning, 385–386 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 298 ] United States, relations with: Extradition treaty, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] ; proposed U.S. legislation restricting tourist cruises from U.S. ports to U.S. ships, representations against, 608–610 [ Pgs. 608–610 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] ; request for U. S. moral condemnation of German repudiation of Versailles and Locarno Treaties, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] ; war debt to United States, negotiations concerning, 579–590 [ Pgs. 579–590 include portions of Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , and Doc. 477 ] Versailles Treaty (Part XII), protest against German denunciation of, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] War, general European, views regarding consequences, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 168 ] Germany ( see also under League of Nations ; and under London Naval Conference ): Armament limitation, 190–193 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 170 ] Colonial aspirations, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 245 ] ; French view, 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 275 ] Foreign policies ( see also Internal policies and Relations with , infra ), 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 300–303 [ Pgs. 300–303 include portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 454–455 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 369 ] Hitler, Adolf: Ethiopian-Italian conflict, 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] ; speech of May 21, 1935 , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 188 ] , and German and Soviet reactions to, 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] ; speech to Reichstag on Mar. 7 , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 188 ] Internal policies ( see also Foreign policies , supra ), 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 245 ] ; popular attitude toward possibility of war, 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] ; radical and conservative political groups, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 249–250 [ Pgs. 249–250 include portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Locarno Treaty: Intention to honor, 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; denunciation, 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; Italian reaction to denunciation, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 188 ] Rearmament ( see also Reoccupation and remilitarization of Rhineland , infra ), 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Relations with— Austria: General, 316–321 [ Pgs. 316–321 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] ; Austro-German Agreement ( July 11 ), 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 322–325 [ Pgs. 322–325 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 270 ] ; German threat to Austria, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; principle of non-immixtion accepted by Germany, 317–318 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 256 ] ; views regarding German intentions, 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] Belgium, 271–272 [ Pgs. 271–272 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Central and southeastern Europe, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 488–502 [ Pgs. 488–502 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] Czechoslovakia: General, 376–379 [ Pgs. 376–379 include portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] ; Czech attitudes, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 341–342 [ Pgs. 341–342 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] ; German attitudes, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] ; German threat, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Danubian region: British view, 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] ; U.S. view, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 235 ] France: General, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] ; bilateral demilitarization of Franco-German frontier, German proposal for, 233–234 [ Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] ; Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance ( 1935 ), German view of, 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; French attitudes, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] ; German attitudes, 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Italy: General, 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 323–324 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 337–338 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 288 ] ; conversations, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] ; German attitudes, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 351–352 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 274 ] ; Italian reaction to German denunciation of Locarno Treaty, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] ; U.S. analysis, 279–280 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 235 ] Japan. See Treaties, conventions, etc. : German-Japanese Accord . League of Nations: German bid to reenter League, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 246 ] ; League analysis of German policy, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 237 ] ; League invitation to participate in Council meeting, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 212 ] ; question of League membership, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; threat of collective force against Germany, 185–186 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 170 ] Lithuania, nonaggression pact offered by Germany, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 275–277 [ Pgs. 275–277 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Little Entente, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Locarno powers: German memorandum, 207–209 [ Pgs. 207–209 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] ; London Accord, German attitude regarding, 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] Netherlands: German offer of alliance, reaction to, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 281 ] ; German offer of nonaggression pact, reply to, 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] ; Netherlands view of German diplomatic and military policy, 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Poland: General, 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] ; German-Polish Nonaggression Pact ( 1934 ), 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 219 ] ; Polish neutrality, speculation concerning its effect on German-Russian hostility, 186–187 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 168 ] ; Polish views, 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] ; U.S. analysis, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 235 ] Soviet Union: General, 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] ; German attitudes, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 274 ] ; German strategy vis-à-vis Soviet Union, French view, 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] ; Soviet refusal to negotiate, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] ; U.S. analysis, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 235 ] United Kingdom: Anglo-German Naval Accord ( June 1935 ), 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; bilateral naval negotiations, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 146–147 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; British questionnaire, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] ; German attitudes, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] ; U.S. analysis, 280–281 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 235 ] ; Western Pact proposed by United Kingdom to replace Locarno Treaty, German note of reply, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 298 ] United States: Appraisal of German policy, 220–227 [ Pgs. 220–227 include portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] ; legislation restricting tourist cruises from U.S. ports to U.S. ships, proposed, representations against, 610–611 [ Pgs. 610–611 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] ; speculation on German reaction if faced with threat of collective force, 193–194 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 170 ] ; U.S. views, 258–260 [ Pgs. 258–260 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Vatican, 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Reoccupation and remilitarization of Rhineland, 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] ; German opinion, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Attitude and actions of— Baltic states, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Belgium, 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 264–265 [ Pgs. 264–265 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] Czechoslovakia, 246–247 [ Pgs. 246–247 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] France, 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 249 ] ; demand for withdrawal of troops, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 198 ] ; plan to create permanent international force in Rhineland, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] Italy, 210–211 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 