Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report Danish Saleem and Charles MaGill National Laboratory of the Rockies The National Laboratory of the Rockies is a national Technical Report laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy, NLR/TP-5T00-96195 Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation, May 2026 operated under Contract No. DE-AC36-08GO28308. This report is available at no cost from the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) at www.nlr.gov/publications. Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report Danish Saleem and Charles MaGill National Laboratory of the Rockies Suggested Citation Saleem, Danish, and Charles MaGill. 2026. Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report. Golden, CO: National Laboratory of the Rockies. NLR/TP-5T00-96195. https://www.nlr.gov/docs/fy26osti/96195.pdf. The National Laboratory of the Rockies is a national Technical Report laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy, NLR/TP-5T00-96195 Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation, May 2026 operated under Contract No. DE-AC36-08GO28308. National Laboratory of the Rockies 15013 Denver West Parkway This report is available at no cost from the National Laboratory Golden, CO 80401 of the Rockies (NLR) at www.nlr.gov/publications. 303-275-3000 • www.nllr.gov This work was authored by the National Laboratory of the Rockies for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), operated under Contract No. DE-AC36-08GO28308. Funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation Solar Energy Technologies Office. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the DOE or the U.S. Government. This report is available at no cost from the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) at www.nlr.gov/publications. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports produced after 1991 and a growing number of pre-1991 documents are available free via www.OSTI.gov. Cover photos (clockwise from left): Josh Bauer, National Laboratory of the Rockies 61725; Visualization from National Laboratory of the Rockies Insight Center; Getty-181828180; Agata Bogucka, National Laboratory of the Rockies 91683; Dennis Schroeder, National Laboratory of the Rockies 51331; Werner Slocum, National Laboratory of the Rockies 67842. The National Laboratory of the Rockies prints on paper that contains recycled content. iii List of Acronyms DER Distributed energy resource OEM Original equipment manufacturer VPP Virtual power plant iv Executive Summary The Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop—held June 17–18, 2025, at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) in Golden, Colorado—brought together approximately 40 external stakeholders from the energy sector, including virtual power plant (VPP) owner/operators, aggregators, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), utilities, testing and certification labs, trade associations, and cybersecurity vendors. Led by key facilitators, the workshop focused on addressing cybersecurity challenges and enhancing grid resilience for distributed energy resources (DERs) and VPPs. The workshop was prompted by the realization that technological innovation in DERs, and aggregations thereof, are rapidly outpacing current cybersecurity best practices and regulations in energy. Given the increasing scale and complexity of distributed technologies within the energy sector with unclear ownership of cybersecurity responsibilities and requirements, there is a lack of thorough understanding and increased uncertainty surrounding cybersecurity risk. Over two days, participants engaged in interactive sessions to identify gaps, prioritize The workshop was created because risks, understand how risks are distributed or technological innovation in DERs, shared, and develop strategies to boost cybersecurity effectiveness across people, and aggregations thereof, are rapidly process, and technology. Key themes included outpacing current cybersecurity best understanding stakeholder roles, leveraging data practices and regulations in energy. to understand and mitigate risks, fast-tracking technology solutions, and understanding the potential impact of compromised aggregated DER systems to the bulk electric system. Workshop attendees also highlighted the rapid evolution of the energy landscape, with increased attack surfaces, supply chain threats, and the need for a resilient ecosystem for VPPs, inverter-based resources, and DERs. Major priorities were identified, including assessing cybersecurity risks, understanding how risk is distributed among stakeholders, and promoting shared responsibility. This report summarizes the outcomes of the workshop, marking a significant step toward a secure, reliable and affordable energy future. v The following are the major priorities identified during the workshop: Define and Implement Shared Cyber Responsibilities: Workshop attendees identified the need for a roadmap that (1) highlights the priority cyber risks and benefits associated with VPPs and other aggregated DER systems, (2) provides a detailed understanding of the mechanisms, processes, and types of stakeholders involved in VPPs, and (3) outlines a robust framework for distributing responsibilities based on identified shared cyber risks and stakeholder roles. Develop an Impact Assessment Capability: Industry can’t define responsibilities and prioritize mitigations if cybersecurity risks are not fully understood. Developing a comprehensive capability to evaluate, visualize, and understand the potential consequences of successful cyberattacks targeting aggregated DERs at the system-of-systems level, including the bulk electric system level, was also identified as one of the major priorities. Workshop attendees suggested including improved interdependent telecommunication modeling, technology validation, and mechanisms for data sharing between OEMs, utilities, third-party aggregators, and VPP owner/operators. Prepare for High-Impact Scenarios: To enhance clarity and preparedness, workshop attendees suggested developing targeted educational trainings and tabletop exercises focused on low-frequency, high-impact events such as cyberattacks during periods of high grid stress involving VPP owner/operators, OEMs, aggregators, and utilities. Attendees suggested prioritizing extreme, multistakeholder, all- hazards scenarios over routine training to clarify roles, responsibilities, and data sharing needs. Additionally, such training will support workforce development for operators, engineers, and managers, fostering a unified understanding of cybersecurity roles across all levels. Standardize VPPs and Data Sharing: Enhancing secure and standardized data sharing mechanisms between OEMs, aggregators, and utilities to improve situational awareness and enable proactive risk management was also identified as a major priority. Attendees suggested a secure and common data sharing mechanism would help alleviate some of the risks that may be associated with cloud platforms. Establish a Cross-Stakeholder Group or Consortium: Lastly, workshop attendees identified forming a team of utilities, OEMs, VPP owner/operators, and aggregators to align security controls, train workforces, and understand the economic, social, and operational impacts of cyber events on the grid, shifting from static compliance to a dynamic, forward-looking, and risk-based approach. The workshop underscored that no single entity can address these challenges alone; a sector-wide approach that includes the broader DER community is imperative to ensure the reliable and secure operation of the electric grid. The priorities identified above provide a roadmap for collaborative action, vi regulatory modernization, and industry alignment to build resilience against current and future cyber threats. Figure 1. Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders Involved in VPPs vii Table of Contents List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ iv Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................... v List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ ix Workshop Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1 The Need for This Workshop ................................................................................................................. 2 Audience................................................................................................................................................. 2 Session Summaries and Key Takeaways ................................................................................................. 4 Session 1: Cybersecurity Dependencies for Resilient DERs and VPPs ................................................. 4 Discussion ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Participant Quotes ......................................................................................................................... 6 Five Key Takeaways ..................................................................................................................... 6 Identified Priority .......................................................................................................................... 6 Session 2: Assessing the Impact of Compromised DER Devices or Systems Within VPPs on U.S. Bulk Energy Systems .................................................................................................................... 6 Discussion ..................................................................................................................................... 6 Participant Quotes ....................................................................................................................... 10 Five Key Takeaways ................................................................................................................... 10 Identified Priority ........................................................................................................................ 10 Session 3: Ensuring Continuity in the Face of Cyberattacks................................................................ 10 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 10 Five Key Takeaways ................................................................................................................... 12 Identified Priority ........................................................................................................................ 13 Session 4: Role of Aggregators in Securing VPPs ............................................................................... 13 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 13 Participant Quotes ....................................................................................................................... 15 Five Key Takeaways ................................................................................................................... 15 Identified Priority ........................................................................................................................ 16 Session 5: Can You Say That in English? Simplifying Grid Reliability and Security Standards With Common Language ..................................................................................................................... 16 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 16 Participant Quotes ....................................................................................................................... 19 Five Key Takeaways ................................................................................................................... 19 Identified Priority ........................................................................................................................ 20 Session 6: The Role of Mission Rehearsal in U.S. Grid Resilience ..................................................... 20 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 20 Participant Quotes ....................................................................................................................... 22 Five Key Takeaways ................................................................................................................... 22 Identified Priority ........................................................................................................................ 22 Future Needs ............................................................................................................................................. 23 viii List of Figures Figure 1. Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders Involved in VPPs ............................ vii Figure 2. Device and network view of a virtual power plant ........................................................................ 1 Figure 3. Workshop audience ....................................................................................................................... 3 Figure 4. Cybersecurity Dependencies for Resilient DER Aggregations ..................................................... 5 Figure 5. Assessing the Impact of Compromised DER Aggregations on U.S. Energy Systems .................. 8 Figure 6. The Potential Impact of Compromised Original Equipment Manufacturer Aggregator Networks on Bulk Electric System Security ............................................................................................ 9 Figure 7. Ensuring Continuity in the Face of Cyberattacks ........................................................................ 11 Figure 8. Role of Aggregators in Securing VPPs ....................................................................................... 14 Figure 9. Shared responsibilities among utilities, aggregators, VPP owner/operators, installers, vendors, etc. .......................................................................................................................................... 15 Figure 10. The “operator” pyramid ............................................................................................................. 16 Figure 11. Simplifying Grid Reliability and Security Standards With Common Language....................... 18 Figure 12. The Role of Mission Rehearsal in U.S. Grid Resilience ........................................................... 