HN HM eo) pas a P= x oe O aii | 209 3 00012 3 [/ \7 ESTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION AND GENERAL LINGUISTIC TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF BENEDETTO CROCE THEORY INTUITION AND EXPRESSION Intuitive knowledge—Its independence in respect to the intellect— Intuition and perception—Intuition and the concepts of space and time—lIntuition and sensation—Intuition and association— Intuition and representation—Intuition and expression—Illu- sions as to their difference—Identity of intuition and expression Il INTUITION AND ART Corollaries and explanations—Identity of art and of intuitive know- ledge—No specitic difference—No difference of intensity—Dif- ference extensive and empirical—Artistic genius—Content and | form in AEsthetic—Critique of the imitation of nature and of the artistic illusion—Critique of art conceived as a sentimental, not a theoretic fact—The origin of Aisthetic, and sentiment— Critique of the theory of sesthetic senses—Unity and indivisi- bility of the work of art—Art_as deliverer 1X PAGE XV x x THEORY OF: A251 HE IC Ill ART AND PHILOSOPHY Indissolubility of intellective and of intuitive knowledge—Critique of the negations of this thesis—Art and science—Content and form: another meaning. Prose and poetry—The relation of first and second degree—Inexistence of other cognoscitive forms —Historicity—Identity and difference in respect of art—His- torical criticism—Historical scepticism—Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural sciences, and their limits—The phenomenon and the noumenon IV HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN AESTHETIC Critique of the verisimilar and of naturalism—Critique of ideas in art, of art as thesis, and of the typical—Critique of the symbol and of the allegory—Critique of the theory of artistic and literary categories—Errors derived from this theory in judgments on art—Empirical meaning of the divisions of the categories Ne ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN HISTORY AND IN LOGIC Critique of the philosophy of History—Aisthetic invasions of Logic —Logic in its essence—Distinction between logical and non- logical judgments— The syllogism — False Logic and true Esthetic—Logic reformed VI THEORETIC AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITY The will—The will as ulterior grade in respect of knowledge—Ob- jections and explanations—Critique of practical judgments or judgments of value—Exclusion of the practical from the zsthetic —Critique of the theory of the end of art and of the choice of content—Practical innocence of art—Independence of art— Critique of the saying: the style is the man—Critique of the concept of sincerity in art PAGE 53 65 77 CONTENES Xi VII ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL The two forms of practical activity —The economically useful—Dis- ot tinction between the useful and the technical — Distinction between the useful and the egoistic—Economic and moral voli- tion—Pure economicity—The economic side of morality—The merely economical and the error of the morally indifferent— — Critique of_utilitarianism and the reform of Ethic and of Economic_-Phenomenon and noumenon in practical activity . 89 Vill EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS The system of the spirit—The forms of genius—Inexistence of a fifth form of activity —Law ; sociality—Religiosity—Metaphysic —Mental imagination and the intuitive intellect — Mystical Esthetic—Mortality and immortality of art. : ; ; 99 IX INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR GRADES AND CRITIQUE OF RHETORIC The characteristics of art—Inexistence of modes of expression— Impossibility of translations—Critique of rhetorical categories —Enmpirical meaning of rhetorical categories— Their use as synonyms of the esthetic fact—Their use as indicating various esthetic imperfections—Their use as transcending the zesthetic fact, and in the service of science — Rhetoric in schools — Similarities of expressions—Relative possibility of translations. 109 Xx ESTHETIC SENTIMENTS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY ~ Various meanings of the word sentiment—Sentiment as activity— Identification of sentiment with economic activity—Critique of hedonism—Sentiment as concomitant of every form of activity oe X11 dathORY OF AS TEE Ie —Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of sentiments— Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union — The beautiful as the value of expression, or expression without adjunct—The ugly and the elements of beauty that constitute it —Illusion that there exist expressions neither beautiful nor ugly—Proper esthetic sentiments and concomitant and acci- dental sentiments—Critique of apparent sentiments . A XI CRITIQUE OF ASTHETIC HEDONISM = [eae of the beautiful as what pleases the superior senses — Critique of the theory of play — Critique of the theory of sexuality and of the triumph—Critique of the Aésthetic of the sympathetic—Meaning in it of content and of form—Aisthetic hedonism and moralism — The rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic negation of art—Critique of pure beauty . XII PAGE I2I 134 THE ASTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-ASTHETIC CONCEPTS Pseudo-zesthetic concepts, and the Aésthetic of the sympathetic— Critique of the theory of the ugly in art and of its surmounting —Pseudo-zsthetic concepts appertain to Psychology—Impossi- bility of rigorous definitions of these—Examples : definitions of the sublime, of the comic, of the humorous—Relation between those concepts and zesthetic concepts XIII THE SO-CALLED PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL IN NATURE AND IN ART Esthetic activity and physical concepts—Expression in the esthetic sense, and expression in the naturalistic sense—Intuitions and memory—The production of aids to memory—The physically beautiful— Content and form: another meaning — Natural beauty and _ artificial beauty—Mixed beauty—Writings—The beautiful that is free and that which is not free-—Critique of the beautiful that is not free—Stimulants of production 142 153 CONTENTS XIV ERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSIC AND ZSTHETIC Critique of zsthetic associationism—Critique of cesthetic physic— Critique of the theory of the beauty of the human body— Critique of the beauty of geometrical figures — Critique of another aspect of the imitation of nature — Critique of the theory of the elementary forms of the beautiful—Critigue of the search for_the objective conditions of the beautiful — The astrology of Aésthetic XV THE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS The practical activity of externalization—The technique of external- ization — Technical theories of single arts — Critique of the classifications of the arts—Relation of the activity of external- ization with utility and morality XVI TASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART ZEsthetic judgment, Its identity with esthetic reproduction— Impossibility of divergences—Identity of taste and genius— Analogy with the other activities — Critique of absolutism (intellectualism) and of cesthetic relativism—Critique of relative relativism—Objections founded on the variation of the stimulus and of the psychic disposition—Critique of the distinction of signs as natural and conventional—The surmounting of variety Restorations and historical interpretation XVII THE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND OF ART Historical criticism in literature and art. Its importance—Artistic and literary history. Its distinction from historical criticism and from the esthetic judgment—The method of artistic and Xill PAGE 170 182 194 XIV PRE ORY OF otis fie literary history—Critique of the problem of the origin of art— oe The criterion of progress and history—Inexistence of a single line of progress in artistic and literary history—Errors in respect of this law—Other meanings of the word ‘‘ progress” in relation to “Esthetic . : ; ; : : : : : ape oul XVIII CONCLUSION : IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND. ASTHEAIC Summary of the inquiry—Identity of Linguistic with sthetic— Aesthetic formulation of linguistic problems. Nature of language—Origin of language and its development—Relation between Grammatic and Logic—Grammatical categories or parts of speech—Individuality of speech and the classification of. languages—Impossibility of a normative Grammatic—Didactic organisms — Elementary linguistic elements, or roots — The esthetic judgment and the model language—Conclusion . 230 HISTORICAL SUMMARY ZEsthetic ideas in Graeco-Roman antiquity—In the Middle Age and at the Renaissance—Fermentation of thought in the seventeenth century—Esthetic ideas in Cartesianism, Leibnitzianism, and in the ‘‘ Hsthetic” of Baumgarten—G. B. Vico—Aésthetic doctrines in the eighteenth century—Emmanuel Kant—The ‘Esthetic of Idealism with Schiller and Hegel—Schopenhauer and Herbart —Friedrich Schleiermacher —The philosophy of language with Humboldt and Steinthal—A#sthetic in France, England, and Italy during the first half of the nineteenth century—Francesco de Sanctis—The Aisthetic of the epigoni— Positivism and esthetic naturalism — A®sthetic psychologism and other recent tendencies—Glance at the history of certain particular doctrines—Conclusion . : : : : reo APPENDIX Translation of the lecture on Pure Intuition and the lyrical nature of art, delivered by Benedetto Croce before the International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg. ; : : Rae y A — SS. RSS Se aH a ea Int RODUCEION THERE are always Americas to be discovered: the most interesting in Europe. I can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to have discovered a Columbus. His name is Benedetto Croce, and he dwells on the shores of the Mediterranean, at Naples, city of the antique Parthenope. Croce’s America cannot be expressed in geographical terms. It is more important than any space of mountain and river, of forest and dale. It belongs to the kingdom of the spirit, and has many provinces. That province which most interests me, I have striven in the following pages to annex to the possessions of the Anglo-Saxon race; an act which cannot be blamed as predatory, since it may be said of philosophy more truly than of love, that “to divide is not to take away.” The Historical Summary will show how many a brave adventurer has navigated the perilous seas of speculation upon Art, how _Aristotle’s\_aiaguellous insight _gave him glimpses of its beauty, how* Plato threw away its golden fruit, how Baumgarten sounded the depth of its waters, Kant sailed along its coast without landing, and Vico hoisted the Italian flag upon its shore. XV XVI1 THEORY OF Alot ne ie But Benedetto Croce has been the first thoroughly to explore it, cutting his way inland ‘through the tangled undergrowth of imperfect thought. He has measured its length and breadth, marked out and described its spiritual features with minute accuracy. The country thus won to philosophy will always bear his name, Estetica di Croce, a new America. It-was at Naples, in the winter of 10607, that: | first saw the Philosopher of /#sthetic. Benedetto Croce, although born in the Abruzzi, Province of Aquila (1866), is essentially a Neapolitan, and rarely remains long absent from the city, on the shore of that magical sea, where once Ulysses sailed, and where sometimes yet (near Amalfi) we may hear the Syrens sing their song. But more wonderful than the song of any Syren seems to me the Theory of Aésthetic as ; the Science of Expression, and that is why I have | overcome the obstacles that stood between me and the giving of this theory, which in my belief is the truth, to the English-speaking world. No one could have been further removed than my- self, as I turned over at Naples the pages of La Critica, from any idea that I was nearing the solution of the problem of Art. All my youth it had haunted me. As an undergraduate at Oxford I had caught the exquisite cadence of Walter Pater’s speech, as it came from his very lips, or rose like the perfume of some exotic flower from the ribbed pages of the Renaissance. Seeming to solve the riddle of the Sphinx, he solved it not—only delighted with pure pleasure of poetry and of subtle thought as he led one along the pathways of his Enchanted Garden, where I shall always love to tread. Pe RODUCTION XVil Oscar Wilde, too, I had often heard at his best, the most brilliant talker of our time, his wit flashing in the spring sunlight of Oxford luncheon-parties as now in his beautiful writings, like the jewelled rapier of Mercutio. But his works, too, will be searched in vain by the seeker after definite esthetic truth. With A. C. Swinburne I had sat and watched the, lava that yet flowed from those lips that were kissed. in youth by all the Muses. Neither from him nor from Be WEEUGES “balllant aphorisms on art could be gathered anything more than the exquisite pleasure of the moment: the povoypoves 7dovn. Of the great pedagogues, I had known, but never sat at the: fees of Jowett, whom I found far less inspiring than any of the great men above mentioned. Among the dead, I had studied Herbert Spencer and Matthew Arnold, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Guyau: I had conversed with that living Neo-Latin, Anatole France, the modern Rousseau, and had enjoyed the marvellous irony and eloquence of his writings, which, while they delight the society in which he lives, may well be one of the causes that lead to its eventual destruction. The solution of the problem of A®sthetic is not in the gift of the Muses. To return to Naples. As I looked over those pages of the bound volumes of La Critica 1 soon became aware that I was in the presence of a mind far above the ordinary level of literary criticism. The profound studies of Carducci, of d’Annunzio, and of Pascoli (to name but three), in which those writers passed before me in all their strength and in all their weakness, led me to devote several days to the Crztica. At the end of that time I was convinced that I had made a b iv! XVill PoE ORY OF ADS iit hy le discovery, and wrote to the philosopher, who owns and edits that journal. In response to his invitation, I made my way, on a sunny day in November, past the little shops of the coral-vendors that surround, like a necklace, the Rione de la Bellezza, and wound zigzag along the over-crowded Toledo. I knew that Signor Croce lived in the old part of the town, but had hardly anticipated so remarkable a change as I experienced on passing beneath the great archway: and finding myself in old Naples. This has already been described elsewhere, and I will not here dilate upon this world within a world, having so much of greater interest to tell ina brief space. I will merely say that the costumes here seemed more picturesque, the dark eyes flashed more dangerously than elsewhere, there was a quaint life, an animation about the streets, different from anything I had known before. As I climbed the lofty stone steps of the Palazzo to the floor where dwells the philosopher of A‘sthetic I felt as though I had stumbled into the eighteenth century and were calling on Giambattista Vico, After a brief inspection by a young man with the appearance of a secretary, I was told that I was expected, and admitted into a small room opening out of the hall. Thence, after a few moments’ waiting, I was led into a much larger room. The walls.were lined all round with bookcases, barred and numbered, filled with volumes forming part of the philosopher’s great library. I had not long to wait. A door opened behind me on my left, and a rather short, thick-set man advanced to greet me, and pronouncing my name at the same time with a slight foreign accent, asked me to be seated beside him. After the interchange of a few INTRODUCEION ab brief formule of politeness in French, our conversation was carried on in Italian, and I had a better opportunity of studying my host’s air and manner. His hands he held clasped before him, but frequently released them, to make those vivid gestures with which Neapolitans frequently clinch their phrase. His most remarkable feature was his eyes, of a greenish grey: extraordinary eyes, not for beauty, but for their fathomless depth, and for the sympathy which one felt welling up in them from the soul beneath. This was especially noticeable as our conversation fell upon the question of Art and upon the many problems bound up with it. I do not know how long that first interview lasted, but it seemed a few minutes only, during which was displayed before me a vast panorama of unknown height and head- land, of league upon league of forest, with its bright- winged birds of thought flying from tree to tree down the long avenues into the dim blue vistas Gish unknown. I returned with my brain awhirl, as though I had been in fairyland, and when I looked at the second edition of the Esée¢zca, with his inscription, I was sure of it. These lines will suffice to show how the translation of the Estetica originated from the acquaintance thus formed, which has developed into friendship. I will now make brief mention of Benedetto Croce’s other work, especially in so far as it throws light upon the 4Esthetic. For this purpose, besides articles in Italian and German reviews, I have made use of the excellent monograph on the philosopher, by G. Prezzolini.’ First, then, it will be well to point out that the 1 Napoli, Riccardo Ricciardi, 1909. aX THEORY OF 75 Tr eae Ai sthetic forms part of a complete philosophical system, to which the author gives the general title of “Philosophy of the Spirit.’ The “sthetic is the first of the three volumes. The second is the Logzc, the third the Phzlosophy of the Practical. In the Logzc, as elsewhere in the system, Croce combats that false conception, by which natural science, in the shape of psychology, makes claim to philosophy, and formal logic to absolute value. The thesis of the pure concept cannot be discussed here. It is connected ‘ with the logic of evolution as discovered by Hegel,’ and is the only logic which contains in itself the ‘interpretation and the continuity of reality. Bergson in his L’Evolution Créatrice deals with logic in a some- what similar manner. I recently heard him lecture on the distinction between spirit and matter at the College de France, and those.who read French and Italian will find that both Croce’s Logic and the book above mentioned by the French philosopher will amply repay their labour. The conception of nature as something lying outside the spirit which informs it, as the non-being which aspires to being, underlies all Croce’s thought, and we find constant reference to it throughout his philosophical system. With regard to the third volume, the Philosophy of the Practical, it is impossible here to give more than a hint of its treasures. I merely refer in passing to the treatment of the will, which is posited as a unity inseparable from the volitional act. For Croce there is no difference between action and intention, means and end: they are one thing, inseparable as the intuition-expression of A®sthetic. The Philosophy of the Practical is a logic and science of the will, not a } | ; j | | | FR ODE CLION one normative science. Just asin Atsthetic the individuality of expression made models and rules impossible, so in practical life the individuality of action removes the possibility of catalogues of virtues, of the exact application of laws, of the existence of practical judg- ments and judgments of value prevzous to action. The reader will probably ask here: But what, then, becomes of morality? The question will be found answered in the 7heory of Asthetic, and | will merely say here that Croce’s thesis of the double degree of ‘the practical activity, economic and moral, is one of the greatest contributions to modern thought. Just as it is proved in the Theory of Esthetic that the‘ concept depends upon the zztuztion, which is the first . degree, the primary and indispensable thing, so it is proved in the Philosophy of the Practical that Morality » or Ethic depends upon Lcononic, which is the first degree of the practical activity. The volitional act is always economic, but true freedom of the will exists and consists in conforming not merely to economic, but to moral conditions, to the human spirit, which is greater than any individual. Here we are face to face with the ethics of Christianity, to which Croce accords all honour. This Philosophy of the Spirit is symptomatic of the happy reaction of the twentieth century against the crude materialism of the second half of the nineteenth. It isthe spirit which gives to the work of art its value, not this or that method of arrangement, this or that tint or cadence, which can always be copied by skilful plagiarists: not so the sfzrz¢ of the creator. In England we hear too much of (natural) science, which has usurped the very name of Philosophy. The XXil Ta BORY OF fio Te wic natural sciences are very well in their place, but dis- coveries such as aviation are of infinitely less importance to the race than the smallest addition to the philosophy of the spirit. Empirical science, with the collusion of positivism, has stolen the cloak of philosophy and must be made to give it back. Among Croce’s other important contributions to thought must be mentioned his definition of History as being esthetic and differing from Art solely in that history represents the vea/, art the posszble. In connec- tion with this definition and its proof, the philosopher recounts how he used to hold an opposite view. Doing everything thoroughly, he had prepared and written out a long disquisition on this thesis, which was already in type, when suddenly, from the midst of his medita- tions, the truth flashed upon him. He saw for the first time clearly that history cannot be a science, since, like _art, it always deals with the particular, Without a moment’s hesitation he hastened to the printers and bade them break up the type. This incident is illustrative of the sincerity and good faith of Benedetto Croce. One knows him to be severe for the faults and weaknesses of others, merciless for his own. Yet though severe, the editor of La Critica is un- compromisingly just, and would never allow personal dislike or jealousy, or any extrinsic consideration, to stand in the way of fair treatment to the writer con- cerned, Many superficial English critics might benefit considerably by attention to this quality in one who is in other respects also so immeasurably their superior. A good instance of this impartiality is his critique of Schopenhauer, with whose system he is in complete [Na R ODI LION no.abtl disagreement, yet affords him full credit for what of truth is contained in his voluminous writings.’ Croce’s education was largely completed in Germany, and on account of their thoroughness he has always been an upholder of German methods. One of his complaints against the Italian Positivists is that they only read second-rate works in French or at the most “the dilettante booklets published in such profusion by the Anglo-Saxon press.” This tendency towards German thought, especially in philosophy, depends upon the fact of the former undoubted supremacy of Germany in that field, but Croce does not for a moment admit the inferiority of the Neo-Latin races, and adds with homely humour in reference to Germany, that we “must not throw away the baby with the bath-water eae Close, arduous study and clear thought are the only key to scientific (philosophical) truth, and Croce never begins an article for a newspaper without the complete collection of the works of the author to be criticized, and his own elaborate notes on the table before him. Schopenhauer said there were three kinds of writers—those who write without thinking, the great majority ; those who think while they write, not very numerous , those who write after they have thought, very rare. Croce certainly belongs to the last division, and, as I have said, always feeds his thought upon complete erudition. The bibliography of the works consulted for the Fstetzca alone, as printed at the end of the Italian edition, extends to many pages and contains references to works in any way dealing with the subject in all the European languages. For instance, Croce has studied 1 The reader will find this critique summarized in the historical portion of this volume. XXIV ERMBORY OF 4s tire Mr. B. Bosanquet’s eclectic works on Aésthetic, largely based upon German sources and by no means without value. But he takes exception to Mr. Bosanquet’s statement that 4e has consulted all works of importance on the subject of Aésthetic. As a matter of fact, Mr. Bosanquet reveals his ignorance of the greater part of the contribution to A%sthetic made by the Neo-Latin races, which the reader of this book will recognize as of first-rate importance. This thoroughness it is which gives such importance to the literary and philosophical criticisms of La Critica. Croce’s method is always historical, and his object in approaching any work of art is to classify the spirit of its author, as expressed in that work. There are, he maintains, but two things to be considered in criticizing a book. These are, firstly, what is its peculiarity, in what way is it singular, how is it differentiated from other works? Secondly, what is its degree of purzty >— That is, to what extent has its author kept himself free from all considerations alien to the perfection of the work as an expression, as a lyrical intuition? With the answering of these questions Croce is satisfied, He does not care to know if the author keep a motor- car, like Maeterlinck; or prefer to walk on Putney Heath, like Swinburne. This amounts to saying that all works of art must be judged by their own standard. How far has the author succeeded in doing what he intended ? 7 Croce is far above any personal animus, although the same cannot be said of those he criticizes. These, like d’Annunzio, whose limitations he points out—his egoism, his lack of human sympathy—are often very bitter, and accuse the penetrating critic of want of IVERODUCTION XXV courtesy. This seriousness of purpose runs like a golden thread through all Croce’s work. The flimsy super- ficial remarks on poetry and fiction which too often pass for criticism in England (Scotland is a good deal more thorough) are put to shame by La Critica, the study of which I commend to all readers who read or wish to read Italian.’ They will find in its back numbers a complete picture of a century of Italian literature, besides a store-house of philosophical criticism. The Quarterly and Edinburgh Reviews are our only journals which can be compared to 7he Crztica, and they are less exhaustive on the philosophical side. We should have to add to these Mud and the Hzbbert Journal to get even an approximation to the scope of the Italian review. As regards Croce’s general philosophical position, it is important to understand that he is zo¢ a Hegelian, in the sense of being a close follower of that philosopher. One of his last works is that in which he deals in a masterly manner with the philosophy of Hegel. The title may be translated, “ What is living and what is dead of the philosophy of Hegel.” Here he explains to us the Hegelian system more clearly than that wondrous edifice was ever before explained, and we realize at the same time that Croce is quite as in- dependent of Hegel as of Kant, of Vico as of Spinoza. Of course he has made use of the best of Hegel, just as every thinker makes use of his predecessors and is in his turn made use of by those that follow him. But it is incorrect to accuse of Hegelianism the author of an anti-hegelian &sthetic, of a Logic where Hegel is only half accepted, and of a Philosophy of the Practical, 1 La Critica is published every other month by Laterza of Bari. XXV1 THEORY OF wo thE ie which contains hardly a trace of Hegel. I give an instance. If the great conquest of Hegel be the dialectic of opposites, his great mistake lies in the confusion of opposites with things which are distinct but not opposite. If, says Croce, we take as an example the application of the Hegelian triad that formulates becoming (affirmation, negation and syn- thesis), we find it applicable for those opposites which are true and false, good and evil, being and not-being, but zot applicable to things which are distinct but not opposite, such as art and philosophy, beauty and truth, the useful and the moral. These confusions led Hegel to talk of the death of art, to conceive as possible a Philosophy of History, and to the application of the © natural sciences to the absurd task of constructing a Philosophy of Nature. Croce has cleared away these diffi- culties by shewing that if from the meeting of opposites must arise a superior synthesis, such a synthesis cannot arise from things which are distinct but not opposzte, since the former are connected together as superior and inferior, and the inferior can exist without the superior, but ot vice versa. Thus we see how philo- sophy cannot exist without art, while art, occupying the lower place, can and does exist without philosophy. This brief example reveals Croce’s independence in dealing with Hegelian problems. I know of no philosopher more generous than Croce in praise and elucidation of other workers in the same field, past and present. For instance, and apart from Hegel, Kant has to thank him for drawing attention to the marvellous excellence of the Crzteque of Judgment, generally neglected in favour of the Critiques of Pure Reason and of Practical Judgment ; 2 TORee Be INTRODUCTION XXVil , é Baumgarten for drawing the attention of the world to his obscure name and for reprinting his Latin thesis } in which the word sthetéc occurs for the first time ; and Schleiermacher for the tributes paid to his neglected genius in the History of A®sthetic. La Critica, too, is full of generous appreciation of contemporaries by Croce and by that profound thinker, Gentile. But it is not only philosophers who have reason to be grateful to Croce for his untiring zeal and diligence. Historians, economists, poets, actors, and writers of fiction have been rescued from their undeserved limbo by this valiant Red Cross knight, and now shine with due brilliance in the circle of their peers. It must also be admitted that a large number of false lights, popular will o’ the wisps, have been ruthlessly ex- tinguished with the same breath. For instance, Karl Marx, the socialist theorist and agitator, finds in Croce an exponent of his views, in so far as they are based upon the truth, but where he blunders, his critic immediately reveals the origin and nature of his mistakes. Croce’s studies in Economic are chiefly represented by his work, the title of which may be translated “ Historical Materialism and Marxist Economic.” To indicate the breadth and variety of Croce’s work I will mention the further monograph on the sixteenth century Neapolitan Pulcinella (the original of our Punch), and the personage of the Neapolitan in comedy, a monument of erudition and of acute and of lively dramatic criticism, that would alone have occupied an ordinary man’s activity for half a lifetime. One must remember, however, that Croce’s average working day is of ten hours. His interest is concentrated on things of the mind, and although he sits on several Royal Com- Vite RORY OF Aoi bie missions, such as those of the Archives of all Italy and of the monument to King Victor Emmanuel, he has taken no university degree, and much dislikes any affectation of academic superiority. He is ready to meet any one on equal terms and try with them to get at the truth on any subject, be it historical, literary, or philosophical. “Truth,” he says, “is democratic,” and I can testify that the search for it, in his company, is very stimulating. As is well said by Prezzolini, “He has a new word for all There can be no doubt of the great value of Croce’s work as an educative influence,and if we are to judge of a philosophical system by its action on others, then we must place the Philosophy of the Spirit very high. It may be said with perfect truth that since the death of the poet Carducci there has been no influence in Italy to compare with that of Benedetto Croce. His dislike of Academies and of all forms of prejudice runs parallel with his breadth and sympathy with all forms of thought. His activity in the present is only equalled by his reverence for the past. Naples he loves with the blind love of the child for its parent, and he has been of notable assistance to such Neapolitan talent as is manifested in the works of Salvatore di Giacomo, whose best poems are written in the dialect of Naples, or rather in a dialect of his own, which Croce had difficulty in persuading the author always to retain. The original jet of inspiration having been in dialect, it is clear that to amend this inspiration at the suggestion of wiseacres at the Café would have been to ruin it altogether. Of the popularity that his system and teaching have already attained we may judge by the fact that the <= INERODUCTION XX1X Aisthetic; despite the difficulty of the subject, is already in its third edition in Italy, where, owing to its influence, philosophy sells better than fiction ; while the French and Germans, not to mention the Czechs, have long had translations of the earlier editions. His Logic is on the point of appearing in its second edition, and I have no doubt that the Phzlosophy of the Practical will eventually equal these works in popularity. The importance and value of Italian thought have been too long neglected in Great Britain, Where, as in Benedetto Croce, we get the clarity of vision of the Latin, joined to the thoroughness and erudition of the best German tradition, we have a combination of rare power and effectiveness, which can by no means be neglected. The philosopher feels that he has a great mission, which is nothing less than the leading back of thought to belief in. the spirit, deserted by so many for crude empiricism and positivism. His view of philosophy is that it sums up all the higher human activities, includ- ing religion, and that in proper hands it is able to solve any problem. But there is no finality about problems: the solution of one leads to the posing of another, and so on. Man is the maker of life, and his spirit ever proceeds from a lower to a higher perfection. Con- nected with this view of life is Croce’s dislike of “ Modernism.” When once a problem has been correctly solved, it is absurd to return to the same problem. Roman Catholicism cannot march with the times. It 1 This translation is made from the third Italian edition (Bari, 1909), enlarged and corrected by the author. The Theory of sthetec first appeared in 1900 in the form of a communication to the Accademia Pontiana of Naples, vol. xxx. The first edition is dated 1902, the second 1904 (Palermo). OS mir BORY- OF eat Ee can only exist by being conservative—its only Logic is to be illogical. Therefore, Croce is opposed to Loisy and Neo-Catholicism, and supports the Encyclical against Modernism. The Catholic religion, with its great stores of myth and morality, which for many centuries was the best thing in the world, is still there for those who are unable to assimilate other food. Another instance of his dislike for Modernism is his criticism of Pascoli, whose attempts to reveal enigmas in the writings of Dante he looks upon as useless. We do not, he says, read Dante in the twentieth century for his hidden meanings, but for his revealed poetry. I believe that Croce will one day be recognized as one of the very few great teachers of humanity. At present he is not appreciated at nearly his full value. One rises from a study of his philosophy with a sense of having been all the time as it were in personal touch with the truth, which is very far from the case after the perusal of certain other philosophies. Croce has been called the philosopher-poet, and if we take philosophy as Novalis understood it, certainly Croce does belong to the poets, though not to the formal category of those who write in verse. Croce is at any rate a born philosopher, and as every trade tends to make its object prosaic, so does every vocation tend to make it poetic. Vet no one has toiled more earnestly than Croce. “Thorough” might well be his motto, and if to-day he is admitted to be a classic without the stiffness one connects with that term, be sure he has well merited the designation. His name stands for the best that Italy has to give the world of serious, stimulating thought. I know nothing to equal it elsewhere. INTRODUCTION bo. 9 Secure in his strength, Croce will often introduce a joke or some amusing illustration from contemporary life, in the midst of a most profound and serious argument. This spirit of mirth is a sign of superiority. He who is not sure of himself can spare no energy for the making of mirth. Croce loves to laugh at his enemies and with his friends. So the philosopher of Naples sits by the blue gulf and explains the universe to those who have ears to hear. “ One can philosophize anywhere,” he says—but he remains significantly at Naples. Thus I conclude these brief remarks upon the author of the #sthetzc, confident that those who give time and attention to its study will be grateful for having placed in their hands this pearl of great price from the diadem of the antique Parthenope. DOUGLAS AINSLIE. THE ATHENZUM, PALL MALL, May 1909. INTUITION AND EXPRESSION Human knowledge has two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; know- ledge obtained through the imagination or know- ledge obtained through the intellect ; knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the universal ; of individual things or of the relations between them: it is, in fact, productive either of images or of concepts. | In ordinary life, constant appeal is made to intuitive knowledge. It is said to be impossible to give expression to certain truths; that they are not demonstrable by syllogisms; that they must be learnt intuitively. The politician finds fault with the abstract reasoner, who is without a lively knowledge of actual conditions; the pedagogue insists upon the necessity of develop- ing the intuitive faculty in the pupil before everything else; the critic in judging a work of B Intuitive knowledge. Its independ- ence in respect to intellective knowledge. 2 THEORY, OF As tik Tic I art makes it a point of honour to set aside theory and abstractions, and to judge it by direct intuition; the practical man professes to live rather by intuition than by reason. But this ample acknowledgment, granted to intuitive knowledge in ordinary life, does not meet with an equal and adequate acknowledg- ment in the field of theory and of philosophy. There exists a very ancient science of intellective knowledge, admitted by all without discussion, namely, Logic; but a _ science of intuitive knowledge is timidly and with difficulty admitted by but a few. Logical knowledge has appropri- ated the lion’s share; and if she does not quite slay and devour her companion, yet yields to her with difficulty the humble little place of maid- servant or doorkeeper. What, it says, is intuitive knowledge without the light of intellective knowledge? It is a servant without a master ; and though a master find a servant useful, the master is a necessity to the servant, since he enables him to gain his livelihood. Intuition is blind ; intellect lends her eyes. Now, the first point to be firmly fixed in the mind is that intuitive knowledge has no need of a master, nor to lean upon any one; she does not need to borrow the eyes of others, for she ' i $ , peoINEOLTION AND EXPRESSION = 3 has most excellent eyes of her own. Doubtless it is possible to find concepts mingled with intuitions. But in many other intuitions there is no trace of such a mixture, which proves that it is not necessary. The impression of a moon- light scene by a painter; the outline of a country drawn by a cartographer; a musical motive, " tender or energetic; the words of a sighing lyric, or those with which we ask, command and ament in ordinary life, may well all be intuitive facts without a shadow of intellective relation. But, think what one may of these instances, and admitting further that one may maintain that the greater part of the intuitions of civilized man are impregnated with concepts, there yet remains to be observed something more important and ‘more conclusive. Those concepts which are \found mingled and fused with the intuitions, are no longer concepts, in so far as they are really _ ningled and fused, for they have lost all _~ independence and autonomy. They have been concepts, but they have now become simple elements of intuition. The philosophical maxims placed in the mouth of a personage of tragedy or of comedy, perform there the function, not of concepts, but of characteristics of such person- age; in the same way as the red in a painted 4 THEORY - OF Asi me tite I figure does not there represent the red colour of the physicists, but is a characteristic element of the portrait. The whole it is that determines ./ the quality of the parts. A work of art may be full of philosophical concepts ; it may contain them in greater abundance and they may be there even more profound than in a philosophical dissertation, which in its turn may be rich to overflowing with descriptions and_ intuitions. But, notwithstanding all these concepts it may contain, the result of the work of art is an intuition; and notwithstanding all those in- tuitions, the result of the philosophical disserta- tion is a concept. The Promessz Spost contains copious ethical observations and distinctions, but it does not for that reason lose in its total effect its character of simple story, of intuition. In like manner the anecdotes and satirical effusions which may be found in the works’ of a philosopher like Schopenhauer, do not remove from those works their character of intellective treatises. The difference between a scientific work and a work of art, that is, between an intellective fact and an intuitive fact lies in the result, in the diverse effect aimed at by their respective authors. This it is that deter- mines and rules over the several parts of each. 7 INTUITION AND EXPRESSION. 5 But to admit the independence of intuition poscpiclae: as regards concept does not suffice to give a true and precise idea of intuition. Another error arises among those who recognize this, or who, at any rate, do not make intuition explicitly dependent upon the intellect. This _ error obscures and confounds the real nature of . | intuition. By intuition is frequently understood 7 \the perception or knowledge of actual reality, the apprehension of something as read. Certainly perception is intuition: the per- ception of the room in which I am writing, of the ink-bottle and paper that are before me, of the ‘pen I am using, of the objects that I touch and make use of as instruments of my person, which, if it write, therefore exists ;— these are all intuitions. But the image that is now passing through my brain of a me writing in another room, in another town, with different paper, pen and ink, is also an intuition. This means that the distinction between reality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary, to the true nature of intuition. If we assume the existence of a human mind which should have intuitions for the first time, it would seem that it could have intuitions of effective reality only, that is to say, that it could have perceptions of nothing 6 THEORY OF Seu e Tie I but the real. But if the knowledge of reality be based upon the distinction between real images and unreal images, and if this distinction does not originally exist, these intuitions would in truth not be intuitions either of the real or of the unreal, but pure intuitions. Where all is real, nothing is real. The child, with its difficulty of distinguishing true from false, history from fable, which are all one to childhood, can furnish us with a sort of very vague and only remotely approximate idea of this ingenuous _ state. Intuition is the indifferentiated unity of the ‘perception of the real and of the simple image lof the possible. In our intuitions we do not oppose ourselves to external reality as empirical beings, but we simply objectify our impressions, whatever they be. Intuition and Those, therefore, who look upon intuition the concepts Zs i ie as sensation formed and arranged simply accord- and time, ing to the categories of space and time, would seem to approximate more nearly to the truth. Space and time (they say) are the forms of intuition ; to have intuitions is to place in space and in temporal sequence. Intuitive activity would then consist in this double and concurrent function of spatiality and temporality. But for these two categories must be repeated what » — Peo eri OnN: AND: EXPRESSION.” » was said of intellectual distinctions, found mingled with intuitions. We have intuitions without space and without time: a tint of sky and a tint of sentiment, an Ah! of pain and_.an effort of will, objectified in consciousness. These are intuitions, which we possess, and with their making, space and time have nothing to do. In some intuitions, spatiality may be found without temporality, in others, this without that ; and even where both are found, they are per- ceived by posterior reflexion: they can be fused with the intuition in like manner with all its other elements : that is, they are in it aterzaliter and not formatter, as ingredients and not as essentials. Who, without a similar act of in- terruptive reflexion, is conscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story or a piece of music? That which intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and time, but character, individual | physiognomy. Several attempts may be noted in modern philosophy, which confirm the view here exposed. Space and time, far from being very simple and primitive functions, are shown to be intellectual constructions of great com- plexity. And further, even in some of those who do not altogether deny to space and time the quality of forming or of categories and Intuttion and ensation, 8 THEORY OF. AiS ware Fic 1 functions, one may observe the attempt to unify and to understand them in a different manner from that generally maintained in respect of these categories. Some reduce intuition to the unique category of spatiality, maintaining that time also can only be conceived in terms of space. Others abandon the three dimensions of space as not philosophically necessary, and conceive the function of spatiality as void of every particular spatial determination. But what could such a spatial function be, that should control even time? May it not be a residuum of criticisms and of negations from which arises merely the necessity to posit a generic intuitive activity? And is not this last truly determined, when one unique function is attributed to it, not spatializing nor temporalizing, but characterizing ? Or, better, when this is conceived as itself a category or function, which gives knowledge of things in their concretion and individuality ? Having thus freed intuitive knowledge from any suggestion of intellectualism and from every posterior and external adjunct, we must now make clear and determine its limits from another side and from a different kind of invasion and confusion. On the other side, and_ before the inferior boundary, is sensation, formless Pe INTUITION AND EXPRESSION 9 matter, which the spirit can never apprehend in itself, in so far as it is mere matter. This it can only possess with form and in form, but postulates its concept as, precisely, a limit. Matter, in its abstraction, is mechanism, passivity; it is what the spirit of man experiences, but does not produce. Without it no human knowledge and activity is possible; but mere matter produces animality, whatever is brutal and impulsive in man, not the spiritual dominion, which is humanity. How often do we strive to under- stand clearly what is passing within us? We do catch a glimpse of something, but this does not appear to the mind as objectified and formed. In such moments it is, that we best perceive the profound difference between matter and form. These are not two acts of ours, face to face with one another; but we assault and carry off the one that is outside us, while that within us tends to absorb and make its own that without. Matter, | attacked and conquered by form, gives place, to concrete form. It is the matter, the content, that differentiates one of our intuitions from another: form is constant : it is spiritual activity, while matter is changeable. Without matter, however, our spiritual activity would not leave its abstraction to become concrete and real, this ntuition and ssoctation, IO THEORY OF “/ESe ibe iie 1 or that spiritual content, this or that definite intuition. It is a curious fact, characteristic of our times, that this very form, this very activity of the spirit, which is essentially ourselves, is so easily ignored or denied. Some confound the spiritual activity of man with the metaphorical and mythological activity of so-called nature, which is mechanism and has no resemblance to human activity, save when we imagine, with A%sop, that arbores loguuntur non tantum ferae. Some even affirm that they have never observed in themselves this “ miracu- lous” activity, as though there were no difference, or only one of quantity, between sweating and thinking, feeling cold and the energy of the will. Others, certainly with greater reason, desire to unify activity and mechanism in a more general concept, though admitting that they are specifi- cally distinct. Let us, however, refrain for the ‘moment from examining if such a unification be possible, and in what sense, but admitting that the attempt may be made, it is clear that to unify two concepts in a third implies a difference between the two first. And here,it is this difference that is of importance and we set it in relief. Intuition has often been confounded with simple sensation. But, since this confusion is too a , reani Y ee wee ae we ULI IGN. AND EXPRESSION 11 shocking to good sense, it has more frequently been attenuated or concealed with a phraseology _which seems to wish to confuse and to distinguish them at the same time. Thus, it has been asserted that intuition is sensation, but not so much simple sensation as assoczation of sensations. The equivoque arises precisely from the word “association.” Association is understood, either as memory, mnemonic association, conscious recollection, and in that case is evident the absurdity of wishing to join together in memory elements which are not intuified, distinguished, possessed in some way by the spirit and pro- duced by consciousness: or it is understood as association of unconscious elements. In this case we remain in the world of sensation and of nature. Further, if with certain associationists we speak of an association which is neither memory nor flux of sensations, but is a fro- ductive association (formative, constructive, dis- tinguishing); then we admit the thing itself and deny only its name. In truth, productive association is no longer association in the sense of the sensualists, but syzthests, that is to say, spiritual activity. Synthesis may be called association; but with the concept of productivity is already posited the distinction tuition and wvesentation, 42 THEORY: OF ALS DEED Tie I between passivity and activity, between sensation and intuition. Other psychologists are disposed to distinguish from sensation something which is sensation no longer, but is not yet intellective concept: che representation or tmage. What is the difference between their representation or image, and our intuitive knowledge? The greatest, and none at all. ‘‘ Representation,” too, is a very equivocal word. If by representation be understood some- thing detached and standing out from the psychic base of the sensations, then representation is intuition. If, on the other hand, it be conceived as a complex sensation, a return is made to simple sensation, which does not change its quality according to its richness or poverty, operating alike in a rudimentary or in a developed organism full of traces of past sensations. Nor is the equi- voque remedied by defining representation as a psychic product of secondary order in relation to sensation, which should occupy the first place. What does secondary order mean here? Does it mean a qualitative, a formal difference? If so, we agree: representation is elaboration of sensation, it is intuition. Or does it mean greater complexity and complication, a quantita- tive, material difference? In that case intuition mm INTUITION AND EXPRESSION would be again confused with simple sensa- tion. And yet there is a sure method of distinguish- aici ing true intuition, true representation, from that which is inferior to it: the spiritual fact from the mechanical, passive, natural fact. Every true; intuition or representation is, also, expression4 That which does not objectify itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation | and naturality. The spirit does not obtain intuitions, otherwise than by making, forming, expressing. He who separates intuition from expression never succeeds in reuniting them. Intuitive activity possesses intuitions to the extent that wt expresses them.