180 ] Locarno powers (except Germany), 228–229 [ Pgs. 228–229 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] Rumania, 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] Scandinavian countries, 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Switzerland, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 218 ] United Kingdom, 213–214 [ Pgs. 213–214 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 231–232 [ Pgs. 231–232 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] ; attempt to put pressure on Germany to withdraw some troops, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] ; French view of British position, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] United States, 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 234 ] Sanctions proposed against Germany, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 248–249 [ Pgs. 248–249 include portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Schacht, Hjalmar, reports from various capitals on his trip through central and southeastern Europe, 488–502 [ Pgs. 488–502 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] Versailles Treaty (Part XII) denounced, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 289 ] ; Czech reaction, 373–374 [ Pgs. 373–374 include portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] ; nations notified, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] ; protestations by Czechoslovakia, France, Rumania, and United Kingdom, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Gold Coast, 731–736 [ Pgs. 731–736 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] Gooderham & Wortz, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] Great Britain. See United Kingdom . Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin and the Niagara Falls, proposed negotiation of a new treaty between United States and Canada, 834–846 [ Pgs. 834–846 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] Hillfern incident, 412–417 [ Pgs. 412–417 include portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 418–420 [ Pgs. 418–420 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 337 ] Hoare-Laval peace proposals (Ethiopian-Italian conflict), 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 211 ] Hoover moratorium on war-debt payments, 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 468 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 468 ] Hull, Cordell ( see also United Kingdom : Trade practices ), statement to press regarding Financial Stabilization Agreement signed between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom ( Sept 25 ), 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] Hungary: Abstention from League of Nations Third Committee meetings, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] ; Czech views, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] Imperial Airways, Ltd., 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] Import regulations, South African complaints of undue restriction by United States, 855–876 [ Pgs. 855–876 include portions of Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , and Doc. 691 ] Income taxation, convention between the United States and Canada respecting ( Dec. 30 ), 790–795 [ Pgs. 790–795 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] India, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 424 ] International commerce and finance, U.S. policy for restoration of, 486–502 [ Pgs. 486–502 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 618–624 [ Pgs. 618–624 include portions of Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , and Doc. 511 ] International Fisheries Commission, 825–829 [ Pgs. 825–829 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , and Doc. 659 ] International Rubber Committee, interest of the United States in liberalizing policy regarding world supply of rubber, 503–520 [ Pgs. 503–520 include portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] Agreement between France, the United Kingdom, India, the Netherlands, and Siam, to regulate production and export of rubber ( May 7, 1934 ), 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 424 ] Rubber Producers’ Restriction Agreement ( Apr. 28, 1934 ), 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 413 ] Views of various countries: Netherlands, 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] ; United Kingdom, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 509–510 [ Pgs. 509–510 include portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] ; United States, 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 514–516 [ Pgs. 514–516 include portions of Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] , 517–519 [ Pgs. 517–519 include portions of Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] International Sugar Conference, preliminary discussions with respect to, 521–534 [ Pgs. 521–534 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] Chadbourne Agreement ( May 9, 1931 ), 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] Cuban export of sugar to United States, 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 437 ] Jones–Costigan Act, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 437 ] Philippine Islands: Export of sugar to United States, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] ; invitation to participate, 526–527 [ Pgs. 526–527 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] ; reply, 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , and Doc. 437 ] Views of United Kingdom, 521–522 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] ; United States, 524–525 [ Pgs. 524–525 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 528–532 [ Pgs. 528–532 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] Irish Free State: Refusal to ratify naval agreement, 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] ; trade agreement with United States, U.S. disinclination to negotiate, 847–851 [ Pgs. 847–851 include portions of Doc. 672 and Doc. 673 ] ; trans-Atlantic air service, reciprocal arrangements effected by Irish Free State with United Kingdom, Canada, and United States, 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] Italy ( see also Ethiopian-Italian conflict ; and under London Naval Conference ): Foreign policy ( see also Relations with , infra ), 205–206 [ Pgs. 205–206 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Naval agreement, refusal to sign, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 77–78 [ Pgs. 77–78 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Naval limitation, views, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Relations with— Austria, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Czechoslovakia, 340–341 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 292 ] France, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 275 ] Germany, 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 323–324 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 337–338 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 268 ] ; conversations, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] ; German views, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 351–352 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 274 ] ; Italian views, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 210–211 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; Polish views, 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] ; U.S. analysis, 279–280 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 235 ] League of Nations: League analysis of Italian policy, 284–286 [ Pgs. 284–286 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] ; question of League membership, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; threat of collective force by League, 185–186 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 168 ] United Kingdom, 304–306 [ Pgs. 304–306 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] ; bilateral naval negotiations, 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] ; view of British policy vis-à-vis Germany, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; Western Pact proposed by United Kingdom to replace Locarno Treaty, Italian reply, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 298 ] United States: Negotiations concerning war debt to United States, 590–597 [ Pgs. 590–597 include portions of Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] Japan ( see also Treaties, conventions, etc. : German-Japanese Accord and Washington Naval Treaty ; also under London Naval Conference and London Naval Treaty ), trade relations with Australia, 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 752–753 [ Pgs. 752–753 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] Jones–Costigan Act, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 437 ] Kellogg Pact, 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Latvia, 275–277 [ Pgs. 275–277 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] League of Nations ( see also Disarmament Conference ): Analysis of British policy, 283–284 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 237 ] ; French, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 237 ] ; German, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 237 ] ; Italian, 284–286 [ Pgs. 284–286 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] Assembly meeting ( Sept. 21 ), proposed postponement, 2–4 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] Committee