SAND2025-15111 SANDIA REPORT SAND2025-15111 Printed December 2025 Worst Case Sabotage Consequence Modeling for Advanced Reactors Christopher A. Faucett, Anna Taconi, Manit Shah, Donny Hartanto Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550 CONTENTS Abstract.................................................................................................................................................................3 Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................................................4 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................8 Acronyms and Terms .........................................................................................................................................9 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................10 2. Reactor Models ..........................................................................................................................................11 3. Sabotage Cases and Release Percentages................................................................................................14 4. RASCAL Results ........................................................................................................................................16 5. MACCS Modeling Approach...................................................................................................................17 5.1. MACCS Parameters and Assumptions.........................................................................................17 5.2. Reactor Release Fractions...............................................................................................................20 5.2.1. Sodium-cooled Fast Microreactor ...................................................................................20 5.2.2. High Temperature Helium-Cooled Prismatic Microreactor .......................................21 5.2.3. Heat Pipe-cooled Microreactor........................................................................................23 6. Consequence Analysis ...............................................................................................................................26 6.1. MACCS Results................................................................................................................................26 6.2. MACCS and RASCAL Comparison.............................................................................................29 6.3. Discussion.........................................................................................................................................32 7. Conclusions and Future Work .................................................................................................................34 References ..........................................................................................................................................................35 Appendix A. MACCS to MELCOR Radionuclide Mapping..............................................................36 Distribution........................................................................................................................................................38 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Reactor building cross-sectional view and orientation...............................................................18 Figure 2. Dose vs. distance for Case A for the 10, 30, and 50 MWth SFM cores. ..................................27 Figure 3. Dose vs. distance for Case A for the 1, 10, and 50 MWth HTPM cores. ................................28 Figure 4. Dose vs. distance for Case A for the 5, 15, and 30 MWth HPMR cores. ................................29 Figure 5. Comparison of RASCAL and MACCS SFM Case A source terms.........................................30 Figure 6. Comparison of RASCAL and MACCS HTPM source terms...................................................31 Figure 7. Comparison of RASCAL and MACCS HPMR source terms...................................................32 Figure 8. Dose vs. distance for the mean dose, peak dose, and various dose quantiles for the 30 MWth HPMR Case A. ..........................................................................................................................33 LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Design Details for SFR, HTPM, and HPMR. ..............................................................................11 Table 2. Key Design Specifications for the 30 MWth SFR (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors 2025b). .........................................................................................................................................................11 Table 3. Key Design Specifications for the 30MWt HTPM (Shah and Hartanto, What might radiological consequences from sabotage-induced releases look like in heat pipe-cooled 5 microreactors? 2025c) and HPMR (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic miroreactor 2025a).....................................................................................................................................12 Table 4. Activity of Radionuclides Immediately after Shutdown in 30MWt SFR, HTPM, and HPMR..........................................................................................................................................................13 Table 5. Release Percentages of 21 Radionuclides for Postulated Sabotage-Induced Accidents in SFR, HTPM, and HPMR ..................................................................................................15 Table 6 Total Effective Does Equivalent as a Function of Downward Distance of Release for Each Sabotage Scenarios ....................................................................................................................16 Table 7. Recommended MACCS nuclides for LWR applications from NUREG/CR-7270 (Bixler, Compton, et al. 2022). .................................................................................................................18 Table 8. MELCOR radionuclide groups (Humphries, et al. 2017)...........................................................19 Table 9. Sodium-cooled fast microreactor characteristics..........................................................................20 Table 10. Radionuclides of importance and release fractions for the SFM.............................................21 Table 11. High temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactor characteristics...............................22 Table 12. Radionuclides of importance and release fractions for the High Temperature Helium-cooled Prismatic Microreactor (NP, PU, and SR are nonstandard MELCOR groups that contain