—Should this expres- | sion seem at first paradoxical, that is chiefly because, as a general rule, a too restricted meaning is given to the word “expression.” It is generally thought of as restricted to verbal expression. But there exist also non-verbal expressions, such as those of line, colour, and sound; to all of these must be extended our affirmation. The intuition and expression together of a painter are pictorial; those of a poet are verbal. But be it pictorial, or verbal, or musical, or whatever else it be called, to no intuition can expression be wanting, because it is an inseparable Lilusions as to their difference. 14 DH EORY OF STE Tie I part of intuition. How can we possess a true intuition of a geometrical figure, unless we possess so accurate an image of it as to be able to trace it immediately upon paper or on a slate? How can we have an intuition of the contour of a region, for example, of the island of Sicily, if we are not able to draw it as it is in all its meanderings? Every one can experience the internal illumination which follows upon _ his success in formulating to himself his impressions and sentiments, but only so far as he is able to formulate them. Sentiments or impressions, then, pass by means of words from the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the contemplative spirit. In this cognitive process it is impossible to distinguish intuition from expression. The one is produced with the other at the same instant, because they are not two, but one. The principal reason which makes our theme appear paradoxical as we maintain it, is the illusion or prejudice that we possess a more complete intuition of reality than we really do. One often hears people say that they have in their minds many important thoughts, but that they are not able to express them. In truth, if they really had them, they would have coined them into beautiful, ringing words, and thus 1 INTUITION AND EXPRESSION 1s expressed them. If these thoughts seem to vanish or to become scarce and poor in the act of expressing them, either they did not exist or they really were scarce and poor. People think that all of us ordinary men imagine and have intuitions of countries, figures and scenes, like painters ; of bodies, like sculptors; save that painters and sculptors know how to paint and to sculpture those images, while we possess them only within our souls. They believe that anyone could have imagined a Madonna of Raphael; but that Raphael was Raphael owing to his technical ability in putting the Madonna upon the canvas. Nothing can be more false than this view. The world of which as a rule we have intuitions, is a small thing. It consists of little expressions which gradually become greater and more ample with the increasing spiritual concentration of certain moments. These are the sort of words which we speak within ourselves, the judgments that we tacitly express: “Here is a man, here is a horse, this is heavy, this is hard, this pleases ine. etc, lt. is a, medley of lisht and colour, which could not pictorially attain to any more sincere expression than a haphazard splash of _ colours, from among which would with difficulty stand out a few special, distinctive traits. This 16 2HBPORY OF ASTHEAIC 1 and nothing else is what we possess in our ordinary life; this is the basis of our ordinary action. It is the index of a book. The labels tied to things take the place of the things themselves. This index and labels (which are themselves expressions) suffice for our small needs and small actions. From time to time we pass from the index to the book, from the label to the thing, or from the slight to the greater intuitions, and from these to the greatest and most lofty. This passage is sometimes far from being easy. It has been observed by those who have best studied the psychology of artists, that when, after having given a rapid glance at anyone, they attempt to obtain a true intuition of him, in order, for example, to paint his portrait, then this ordinary vision, that seemed so precise, so lively, reveals itself as little better than nothing. What remains is found to be at the most some superficial trait, which would not even suffice for a caricature. The person to be painted stands before the artist like a world to discover. Michael Angelo said, ‘one paints, not with one’s hands, but with one’s brain.” Leonardo shocked the prior of the convent delle Grazie by standing for days together opposite the ‘“ Last Supper” without touching it with the brush. He 7 INTUITION AND EXPRESSION 7 remarked of this attitude “that men of the most lofty genius, when they are doing the least work, are then the most active, seeking invention with their minds.” The painter is a painter, because he sees what others only feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see. We think we see a smile, but in reality we have only a vague impression of it, we do not perceive all the characteristic traits from which it results, as the painter perceives them after his internal meditations, which thus enable him to fix them on the canvas. Even in the case of our intimate friend, who is with us every day and at all hours, we do not possess intuitively more than, at the most, certain traits of his physiognomy, which enable us to distinguish him from others. The illusion is less easy as regards musical expression; because it would seem strange to everyone to say that the composer had added or attached notes to the motive, which is already in the mind of him who is not the composer. As if Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony were not his own intuition and his own intuition the Ninth Symphony. Thus, just as he who is deceived as to his material wealth is confuted by arithmetic, which states its exact amount, so is he confuted who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his own thoughts and images. e Ldentity of intuition and expression, 18 THEORY OF Aotme tie I He is brought back to reality, when he is obliged to cross the Bridge of Asses of expression. We say to the former, count; to the latter, speak, here is a pencil, draw, express yourself. We have each of us, as a matter of fact, a little of the poet, of the sculptor, of the musician, of the painter, of the prose writer: but how little, as compared with those who are so called, precisely because of the lofty degree in which they possess the most universal dispositions and energies of human nature! How little does a painter possess of the intuitions of a poet! How little does one painter possess those of another painter! Never- theless, that little is all our actual patrimony of intuitions or representations. Beyond these are only impressions, sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions, or whatever else one may term what is outside the spirit, not assimilated by man, postulated for the convenience of exposition, but effectively inexistent, if existence be also a spiritual fact. We may then add this to the verbal variants descriptive of intuition, noted at the beginning: intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge, independent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function; indifferent to discrimina- tions, posterior and empirical, to reality and to PRE, : INTUITION AND EXPRESSION 19 unreality, to formations and perceptions of space and time, even when posterior: intuition or representation is distinguished as form from what is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or from psychic material ; and this form, this taking possession of, is expression. To have an intuition is to express. It is nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than éo express. I] INTUITION AND ART orollariesand BEFORE proceeding further, it seems opportune xplanations. dentity of art md intuttive nowledge. No specitic lifference. to draw certain consequences from what has been established and to add some explanation. We have frankly identified intuitive or ex- pressive knowledge with the esthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive knowledge and attributing to them the character- istics of intuition, and wzce versa. But our identification is combated by the view, held even by many philosophers, who consider art to be an intuition of an altogether special sort. ‘Let us admit” (they say) “that art is intuition; but intuition is not always art: artistic intuition is of a distinct species differing from intuition in general by something more.” But no one has ever been able to indicate of what this something more consists. It has some- times been thought that art is not a simple intuition, but an intuition of an intuition, in the 20 i 11 ENTOIVTION AND AKT oe same way as the concept of science has been defined, not as the ordinary concept, but as the concept of a concept. Thus man should attain to art, by objectifying, not his sensations, as happens with ordinary intuition, but intuition itself. But this process of raising to a second power does not exist ; and the comparison of it with the ordinary and scientific concept does not imply what is wished, for the good reason that it is not true that the scientific concept is the concept of a concept. If this comparison imply anything, it implies just the opposite. The ordinary concept, if it be really a concept and not a simple representation, is a perfect concept, however poor and limited. Science substitutes concepts for representations ; it adds and substitutes other concepts larger and more comprehensive for those that are poor and limited. It is ever discovering new relations. But its method does not differ from that by which is formed the smallest universal in the brain of the humblest of men. What is generally called art, by antonomasia, collects intuitions that are wider and more complex than those which we generally experience, but these intuitions are always of sensations and impressions. Art is the expression of impressions, not the expression of expressions. 22 THEORY OF ASTOR TIC It No difference For the same reason, it cannot be admitted oes that intuition, which is generally called artistic, differs from ordinary intuition as to intensity. This would be the case if it were to operate differently on the same matter. But since artistic function is more widely distributed in different fields, but yet does not differ in method from ordinary intuition, the difference between the one and the other is not intensive but extensive. The intuition of the simplest popular love-song, which says the same thing, or very nearly, as a declaration of love such as issues at every moment from the lips of thousands of ordinary men, may be intensively perfect in its poor simplicity, although it be extensively so much more limited than the complex intuition of a love-song by Leopardi. The difference The whole difference, then, is quantitative, ind empirical, and as such, indifferent to philosophy, sczentza gualitatum. Certain men have a greater apti- / tude, a more frequent inclination fully to express certain complex states of the soul. These men are known in ordinary language as artists. Some very complicated and difficult expressions are more rarely achieved and these are called works of art. The limits of the expressions and in- tuitions that are called art, as opposed to those that are vulgarly called not-art, are empirical and It MN EO1 TION AND ART aes impossible to define. If an epigram be art, why not a single word? If a story; why not the occasional note of the journalist? If a landscape, why not a topographical sketch? The teacher of philosophy in Moliére’s comedy was right: ‘““whenever we speak we create prose.” But there will always be scholars like Monsieur Jourdain, astonished at having created prose for forty years without knowing it, and who will have difficulty in persuading themselves that when they call their servant John to bring their slippers, they have spoken nothing less than—prose. We must hold firmly to our identification, because among the principal reasons which have prevented AZsthetic, the science of art, from re- vealing the true nature of art, its real roots in human nature, has been its separation from the general spiritual life, the having made of it a sort of special function or aristocratic circle. No one is astonished when he learns from physio- logy that every cellule is an organism and every organism a cellule or synthesis of cellules. No one is astonished at finding in a lofty mountain the same chemical elements that compose a small stone or fragment. There is not one physiology of small animals and one of large animals ; nor is Artistic genius. 24 PiibORY, Of. 7S Pit Tie It there a special chemical theory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is not a science of lesser intuition distinct from a science of greater intuition, nor one of ordinary intuition distinct from artistic intuition. There is but one A%sthetic, the science of intuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the esthetic or artistic fact. And this A®sthetic is the true analogy of Logic. Logic includes, as facts of the same nature, the formation of the smallest and most ordinary concept and the most com- plicated scientific and philosophical system. Nor can we admit that the word genzus or artistic genius, as distinct from the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than a quantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to ourselves. But how could this be possible, unless there be identity of nature between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference be only one of quantity? It were well to change foeta nascitur into homo nascitur poeta: some men are born great poets, some small. The cult and superstition of the genius has arisen from this quantitative difference having been taken as a difference of quality. It has been forgotten that genius is not something that has fallen from heaven, but humanity itself. The man of genius, II INTUITION AND ART 25 who poses or is represented as distant from humanity, finds his punishment in becoming or appearing somewhat ridiculous. Examples of this are the gexzus of the romantic period and the superman of our time. But it is well to note here, that those who claim unconsciousness as the chief quality of an artistic genius, hurl him from an eminence far above humanity to a position far below it. Intuitive or artistic genius, like every form of human activity, is always conscious; otherwise it would be blind mechanism. The only thing that may be wanting to the artistic genius is the reflective consciousness, the superadded consciousness of the historian or critic, which is not essential to artistic genius. The relation between matter and form, or Content and 5 ; forn in between content and form, as it is generally xschecic called, is one of the most disputed questions in A®sthetic. Does the esthetic fact consist of content alone, or of form alone, or of both together? This question has taken on various meanings, which we shall mention, each in its place. But when these words are taken as signifying what we have above defined, and matter is understood as emotivity not zsthetically « elaborated, that is to say, impressions, and form 26 THEORY OF 75 Piretic It elaboration, intellectual activity and expression, then our meaning cannot be doubtful. We must, therefore, reject the thesis that makes the zesthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is, of the simple impressions), in like manner with that other thesis, which makes it to consist of a junction between form and content, that is, of impressions plus expressions. In the esthetic fact, the esthetic activity is not added to the fact of the impressions, but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The impressions reappear as it were in expression, like water put into a filter, which reappears the same and «yet different on the other side. ine esthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form. | From this it results, not that the content is something superfluous (it is, on the contrary, the necessary point of departure for the expressive fact); but that there zs no passage between the quality of the content and that of the form. It has sometimes been thought that the content, in order to be esthetic, that is to say, trans- formable into form, should possess some de- terminate or determinable quality. But were that so, then form and content, expression and impression, would be the same thing. It is true 11 PNT UPEION AND. AY 27 that the content is that which is convertible into form, but it has no determinable qualities until this transformation takes place. We know nothing of its nature. It does not become zesthetic content at once, but only when it has been effectively transformed. A‘sthetic content has also been defined as what is zzteresting. That is not an untrue statement; it is merely void of meaning. What, then, is interesting? Expressive activity ? Certainly the expressive activity would not have raised the content to the dignity of form, had it not been interested. The fact of its having been interested is precisely the fact of its raising the content to the dignity of form. But the word “interesting” has also been employed in another not illegitimate sense, which we shall explain further on. The proposition that art is zzztatzon of nature has also several meanings. Now truth has been maintained or at least shadowed with these words, now error. More frequently, nothing definite has been thought. One of the legitimate scientific meanings occurs when imitation is understood as representation or intuition of nature, a form of knowledge. And when this meaning has been understood, by placing in greater relief the spiritual character of the process, the other Critique of th zmitation of nature and of the artistic zlluston. 28 THEORY OF AST He Ere II proposition becomes also legitimate: namely, that art is the zdealization or tdealtzing imitation of nature. But if by imitation of nature be understood that art gives mechanical repro- ductions, more or less perfect duplicates of natural objects, before which the same tumult of impressions caused by natural objects begins over again, then the proposition is evidently false. The painted wax figures that seem to be alive, and before which we stand astonished in the museums where such things are shown, do not give esthetic intuitions. Illusion and hallucination have nothing to do with the calm domain of artistic intuition. If an artist paint the interior of a wax-work museum, or if an actor give a burlesque portrait of a man-statue on the stage, we again have spiritual labour and artistic intuition, Finally, if photography have anything in it of artistic, it will be to the extent that it transmits the intuition of the photographer, his point of view, the pose and the grouping which he has striven to attain. And if it be not altogether art, that is precisely because the element of nature in it remains more or less insubordinate and ineradicable. Do we ever, indeed, feel complete satisfaction before even the best of photographs? Would not an artist ie PNP ON AN) A Roe 29 vary and touch up much or little, remove or add something to any of them ? The statements repeated so often, with others Critique of an conceived as a similar, that art is not knowledge, that it does sewimentai notatheoretica not tell the truth, that it does not belong to the “seri appearance world of theory, but to the world of feeling, arise “’/!"* from the failure to realize exactly the theoretic character of the simple intuition. This simple intuition is quite distinct from intellectual knowledge, as it is distinct from the perception of the real. The belief that only the intellective is knowledge, or at the most also the perception of the real, also arises from the failure to grasp the theoretic character of the simple intuition. We have seen that intuition is knowledge, free of concepts and more simple than the so-called perception of the real. Since art is knowledge and form, it does not belong to the world of feeling and of psychic material. The reason why so many estheticians have so often insisted that art is appearance (Schein), is_ precisely because they have felt the necessity of dis- tinguishing it from the more complex fact of perception by maintaining its pure intuitivity. For the same reason it has been claimed that art is sentiment. In fact, if the concept as content of art, and historical reality as such, be excluded, ‘vitique of the ceory of sthetic senses. 30 Pia eORY OF Aesth ric 11 there remains no other content than _ reality apprehended in all its ingenuousness and im- mediateness in the vital effort, in sextzment, that is to Say, pure intuition. The theory of the esthetzc senses has also arisen from the failure to establish, or from having lost to view the character of the expression as distinct from the impression, of the form as distinct from the matter. As has just been pointed out, this reduces itself to the error of wishing to seek a passage from the quality of the content to that of the form. To ask, in fact, what the esthetic senses may be, implies asking, what sensible impressions may be able to enter into esthetic expressions, and what must of necessity do so. To this we must at once reply, that all im- pressions can enter into esthetic expressions or formations, but that none are bound to do so. Dante raised to the dignity of form not only the ‘“sweet colour of the oriental sapphire” (visual impression), but also tactile or thermic impres- sions, such as the ‘thick air” and the ‘fresh rivulets” which “parch all the more” the throat of the thirsty. The belief that a picture yields only visual impressions is a curious illusion. The bloom of a cheek, the warmth of a youthful 11 ENA OrEON AND ART a1 body, the sweetness and freshness of a fruit, the cutting of a sharpened blade, are not these, also, impressions that we have from a picture? Maybe they are visual? What would a picture be for a hypothetical man, deprived of all or many of his senses, who should in an instant acquire the sole organ of sight? The picture we are standing opposite and believe we see only with our eyes, would appear to his eyes as little more than the paint-smeared palette of a painter. Some who hold firmly to the esthetic character of given groups of impressions (for example, the visual, the auditive), and exclude others, admit, however, that if visual and auditive impressions enter dzrect/y into the esthetic fact, those of the other senses also enter into it, but only as associated. But this distinction is altogether arbitrary. A¢sthetic expression is a synthesis, in which it is impossible to distinguish direct and indirect. All impressions are by it Pred son a level, in so. far- as they are zestheticised. He who takes into himself the image of a picture or of a poem does not ex- perience, as it were, a series of impressions as to this image, some of which have a prerogative or precedence over others. And nothing is known of what happens prior to having received it, for 22 THEORY OF Moth 11 the distinctions made after reflexion have nothing to do with art. The theory of the esthetic senses has also been presented in another way; that is to say, as the attempt to establish what physiological organs are necessary for the esthetic fact. The physiological organ or apparatus is nothing but a complex of cellules, thus and thus constituted, thus and thus disposed; that is to say, it is merely physical and natural fact or concept. But expression does not recognize physiological facts. Expression has its point of departure in the im- pressions, and the physiological path by which these have found their way to the mind is to it altogether indifferent. One way or another amounts to the same thing: it suffices that they are impressions. It is true that the want of given organs, that is, of given complexes of cells, produces an absence of given impressions (when these are not obtained by another path by a kind of organic compensation). The man born blind cannot express or have the intuition of light. But the impressions are not conditioned solely by the organ, but also by the stimuli which operate upon the organ. Thus, he who has never had the impression of the sea will never be able to express 1 EN PUTELON AND: Ak ae it, in the same way as he who has never had the impression of the great world or of the political conflict will never express the one or the other. This, however, does not establish a depend- ence of the expressive function on the stimulus or on the organ. It is the repetition of what we know already: expression presupposes impres- sion. Therefore, given expressions imply given impressions. Besides, every impression excludes other impressions during the moment in which it dominates ; and so does every expression. Another corollary of the conception of expres- Unity and indivisibility sion as activity is the zzdiveszbelzty of the work of oe wort y art. Every expression is a unique expression. Activity is a fusion of the impressions in an organic whole. A desire to express this has always prompted the affirmation that the work of art should have wazty, or, what amounts to the same thing, uaity im variety. Expression is a synthesis of the various, the multiple, in the one. @he fact that we divide a work of art into parts, as a poem into scenes, episodes, similes, sentences, or a picture into single figures and objects, background, foreground, etc., may seem to be an objection to this affirmation. But such division annihilates the work, as dividing the grganism into heart, brain, nerves, muscles and D art. 34 THEORY, OF 7AtST ire It so on, turns the living being into a corpse. It is true that there exist organisms in which the division gives place to more living things, but in such a case, and if we transfer the analogy to the zsthetic fact, we must conclude for a multi- plicity of germs of life, that is to say, for a speedy re-elaboration of the single parts into new single