of Thirteen, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 237 ] Economic cooperation, efforts to promote, U.S. interest in, 453–485 [ Pgs. 453–485 include portions of Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] Ethiopian-Italian conflict, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Germany ( see also Sanctions , infra ): Bid to reenter League, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 246 ] , and Soviet reaction, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] ; invitation from League to participate in Council meeting, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 212 ] ; question of German membership, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; threat of collective force against Germany, 185–186 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 168 ] Italy ( see also Sanctions , infra ): League analysis of Italian policy in Ethiopia, 284–286 [ Pgs. 284–286 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] ; question of Italian membership, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; threat of collective force against, 185–186 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 168 ] Mutual assistance between League members, Belgian views regarding, 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Prestige, loss of, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 268 ] Reform proposed, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 245 ] ; Belgian views regarding, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 248 ] Sanctions: Germany, proposed against, 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 248–249 [ Pgs. 248–249 include portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] ; Scandinavian views, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] ; Yugoslav views, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] Italy, proposed against, 184–186 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 181 ] ; Belgian view, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 248 ] ; Swiss view, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 218 ] ; Yugoslav position regarding, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] Liberty Bond legislation, 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 464 ] Liechtenstein, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] Liquor smuggling into United States, U.S. efforts to suppress, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 407–452 [ Pgs. 407–452 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] Hillfern incident, 412–417 [ Pgs. 412–417 include portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 418–420 [ Pgs. 418–420 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 337 ] Liquor Tax Bill (H.R. 9185) proposed: Canadian protests against certain provisions, and negotiations with United States leading to settlement of U.S. claims against Canadian distillers, 796–825 [ Pgs. 796–825 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] Negotiations with Belgium, 407–423 [ Pgs. 407–423 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] ; Canada, 424–426 [ Pgs. 424–426 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] ; Cuba, 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] ; France, 428–436 [ Pgs. 428–436 include portions of Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] ; Mexico, 436–437 [ Pgs. 436–437 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] ; Netherlands, 437–439 [ Pgs. 437–439 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] ; Norway, 439–452 [ Pgs. 439–452 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] Reidun incident, 439–452 [ Pgs. 439–452 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] Liquor Tax Bill (H.R. 9185), 796–825 [ Pgs. 796–825 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] Lithuania. See under Baltic states . Little Entente, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 287 ] ; French pressure to extend mutual defense obligations to include defense against Germany, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 300 ] ; German attitude, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Locarno powers: Brussels Conference, proposed, attitudes of the powers, 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 351–352 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] Geneva meeting ( Apr. 10 ), 287–288 [ Pgs. 287–288 include portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] London Accord ( Mar. 19 ), 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] Locarno Treaty. See under Treaties, conventions, etc. London (World) Monetary and Economic Conference ( June 12–July 27, 1933 ), 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 533 ] London Naval Conference, 22–101 [ Pgs. 22–101 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] Anglo-American exchange of views on consultative and nonaggression pacts with Japan, 24–26 [ Pgs. 24–26 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Australia, signature and ratification of Treaty by, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Bilateral agreements and conversations. See under United Kingdom , infra . Canada, signature and ratification of Treaty, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Categories Subcommittee Report, 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Draft text of Treaty, 80–86 [ Pgs. 80–86 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 89–90 [ Pgs. 89–90 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Ethiopian-Italian conflict, relation to, 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] European political events, relation to, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 172 ] Four-power treaty proposed, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66 ] France, naval construction, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 103 ] ; ratification of Treaty by, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] Gentlemen’s agreement, proposed by United States between United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany, 78–79 [ Pgs. 78–79 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] Germany: Bilateral conversations with United Kingdom, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] ; Naval Agreement with United Kingdom ( 1937 ), 116 n [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] ; participation in Conference, proposed, and French reaction, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] India, ratification of Treaty by, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Irish Free State, refusal to sign Treaty, 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Italy: Conversations with United States, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] ; disposition to ratify Treaty, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] ; refusal to accede to Treaty, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] ; refusal to sign naval agreement and U.S. alternatives, 76–78 [ Pgs. 76–78 include portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 79–81 [ Pgs. 79–81 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] ; relation of Conference to Italian policy, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Japan: Criticism of Conference, 118–120 [ Pgs. 118–120 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] ; naval construction, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 30 ] ; parity, demand for, 22–36 [ Pgs. 22–36 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 118 ] ; participation in Conference as observer, 28–35 [ Pgs. 28–35 include portions of Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] ; refusal to accede to Treaty, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 105–106 [ Pgs. 105–106 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] ; submarine warfare rules proposed for discussion, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] New Zealand, signature and ratification of Treaty by, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Naval limitation ( see also Parity and Tonnage and armament limits , infra ): British view, 42–44 [ Pgs. 42–44 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , and Doc. 36 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 79–80 [ Pgs. 79–80 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] ; French view, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 84–85 [ Pgs. 84–85 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] ; Italian view, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] ; U.S. view, 42–44 [ Pgs. 42–44 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , and Doc. 36 ] Parity ( see also Naval limitation , supra; Tonnage and armament limits , infra ): Bilateral declarations between United Kingdom and United States, 95–99 [ Pgs. 95–99 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] ; Japanese demand for, 22–36 [ Pgs. 22–36 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 118 ] Protocol of Signature, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Qualitative Limitation Subcommittee Report, 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Ratification of Treaty ( see also specific countries ), effects of delaying, 90–91 [ Pgs. 90–91 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Soviet Union: Naval Agreement with United Kingdom ( 1937 ), 116 n [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] ; naval construction, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 103 ] ; participation in