isotopes of Np, Pu, and Sr, respectively)............................................................23 Table 13. High temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactor characteristics...............................24 Table 14. Radionuclides of importance and release fractions for the HPMR (NP, PU, and SR are nonstandard MELCOR groups that contain isotopes of Np, Pu, and Sr, respectively). .........24 Table 15. MACCS nuclides and corresponding MELCOR groups..........................................................36 6 This page left blank 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In anticipation of near-term advanced reactor licensing, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has proposed rulemaking in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Parts 53 (10 CFR 53) and 73 (limited-scope) (10 CFR 73) that would relax physical security requirements for advanced reactor licensees based on dose at the site boundary following a sabotage event. Ostensibly, the reduction in onsite responders will increase the cost competitiveness of ARs in the domestic energy market. However, the utility of the proposed 10 CFR 53 and 73 rulemaking is limited in that there is currently no NRC-approved guidance or methodology for demonstrating an AR meets the proposed 25 rem at the site boundary criteria. The objective of this work was to perform a preliminary consequence assessment of radiological source terms resulting from hypothetical sabotage events for three advanced reactor technologies to better understand if or how advanced reactor licensees could meet the proposed 10 CFR 53 or 10 CFR 73 site boundary dose criteria. The three reactors modeled were: • Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage- induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors 2025). • High Temperature helium-cooled Prismatic Microreactor (HTPM) (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium- cooled prismatic miroreactor 2025) • Heat Pipe-cooled Microreactor (HPMR) (Shah and Hartanto, What might radiological consequences from sabotage-induced releases look like in heat pipe-cooled microreactors? 2025) Using the MACCS consequence analysis code to simulate radionuclide environmental transport and health consequences from post-sabotage radionuclide releases for the three advanced reactor designs provided by collaborators at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the distance at which the peak dose falls below 25 rem (D25rem) was calculated for each reactor. It was generally observed that D25rem was between 0.5 to 1 km for lower power reactors (< 10 MWth) and up to 10 to 30 km for larger reactors (>30 MWth). When compared against results from the RASCAL code for the same reactor releases, it was found that MACCS predicted larger values for D25rem; it is expected that the differences in results were driven by how MACCS and RASCAL perform nearfield modeling and different choices in modeling parameters. While the results of this study may provide preliminary insights into using the proposed 10 CFR 53 or 73 limited scope rulemaking for reduced physical security requirements, the technical rigor of this work is well below what is expected will be required for advanced reactor licensees. Development of technically defensible post-sabotage release estimates and modeling approaches is a priority for future work in this area including: • Development of realistic, worst case release scenarios with resulting source terms for advanced reactor types based on design basis threat capabilities, • Investigating the effects of security delay barriers on radionuclide retention in containment or confinement buildings, • Exploring the impact of siting on consequence simulations by using weather data from various locations (including remote areas) for MACCS input, 8 • Performing a parametric sensitivity study to identify which MACCS parameters have the greatest effect on D25rem. 9 ACRONYMS AND TERMS Acronym/Term Definition 10 CFR 53 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 53 10 CFR 73 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 73 HPMR Heat pipe-cooled microreactor HTPM High-temperature helium-cooled microreactor LWR Light water reactor NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory RASCAL Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis for radiological emergencies SFM Sodium-cooled fast microreactor SFR Sodium-cooled fast reactor SNL Sandia National Laboratories TRISO Tristructural isotopic UCO Uranium oxycarbide 10 1. INTRODUCTION In anticipation of near-term advanced reactor licensing, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has proposed rulemaking in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Parts 53 (10 CFR 53) and 73 (limited-scope) (10 CFR 73) that would relax physical security requirements for advanced reactor licensees based on dose at the site boundary following a sabotage event. Specifically, the proposed rulemaking reduces the number of onsite security responders required if the consequences from a sabotage-induced radiological source term do not exceed 25 rem at the site boundary 2 hours after the initial release either with (10 CFR 73) or without (10 CFR 53) mitigative actions. Ostensibly, the reduction in onsite responders will increase the cost competitiveness of ARs in the domestic energy market. However, the utility of the proposed 10 CFR 53 and 73 rulemaking is limited in that there is currently no NRC-approved guidance or methodology for demonstrating an AR meets the proposed 25 rem at the site boundary criteria. To better understand if or how advanced reactor licensees could meet the proposed 10 CFR 53 or 10 CFR 73 site boundary dose criteria, this work presents a preliminary consequence assessment of radiological source terms resulting from hypothetical sabotage events for three advanced reactor technologies: • Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage- induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors 2025). • High Temperature helium-cooled Prismatic Microreactor (HTPM) (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium- cooled prismatic miroreactor 2025) • Heat Pipe-cooled Microreactor (HPMR) (Shah and Hartanto, What might radiological consequences from sabotage-induced releases look like in heat pipe-cooled microreactors? 