expressions. It will be observed that expression is some- times based on other expressions. There are simple and there are compound expressions. One must admit some difference between the eureka, with which Archimedes expressed all his joy after his discovery, and the expressive act (indeed all the five acts) of a regular tragedy. Not in the least: expression is always directly based on impressions. He who conceives a tragedy puts into a crucible a great quantity, so to say, of impressions: the expressions themselves, con- ceived on other occasions, are fused together with the new in a single mass, in the samefiway as we can cast into a smelting furnace formless pieces of bronze and most precious statuettes. Those most precious statuettes must be melted in the same way as the formless bits of bronze, before there can be a new statue. The old expressions must descend again to the level of m1 INTUITION AND ART 35 impressions, in order to be synthetized in a new single expression. By elaborating his impressions, man /vees himself from them. By objectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their superior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another aspect and another formula of its character of activity. Activity is the deliverer, just because it drives away passivity. This also explains why it is customary to attribute to artists alike the maximum of sensi- bility or fasszon, and the maximum insensibility or Olympic serenity. Both qualifications agree, for they do not refer to the same object. The sensi- bility or passion relates to the rich material which the artist absorbs into his psychic organism ; the insensibility or serenity to the form with which he subjugates and dominates the tumult of the feelings and of the passions. Art as the deliverer. III ART AND PHILOSOPHY ndissolwbility "THE two forms of knowledge, esthetic and intel- f intellective rom intuitive lectual or conceptual, are indeed diverse, but this nowledge. does not amount altogether to separation and disjunction, as we find with two forces going each its own way. If we have shown that the esthetic form is altogether independent of the intellectual and suffices to itself without external support, we have not said that the intellectual can stand without the esthetic. This receprocity would not be true. What is knowledge by concepts? It is know- ledge of relations of things, and those things are intuitions. Concepts are not possible without intuitions, just as intuition is itself impossible without the material of impressions. Intuitions are: this river, this lake, this brook, this rain, this glass of water; the concept is: water, not this or that appearance and particular example of water, but water in general, in whatever time 36 11 Git AND PI e@sOriy a7 Se) or place it be realized; the material of infinite intuitions, but of one single and constant concept. However, the concept, the universal, if it be no longer intuition in one respect, is in another respect intuition, and cannot fail of being intui- tion. For the man who thinks has impressions and emotions, in so far as he thinks. His impres- sion and emotion will not be love or hate, but the effort of his thought ztself, with the pain and the joy, the love and the hate joined to it. This effort cannot but become intuitive in form, in becoming objective to the mind. To speak, is not to think logically ; but to ¢hzxk logically is, at the same time, to speak. That thought cannot exist without speech, Critique of t negations of is a truth generally admitted. The negations of ss sesis. this thesis are all founded on equivoques and errors. The first of the equivoques is implied by those who observe that one can likewise think with geometrical figures, algebraical numbers, ideo- graphic signs, without a single word, even pronounced silently and almost insensibly within one. They also affirm that there are languages in which the word, the phonetic sign, expresses nothing, unless the written sign also be looked at. But when we said ‘‘speech,” we intended to 38 ih ORY OF. Zeon EEC HI employ a synecdoche, and that “expression” generically, should be understood, for expression is not only so-called verbal expression, as we have already noted. It may be admitted that a concepts may be thought without phonetic _ manifestations. But the very examples adduced to show this also prove that those concepts never exist without expressions. Others maintain that animals, or certain animals, think or reason without speaking. Now as to how, whether, and what animals think, whether they be rudimentary, half-savage men resisting civilization, rather than physiological machines, as the old spiritualists would have it, are questions that do not concern us _ here. When the philosopher talks of animal, brutal, impulsive, instinctive nature and the like, he does not base himself on conjectures as to these facts concerning dogs or cats, lions or ants; but upon observations of what is called animal and brutal in man: of the boundary or animal basis of what we feel in ourselves. If individual animals, dogs or cats, lions or ants, possess something of the activity of man, so much the better, or so much the worse for them. This means that as regards them also we must talk, not of their nature as a whole, but of its animal ut wet een DOE TEE OSOPEY 39 basis, as being perhaps larger and more strong tiene the animal basis: of man, And if we suppose that animals think, and form concepts, what is there in the line of conjecture to justify the admission that they do so without corre- sponding expressions? The analogy with man, the knowledge of the spirit, human psychology, which is the instrument of all our conjectures as to animal psychology, would oblige us to suppose that if they think in any way, they also have some sort of speech. It is from human psychology, that is, literary psychology, that comes the other objection, to the effect that the concept can exist without the word, because it is true that we all know books that are well thought and badly written: that is to say, a thought which remains thought deyond the expression, xofwithstanding the imperfect expression. But when we talk of books well thought and badly written, we cannot mean other than that in those books are parts, pages, periods or propositions well thought out and well written, and other parts (perhaps the least important) ill thought out and badly written, not truly thought out and therefore not truly expressed. Where _ Vico’s Scienza nuova is really ill written, it is also ill thought out. If we pass from the considera- 40 GH HORRY, © bP] Alot Pee re tion of big books to a short proposition, the error or the imprecision of this statement will be recognized at once. How could a proposition be clearly thought and confusedly written out ? All that can be admitted is that sometimes we possess thoughts (concepts) in an intuitive form, or in an abbreviated or, better, peculiar expression, sufficient for us, but not sufficient to communicate it with ease to another or other definite individuals. Hence people say _in- accurately, that we have the thought without the expression ; whereas it should properly be said that we have, indeed, the expression, but in a form that is not easy of social communication. This, however, is a very variable and altogether relative fact. There are always people who catch our thought on the wing, and prefer it in this abbreviated form, and would be displeased with the greater development of it, necessary for other people. In other words, the thought considered abstractly and logically will be the same; but esthetically we are dealing with two different intuition-expressions, into both of which enter different psychological elements. The same argument suffices to destroy, that is, to interpret correctly, the altogether empirical distinction between an zzternadl and an external language. 111 Ak AND PribOsOrry Al The most lofty manifestations, the summits of intellectual and of intuitive knowledge shining from afar, are called, as we know, Art and Science. Art and Science, then, are different and yet linked together; they meet on one side, which is the esthetic side. Every scientific work is also a work of art. The esthetic side may ‘remain little noticed, when our mind is altogether taken up with the effort to understand the thought of the man of science, and to examine its truth. But it is no longer concealed, when we pass from the activity of understanding to that of contemplation, and behold that thought either developed before us, limpid, exact, well- shaped, without superfluous words, without lack of words, with appropriate rhythm and intona- tion; or confused, broken, embarrassed, tentative. Great thinkers are sometimes termed great writers, while other equally great thinkers remain more or less fragmentary writers, if indeed their fragments are scientifically to be compared with harmonious, coherent, and perfect works. We pardon thinkers and men of science their literary mediocrity. The fragments console us for the failure of the whole, for it is far more easy to recover the well-arranged composition from the fragmentary work of genius than to Art and science, 42 PAE ORY OF Als lle te 111 achieve the discovery of genius. But how can we pardon mediocre expression in pure artists? _ Mediocribus esse poetis non adi, non homines, non ntent and ‘m.: another aning. ose and try. he relation first and ‘ond degree. concessere columnae. The poet or painter who lacks form, lacks everything, because he lacks himself. Poetical. material. permeates..the Soul of all: the expression alone, that is to say, the form, makes the poet. And _ here appears the truth of the thesis which denies to art all content, as content being understood just the _intel- lectual concept. In this sense, when we take “content” as equal to “concept” it is most true, not only that art does not consist of content, but also that z¢ has no content. In the same way the distinction between poetry and prose cannot be justified, save in that of art and science. It was seen in antiquity that such distinction could not be founded on external elements, such as rhythm and metre, or on the freedom or the limitation of the form; that it was, on the contrary, altogether internal. Poetry is the language of sentiment ; prose of the intellect ; but since the intellect is also sentiment, in its con- cretion and reality, so all prose has a poetical side. The relation between intuitive knowledge or expression, and intellectual knowledge or ee ee concept, between art and science, poetry and mt ART AND PHILOSOPHY 43 prose, cannot be otherwise defined than by saying that it is_one of double degree. The first degree is the expression, the second the concept : the first “can | exist without the second, but the second cannot exist. without ie entet. 1 ere exists poetry without prose, but not prose without poetry. Expression, indeed, is the first affirmation of human activity. Poetry is ‘the : the first men ‘‘were by nature sublime poets.’ We also ” maternal language of the human race admit this in another way, when we observe that the passage from soul to mind, from animal to human activity, is effected by means of language. And this should be said of intuition or expression. in general. But to us it appears somewhat inaccurate to define language or expression as an intermediate link between nature and humanity, as though it were a mixture of the one and of the other. Where humanity appears, the rest has already disappeared; the man who expresses himself, certainly emerges from the state of nature, but he really does emerge: he does not stand half within and half without, as the use of the phrase “intermediate link” would imply. The cognitive intellect has no form other than these two. Expression and concept exhaust it completely. The whole speculative life of man Inexistence of other forms of knowledge. Tistory. Its dentity with nd difference rom art, 44 THEORY OR AWS E TiC 111 is spent in passing from one to the other and back again. fiistoricity is incorrectly held to be a third theoretical form. History is not form, but content: as form, it is nothing but intuition or zesthetic fact. History does not seek for laws nor form concepts; it employs neither induction nor deduction ; it is directed ad narrvandum, non ad demonstrandum ; it does not construct universals and abstractions, but posits intuitions. ‘The this, the that, the te omni modo determinatum, is its kingdom, as it is the kingdom of art. History, therefore, is included under the universal concept of art. Faced with this proposition and with the impossibility of conceiving a third mode of knowledge, objections have been brought forward which would lead to the affiliation of history to intellective or scientific knowledge. The greater portion of these objections is dominated by the prejudice that in refusing to history the character of conceptual science, something of its value and dignity has been taken from it. This really arises from a false idea of art, conceived, not as an essential theoretic function, but as an amusement, a superfluity, a frivolity. Without reopening a long debate, which so far as we are concerned, is II Biv AN PritOsOPrH ¥ A5 finally closed, we will mention here one sophism which has been and still is widely repeated. It is intended to show the logical and scientific nature of history. The sophism consists in admitting that historical knowledge has for its object the individual ; but not the representation, it is added, so much as the concept of the individual. From this it is argued that history is also a logical or scientific form of knowledge. History, in fact, should elaborate the concept of a personage such as Charlemagne or Napoleon ; of an epoch, like the Renaissance or the Reformation ; of an event, such as the French Revolution and the Unifica- tion of Italy. This it is held to do in the same way as Geometry elaborates the concepts of spatial form, or A*sthetic those of expression. Butall this is untrue. History cannot do otherwise than represent Napoleon and Charlemagne, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the French Revolution and the Unification of Italy as in- dividual facts with their individual physiognomy : that is, in the same way as logicians state, that one cannot have a concept of an individual, but only a representation. The so-called concept of the individual is always a universal or general concept, full of details, very rich, if you will, but however rich it be, yet incapable of attaining to 46 PE ORY OF ALS tre Tie W1 that individuality, to which historical knowledge, as esthetic knowledge, alone attains. Let us rather show how the content of history comes to be distingui tof art: Phe distinction is secondary. Its origin will be found in what has already been observed as to the ideal character of the intuition or first perception, in which all is real and therefore nothing is real. The mind forms the concepts of external and internal at a later stage, as it does those of what has happened and of what is desired, of object and subject, and the like. Thus it distinguishes historical from non-historical intuition, the read SOAP NR oa eretorcinge PONY narra from the zzreal, real fancy from pure fancy. Even internal facts, what is desired and imagined, castles in the air, and countries of Cockagne, have their reality. The soul, too, has its history. His illusions form part of the bio- graphy of every individual. But the history of an individual soul is history, because in it is always active the distinction between the real and the unreal, even when the real is the illusions them- selves. But these distinctive concepts do not appear in history as do scientific concepts, but rather like those that we have seen dissolved and melted in the esthetic intuitions, although they stand out in history in an altogether new relief. 11 ART AND PHILOSOPHY 47 History does not construct the concepts of the real and unreal, but makes use of them. History, in fact, is not the theory of history. Mere con- ceptual analysis is of no use in realizing whether an event in our lives were real or imaginary. It is necessary to reproduce the intuitions in the mind in the most complete form, as they were at the moment of production, in order to recognize the content. Historicity is distinguished in the concrete from pure imagination only as one intui- tion is distinguished from another: in the memory. ee Where this is not possible, owing to the deli- cate and fleeting shades between the real and unreal intuitions, which confuse the one with the other, we must either renounce, for the time at least, the knowledge of what really happened (and this we often do), or we must fall back upon conjecture, verisimilitude, probability. The principle of verisimilitude and of probability | dominates in fact all historical criticism. Exam- ination of the sources and of authority is directed toward establishing the most credible evidence. And what is the most credible evidence, save that of the best observers, that is, of those who best remember and (be it understood) have not desired to falsify, nor had interest in falsi- fying the truth of things? From this it follows Flistorical criticism. Historical scepticism. 48 THEORY. OR. AS TEE ae IT that intellectual scepticism finds it easy to deny the certainty of any history, for the certainty of history is never that of science. Historical _cer- tainty is. composed of memory and ‘of authority, not of analyses and of demonstration. To speak of historical induction or demonstration, is to make a metaphorical use of these expressions, which bear quite a different meaning in history to that which they bear in science. The con- viction of the historian is the undemonstrable conviction of the juryman, who has heard the witnesses, listened attentively to the case, and prayed Heaven to inspire him. Sometimes, without doubt, he is mistaken, but the mistakes are in a negligible minority compared with the occasions when he gets hold of the truth. That is why good sense is right against the intel- lectualists, in believing in history, which is not a ‘fable agreed upon,” but that which the in- dividual and humanity remember of their past. We strive to enlarge and to render as precise as possible this record, which in some places is dim, in others very clear. We cannot do without it, such as it is, and taken as a whole, it is rich in truth. In a spirit of paradox only, can one doubt if there ever were a Greece or a Rome, an Alexander or a Cesar, a feudal Europe ie ERT AND PHILOSOPHY 4, _ overthrown by a series of revolutions, that on | the 1st of November 1517 the theses of Luther | were seen fixed to the door of the church of | Wittenberg, or that the Bastile was taken by the people of Paris on the 14th of July 1780. “What proof givest thou of all this?” asks - the sophist, ironically. Humanity replies “I re- ve member.” The world of what has happened, of the Philosophy as concrete, of history, is the world that is called The so-called, real, natural, “including in this definition the tienes and reality that is called physical, as well as that which is called spiritual and human. All this world is intuition; historical intuition, if it be realistically shown as it is, or imaginary intui- tion, artistic in the strict sense, if shown under the aspect of the possible, that is to say, of the imaginable. Science, true science, which is not intuition but concept, not individuality but universality, cannot be anything but a science of the spirit, that is, of what is universal in reality : Philosophy. If natural sczences be spoken of, apart from philosophy, it is necessary to observe that these are not perfect sciences: they are complexes of knowledge, arbitrarily abstracted and fixed. The so-called natural sciences themselves recognize, E 50 THEORY On. ASHE rie 111 in fact, that they are surrounded by limitations. These limitations are nothing more than historical and intuitive data. They calculate, measure, “establish equalities, regularity, create classes and types, formulate laws, show in their own way how one fact arises out of other facts ; but in their progress they are always met with facts which are known intuitively and_ historically. Even geometry now states that it rests alto- gether on hypotheses, since space is not three- dimensional or Euclidean, but this assumption is. Made! use. of by preference: because it. ic more convenient. What there is of truth in the natural sciences, is either philosophy or historical fact. What they contain proper to themselves is abstract and arbitrary. When the natural sciences wish to form themselves into perfect sciences, they must issue from their circle and enter the philosophical circle. This they do when they posit concepts which are anything but natural, such as those of the atom without extension in space, of ether or vibrating matter, of vital force, of space beyond the reach of in- tuition, and the like. These are true and proper philosophical efforts, when they are not mere words void of meaning. The concepts of natural science are, without doubt, most useful ; m1 Pict oaND, PHILOSOPHY 51 _ but one cannot obtain from them that system, | which belongs only to the spirit. | These historical and intuitive assumptions, which cannot be separated from the natural sciences, furthermore explain, not only how, in the progress of knowledge, that which was once considered to be truth descends gradually to the grade of mythological beliefs and imaginary illusions, but also how, among natural scientists, there are'some who term all that serves as basis of argument in their teaching mythical facts, verbal expedtents, or conventions. The naturalists and mathematicians who approach the study of the energies of the spirit without preparation, are apt to carry thither these mental habits and to speak, in philosophy, of such and such con- ventions ‘“‘as arranged by man.” They make conventions of truth and morality, and their supreme convention is the Spirit itself! How- ever, if there are to be conventions, something must exist about which there is no convention to be made, but which is itself the agent of the convention. This is the spiritual activity of man. The limitation of the natural sciences postulates the illimitation of philosophy. These explications have firmly established that 2%e pienome- non and the the pure or fundamental forms of knowledge are xenon. 52 Wis ORY OF 7 Stiri PIG II two: the intuition and the concept—Art, and “Science or Philosophy. With these are to be included History, which is, as it were, the product of intuition placed in contact with the concept, that is, of art receiving in itself philosophic distinctions, while remaining concrete and _in- dividual. All the other-forms (natural sciences and mathematics) are impure, being mingled with extraneous elements of practical origin. The intuition gives the world, the phenomenon ; the concept gives the noumenon, the Spirit. IV HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN ASTHETIC THESE relations between intuitive or esthetic knowledge and the other fundamental or deriva- tive forms of knowledge having been definitely established, we are now in a position to reveal the errors of a series of theories which have been, or are, presented, as theories of A‘sthetic. From the confusion between the exigencies of art in general and the particular exigencies of history has arisen the theory (which has lost ground to-day, but used to dominate in the past) of verisimilitude as the object of art. As is generally the case with erroneous propositions, the intention of those who employed and employ the concept of verisimilitude has no doubt often been much more reasonable than the definition given of the word. By verisimilitude used to be meant the artistic coherence of the representation, If “verisimilar” be translated by “coherent,” a most 5g Critique of verisimilitude and of naturalisn. 54 THEORY Ore veo lit ele Iv exact meaning will. often be found in the dis- cussions, examples, and judgments of the critics. An improbable personage, an improbable ending to a comedy, are really badly-drawn personages, badly - arranged endings, happenings without artistic motive. It has been said with reason that even fairies and sprites must have veri- similitude, that is to say, be really sprites and fairies, coherent artistic intuitions. Sometimes the word “possible” has been used instead of ‘“verisimilar.” As we have already remarked in passing, this word possible is synonymous with that which is imaginable or may be known intuitively. Everything which is really, that is to say, coherently, imagined, is possible. But formerly, and especially by the theoreticians, by verisimilar was understood historical credibility, or that historical truth which is not demonstrable, but conjecturable, not true, but verisimilar. It has been sought to impose a like character upon art. Who does not recall the great part played in literary history by the criticism of the verisimilar ? For example, the fault found with the /erusalem Delivered, based upon the history of the Crusades, or of the Homeric poems, upon that of the veri- similitude of the costume of the emperors and kings? At other times has been imposed upon art 7 CRITIQUE OF ERRORS 55 the duty of the esthetic reproduction of historical Teac. s this’ 1s another of ‘the erroneous significations assumed by the theory concerning the imitation of nature. Verism and naturalism have since afforded the spectacle of a confusion of the zsthetic fact with the processes of the natural sciences, by aiming at some sort of experimental drama or romance. The confusions between the methods of art and those of the philosophical sciences have been far more frequent. Thus it has often been held to be within the competence of art to develop concepts, to unite the intelligible with the sensible, to represent zdeas or universals, putting art in the place of science, that is, confusing the artistic function in general with the particular case in which it becomes esthetico-logical. The theory of art as supporting theses can be reduced to the same error, as can be the theory of art considered as individual representation, exemplifying scientific laws. The example, in so far as it is an example, stands for the thing exemplified, and is thus an exposition of the universal, that is to say, a form of science, more or less popular or vulgarized. The same may be said of the esthetic theory of the ¢ypzcal, when by type is understood, as it Critique of tdeas in art, of theses tn art, and of the typical. Critique of the symbol and of the allegory. 