21 Figure 13. Phil Venables on the importance of risk quantification............................................................. 24 Figure A-1. Graphical notes of the workshop introduction ........................................................................ 26 Figure A-2. Threat to Consequence: Compounding Hazards Demonstration ............................................ 27 Figure A-3. From Metrics to Mindsets: How Industry and Regulators Task Risk ..................................... 28 Figure A-4. Fast Tracking Technology Solutions to Boost Cybersecurity in VPP Aggregator Operations29 Figure A-5. Plugging the Gaps: Cybersecurity Standards for Resilient DERs and VPPs .......................... 30 ix Workshop Overview Rapid technological changes and increased reliance on DERs and VPPs managed by cloud- native platforms are transforming the grid into a digitally connected, software-defined system that could introduce new complexities. For example, these changes can create an expanded attack surface, supply chain security risks, and zero-day vulnerabilities resulting from inconsistent regulations and data silos. As utilities increasingly rely on VPPs, especially during peak demand, and cybersecurity policies vary across regions, proactive cybersecurity and clear stakeholder roles and responsibilities are needed (Industry Research 2025). The goal of the Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop was to identify and address the critical cybersecurity challenges of a rapidly changing electric grid and to drive cybersecurity priorities that foster shared responsibility among all energy sector stakeholders, including aggregators, DER manufacturers, VPP owners/operators, and utilities, among others. Since no standardized cyber ownership and participation model currently exists for VPPs or DER aggregators, the workshop aimed to: • Characterize the priority cyber risks and benefits associated with aggregated DER systems or VPPs • Evaluate the distribution of cyber risk among stakeholders within the DER ecosystem, such as VPP owners/operators, DER aggregators, utilities, and vendors, etc. • Prioritize shared responsibilities for managing cyber risks across all stakeholders • Understand the impact of compromised DER devices or systems within VPP networks on the bulk electric systems’ security • Accelerate the adoption of priority cybersecurity controls among VPPs, DER aggregators, and utility aggregators. Figure 2. Device and network view of a virtual power plant This graphic is illustrative and is not intended to be a comprehensive technical specification. 1 The Need for This Workshop As the integration of grid-connected DERs increases, new markets and technology innovation are driving operational changes on the grid, making it more digitally connected and software defined. This modernization drives new utility business models with a growing number of non- utility stakeholders—such as VPP owners/operators and aggregators—playing an active role in energy markets and providing grid services that affect grid reliability. These new non-utility stakeholders are shifting from selling kilowatts to selling flexibility by transforming batteries and smart inverters into dispatchable assets that utilities value. While the degree of DER adoption and participation varies around the country, there is a wide variation in (1) cybersecurity policies and processes for managing and maintaining aggregated DER systems, (2) tools and technologies that enhance coordination across multiple stakeholders without sacrificing data confidentiality, and (3) standards and regulations for defining roles and responsibilities. This variability is a key challenge for applying consistent and interoperable cybersecurity controls to ensure collective defense of the grid at the national level. During the workshop, attendees identified the following themes to address: • What are the key cybersecurity challenges in aggregated DER systems, including VPPs? • What are the major trends that are expected to have the greatest impact to cybersecurity? • What are the greatest challenges in understanding the distribution of risk across stakeholders, including VPP owners/operators, DER aggregators, utilities, and vendors? • How can we promote shared responsibilities for managing risks across all stakeholders? • What is the potential impact of compromised devices or systems within a VPP network or an aggregation of DERs on bulk electric system security? • As the attack surface increases, what will be the mix of utility versus aggregator-controlled systems? • What new tools are needed to secure aggregated DER systems? • What type of training and education is needed and on what topics? Audience The participants encompassed a broad spectrum of stakeholders, reflecting the diverse landscape of DER and VPP operations. Their expertise and knowledge in aggregated DER systems, VPPs, technology, grid management, energy markets, regulation, and cybersecurity played a crucial role in steering the workshop. They contributed valuable perspectives to pinpoint major risks, analyze risk distribution, and foster collective accountability for addressing these critical cybersecurity challenges. 2 Figure 3. Workshop audience Image by Taylor Henry, NLR 3 Session Summaries and Key Takeaways Session 1: Cybersecurity Dependencies for Resilient DERs and VPPs The regulatory landscape for DERs is shaped by the involvement of numerous stakeholders, which has led to the establishment of various regulations. However, as the number of DER owners continues to grow, ensuring safety becomes increasingly complex and highlights the need for more flexible technological solutions. In this context, the concept of sovereign power has emerged, with discussions focusing on encouraging individuals to own their own cryptographic keys for their equipment. As more people install their own energy systems, like solar panels and batteries, keeping the grid safe becomes harder. To solve this, the panel discussed sovereign power. The idea is to give individuals more control by having them manage their own digital security keys for their equipment. This approach is envisioned to start within campuses or smaller communities before potentially scaling to individual users. Liability and risk are significant concerns, particularly in scenarios involving black sky operations, such as the leasing of conductors after major events like hurricanes. When things go wrong during a disaster, it’s often unclear who is legally responsible or who pays for the damage. This is a major worry during black sky operations when emergency work is required to fix the power grid after a massive catastrophe. For example, if a utility company needs to lease or borrow power lines and equipment to get the lights back on after a major hurricane, the legal risks regarding who owns, maintains, or is liable for that equipment become very complicated. The risks extend to utilities as well, especially if a major distributed energy resource management system provider or aggregator is compromised, which could have cascading effects across multiple utilities within a region. A foundational