2025) For each reactor type, multiple representative reactor models for each reactor type were created by Shah and Hartanto for a range of power levels and fuel loadings. Using experimental fuel release data, environment release estimates were provided by Shah and Hartanto for different sabotage scenarios ranging from full core damage to smaller, fractional fuel damage events. Shah and Hartanto go on to estimate does consequence for two sabotage-induced scenarios using RASCAL, specifically focuses on the first two hours after the release. Their work is thoroughly summarized. Additionally, the inventories and release fractions created by Shah and Hartanto were used as input for the MACCS consequence analysis code. To identify worst case scenarios, MACCS simulations were performed using random sampling of weather conditions at a notional reactor site. The key figure of merit for this work is the distance from the release point where the dose from the different scenarios fell below 25 rem. This work is intended as a preliminary assessment of consequences from postulated sabotage release scenarios and should not be misinterpreted as a technical basis for justifying a reduction in security requirements. 11 2. REACTOR MODELS For each set of work, the same reactor models and references were used by Shah and Hartanto to create the release fractions. Each reactor was assumed to be 30MWt. The details are listed in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3. Table 1. Design Details for SFR, HTPM, and HPMR. Neutron Microreactor Reference Design Fuel Form Enrichment Coolant spectrum Super-safe, small and simple SFR U-10Zr 15 wt% Sodium Fast (4S) reactor [ref] High-temperature HTPM UCO kernel 19.75 wt% Helium Thermal engineering test reactor [ref] Realistic heat pipe-cooled HPMR UCO kernel 19.75 wt% Sodium Thermal microreactor [ref] Table 2. Key Design Specifications for the 30 MWth SFR (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors 2025). Property SFR [ref] Fuel pin pitch (cm) 1.51 Fuel pin radius (cm) 0.645 Thickness of clad (cm) 0.055 Inner radius of clad (cm) 0.645 Outer radius of clad (cm) 0.7 Fuel volume fraction (%) 31.42 Active core height (cm) 250 Assembly pitch (cm) 20.6 Length of fuel duct (cm) 520 Core loading (MTU) 10.2 Specific power (MWt/MTU) 2.95 Cycle length (years) 30 12 Table 3. Key Design Specifications for the 30MWt HTPM (Shah and Hartanto, What might radiological consequences from sabotage-induced releases look like in heat pipe-cooled microreactors? 2025) and HPMR (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic miroreactor 2025). Property HTPM HPMR Kernel radius (cm) 0.02125 0.02125 Buffer radius (cm) 0.03125 0.03125 Inner pyrocarbon radius (cm) 0.03525 0.03525 Silicon carbide radius (cm) 0.03875 0.03875 Outer pyrocarbon radius (cm) 0.04275 0.04275 Packing fraction (%) 40 36 Active core height (cm) 240 160 No. fuel blocks (per core) 90 60 No. TRISO particles per compact 3,558 8,639 Core loading (MTU) 0.84 0.9 Specific power (MWt/MTU) 35.85 33.22 Cycle length (years) 7.15 2.7 Shah and Hartanto performed their depletion analysis using SCALE. The SCALE/TRITON package was able to predict cycle length, discharge burnup, and generate the ORIGEN reactor library. Then, SCALE/ORIGAMI was used to calculate the source terms inventory at the targeted discharge burnup. In SCALE/ORIGAMI, activation of non-fuel materials (e.g., coolant and graphite) were also accounted. [ref] Due to the differences in initial fuel mass and specific power, the inventories of fission products and actinides varied for each reactor at the end of cycle. The core inventories for each reactor at time of shutdown are listed in x. The inventories at shutdown represent an immediate release due to sabotage. It includes 16 fission product radionuclides for the SFR and 21 radionuclides for the HTPM and HPMR, which are most likely to contribute to total radiological does. C-14, Si-31, and Co-60 are included for the HTPM and HPMR due to the graphite in the TRISO pebbles. Na-24 is included in the HPMR and the SFR due to the presence of the sodium coolant. 13 Table 4. Activity of Radionuclides Immediately after Shutdown in 30MWt SFR, HTPM, and HPMR Radioactivity (Ci) Radionuclide SFR HTPM HPMR 85Kr — 2.35E+04 1.08E+04 133Xe 1.68E+06 1.70E+06 1.70E+06 110mAg — 1.88E+03 3.01E+02 131I 7.76E+05 7.90E+05 7.68E+05 133I 1.67E+06 1.69E+06 1.69E+06 135I 1.59E+06 1.60E+06 1.59E+06 134Cs 4.78E+04 1.97E+05 4.22E+04 136Cs 2.59E+04 5.51E+04 2.19E+04 137Cs 7.67E+05 2.41E+05 9.46E+04 132Te 1.13E+06 1.13E+06 1.12E+06 Fission 99Mo Products 1.52E+06 1.53E+06 1.54E+06 140Ba 1.49E+06 1.49E+06 1.52E+06 90Sr 6.52E+05 2.02E+05 8.55E+04 106Ru 2.93E+05 3.99E+05 1.93E+05 154Eu — 9.55E+03 1.49E+03 156Eu — 9.07E+04 2.59E+04 144Ce 1.27E+06 1.25E+06 1.21E+06 95Zr — 1.48E+06 1.56E+06 239Np 1.52E+07 1.09E+07 1.13E+07 238Pu 2.76E+03 6.30E+03 4.65E+02 239Pu 1.12E+04 5.49E+02 5.23E+02 14C — 1.43E+00 7.46E-01 24Na 8.71E+04 — 2.28E+05 Activation Products 31Si — 1.26E+04 1.27E+04 60Co — 5.88E+02 3.67E+02 14 3. SABOTAGE CASES AND RELEASE PERCENTAGES Sabotage scenarios and definitions varied by reactor type and are defined below: For the SFR • Case A: Severe core damage with containment integrity compromised as a result of direct sabotage. Volatile and non-volatile fission products are released in significant amounts. • Case B: Indirect sabotage creates an accident with core degradation. Containment integrity is also compromised. However, limited mitigation measures are available. Volatile and non- volatile fission products are released. • Case C: Sabotage results in limited fuel damage. Containment integrity is partially degraded. Only volatile fission products are released. For the HTPM • Case A: Reactor sabotage results in severe core damage with peak fuel temperatures exceeding 2,173 K. The high temperatures result in a significant number of failed TRISO particles and a large release of fission products. Containment integrity is severely compromised. • Case B: Adversaries create elevated fuel temperatures between 1,773 K and 2,173 K. A limited number of TRISO particles fail leading to small releases of fission products with high diffusion coefficients. Containment integrity is damaged. For the HPMR • Case A: Reactor sabotage results in severe core damage with peak fuel temperatures exceeding 2,173 K. The high temperatures result in a significant number of failed TRISO particles and a large release of fission products. Containment integrity is severely compromised. • Case B: Indirect sabotage results in a severe depressurized loss of cooling scenario. Passive decay heat removal systems are unavailable. Fuel temperatures peak between 1,773 K and 2,173 K. Containment integrity is damaged. The release values for Case C for the SFR scenario are more equivalent to the release under Case B in the HTPM and HPMR, and therefore, is used in place of Case B for demonstration of release percentages. Dose consequences for both postulated sabotage-induced accidents were estimated for each design using RASCAL tool (Ramsdell et al., 2013) and focused on the first 2 h after the simulated release. The consequence characterizes the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), which is the sum of the effective dose equivalent–external exposure from plumeshine and (4-day early phase) groundshine–and the committed effective dose equivalent (internal exposure). The radiological releases were assumed to occur under standard meteorological conditions, characterized by atmospheric stability class D (neutral conditions), wind speed of 6.44 kph, no precipitation, air temperature of 21.1°C, and relative humidity of 50%. The releases were simulated to occur at 10 m above ground level, and all doses were measured downwind along the plume centerline (0.15 to 1.2 km in 0.15 intervals) 1 m above ground level during the first 2 h following the onset. The assessment assumed no protective actions (e.g., evacuation) and supported to evaluate physical protection requirements against the criterion of the total dose not exceeding 25 rem over the first 2 h at the exclusion zone boundary (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017). 