56 THEORY Ore 7S Rei Iv | frequently is, just the abstraction or the concept, and it is affirmed that art should make ¢he sfeczes shine in the individual. If by typical be here understood the individual, here, too, we have a merely verbal variation. ‘To typify would signify, in this case, to characterize ; that is, to determine and to represent the individual. Don Quixote is a type; but of whom is he a type, if not of_all Don Ouixotes:? = A type, that. ts. to. say, 01, himself. Certainly he is not a type of abstract concepts, such as the loss of the sense of reality, or of the love of glory. An infinite number of personages can be thought of under these concepts, who are not Don Quixote. In other words, we find our own impressions fully determined and verified in the expression of a poet (for example in a poetical personage). We call that expression typical, which we might call simply esthetic. Poetical or artistic universals have been spoken of in like manner, in order to show that the artistic product is altogether spiritual and ideal in itself. Continuing to correct these errors, or to make clear equivoques, we will note that the sydol has sometimes been given as essence of art. Now, if the symbol be given as inseparable from the artistic intuition, it is theysynonym of the Ww . CRITIQUE OF ERRORS 57 intuition itself, which always has an_ ideal character. There is no double-bottom to art, but one only ; in art all is symbolical, because all is ideal. But if the symbol be looked upon as separable—if on the one side can be expressed the symbol, and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the intellectualist error: that pretended symbol is the exposition of an abstract concept, it is an allegory, it is science, or art that apes science. But we must be just toward the allegorical also. In some cases, it is altogether harmless. Given the Gevusalemme liberata, the allegory was imagined afterwards ; given the Adone of Marino, the poet of the lascivious insinuated afterwards that it was written to show how “immoderate indulgence ends in pain”; given a statue of a beautiful woman, the sculptor can write on a card that the statue represents Clemency or Goodness. This allegory linked to a finished work fost festum does not change the work of art. What is it, then? It is an expression externally added to another expression. A little page of prose is added to the Gerusalemme, expressing another thought of the poet; a verse or a strophe is added to the Adone, expressing what the poet would like to make a part of his public swallow ; atigque of 2 theory of tistic and erary classes. 58 THEORY -OR 7S DEE tre IV while to the statue nothing more than the single word is added: Clemency or Goodness. But the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error lies in the theory of artistic and literary classes, which still has vogue in literary treatises, and disturbs the critics and the historians of art. Let us observe its genesis. The human mind can pass from the esthetic to the logical, just because the former is a first step, in respect to the latter. It can destroy the expressions, that is, the thought of the individual with the thought of the universal. It can reduce -expressive facts to logical relations. We have already shown that this operation in its turn becomes concrete in an expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions have not been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new esthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have left the first. He who enters a picture-gallery, or who reads a series of poems, may, after he has looked and read, go further: he may seek out the relations of the things there expressed. Thus those pictures and-compositions, each of which is an individual inexpressible by logic, are resolved into “universals and abstractions, such as costumes, landscapes, portraits, domestic life, battles, animals, flowers, Iv Chi lOUn OF PRROKS 59 fruit, seascapes, lakes, deserts, tragic, comic, piteous, cruel, lyrical, epic, dramatic, knightly, rdyllic facts, and the like. They are often also resolved into merely quantitative categories, such as ttl puture, picture, statuette, group, madrigal, song, sonnel, garland of sonnets, poetry, poem, story, vonance, and the like. When we think the concept domestic life, or knighthood, or zdyll, or cruelty, or any other quantitative concept, the individual expressive fact from which we started is abandoned. From zsthetes that we were, we have been changed into logicians ; from contemplators of expression, into reasoners. Certainly no objection can be made to such a process. In what other way could science be born, which, if «esthetic expressions be assumed in it, yet has for function to go beyond them? The logical or scientific form, as such, excludes the esthetic form. He who begins to think scientifically has already ceased to contemplate zsthetically ; although his thought will assume of necessity in its turn an esthetic form, as has already been said, and as it would be superfluous to repeat. | The error begins when we try to deduce the , expression from the concept, and to find in the | thing substituting the laws of the thing substi- 60 THBORVIOU Bote ie IV tuted; when the difference between the second and the first step has not been observed, and when, in consequence, we declare that we are standing on the first step, when we are really standing on the second. This error is known as the theory of artistic and literary classes. What is the esthetic form of domestic life, of knighthood, of the idyll, of cruelty, and so forth? How should these contents be vrepresented? Such is the absurd problem implied in the theory of artistic and literary classes. It is in this that consists all search after laws or rules of styles. Domestic life, knighthood, idyll, cruelty, and the like, are not impressions, but concepts. They are not contents, but logico-asthetic forms. You cannot express the form, for it is already itself expression. And what are the words cruelty, idyll, knighthood, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those concepts? Even the most refined of these distinctions, those that have the most philosophic appearance, do not resist criticism; as, for instance, when works of art are divided into the subjective and the objective styles, into lyric and epic, into works of feeling and works of design. It is impossible to separate in esthetic analysis, the subjective IV CRIfliOuUt OF BPRROKS 61 from the objective side, the lyric from the epic, the image of feeling from that of things. From the theory of the artistic and literary 477s derive : ; Jroue this theor classes derive those erroneous modes of judgment «caring es ; : zn judgments and of criticism, thanks to which, instead of ”“”% asking before a work of art if it be expressive, and what it expresses, whether it speak or stammer, or be silent altogether, it is asked if it be obedient to the /aws of the epic poem, or to those of tragedy, to those of historical portraiture, or to those of landscape painting. Artists, however, while making a verbal pretence of agreeing, or yielding a feigned obedience to them, have really always disregarded these laws of styles. Every true work of art has | violated some established class and upset the | ideas of the critics, who have thus been obliged to enlarge the number of classes, until finally even this enlargement has proved too narrow, owing to the appearance of new works of art, which are naturally followed by new scandals, new upsettings, and—new enlargements. | From the same theory come the prejudices, owing to which at one time (and is it really passed?) people used to lament that Italy had no tragedy (until a poet arose who gave to Italy that wreath which was the only thing wanting to her glorious 62 Tor ORY OF AS the tie IV hair), nor France the epic poem (until the Hlen7z- ade, which slaked the thirsty throats of the critics). Eulogies accorded to the inventors of new styles are connected with these prejudices, so much so, that in the seventeenth century the invention of the mock-herotc poem seemed an important event, and the honour of it was dis- puted, as though it were the discovery of America. But the works adorned with this name (the Secchia vapita and the Scherno degli Det) were still-born, because their authors (a slight draw- ~back) had nothing new or original tosay. Medi- ocrities racked their brains to invent, artificially, new styles. The zscatorial eclogue was added to the pastoral, and then, finally, the mzltary eclogue. The Amznta was bathed and became the Akeo. Finally, there have been historians of art and literature, so much fascinated with these ideas of classes, that they claimed to write the history, not of single and effective literary and artistic works, but of their classes, those empty phantoms. They have claimed to portray, not the evolution of the artistzc spirit, but the evolution of classes. The philosophical condemnation of artistic and literary classes is found in the formulation and demonstration of what artistic activity has ever IV CRT roOUr OP ERRORS 63 sought and good taste ever recognized. What is to be done if good taste and the real fact, put into formulas, sometimes assume the air of paradoxes? Now if we talk of tragedies, comedies, dramas, Zmpirica/ sense of the romances, pictures of everyday life, battle-pieces, «ésiors of classes. landscapes, seascapes, poems, versicles, lyrics, and the like, if it be only with a view to be under- stood, and to draw attention in: general and approximatively to certain groups of works, to which, for one reason or another, it is desired to draw attention, in that case, no scientific error has been committed. We employ vocatles and phrases; we do not establish laws and defint- tions. The mistake arises when the weight of a scientific definition is given to a word, when we ingenuously let ourselves be caught in the meshes of that phraseology. Pray permit me a com- parison. It is necessary to arrange the books in a library in one way or another. This used generally to be done by means of a rough classi- fication by subjects (among which the categories of miscellaneous and eccentric were not wanting) ; they are now generally arranged by sizes or by publishers. Who can deny the necessity and the utility of these groupings? But what should we say if some one began seriously to seek out 64 THEORY OF SLE Ele Iv the literary laws of miscellanies and of eccen- tricities from the Aldine or Bodonian collection, from size A or size B, that is to say, from these altogether arbitrary groupings whose sole object has been their practical use? Well, whoever should undertake an “enterprise such as this, would be doing neither more nor less than those who seek out the esthetic laws of literary and artistic classes. V ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN HISTORIC AND LOGIC Tue better to confirm these criticisms, it will be opportune to cast a rapid glance over analogous and opposite errors, born of ignorance as to the true nature of art, and of its relation to history and to science. These errors have injured alike the theory of history and of science, of Historic (or Historiology) and of Logic. Historical intellectualism has been the cause Critigue of of the many researches which have been made, especially during the last two centuries, re- searches which continue to-day, for a phzlosophy of history, for an zdeal history, for a sociology, for a historical psychology, or however may be other- wise entitled or described a science whose object is to extract from history, universal laws and concepts. Of what kind must be these laws, these universals ? Historical laws and historical concepts? In that case, an elementary criticism _ of knowledge suffices to make clear the absurdity 65 F 66 EE OR Ole At Ele Le v of the attempt. When such expressions as a historical law, a historical concept are not simply metaphors colloquially employed, they are true contradictions in terms: the adjective is as un- suitable to the substantive as in the expressions qualitative quantity or pluralistic monism. History means concretion and individuality, law and con- cept mean abstraction and universality. If, on the other hand, the attempt to draw from history historical laws and concepts be abandoned, and it be merely desired to draw from it laws and concepts, the attempt is certainly not frivolous ; but the science thus obtained will be, not a philosophy of history, but rather, according to the case, either philosophy in its various specifica- tions of Ethic, Logic, etc., or empirical science in its infinite divisions and subdivisions. Thus are sought out either those philosophical con- cepts which are, as has already been observed, at the bottom of every historical construction and separate perception from intuition, historical intui- tion from pure intuition, history from art; or already formed historical intuitions are collected and reduced to types and classes, which is exactly the method of the natural sciences. Great thinkers have sometimes donned the unsuitable cloak of the philosophy of history, and notwithstanding » v Mis lORIC- AND LOGIC 67 the covering, they have conquered philosophical truths of the greatest magnitude. The cloak has been dropped, the truth has remained. Modern sociologists are rather to be blamed, not so much for the illusion in which they are in- volved when they talk of an impossible science of sociology, as for the infecundity which almost always accompanies their illusion. It is but a small evil that A‘sthetic should be termed sociological Esthetic, or Logic, social Logic. The grave evil is that their A‘sthetic is an old- fashioned expression of sensualism, their Logic verbal and incoherent. The philosophical move- ment, to which we have referred, has borne two good fruits in relation to history. First of all has been felt the desire to construct a theory of historiography, that is, to understand the nature and the limits of history, a theory which, in con- formity with the analyses made above, cannot obtain satisfaction, save in a general science of in- tuition, in an Aésthetic, from which Historic would be separated under a special head by means of the intervention of the universals. Furthermore, concrete truths relating to historical events have often been expressed beneath the false and pre- sumptuous cloak of a philosophy of history ; canons and empirical advice have been formulated AE sthetic mvastons tnto Logic. 68 EME ORY OF e405 CHE Tle v by no means superfluous to students and critics. It does not seem possible to deny this utility to the most recent of philosophies of history, to so- called historical materialism, which has thrown a very vivid light upon many sides of social life, formerly neglected or ill understood. The principle of authority, of the se dex, is an invasion of historicity into the domains of science and philosophy which has raged in the schools. This substitutes for introspection and philosophical analyses, this or that evidence, document, or authoritative statement, with which history certainly cannot dispense. But Logic, the science of thought and of intellectual knowledge, has suffered the most grave and destructive disturbances and errors of all, through the im- perfect understanding of the zsthetic fact. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, if logical activity come after and contain in itself zsthetic activity? An inexact A‘sthetic must of necessity drag after it an inexact Logic. Whoever opens logical treatises, from the Organum of Aristotle to the moderns, must admit that they all contain a haphazard mixture of verbal facts and facts of thought, of gram- matical forms and of conceptual forms, of fEsthetic and of Logic. Not that attempts have v PS rORTC AND LOGIC 69 been wanting to escape from verbal expres- sion and to seize thought in its effective nature. Aristotelian logic itself did not become mere syllogistic and verbalism, without some stumbling and oscillation. The especially logical problem was often touched upon in the Middle Ages, by the nominalists, realists, and conceptualists, in their dis- putes. With Galileo and with Bacon, the natural sciences gave an honourable place to induction. Vico combated formalist and mathematical logic in favour of inventive methods. Kant called attention to a@ priort syntheses. The absolute idealists despised the Aristotelian logic. The followers of Herbart, bound to Aristotle, on the other hand, set in relief those judgments which they called narrative, which are of a character altogether different from other logical judgments, Finally, the linguists insisted upon the irration- ality of the word, in relation to the concept. But a conscious, sure, and radical movement of reform can find no base or starting-point, save in the science of Aésthetic. In a Logic suitably reformed on this basis, it will be fitting to proclaim before all things this truth, and to draw from it all its consequences: ( the logical fact, the only logical fact, is the concept, 1 } the universal, the spirit that forms, and in so far Logic in its essence. 70 THEORY Oba Pit tLe v as it forms, the universal. And if be understood by induction, as has sometimes been understood, the formation of universals, and by deduction the verbal development of these, then it is clear that true Logic can be nothing but inductive Logic. But since by the word “deduction” has been more frequently understood the special processes of mathematics, and by the word “induction” those of the natural sciences, it will be advisable to avoid the one and the other denomination, and to say that true Logic is the Logic of the concept. The Logic of the concept, adopting a method which is at once induction .and deduction, will adopt neither the one nor.the.other.exclusively, that is, will adopt the (speculative) method, which is intrinsic to it. The concept, the universal, is in itself, abstractly considered, znexpressible. No word is proper to it. So true is this, that the logical concept remains always the same, notwith- standing the variation of verbal forms. In respect to the concept, expression is a simple szgn _ or zudication. There must be an expression, it cannot fail; but what it is to be, this or that, is determined_by the historical and psychological conditions of the individual who is speaking. The_quality ofthe expression .is.not-.deducible from the nature of the concept. There does not v ls bORIC AN DoLOGIC visi exist a true (logical) sense of words. He who forms a concept bestows on each occasion their true meaning on the words. This being established, the only truly logical (that is, asthetico-logical) propositions, the only rigorously logical judgments, can be nothing but those whose proper and exclusive content is the determination of a concept. These propositions or judgments are the definztions. Science itself is nothing but a complex of definitions, unified in a supreme definition; a system of concepts, or chief concept. It is therefore necessary to exclude. from Logic all those propositions which do not affirm universals. Narrative judgments, not less than those termed non-enunciative by Aristotle, such as the expression of desires, are not properly logical judgments. They are either purely esthetic propositions or historical propositions. “Peter is passing; it is raining to-day; I am sleepy; I want to read”: these and an infinity of propositions of the same kind, are nothing but either a mere enclosing in words the impression of the fact that Peter is passing, of the falling rain, of my organism inclining to sleep, and of my will directed to reading, or they are exis- tential affirmation concerning those facts. They Distinction b tween logical and non-logic judgments. Syllogistic. G2 PHERORY OFS Fae ae v are expressions of the real or of the unreal, of historical or of pure imagination; they are certainly not definitions of universals. This exclusion cannot meet with great diffi- culties. It is already almost an accomplished fact, and the only thing required is to render it explicit, decisive, and coherent. But what is to be done with all that part of human experience which is called sy@/ogzstzc, consisting of judgments and reasonings which are based on concepts. What is syllogistic? Is it to be looked down upon from above with contempt, as something useless, as has so often been done in the reaction of the humanists against scholasticism, in absolute idealism, in the enthusiastic admiration of our times for the methods of observation and experiment of the natural sciences? Syllogistic, reasoning 72 forma, is not a discovery of truth ; it is the art of exposing, debating, disputing with oneself and others. Proceeding from concepts already formed, from facts already observed and making appeal to the persistence of the true or of thought (such is the awe of the principle of identity and contradiction), it infers conse- quences from these data, that is, it represents what has already been discovered. ~ Therefore, if it be an zdem per idem from the point of view :| v iis PORIC AND LOGIC 73 of invention, it is most efficacious as a teaching and an exposition. To o reduce affirmations to the syllogistic scheme is a way of controlling one’s own thought and of criticizing that of others. It is easy to laugh at syllogisers, but, if syllogistic has been born and retains its place, it must have good roots of its own. Satire applied to it can concern only its abuses, such as the attempt to prove syllogistically questions of fact, observation, and intuition, or the neglect of profound medita- tion and unprejudiced investigation of problems, for syllogistic formality. And if so-called mathe- matical Logic can sometimes aid us in our attempt to remember with ease, to manipulate the results of our own thought, let us welcome this form of the syllogism also, long prophesied by Leibnitz and essayed by many, even in our days. But precisely because syllogistic is the art of exposing and of debating, its theory cannot hold the first place in a_ philosophical _ Logic, usurping that belonging to the doctrine of the concept, which is the central and dominating doctrine, to which is reduced everything logical in syllogistic, without leaving a residuum (rela- tions of concepts, subordination, co-ordination, identification, and so on). Nor must it ever be forgotten that the concept, the (logical) judgment, een alse Logic nd true Esthetic. 74 THEORY OR AS. tre Lie v and the syllogism do not occupy the same position. The first alone is the logical fact, the second and third are the forms in which the first manifests itself. These, in so far as they are forms, cannot be examined save esthetically (grammatically) ; in so far as they possess logical content, only by neglecting the forms themselves and passing to the doctrine of the concept. This shows the truth of the ordinary remark to the effect that he who reasons ill, also speaks and writes ill, that exact logical analysis is the basis of good expression. This truth is a tautology, for to reason well is in fact to express oneself well, because the expression is the in- tuitive possession of one’s own logical thought. The principle of contradiction, itself, is at bottom nothing but the esthetic principle of coherence. It will be said that starting from erroneous con- cepts it is possible to write and to speak exceed- ingly well, as it is also possible to reason well ; that some who are dull at research may yet be most limpid writers. That is precisely because to write well depends upon having a clear in- tuition of one’s own thought, even if it be erroneous; that is to say, not of its scientific, but of its zsthetic truth, since it is this truth itself. A philosopher like Schopenhauer can 5 HISTORIC AND LOGIC 75 iiiagime that are is a tepresentation of the Platonic ideas. This doctrine is absolutely false scientifically, yet he may develop this false know- ledge in excellent prose, zsthetically most true. But we have already replied to these objections, when we observed that at that precise point where a speaker or a writer enunciates an ill-thought concept, he is at the same time speaking ill and writing ill, He may, however, afterwards recover himself in the many other parts of his thought, which consist of true propositions, not connected with the preceding errors, and lucid expressions may with him follow upon turbid expressions. All enquiries as to the forms of judgments and of syllogisms, on their conversion and on their various relations, which still encumber treatises on Logic, are therefore destined to become less, to be transformed, to be reduced to something else. The doctrine of the concept and of the organ- ism of the concepts, of definition, of system, of philosophy, and of the various sciences, and the like, will fill the place of these and will constitute the only true and proper Logic. Those who first had some suspicion of the intimate connexion between Aésthetic and Logic and conceived A‘sthetic as a Logic of sensible knowledge, were strangely addicted to applying Logic reforme 76 an EORY OR is Pn 11 v logical categories to the new knowledge, talking of esthetic concepts, esthetic zudgments, cesthetze syllogisms, and so on. We are less superstitious as regards the solidity of the traditional Logic of the schools, and better informed as to the nature of Esthetic. We do not recommend the application of Logic to _ZEsthetic, but the. liberation of Logic from zsthetic_forms. These have given rise to non-existent forms or cate- gories of Logic, due to the following of altogether arbitrary and crude distinctions. Logic thus reformed will always be formal Logic ; it will study the true form or activity of thought, the concept, excluding single and particu- lar concepts. The old Logic is ill called formal ; it were better to call it verbal or formalistic. Formal. Logic will drive out formalistic Logic. To attain this object, it will not be necessary to have recourse, as some have done, to a real or material Logic, which is not a science of thought, but thought itself in the act ; not only a Logic, but the complex of Philosophy, in which Logic also is included. The science of thought (Logic) is that of the concept, as that of fancy (Aésthetic) is the science of expression. The well-being of both sciences lies in exactly following in every particular the distinction between the two domains. VI THEORETIC AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITY THE ‘intuitive and intellective forms exhaust, as we have said, all the theoretic form of the spirit. But it is not possible to know them thoroughly, nor to criticize another series of erroneous zesthetic theories, without first establishing clearly their relations with another form of the spirit, which is the practical form. This form or practical activity is the w7?, We do not employ this word here in the sense of any philosophical system, in which the will is the foundation of the universe, the principle of things and the true reality. Nor do we employ it in the ample sense of other systems, which understand by will the energy of the spirit, the spirit or activity in general, making of every act of the human spirit an act of will. Neither such meta- physical nor such metaphorical meaning is ours. For us, the will is, as generally accepted, that activity of the spirit, which differs from the mere 77 The will, [he wll as an terior stage nm respect to nowled ge. Dojections and luctdations. 