Conference, proposed, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 34 ] Submarine warfare rules proposed by Japan, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Tonnage and armament limits ( see also Naval limitation and Parity , supra ), 42–58 [ Pgs. 42–58 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 65–67 [ Pgs. 65–67 include portions of Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , and Doc. 56 ] Capital ships, 47–48 [ Pgs. 47–48 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 49–50 [ Pgs. 49–50 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 105–106 [ Pgs. 105–106 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 111–114 [ Pgs. 111–114 include portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] , 114–117 [ Pgs. 114–117 include portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 118 ] Cruisers, 45–47 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 49–55 [ Pgs. 49–55 include portions of Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , and Doc. 45 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 103 ] Light surface vessels, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Reduction of upper limit of unit tonnage, French proposal for and British and U.S. reactions, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 61–63 [ Pgs. 61–63 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 65–66 [ Pgs. 65–66 include portions of Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , and Doc. 56 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 61 ] ; compromise proposal, 84–85 [ Pgs. 84–85 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] United Kingdom: Bilateral agreements and conversations, 24–26 [ Pgs. 24–26 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 70–73 [ Pgs. 70–73 include portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66 ] , 95–99 [ Pgs. 95–99 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] ; ratification of Treaty, 91–92 [ Pgs. 91–92 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] ; scrapping of naval vessels, 54–55 [ Pgs. 54–55 include portions of Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , and Doc. 45 ] United States: Anglo-American exchange of views on consultative and nonaggression pacts with Japan, 24–26 [ Pgs. 24–26 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] ; conversations with Italy, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] ; gentlemen’s agreement, proposed by United States between United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany, 78–79 [ Pgs. 78–79 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] ; reaction to British proposal to negotiate bilateral agreements in consequence of French-Italian impasse, 70–73 [ Pgs. 70–73 include portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66 ] ; signature and ratification of Treaty, 87–94 [ Pgs. 87–94 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , and Doc. 86 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 102–103 [ Pgs. 102–103 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] London Naval Treaty ( Mar. 25 ) ( see also London Naval Conference ), British efforts to relate other Powers to, by accession or separate bilateral treaties: Germany, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 146–147 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; Italy, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] ; Japan, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] ; Poland, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] ; Scandinavian countries, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] ; Soviet Union, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] ; U. S. views, 111–112 [ Pgs. 111–112 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ): Allusions and citations, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 163 ] Naval tonnage, retention by Japan, United Kingdom, United States, under terms of, 132–159 [ Pgs. 132–159 include portions of Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] Capital ship tonnage, U.S., 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 130 ] Cruiser tonnage: Japan, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] ; United Kingdom, 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 149–151 [ Pgs. 149–151 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] ; United States, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Destroyer tonnage: Japan, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] ; United Kingdom, 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] ; United States, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] Submarine tonnage: Japan, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] ; United Kingdom, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] ; United States, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] Part IV (Rules of Submarine Warfare), signature of procès-verbal ( Nov. 6 ), 160–164 [ Pgs. 160–164 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] Maffey report, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 237 ] Martin Co., Glenn L., 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] Matson Line, 706–711 [ Pgs. 706–711 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 559 ] Mediterranean Mutual Assistance Accord, 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Melchers Distilleries, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] Memel District, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 179 ] Mexico, 436–437 [ Pgs. 436–437 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] Mineral Leasing Act ( Feb. 25, 1920 ), 736–741 [ Pgs. 736–741 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] Monetary and Economic Conference, London (World) ( June 12–July 21, 1933 ), 663–664 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] Montevideo Conference ( 1933 ), 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 381 ] Montreux Convention ( July 20 ), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 268 ] Moscow Protocol ( Dec. 28 ), 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 114 ] Most-favored-nation principle, 453–475 [ Pgs. 453–475 include portions of Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] passim Munitions. See Disarmament Conference . Narcotics. See Conferences : Drugs . Naval General Board, U.S., 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 52–53 [ Pgs. 52–53 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Naval matters. See Disarmament Conference ; London Naval Conference ; and under Treaties . Netherlands ( see also International Rubber Committee ): Germany, relations with: German diplomatic and military policies, views concerning, 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] ; German offer of alliance, reaction to, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 281 ] League of Nations Third Committee, support of proposal to reconvene, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Liquor smuggling into United States, negotiations regarding, 437–439 [ Pgs. 437–439 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] Military and foreign policy, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 281 ] U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships, proposed, representations against, 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] ; U.S. legislation restricting tourist cruises from U.S. ports to U.S. ships, proposed, representations against, 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] Neutrality legislation, U.S.: Airplanes to be purchased by Turkey from Glenn L. Martin Co., effect of U.S. neutrality legislation on negotiations concerning, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] Nye–Clark Neutrality Bill, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Panama Canal Zone, status with respect to U.S. neutrality legislation, 174–175 [ Pgs. 174–175 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] Pittman–McReynolds Neutrality Bill, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] State Department views on various proposals, 165–179 [ Pgs. 165–179 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] : Cash and carry, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 158 ] ; embargo by Presidential discretion, 165–166 [ Pgs. 165–166 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 168–169 [ Pgs. 168–169 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 159 ] ; embargo on war materials, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 166–167 [ Pgs. 166–167 include portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 169–170 [ Pgs. 169–170 include portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 159 ] ; embargo on war materials in excess of normal volume, 165–166 [ Pgs. 165–166 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] ; prohibition of all air attack on merchant vessels, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 163 ] ; prohibition of armed merchant vessels, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 163 ] ; prohibition of loans and credit to belligerents, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] ; prohibition of use of U.S. ports to armed merchant vessels during war, 175–176 [ Pgs. 175–176 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 176–178 [ Pgs. 176–178 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] ; total embargo, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 159 ] ; travel on belligerent ships and trade with