15 Table 5. Release Percentages of 21 Radionuclides for Postulated Sabotage-Induced Accidents in SFR, HTPM, and HPMR Release percentage (%) Fission products Case A Case B SFR HTPM/HPMR SFR HTPM/HPMR 85Kr NA 5 NA 0.1 133Xe 100 5 85 0.1 110mAg NA 100 NA 30 131I 15 5 1 0.1 133I 15 5 1 0.1 135I 15 5 1 0.1 134Cs 55 90 3 0.3 136Cs 55 90 3 0.3 137Cs 55 90 3 0.3 132Te 1 1 0.05 0.02 99Mo 0.5 1 0.01 0.02 140Ba 1 1 0.05 0.02 90Sr 0.3 25 — 10 106Ru 0.5 5 0.01 0.1 154Eu NA 25 NA 10 156Eu NA 25 NA 10 144Ce 0.5 10 — 1 95Zr NA 5 NA 0.1 239Np 0.1 1 — — 238Pu 0.1 0.1 — — 239Pu 0.1 0.1 — — 16 4. RASCAL RESULTS Table 6 presents the total dose at eight downwind locations across both scenarios for each design. The Case A accident resulted in the highest total dose of 5,400 rem for HTPM, 3,900 rem for SFM, and 2,800 rem for HPM at 0.15 km. In comparison, the Case B accident resulted in the highest total dose of 670 rem for HTPM, 340 rem for HPMR, and 200 rem for SFM at 0.15 km. For Case A scenario, the dose exceeded 25 rem at each of the dose locations for Case A scenario in all designs. For Case B scenario, the dose remained less than 25 rem at distances between 0.45 and 0.6 km in SFM, at 1.2 km in HTPM, and at distances between 0.75 and 0.9 km in HPMR. These results were based on the total releases of 1.50x106 Ci to 2.81 x106 Ci in SFM, 5.33 x104 Ci to 1.18 x104 Ci in HTPM, and 3.23 x104 Ci to 8.23x105 Ci in HPMR. Table 6 Total Effective Does Equivalent as a Function of Downward Distance of Release for Each Sabotage Scenarios Downward Distance (km) 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.05 1.20 Microreactor Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) (rem) SFR 3900 1200 640 420 300 220 180 140 Case HTPM 5400 1700 900 580 410 310 250 200 A HPMR 2800 80 470 300 220 160 130 100 SFR 200 62 33 21 15 11 8.9 7.2 Case HTPM 670 210 110 720 51 39 31 25 B HPMR 340 110 57 37 26 20 15 12 For both scenarios across the three designs, the inhalation dose (committed effective dose equivalent) was the major contributor to the total dose, accounting for more than 75%. In SFM, 137 Cs, 131I, and 239Pu collectively contributed more than 88% of the inhalation dose under Case A, whereas 137Cs and 131I accounted for more than 91% of the inhalation dose under Case B. In HTPM, 144 Ce, 90Sr, and 137Cs collectively contributed over 75% of the inhalation dose under Case A, while 90 Sr and 144Ce contributed more than 94% of the inhalation dose under Case B. In HPM, 144Ce, 90Sr, and 137Cs collectively contributed over 80% of the inhalation dose under Case A, while 90Sr and 144Ce contributed more than 96% of the inhalation dose under Case B. 17 5. MACCS MODELING APPROACH This section describes modeling inputs and assumptions used for MACCS simulations including descriptions for each reactor and their respective release fractions. 5.1. MACCS Parameters and Assumptions The MACCS consequence analysis code was used to simulate radionuclide environmental transport and health consequences. Developed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for the NRC, MACCS simulates the consequences of a radiological release including dose to the public, land contamination, and economic losses. Additionally, MACCS can automatically perform probabilistic consequence assessments by sampling publicly available meteorological data for a user-specified geographical location which allows for investigation of a broad range of scenarios including combinations of weather that maximize dose to the public. While MACCS has historically been used for severe accident consequence analysis, MACCS can model the release of any user-defined radionuclide inventory such as the postulated source terms provided by ORNL for each reactor type. The following MACCS input parameters were used for all simulations: • Weather parameters (rain distances and intensities, wind speed and direction) were sampled from the site weather data file for the Surry Nuclear Power Station that is distributed with the MACCS code. Because this analysis is not site specific, the Surry weather data was used for convenience. Non-uniform random bin sampling was used based on the recommendations by Bixler et al. (Bixler, Compton, et al. 2022). • The radial nodalization uses 0.1 km increments between 0 km to 1 km, 1 km increments from 1 km to 10 km, and 10 km increments between 10 km to 100 km (i.e., the tick marks on a logarithmic plot scale). Additional grid points were added at 200 km, 500 km, and 1000 km. The angular nodalization uses 16 evenly spaced subdivisions to align with data in the Surry weather file. • The reactor building was assumed to be 11 m tall with a 21 m by 21 m footprint. The reactor building dimensions were chosen based on an advanced reactor source term modeling demonstration by SNL (Wagner, et al. 2022). Figure 1 shows the orientation of the reactor building. • Releases were modeled as point sources using a Gaussian plume. The decay heat-driven buoyancy model was used with decay heat calculated using the inventories and release fractions given by ORNL. All releases were assumed to occur over a 1 h period. A constant 0.15 µm mass median diameter was assumed. • The release height was assumed to be 1 m from the ground as it is expected that adversaries would breach the reactor building close to the ground (i.e., as opposed to the roof). • The Regulatory Guide 1.145 Full Model implemented in MACCS was used for nearfield modeling. • The recommended modeling parameters for aerosol transport and health effects from NUREG/CR-7270, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, were used (Bixler, Compton, et al. 2022). The recommended nuclides from NUREG/CR-7270 shown in Table 7 were assumed to be applicable to the reactors modeled in this work. 18 Figure 