78 THEORY OF Aol rie vI theoretical contemplation of things,’ and is pro- ductive, not of knowledge, but of actions. Action is really action, in so far as it is voluntary. It is not necessary to remark that in the will to do, is included, in the scientific sense, also what is vulgarly called not-doing: the will to resist, to reject, the prometheutic will, is also action. Man understands things with the theoretical form, with the practical form he changes them ; with the one he appropriates the universe, with the other he creates it. But the first form is the basis of the second; and the relation of doudle degree, which we have already found existing between esthetic and logical activity, is repeated between these two on a larger scale. Knowledge | independent of the will is thinkable; will in- dependent of knowledge is unthinkable. Blind will is not will; true will has eyes. aoe can we will, ese having Bees us knowledge of Weeicaly Waltons Semmes us as to the nature of those objects? How can we really will, if we do not know the world which surrounds us, and the manner of changing things by acting upon them ? It has been objected that men of action, practical men in the eminent sense, are the v1 PEC ORETIC ACTIVITY, ETC. 46 least disposed to contemplate and to theorize: their energy is not delayed in contemplation, it rushes at once into will. And conversely, that contemplative men, philosophers, are often very mediocre in practical matters, weak willed, and therefore neglected and thrust aside in the tumult of life. It is easy to see that these distinctions are merely empirical and quantitative. Certainly, the practical man has no need of a philosophical system in order to act, but in the spheres where he does act, he starts from intuitions and concepts which are most clear to him. Otherwise he could not will the most ordinary actions. It would not be possible to will to feed oneself, for instance, without knowledge of the food, and of the link of cause and effect between certain movements and certain organic sensations. Rising gradually to the more complex forms of action, for example to the political, how could we will anything politi- cally good or bad, without knowing the real conditions of society, and consequently the means and expedients to be adopted? When the practical man feels himself in the dark about one or more of these points, or when he is seized with doubt,. action either does not begin or stops. It is then that the theoretical moment, which in the rapid succession of human actions is hardly noticed and ‘yitigue of ractical udgments or udgments of alue. 80 LEhORY Or Ato era vI rapidly forgotten, becomes important and occupies consciousness for a longer time. And if this moment be prolonged, then the practical man may become Hamlet, divided between desire for action and his small amount of theoretical clarity as regards the situation and the means to be employed. And if he develop a taste for con- templation and discovery, and leave willing and acting, to a more or less great extent, to others, there is formed in him the calm disposition of the artist, of the man of science, or of the philosopher, who are sometimes unpractical or altogether blameworthy. These observations are all obvious, Their exactitude cannot be denied. Let us, how- ever, repeat that they are founded on quantitative distinctions and do not disprove, but confirm the fact that an action, however slight it be, cannot really be an action, that is, an action that is willed, unless it be preceded by cognoscitive activity. Some psychologists, on the other hand, place before practical action an altogether special class of judgments, which they call pvactzcal judgments or judgments of value. They say that in order to resolve to perform an action, it is necessary to have judged: “this action is useful, this action is good.” And at first sight this vI PeeORM ITC ACTIVITY, HEC. 8; seems to have the testimony of consciousness on its side. But he who observes better and analyses with greater subtlety, discovers that such judgments follow instead of preceding the affirmation of the will; they are nothing but the expression of the already exercised volition. A good or useful action is an action that is willed. It will always be impossible to distil from the objective study of things a single drop of usefulness or goodness. We do not desire things because we know them to be good or useful ; but we know them to be good and useful, because we desire them. Here too, the rapidity with which the facts of consciousness follow one another has given rise to an illusion. Practical action is preceded by knowledge, but not by practical knowledge, or better by the practical : to obtain this, it is first necessary to have practical action. The third moment, therefore, of practical judgments, or judgments of value, is altogether imaginary. It does not come between the two moments or degrees of theory and practice. That is why there exist no normative sciences in general, which regulate or command, discover and indicate values to the practical activity ; because there is none for any other activity, assuming every science already realized G Exclusion of the practical from the esthetic. 82 THEORY; Ob AS Tin Eli vie and that activity developed, which it afterwards takes as its object. These distinctions established, we must con- demn as erroneous every theory which confuses esthetic with practical activity, or introduces the laws of the second into the first. That science is theory and art practice has been many times affirmed. Those who make this statement, and look upon the esthetic fact as a practical fact, do not do so capriciously or because they are groping in the void; but because they have their eye on something which is really practical. But the practical which they are looking at is not A¢sthetic, nor within A¢sthetic ; it is outside and beside it; and although they are often found united, they are not necessarily united, that is to say, by the bond of identity of nature. The esthetic fact is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration of the impressions. When we have conquered the word within us, conceived definitely and vividly a figure or a statue, or found a musical motive, expression is born and is complete; there is no need for any- thing else. If after this we should open our mouths and wz/Z to open them, to speak, or our throats to sing, and declare in a loud voice Pee VOLE PIC ACIIWITY, BIC. 82 and with extended throat what we have com- pletely said or sung to ourselves; or if we should stretch out and wz// to stretch out our hands to touch the notes of the piano, or to take up the brushes and the chisel, making thus in detail those movements which we have already done rapidly, and doing so in such a way as to leave more or less durable traces; this is all an addition, a fact which obeys quite different laws to the first, and with these laws we have not to occupy ourselves for the moment. Let us, however, here recognize that this second move- ment is a production of things, a practical fact, or a fact of weld, It is customary to distinguish the internal from the external work of art: the terminology seems here to be infelicitous, for the work of art (the esthetic work) is always zudernad; and that which is called external is no longer a work of art. Others distinguish between esthetic fact and artzstic fact, meaning by the second the external or practical stage, which may and generally does follow the first. But in this case, it is simply a case of linguistic usage, doubtless permissible, although perhaps not opportune. For the same reasons the search for the end of art is ridiculous, when it is understood 84 Oe Ee ORO fe 7S EEL ee: vI Critique of the Of art as art. And since to fix an end is theory of the end of art and to Choose, the theory that the content of art of the choice of the content. must be selected is another form of the same error. A selection from among impressions and sensations implies that these are already expressions, otherwise, how can a selection be made among what is continuous and indistinct ? To choose is to will: to will this and not to will that: and this and that must be before us, they must be expressed. Practice follows, it does not precede theory; expression is free_ inspiration. The true artist, in fact, finds himself big with his theme, he. knows not how; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will it or not wilit, If he were to wish to act in opposition to his inspiration, to make an arbitrary choice, if, born Anacreon, he were to wish to sing of Atreus and of Alcides, his lyre would warn him of his mistake, echoing only of Venus and of Love, notwithstanding his efforts to the contrary. Practical The theme or content cannot, therefore, be innocence of : : : art. practically or morally charged with epithets of praise or of blame. When critics of art remark that a theme is dadly selected, in cases where that observation has a just foundation, it is a question of blaming, not the selection of the theme (which oe ORE ING ACPIVITY. ETC. S« would be absurd), but the manner in which the artist has treated it. The expression has failed, owing to the contradictions which it contains. And when the same critics rebel against the theme or the content as being unworthy of art and blameworthy, in respect to works which they proclaim to be artistically perfect ; if these expressions really are perfect, there is nothing to be done but to advise the critics to leave the artists in peace, for they cannot get inspiration, save from what has made an impression upon them. The critics should ! think rather of how they can effect changes in | | nature and in society, in order that those im- | pressions may not exist. If ugliness were to vanish from the world, if universal virtue and felicity were established there, perhaps artists would no longer represent perverse or pessimistic sentiments, but sentiments that are calm, innocent, and joyous, like Arcadians of a real Arcady. _ But so long as ugliness and turpitude exist in nature and impose themselves on the artist, it is not possible to prevent the expression of these things also; and when it has arisen, factum — infectum fiert neguit. We speak thus entirely from the esthetic point of view, and from that of pure esthetic criticism. We do not delay to pass here in review the The independ ence of art. 86 THEORY, OF AtS CEC vi damage which the criticism of choice does to artistic production, with the prejudices which it produces or maintains among the artists them- selves, and with the contrast which it occasions between artistic impulse and critical exigencies. It is true that sometimes it seems to do some good also, by assisting the artists to discover themselves, that is, their own impressions and their own inspiration, and to acquire consciousness of the task which is, as it were, imposed upon them by the historical moment in which they live, and by their individual temperament. In these cases, criticism of choice merely recognizes and aids the expressions which are already being formed. It believes itself to be the mother, where, at most, it is only the midwife. The impossibility of choice of content com- pletes the theorem of the independence of ari, and is also the only legitimate meaning of the expression: art for art's sake. Art is thus in- dependent of science, as it is of the useful and the moral. Let it not be feared that thus may be justified art that is frivolous or cold, since that which is truly frivolous or cold is so because it has not been raised to expression; or in other words, frivolity and frigidity come always from the form of the esthetic elaboration, from the Woe One AC TIVIEY, EPCs. 37 lack of a content, not from the material qualities of the content. The saying: ¢he style ts the man, can also not be completely criticized, save by starting from the distinction between the theoretic and the practical, and from the theoretic character of the esthetic activity. Man is not simply knowledge and contemplation: -he is also will, which contains in it the cognoscitive moment. ' Now the saying is either altogether void, as when it is understood that the man is the style, in so far as he is style, that is to say, the man, but only in so far as he is an expression of activity ; or it is erroneous, when the attempt is made to deduce from what a man has seen and expressed, that which he has done and willed, inferring thereby that there is a necessary link between knowing and willing. Many legends in the biographies of artists have sprung from this erroneous identification, since it seemed impossible that a man who gives expression to generous senti- ments should not be a noble and generous man in practical life; or that the dramatist who gives a great many stabs in his plays, should not himself have given a few at least in real life. Vainly do the artists protest: J/asczva est nobis pagina, vita proba. They are merely taxed in Critique of saying : the style ts the n 88 PE ORY, OF od tre te vI addition with lying and hypocrisy. O you poor women of Verona, how far more subtle you were, when you founded your belief that Dante had really descended to hell, upon his dusky counte- nance! Yours was at any rate a_ historical conjecture. tique of Finally, szzcervzty imposed upon the artist as concept of : : : : erityin a duty (this law of ethics which, they say, is also a law of esthetic) arises from another equivoke. For by sincerity is meant either the moral duty not to deceive one’s neighbour; and in that case is foreign to the artist. For he, in fact, deceives no one, since he gives form to what is already in his mind. He would deceive, only if he were to betray his duty as an artist by a lesser devotion to the intrinsic necessity of his task. If lies and deceit are in his mind, then the form which he gives to these things cannot be deceit or lies, precisely because it ts csthetic. Ihe artist, if he be a charlatan, a liar, or a miscreant, purifies his other self by reflecting it in art, = Or by sincerity is meant, fulness and truth of expres- sion, and it is clear that this second sense has nothing to do with the ethical concept. The law, which is at once ethical and esthetic, reveals itself in this case in a word employed alike by Ethic and Aésthetic. Vil ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL | Tue twofold grade of the theoretical activity, 7% two form esthetic and logical, has an important parallel in eS the practical activity, which has not yet been placed in due relief. The practical activity is _ also divided into a first and second degree, the ; second implying the first. The first practical degree is the simply wsefu/ or economical activity ; the second the moral activity. Economy is, as it were, the A‘sthetic of practical life; Morality its Logic. | If this has not been clearly seen by philo- phere: sophers; if its suitable place in the system of _ the mind has not been given to the economic | activity, and it has been left to wander in the _ prolegomena to treatises on political economy, often uncertain and but slightly elaborated, this is due, among other reasons, to the fact that the useful or economic has been confused, now 89 90 an OR Ve OF A105 FEELS vil with the concept of ¢echnigue, now with that of the egozsézc. stinction Technigue is certainly not a special activity of ‘ween the Fae tate Oe the spirit. Technique is knowledge; or better, it is knowledge itself, in general, that takes this name, as we have seen, in so far as it serves as basis for practical action. Knowledge which is not followed, or is presumed to be not easily followed by practical action, is called pure: the same knowledge, if effectively followed by action, is called applied; if it is presumed that it can be easily followed by the same action, it is called technical or applied. This word, then, indicates a sttuation in which knowledge already is, or easily can be found, not a special form of know- ledge. So true is this, that it would be altogether impossible to establish whether a given order of knowledge were, intrinsically, pure or applied. All knowledge, however abstract and philosophical one may imagine it to be, can be a guide to practical acts; a theoretical error in the ultimate principles of morals can be reflected and always is reflected in some way, in practical life. One can only speak roughly and unscientifically of truths that are pure and of others that are applied. The same knowledge which is called technical, can also be called wsefuZ. But the word “ useful,” vil Pie OnY AND PRACTICE gI in conformity with the criticism of judgments of value made above, is to be understood as used here in a linguistic or metaphorical sense. When we say that water is useful for putting out fire, the word “useful” is used in a non-scientific sense. Water thrown on the fire is the cause of its going out: this is the knowledge that serves Por Pasis to the action, lét. us: say,-of firemen. There is a link, not of nature, but of simple succession, between the useful action of the person who extinguishes the conflagration, and this knowledge. The technique of the effects of the water is the theoretical activity which precedes; the action of him who extinguishes the fire is alone useful. Some economists identify utility with egozsm, that is to say, with merely economical action or desire, with that which is profitable to the in- dividual, in so far as individual, without regard to and indeed in complete opposition to the moral law. The egoistic is the immoral. In this case Economy would be a very strange science, standing, not beside, but facing Eghie, like the devil facing God, or at least like the advocatus diaboli in the processes of canonization. Such a conception of it is altogether inadmissible : the science of immorality is implied in that of Distinction between the useful and t egotstic. COMOMLC vill and noral will, 92 aH eORY, OF to thin tie vii morality, as the science of the false is implied in Logic, the science of the true, and a science of ineffectual expression in A®sthetic, the science of successful expression. If, then, Economy were the scientific treatment of egoism, it would be a chapter of Ethic, or Ethic itself; because every moral determination implies, at the same time, a negation of its contrary. Further, conscience tells us that to conduct oneself economically is not to conduct oneself egoistically ; that even the most morally scrupulous man must conduct himself usefully (economically), if he does not wish to be inconclusive and, therefore, not truly moral. If utility were egoism, how could it be the duty of the altruist to behave like an egoist ? If we are not mistaken, the difficulty is solved in a manner perfectly analogous to that in which is solved the problem of the relations between the expression and the concept, between A¢sthetic and Logic. To will economically is to wzll an end; to will morally is to well the rational end. But whoever wills and acts morally, cannot but will and act usefully (economically). How could he will the rational, unless he willed it also as hes particular end? vil THEORY AND PRACTICE 93 The reciprocal is not true; as it is not true in zsthetic science that the expressive fact must of necessity be linked with the logical fact. It is possible to will economically without willing morally; and it is possible to conduct oneself with perfect economic coherence, while pursuing an end which is objectively irrational (immoral), or, better, an end which would be so judged in a superior grade of consciousness, Examples of the economic, without the moral character, are the Prince of Machiavelli, Czsar Borgia, or the Iago of Shakespeare. Who can help admiring their strength of will, although their activity is only economic, and is opposed to what we hold moral? Who can help admiring the ser Ciappelletto of Boccaccio, who, even on his death-bed, pursues and realizes his ideal of the perfect rascal, making the small and timid little thieves who are present at his burlesque confession exclaim: ‘‘What manner of man is this, whose perversity, neither age, nor infirmity, nor the fear of death, which he sees at hand, nor the fear of God, before whose judgment-seat he must stand in a little while, have been able to remove, nor to cause that he should not wish to die as he has lived ?” The moral man unites with the pertinacity Pure economtictty. he economic le of wrality, 94 THEORY OF AsolHib Tic vil and fearlessness of a Caesar Borgia, of an Iago, or of a ser Ciappelletto, the good will of the saint or of the hero. Or, better, good will would not be will, and consequently not good, if it did not possess, in addition to the side which makes it good, also that which makes it wz//, Thus a logical thought, which does not succeed in ex- pressing itself, is not thought, but at the most, a confused presentiment of a thought yet to come. It is not correct, then, to conceive of the amoral man as also the anti-economical man, or to make of morality an element of coherence in the acts of life, and therefore of economicity. Nothing prevents us from conceiving (an hypothesis which is verified at least during certain periods and moments, if not during whole lifetimes) a man altogether without moral conscience. In a man thus organized, what for us is immorality is not so for him, because it is not so felt. The consciousness of the contradiction between what is desired as a rational end and what is pursued egoistically cannot be born in him. This con- tradiction is anti-economicity. Immoral conduct becomes also anti-economical only in the man who possesses moral conscience. The moral remorse which is the proof of this, is also economical | 1 vil PEeOkRY AND PRaclhicr 95 remorse ; that is to say, pain at not having known how to will completely and to attain to that moral ideal which was willed at the first moment, but was afterwards perverted by the passions. Video melora proboqgue, detertora seguor. The video and the frodo are here an initial will immediately contradicted and passed over. In the man deprived of moral sense, we must admit a remorse which is merely economic ; like that of a thief or of an assassin who should be attacked when on the point of robbing or of assassinating, and should abstain from doing so, not owing to a conversion of his being, but owing to his impressionability and bewilderment, or even owing to a momentary awakening of the moral con- sciousness. When he has come back to himself, that thief or assassin will regret and be ashamed of his inconsequence ; his remorse will not be due to having done wrong, but to not having done it ; his remorse is, therefore,economic, not moral, since the latter is excluded by hypothesis. However, a lively moral conscience is generally found among the majority of men, and its total absence is a rare and perhaps non-existent monstrosity. i inay, therefore, be admitted, that morality coincides with economicity in the conduct of life. There need be no fear lest the parallelism he merely monic and 2 error of 2 morally different. 96 THEORY, OF ot He Tic vit affirmed by us should introduce afresh into science the category of the morally indifferent, of that which is in truth action and volition, but is neither moral nor immoral; the category in sum of the “Zczt and of the permzsszble, which has always been the cause or mirror of ethical corruption, as is the case with Jesuitical morality in which it dominated. It remains quite certain that indifferent moral actions do not exist, because moral activity pervades and must per- vade every least volitional movement of man. But this, far from upsetting the parallelism, confirms it. Do there exist intuitions which science and the intellect do not pervade and analyse, resolving them into universal concepts, or changing them into historical affirmations? \We have already seen that true science, philosophy, knows no external limits which bar its way, as happens with the so-called natural sciences. Science and morality entirely dominate, the one the esthetic intuitions, the other the economic volitions of man, although neither of them can appear in the concrete, save in the intuitive form as regards the one, in the economic as regards the other. This combined identity and difference of the useful and of the moral, of the economic and ZETEC ERI RREOSIAEE GM 7 Sade z eter vl Te PORY AND Pee Tick 97 of the ethic, explains the fortune enjoyed now and formerly by the utilitarian theory of Ethic. It is in fact easy to discover and to show a utilitarian side in every moral action; as it is easy to show an esthetic side of every logical proposition. The criticism of ethical utilitarian- ism cannot escape by denying this truth and seeking out absurd and inexistent examples of useless moral actions. It must admit the utilitarian side and explain it as the concrete form of morality, which consists of what is wzthzn this form. Utilitarians do not see this within. This is not the place for a more ample development of such ideas. Ethic and Economic cannot but be gainers, as we have said of Logic and Esthetic, by a more exact determination of the relations that exist between them. Economic science is now rising to the animating concept of the useful, as it strives to pass beyond the mathematical phase, in which it is still entangled ; a phase which, when it superseded historicism, was in its turn a progress, destroying a series of arbitrary distinctions and false theories of Economic, implied in the confusion of the theoretical with the historical. With this conception, it will be easy on the one hand to absorb and to verify the semi-philosophical H Critique of utilitarianism and the reform of Ethic and of Economic. Phenomenon and noumenon tn practical activity. 98 VHEORY OF 705 Lit Tie vil theories of so-called pure economy, and on the other, by the introduction of successive com- plications and additions, and by passing from the philosophical to the empirical or naturalistic method, to include the particular theories of the political or national economy of the schools. As esthetic intuition knows the phenomenon or nature, and philosophic intuition the noume- non or spirit; so economic activity wills the phenomenon or nature, and moral activity the noumenon or spirit. Zhe spirit which desires itself, its true self, the universal which is in the empirical and finite spirit: that is the formula which perhaps defines the essence of morality with the least impropriety. This will for the true self is absolute liberty. VIII EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS In this summary sketch that we have given, of Pia Mics the entire philosophy of the spirit in its funda- mental moments, the spirit is conceived as consisting of four moments or grades, disposed in such a way that the theoretical activity is to the practical as is the first theoretical grade to the second theoretical, and the first practical Bade to the second. practical: The four moments imply one another regressively by feew concretion......he concept’ cannot be without expression, the useful without the one and the other, and morality without the three preceding grades. If the esthetic fact is alone independent, and the others more or less dependent, then the logical is the least so and the moral will the most. Moral intention Operates on given theoretic bases, which cannot be dispensed with, save by that absurd practice, the jesuitical erection of intention. Here people 99 The forms of gentus. Non-existence - of a fifth form of activity. Law, sociality, 100 Pip ORY OF Wo Eri be vill pretend to themselves not to know what at bottom they know perfectly well. If the forms of human activity are four, four also are the forms of genius. Geniuses in art, in science, in moral will or heroes, have certainly always been recognized. But the genius of pure Economic has met with opposition. It is not altogether without reason that a category of bad geniuses or of genzuses of evil has been created. The practical, merely economic genius, which is not directed to a rational end, cannot but excite an admiration mingled with alarm. It would be a mere question of words, were we to discuss whether the word ‘‘genius” should be applied only to creators of zsthetic expression, or also to men of scientific research and of action. To observe, on the other hand, that genius, of whatever kind it be, is always a quantitative conception and an empirical distinction, would be to repeat what has already been explained as regards artistic genius. A fifth form of spiritual activity does not exist. It would be easy to demonstrate how all the other forms, either do not possess the character of activity, or are verbal variants of the activities already examined, or are complex and derived facts, in which the various activities are mingled, ae vill Oriiwk SEIKI UAL FORMS | «101 or are filled with special contents and con- tingent data. The judiczal fact, for example, considered as what is called objective law, is derived both from the economic and from the logical activities. Law is a rule, a formula (whether oral or written matters little here) in which is contained an eco- nomic relation willed by an individual or by a collectivity. This economic side at once unites it with and distinguishes it from moral activity. Take another example. Sociology (among the many meanings the word bears in our times) is sometimes conceived as the study of an original element, which is called soczahty. Now what is it that distinguishes sociality, or the relations which are developed in a meeting of men, not of subhuman beings, if it be not just the various spiritual activities which exist among the former and which are supposed not to exist, or to exist only in a rudimentary degree, among the latter? Sociality, then, far from being an original, simple, irreducible conception, is very complex and complicated. This could be proved by the impossibility, generally recognized, of enunciating a single sociological law, properly so-called. Those that are improperly called by that name are revealed as either empirical Religiosity. 102 THEORY OF ALSTHE Tic VIII historical observations, or spiritual laws, that is to say judgments, into which are translated the conceptions of the spiritual activities; when they are not simply empty and indeterminate general- izations, like the so-called law of evolution. Sometimes, too, nothing more is understood by sociality than social rule, and so law; and thus sociology is confounded with the science or theory of law itself. Law, sociality, and like terms, are to be dealt with in a mode analogous to that employed by us in the consideration of historicity and technique. It may seem fitting to form a different judg- ment as to veligzous activity. But religion is nothing but knowledge, and doesnot differ from its other forms and subforms. For it is in truth and in turn either the expression of practical and ideal aspirations (religious ideals), or historical narrative (legend), or conceptual science (dogma). It can therefore be maintained with equal truth, both that religion is destroyed by the progress of human knowledge, and that it is always present there. Their religion was the whole patrimony of knowledge of primitive peoples: our patrimony of knowledge is our religion. The content has been changed, bettered, refined, and it will .change and become better ON — _ ~ VIII GRAB SeIRITUAL FORNS 103 and more refined in the future also; but its function is always the same. We do not know what use could be made of religion by those who wish to preserve it side by side with the theoretic activity of man, with his art, with his criticism, and with his philosophy. It is impos- sible to preserve an imperfect and inferior kind of knowledge, like religion, side by side with what has surpassed and disproved it. Catholicism, which is always coherent, will not tolerate a Science, a History, an Ethic, in contradiction to its views and doctrines. The rationalists are less coherent. They are disposed to allow a little space in their souls for a religion which is in contradiction with their whole theoretic Borie. These affectations and religious susceptibilities of the rationalists of our times have their origin in the superstitious cult of the natural sciences. These, as we know and as is confessed by the mouth of their chief adepts, are all surrounded by Zzmzts. Science having been wrongly identi- fied with the so-called natural sciences, it could be foreseen that the remainder would be asked of religion; that remainder with which the human spirit cannot dispense. We are therefore indebted to materialism, to positivism, Metaphysic. 104 THEORY OF AS Treille vill to naturalism for this unhealthy and often dis- ingenuous reflowering of religious exaltation. Such things are the business of the hospital, when they are not the business of the politician. Philosophy withdraws from religion all reason for existing, because. it..substitutes. itself for religion. As the science.of the spirit, it looks upon religion as a phenomenon, a transitory historical fact, a psychic condition that can be surpassed. Philosophy shares the domain of knowledge with the natural disciplines, with history and with art. it leaves: to the first: narration, measurement and classification ; to the second, the chronicling of what has individually happened ; to the third, the individually possible. There is nothing left to share with religion. For the same reason, philosophy, as the science of the spirit, cannot be philosophy of the intuitive datum; nor, as has been seen, Phzlosophy of FT[istory, nor Philosophy of Nature; and therefore there cannot be a philosophic science of what is not form and universal, but material and particular. This amounts to affirming the impossibility of metaphystc. } ‘The Method or Logic of history followed the Philosophy of history; a gnoseology of the conceptions which are employed in the natural sciences succeeded natural philosophy. What philosophy can study of the one is its mode of construction (intuition, perception, document, prob- ability, etc.); of the others she can study the forms of the conceptions which appear in them (space, time, motion, number, types, classes, etc.). Philosophy, which should become metaphysical in the sense above described, would, on the other hand, claim to compete with narrative history, and with the natural sciences, which in their field are alone legitimate and effective. Such a competition becomes in fact a labour spoiling labour. We are antimetaphysical in this sense, while yet” declaring ourselves wltrametaphysial, if by that word it be desired to claim and to affirm the function of philosophy as the autoconsciousness of the spirit, as opposed to the merely empirical and classificatory function of the natural sciences. In order to maintain itself side by side with asenzaz tmagination the sciences of the spirit, metaphysic has been oe obliged to assert the existence of a_ specific spiritual activity, of which it would be the product. This activity, which in antiquity was called menta/ or superior imagination, and in modern times more often zztuztive intellect or wntellectual in- tution, would unite in an altogether special form the characters of imagination and of intellect. Mystical esthetic. 106 Tite ORY OP AS Pi balie vit It would provide the method of passing, by deduction or dialectically, from the infinite to the finite, from form to matter, from the concept to the intuition, from science to history, operating by a method which should be at once unity and compenetration of the universal and the particular, of the abstract and the concrete, of intuition and of intellect. A faculty marvellous indeed and delightful to possess ; but we, who do not possess it, have no means of proving its existence. Intellectual intuition has sometimes been con- sidered as the true esthetic activity. At others a not less marvellous esthetic activity has been placed beside, below, or above it, a faculty altogether different from simple intuition. The glories of this faculty have been sung, and to it have been attributed the fact of art, or at the least certain groups of artistic production, arbitrarily chosen. Art, religion, and philosophy have seemed in turn one only, or three distinct faculties of the spirit, now one, now another of these being superior in the dignity assigned to each. It is impossible to enumerate all the various attitudes assumed by this conception of A¢sthetic, which we will call mystecal. We are here in the kingdom, not of the science of imagination, but of imagination itself, which creates its world with VIII OCPD Sein ft UAL PORMS 107 the varying elements of the impressions and of the feelings. Let it suffice to mention that this mysterious faculty has been conceived, now as practical, now as a mean between the theoretic and the practical, at others again as a theoretic grade together with philosophy and religion. The immortality of art has sometimes been deduced from this last conception as belonging with its sisters to the sphere of absolute spirit. At other times, on the other hand, when religion has been looked upon as mortal and as dissolved in philosophy, then the mortality, even the actual death, or at least the agony of art has been proclaimed. These questions have no meaning for us, because, seeing that the function of art isa necessary grade of the spirit, to ask if art can be eliminated is the same thing as asking if sensation or intelligence can be eliminated. But metaphysic, in the above sense, since it transplants itself to an arbitrary world, is not to be criticized in detail, any more than one can criticize the botany of the garden of Alcina or the navigation of the voyage of Astolfo. Criticism can only be made by refusing to join the game; that is to say, by rejecting the very possibility of metaphysic, always in the sense above indicated. As we do not admit intellectual intuition in Mortality and zmmortality of are. 108 PH EORY OFF 7s Die rte VuI philosophy, we can also not admit its shadow or equivalent, zsthetic intellectual intuition, or any other mode by which this imaginary function may be called and represented. We repeat again that we do not know of a fifth grade beyond the four grades of spirit which consciousness reveals to us. rx INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR GRADES AND CRITIQUE OF RHETORIC Ir is customary to give long enumerations of the Hess characteristics of art. Having reached this point of the treatise, having studied the artistic function as spiritual activity, as theoretic activity, and as special theoretic activity (intuitive), we are able to discern that those various and copious descriptions mean, when they mean anything at all, nothing but a repetition of what may be called the qualities of the esthetic function, generic, specific, and characteristic. To the first of these are referred, as we have already observed, the characters, or better, the verbal variants of uxzty, and of wzzty in variety, those also of szmplicety, of originality, and so on; to the second of these, the characteristics of truth, of s¢ucerzty, and the like ; to the third, the characteristics of /z/e, of vzvaczty, of animation, of concretion, of endividuality, of characteristicaty. The words may vary yet 109 110 TUEORY OF Poth tie 1x more, but they will not contribute anything scientifically new. The results which we have shown have altogether exhausted the analysis of expression as such. lone But at this point, the question as to whether expression. there be various modes or grades of expression is still perfectly legitimate. We have dis- tinguished two grades of activity, each of which is subdivided into two other grades, and there is certainly, so far, no visible logical reason why there should not exist two or more modes of the zsthetic, that is of expression.—The only objection is that these modes do not exist. For the: present at least, it 1s a” question of simple internal observation and of self consciousness. One may scrutinize esthetic facts as much as one will: no formal differences will ever be found among them, nor will the esthetic fact be divisible into a first and a second degree. This signifies that a philosophical classification of expressions is not possible. Single expressive facts are so many individuals, of which the one cannot be compared with the other, save generically, in so far as each is expression. To use the language of the schools, expression is a species which cannot in its turn perform the oer oolON AND KEE PORIC. 114 functions of genus. Impressions, that is to say contents, vary ; every content differs from every other content, because nothing in life repeats itself; and the continuous variation of contents follows the irreducible variety of expressive facts, the esthetic syntheses of the impressions. A corollary of this is the impossibility of /mpossiaitity translations, in so far as they pretend to effect the transference of one expression into another, like a liquid poured from a vase of a certain shape into a vase of another shape. We can elaborate logically what we have already elabor- ated in zsthetic form only ; but we cannot reduce that which has already possessed its ezsthetic form to another form also esthetic. In truth, every translation either diminishes and spoils; or it creates a new expression, by putting the former back into the crucible and mixing it with other impressions belonging to the pretended translator. In the former case, the expression always remains one, that of the original, the translation being more or less deficient, that is to say, not properly expression: in the other case, there would certainly be two expressions, but with two different contents. “ Ugly faithful ones or faithless beauties” is a proverb that well expresses the dilemma with which every trans- of translations. Critique of rhetorical categories. Viz THEORY OF Ao T Ee LIG Ix lator is faced. Inzsthetic translations, such as those which are word for word or interlinear, or paraphrastic translations, are to be looked upon as simple commentaries on the original. The division of expressions into various classes is known in literature by the name of theory of ornament or of rhetorical categories. But similar attempts at classification in the other forms of art are not wanting: suffice it to mention the vealzstic and symbolic forms, spoken of in painting and sculpture. The scientific value to be attached in A¢sthetic and in zsthetic criticism to these distinctions of realistic and symboltc, of style and absence of style, of objective and subjective, of classic and romantic, of semple and ornate, of proper and metaphort- cal, of the fourteen forms of metaphor, of the figures of word and of sentence, and further of pleonasm, of ellipse, of inversion, of repetition, of synonyms and homonyms, and so on; is xzf or altogether negative. To none of these terms and distinctions can be given a satisfactory esthetic definition. Those that have been attempted, when they are not obviously errone- ous, are words devoid of sense. A typical example of this is the very common definition of metaphor as of another word used in place me ee RE OSLON AND RHETORIC 113 of the word itself. Now why give oneself this trouble? Why take the worse and longer road when you know the shorter and better road? Perhaps, as is generally said, because the correct word is in certain cases not so expressive as the so-called incorrect word or metaphor? But in that case the metaphor becomes exactly the right word, and the so-called right word, if it were used, would be du¢t Little expressive and therefore most improper. Similar observations of elementary good sense can be made regard- ing the other categories, as, for example, the generic one of the ornate. One can ask oneself how an ornament can be joined to expression. Externally ? In that case it must always remain separate. Internally? In that case, either it does not assist expression and mars it; or it does form part of it and is not ornament, but a con- stituent element of expression, indistinguishable from the whole. It is not necessary to dwell upon the harm done by these distinctions. Rhetoric has often been declaimed against, but although there has been rebellion against its consequences, its principles have been carefully preserved, perhaps in order to show proof of philosophic coherence. Rhetoric has contributed, if not to make dominant I Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories. Use of these categories as synonyms of the esthetic fact. 114 THEORY OF ASTHETIC e in literary production, at least to justify theoreti- cally, that particular mode of writing ill which is called fine writing or writing according to rhetoric. The terms above mentioned would never have gone beyond the schools, where we all of us learned them (certain of never finding .the oppor- tunity of using them in strictly zesthetic discussions, or even of doing so jocosely and with a comic intention), save when occasionally employed in one of the following significations: as verbal variants of the zsthetic concept; as indications of the antz-esthettc, or, finally (and this is their most important use), in a sense which is no longer esthetic and literary, but serely logical. Expressions are not divisible into classes, but some are successful, others half-successful, others failures. There are perfect and imperfect, complete and deficient expressions. The terms already cited, then, sometimes indicate the successful expression, sometimes the various forms of the failures. But they are employed in the most inconstant and capricious manner, for it often happens that the same word serves, now to proclaim the perfect, now to condemn the imperfect. An instance of this is found when someone, Toe SPREE SSION AND RHETORIC irs criticizing two pictures—the one without in- spiration, in which the author has copied natural objects without intelligence; the other inspired, but without obvious likeness to existing objects —calls the first realistic, the second symbolic. Others, on the contrary, pronounce the word realistic about a strongly felt picture representing a scene of ordinary life, while they talk of symdolic in reference to another picture representing but a cold allegory. It is evident that in the first case symbolic means artistic, and realistic inartistic, while in the second, realistic is synonymous with artistic and symbolic with inartistic. How, then, can we be astonished when some hotly maintain that the true art form is the symbolic, and that the realistic is inartistic; others, that the realistic is the artistic, and the symbolic the inartistic ? We cannot but grant that both are right, since each makes use of the same words in senses so diverse. The great disputes about the c/asszc and the romantic are frequently based upon such equi- vokes. Sometimes the former was understood as the artistically perfect, and the second as lacking balance and imperfect; at others, the classic was cold and artificial, the romantic sincere, warm, efficacious, and truly expressive. Thus it was Their use toin- dicate various esthetic zmperfections. 116 PHEORY OF 7S COEAIe Ix always possible to take the side of the classic against the romantic, or of the romantic against the classic. The same thing happens as regards the word style. Sometimes it is affirmed that every writer should have style. Here style is synonymous with form or expression. Sometimes the form of a code of laws or of a mathematical work is said to be devoid of style. Here the error of admitting diverse modes of expression is again committed, of admitting an ornate and a naked form of expression, because, since style is form, the code and the mathematical treatise must also, strictly speaking, have each its style. At other times, one hears the critics blaming someone for ‘‘having too much style” or for “ writing a style.” Here it is clear that style signifies, not the form, nor a mode of it, but improper and pretentious expression, which is one form of the inartistic. Passing to the second, not altogether in- significant, use of these words and distinctions, we sometimes find in the examination of a literary composition such remarks as follow: here is a pleonasm, here an ellipse, there a metaphor, here again a synonym or an equivoke. This means that in one place is an error consisting of using a larger number of words than is necessary ro XP RE SSION AND RHE VORIC: 117 (pleonasm); that in another the error arises from too few having been used (ellipse), elsewhere from the use of an unsuitable word (metaphor), or from the use of two words which seem to express two different things, where they really express the same thing (synonym); or that, on the contrary, it arises from having employed one which seems to express the same thing where it expresses two different things (equivoke). This pejorative and pathological use of the terms is, however, more uncommon than the preceding. Finally, when rhetorical terminology ‘possesses no esthetic signification similar or analogous to those passed in review, and yet one is aware that it is not void of meaning and designates some- thing that deserves to be noted, it is then used in the service of logic and of science. If it be granted that a concept used in a scientific sense by a given writer is expressed with a definite term, it is natural that other words formed by that writer as used to signify the same concept, or incidentally made use of by him, become, zz respect to the vocabulary fixed upon by him as true, metaphors, synecdoches, synonyms, elliptic forms, and the like. We, too, in the course of this treatise, have several times made use of, and intend again to make use of such terms, in order Their use zm a Sense transcending aesthetic, in the service of science, Rhetoric tn the schools. 