belligerents at individual’s risk, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] New Zealand: Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property ( May 27 ), supplementary, 716–720 [ Pgs. 716–720 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] Discrimination against U.S. commerce in Western Samoa, U.S. representations regarding, 852–854 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 674 ] London Naval Treaty ( Mar. 25 ), signature and ratification of, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 94 ] Trade between Australia and New Zealand, proposed restriction to British shipping, informal discussions and communications regarding, 706–716 [ Pgs. 706–716 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] Niagara Falls and Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin, proposed negotiation of new treaty between United States and Canada, 834–846 [ Pgs. 834–846 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] Nigeria, tobacco imported into, U.S. representations against proposed preferential margin of duty on, 731–736 [ Pgs. 731–736 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] Norway: Liquor smuggling into United States, negotiations regarding, 439–452 [ Pgs. 439–452 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] London Naval Conference, bilateral conversations, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] Proposed U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships, representations against, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] Remilitarization of Rhineland, position concerning, 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Sanctions against Germany, views concerning, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Support of proposal to reconvene League of Nations Third Committee, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Nye–Clark Neutrality Bill, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Oil, U.S. recognition of United Kingdom as reciprocal country under Mineral Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920 , 736–741 [ Pgs. 736–741 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] Oil Export Corporation of New York, 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] Ottawa Agreements ( Aug. 20, 1932 ), 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 551 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] Pan American Airways, 722–730 [ Pgs. 722–730 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] Panama Canal Zone, status with respect to U.S. neutrality legislation, 174–175 [ Pgs. 174–175 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] Parity, naval: Japanese demand for, 22–36 [ Pgs. 22–36 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 118 ] ; U.S.-British exchange of notes reaffirming parity principle, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 93 ] Peninsular and Orient Steam Navigation Co., 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 557 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 559 ] Petroleum, U.S. recognition of United Kingdom as reciprocal country under Mineral Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920 , 736–741 [ Pgs. 736–741 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] Philippine Islands: Export of sugar to the United States, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] ; International Sugar Conference, invitation to participate, 526–527 [ Pgs. 526–527 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] ; reply, 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , and Doc. 437 ] Pittman–McReynolds Neutrality Bill, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] Poland: Attitude toward Danzig, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] ; France, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] ; Germany, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] ; Italy, 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] ; Soviet Union, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 174 ] ; Spain, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] Bilateral naval conversations with United Kingdom, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] British declaration to safeguard Poland against attack, gratitude for, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 232 ] European war, views on likelihood of, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Franco-Polish Alliance, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] German-Japanese Accord against Communist International ( Nov. 25 ), Polish reaction, 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] German-Polish Nonaggression Pact ( 1934 ), 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 219 ] Neutrality, effect on German-Russian hostility, speculation concerning, 186–187 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 168 ] Policies, 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] ; Czech view, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] ; French view, 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] ; U.S. view, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 235 ] U.S. legislation restricting tourist cruises from U.S. ports to U.S. ships, proposed, representations against, 612–614 [ Pgs. 612–614 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , and Doc. 500 ] Portugal, attitude toward civil war in Spain, 354–355 [ Pgs. 354–355 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Property, real and personal, supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of ( May 27 ), 716–720 [ Pgs. 716–720 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] Quotas and exchange control, 455–475 [ Pgs. 455–475 include portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] passim Radio facilities on cargo ships, proposed U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to, representations of certain foreign governments against, 618–624 [ Pgs. 618–624 include portions of Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , and Doc. 511 ] : Belgium, 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] ; Denmark, 621–622 [ Pgs. 621–622 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , and Doc. 509 ] ; Netherlands, 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] ; Norway, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] ; Sweden, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 505 ] ; United Kingdom, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 504 ] ; views of U.S. State Department, 622–623 [ Pgs. 622–623 include portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] Reidun incident, 439–452 [ Pgs. 439–452 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] Reifel case, 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] Revenue Act of 1936 , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 628 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 629 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 629 ] Rhineland, reoccupation and remilitarization of. See Germany : Reoccupation . Roca–Runciman Agreement, 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 544 ] Rome Protocols ( Mar. 17, 1934 ), 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 411 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Canadian distillers, U.S. claims against, proposals regarding settlement of, 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 656 and Doc. 657 ] London Naval Treaty ( Mar. 25 ), question concerning, 96–97 [ Pgs. 96–97 include portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 94 ] Rubber. See International Rubber Committee . Rubber Manufacturers Association, 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] Rumania: Czechoslovakian views regarding, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] Germany, relations with: German denunciation of Versailles Treaty (Part XII), protest against, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] ; German reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, Rumanian reaction, 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] United States, relations with: Extradition treaty, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] ; war debt owed to United States, negotiations concerning, 597–598 [ Pgs. 597–598 include portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] Russia. See Soviet Union . St. Lawrence–Great Lakes Basin and the Niagara Falls, proposed negotiation of a new treaty between United States and Canada, 834–846 [ Pgs. 834–846 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] St. Pierre-et-Miquelon, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 429–435 [ Pgs. 429–435 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 444–447 [ Pgs. 444–447 include portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Samoa, discrimination against U.S. commerce in New Zealand mandate of Western Samoa, U.S. representations regarding, 852–854 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 674 ] Sanctions. See under Ethiopian-Italian conflict and Germany : Reoccupation and remilitarization of Rhineland . Scandinavian countries, bilateral naval negotiations with United Kingdom, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] Schacht, Hjalmar, 488–502 [ Pgs. 488–502 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] Seagrams, Joseph E. & Sons, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] Siam, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 424 ] Smuggling ( see also Liquor smuggling into United