1. Reactor building cross-sectional view and orientation. Table 7. Recommended MACCS nuclides for LWR applications from NUREG/CR-7270 (Bixler, Compton, et al. 2022). MACCS Nuclides Co-58 Y-90 Ru-103 Te-132 Ba-137m Nd-147 Co-60 Y-91m Ru-105 I-131 Ba-139 Np-239 Kr-85 Y-91 Ru-106 I-132 Ba-140 Pu-238 Kr-85m Y-92 Rh-103m I-133 La-140 Pu-239 Kr-87 Y-93 Rh-105 I-134 La-141 Pu-240 Kr-88 Zr-95 Rh-106 I-135 La-142 Pu-241 Rb-86 Zr-97 Te-127 Xe-133 Ce-141 Am-241 Rb-88 Nb-95 Te-127m Xe-135 Ce-143 Cm-242 Sr-89 Nb-97 Te-129 Xe-135m Ce-144 Cm-244 Sr-90 Nb-97m Te-129m Cs-134 Pr-143 Sb-127 Sr-91 Mo-99 Te-131 Cs-136 Pr-144 Sb-129 Sr-92 Tc-99m Te-131m Cs-137 Pr-144m 19 Release fractions for each source term were only provided for nuclides that were expected to contribute the greatest dose to the public following a release (i.e., as opposed to the nuclides in Table 7). To determine the release of nuclides where release fractions were not provided, the MACCS nuclides were grouped into the classes used by the MELCOR severe accident analysis code1 (shown in Table 8). MELCOR groups elements by chemical similarity, and elements within each group are assumed to release and transport together. Because there is no experimental data for releases from advanced reactor fuels from sabotage events, the assumption that chemically similar radionuclides will release together was used for this work. Based on this assumption, if the group contained a nuclide where the release fraction had been provided, the release fraction for the individual nuclide was assigned to the entire group. If no data was provided for any element in a group, the release fractions for all elements in a group were set to zero. In instances where two nuclides in the same group had different release fractions, the higher release fraction was used for conservatism. Table 8. MELCOR radionuclide groups (Humphries, et al. 2017). Group Chemical Group Elements Name XE Noble Gas Xe, He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe, Rn, H, N CS Alkali Metals Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Fr, Cu BA Alkaline earths Be, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba, Ra, Es, Fm I2 Halogens F, Cl, Br, I, At TE Chalcogens O, S, Se, Te, Po RU Platinoids Ru, Rh, Pd, Re, Os, Ir, Pt, Au, Ni MO Early Transition Elements V, Cr, Fe, Co, Mn, Nb, Mo, Tc, Ta, W CE Tetravalent Ti, Zr, Hf, Ce, Th, Pa, Np, Pu, C Al, Sc, Y, La, Ac, Pr, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Gd, Tb, LA Trivalents Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Am, Cm, Bk, Cf U Uranium U CD More Volatile Main Group Cd, Hg, Zn, As, Sb, Pb, Tl, Bi AG Less Volatile Main Group Ga, Ge, In, Sn, Ag 1 MELCOR is a systems level severe accident analysis code, also developed by SNL for the NRC. MELCOR is commonly used together with MACCS for nuclear reactor safety analyszes. 20 To align with the proposed 10 CFR 53/73 limited scope rulemaking, an approach used by Nosek was used to track dose only for the first 2 hours following a release (Nosek 2023). Nosek defined a population cohort that evacuates 2 h after the initial release. The cohort has an evacuation protection factor of 0 (i.e., no dose is received after evacuation occurs) so no dose is received after 2 h. Before evacuation, an environmental shielding factor of 1 is used (i.e., no shielding is provided). 5.2. Reactor Release Fractions This section presents the consequence modeling for the SFM, HPMR, and HTPM. The inventories for each reactor were created by Shah and Hartanto by simulating burnup until the reactor could not sustain criticality (i.e., keff < 1). For all reactors, release fractions for key nuclides were estimated for hypothetical sabotage scenarios. The release fractions are intended as rough approximations; specific adversary sabotage actions or post-sabotage accident sequences for each scenario were not provided. 5.2.1. Sodium-cooled Fast Microreactor The SFM is a pool-type sodium fast neutron microreactor inspired by the Toshiba 4S design (Ueda, et al. 2005). The SFM uses U-Zr10 fuel enriched to 15 wt% 235U. Three SFM cores were modeled representing 10 MWth, 30 MWth, and 50 MWth designs. The fuel loading and burnup for each design are shown in Table 9. Table 9. Sodium-cooled fast microreactor characteristics. Power Level (MWth) Fuel Loading (MTU) Final Burnup (GWd/MTU) 10 6.9 4.2 30 10.2 32 50 7.7 16.5 Release fractions for the SFM were provided for three scenarios, as previously defined in Section 3: • Case A: Severe core damage with containment integrity compromised as a result of direct sabotage. Volatile and non-volatile fission products are released in significant amounts. • Case B: Indirect sabotage creates an accident with core degradation. Containment integrity is also compromised. However, limited mitigation measures are available. Volatile and non- volatile fission products are released. • Case C: Sabotage results in limited fuel damage. Containment integrity is partially degraded. Only volatile fission products are released. Shah and Hartanto provided release fractions for 16 radionuclides that are expected to contribute 95% of the total dose from a liquid metal-cooled reactor release as presented in Table 5 and are redefined in Table 10, which presents the release fractions for the radionuclides for each scenario provided by Shah and Hartanto and the MELCOR group from Table 8 the release fractions were applied to. No releases were provided for elements in the LA group. Three modifications were made to the release fractions: 21 • Both 90Sr and 140Ba belong to the BA group. The larger 140Ba release fraction was used for nuclides in the BA group. • Np and Pu isotopes were moved to the U group. For U-Zr fuel, U is expected to release with Pu, and Np release can be approximated using U or Pu releases. The Pu release fraction was applied to the U group (Grabaskas, Bucknor and Jerden 2016). • No release fractions were given for radionuclides in the CD group. However, Sb releases can be conservatively approximated using release fractions for Te (Grabaskas, Bucknor and Jerden 2016). Sb belongs to the CD group, so the release fractions for the TE group were also applied to the CD group. Table 10. Radionuclides of importance and release fractions for the SFM. Release Fraction (%) Radionuclides of MELCOR Group Importance Case A Case B Case C 133 Xe XE 100 85 85 134 Cs, 136Cs, 137Cs CS 55 10 3 140 Ba, 90Sr2 BA 1 0.5 0.05 131 I, 133I, 135I I2 15 3 1 132 Te TE 1 0.5 0.05 106 Ru RU 0.5 0.1 0.01 99 Mo MO 0.5 0.1 0.01 144 Ce CE 0.5 0.01 - - LA - - - - CD 1 0.5 0.05 239 Np, 238Pu, 239Pu U 0.1 0.05 - 5.2.2. High Temperature Helium-Cooled Prismatic Microreactor The HTPM is a helium cooled prismatic microreactor based on the BWXT Advanced Nuclear Reactor (BWXT 2025). The HTPM uses uranium oxycarbide (UCO) tristructural-isotopic (TRISO) 2 The release fractions provided for 90Sr were 0.3 for Case A, 0.1 for Case B, and 0 for Case C. While using the release for 140Ba created a non-zero release for 90Sr for Case C, it decided that the non-zero release was acceptable given its small magnitude compared to releases of the XE and CS group. 