118 PAE ORY OF Ae od te Lic Ix to make clear the sense of the words we employ, or may find employed. But this proceeding, which is of value in the disquisitions of scientific and intellectual criticism, has none whatever in esthetic criticism. For science there exist appropriate words and metaphors. The same concept may be psychologically formed in various circumstances and therefore be expressed with various intuitions. When the scientific terminology of a given writer has been established, and one of these modes has been fixed as correct, then all other uses of it become improper or tropical. But in the esthetic fact exist only appropriate words. The same intuition can only be expressed in one way, precisely because it is an intuition and ROL a CONCeDT Some, while they admit the esthetic in- sufficiency of the rhetorical categories, yet make a reserve as regards their utility and the service they are supposed to render, especially in schools of literature. We confess that we fail to under- stand how error and confusion can educate the mind to logical clearness, or aid the teaching of a science which they disturb and obscure. Perhaps it may be desired to say that they can aid memory and learning as empirical classes, as was admitted above for literary and artistic styles. But there moe MPR SSION AND RHETORIC 119 is another purpose for which the rhetorical categories should certainly continue to be admitted to the schools: to be criticized there. We cannot simply forget the errors of the past, and truth cannot be kept alive, save by making it fight against error. Unless a notion of the rhetorical categories be given, accompanied by a suitable criticism of these, there is a risk of their springing up again. For they are already spring- ing up with certain philologists, disguised as most recent psychological discoveries. It would seem as though we wished to deny all bond of likeness among themselves between expressions and works of art. The likenesses exist, and owing to them, works of art can be arranged in this or that group. But they are likenesses such as are observed among’ in- dividuals, and can never be rendered with abstract definitions. That is to say, these like- nesses have nothing to do with identification, subordination, co-ordination, and the other relations of concepts. They consist wholly in what is called a famzly “ckeness, and are connected with those historical conditions existing at the birth of the various works, or in an affinity of soul between the artists. It is in these resemblances that lies the ve/azzve The resemblances of expresston: 120 THEORY OF. AtotHe dic 1x The velative possibility of translations. This does not consist ‘panslationt of the reproduction of the same original ex- pressions (which it would be vain to attempt), but in the measure that expressions are given, more or less nearly resembling those. The translation that passes for good is an approximation which has original value as a work of art and can stand by itself. X ESTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION Dit WEEN THE: UGLY AND THE BHAU TIPU PassING on to the study of more complex concepts, where the esthetic activity is found in conjunction with other orders of facts, and showing the mode of this union or complication, we find ourselves at once face to face with the concept of feeling and with the feelings which are called esthetzc. The word “feeling” is one of the richest in Various sign fications of th meanings. We have already had occasion to #7 feeling. meet with it once, among those used to designate the spirit in its passivity, the matter or content of art, and also as synonym of zmpresstons. Once again (and then the meaning was altogether different), we have met with it as designating the non-logical and non-historical character of the esthetic fact, that is to say pure intuition, a form of truth which defines no concept and states no fact. But feeling is not here understood in either I21 Feeling as activity. Identification of feeling with economic activity. 122 TE PORY OFe 7 SiH Lie x of these two senses, nor in the others in which it has nevertheléss been used to designate other cognoscitive forms of spirit. Its meaning here is that ofa special activity, of non-cognoscitive nature, but possessing its two poles, positive and negative, in pleasure and farm. This activity has always greatly embarrassed philosophers, who have attempted either to deny it as an activity, or to attribute it to xature and to exclude it from spirit. Both solutions bristle with difficulties, and these are of such a kind that the solutions prove themselves finally unacceptable to anyone who examines them with care. For of what could a non-spiritual activity consist, an actzvety of nature, when we have no other knowledge of activity save as spiritual, and of spirituality Save as activity? Nature is, in this case, by definition, the merely passive, inert, mechanical and material. On the other hand, the negation of the character of activity to feeling is energeti- cally disproved by those very poles of pleasure and of pain which appear in it and manifest activity in its concreteness, and, we will say, all aquiver. This critical conclusion ought to place us in the greatest embarrassment, for in the sketch of the system of the spirit given above, we have left ox foo Pier eae ETN GS 123 no room for the new activity, of which we are now obliged to recognize the existence. But accivity. of feeling, i. it be \dctivity, is not specially new. It has already had its place assigned to it in the system which we have sketched, where, however, it has been indicated under another name, as economic activity. What is called the activity of feeling is nothing but that more elementary and fundamental practical activity, which we have distinguished from ethical activity, and made to consist of the appetite and desire for some individual end, without any moral determination, If feeling has been sometimes considered as organic or natural activity, this has happened precisely because it does not coincide either with logical, zesthetic, or ethical activity, Looked at from the standpoint of these three (which were the only ones admitted), it has seemed to lie outsede the true and real spirit, the spirit in its aristocracy, and to be almost a determination of nature and of the soul, in so far as it is nature. Thus the thesis, several times maintained, that the esthetic activity, like the ethical and intel- lectual activities, is not feeling, becomes at once completely proved. This thesis was inexpugnable, when sensation had already been reduced con- Critique of redonism. Feeling as a concomitant to every form of activity. 124 THEORY OF 7StTHEIIG x fusedly and implicitly to economic volition. The view which has been refuted is known by the name of hedonism. For hedonism, all the various forms of the spirit are reduced to one, which thus itself also loses its own distinctive character and becomes something turbid and mysterious, like ‘‘the shades in which all cows are black.” Having effected this reduction and mutilation, the hedonists naturally do not succeed in. seeing anything else in any activity but pleasure and pain. They find no substantial difference between the pleasure of art and that of an easy digestion, between the pleasure of a good action and that of breathing the fresh air with wide-expanded lungs. But if the activity of feeling in the sense here defined must not be substituted for all the other forms of spiritual activity, we have not said that it cannot accompany them. Indeed it accompanies them of necessity, because they are all in close relation, both with one another and with the elementary volitional form. Therefore each of them has for concomitants individual volitions and volitional pleasures and pains which are known as feeling. But we must not confound what is concomitant, with the principal fact, and take the one for the other. The discovery of the truth, or the satisfaction of a moral duty fulfilled, produces x (otto Pie NGS 125 in us a joy which makes our whole being vibrate, for, by attaining to those forms of spiritual activity, it attains at the same time that to which it was practically tending, as to its end, during the effort. Nevertheless, economic or hedonistic satisfaction, ethical satisfaction, zsthetic satis- faction, intellectual satisfaction, remain always distinct, even when in union. Thus is solved at the same time the much- debated question, which has seemed, not wrongly, a matter of life or death for zsthetic science, namely, whether the feeling and the pleasure precede or follow, are cause or effect of the esthetic fact. We must enlarge this question, to include the relation between the various spiritual forms, and solve it in the sense that in the unity of the spirit one cannot talk of cause and effect and of what comes first and what follows it in time. And once the relation above exposed is established, the statements, which it is customary to make, as to the nature of esthetic, moral, intellectual, and even, as is sometimes said, economic feelings, must also fall. In this last case, it is clear that it is a question, not of two terms, but of one, and the quest of economic feeling can be but that same one concerning the Meaning of cer- tain ordinary distinctions of feelings. 126 THEORY. OF ASTHETIC x economic activity. But in the other cases also, the search can never be directed to the substantive, but to the adjective: esthetic, morality, logic, explain the colouring of the feelings as esthetic, moral, and intellectual, while feeling, studied alone, will never explain those refractions. A further consequence is, that we can free ourselves from the distinction between values or feelings of value, and feelings that are merely hedonistic and wzthout value; also from other similar distinctions, like those between ad‘s- interested feelings and zuxterested feelings, between ojjectzve feelings and the others that are not objective but simply sudbzecteve, between feelings of approval and others of mere pleasure (Gefallen and Vergniigen of the Germans). Those dis- tinctions strove hard to save the three spiritual forms, which have been recognised as the triad of the Zrue, the Good, and the Beautzful, from confusion with the fourth form, still unknown, yet insidious through its indeterminateness, and mother of scandals. For us this triad has finished its task, because we are capable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by welcoming even the selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings, among the respectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses ET x root Hebe PER INGS 127 were conceived of by ourselves and_ others, between value and feelings, as between spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but difference between value and value. As has already been said, the economic feeling or activity reveals itself as divided into two poles, positive and negative, pleasure and pain, which we can now translate into useful, and useless or hurtful. This bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of the active character of feeling, precisely because the same bipartition is found in all forms of activity. If each of these is a value, each has opposed to it antzvalue or adts- value. Absence of value is not sufficient to cause disvalue, but activity and passivity must be struggling between themselves, without the one getting the better. of the other; hence the con- Value and dtsvalue: the contraries and their union. tradiction, and the disvalue of the activity that- is embarrassed, contested, or interrupted. Value | is activity that unfolds itself freely: disvalue is its contrary. We will content ourselves with this definition of the two terms, without entering into the problem of the relation between value and disvalue, that is, between the problem of con- traries. (Are these to be thought of dualistically, as two beings or two orders of beings, like The Beautiful as the value of expresston, or expression and nothing more. 128 THEORY OF AST E Te & Ormuzd and Ahriman, angels and devils, enemies to one another; or as a unity, which is also contrariety?) This definition of the two terms will be sufficient for our purpose, which is to make clear esthetic activity in particular, and one of the most obscure and disputed concepts of Aésthetic which arises at this point: the concept of the Leautzfut. /Esthetic, intellectual, economic, and ethical values and disvalues are variously denominated in current speech: Jdeautzful, true, good, useful, just, and so on—these words: designate the free development of spiritual activity, action, scientific research, artistic production, when they are suc- cessful ; ugly, false, bad, useless, unbecoming, unjust, wmexact designate embarrassed activity, the product of which is a failure. In linguistic usage, these denominations are being continually shifted from one order of facts to another, and from this to that. Leautzful, for instance, is said not only of a successful expression, but also of a scientific truth, of an action successfully achieved, and of a moral action: thus we talk of an zxtellectual beauty, of a beautiful action, of a moral beauty. Many philosophers, especially zstheticians, have lost their heads in their pursuit of these most varied uses: they have entered an inextricable ® (ood nee re: BEE LINGS 129 and impervious verbal labyrinth. For this reason it has hitherto seemed convenient studiously to avoid the use of the word beautiful to indicate successful expression. But after all the explana- tions that have been given, and all danger of mis- understanding being now dissipated, and since, on the other hand, we cannot fail to recognize that the prevailing tendency, alike in current speech and in philosophy, is to limit the meaning of the vocable deautiful altogether to the esthetic value, we may define beauty as successful expres- ston, or better, as expression and nothing more, because expression, when it is not successful, is not expression. Consequently, the ugly is unsuccessful ex- pression. The paradox is true, that, in works of art that are failures, the beautiful is present as unity and the ugly as multiplicity. Thus, with regard to works of art that are more or less failures, we talk of qualities, that is to say of those parts of them that are beautiful. We do not talk thus of perfect works. It is in fact impossible to enumerate their qualities or to designate those parts of them that are beautiful. In them there is complete fusion: they have but one quality. Life circulates in the whole organism: it is not withdrawn into certain parts. K The ugly, and the elements of beauty which compose tt. Lllusions that there exist expressions which are neither beautt- ful nor ugly. 130 THBORY OF oti Erie x The qualities of works that are failures may be of various degrees. They may even be very great. The beautiful does not possess degrees, for there is no conceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive that is more expressive, an adequate that is more than adequate. Ugliness, on the other hand, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly (or almost beautiful) to the extremely ugly. But if the ugly were complete, that is to say, with- out any element of beauty, it would for that very reason cease to be ugly, because in it would be absent the contradiction which is the reason of its existence. The disvalue would become nonvalue; activity would give place to passivity, with which it is not at war, save when there effectively is war. And because the distinctive consciousness of the beautiful and of the ugly is based on the con- trasts and contradictions in which esthetic activity is developed, it is evident that this consciousness becomes attenuated to the point of disappear- ing altogether, as we descend from _ the more complicated to the more simple and to the simplest cases of expression. From this arises the illusion that there are expressions which are neither beautiful nor ugly, those which are obtained without sensible effort and appear easy and natural being so considered. os “eo PHETIC PERLINGS 131 The whole mystery of the deautiful and the Flees ugly is reduced to these henceforth most CAS nae definitions. Should any one object that there slings: exist perfect esthetic expressions before which no pleasure is felt, and others, perhaps even failures, which give him the greatest pleasure, it is necessary to advise him to pay great atten- tion, as regards the esthetic fact, to that only which is truly esthetic pleasure. Esthetic pleasure is sometimes reinforced by pleasures arising from extraneous facts, which are only casually found united with it. The poet or any other artist affords an instance of purely eesthetic pleasure, during the moment in which he sees (or has the intuition of) his work for the first time; that is to say, when his impressions take form and his countenance is irradiated with the divine joy of the creator. On the other hand, a mixed pleasure is experienced by any one who goes to the theatre, after a day’s work, to witness a comedy: when the pleasure of rest and amusement, and that of laughingly snatching a nail from the gaping coffin, is accompanied at a certain moment by real zsthetic pleasure, obtained from the art of the dramatist and of the actors. The same may be said of the artist who looks upon his labour with pleasure, when Critique of ap- parent feelings. 132 TABOR OF 75th Lie x it is finished, experiencing, in addition to the esthetic pleasure, that very different one which arises from the thought of self-love satisfied, or of the economic gain which will come to him from his work. Examples could be multiplied. A category of apparent esthetic feelings has been formed in modern Atsthetic. These have nothing to do with the esthetic sensations of pleasure arising from the form, that is to say from the work of art. On the contrary, they arise from the content of the work of art. It has been observed that “artistic representations arouse pleasure and pain in their infinite variety and gradations. We tremble with anxiety, we rejoice, we fear, we laugh, we weep, we desire, with the personages of a drama or of a romance, with the figures in a picture, or with the melody of music. But these feelings are not those that would give occasion to the real fact outside art; that is to say, they are the same in quality, but they are quantitively an attenuation. A‘%sthetic and apparent pleasure and pain are slight, of little depth, and change- able.” We have no need to treat of these apparent feelings, for the good reason that we have already amply discussed them; indeed, we have treated of them alone. What are ever feelings that Bee ER: : JESTHETI® FEELINGS 133 become apparent or manifest, but feelings objectified, intensified, expressed? And it is natural that they do not trouble and agitate us passionately, as do those of real life, because those were matter, these are form and activity ; those true and proper feelings, these intuitions and expressions. The formula, then, of apparent feelings is nothing but a tautology. The best that can be done is to run the pen through it. Critique of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher senses. XI CRITIQUE OF STHETIC HEDONISM As we are opposed to hedonism in_ general, that is to say, to the theory which is based on the pleasure and pain intrinsic to Economy and accompanies every other form of activity, confounding the content and that which con- tains it, and fails to recognize any process but the hedonistic; so we are opposed to esthetic hedonism in particular, which looks upon the esthetic at any rate, if not also upon all other activities, as a simple fact of feeling, and con- founds the pleasurable of expression, which is the beautiful, with the pleasurable and nothing more, and with the pleasurable of all sorts. The esthetic-hedonistic point of view has been presented in several forms. One of the most ancient conceives the beautiful as that which pleases the sight and hearing, that is to say, the so-called superior senses. When analysis : of zsthetic facts first began, it was, in fact, 134 XI Mot heii, TEDONTSHI 135 difficult to avoid the mistake of thinking that a picture and a piece of music are impressions of sight or of hearing: it was and is an indisputable fact that the blind man does not enjoy the picture, nor the deaf man the music. To show, as we have shown, that the esthetic fact does not depend upon the nature of the impressions, but that all sensible impressions can be raised to ewsthetic expression and that none need of necessity be so raised, is an idea which presents itself only when all the other ways out of the difficulty have been tried. But whoso imagines that the esthetic fact is something pleasing to the eyes or to the hearing, has no line of defence against him who proceeds logically to identify the beautiful with the pleasurable in general, and includes cooking in Aésthetic, or, as some positivist has done, the viscerally beautiful. The theory of A/ay is another form of zsthetic hedonism. The conception of play has sometimes helped towards the realization of the actifying character of the expressive fact : man (it has been said) is not really man, save when he begins to play ; that is to say, when he frees himself from natural and mechanical causality and operates spiritually ; and his first game is art. But since the word flay also means that pleasure which Critique of the theory of play. 136 ROE ORY OF 75 EE TIC XI arises from the expenditure of the exuberant energy of the organism (that is to say, from a practical act), the consequence of this theory has been, that every game has been called an esthetic fact, and that the esthetic function has been called a game, in so far as it is possible to play with it, for, like science and every other thing, Esthetic can be made part of a game. But morality cannot be provoked at the intention of playing, on the ground that it does not consent ; on the contrary, it dominates and regulates the act of playing itself. Critique of Finally, there have been some who have tried the theories of sexualityandof tg deduce the pleasure of art from the reaction the triumph, of, the sexual organs There ‘are some very modern estheticians who place the genesis of the esthetic fact in the pleasure of conquering, of triumphing, or, as others add, in the desire of the male, who wishes to conquer the female. This theory is seasoned with much anecdotal erudition, Heaven knows of what degree of credibility! on the customs of savage peoples. But in very truth there was no necessity for such important aid, for one often meets in ordinary life poets who adorn themselves with their poetry, like cocks that raise their crests, or turkeys that spread their tails. But he who does such things, in so far as he does XI foo neice DONIS KI 137 them, is not a poet, but a poor devil of a cock or turkey. The conquest of woman does not suffice to explain the art fact. It would be just as correct to term poetry economzc, because there have been aulic and stipendiary poets, and there are poets the sale of whose verses helps them to gain their livelihood, if it does not altogether provide it. However, this definition has not failed to win over some zealous neophytes of historical materialism. Another less vulgar current of thought con- siders Afsthetic to be the science of the sympathetic, of that with which we sympathize, which attracts, rejoices, gives us pleasure and excites admiration. But the sympathetic is nothing but the image or representation of what pleases. And, as such, it is a complex fact, resulting from a constant element, the zsthetic element of representation, and from a variable element, the pleasing in its infinite forms, arising from all the various classes of values. In ordinary language, there is sometimes a feeling of repugnance at calling an expression beautiful, which is not an expression of the sym- pathetic. Hence the continual contrast between the point of view of the esthetician or of the art critic and that of the ordinary person, who cannot Critique of the Esthetic of the sympathetic, Meaning in it of content and form. Esthetic hedonism and meoraltsm. 138 PTHUPORY OR Ao LHe Pic x! succeed in persuading himself that the image of pain and of turpitude can be beautiful, or, at least, can be beautiful with as much right as the pleasing and the good. The opposition could be solved by distinguish- ing two different sciences, one of expression and the other of the sympathetic, if the latter could be the object of a special science; that is to say, if it were not, as has been shown, a complex fact. If predominance be given to the expressive fact, it becomes a part of A¢%sthetic as science of expression ; if to the pleasurable content, we fall back to the study of facts which are essentially hedonistic (utilitarian), however complicated they may appear. The origin, also, of the connexion between content and form is to be sought for in the Aésthetic of the sympathetic, when this is conceived as the sum of two values. In all the doctrines just now discussed, the art fact is posited as merely hedonistic. But this view cannot be maintained, save by uniting it with a philosophic hedonism that is complete and not partial, that is to say, with a hedonism which does not admit any other form of value. Hardly has this hedonistic conception of art been received by philosophers, who admit one or more spiritual values, of truth or of morality, than the following XI ZeotTHE TiC rie DONITS I 139 question must necessarily be asked: What should be done with art? To what use should it be put? Should a free course be allowed to its pleasures ? And if so, to what extent? The question of the end of art, which in the A‘sthetic of expression would be a contradiction of terms, here appears in place, and altogether logical. Now it is evident that, admitting the Ze rigoristic negation, and premisses, but two solutions of such a question pels can be given, the one altogether negative, the %”* other restrictive. The first, which we shall call rigoristic or ascetic, appears several times, although not frequently, in the history of ideas. It looks upon art as an inebriation of the senses, and therefore, not only useless, but harmful. Accord- ing to this theory, then, it is necessary to drive it with all our strength from the human soul, which it troubles. The other solution, which we shall call pedagogic or moralistico-utilitarian, admits art, but only in so far as it concurs with the end of morality; in so far as it assists with innocent pleasure the work of him who leads to the true and the good ; in so far as it sprinkles with dulcet balm the sides of the vase of wisdom and of morality. It is well to observe that it would be an error to divide this second view into intellectualist and ‘yitique of ure beauty, 140 THEORY OF 7257 HE 11 xI moralistico-utilitarian, according to whether the end of leading to the true or to what is practically good, be assigned to art. The task of instructing, which is imposed upon it, precisely because it is _an end which is sought after and advised, is no longer merely a theoretical fact, but a theoretical fact become the material for practical action ; it is not, therefore, intellectualism, but pedagogism and practicism. Nor would it be more exact to subdivide the pedagogic view into the pure utilitarian and the moralistico-utilitarian ; because those who admit only the individually useful (the desire of the individual), precisely because they are absolute hedonists, have no motive for seeking an ulterior justification for art. But to enunciate these theories at the point to which we have attained is to confute them. We therefore restrict ourselves to observing that in the pedagogic theory of art is to be found another of the reasons why it has been erroneously claimed that the content of art should be chosen with a view to certain practical effects. The thesis, re-echoed by the artists, that art consists of puve beauty, has often been brought forward against hedonistic and _ pedagogic “Esthetic: ‘‘ Heaven places All our joy in pure beauty, and the Verse is everything.” If it is XI AESTHETIC HEDONISM 14! ‘wished that this should be understood in the sense that art is not to be confounded with sensual pleasure, that is, in fact, with utilitarian practicism, nor with moralism, then our A