States, U.S. efforts to suppress ), arms and ammunition from United States into Cuba, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 338 ] South Africa. See Union of South Africa . Soviet Union ( see also under London Naval Conference ): Permanent Peace Conference proposed, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 1 ] Relations with— Belgium, view of Belgian neutrality, 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285 ] Czechoslovakia, Treaty of Mutual Assistance ( 1935 ), 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 292 ] Finland, 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] France ( see also Treaties, conventions, etc. : Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance , 1935 ), 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 174 ] ; French views, 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] ; Soviet views, 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Germany, 200–201 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 174 ] ; German bid to reenter League of Nations, Soviet reaction, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] ; German-Japanese Accord against Communist International ( Nov. 25 ), Soviet views and reaction, 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] ; German views, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 274 ] ; Hitler’s May 21st speech, Soviet reaction, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] ; refusal to negotiate with Germany, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] ; U.S. analysis, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 235 ] Japan, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 174 ] Mongolia, 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Poland, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 174 ] ; effect of Polish neutrality on German-Soviet hostility, speculation concerning, 186–187 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 168 ] Rumania, 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] United Kingdom, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 174 ] ; Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement ( 1937 ), U.S. view, 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] United States: Soviet efforts to improve relations, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 174 ] ; U.S. view of Soviet intentions, 337–338 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 268 ] Spain, civil war in, 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] ; embargo on exports of war materials from France, 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] ; Polish view, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 299 ] ; Portuguese view, 354–355 [ Pgs. 354–355 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Standard Oil Export Corporation of New York, 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] Stresa front, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 246 ] Submarine warfare, rules of: Japanese proposal for discussion by London Naval Conference, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] ; signature of procès-verbal ( Nov. 6 ) of Part IV of London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ) 160–164 [ Pgs. 160–164 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] Sugar. See International Sugar Conference . Sweden: London Naval Conference, bilateral conversations, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] Remilitarization of the Rhineland, position concerning, 270–271 [ Pgs. 270–271 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Sanctions against Germany, views concerning, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Support of proposal to reconvene League of Nations Third Committee, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships, proposed, representations against, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 505 ] U.S. legislation restricting tourist cruises from U.S. ports to U.S. ships, proposed, representations against, 614–615 [ Pgs. 614–615 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] Switzerland, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 218 ] Tariff rates on imports from countries in default on war-debt payments owed United States, opposition by U.S. State Department to proposals to increase, 599–603 [ Pgs. 599–603 include portions of Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] Taxation, income, convention between the United States and Canada respecting, 790–795 [ Pgs. 790–795 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] Territorial waters: British refusal to recognize U.S. right to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying British flag, except as provided by treaty, 730–731 [ Pgs. 730–731 include portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] Tobacco imported into Nigeria and Gold Coast, U.S. representations against proposed preferential margin of duty, 731–736 [ Pgs. 731–736 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] Tonnage and armament limits. See under London Naval Conference . Tourist cruises from U.S. ports restricted to U.S. ships, proposed legislation, representations against: Canada, 605–608 [ Pgs. 605–608 include portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] ; France, 608–610 [ Pgs. 608–610 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] ; Germany, 610–611 [ Pgs. 610–611 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] ; Netherlands, 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] ; Poland, 612–614 [ Pgs. 612–614 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , and Doc. 500 ] ; Sweden, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 505 ] ; views of U.S. State Department, 615–617 [ Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] Trade, international, League of Nations efforts to promote, 453–485 [ Pgs. 453–485 include portions of Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] Trade agreement between United States and United Kingdom, proposed, preliminary discussions concerning, 666–669 [ Pgs. 666–669 include portions of Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 669–671 [ Pgs. 669–671 include portions of Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 685–688 [ Pgs. 685–688 include portions of Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 692–699 [ Pgs. 692–699 include portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 702–706 [ Pgs. 702–706 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] Trade Agreements Act ( 1934 ), 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 522 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 524 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 587 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] Trans-Atlantic air service, reciprocal arrangements effected by the United States with the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State, 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] Treaties, conventions, etc.: Anglo-German Naval Accord ( June, 1935 ), 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 147 n [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement ( 1937 ), 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Austro-German Agreement ( July 11 ), 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 270 ] ; Czech reaction, 328–329 [ Pgs. 328–329 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] ; French reaction, 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] ; implications with respect to future German policy, 322–325 [ Pgs. 322–325 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] Chadbourne Agreement ( May 9, 1931 ), 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 430 ] Czechoslovak-Austrian Trade Treaty ( Apr. 2 ), 495–496 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 411 ] Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance ( 1935 ), 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 292 ] Dardanelles Agreement (Montreux Convention, July 20 ), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 268 ] Extradition, supplementary treaties between United States and certain European countries, citation to texts, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of General: ] Financial Stabilization Agreement signed between the United States France, and the United Kingdom ( Sept 25 ), 535–565 [ Pgs. 535–565 include portions of Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463 ] Draft texts, 544–545 [ Pgs. 544–545 include portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 450 ] France: Conversations with United States, 535–536 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 440 ] , 539–543 [ Pgs. 539–543 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] , 550–552 [ Pgs. 550–552 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , and Doc. 452 ] , 554–557 [ Pgs. 554–557 include portions of Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] ; views on draft text, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] United Kingdom: Conversations with United States, 537–539 [ Pgs. 537–539 include portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] ; views on draft text, 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 448 ] United States: Criticism of U.S. gold policy by Ambassador Bullitt, 562–563 [ Pgs. 562–563 include portions of Doc. 461 and Doc. 462 ] ; text of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s press release, 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] ; text of