Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Directorate _ of Intelligence Intelligence Memorandum Office of African and Latin American Analysis 9 August 1993 Liberia: War and Peace Through Taylor's Eyes (b)(3) Summary rebel leader Charles Taylor agreed to the recent Cotonou peace (b)(3) accord because of economic problems and his belief the he can still win an election, but he will not hesitate to manipulate or scuttle the agreement--as he has in the past--if he concludes he is losing ground during implementation. Although Taylor recognizes that he made some key concessions in negotiations, he apparently is confident for now that Nigeria's weakening commitment to the West African security force (ECOMOG), the addition of a UN presence to ensure Nigerian neutrality, and growing disarray within the other Liberian factions will redound to his advantage. Taylor, however, clearly intends to preserve an edge in the runup to elections at any cost; he probably would rebuff efforts to maintain a level playing field as biased against him. Like his rivals, he views maintaining a military option as insurance against an unacceptable outcome to the peace process and against retribution from ethnic foes. The rebel leader, nevertheless, views US and UN involvement as critical to the peace process and to Liberia's postwar recovery, providing Washington some limited, but important leverage in pressing him to abide by the accord. (b)(3) This memorandum was jointly prepared b Office of African and Latin American Analysis and Office of South Asia and (b)(3) Sub-Saharan Africa, NSA, with contributions from ALA, (b)(6) LDA. Comments and queries are welcome 4 and may be directed to Chief, Africa Division, (b)(3) FepSeeret ALA M 93-20115 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Looking Back at Key Events | The Breakdown of the Yamoussoukro Peace Process National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) leader Taylor--whom most observers blame for the failure of the old Yamoussoukro peace process--appears convinced that he was justified in not implementing that accord because other signatories broke their commitments. The accord, signed in late 1991 at Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast by Taylor, a‘host of regional leaders, and the Secretaries General of the OAU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), called for a cease-fire, disarmament of the I‘iberian combatants, and elections, all within a six-month timeframe. around the same time, Taylor arranged to sell off excess weapons to finance a presidential campaign, suggesting that at least initially he planned to implement the accord in the hope of gaining power through the electoral process. indicates, however, that his willingness to follow through waned as he became increasingly suspicious of the motives of ECOMOG, which was charged with overseeing the accord. The deployment and role of Senegalese troops in ECOMOG became a particular point of contention. Taylor believed--with some justification, -that he had agreed to a deal whereby Senegal's troop deployment would be matched by a Nigerian drawdown. Taylor was angry when he realized the Senegalese deployment was an augmentation of the ECOMOG force. Taylor's doubts about ECOMOG's impartiality as a peacekeeper intensified when the Senegalese ECOMOG troops, deployed along the border with Sierra Leone as a buffer force, failed to block an attack against the NPFL in July 1992 by ULIMO, a rival Liberian rebel group that was then based in Sierra Leone. During the same period, Taylor discovered that ECOMOG was providing logistic assistance and weapons to all the main anti-Taylor Liberian factions, including ULIMO, remnants of former President Doe's Army (AFL), and military elements attached to the Interim Government in Monrovia. The Resumption of Hostilities While most observers point to Taylor's assault on Monrovia on 15 October 1992 as the beginning of renewed hostilities after the failed Yamoussoukro peace process, Taylor believes ULIMO--backed by ECOMOG--violated the cease-fire first when it captured most of western Liberia from NPFL forces in mid-August. Taylor--already bitter over ECOMOG's failure to block ULIMO's march into © iberia--viewed the regional force's artillery support for ULIMO fighters battling the NPEL on the outskirts of the capital in early September as confirmation that he had little choice but to pursue a military option. In addition, Taylor saw ECOMOG's enforcement of a naval blockade against his territory and Nigerian ECOMOG Commander Olurin's decision to implement a 45-mile defensive perimeter around Monrovia as a virtual declaration of war, | Finally, Taylor claimed that his move to detain and disarm ECOMOG soldiers in September 1992--the key event that led . Nigeria to oppose Taylor directly--was designed to preempt ECOMOG's expected move against him. Fop-Seeret- Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 . -- Lost weapons should be located and recovered. Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 The Yamoussoukro Agreement... The Yamoussoukro agreement specified the following conditions as prerequisites for peace: -- All parties should be willing to encamp and disarm. -- The neutrality of ECOMOG should be recognized by all. -- BCOMOG should secure all entry points into Liberia. { The agreement also set forth as actions items the following tasks: -- Elimination of unspecified “external threats" to allow encampment and disarmament. -- The securing of key ports and border crossings into Liberia by patrols and static guards. -- Establishment of guard forces for key installations. -- Efforts to recover hidden weapons, but only if reasonable cause was demonstrated. The “reasonable cause" caveat came at Taylor's insistence; he feared arbitrary security sweeps. -- Provision of security for faction leaders. -- Initiation of the encampment and disarmament phase on 15 November 1991, to be completed by 14 January 1992, followed by elections in mid-1992. ...and the Cotonou Accord The peace accord signed in Cotonou, Benin in late July affirms the Yamoussoukro agreement as the basis for a peace plan and set forth separate military and political agendas. The military accord called for: -- A cease-fire in place. -- Monitoring by a 250-man UN monitoring force. -- An augmentation of the current ECOMOG force with four battalions of additional African troops from countries outside the West African region, with disarmament to take place only after the new troops arrive. -- Disarmament and encampment of fighters as specified by the Yamoussoukro agreement. -- Patrolling of borders and entry points by ECOMOG. The political part of the accord calls for: -- A single transition government with three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial. -- A five-man transition council with a mandate limited to managing day to day business and arranging elections; the council is to include one representative from each of the warring factions and two nonpartisan “eminent Liberians." -- Presidential and legislative elections to be held seven months from the signing of the agreement, in February 1994. Officials that serve in the transition government will be ineligible to contest the elections. -- A major UN role in monitoring the election. Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Taylor's Assessment of Key Actors Nigeria and ECOMOG: Enemy Number One Taylor thus views ECOMOG as a protagonist in the Liberian conflict, not a peacekeeper, and he sees Nigeria as his principal enemy. he has cited ECOMOG's bombing of civilian targets behind rebel lines, support for other armed factions, and blocking of humanitarian assistance from Taylor-held territory as evidence of ECOMOG's partisanship. Taylor claims that the bombings of the Firestone Hospital and the museum at Tubman Farm, in particular, indicate ECOMOG's willingness to destroy Liberia to gain a military victory. Moreover, Taylor is bitter over what he sees as ECOMOG's selective adherence to UN mandates--enforcing UN sanctions against NPFL territory at the cost of great hardship for civilians as well as NPFL fighters in Taylorland, while continuing to arm and supply anti-Taylor factions in defiance of a UN Security Council resolution. As a result, he is adamant that the current Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG is unfit to serve as a peacekeeping force and is insisting on a major reconfiguration of ECOMOG with outside forces to monitor and implement the latest peace accord. Taylor rejects Nigerian President Babangida's claims that he is bankrolling ECOMOG to bring democratic transition to Liberia and is deeply suspicious of Babangida's intentions. He contends that Babangida is primarily concerned with personal financial investments in Liberia and might be more amenable to a negotiated solution if he were assured his property would be protected, 1 As of June, Taylor reportedly planned to meet with the Nigerian leader and to reassure him that the NPFL posed no threat to his personal interests, but ongoing turmoil in Nigeria resulting from the annulment of the presidential election in June apparently has convinced Taylor to back away from personal contact with Babangida. Taylor apparently also believes, however, that the Nigerian authorities are constantly plotting against him; he suspects that Lagos, in addition to supporting ULIMO and the AFL, is training a force of anti-Taylor Liberians under former rival rebel leader Prince Johnson--a claim we have no evidence to support. His security fears were no doubt reinforced by ECOMOG's apparent attempt-- --to bomb his convoy as he transited Ivory Coast in early June enroute to a UN-sponsored meeting in Ouagadougou. More recently, Taylor's concern with his security led him to refuse an invitation to attend the signing ceremony in Benin for the new peace accord, which may create problems if Taylor interprets ambiguous portions of the accords differently than the other signatories. Other Regional Relations: Looking For Friends Taylor evidently intends to continue relying on Burkina's President Campaore for help in bypassing the arms embargo and in mitigating his regional isolation. Campaore apparently remains Taylor's benefacto:; a Burkinabe envoy was in China in mid-May overseeing the loading of a shipment of materiel destined for the NPFL. Taylor has immediate access to Campaore and keeps in