22 fuel enriched to 19.75 wt% 235U. Shah and Hartanto modeled three HTPM cores at 1 MWth, 10 MWth, and 50 MWth. Key parameters for each core are shown in Table 11. Table 11. High temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactor characteristics. Power Level (MWth) Fuel Loading (MTU) Final Burnup (GWd/MTU) 1 0.22 36 10 0.33 50 50 0.84 16.5 Shah and Hartanto modeled two scenarios by for the HTPM as previously defined in Section 3: • Case A: Reactor sabotage results in severe core damage with peak fuel temperatures exceeding 2,173 K. The high temperatures result in a significant number of failed TRISO particles and a large release of fission products. Containment integrity is severely compromised. • Case B: Adversaries create elevated fuel temperatures between 1,773 K and 2,173 K. A limited number of TRISO particles fail leading to small releases of fission products with high diffusion coefficients. Containment integrity is damaged. Release fractions for 21 radionuclides of importance were provided by Shah and Hartanto for the HTPM in Table 5. The radionuclides, their release fractions, and their corresponding MELCOR group are shown in Table 12. No releases were provided for elements in the CD or U groups. Three modifications were made to the release fractions: • Different release fractions were given for 144Ce, 95Zr, 239Np, and 238Pu/239Pu, all of which belong to the CE group. The largest release fraction (144Ce) was used to the CE group. • New groups were created specifically for the elements Np (NP) and Pu (PU). Applying the release fraction for 144Ce to Pu and Np would create releases orders of magnitude higher than the releases provided by Shah and Hartanto. The releases fractions for 239Np and 238 Pu/239Pu were applied to the NP and PU groups, respectively. • A new SR group was created for isotopes of Sr which would normally belong to the BA group. The release fractions from Shah and Hartanto for isotopes in the BA group (90Sr and 140 Ba) differ by orders of magnitude. However, if limited to the standard nuclides used for MACCS analyses, the BA group only contains Ba and Sr. The discrepancy in release fractions was therefore resolved by moving SR to its own group and applying the 140Ba and 90 Sr release fractions to their respective groups. 23 Table 12. Radionuclides of importance and release fractions for the High Temperature Helium- cooled Prismatic Microreactor (NP, PU, and SR are nonstandard MELCOR groups that contain isotopes of Np, Pu, and Sr, respectively). Release Fraction (%) Radionuclides of MELCOR Group Importance Case A Case B 85 Kr, 133Xe XE 5 0.1 134 Cs, 136Cs, 137Cs CS 90 0.3 140 Ba BA 1 0.02 131 I, 133I, 135I I2 15 3 132 Te TE 1 0.5 106 Ru RU 0.5 0.1 99 Mo MO 0.5 0.1 144 Ce, 95Zr CE 0.5 0.01 154 Eu, 156Eu LA 25 10 - CD - - - U - - 110m Ag AG 100 30 239 Np NP 1 0 238 Pu, 239Pu PU 0.1 0 90 Sr SR 25 10 5.2.3. Heat Pipe-cooled Microreactor The HPMR is a heat pipe-cooled microreactor inspired by the Westinghouse eVinci design (Westinghouse Electric Corporation n.d.). The HPMR uses UCO TRISO fuel in prismatic blocks cooled by sodium heat pipes. Characteristics for the HPMR are shown in Table 13. 24 Table 13. High temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactor characteristics. Power Level (MWth) Fuel Loading (MTU) Final Burnup (GWd/MTU) 5 0.27 18.46 15 0.54 27.68 30 0.90 33.22 Shah and Hartanto modeled two scenarios by for the HPMR as previously defined in Section 3: • Case A: Reactor sabotage results in severe core damage with peak fuel temperatures exceeding 2,173 K. The high temperatures result in a significant number of failed TRISO particles and a large release of fission products. Containment integrity is severely compromised. • Case B: Indirect sabotage results in a severe depressurized loss of cooling scenario. Passive decay heat removal systems are unavailable. Fuel temperatures peak between 1,773 K and 2,173 K. Containment integrity is damaged. Functionally, Case A and B for the HPMR are identical to the HTPM. To this point, Shah and Hartanto specify the same release fractions for the same 21 radionuclides of importance shown in Table 12 from the HTPM for the HPMR. However, Shah and Hartanto also specify 100% release of four additional activation products – 14C from activated graphite, 24Na from sodium coolant in the heat pipes, and 31Si and 60Co from activated graphite impurities. To model the activation products, a new AP group was defined that included C, Na, Si, and 60Co (i.e., all other isotopes of Co remained in the MO group). No isotopes of C, Na, or Si are included in the standard list of MACCS nuclides, so defining the AP group did not increase the release of non-activation product nuclides. Table 14. Radionuclides of importance and release fractions for the HPMR (NP, PU, and SR are nonstandard MELCOR groups that contain isotopes of Np, Pu, and Sr, respectively). Release Fraction (%) Radionuclides of MELCOR Group Importance Case A Case B 85 Kr, 133Xe XE 5 0.1 134 Cs, 136Cs, 137Cs CS 90 0.3 140 Ba BA 1 0.02 131 I, 133I, 135I I2 15 3 25 Release Fraction (%) Radionuclides of MELCOR Group Importance Case A Case B 132 Te TE 1 0.5 106 Ru RU 0.5 0.1 99 Mo MO 0.5 0.1 144 Ce, 95Zr CE 0.5 0.01 154 Eu, 156Eu LA 25 10 - CD - - - U - - 110m Ag AG 100 30 239 Np NP 1 0 238 Pu, 239Pu PU 0.1 0 90 Sr SR 25 10 C, 24Na, 31Si, 60Co 14 AP 100 100 26 6. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS The key output metric for the consequence analysis was the distance at which the peak dose3 falls below 25 rem (D25rem). However, because MACCS used randomly sampled weather data for each run, each run produced a distribution of doses over the spatial grid i.e., there were not singular point values for D25rem. As part of its output, MACCS provides statistical values for doses over the spatial grid including the mean dose, the absolute peak dose, and various dose quantiles4. Doses representing the 90th quantile5 were used to estimate D25rem. Only results for Case A are presented as Case A is the bounding, worst case scenario for all reactor types. The findings are intended as investigatory and should not be misinterpreted as a technical basis for advanced reactor licensing. 6.1. MACCS Results Error! Reference source not found. shows the dose vs. distance curve for the 10, 30, and 50 MWth SFM cores. D25rem for the 10 MWth SFM was between6 0.1 to 0.3 km. D25rem for the 30 and 50 MWth SFM was between 1 to 3 km, or about an order of magnitude higher than D25rem for the 10 MWth SFM. The 30 MWth and 50 MWth curves effectively overlay each other. For the same release fractions, it would normally be expected that the higher power core would have the larger source term as power level often has a positive correlation with the total fuel loading and fission product inventory. In this instance, the 30 MWth SFM has both a larger fuel inventory and a higher burnup than the 50 MWth which meant a larger inventory of long-lived fission products such as 137Cs. In contrast, the steady- state inventory of short-lived fission products like 131I would be higher for the 50 MWth SFM. For these reasons, the similarities between the 30 MWth and 50 MWth dose curves are not unexpected. 3 All doses are effective doses tracked by the “L-ICRP60ED” organ in MACCS. 4 MACCS reports the 50th, 90th, 95th, and 99th dose quantiles, the mean dose, and the highest dose from all runs for all intervals on the spatial grid. 5 Normally, regulatory guidance would be used to determine which specific percentile represents acceptable risk for security decision making. Applicable regulatory guidance was not identified for this work. The authors note 6 The dose for the grid interval spanning 0.1 to 0.2 km was above 25 rem, and the dose for the interval spanning 0.2 to 0.3 km was below 25 rem. The “true” distance for D25rem 27 Figure 2. Dose vs. distance for Case A for the 10, 30, and 50 MWth SFM cores. Dose vs. distance curves for the HTPM are shown in Figure 3. D25rem was between 0.9 to 1.1 km for the 1 MWth HTPM and between 2 to 4 km for the 10 MWth HTPM. D25rem for the 50 MWth core was about an order of magnitude higher than the 1 MWth with D25rem falling between 9 to 11 km. Unlike the SFM, the dose curves were distinctly different for all HTPM and HPMR cores. While D25rem was positively correlated with reactor power, no obvious correlation was observed. 28 Figure 3. Dose vs. distance for Case A for the 1, 10, and 50 MWth HTPM cores. Dose vs. distance curves for the HPMR are shown in Figure 3. Like the HTPM, D25rem for the HPMR cores was also correlated to reactor power with maximum values of 3 to 5 km for the 30 MWth core. In contrast, D25rem was between 0.7 to 0.9 km for the 5 MWth HTPM and between 1 to 1.2 km for the 15 MWth for the 15 MWth HTPM. Although the HTPM and HPMR used the same release fractions, the HPMR scenarios included a release of graphite activation products whereas the HTPM scenarios did not. Because of differences in each respective reactors’ inventories, it is not clear whether the inclusion of activation products significant affected D25rem. Test calculations removing the activation products from the HPMR source terms did not change D25rem for any simulation. 29 Figure 4. Dose vs. distance for Case A for the 5, 15, and 30 MWth HPMR cores. 6.2. MACCS and RASCAL Comparison In their papers on SFM, HTPM, and HPMR releases, Shah and Hartanto estimated radiological consequences for each reactor type using the Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis for radiological emergencies (RASCAL) health physics codes. Like MACCS, RASCAL is a tool for estimating the consequences of a radiological release. Whereas MACCS is designed as a comprehensive, systems-level consequence assessment tool, RASCAL is developed as a “a tool for the rapid assessment of an incident or accident at an NRC-licensed facility” (Ramsdell Jr., et al. 2012). Because MACCS or RASCAL could be used for estimating D25rem, a brief comparison of simulations for each reactor type was performed. The comparison was meant to be investigatory; a detailed crosswalk of RASCAL and MACCS modeling capabilities was not performed. Figure 5 compares SFM dose vs. distance curves produced using RASCAL and MACCS. The HotSpot curves were plotted using data from Shah and Hartanto, and the MACCS curves are the same as those shown in Figure 2 (Shah and Hartanto, Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors 2025). A significant divergence in results is observed for all SFM power levels with RASCAL predicting higher doses than MACCS. This creates a significant difference in D25rem for the 10 MWth core – RASCAL predicts D25rem between 0.9 to 1.2 km compared to 0.1 to 0.3 km for MACCS. The dose curves from Shah and Hartanto for the 30 and 50 MWth SFM cores do not decrease below 25 rem. Because the difference between RASCAL and 30 MACCS results is most prominent closest to the release point, this divergence was attributed to MACCS having more mature near-field modeling capabilities than RASCAL. Figure 5. Comparison of RASCAL and MACCS SFM Case A source terms. Figure 6 and Figure 7 compare RASCAL and MACCS dose vs. distance curves for the HTPM and HPMR Case A scenarios. Generally, good agreement is seen between RASCAL and MACCS for both reactor types with differences again mostly observed below 0.5 km from the release point. MACCS predicts D25rem for the 1 MWth HTPM between 0.9 to 1.1 km compared to D25rem between 0.6 to 0.9 km for RASCAL. For the 5 MWth HPMR, MACCS predicts D25rem between 0.6 to 0.8 km whereas RASCAL predicts D25rem between 0.9 to 1.2 km. Similar to the SFM, the data provided by Shah and Hartanto for the higher power HTPM and HPMR cores does not decrease below 25 rem. 31 Figure 6. Comparison of RASCAL and MACCS HTPM source terms. 32 Figure 7. Comparison of RASCAL and MACCS HPMR source terms. 6.3. Discussion Because the SFM, HTPM, and HPMR all represent unique combinations of fuel loadings, thermal power, and burnup, it is challenging to draw conclusions regarding D25rem by comparing reactor types. For example, in addition to having different release fractions, the SFM cores have higher fuel loadings than the HTPM and HPMR cores, but the HPMR and HTPM have higher burnups. Both factors increase radionuclide inventories which in turn can create potentially larger source terms, but the effect of both is difficult to assess without performing a parametric sensitivity study (which was outside the scope of this work). However, high-level conclusion were drawn regarding identifying D25rem: • The choice of quantile for assessing D25rem can have significant implications. As an example, Figure 8 shows dose vs. distance for all statistical values reported by MACCS for the 30 MWth HPMR. If peak dose is used, D25rem is between 10 to 12 km compared to 3 to 5 km for the 90th quantile or 2 to 4 km for the 50th quantile. The authors are unaware of any regulatory guidance on what statistical value is an acceptable level of risk. • For this work, D25rem was presented as a broad range on a spatial grid as a precise estimate for was not necessary. However, minor changes to D25rem for real-world site design may