U.S. statement, 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] ; views on draft text, 545–546 [ Pgs. 545–546 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] Fisheries: Convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, 825–834 [ Pgs. 825–834 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] ; sockeye salmon agreement ( 1930 ), 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] Franco-Belgian Military Agreement ( 1920 ), 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Franco-Polish Alliance ( 1921 ), 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 232 ] Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance ( 1935 ), 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 274 ] ; German view, 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; Netherlands view, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] ; Soviet view, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 174 ] German-Japanese Accord against Communist International ( Nov. 25 ), 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 390–406 [ Pgs. 390–406 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] Japanese explanation of, 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Preliminary views of Belgium, 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] ; Germany, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , Japan, 395–396 [ Pgs. 395–396 include portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] ; Soviet Union, 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] ; United Kingdom, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] Reactions of China, 405–406 [ Pgs. 405–406 include portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] ; Poland, 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] ; Soviet Union, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] ; United Kingdom, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] ; United States, 402–403 [ Pgs. 402–403 include portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Text, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] German-Polish Nonaggression Pact ( 1934 ), 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 219 ] Kellogg Pact ( 1928 ), 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Locarno Treaty ( 1925 ) ( see also Locarno Powers ), 108 n [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] ; British intention to honor, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 172 ] ; British obligations under, as seen by France with respect to German remilitarization of Rhineland, 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] ; German denunciation, 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; German intention to honor, 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; Italian reaction to German denunciation, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; Polish view, 273–274 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 232 ] ; proposed actions by signatories (except Germany) in protest against German remilitarization of Rhineland, 228–229 [ Pgs. 228–229 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] ; Western Pact proposed by United Kingdom to replace, 384–387 [ Pgs. 384–387 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ). See London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ). London Naval Treaty ( Mar. 25 ). See London Naval Treaty ( Mar. 25 ). Mediterranean Mutual Assistance Accord, 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Montreux Convention ( July 20 ), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 268 ] Naval armaments, limitation of. See London Naval Conference ; London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ); and Washington Naval Treaty ( 1922 ), infra . Niagara Falls Convention ( 1929 ), 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 837–840 [ Pgs. 837–840 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] Ottawa Agreements ( 1932 ), 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 551 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] Paris (Kellogg) Pact ( 1928 ), 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Property, real and personal, supplementary convention between United States and United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting tenure and disposition of ( May 27 ), 716–720 [ Pgs. 716–720 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] Protocols: Moscow ( Dec. 28 ), 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 114 ] ; Rome ( Mar. 17, 1934 ), 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 411 ] Rubber. See International Rubber Committee . Safety of Life at Sea, International Convention for, 618–624 [ Pgs. 618–624 include portions of Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , and Doc. 511 ] St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty ( 1932 ), 837–844 [ Pgs. 837–844 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670 ] Taxation, income, convention between United States and Canada ( Dec. 30 ), 790–795 [ Pgs. 790–795 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] Versailles Treaty: Allusions and citations, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 202 ] Part XII denounced by Germany, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 289 ] ; effect on Czechoslovakia, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] ; nations notified, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] ; protest by United Kingdom, France, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Washington Naval Treaty ( 1922 ): Allusions and citations, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 94 ] Article XIX: British proposal to modify to permit modernization of existing fortifications, 122–123 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] ; Japanese proposal to renew, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 117 ] ; U.S. consideration of British proposal, 124–129 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 118 ] , and rejection, 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Turkey, purchase of airplanes from Glenn L. Martin Co., 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 165 ] Union of South Africa, U.S. efforts to meet complaints that U.S. import regulations unduly restrict South African exports to United States, 855–876 [ Pgs. 855–876 include portions of Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , and Doc. 691 ] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union . Union Steamship Co., 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 559 ] United Distillers, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] United Kingdom ( see also Disarmament Conference ; League of Nations ; London Naval Treaty ( 1930 ); and under London Naval Conference ), 629–741 [ Pgs. 629–741 include portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] Anglo-German Naval Accord ( June, 1935 ), 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement ( 1937 ), U.S. views, 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property ( May 27, 1936 ), supplementary, 716–720 [ Pgs. 716–720 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] Efforts to relate other powers to London Naval Treaty ( Mar. 25 ): Germany, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 146–147 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; Italy, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] ; Japan, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , and Doc. 109 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] ; Poland, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] ; Scandinavian countries, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] ; Soviet Union, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 110 ] ; U.S. views, 111–112 [ Pgs. 111–112 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Ethiopian-Italian conflict, policy in, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] European conflicts, plan for dealing with, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] Financial Stabilization Agreement signed between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom ( Sept. 25, 1936 ). See under Treaties, conventions, etc. German-Japanese Accord against Communist International ( Nov. 25 ), British views and reaction, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Locarno Treaty. See under Treaties, conventions, etc. Petroleum (Production) Act ( 1934 ), 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 579 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] Petroleum (Production) Regulations ( 1935 ), 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] Rearmament, 196–197 [ Pgs. 196–197 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Relations with— Belgium, 306–307 [ Pgs. 306–307 include portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Czechoslovakia, 339–340 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 269 ] France: Anglo-French cooperation, need for, 296–297 [ Pgs. 296–297 include portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] ; British attitude toward France following German reoccupation and remilitarization of Rhineland, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] ; French attitude toward British, 308–309 [ Pgs. 308–309 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] ; naval matters, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 131 ] Germany: British questionnaire, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] ; Danubian interests, British