problem for VPPs is the lack of clear identification and management, as their composition can change rapidly and make oversight challenging. A major hurdle for VPPs is that they are hard to track and manage. Because the components that make up a VPP can change in an instant, it is difficult for regulators and grid operators to keep a clear eye on what they are actually doing. It helps to remember what a VPP is: it’s not a single facility, but a cloud-based power plant. It’s a collection of hundreds or thousands of small energy sources—like home batteries, rooftop solar panels, and electric vehicle chargers—all connected by software to act as one big power source. Data silos present another major issue, as OEMs and meter providers often do not share data, resulting in blind spots for utilities. For example, some utilities may not ingest telemetry from certain OEMs, limiting their visibility and operational awareness. This fragmentation raises questions about how to collectively distribute risk when data is siloed and ownership is ambiguous. Cybersecurity remains a critical focus in DER and inverter-based system integration, with key challenges including determining responsibility for implementing and overseeing controls (i.e., “who controls the controls?”) and avoiding overreliance on any single entity, such as an OEM, 4 which is widely seen as unsustainable. There is growing consensus that current incentives often misalign costs and benefits, prompting calls to rebalance them so that those who gain from secure grid connectivity—utilities and customers—share the investment burden. As a result, an emerging perspective is that customers (i.e., DER owners or aggregators) may need to contribute to cybersecurity costs as a condition of grid interconnection to ensure more equitable and sustainable risk management across the ecosystem. Figure 4. Cybersecurity Dependencies for Resilient DER Aggregations 5 • "If everything (risk wise) falls on one person/company that is a recipe for disaster." • "You are going to have to pay for cybersecurity one way or another, it has to be live defenders because the attackers are live." • "To be connected to the grid, cybersecurity requirements must be put in place." 1. Few regulations exist around VPPs allowing anyone to become one, which leads to unclear roles. 2. The concentration of monitoring responsibility in one entity (e.g., a major cloud distributed energy resource management system provider) poses significant systemic risk. 3. The concept of sovereign power where individuals control their own equipment's security keys was explored as a potential future model, starting with smaller, controlled environments. 4. The U.S. has a fragmented Public Key Infrastructure landscape (e.g., California vs. Pennsylvania), unlike Australia's national-level approach, complicating secure communication. 5. Mandatory cybersecurity requirements for grid connection are likely to become the norm, with customers potentially bearing the cost. Establish clear definitions and thresholds for VPPs and aggregators, along with a framework for distributing risks and responsibility obligations among stakeholders. Session 2: Assessing the Impact of Compromised DER Devices or Systems Within VPPs on U.S. Bulk Energy Systems Utilities are increasingly recognizing the need to model the potential impacts of compromised DER aggregations, yet there remains a notable lack of comprehensive discussion and preparedness to address these risks in depth. While some progress has been made in resource adequacy modeling—particularly with inverter-based resources—the integration of cyber considerations, such as the implications of inverter-based resources tripping, restoration, or permanent disabling (bricking), is still in its early stages. This gap highlights the broader challenge of validating and certifying cyber standards for DER equipment, a topic that has generated significant discussion but requires more robust implementation and oversight. 6 A persistent obstacle is the difficulty in accessing and leveraging data from behind-the-meter DERs. For example, utilities often cannot access critical solar or battery data from many residential solar systems through standard metering infrastructure, such as existing smart meters, which limits their operational visibility. This issue is compounded by the risk of single- threadiness, where single points of failure—such as Remote Terminal Units—can leave utilities reliant on manual controls if automated systems fail. The sector also suffers from a lack of cohesive strategy, with no centralized leadership to unify cybersecurity efforts across diverse stakeholders. This fragmentation is exacerbated by regulatory lag, as technological advancements in DER products frequently outpace the development of corresponding regulatory guidelines. The division of responsibility between OEMs and utilities further complicates matters; grid operators often bear the risk but must depend on OEMs for the implementation of cybersecurity measures. 7 Figure 5. Assessing the Impact of Compromised DER Aggregations on U.S. Energy Systems 8 Figure 6. The Potential Impact of Compromised Original Equipment Manufacturer Aggregator Networks on Bulk Electric System Security Investment in cybersecurity is hindered by a chicken and egg dilemma: OEMs are reluctant to invest without clear utility commitment, while utilities hesitate to commit without OEM assurances. Managing the software supply chain adds another layer of complexity, as utilities must oversee patches, updates, and cloud connectivity for large fleets of assets. Additionally, OEMs typically possess more detailed insights into DER adoption than utilities, creating significant blind spots for grid operators. To address these challenges, stakeholders have looked to models from the telecommunications industry, such as leasing space for towers or bundling basic cybersecurity with Internet Service 9 Provider modem leases, as potential frameworks for improving cybersecurity and operational coordination in the DER ecosystem. • "No one is ready to really dig in and/or we didn’t have the right people in the room." 1. Utilities lack sufficient information about the cyber risks introduced by DER equipment and control vendors. 2. There's a significant disconnect in operational information between utilities and OEMs, leading to major blind spots for utilities. 3. A strong need exists for validation and certification of cybersecurity standards implementation by OEMs. 4. A framework for decision-making regarding DER/VPP adoption is urgently required. 5. Clear definitions and mechanisms for data sharing between OEMs/aggregators and utilities are essential for situational awareness and decision-making. • Develop a comprehensive framework/process to assess the potential impact of compromised DER devices and systems within VPPs on bulk power systems. Session 3: Ensuring Continuity in the Face of Cyberattacks The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape presents significant challenges for DERs and VPPs, as best practices often struggle to keep pace with rapidly changing attack vectors. A critical issue is the shortage of professionals with expertise in supervisory control and data acquisition systems within the aggregator space, compounded by a lack of incentives for DER owners to maintain robust cybersecurity measures after initial interconnection. This workforce gap is particularly concerning given the substantial visibility and control gaps for residential and small commercial VPPs, which leaves them highly vulnerable to sophisticated attacks, such as those exemplified by Volt Typhoon-type manipulations. Standard response protocols in the event of a cyber incident typically involve a sequence of disconnection, identification, isolation, eradication, and reconnection, with operators frequently resorting to manual controls when automated systems are compromised. Maintaining system stability during such disruptions is a key concern, requiring careful balancing of generation drops with controlled load shedding to prevent broader grid instability. 10 Figure 7. Ensuring Continuity in the Face of Cyberattacks 11 The sector also faces misaligned incentives: aggregators are primarily motivated to fulfill contracts cost-effectively, while regulators emphasize security, leading to conflicting investment priorities. Many operators lack the resources to implement robust cybersecurity controls, making shared investment from utilities a necessity. This fuels ongoing debates about risk allocation— whether utilities, VPPs, or OEMs should bear the primary responsibility, especially as cloud- based DER platforms become more prevalent. Effective cybersecurity prioritization must consider the criticality of each system, including factors such as size, the number of customers affected, and potential outage duration. There is a growing need to quantify cyber risk and related investments in practical, budget-aligned terms to facilitate informed decision-making. Recommendations for cyber-informed engineering emphasize the importance of design-level resilience and the inclusion of analog redundancies to mitigate digital vulnerabilities. Risks associated with OEMs and cloud infrastructure are particularly noteworthy; if The sector also faces an OEM that also operates as a VPP is misaligned incentives: compromised, the systemic integration can aggregators are primarily amplify the impact across the grid. Cloud infrastructure supporting DERs and OEMs motivated to fulfill contracts is recognized as a major attack vector, cost-effectively, while necessitating heightened vigilance and regulators emphasize security, security measures. leading to conflicting investment priorities. On the regulatory front, European initiatives such as the Cyber Resilience Act are expected to set the pace for global cybersecurity standards over the coming decade. Proposals for integrating patchable digital chips into distributed devices aim to enable remote security management and rapid response to emerging threats. Additionally, there is a push to encourage regular cybersecurity audits and leverage utility influence to drive upstream investment in security measures. 1. The rapid evolution of cyber threats outpaces current cybersecurity best practices and workforce development, particularly in the aggregator space. 2. Significant vulnerabilities exist in behind-the-meter assets due to lack of visibility, control, and maintenance incentives. 3. Misaligned incentives and cost sharing challenges among stakeholders hinder robust cybersecurity investments. 4. OEMs and cloud platforms represent critical, potentially amplified, attack vectors that require specific attention. 5. There is a strong need to quantify cybersecurity risks and investments in tangible, business-aligned terms to drive prioritization and funding. 12 • Develop clear, actionable strategies and incentives to align cybersecurity investment motivations across all stakeholders, particularly addressing behind-the-meter vulnerabilities and OEM/cloud risks. Session 4: Role of Aggregators in Securing VPPs Questions have emerged regarding the precise definition of an aggregator within the DER and VPP ecosystem, reflecting the complexity and evolving nature of these roles. There is a strong consensus that customers and asset owners should bear minimal responsibility for cybersecurity; if forced to deal with complex security rules or high technical costs, they will likely get frustrated and quit, which would hurt overall participation in energy programs. As one participant noted, "Customers/asset owners should be minimally responsible for cybersecurity. If they have to do something, they lose." The debate continues over the extent of vendor responsibility, with some arguing that vendors should play a supporting role, while others believe they should assume full responsibility for secure protocols and system design. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced in VPP leasing models where ownership of security responsibilities remains unclear. VPPs operating on thin margins often focus on minimizing risk just enough to meet regulatory requirements frequently passing additional costs to customers or vendors. This approach can result in a bare-minimum compliance culture where reputation is currently the only motive for implementing cybersecurity fixes. A clear distinction is also drawn between general DER security and the more specialized cybersecurity needs of VPPs. OEMs are currently viewed as holding the greatest share of risk The debate continues over the extent of responsibility, while installers and vendor responsibility, with some arguing operators with access to VPP systems that vendors should play a supporting role, further expand the attack surface. while others believe they should assume Utilities face ongoing challenges and full responsibility for secure protocols and opportunities in ingesting and sharing system design. This uncertainty is data with VPPs and aggregators, particularly pronounced in VPP leasing which is critical for effective risk models where ownership of security management but complicated by responsibilities remains unclear. technical and regulatory barriers. Lessons from cloud security providers—who have long grappled with shared responsibility models—are seen as valuable, with the suggestion that the DER sector should learn from these experiences rather than repeat past mistakes. The human element remains a significant risk, as homeowners and DER users can inadvertently introduce vulnerabilities. 13 Figure 8. Role of Aggregators in Securing VPPs 14 Figure 9. Shared responsibilities among utilities, aggregators, VPP owner/operators, installers, vendors, etc. Graphic by Taylor Henry, NLR Aggregators often resist utility-imposed cybersecurity requirements, prioritizing demand flexibility and operational efficiency over additional security measures. This pushback underscores the need for common standards and conformance testing frameworks, such as those provided by UL and SunSpec, to ensure a consistent and effective approach to cybersecurity across the industry. • "Cloud security providers had this problem of shared responsibility ages ago, so learn from that instead of retrying." 1. The definition and scope of aggregator and VPP remain ambiguous, hindering clear assignment of cybersecurity roles. 2. Customer/asset owners should not bear primary cybersecurity responsibility; it must flow to other stakeholders like vendors or aggregators. 3. There is a critical need for a framework that clearly assigns cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, particularly regarding secure protocols, design, and liability. 15 4. Learning from established shared responsibility models, such as those in cloud security, can accelerate progress in VPP cybersecurity. 5. The human element, especially homeowners and installers, represents a significant and often overlooked cybersecurity risk in the DER/VPP ecosystem. • Develop a clear, universally accepted definition of aggregator and VPP and a comprehensive framework for assigning and enforcing cybersecurity roles and responsibilities across all stakeholders, drawing lessons from existing shared responsibility models. Session 5: Can You Say That in English? Simplifying Grid Reliability and Security Standards With Common Language The complexity of standards in the VPP ecosystem is driven by the involvement of numerous stakeholders, a proliferation of standards, and the absence of clear, unified rules specifically tailored for VPPs. This environment creates both opportunities and risks: while VPPs are recognized as entrepreneurial ventures that can unlock new value streams, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities and operational uncertainties. One proposed solution to this complexity is the formal registration of entities and their roles—such as with Independent System Operators, Regional Transmission Organizations, or Distribution System Operators—to establish clearer lines of responsibility and oversight. Figure 10. The “operator” pyramid Graphic from Uri Sadot, SolarEdge Technologies A key distinction has emerged between traditional VPPs and cloud-capable aggregation entities, raising questions about which bodies are best positioned to regulate the associated risks. Many existing standards, often based on National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance, emphasize perimeter security; however, this approach may fall short in addressing the unique challenges of distributed, cloud-centric architectures. This has led to ongoing debates about who should be responsible for validating the cybersecurity requirements that utilities impose on aggregators, and how to design effective cyber defense exercises that meaningfully involve these entities. 16 There is a growing recognition of the need to refine learning objectives for cybersecurity, such as distinguishing between interoperability and interdependencies, and shifting from basic to essential requirements. The increasing reliance on Software as a Service in the VPP sector has exposed a training gap, particularly regarding the delineation of roles and responsibilities in a cloud-based environment. Allowing states to set their own standards could foster localized innovation, but it also underscores the tension between the need for flexibility and the imperative for high-level alignment across the industry. Discussions have considered whether National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners baselines could serve as a foundational framework for this evolving paradigm. Another challenge lies in applying concepts from physical system security to virtual products and platforms, such as those offered by aggregation and DERMS platform providers, which may require fundamentally different approaches. 17 Figure 11. Simplifying Grid Reliability and Security Standards With Common Language 18 The industry is also witnessing a shift from recommended practices (should) to mandatory requirements (shall), reflecting a broader move toward enforceable standards. There is potential for the Department of Energy to develop tailored roadmaps for different stakeholder groups and support more coordinated progress. Quantifying the cost of cybersecurity and articulating the consumer benefits remain ongoing challenges, as does planning for critical operations—such as black start procedures—during internet outages. The need to integrate cloud security into training curricula is increasingly urgent, given the cloud-centric nature of modern DERs. Stakeholders acknowledge that the floor of minimum requirements is not static and must evolve over time to accommodate technological advances and emerging threats. There is also a call for broader education, ensuring that Software as a Service providers and other participants understand their roles within the larger grid ecosystem. Despite these discussions, privacy concerns—particularly regarding the storage and processing of customer information—remain a notable gap. Additionally, insurance companies are beginning to require robust cybersecurity policies, highlighting the need for consistent service standards across VPPs, whether through traditional insurance or self-insurance mechanisms. • “What if we let the states decide?” • “How can we apply physical systems to a virtual product?” • “What happens if there is an internet outage? How do we do a black start from an internet outage?” 1. The current landscape is characterized by numerous, often unharmonized, cybersecurity standards and a lack of clear regulatory frameworks for VPPs. 2. There is a critical need to simplify and standardize language around grid reliability and security, moving towards clear definitions and essential requirements. 3. Training and education are vital to bridge knowledge gaps, particularly concerning the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholders in the evolving, cloud-centric grid. 4. The floor of cybersecurity requirements is dynamic, necessitating a continuous improvement approach rather than static compliance. 5. Privacy and customer data protection, especially in aggregated cloud instances, are significant unaddressed gaps that require attention. 19 • Develop a common language and standardized definitions for VPPs and aggregators along with a flexible yet aligned framework for cybersecurity requirements that can be adapted at state/regional levels and integrate cloud security into training programs. Session 6: The Role of Mission Rehearsal in U.S. Grid Resilience The current landscape of cybersecurity exercises and training in the energy sector features a range of established programs and competitions, such as Cyber Fire, GridEx, CyManII, CyberForce, CyberPatriot, and cyber-informed engineering-based challenges. While these initiatives provide valuable experience, a significant gap remains in their coverage of VPPs and DERs. Most existing grid exercises are heavily focused on transmission systems, leaving VPPs and DERs as notable blind spots in preparedness efforts. GridEx, hosted by the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, exemplifies this limitation by concentrating primarily on transmission and systemic risk. The exercise often relies on assumptions that may not hold in real-world extreme scenarios, such as the loss of critical infrastructure like airports. This highlights the need for the development of tabletop exercises specifically tailored to the unique challenges posed by VPPs and DER aggregators. A persistent challenge is the lack of clear definitions for aggregators and VPPs, as well as their overlapping roles with utilities. This ambiguity complicates the design of effective exercises and the assignment of responsibilities. Data sharing between aggregators, OEMs, and utilities is another area of concern; current practices are often bespoke and limited, hindering the ability of utilities to access real-time data from DERs—such as through smart meters—that is essential for effective preparation and response. Stakeholders have expressed particular concern about threat scenarios in which attackers target VPPs during periods of high demand, such as hot days when utilities rely on these resources for load management. Reference was made to various tabletop exercises that underscored the nation’s unpreparedness for cyber warfare and emphasized the need for a civil defense mindset. There is growing interest in exercising extreme, low-frequency, high-impact scenarios, rather than focusing solely on day-to-day cyberattacks. Education is also a priority, with a recognized need to better inform engineering teams about the potential impacts of cyberattacks and the critical role of VPPs in grid stability. Understanding the scale at which utilities can implement load shedding—whether at the device, neighborhood, or community level—is essential for effective incident response planning. Additional recommendations include requiring VPPs to register if they are connected to the energy market to improve oversight and coordination. There is also concern about cascading failures of compliance due to third-party risk dependencies, as well as the lack of clear delineation of ownership for risk management and incident response. These challenges underscore the urgent need for more comprehensive VPP and DER focused cybersecurity exercises, clearer definitions and roles, improved data sharing, and enhanced education and preparedness across the sector. 20 Figure 12. The Role of Mission Rehearsal in U.S. Grid Resilience 21 • "There is a blind spot to systemic risk because the focus is on what’s happening in a single utility." • "Utilities are REALLY interested in getting the data so they can better prepare." • "Most of the stakeholders haven’t been engaged in the exercise or rehearsal." 1. Current grid cybersecurity exercises largely overlook VPPs and DERs creating a significant gap in preparedness for systemic risks. 2. There is a strong desire among stakeholders to conduct mission rehearsal exercises focused on low-frequency, high-impact cyberattack scenarios involving DERs and VPPs. 3. The lack of standardized data sharing mechanisms between OEMs/aggregators and utilities is a critical barrier to effective risk assessment and response. 4. Clear definitions of aggregator and VPP roles, along with delineated ownership of risk and incident response, are fundamental prerequisites for effective mission rehearsal. 5. Education for engineering teams and the broader community on the impacts of cyberattacks on the distributed grid is essential for fostering a collective defense mindset. • Initiate and develop tabletop exercises specifically for VPPs and aggregators, focusing on extreme, multi-stakeholder, all-hazards scenarios to clarify roles, responsibilities, and data sharing needs and to inform the expansion of existing reference architectures. 22 Future Needs Based on the workshop discussions, several critical future needs and their call to action were identified. These are designed to be practical, collaborative, time-bound where appropriate, and aligned with the workshop's emphasis on DER/VPP cybersecurity, stakeholder coordination, and grid resilience. Future Needs Description Call to Action Standardized A clear, universally accepted Develop standardized definitions, architectures, and Definitions and definition of VPPs and aggregators is procurement language guidance to integrate a Frameworks paramount. This includes developing shared responsibility model into existing contractual standardized cybersecurity agreements between utilities, aggregators, and VPP architectures and frameworks that and distributed power plant owners and operators. account for the distributed nature, diverse ownership, and complex interdependencies of DERs. Enhanced Data Establish secure and standardized Develop a cross-functional group with diverse Sharing methods for data exchange between skillsets to establish a secure and standardized data Mechanisms OEMs, aggregators, and utilities to sharing mechanism, foster cross-consortium improve situational awareness and collaboration, and situational awareness. enable proactive risk management. This could involve exploring secure cloud data brokers. Tailored Develop and implement cybersecurity Form a joint task force having participation from Cybersecurity frameworks specifically designed for various stakeholders such as standards development Standards and distributed energy environments. This organizations (SDOs), utilities, aggregators, DER Regulations includes harmonizing regional manufacturers, etc, to develop and propose tailored regulations and defining clear cybersecurity standards and compliance frameworks compliance mandates for all VPP specifically for aggregated DER and VPP systems. participants to ensure grid integrity. Build on existing foundations like UL 2941 and IEEE 1547.3 by adding aggregator-level controls, shared responsibility models, and clear mandates for third- party data flows. Submit prioritized recommendations to SDOs (e.g., IEEE, UL) and FERC for integration into future rulemakings, interconnection procedures, and regulatory guidance. Comprehensive Advance a capability for national level Develop an impact assessment capability and initial Risk probabilistic all-hazards consequence assessment decision tree and triage map to help Quantification modeling with regional granularity to stakeholders better understand the risks and and Modeling understand the economic, social, and associated mitigation efforts. operational impacts of cyber events on the grid. This requires shifting from rearward-looking metrics to forward- looking risk simulation. Workforce Address the shortage of cybersecurity Develop targeted training programs for all Development professionals with expertise in stakeholders, including engineers, operators, and and Training (Supervisory Control and Data homeowners to foster a shared understanding of Acquisition and aggregator systems.. cybersecurity roles and responsibilities Mission Conduct regular, multistakeholder Develop targeted educational trainings and tabletop Rehearsal and tabletop and full-scale exercises that exercises focused on low-frequency, high-impact Exercises specifically incorporate VPPs and events. Include all stakeholders involved in the DERs, focusing on low-frequency, distributed generation or VPP ecosystem. high-impact scenarios to test response protocols and clarify incident response ownership. 23 Future Needs Description Call to Action Incentive Realign financial and regulatory Collaborate with DOE, state regulators, utilities, and Alignment incentives to encourage robust industry associations to design and pilot incentive cybersecurity investments across all mechanisms (e.g., performance-based tariffs, stakeholders, recognizing that rebates, grid priority credits, or insurance discounts) cybersecurity is a shared that reward aggregators, VPP operators, and DER responsibility and a cost that must be owners for verifiable cybersecurity investments. borne collectively. Launch at least one utility- or state-sponsored pilot by the end of next year to quantify risk reduction, grid resilience benefits, and adoption acceleration. Disseminate results to inform national policy, rate- case proceedings, and broader incentive frameworks that promote shared responsibility without undue burden on any single stakeholder. Cloud Security Given the heavy reliance on cloud Initiate a collaborative R&D partnership among Integration platforms, integrate cloud security national labs (NLR, PNNL, INL), major cloud best practices, threat scenarios, and providers (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud), and mitigation strategies into overall VPP/aggregator vendors to develop and validate DER/VPP cybersecurity frameworks secure-by-design cloud architectures for DER and training. aggregation. Prioritize zero-trust principles, encrypted telemetry, scalable anomaly detection, and mitigation of cloud-specific threats Produce open reference designs, best-practice guidance, and training modules by 2027, with validation through NLR’s ARIES Cyber Range and real-world aggregator pilots to integrate cloud security seamlessly into overall DER/VPP cybersecurity frameworks. Figure 13. Phil Venables on the importance of risk quantification Image from David White, Axio 24 References Industry Research. 2025. “Virtual Power Plant (VPP) Market Size, Share, Growth, and Industry Analysis, By Types (OC Model, FM Model), By Applications (Commercial, Industrial, Residential), and Regional Insights and Forecast to 2035.” https://www.industryresearch.co/market-reports/virtual-power-plant-vpp-market-301761. 25 Appendix A. Meeting Illustrations Illustrations were recorded throughout the workshop. Illustrations not included in the body of this report are shown in this appendix. A.1 Workshop Introduction Figure A-1. Graphical notes of the workshop introduction 26 A.2 Threat to Consequence: Compounding Hazards Demonstration Figure A-2. Threat to Consequence: Compounding Hazards Demonstration 27 A.3 From Metrics to Mindsets: How Industry and Regulators Task Risk Figure A-3. From Metrics to Mindsets: How Industry and Regulators Task Risk 28 A.4 Fast Tracking Technology Solutions to Boost Cybersecurity in VPP Aggregator Operations Figure A-4. Fast Tracking Technology Solutions to Boost Cybersecurity in VPP Aggregator Operations 29 A.5 Plugging the Gaps: Cybersecurity Standards for Resilient DERs and VPPs Figure A-5. Plugging the Gaps: Cybersecurity Standards for Resilient DERs and VPPs 30 Appendix B. Definitions • Virtual Power Plants (VPP): VPPs are aggregations of DERs that can balance electrical loads and provide utility-scale and utility-grade grid services like a traditional power plant 1. They enable smaller energy resources to participate in energy markets and provide grid services as aggregated entities, which would otherwise not be feasible. • Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs): Generation or storage systems using power electronic converters connected to the grid (transmission, sub-transmission, or distribution) and managed as a single resource at a common interconnection point. • Distributed Energy Resources (DERs): DERs are grid edge devices, including generation resources (wind, solar), storage (battery, hydrogen), and energy management systems (demand response, building load controllers) that are typically connected to the distribution grid. DERs also form the core components of VPPs. • DER Aggregators: DER aggregators are entities that combine multiple DERs into a single, manageable unit to participate in energy markets and provide grid services. Aggregators optimize the collective output of these resources, enabling smaller DERs to access markets and services they couldn't individually. • Cloud Service Provider (CSP): CSPs offer cloud-based platforms and services for VPP operations, including data storage, processing, and analytics. They may also provide the technological infrastructure that enables remote monitoring, control, and optimization of DERs within a VPP. • Consumer: Consumers own or operate DERs and participate in a VPP by allowing their resources to be aggregated and controlled as part of the larger system. • Utility: Utilities are responsible for electricity distribution and grid management that can leverage VPPs to enhance grid reliability and resilience. Utilities play a crucial role in VPP deployment by partnering with technology providers and customers to create VPPs that may benefit both the grid and consumers. • Vendor: Vendors supply hardware, software, and services essential to the operation of a VPP. This may include manufacturers of control systems or DER equipment as well as providers of VPP or energy management software. • VPP Owner: VPP owners are responsible for the overall management and operation of VPPs, including integration with other stakeholders and market participation. VPP owners may be a utility, a third-party operator, or a cloud service provider. • VPP Operator: VPP operators are tasked with executing VPP services, managing day-to- day operations, and ensuring seamless integration with other stakeholders. This role may be performed by the VPP owner or a separate entity contracted for this purpose. • VPP Network: VPP networks are the communication infrastructure that interconnects VPP devices, users, utilities, Independent System Operators or Regional Transmission Organizations, and energy markets. This network enables real-time data exchange, control commands, and market participation. • VPP Devices: VPP devices are any hardware connected to the VPP network, including power generating units, energy storage systems, smart loads, and control systems. These devices may be owned by the VPP owner or third parties. 1 Department of Energy, Virtual Power Plants, Liftoff report, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025- 07/LIFTOFF_DOE_Virtual%20Power%20Plants%202023.pdf 31 Appendix C. Workshop Slides To view the workshop slides, visit the following links: • Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Introduction and Objectives: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/gen/fy26/95420.pdf • ARIES Cyber Range Overview and Threat-to-Consequence Compounding Hazards Demonstration: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/fy26osti/95377.pdf • Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders Involved in VPPs: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/fy26osti/95473.pdf • Distributed Energy Resource Standards Library Overview: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/fy26osti/95421.pdf • Fast-Tracking Technology Solutions to Boost Cybersecurity in Virtual Power Plant and Aggregator Operations: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/fy26osti/95364.pdf. 32