constant Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 ‘Fop-Secret- contact, often using his wife, a close friend of Campaore's wife, or one of Campaore’s presidential advisors as a go-between. Campaore and his government consistently object to Nigeria's hardline approach toward the NPFL in the course of diplomatic contacts and assert that Abuja has made a settlement in Liberia more difficult by its opposition to. Taylor, | Taylor views Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny as a key regional player and tries to maintain working relations with Abidjan despite strained bilateral ties. Under pressure from ECOWAS, Houphouet has forbidden Ivorians from aiding Taylor and declared Ivorian territory off-limits for NPFL travel and eanshiomencle Nonetheless, enforcement is lax in remote border regions, and the NPFL reportedly is still able to circumvent sanctions by bribing Ivorian officials. Taylor has tried to exploit Abidjan's longstanding distrust of Nigeria to keep it from closing ranks with ECOMOG against him. For example, he reportedly ordered his representative in Abidjan to fan Ivorian outrage over ECOMOG's bombing of the border town of Gbinta in February by encouraging the Ivorian media to publicize the incident. Liberian Factions: The Pecking Order Despite his recent military setbacks, Taylor still appears convinced--correctly, we believe--that his is the largest, most capable Liberian fighting force.2 He has publicly called both ULIMO and the AFL ineffectual, and has cited as evidence the looting, undisciplined behavior, and ethnic favoritism that characterizes both groups. He believes that both ULIMO and the AFL are totally dependent on ECOMOG logistic support, and that the Liberian Interim Government (IGNU) is under ECOMOG control, . He has maintained that the conflict ultimately would have to be resolved by Liberians, and apparently approves of the new peace accord because it was negotiated by Liberians and its provisions will lead to a decline in Nigerian influence. Key External Actors: Role in the Peace Process 2-The NPFiL's manpower fluctuates seasonally, and changes as fighting waxes and wanes, but the force may still be able to muster and equip up to 8,000 men. The AFL carries some 4,500 men on the books, although many of them are AWOL at any given time. ULIMO is divided and prone to infighting that diminishes its effectiveness; we believe its maximum strength is no more that 3,000 men [tn addition, of all the Liberian factions, only the NPFL has an independent logistic system. Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 although Taylor has viewed US policy in Liberia as unfavorable toward him in the past, he continues to see a US role in the peace process as essential. He has indicated that he resents US support to ECOMOG, and believes that concessions he has made at US urging have backfired. Despite these misgivings about US actions, he appears to believe that the special Us-. Liberian relationship necessitates Washington's involvement in any peace process. e would likely turn to the United States to provide security for presidential candidates in the event that a durable cease-fire and disarmament set the stage for an election. Key Goals and Objectives — (b)(3) Gaining Power Taylor remains committed to gaining the presidency, but flexible on tactics for achieving this goal. he recognizes that recent battlefield reverses at ECOMOG's hands and the cumulative effects of ECOMOG-led sanctions have hurt his . political standing. Taylor, however, views his drop in popularity as only temporary and expects to use the peace process outlined in the Cotonou accord to rebuild his political base to ensure that he wins the election.3 He appears convinced that he has the ability to unify opposing factions in Liberia and cites as proof his previous success in reincorporating Prince Johnson's splinter INPFL rebel group into the NPFL. he maintains contacts with a wide variety of Liberians; in late April and early May, for example, he was engaged in secret negotiations with ULIMO and IGNU officials, although the particulars are unclear. Taylor also remains bent on keeping his military options open in case he loses ground on the political front. | Taylor was surprised by Nigeria's strong backing of ECOMOG, and he recognized late last year that he could not win the war as long as Abuja remained committed to the regional force. He remained confident, however, even when suffering tactical defeats at ECOMOG's hands, that the regional force would be equally unable to decisively defeat him and repeatedly stated that he was capable of outwaiting Abuja. The Nigerian military's focus on domestic politics and its diminished logistic support to ECOMOG in recent months suggests that Taylor's analysis 3 his charisma, resourcefulness, and the fecklessness and divisions among other Liberian factions suggest that he probably is capable of rebuilding his political base despite strong negatives. In our view, Taylor's political standing throughout Liberia in 1991 was such that he would have easily won an election. Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 ‘Fop Seeret- may be accurate. Taylor that doubts any civilian successor government that took over in Abuja would immediately pull out of Liberia, but believes an elected government would be less partisan and more willing to negotiate with him. In any case, he has publicly boasted that he can fight on for 10 years if necessary, _and that anv neace process that excludes or marginalizes him will fail. i Taking Advantage of the Cease-fire Taylor welcomes the cease-fire as a chance to regain the political initiative, improve economic conditions in his area of control, and rest his battle-weary troops. the rebel leader will insist that sanctions against his territory be removed now that a cease-fire is in effect because he desperately needs the revenues generated by timber and other exports to run his political campaign. Taylor prob has stockpiled $30 million worth of timber to be sold ‘as soon as Sanctions are lifted. suggest that he hopes also to improve the quality of life in rebel-held territory--and his own popularity--by increasing commerce and humanitarian aid flows. Finally, he reportedly is planning to use the cease-fire to rest and resupply his troops to preserve his military option. Dilution of Nigeria's Influence One of Taylor's priorities has been to see the forces of his Nigerian foes removed from Liberia or their numbers and influence there diminished. that he would have preferred to replace the Nigerians in ECOMOG with non-African troops, whom he views as intrinsically less partisan, but was pleased with the compromise in the peace accord that called for the addition to ECOMOG of 3,000-4,000 new troops from non-West African countries, in effect diluting the Nigerian presence. Taylor, however, is likely to refuse to disarm to any Nigerian troops, and probably will demand that the 10,000 Nigerian troops be restricted to the Monrovia area, a stance that may complicate implementation of the accord. Implications for the Peace Process Taylor, in the near term, is likely to cooperate in implementing the peace plan because he believes he still holds a winning hand and that the peace process now offers his best bet for gaining the presidency. Despite some significant concessions in the accord--especially his agreement to dissolve the administration he has set up in "Taylorland" once a new transition government is in place--the rebel leader almost certainly believes he is better placed than rival faction leaders to use the peace process to improve his political standing. Taylor's 4 we believe Taylor's forces can continue to fight an effective insurgency for six months to a year, and could continue low-level guerrilla warfare indefinitely, although serious fuel shortages have reduced their ability to move fighters and equipment quickly and have forced the NPFL to pick its battles. He reportedly remains capable of importing limited quantities of weapons and - ammunition, despite sanctions against him. Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 “Fop-Seeret- (b)(3) political confidence apparently has been reinforced by the terms of the UN-sponsored Cotonou peace accord, the continuing domestic turmoil in Nigeria, and the growing disarray within the other Liberian factions. Moreover, although Nigeria has not yet withdrawn any combat troops, Taylor probably views Abuja's willingness to accede to the UN plan, curtail offensive operations, and reduce logistic support to ECOMOG as improving his chances to regain a military edge if fighting resumes. He remains strongly supportive of a UN and US role in the implementation of the accords, believing this will ensure Nigerian neutrality and provide the humanitarian resources he needs to recoup his political fortunes. His recognition that the United States is essential to the peace process and to the economic prospects of postwar Liberia will provide Washington some limited, but important leverage with Taylor during implementation. Taylor, however, will almost certainly try to stall or undermine the peace process if he believes he is losing ground. Although he clearly will be one of the leading presidential candidates, he may be overestimating his ability to hold his fragile coalition together, particularly given his autocratic style and Americo-Liberian background--which separates him from his core of ethnic Gio and Mano followers. If he appears likely to lose the election--or actually does so--we believe he will cry foul and return to the bush in an effort to resume fighting. Unless an effective, internationally supervised disarmament and demobilization program has reduced the availability of this option by then. If most Liberians judged the election to be legitimate and if the new government ensured that Gios and Manos were fairly represented, Taylor likely would have some difficulty recruiting fighters and reigniting his movement. Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Appendix Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release: 2026/07/02 C06841006 : 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release Ss > o £ LL = at 2. Lt 25 e590 re) =r om rec OG eS © ';OO8 Lt 22zo O71 50O ZdOW . LL a 13 x j= £ <_< 12 a B = © a} 4 OF ane + Vic 2 0 fd i > 2 oI F< ro) K "SI < A SS OF & fae Liberia: : 2026/07/02 C06841006 Approved for Release