view of, 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] ; education of British public opinion to realities of German menace, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 243 ] ; German views, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] ; Italian view, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; naval matters, 146–147 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 131 ] ; policy of temporization by British toward Germany, 197–198 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 172 ] ; reoccupation and remilitarization of Rhineland, 213–214 [ Pgs. 213–214 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 231–232 [ Pgs. 231–232 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] ; U.S. analysis, 280–281 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 235 ] Italy: British policy of temporization, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 172 ] ; British position, 304–306 [ Pgs. 304–306 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] ; naval matters, 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] Japan, British policy of temporization vis-à-vis, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 172 ] Poland, naval matters, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Scandinavian countries, naval matters, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 131 ] Roca–Runciman Agreement, 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 544 ] Rubber. See International Rubber Committee . Territorial waters, British refusal to recognize U.S. right to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying British flag, except as provided by treaty, 730–731 [ Pgs. 730–731 include portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] Tobacco imported into Nigeria and Gold Coast, U.S. representations against proposed preferential margin of duty, 731–736 [ Pgs. 731–736 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , and Doc. 578 ] Trade agreement between United States and United Kingdom, proposed, preliminary discussions, 666–669 [ Pgs. 666–669 include portions of Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 669–671 [ Pgs. 669–671 include portions of Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 685–688 [ Pgs. 685–688 include portions of Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 692–699 [ Pgs. 692–699 include portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 702–706 [ Pgs. 702–706 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] Trade between Australia and New Zealand, proposed restriction to British shipping, informal discussions and communications regarding, 706–716 [ Pgs. 706–716 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] Trade practices of United Kingdom, 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , and Doc. 527 ] , 660–666 [ Pgs. 660–666 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 671–672 [ Pgs. 671–672 include portions of Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , and Doc. 539 ] , 678–680 [ Pgs. 678–680 include portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 700–702 [ Pgs. 700–702 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] ; U.S. criticism of, and efforts of Secretary of State Hull to secure British cooperation in his international trade program, 629–643 [ Pgs. 629–643 include portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 647–655 [ Pgs. 647–655 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] , 656–659 [ Pgs. 656–659 include portions of Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 672–674 [ Pgs. 672–674 include portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 675–678 [ Pgs. 675–678 include portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 680–684 [ Pgs. 680–684 include portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , and Doc. 546 ] , 688–692 [ Pgs. 688–692 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] Trans-Atlantic air service, reciprocal arrangements effected by United Kingdom with United States, Canada, and Irish Free State, 720–730 [ Pgs. 720–730 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] U.S. legislation providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships, proposed, representations against, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 504 ] U.S. recognition of United Kingdom as reciprocal country under Mineral Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920 , 736–741 [ Pgs. 736–741 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] Versailles Treaty. See under Treaties, conventions, etc. Washington Naval Treaty ( 1922 ). See under Treaties, conventions, etc. Western Pact proposed to replace Locarno Treaty, 384–387 [ Pgs. 384–387 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] United States Naval General Board, 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 52–53 [ Pgs. 52–53 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] United States vs. Butler , case cited, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 437 ] U.S. Agriculture Department, activities in connection with South African complaints that U.S. import regulations discriminate against South African exports to United States, 855–873 [ Pgs. 855–873 include portions of Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , and Doc. 688 ] passim U.S. Congress: Bland Bill (H. R. 112), 605–617 [ Pgs. 605–617 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] House Committees: Merchant Marine, Radio, and Fisheries, 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 494 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 509 ] ; Ways and Means, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 490 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] Liquor Tax Bill (H. R. 9185), Canadian protests against certain provisions, and negotiations with the United States leading to settlement of U.S. claims against Canadian distillers, 796–825 [ Pgs. 796–825 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] Nye–Clark Neutrality Bill, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Pittman–McReynolds Neutrality Bill, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] Senate Committees: Commerce, 614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 505 ] ; Finance, 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 655 ] ; Foreign Relations, 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 668 ] U.S. Justice Department, negotiations with Canada concerning Liquor Tax Bill (H. R. 9185), 799–824 [ Pgs. 799–824 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] passim U.S. Treasury Department: Negotiations concerning Tripartite Financial Stabilization Agreement ( Sept. 25, 1936 ), 535–565 [ Pgs. 535–565 include portions of Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463 ] passim; negotiations with Canada concerning Liquor Tax Bill (H.R. 9185), 796–824 [ Pgs. 796–824 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657 ] passim; position with respect to war-debt payments due United States, 567–575 [ Pgs. 567–575 include portions of Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] passim Vatican Concordat with Germany, 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Versailles Treaty. See under Treaties, conventions, etc. “Voyages to Nowhere”, Bland Bill (H.R. 112), 605–617 [ Pgs. 605–617 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] Walker, Hiram & Sons, Ltd., 796–823 [ Pgs. 796–823 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] War-debt payments due United States: Hoover moratorium, 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 468 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 468 ] Legislation and policy, 568–575 [ Pgs. 568–575 include portions of Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] ; texts of replies of the debtor states to semi-annual debt notifications by United States, 575–577 [ Pgs. 575–577 include portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] , and import of modifications introduced into these replies, 577–579 [ Pgs. 577–579 include portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] Liberty Bond legislation, 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 464 ] Negotiations with France, 579–590 [ Pgs. 579–590 include portions of Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , and Doc. 477 ] ; Italy, 590–597 [ Pgs. 590–597 include portions of Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] ; Rumania, 597–598 [ Pgs. 597–598 include portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] State Department: Opposition to proposals to increase tariff rates on imports from countries in default on war-debt payments, 599–603 [ Pgs. 599–603 include portions of Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] ; views on bill providing for acquisition of essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods, 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] Status as of Dec. 15 , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of General: ] War in Europe, possibility of, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Washington Naval Treaty ( 1922 ). See under Treaties, conventions, etc. World Economic Conference, London, ( June 12–July 27, 1933 ), 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 533 ] Yugoslavia, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] , 289–290 [ Pgs. 289–290 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 499–502 [ Pgs. 499–502 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ]