INL/RPT-26-92283-Revision-0 ECAR-9159, "Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Parameters for Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities" May 2026 Bradley J Schrader INL is a U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC INL/RPT-26-92283-Revision-0 ECAR-9159, "Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Parameters for Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities" Bradley J Schrader May 2026 Idaho National Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 http://www.inl.gov Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Under DOE Idaho Operations Office Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517 Page 1 of 37 1. Effective Date 05/04/2026 Professional Engineer’s Stamp 2. DCR Number: 740388 N/A 3. Does this ECAR involve a N/A Safety SSC (see def. LWP-10200)? See LWP-10010 for requirements 4. Safety SSC Determination N/A Document ID 5. SSC ID N/A 6. Project No. N/A 7. Engineering Job (EJ) or N/A Engineering Change (EC) No. 8. Building N/A 9. Site Area All 10. Objective/Purpose The DOE–NRC MOU streamlines coordination on advanced reactor technologies, supports implementation of several nuclear-related Executive Orders, and enables DOE safety analyses to inform future NRC licensing. This ECAR describes the technical basis and summarizes the atmospheric transport parameters used for dose-consequence assessments following DOE-STD-3009-2014 and NE-STD-1027-2025 (replaces DOE-STD-1027-2018) for INL Hazard Category (HC-2) Category B Reactors and Hazard Category (HC-2 and 3) nuclear facilities. 11. If revision, please state the reason and list sections and/or page being affected. N/A 12. Conclusion/Recommendations To assure consistency between DOE and NRC safety basis requirements this ECAR documents the DOE basis requirements for dose consequence assessments in accordance with Standard DOE-STD-3009-2014. The methodology in this ECAR outlines parameters for evaluating airborne radiological releases and provides a consistent basis for assessing current and future DOE NE facilities. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 2 of 37 CONTENTS 1. PROJECT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.............................................................................. 3 2. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 4 3. SOFTWARE .................................................................................................................................. 6 4. HAZARD CATEGORIZATION ...................................................................................................... 6 5. HAZARD CATEGORY 2 CATEGORY B REACTOR FACILITIES ................................................ 8 6. ATOMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT AND DOSE CONSEQUENCE ............................................... 11 6.1 Meteorology..................................................................................................................... 11 6.1.1 Meteorologic Condition Basis .......................................................................... 13 6.1.2 Release and Exposure Durations .................................................................... 14 6.1.3 Plume Dispersion Coefficient (X/Q) ................................................................. 15 6.1.4 Wind Speed and Weather Class ...................................................................... 16 6.1.5 Receptor Location ............................................................................................ 17 6.1.6 Elevated vs. Ground Release .......................................................................... 19 6.1.7 Mixing depth and Air Density ........................................................................... 20 6.1.8 Dry Deposition Velocities ................................................................................. 20 6.1.9 Building Wake and Plume Meander ................................................................. 21 6.2 Inhalation Dose Calculation............................................................................................. 22 6.2.1 Dose Conversion Factors ................................................................................ 23 6.2.2 Material-at-Risk (MAR) .................................................................................... 24 6.2.3 Damage Ratio .................................................................................................. 25 6.2.4 Airborne Release Fraction, Respirable Fraction and Particle Diameter........... 26 6.2.5 Leak Path Factor .............................................................................................. 27 6.2.6 Breathing rate (BR) and Absorption Types ...................................................... 28 6.2.7 Cloud Gamma .................................................................................................. 29 7. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 29 8. REFERENCES............................................................................................................................ 35 TABLES Table 1. Dry Deposition Velocities..............................................................................................................21 Table 2. Fuel Type ARF Values. .................................................................................................................27 Table 3. Dose Consequence Analysis Parameters. ........................................................................................30 TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 3 of 37 1. PROJECT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Project Role Name Organization Pages Covered (if applicable) Bradley J. H540 See DCR 740388 Performer Schrader Checkera Troy Reiss U751 See DCR 740388 Independent Reviewerb N/A N/A N/A CUI Reviewerc N/A N/A N/A Keeshia B. H460 See DCR 740388 Managerd Goodenough Requestoref Christopher M. H400 See DCR 740388 Long Nuclear Safetyf Troy Reiss U751 See DCR 740388 Document Ownerf Christopher M. H400 See DCR 740388 Long Reviewerf Troy Reiss U751 See DCR 740388 Responsibilities: a. Confirmation of completeness, mathematical accuracy, and correctness of data and appropriateness of assumptions. b. Concurrence of method or approach. See definition, LWP-10106. c. Concurrence with the document’s markings in accordance with LWP-11202. d. Concurrence of procedure compliance. Concurrence with method/approach and conclusion. e. Authorizes the commencement of work of the engineering deliverable. f. Concurrence with the document’s assumptions and input information. See definition of Acceptance, LWP-10200. NOTE: Delete or mark “N/A” for project roles not engaged. Include ALL personnel and their roles listed above in the DCR system. The list of the roles above is not all inclusive. If needed, the list can be extended or reduced. Page 4 of 37 2. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this engineering calculations and analysis report (ECAR) is to summarize Department of Energy (DOE) approved hazard evaluation methods and specific parameters to be used in qualitative and quantitative accident analysis for both reactor and nonreactor nuclear facilities. The Department of Energy-Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) has established evaluation guidelines (EGs) in correspondence CLN201105, “Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Idaho Operations Office 2020 Documented Safety Analysis Review and Oversight Guidance,”1 for Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reactor and other nuclear facilities. These EGs are to be used for acceptance criteria in the hazard evaluation and for selection of safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) structures, systems, and components (SSCs), specific administrative controls (SACs), and technical safety requirements (TSRs) in compliance with DOE G 423.1-1B, “Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements,”2 and DOE-STD-1186-2016, “Specific Administrative Controls.”3 Additional guidance relevant to this summary was provided in CLN240813, “Unmitigated Analysis for New Department of Energy Reactors for Safety System Classification.”4 Other applicable DOE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) specific guidance that is to be used when preparing hazards evaluations for safety analysis reports are identified. They are but not limited to; Orders (DOE O), DOE Reports, Standards (STD), Handbooks (HDBK), Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Regulatory Guides (RG) and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation (NUREG) reports. The requirements found in DOE-STD-3009-2014, “Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis,”5 establish specific criteria for the important radiological dose consequence. The establishment of DOE-STD-3009 as the mandatory guidance is intended to ensure consistent compliance with DOE regulations and technical requirements for nonreactor and reactor facilities. There are specific differences between the types of dose consequence accident analysis that will be clarified in this document. This ECAR also summarizes existing INL technical basis documents that establish the methodology and default parameters used for calculating the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere at INL Hazard Category (HC) 2 Category B Reactors and Hazard Category 2 or 3 nuclear facilities. Where DOE-STD-3009-2014 defines a nuclear facility as: Nuclear facility. A reactor or a nonreactor nuclear facility where an activity is conducted for or on behalf of DOE and includes any related area, structure, facility, or activity to the extent necessary to ensure proper implementation of the requirements established by 10 CFR Part 830, “Nuclear Safety Management.” The key parameters summarized are: • Software used to establish dose consequence for design basis accidents. • Quantitative hazard evaluation for Hazard Categorization (HC) of both reactor and non-reactor facilities. The methodology for the quantitative hazard evaluation follows the TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 5 of 37 guidance of NEI 18-04, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development.”6 • HC-2 Category B reactor unique quantitative hazard evaluation parameters including: • Hazard Evaluation Standards • Source Terms and how to credit passive design features such as “Inherently Safe Fuel.” • Atmospheric transport and dose calculation parameters: Meteorology • Meteorologic Conditions Basis • Release and Exposure Times • Plume Dispersion Coefficient • Weather Class and Wind Velocity • Receptor Location • Elevated vs. Ground Release • Mixing depth and Air Density • Dry Deposition Velocities • Building Wake and Plume Meander. Inhalation Dose Calculation • ICRP-68, “Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,”7 Worker Dose Calculation • ICRP-72, “Age-dependent Doses from Intakes of Radionuclides,”8 Public Dose Calculation • Breathing Rate • Respirable Fraction • Particle diameter Adjustment • Absorption Types • Cloud Gamma. Page 6 of 37 3. SOFTWARE DOE-STD-30095 requires one of the followings options to be used in evaluating atmospheric dispersion and the resulting plume dispersion coefficient (X/Q): • Option 1: Follow a process based on NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, “Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants.”9 • Option 2: Use a DOE-approved toolbox code and apply the conservative parameters. • Option 3: Use site-specific methods and parameters as defined in a site/facility specific DOE-approved modeling protocol. Analysis Parameter 1 – Software Since 1964, the INL has used the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC)10 program as the code of record for all of the nuclear facilities. From the earliest years of the National Reactor Test Station, RSAC has been used to evaluate accidents that were too complex to be evaluated by hand calculations. It has been used to evaluate over 50 reactors, numerous nuclear facilities and uncountable experiments. RSAC is approved by DOE-ID for calculating the dose consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere at the INL under Option 3. CCN244780, “Approval of the Sample Preparation Laboratory (PDSA-423),”11 clarifies DOE-ID position on Option 3. It states: “Also approved and provided by the SPL submittals is TEV-3543, "INL Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Protocol." This dose consequence modeling protocol was used for the analysis supporting the PDSA for SPL, and will be used for future DSAs prepared using DOE-STD-3009-2014, "Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis." This protocol represents site specific parameters for the INL, and is consistent with modeling protocol using the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program.” Other software that meets the criteria outlined in Options 1 or 2 can be used. Care should be taken when comparing results between software packages to understand what the differences in the parameters are, such as dispersion coefficients and particle transport effects. 4. HAZARD CATEGORIZATION 10 CFR 830 Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements,”12 NE-STD-1027-2025, “Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities,”13 DOE-STD-3009-2014,5 and DOE-STD-1237-2021, “Documented Safety Analysis for DOE Reactor Facilities,”14 establish the requirements and guidelines for performing hazard and accident analyses and provide a methodology for hazard categorization. 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, Section 830.202, Safety Basis, (b)(3), which states that: Page 7 of 37 “In establishing the safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility, the contractor responsible for the facility must…Categorize the facility consistent with DOE-STD-1027-2018.” (NE-STD-1027-2025 supersedes at INL) Nuclear facility hazard category is determined by application of NE-STD-1027-2025. Hazard categorization is key to determining the appropriate methodology used for accident evaluation. NE-STD-1027-2025 is applicable to all DOE-owned or DOE-leased, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), nuclear facilities and activities located at INL. Specifically for reactor facilities there are two sub-categories as defined in 10 CFR 830 Section 3. They are Category A and B. • Hazard Category 1 - Intended for Category A reactors or nonreactor nuclear facilities designated by Program Secretarial Officers (PSOs). The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a HC-1 Category A reactor and the requirements for HC-1 Category A reactors is not addressed in this ECAR. Category A Reactor – Those production, test, and research reactors designated by DOE based on power level (i.e., design thermal power rating of 20 megawatts steady state and higher), potential fission product inventory, and experimental capability. Category A reactors are Hazard Category 1 nuclear facilities. • Hazard Category 2 – Threshold Quantities (TQs) for HC-2 are based on a 1 rem dose to a receptor at just less than 300 meters; using a X/Q value of 1 x 10-4 sec/m3 to generate the TQs; simplified release fraction bins; and categorized as HC-2, unless criticality is precluded. Category B Reactor – A reactor as defined by 10 CFR Part 830, Section 830.3, that is not a Category A Reactor. Category B reactors are Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities. • Hazard Category 3 –TQs are based on a 10 rem dose to a receptor at 30 meters; using a X/Q value of 7.2 x 10-2 sec/m3; and comparison of the five exposure pathways and selection of the most limiting pathway to establish the TQs. There are no nuclear reactors categorized as Hazard Category-3. • Hazard Evaluation - A hazard evaluation is an organized effort to identify and analyze the significance of hazardous situations associated with a process or activity. Specifically, hazard evaluations are used to pinpoint weaknesses in the design and operation of facilities that could lead to hazardous material releases, fires, or explosions. These studies provide organizations with information to help them improve the safety and manage the risk of their operations. DOE-STD-3009-20145 states: “The hazard evaluation shall provide (a) an assessment of the facility hazards associated with the full scope of planned operations covered by the DSA and (b) the identification of controls that can prevent or mitigate these hazards or hazardous conditions. The hazard evaluation shall analyze normal operations (e.g., startup, facility activities, shutdown, and testing and maintenance configurations) as well as abnormal and accident conditions. In addition to the process-related hazards identified during the hazard identification process, Page 8 of 37 the hazard evaluation shall also address natural phenomena and man-made external events that can affect the facility.” Analysis Parameter 2 – Hazard Evaluation Basis Standards The mandatory standards for hazard evaluations used in INL nuclear safety documented safety analyses (DSAs) are: • 10 CFR 830 Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements” • NE-STD-1027-2025, “Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities” • DOE-STD-1237-2021, “Documented Safety Analysis for DOE Reactor Facilities.” DOE-STD-1237-2021 states, “Contractors with existing reactor facilities that have DOE- approved DSAs may continue operations under those DSAs. There is no requirement or need for an existing, approved reactor DSA to be revised or revisited in light of the issuance of this Standard.” 5. HAZARD CATEGORY 2 CATEGORY B REACTOR FACILITIES DOE-STD-1237-202114 describes an acceptable methodology for preparing a DSA for a reactor facility. This Standard is a DOE-approved methodology for meeting the requirements in Title 10 of CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements. In DOE-ID letter CLN2408134 the guidance for reactors is summarized. “With the advent of more advanced reactor fuel types using inherently robust fuels, such as tristructural isotropic particle fuel (TRISO), unmitigated analysis could result in overly conservative SSC categorization with the resulting misapplication of resources… Reactors and reactor support facilities that follow the unmitigated release guidance of DOE-STD-3009-2014, as utilized in DOE-STD-1237-2021 for SSC classification, and utilize other informing guidance such as NEI 18-04 Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development, may use information concerning the physical realities of accident, and nuclide release phenomena, with sufficient technical justification for the unmitigated analysis. Crediting passive features such as fuel type, for fission product retention needs to be supported with an initial condition and appropriate SSC classification. Uncertainties associated with physical properties of the fuel and reactor design will be factored into any credit provided for these SSCs for mitigation of radioactive releases.” DOE-STD-1271-2025, “Authorization Pathway for Nuclear Facilities,”15 Attachment 2 provides additional guidance for test reactor qualified fuel types. “NE encourages the use of previously qualified fuels with a proven operating history. Fuel qualification is a very important step in the assurance of adequate protection for reactor designs. Use of TRISO (1), TRIGA (2), EBR-II Na-bonded fuel (3), and others Page 9 of 37 manufactured under a qualified process provides assurance that fundamental safety features can be met. With the advent of more advanced reactor fuel types using inherently robust fuels, such as tristructural isotropic particle fuel (TRISO), unmitigated analysis could result in overly conservative SSC categorization with the resulting misapplication of resources. To achieve the moniker of “inherently safe” fuel, agreement between the regulator and the reactor designer/design authority, must be achieved regarding the properties of the fuel and the authorization envelope that cannot be exceeded under design basis conditions. This includes manufacturing specifications and quality control steps that ensure the fuel specifications are maintained during critical steps in the manufacturing process, transport, and insertion into the reactor core. Systems or conditions necessary to