have significant financial impacts (i.e., by increasing the site footprint), and additionally guidance 33 is needed regarding what spatial fidelity or error margin provides a technically defensible estimate for D25rem. Additional guidance on using techniques like interpolation between grid points for determining D25rem may also be helpful to prospective licensees. Figure 8. Dose vs. distance for the mean dose, peak dose, and various dose quantiles for the 30 MWth HPMR Case A. 34 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK This work presented a preliminary scoping study into the feasibility of advanced reactor licensees meeting criteria in the proposed 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 73 limited scope rulemaking for reduced onsite responders. Using radionuclide inventories and release fractions for three different advanced reactors, consequences for hypothetical sabotage scenarios were modeled using MACCS, and the distance at which the doses from each scenario fell below 25 rem threshold were observed. It was found that D25rem was highly dependent on both the sampled weather conditions in MACCS and the postulated radionuclide release fraction from hypothetical sabotage events. The analyses performed in this work were an initial scoping study into integrated security-safety consequence modeling using coarse estimates for radiological source terms. While the results of this study may provide preliminary insights into using the proposed 10 CFR 53 or 73 limited scope rulemaking for reduced physical security requirements, the technical rigor of this work is well below what is expected will be required for advanced reactor licensees. Therefore, development of technically defensible post-sabotage release estimates and modeling approaches is a priority for future work in this area. Future work planned for FY26 on this topic includes: • Development of realistic, worst case release scenarios with resulting source terms for advanced reactor types based on design basis threat capabilities, • Investigating the effects of security delay barriers on radionuclide retention in containment or confinement buildings, • Exploring the impact of siting on consequence simulations by using weather data from various locations (including remote areas) for MACCS input, • Performing a parametric sensitivity study to identify which MACCS parameters have the greatest effect on D25rem. 35 REFERENCES Bixler, N., K. Compton, M. Dennis, L. Eubanks, R. Haaker, J. Jones, M. Kimura, et al. 2022. Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. Bixler, N., R. Gauntt, L. Humphries, J. Jones, K. Ross, and K. Wagner. 2013. State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses Project Volume 2: Surry Integrated Analysis. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. BWXT. 2025. BWXT Advanced Nuclear Reactor (BANR). https://www.bwxt.com/sectors/nuclear- energy/smrs-microreactors/bwxt-advanced-nuclear-reactor-banr/. Grabaskas, David, Matthew Bucknor, and James Jerden. 2016. Regulatory Technology Development Plan Sodium Fast Reactor Mechanistic Source Term – Metal Fuel Radionuclide Release. Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory. Homann, Steven G., and Fernando Aluzzi. 2014. HotSpot Health Physics Code Version 3.0 User's Guide. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Humphries, L. L., B. A. Beeny, C. Faucett, F. Gelbard, T. Haskin, D. L. Louie, and J. Phillips. 2017. MELCOR Computer Code Manuals, Vol. 2: Reference Manual, Version 2.2.9541. Albuquerque, NM and Livermore, CA: Sandia National Laboratories. Nosek, A. J. 2023. MACCS Consequence Analysis Demonstration Calculations for an Example Heat Pipe Reactor Source Term. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Ramsdell Jr., J. V., G. F. Athey, S. A. McGuire, and L. K. Brandon. 2012. RASCAL 4: Description of Models and Methods. Washington, D.C.: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shah, M. D., and D. Hartanto. 2025a. Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high- temperature helium-cooled prismatic miroreactor. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Shah, M. D., and D. Hartanto. 2025b. Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium- cooled fast microreactors. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Shah, M. D., and D. Hartanto. 2025c. What might radiological consequences from sabotage-induced releases look like in heat pipe-cooled microreactors? Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Ueda, Nobuyuki, Izumi Kinoshita, Akio Minato, Shigeo Kasia, Tsugio Yokoyama, and Shigeki Maruyama. 2005. "Sodium cooled small fast long-life reactor “4S”." Progress in Nuclear Energy 222-230. Wagner, Kenneth, Chris Faucett, Rod Schmidt, and David Luxat. 2022. MELCOR Accident Progression and Source Term Demonstration Calculations for a Heat Pipe Reactor. Albuquerque, NM and Livermore, CA: Sandia National Laboratories. Westinghouse Electric Corporation. n.d. eVinci™ Microreactor. https://westinghousenuclear.com/energy-systems/evinci-microreactor/. 36 APPENDIX A. MACCS TO MELCOR RADIONUCLIDE MAPPING Table 15 shows which MELCOR radionuclide group the nuclides commonly used in MACCS analyses belong to. Table 15. MACCS nuclides and corresponding MELCOR groups. Group Group Elements MACCS Nuclides Name Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-135m XE Xe, He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe, Rn, H, N Kr-85 Kr-85m Kr-87 Kr-88 Cs-134 Cs-136 Cs-137 CS Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Fr, Cu Rb-86 Rb-88 Ba-137m Ba-139 Ba-140 BA Be, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba, Ra, Es, Fm Sr-89 Sr-90 Sr-91 Sr-92 I2 F, Cl, Br, I, At I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Te-127 Te-127m Te-129 Te-129m TE O, S, Se, Te, Po Te-131 Te-131m Te-132 Rh-103m Rh-105 Rh-106 RU Ru, Rh, Pd, Re, Os, Ir, Pt, Au, Ni Ru-103 Ru-105 Ru-106 Co-58 Co-60 Nb-95 Nb-97 Nb-97m MO V, Cr, Fe, Co, Mn, Nb, Mo, Tc, Ta, W Mo-99 Tc-99m Zr-95 Zr-97 Ce-141 Ce-143 Ce-144 CE Ti, Zr, Hf, Ce, Th, Pa, Np, Pu, C Nd-147 Np-239 Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Al, Sc, Y, La, Ac, Pr, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Y-90 Y-91m Y-91 Y-92 Y-93 LA Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Am, La-140 La-141 La-142 Cm, Bk, Cf Pr-143 Pr-144 Pr-144m 37 Group Group Elements MACCS Nuclides Name Am-241 Cm-242 Cm-244 U U - CD Cd, Hg, Zn, As, Sb, Pb, Tl, Bi Sb-127 Sb-129 AG Ga, Ge, In, Sn, Ag - 38 DISTRIBUTION Email—Internal Name Org. Sandia Email Address Technical Library 1911 sanddocs@sandia.gov 39 This page left blank 40 ERROR! NO TEXT OF SPECIFIED STYLE IN DOCUMENT. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. ERROR! NO TEXT OF SPECIFIED STYLE IN DOCUMENT.