ensure that the fuel performance and authorization envelope are not exceeded must be assigned an appropriate safety classification commensurate with their impact on protecting the expected fuel performance.” DOE-ID letter CLN2408134 states: “..all quantitative dose results presented in safety basis documents will be utilized using a mitigated analysis and taking credit for the performance of any credited passive safety systems including passive features of the fuel when demonstrated or conservatively calculated, and accounting for known fission product behavior such as TID-14844 Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactors, and RG 1.183 Alternative Radiological Source Terms For Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors.” To achieve the moniker of “inherently safe” fuel, agreement between the regulator and the reactor designer/design authority, must be achieved regarding the properties of the fuel and the authorization envelope that cannot be exceeded under design basis conditions. DOE has identified “Use of TRISO (1), TRIGA (2), EBR-II Na-bonded fuel (3), and others manufactured under a qualified process provides assurance that fundamental safety features can be met.” As an example, the TRISO fuel is referenced and the fuel release fractions from the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) 1 and 2 testing. Analysis Parameter 3 – Inherently Safe Fuel Category B reactor dose consequence evaluation may credit the fuel design as a passive design feature when two conditions are met: 1. There is a documented agreement between DOE/ID and the reactor designer/design authority regarding the properties of the fuel and the authorization envelope that cannot be exceeded under design basis conditions. And 2. Testing and manufacturing under a qualified process provides assurance that fundamental safety features regarding the properties of the fuel can be met. Page 10 of 37 For unmitigated dose consequence analysis the crediting passive features such as fuel type, for fission product retention must be supported with an initial condition and appropriate SSC classification. When credit is taken for the fuel as “inherently safe” the basis approval documentation should be referenced. Examples of INL dose consequence evaluations that document fuel specific airborne release fractions are: • ECAR-5960, “Microreactor Inhalation Dose Consequence,”16 – This ECAR evaluates the dose consequence for accidents involving fuel types to be evaluated inside the Microreactor Experiments (DOME) test bed. The DOME test bed is located inside Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) facility at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). • ECAR-5127, “Evaluation of the MARVEL Reactor Inhalation Dose Consequences,”17 – This ECAR evaluates the dose consequence for the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation Project (MARVEL) design effort. The MARVEL project will be located in the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility. An example of how the technical basis for the fuel release fractions are those found used in this ECAR and are based on the results documented in LA-UR-18-28899, “Kilopower Space Reactor Launch Safety Maximum Credible Dose for a Criticality Accident,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, August 2018. • ECAR-5208, “Evaluation of LOTUS Test Bed Inhalation Dose Consequences,”18 – This ECAR is an example of not enough available information and testing on the fuel type to establish a fuel airborne release fraction (ARF). Instead, as an example, the evaluation uses the following as the basis for a molten salt reactor in Table 2, Release Fractions: “The release from the molten salt reactor is assumed to be bound by a spill of molten metal with all noble gases and volatile fission products being available for release. All other nuclides receive an ARF×RF= 1.0E-02 from DOE-HDBK-3010, “Airborne Release Fractions and Respirable Fractions.” U will receive an ARF×RF= 1.0E- 04 based on the UCl3 vapor fractions. The elements of Kr, Xe, and I will receive an ARF×RF= 1.0 based on the gaseous nature or known volatility of the element. The unverified elements of As, Cd, and In will receive an ARF×RF= 1.0. These elements were noted as having a higher release fraction using a scoping Gibbs energy minimization calculation, and these elements are conservatively receiving a maximum ARF. Zr, Te, Nb, Ru, Mo, Sb, Cs, and Ce receive an ARF×RF based on previous published research.19” • ECAR-5065, “Evaluation of Microreactor Inhalation Dose Consequences,”20 – This ECAR does not credit fuel type ARF and assumes a 100% release of all radioisotopes from low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The 100% release fraction is extremely conservative and non-mechanistic evaluation that should be no longer be used. When insufficient documentation exists to characterize the fuel type as “inherently safe”, the release fractions found in ECAR-5127 should be used. This list is not intended to be all inclusive but provide examples of how available information has been used to establish a fuel type release fraction to evaluate dose consequence from reactor fuel designated as “inherently safe”. Page 11 of 37 Analysis Parameter 4 – Natural Phenomena Hazard Design Criteria and Inherently Safe Fuel NDC categorization can not credit inherently safe fuel as a passive design feature with its appropriate reduction in source term without DOE-ID approval. An application for “inherently safe”, within the DOE “unmitigated” framework is the requirement for performing an assessment of the potential “unmitigated” consequences of events. To appropriately classify the required facility Natural Phenomena Hazard Design Criteria (NDC) categorization, NE-STD-1020-2025, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities,”21 states: “Unmitigated analysis for Natural Phenomena Hazard (NPH) performance allow for assuming the presence of passive SSCs. The analysis will take into account the fuel form. If the fuel form is sufficiently robust, even in a severely unmitigated analysis, a conservative reduction of the source term can then be used. This assumes that there is an understanding of the accident conditions and system specifications that support the reduction in source term. This will set the NDC categorization, as well as the upper limit on safety SSC classification for the proposed project or activity but will generally not be presented in the safety basis (or Documented Safety Analysis), other than by reference, as a means to avoid any confusion about the acceptable safety behavior of the systems.” 6. ATOMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT AND DOSE CONSEQUENCE Two sets of input parameters are used to evaluate dose consequence in accordance with the basis standards. Those two sets are Meteorological Conditions and Dose Consequence Assessment. TEV-3543, “INL Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Protocol,”22 as approved by DOE-ID demonstrates adoption of the DOE-STD-3009-2014 specific guidance for the most relevant parameters for the radiological dose consequence modeling protocol: receptor location, atmospheric dispersion, and dose coefficients, as well as, technical bases for other derived parameters. 6.1 Meteorology The INL uses a specific set of preapproved atmospheric conditions in DSA dose consequence analysis. Meteorologic conditions can be adjusted based on specific conditions and events as approved by DOE-ID. Additional sources of meteorological data for consideration in the description of airflow trajectories from the site may include National Weather Service stations or other meteorological programs that are well maintained and well exposed (e.g., other nuclear facilities, university and private meteorological programs). Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.23, “Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants,”23 Revision 1, issued March 2007, includes guidance on the measurement and processing of onsite meteorological data for use as input to atmospheric dispersion models in support of plant licensing and operation. RG 1.23 describes a suitable onsite meteorological measurements program to collect the basic meteorological data needed to: TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 12 of 37 1. determine the environmental impacts of a nuclear power plant, 2. perform consequence assessments supporting routine release and design-basis accident evaluations, and 3. support emergency preparedness programs at power reactor sites. Basic background regarding the facility is necessary in demonstrating the appropriateness of the methods for assessing atmospheric dispersion. This background includes information regarding the following. Each will be evaluated and summarized individually. • Receptor locations – A facility map that highlights the release point and DOE site boundaries, local land use, significant building structures, and elevated terrain if those considerations are being used in the modeling process • Meteorological data – Sufficient information regarding the projected sources of the data, the years covered, and the methodology used to process the raw data into a format appropriate for use in dispersion modeling, and the methods used to establish the averaging time, release height, calm wind handling, and the use of local surface roughness • Methodologies used to prepare modeling parameters and their validity – Examples of these parameters include, but are not limited to, surface roughness, building wake, plume meander, averaging time, release characteristics, deposition velocity, and the appropriate dispersion coefficients. The preapproved conditions are documented here. The technical basis for use of those conditions is referenced. • Meteorologic Conditions Basis • Release and Exposure Times • Plume Dispersion Coefficient • Weather Class and Wind Velocity • Receptor Location • Elevated vs. Ground Release • Mixing depth and Air Density • Dry Deposition Velocities • Building Wake and Plume Meander. Page 13 of 37 6.1.1 Meteorologic Condition Basis Per DOE-STD-3009-2014: For the calculation of off-site doses, five years of representative, recent meteorological data shall be used as input to the dispersion model. If five years of data are not available, justification for using a smaller data set shall be provided in the DSA. If representative meteorological data is not available, Pasquill stability class F and one meter/second wind speeds may be used for radiological dispersion consistent with NRC’s and DOE’s long-standing practice. Analysis Parameter 5 – Weather Conditions Data Set The NOAA/INL Mesonet online data set meets RG 1.23 and provides over 20 years of continuous quality-controlled meteorological data across the INL and is the data set to be used at the INL is approved by DOE-ID. Meteorological measurements have been made at the INL since 1950. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Air Resources Laboratory (with its local office in Idaho Falls) maintains the Mesonet database for the INL onsite and offsite meteorological towers. The results are summarized by NOAA in EGG-WM-11243, “Air Dispersion Parameters for Use in Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Department of Energy Safety Analyses.”24 This document establishes the INL meteorological monitoring program that complies with RG 1.23. This document provides the basis for selecting the appropriate weather class, wind speed, mixing layer depth and other dispersion parameters associated with dose consequence modeling. The values for the weather conditions approved by DOE-ID are found in TEV-354322 and are summarized in this document. Other classification schemes may be used to estimate atmospheric stability but the use of alternative methods to classify atmospheric stability may require modifications to the models described in Regulatory Guides 1.1459 and 1.194.25 Where: RG 1.1459 provides guidance on appropriate dispersion models for estimating offsite relative concentrations (χ/Q values) as a function of downwind direction and distance (i.e., at the EAB and LPZ) for various short-term periods (up to 30 days) after an accident. • The Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) radiation receptor is located at the closest boundary of the designated exclusion area surrounding a nuclear facility, typically defined as the boundary where the licensee has the authority to remove personnel and property. Page 14 of 37 • The Low Population Zone (LPZ) isn't a single receptor but a defined geographical area surrounding a nuclear plant, with its outer boundary serving as a critical point for calculating public radiation doses during accidents, using receptors located at or beyond this boundary, often modeled via atmospheric dispersion codes like RSAC to assess potential health impacts. And RG 1.194, “Atmospheric Relative Concentrations for Control Room Radiological Habitability Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants,”25 discusses acceptable approaches for estimating short-term (i.e., 2 hours to 30 days postaccident) average χ/Q values in the vicinity of buildings at control room ventilation air intakes and at other locations of significant air inleakage to the control room envelope resulting from postulated accidental radiological airborne releases. Conditions other than those that are preapproved by DOE will require DOE-ID manager approval. Methods for the classification of atmospheric stability, or for direct determination of plume spread parameters, should be adequately described and substantiated for applicability to the site. 6.1.2 Release and Exposure Durations DOE-STD-3009-2014 requires that the release and exposure duration for dose consequence should be no shorter than three minutes and no greater than eight hours. NRC requires that the release and exposure duration be up to 30 days. These locations are for the 100 meter collocated worker and off-site receptor. Analysis Parameter 6 – Release Duration While a conservative derivation of release duration is allowable under regulation, as a baseline for INL reactor and nonreactor nuclear facilities should assume an instantaneous release of the entire inventory as a point source. This assumption will conservatively result in the largest plume concentration. The exposure duration is a time integrated exposure with the receptor centerline in the plume that is dependent on distance. RSAC defaults to the time necessary to result in 100% release. Stay time in the plume is not considered because the dose consequence required by STD-3009 does not include contributions from the ingestion or ground surface pathway, unless otherwise documented in a facility-specific DSA. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 15 of 37 6.1.3 Plume Dispersion Coefficient (X/Q) The plume dispersion coefficient (χ/Q) “represents the dilution of the radioactive plume via dispersion and deposition as it travels from the facility during an accident.” This plume dispersion value is a function of the radioactivity released, meteorological conditions involved in the accident, and relative location of the release point and the receptor. The χ/Q value is considered to be constant for all radionuclides of respirable size in an event and is independent of particular radionuclide and source types. X/Q is a derived coefficient that uses the following equation to establish the ground level concentration at any downwind distance (x): 2 𝑄𝑄 1 𝑦𝑦 1 𝐻𝐻 2 𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢 2 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 2 𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧 Where: Q: Source term (g(Ci)/sec) x: Distance to receptor (m) y: Distance from plume Centerline (m) z: Receptor height above ground (m) u: Mean wind speed (m/sec) 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 : Lateral dispersion coefficient (m) 𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧 : Vertical dispersion coefficient (m) H: Effective release height (m) hs: Stack height hpr: Plume rise (m) ht: Topographic height of receptor (m) Lateral and vertical plume spread parameters, σy and σz , as functions of meteorological conditions and topography, are established with respect to the characteristics of the accidental release and distances of interest. The Markee26 plume standard deviation set (σs), for Gaussian dispersion, was developed specifically for the desert terrain at INL by Markee and issued and approved by DOE in IDO-12048, “Climatography of the National Reactor Testing Station,”27 DOE/ID-12118, “Climatography of INEL 2nd Edition,”28 and reissued in 2007 by DOE in DOE/ID-12118, “Climatography of INEL 2nd Edition.”29 The Markee data set is also known as the desert terrain sigmas. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 16 of 37 Analysis Parameter 7 – Plume Dispersion Coefficient The INL has historically used the Markee data set as approved by the INL DOE-ID to establish the atmospheric dispersion factors (χ/Q) used for accidents χ/Q values are used for assessment of consequences of atmospheric radioactive releases for design basis accidents and for onsite and offsite releases of hazardous airborne materials are reviewed for appropriateness of atmospheric dispersion model assumptions, input data, and adequate documentation of this information. Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, a X/Q value of 3.5 × 10-3 sec/m3 shall be used for ground-level release evaluation at the 100 m receptor location (on-site), unless an alternate on-site X/Q value is justified. Modifications should be based on specific studies under similar conditions may be considered to better represent plume spread over unique terrain features such as deserts (Markee data set). For nuclear facilities located at the INL, the Markee plume standard deviation set will be used, unless otherwise documented in a facility-specific DSA. When applying the Markee plume standard deviation set (σs), a X/Q value of 4.081 × 10-3 sec/m3 for a 100 m (on-site) receptor location (collocated worker) will typically be used, unless otherwise documented in a facility-specific DSA. For other downwind distances at the INL the X/Q value calculated by using the Markee (reference) data set to generate the σ(y) and σ(z) values used in the equation. The Markee dispersion coefficients take into account both the terrain and ground cover found at the INL. The Markee sigmas were approved by DOE-ID for use in DSAs since 1966 and were since reapproved in CCN244780.11 6.1.4 Wind Speed and Weather Class Two probabilistic approaches are described in Regulatory Guide 1.145 are available for evaluating atmospheric dispersion characteristics. The first method is a direction-dependent probabilistic approach which uses the highest χ/Q value which is exceeded 0.5% of the time in each of 16 compass directions from the plant. The second method is a direction-independent probabilistic approach which uses the χ/Q value which is exceeded 5% of the time independent of direction. The direction independent method has historically been used in non-reactor nuclear facilities at the INL. Page 17 of 37 Analysis Parameter 8 – Reactor and Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities Direction Independent 95% Weather For the purposes of comparison to the EG, DOE-STD-3009-2014 requires the 95% conditions. The DOE-ID preapproved weather class and wind speeds for the 95% conditions are Markee Stability Class F and a wind speed of 1.04 m/s. Analysis Parameter 9 – Reactor Nuclear Facilities Direction Dependent Weather Direction dependent dose consequence evaluations are based on the location of the reactor, weather class, wind speed and direction during expected reactor specific accident scenarios. Direction dependent conditions require specific approval from DOE-ID to depart from the STD-3009 criteria. Other reactors at the INL, with approval from DOE-ID have used weather class D and 4.5 m/s wind speed to evaluate dose consequence. 6.1.5 Receptor Location The INL makes an independent evaluation of atmospheric dispersion for pertinent distances they are; Facility Worker, collocated worker and the offsite public. DOE-STD-3009-2014 specifies that the location for the on-site receptor (collocated worker) shall be 100 m from the point of release. INL nuclear facilities use 100 m for the collocated worker release distance for comparison to INL dose limits in addition to the locations documented in a facility specific DSA for the offsite receptor. Small modular reactors (SMR) located at the INL present a unique blend of oversite agencies. They must combine both NRC and DOE requirements to define the offsite public. The guidance in DOE-STD-3009-2014 for the offsite receptor must be followed. In addition, the locations as defined by the NRC in 10 CFR 100.11 as the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Low Population Zone (LPZ) may be required to be evaluated for comparison purposes. Where they are defined as: • Exclusion Area (EAB): The boundary within which, for two hours after a postulated fission product release, no individual would receive more than 25 rem to the whole body or 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure. • Low Population Zone (LPZ): The boundary within which, during the entire passage of the radioactive cloud, no individual would receive more than 25 rem to the whole body or 300 rem to the thyroid These values are assumed to represent conditions for a 2-hour period. χ/Q values for time periods greater than two hours are estimated for the LPZ distance by Page 18 of 37 assuming either a logarithmic relationship between the "2-hour" value and the annual average value or a “sliding window” approach using hourly meteorological data. As applied herein, the term “sliding window” refers to the calculation of running mean χ/Q values for time periods varying from 1 to 720 hours in duration, using an averaging method similar to that used for control room χ/Q values as referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.19425 and as discussed in Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 of NUREG/CR-6331, “Atmospheric Relative Concentrations in Building Wakes.”30 Facility Worker (FW) location presents a unique challenge to establish both the concentration of airborne radioactive material and exposure duration. DOE-HDBK-1224-2024, “Hazard and Accident Analysis Handbook,” states; “the designation of FW consequences is based on first understanding how these type of consequence thresholds can be triggered by common hazards found in the DOE complex, or what these consequence thresholds mean in relation to radiological or hazardous chemical worker exposures. That is, FW consequences in many cases are based on accepted past-experience or consensus judgments from previous hazard evaluations throughout the DOE Complex, and not on quantitative calculations with their associated hard-to-defend assumptions and uncertainties. DOE has no simple numerical consequence metric to assess threshold consequences for FWs. Because of the location of the postulated FWs inside a facility or very near the source of a release, downwind. If quantitative or semi-quantitative analyses are to be performed to support FW consequences, the airborne concentrations associated with such releases should be evaluated without assuming that the release instantly mixes into the volume of the room or work area. However, a conservative but reasonable period of exposure could be assumed.” A complete explanation of the evaluation of facility worker exposure can be found in DOE-HDBK-1224-2024 Section 2.6.1.2 Facility Worker Consequences.31 Analysis Parameter 10 – Receptor Location For the purposes of comparison to the EGs, DOE-STD-3009-2014 requires the comparison of a collocated worker at 100 m and a designated member of the public at the location of a hypothetical MOI. This MOI is typically located at the shortest distance to the DOE site boundary, or at the site boundary with the highest directionally dependent dose, based on ground level release. DOE provides specific guidelines for reactor receptor locations in letter CLN240813.4 Locations that meet those guidelines may include other distances. Other distances can be evaluated such as control room worker. Collocated Page 19 of 37 workers at distances farther than 100 meters can be limiting when an elevated release is considered. As documented in the reactor specific DSA, this is based on siting of the reactor. As discussed in 10 CFR 100, “Reactor Site Criteria,”32 population center distance is defined as the distance from a reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated center containing more than 25,000 residents. Idaho Falls is the closest population center, and the population center distance is approximately 30 mi (48 km). The LPZ is also defined by 10 CFR 100, as the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area within which the total number and density of residents make it reasonably probable that protective measures could be taken on their behalf in the event of a serious accident. The closest significantly populated locality to the INL exclusion area is Mud Lake, Idaho. Mud Lake, Idaho, is chosen as the LPZ boundary distance. Onsite doses are scenario dependent and may be considered for control room workers, collocated workers at 100 m, 300 m, at the Control Building, and at the nearest population center. Dose to the FW should use the guidance found in DOE-HDBK-1224-2024 Section 2.6.1.2 Facility Worker Consequences.31 6.1.6 Elevated vs. Ground Release RG 1.194 indicates that the dose associated with an elevated release (release from the stack) should not be evaluated unless the stack height is greater than 2.5 times that of adjacent structures. NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,”33 contains a section (2.3.4) with relevant guidance. Section 2.3.4 states, “Most accidental releases can be considered as continuous releases (i.e., on the order of several minutes or more). The general Gaussian diffusion model for continuous releases is used to evaluate releases on the order of several minutes or more. For puff releases, either instantaneous point-source Gaussian diffusion equations with a correction for initial source volume or hemispheric cloud configuration assumptions with the cloud traveling slowly downwind (e.g., at approximately 1 m/sec) can be used. Other modifications to the atmospheric dispersion model which should be considered include restrictions to horizontal or vertical plume spread (e.g., by narrow deep valleys, channeling of airflow, and by persistent low-level temperature inversions). Fumigation conditions should be considered for elevated releases to the receptor.” Analysis Parameter 11 – Elevated Release Ground level release should be considered the baseline unless justified that a release out the stack has occurred that is 2.5 times the height of adjacent structures. If it is determined that an elevated release is to be evaluated then Page 20 of 37 downwind distance should be evaluated using a sensitivity analysis to determine at what distance the highest exposed collocated worker is located. 6.1.7 Mixing depth and Air Density The atmospheric mixed layer is a zone having nearly constant potential temperature and specific humidity with height above ground level. In the case of plume diffusion it acts a ceiling and reflects back the plume into the area of concern. A lower mixing depth will increase ground level concentrations from a radioactive release at farther distances from the release. The effect of air density on plume transport is significant, as it influences the buoyancy and momentum of the plume. When the plume's density is close to that of the ambient air, the effect of density variations on inertia may be ignored, and only the buoyancy driving force needs to be accounted for. However, for very buoyant plumes, the density differences are crucial, and the model must be adjusted accordingly. Air density is an input parameter for RSAC but is only used when a jet or buoyant plume release is specified. These options are only available when an elevated (Stack) release occurs. Analysis Parameter 12 – Mixing Depth and Air Density The 95% mixing depth at the INL is 400 meters. The air density at the INL is 1099 grams/cubic meter. Both of these values are default in RSAC. 6.1.8 Dry Deposition Velocities The dry deposition factor (DDF) accounts for the material that is removed from the plume via deposition on the ground and accounts only for plume depletion that is expected to occur, independent of weather conditions. An estimate of the amount of radioactivity that is deposited on the ground must be made to calculate ground surface, resuspension and ingestion doses. Dry deposition velocities are a function of particle size and chemical species. For codes that do not contain fixed values or calculate the parameters internally, DOE-STD-3009-2014 states that the following deposition velocity values shall be used: 0.1 cm/sec for unfiltered release of particles (1-10 um Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter), 0.01 cm/sec for filtered particles, or 0 cm/sec for tritium/noble gases. Typically, INL nonreactor dose consequence analyses conservatively do not credit any filtration. Therefore, for INL nonreactor nuclear facilities, the RSAC default dry deposition velocity values will be used. Sehmel34 provides a summary of particle and gas dry deposition velocities. TEV-1458, “Justification of the Dry Deposition Velocities used at the Idaho National Laboratory,”35 includes a comparison of the suggested dry deposition velocities from Sehmel34 versus the RSAC default values. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 21 of 37 This technical justification concludes that the RSAC default values, as shown in Table 1, are conservative. Analysis Parameter 13 – Dry Deposition Velocities If filtration is credited in a particular scenario, as described in a facility-specific DSA, dry deposition will not be included in the dose consequence analysis. The default dry deposition velocities unless otherwise justified and approved are: Table 1. Dry Deposition Velocities. Group Dry Deposition Velocity (m/s) Solids 1.000E-03 Halogens 1.000E-02 Noble Gases 0.000E+00 Cesium 1.000E-03 Ruthenium 1.000E-03 Note: Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, a surface roughness of 3 cm should be used for ensuring conservative calculation of off-site doses. Surface roughness is not a modifiable parameter in RSAC and is taken into account in the dry deposition velocity value, as these values are a function of both the depositing material and the deposition surface. INL reactor and nonreactor nuclear facilities should not credit surface roughness beyond dry deposition velocity. 6.1.9 Building Wake and Plume Meander Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, “plume meander may be used, consistent with the accident release duration and the appropriate code guidance.” The Ramsdel plume meander model was developed to address excessive overprediction in earlier atmospheric dispersion models, especially under low wind speed and stable atmospheric conditions. Plume meander considerations can result is a significant reduction in dose consequence calculations. While the NRC has endorsed the Ramsdel model for both onsite and offsite dose consequence analyses, DOE has not adopted the model at the INL. Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, building wake should not be credited in the plume dispersion outside of plume meander. Building wake effects assume that the wind is blowing in the direction of the release and result in a less conservative downwind dose consequence Unless determined otherwise and documented in a facility-specific DSA, there will be no building wake correction made for INL nonreactor nuclear facilities in the dose consequence analysis. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 22 of 37 Analysis Parameter 14 – Building Wake and Plume Meander Until directed by DOE-ID, INL reactor and non-reactor nuclear facilities will not use plume meander or building wake in dose consequence calculations. 6.2 Inhalation Dose Calculation The airborne transport process and subsequent uptake (inhalation) is represented by the following dose consequence equation and is calculated as the committed effective dose (CED): χ CED = ∙ BR ∙ ∑N i=1{STi ∙ DDFi ∙ DCFi } Q Where 𝜒𝜒 = Plume dispersion coefficient (s/m3) 𝑄𝑄 BR = Breathing rate (m3/s) STi = Airborne source term of radionuclide i (Ci) DCFi = Dose conversion factor of radionuclide i (rem/Ci) DDFi = Fraction of radionuclide i remaining in plume after dry deposition (no units) N = Number of radionuclides contributing to dose (no units) The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) provides information essential to the implementation of the methods described. Central to the application of the dose calculation method is the use of the protection quantities ‘equivalent dose’ and ‘effective dose’. ICRP has provided sets of dose coefficients (dose per unit exposure) to allow users to calculate equivalent and effective doses for intakes of radionuclides or exposure to external radiation for comparison with dose limits, constraints, and reference levels as recommended by ICRP. Over the years, dose coefficients have been published in various ICRP reports. The present publication compiles coefficients provided previously in Publications 68 and 72 for intakes of radionuclides by workers and members of the public, and occupational exposures to external sources of radiation. The modeling protocol needs to include sufficient information to allow for the establishment of the technical basis for the dispersion modeling result. The important parameters discussed in this section include: • Dose Conversion Factors • ICRP-68 Worker Dose Conversion Factors TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 23 of 37 • ICRP-72 Public Dose Conversion Factors. • Breathing Rate • Respirable Fraction • Particle diameter Adjustment • Absorption Types • Cloud Gamma. 6.2.1 Dose Conversion Factors The consequence levels (thresholds) are in units of total effective dose (TED), which is calculated using the following equation: TED = CED + DDE Where: CED = Committed effective dose (calculated as shown above) DDE = Deep dose resulting from the external cloud gamma dose (calculated by RSAC) The accident-specific parameters used to evaluate the dose to downwind receptors requires that certain assumptions be made that modify the dispersion release fraction due to the physical aspects of the release. The five components of the following source term equation recommended by DOE-HDBK-3010-94, “Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities,”36 contain the basis for the material release parameters. To calculate downwind radiological doses for these scenarios, a source term (ST) was determined. The ST is the amount of radioactive material released during the postulated accident scenario. The STs are determined using the following equation: Where: ST = source term MAR = material-at-risk DR = damage ratio ARF = airborne release fraction Page 24 of 37 RF = respirable fraction LPF = leak path factor Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, “Direct shine and ground shine from gamma emitters only need to be evaluated if they cause an upward change in the consequence level as defined in Table 1 [of the standard].” Analysis Parameter 15 – Dose Conversion Factors DCFs shall be used based on receptor location. ICRP-68 for Worker and Collocated Worker Receptors independent of location onsite. ICRP-72 for Public Receptors. Worker Dose – STD-3009 does not have specific dose limits for the facility worker. However, Attachment 2 of CLN2011051 states: For most postulated accidents with severe in-facility worker consequences, such as unshielded criticalities or process explosions, it is seldom possible to identify a consequence-mitigation barrier, which will allow meeting such a guideline. However, any accidents that have a significant consequence potential to the worker, regardless of likelihood/frequency range, should be thoroughly evaluated to determine the need for appropriate controls. The safety-significant SSCs identified in nuclear facility DSAs for worker safety can be limited to those which prevent or mitigate postulated abnormal events in the "anticipated" or "unlikely" frequency range which could result in consequences to collocated workers as follows: (1) ≥25 rem (TED), or (2) exposure to life-threatening concentrations of hazardous chemicals (e.g., ≥Protection Action Criteria (PAC)-3 levels for the worker and collocated worker, or ≥PAC-2 to the public). In cases where postulated accidents meet these criteria and additional barriers are needed to achieve acceptable risk, safety-significant SSCs and controls may be identified for risk reduction. 6.2.2 Material-at-Risk (MAR) The modeling protocol needs to include sufficient information to allow for the establishment of the technical basis for the dispersion modeling result. By providing this level of information regarding the tools, methodologies, site characteristics, and data sources, the facility can ensure that any concerns regarding the final result are resolved early in the process. The MAR is the amount of radionuclides (in grams or curies of activity for each radionuclide) available to be acted on by a given physical stress. For facilities, processes, and activities, the MAR is a value representing some maximum Page 25 of 37 quantity of radionuclide present or reasonably anticipated for the process or structure being analyzed. The inventory for reactor fuel should include all radionuclides prior to the applications of release fractions based on inherently safe fuel or other passive design features. Different MARs may be assigned for different accidents as it is only necessary to define the material in those discrete physical locations that are exposed to a given stress. For example, a spill may involve only the contents of a tank in one glovebox. Conversely, a seismic event may involve all of the material in a building. Analysis Parameter 16 – Material at Risk (MAR) Bounding material-at-risk for given accidents are estimated as part of physical model development The MAR is the bounding quantity of radioactive material that is available to be acted upon by a given physical stress from a postulated accident. The MAR may be the total inventory in a facility or a portion of this inventory in one location or operation, depending on the event. MAR values used in hazard and accident analysis shall be consistent with the values noted in hazard identification/evaluation, and shall be bounding with respect to each accident being evaluated. While DOE-STD-1027-92 (NE-STD-1027-2025) excludes material in Department of Transportation Type B containers from consideration for the purposes of hazard categorization, the existence of such material shall be acknowledged in the DSA and the material excluded from the source term for a particular accident scenario only if the containers can be shown to perform their safety functions under accident conditions. 6.2.3 Damage Ratio The damage ratio (DR) represents the fraction of MAR that could be affected by the postulated accident and is a function of the accident initiator and the operational scenario being evaluated. DRs are determined based on engineering judgment, best available information, and prior analyses. The DR is estimated based upon engineering analysis of the response of structural materials and materials-of-construction for containment to the type and level of stress/force generated by the event. Standard engineering approximations are typically used. These approximations often include a degree of conservatism due to simplification of phenomena to obtain a useable model, but the purpose of the approximation is to obtain, to the degree possible, a realistic understanding of potential effects. The DR for scenarios without passive design features credited or engineering analysis is generally evaluated at 1.0. It assumes that the events are significant enough such that 100% of the material at risk is sufficiently impacted from the event to be released. Page 26 of 37 Analysis Parameter 17 – Damage Ratio (DR) DR is the fraction of material that is actually affected by the accident-generating conditions. DOE-HDBK-3010 notes that some degree of ambiguity can result from overlapping definitions of MAR and DR. A given DSA should use one consistent definition throughout. A DR of 1.0 shall be used unless there is an applicable standard or technical basis for a different value. For example, DOE-STD-5506-2007 contains specific DRs (and associated MAR guidance) that may be used in transuranic waste operations. 6.2.4 Airborne Release Fraction, Respirable Fraction and Particle Diameter The Airborne Release Fraction (ARF) is the coefficient used to estimate the amount of a radioactive material that can be suspended in air and made available for airborne transport under a specific set of induced physical stresses. The Respirable Fraction (RF) is the fraction of airborne radionuclide particles that can be transported through air and inhaled into the human respiratory system. The RF is commonly assumed to include particles of 10-μm Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter and less. The particle diameter will affect the dose conversion factor used for a particular accident. The dose conversion factor for the facility worker in ICRP-68 assumes a median diameter of 5 μm, and for the Public in ICRP-72 assumes a median diameter of 1 μm. Bounding estimates, and in many cases median estimates, for radionuclide ARFs and RFs for a wide variety of MAR and release phenomena are presented in DOE-HDBK-3010. The bounding estimates shall be used unless a different value is provided in an applicable standard or is otherwise technically justified. The ARF values for some fuel types are listed in the table below. Analysis Parameter 18 - Airborne Release Fraction, Respirable Fraction and Particle Diameter ARFs and RFs are selected based on physical conditions and stresses anticipated during accidents. The ARFs for nonreactor based events such as drops and fires are found in DOE-HDBK-3010. For reactor fuel the ARFs for each reactor fuel type should be based on experimental results such as those for inherently safe fuel. Each reactor fuel type will have different ARF values based on the bounding accident to which the reactor fuel is subjected. The dose conversion factors in ICRP-68 for facility workers assumes a median diameter of 5 μm and ICRP-72 for the Public assumes a median diameter of 1 μm. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 27 of 37 Table 2. Fuel Type ARF Values. Reactor Release Type ARF × RF Material, Release Conditions, and Reference 100% fuel and fission product 1.0 Total amount of material available to be released from reactor fuel during a reactor run. SFR eutectic release, The eutectic release fractions are derived from the eutectic fuel pin failure events in ANL-ART-49 with scoping calculations, and the event is judged to be Noble gases (Xe, Kr) 0.67 applicable for an SFR microreactor The fractions are the migration fractions Halogens (I, Br) 0.1 interpolated to 6% burnup from the input deck shown in the ECAR. The Alkali metals (Cs, Rb) 0.42 resulting fractions may be conservative for a release from a microreactor because some radionuclides will be held up in the reactor vessel, and it assumes Tellurium group (Te, Sb, Se) 6.0E-3 that that the estimated releases are entirely airborne and respirable. Barium, strontium (Ba, Sr) 0.24 Noble metals (Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo, Tc, Co) 6.0E-4 Cerium group (Ce, Pu, Np) 6.0E-4 Lanthanides (La, Zr, Nd, Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm, Y, Cm, Am) 6.0E-5 Eu 0.42 Remaining elements 1.0E-03 MSFR The release from the molten salt reactor is assumed to be bound Volatile/gas (Kr, Xe, I) 1.0 by a spill of molten metal with all noble gases and volatile fission Unverified (As, Cd, In) 1.0 products being available for release. All other nuclides receive an Zr, Te, Ru, Nb, Mo, Sb 1.0 ARF×RF= 0.01 from DOE-HDBK-3010. U will receive an U, Pu, Am 1.0E-04 ARF×RF= 0.0001 based on the UCl3 vapor fractions in Reference Remaining non-volatile elements (e.g., 1.0E-02 4.The elements of Kr, Xe, and I will receive an ARF×RF= 1.0 U, Cs, Ce, etc.) based on the gaseous nature or known volatility of the element. The unverified elements of As, Cd, and In will receive an ARF×RF= 1.0. The unverified elements were noted as having a higher release fraction using a scoping Gibbs energy minimization calculation. The elements Zr, Te, Nb, Ru, Mo, Sb, Cs, and Ce receive an ARF×RF based on previous research PWR LOCA This is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) release event taken from RG 1.183. Noble gases (Xe, Kr) 1.0 Halogens (I, Br) 0.4 Alkali metals (Cs, Rb) 0.3 Tellurium group (Te, Sb, Se) 5.0E-02 Barium, strontium (Ba, Sr) 2.0E-02 Noble metals (Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo, Tc, Co) 2.5E-03 Cerium group (Ce, Pu, Np) 5.0E-04 Lanthanides (La, Zr, Nd, Eu, Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm, Y, Cm, Am) 2.0E-04 Remaining elements 1.0E-04 6.2.5 Leak Path Factor The leak path factor (LPF) is the fraction of material in the aerosol transported through some confinement deposition or filtration mechanism. Several leakpaths may be associated with a specific accident, such as the fraction passing from a glovebox, the fraction passing from a room, or the fraction passing through a Page 28 of 37 leaking door. The LPF used in the common five-factor formula is the total fraction of respirable airborne material released during the accident that escapes from the building to the environment. Analysis Parameter 19 – Leak Path Factor For purposes of the unmitigated release calculation, the LPF shall be set to unity. For mitigated analysis, analytical tools used in calculating the LPF shall be appropriate to the physical conditions being modeled, including the use of input parameters, such that the overall LPF would be conservative. Typically, this factor accounts for the amount of the airborne MAR that escapes from a building or room. LPFs other than 1.0 are accident specific and approved by DOE-ID. 6.2.6 Breathing rate (BR) and Absorption Types Breathing rate (BR) is a property of the receptor, and is independent of all radionuclides and sources involved in an accident. Absorption Types as defined in ICRP-68 is the absorption from the respiratory tract to the bloodstream is categorized into three default types based on how quickly the material dissolves: Type F (Fast): Materials that are readily absorbed into the blood with a fast rate of clearance. These have an approximate absorption half-time of 10 minutes (100% of the material). Type M (Moderate): Materials with intermediate rates of absorption. About 10% is absorbed with a 10-minute half-time, while the remaining 90% has a half-time of 140 days. Type S (Slow): Materials that are relatively insoluble and stay in the lungs for a long time. Only 0.1% is absorbed quickly (10-minute half-time), and 99.9% has a half-time of 7,000 days. These types are based on the Human Respiratory Tract Model (HRTM) found in ICRP-66, “Radiological Protection, Human Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection.”37 Analysis Parameter 20 – Breathing Rate and Absorption Type Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, a breathing rate of 3.3 × 10-4 m3/s, which corresponds to light activity breathing rate for adults, should be assumed for the maximally-exposed off-site individual (MOI) and collocated worker. INL nuclear facilities will use a breathing rate of 3.33 × 10-4 m3/s, converted from a light work breathing rate of 20 1/min for the ICRP. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 29 of 37 Default to the lung absorption type that results in the highest dose unless specific information on the chemical form of the material at risk is known and lower DCFs for other absorption types can be justified. 6.2.7 Cloud Gamma Cloud Gamma radiation dose, or "cloudshine," is the external exposure from gamma-emitting radionuclides suspended in the atmosphere, typically following a nuclear accident or explosion. Doses are calculated using air concentration, specific radionuclide energies, and geometry (often half an infinite cloud at ground level). Key factors include plume altitude, air density, and distance from the source. Gaussian Plume Model: Commonly used to calculate the air concentration and, subsequently, the dose at ground level, assuming the receptor is exposed to half an infinite cloud due to the ground surface. Factors Affecting Gamma Gamma Dose: • Distance: The dose decreases with horizontal distance from the source, but overhead plumes at short distances can still cause significant dose rates. • Meteorology: Stable atmospheric conditions can keep the plume aloft, resulting in low ground-level doses but potentially high, unexpected overhead gamma doses. • Altitude: Gamma rays from lower, nearer parts of the cloud contribute more to the dose than higher, distant parts. • Dose Rate Components: The total dose rate depends on the radionuclide inventory, cloud concentration, and energy levels. Analysis Parameter 18 – Cloud Gamma Cloud gamma only needs to be evaluated if they cause an upward change in the consequence level as defined in Table 1 of DOE-STD-3009-2014. However, it is recommended to always calculate cloud gamma and include it in the total dose. In cases where direct shine may contribute significantly to dose, that contribution should be evaluated without the use of the RF, and without the use of the ARF if due to a spill release resulting in exposure to a pool. 7. Summary A radiological dose consequence protocol has been developed for use in INL nonreactor nuclear facilities to satisfy the requirements in DOE-STD-3009-2014. RSAC is the software tool used for TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 30 of 37 determining the radiological dose. The input parameters listed provide the approved modeling protocol. Table 3. Dose Consequence Analysis Parameters. # Parameters Value 1 Software RSAC is approved by DOE Idaho Operations office for calculating the dose consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) under Option 3 of DOE STD-3009-2014. 2 Hazard The mandatory standards for hazard evaluations used in INL nuclear safety DSAs are: Evaluation • Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities - NE-STD-1020-2025 Basis Chg No 1 Standards • Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities - NE-STD-1027-202510 CFR 830 Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements”; • DOE-STD-1237-2021, “Documented Safety Analysis for DOE Reactor Facilities.” 3 Inherently Category B reactor dose consequence evaluation may be credit the fuel design as a passive Safe Fuel design feature when two conditions are met: 1. There is a documented agreement between DOE/ID and the reactor designer/design authority regarding the properties of the fuel and the authorization envelope that cannot be exceeded under design basis conditions. And 2. Testing and manufacturing under a qualified process provides assurance that fundamental safety features regarding the properties of the fuel can be met. For unmitigated dose consequence analysis, the crediting passive features such as fuel type, for fission product retention must be supported with an initial condition and appropriate SSC classification. When credit is taken for the fuel as “inherently safe” the basis approval documentation should be referenced. 4 NPH and NDC categorization can credit inherently safe fuel as a passive design feature with its Inherently appropriate reduction in source term. Safe Fuel 5 Meteorological The NOAA/INL Mesonet online data set provides over 20 years of continuous quality- Data Set controlled meteorological data across the INL and is the data set to be used at the INL is approved by DOE-ID. RG 1.23, “Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 1, issued March 2007, includes guidance on the measurement and processing of onsite meteorological data for use as input to atmospheric dispersion models in support of plant licensing and operation. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 31 of 37 # Parameters Value 6 Release INL reactor and nonreactor nuclear facilities should assume for an initial scenario an Duration Instantaneous, Point Release, Ground Level, Non-buoyant Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants.” RG 1.145, provides additional guidance on appropriate dispersion models for estimating offsite relative concentrations (χ/Q values) as a function of downwind direction and distance (i.e., at the EAB and LPZ) for various short-term periods (up to 30 days) after an accident. While a conservative derivation of release duration is allowable under regulation, instantaneous release of the entire inventory as a point source is required. RG 1.194, “Atmospheric Relative Concentrations for Control Room Radiological Habitability Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants,” issued June 2003, discusses acceptable approaches for estimating short-term (i.e., 2 hours to 30 days postaccident) average χ/Q values in the vicinity of buildings at control room ventilation air intakes and at other locations of significant air inleakage to the control room envelope resulting from postulated accidental radiological airborne releases. 7 Plume The INL has historically used the Markee data set as approved by the DOE-ID field office Dispersion to establish the atmospheric dispersion factors (χ/Q) used for accident dose consequence Coefficients evaluations. 100 m - RSAC calculated (4.018 × 10-3 sec/m3) using this distance and dispersion factor will provide a basis for comparison to values found in DOE criteria. 8 Weather Class Weather Class F (moderately stable) and Wind Speed All doses are calculated on the basis of ground level release. For the dispersion analyses, the instantaneously released source is assumed to be conservatively transported at a rate of 1 m/s (about 2.3 mph) using Class F stability out to 1000 meters. The DOE-ID preapproved weather class and wind speeds for the 95% conditions are Markee Stability Class F and a wind speed of 1.04 m/s. 9 Reactor Requires specific evaluation based on the location of the reactor and reactor specific Facilities accident scenarios. Direction Other reactors at the INL have used weather class D and 4.5 m/s wind speed to evaluate Dependent dose consequence. Specific approval from DOE to depart from DOE-STD-3009-2014 Weather criteria is required. 10 Receptor and Facility worker (scenario dependent), collocated workers (Control Room and collocated Location facilities), and offsite public at the exclusion area boundary (EAB), low population zone (Mud Lake), and nearest population center (Idaho Falls). For the purposes of comparison to the evaluation guidelines (EG), DOE-STD-3009-2014 requires the comparison of a collocated worker at 100 m and a designated member of the public at the location of a hypothetical MOI. This MOI is typically located at the shortest distance to the DOE site boundary, or at the site boundary with the highest directionally dependent dose, based on ground level release. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 32 of 37 # Parameters Value 11 Elevated Ground level release should be considered the baseline unless justified that a release out Release the stack has occurred that is 2.5 times the height of adjacent structures. If it is determined that an elevated release is to be evaluated then downwind distance should be evaluated using a sensitivity analysis to determine at what distance the highest exposed collocated worker is located. 12 Mixing Depth The 95% mixing depth at the INL is 400 meters. The air density at the INL is 1099 and Air grams/cubic meter. Both of these values are default in RSAC. Density 13 Dry Deposition The default dry deposition velocities unless otherwise justified and approved are: Velocities Group Dry Deposition Velocity (m/s) Solids 1.000E-03 Halogens 1.000E-02 Noble Gases 0.000E+00 Cesium 1.000E-03 Ruthenium 1.000E-03 If filtration is credited in a particular scenario, as described in a facility-specific DSA, dry deposition will not be included in the dose consequence analysis. 14 Plume Meander and Until directed by DOE-ID, INL reactor and non-reactor nuclear facilities will not use Building Wake plume meander or building wake in dose consequence calculations. 15 Dose Conversion DCFs shall be used based on receptor location. Factors ICRP-68 for onsite dose to workers . ICRP-72 for Public Receptors TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 33 of 37 # Parameters Value 16 Material at Risk Bounding material-at-risk for given accidents are estimated as part of physical model development The MAR is the bounding quantity of radioactive material that is available to be acted upon by a given physical stress from a postulated accident. The MAR may be the total inventory in a facility or a portion of this inventory in one location or operation, depending on the event. MAR values used in hazard and accident analysis shall be consistent with the values noted in hazard identification/evaluation, and shall be bounding with respect to each accident being evaluated. While DOE-STD-1027-92 (NE-STD-1027-2025) excludes material in Department of Transportation Type B containers from consideration for the purposes of hazard categorization, the existence of such material shall be acknowledged in the DSA and the material excluded from the source term for a particular accident scenario only if the containers can be shown to perform their safety functions under accident conditions. 17 Damage Ratio DR is the fraction of material that is actually affected by the accident-generating conditions. DOE-HDBK-3010 notes that some degree of ambiguity can result from overlapping definitions of MAR and DR. A given DSA should use one consistent definition throughout. A DR of 1.0 shall be used unless there is an applicable standard or technical basis for a different value. For example, DOE-STD-5506-2007 contains specific DRs (and associated MAR guidance) that may be used in transuranic waste operations. 18 Airborne Release ARFs and RFs are selected based on physical conditions and stresses anticipated Fraction during accidents. The ARFs for nonreactor based events such as drops and fires are found in DOE-HDBK-3010. For reactor fuel the ARFs for each reactor fuel type Respirable should be based on experimental results such as those for inherently safe fuel. Each Fraction reactor fuel type will have different ARF values based on the bounding accident to Particle which the reactor fuel is subjected. The dose conversion factors in ICRP-68 for Diameter facility workers assumes a median diameter of 5 μm and ICRP-72 for the Public assumes a median diameter of 1 μm. 19 Leak Path Factor For purposes of the unmitigated release calculation, the LPF shall be set to unity. For mitigated analysis, analytical tools used in calculating the LPF shall be appropriate to the physical conditions being modeled, including the use of input parameters, such that the overall LPF would be conservative. Typically, this factor accounts for the amount of the airborne MAR that escapes from a building or room. LPFs other than 1.0 are accident specific and approved by DOE-ID. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 34 of 37 # Parameters Value 20 Breathing Rate and Per DOE-STD-3009-2014, a breathing rate of 3.3 × 10-4 m3/s, which corresponds to Absorption light activity breathing rate for adults, should be assumed for the maximally-exposed Type off-site individual (MOI) and collocated worker. INL nuclear facilities will use a breathing rate of 3.33 × 10-4 m3/s, converted from a light work breathing rate of 20 l/min for the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) Default to the lung absorption type that results in the highest dose unless specific information on the chemical form of the material at risk is known and lower DCFs for other absorption types can be justified. 21 Cloud Gamma Cloud gamma only needs to be evaluated if they cause an upward change in the consequence level as defined in Table 1 of DOE-STD-3009-2014. Slowly-developing dose pathways, such as ingestion of contaminated food, water supply contamination, or particle resuspension, are not included. In cases where direct shine may contribute significantly to dose, that contribution should be evaluated without the use of the RF, and without the use of the ARF if due to a spill release resulting in exposure to a pool. TEM-10200-1, Rev. 13 ECAR-9159, Rev. 0 Page 35 of 37 8. REFERENCES 1. 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