a Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 27¢.6 a MEMORANDUM DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE The Situation in Vietnam To et 3.5(c) 4 sera enbes 1967 Re aa i Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 ~~ 3.5(c) ( TO GRET (| 3.5(c) Information as of 1600 25 December 1967 - 3.5(c) HIGHLIGHTS Allied ground and air operations have resumed in Vietnam following the Christmas military: standdown. - Except for small-scale guerrilla activity, Communist forces generally respected the cease-fire while at the same time apparently repositioning and resupply- ing some regular units. Political leaders in Saigon, meanwhile, appear to be increasingly disenchanted with President Thieu's conduct of the affairs of government. I. Military Situdtion in South Vietnam: Allied forces have resumed military operations in Vietnam following the Christmas cease-fire (Para. 1). While at least 92 Communist truce violations were recorded during the allies 24-hour version of the cease-fire, no major attacks occurred, suggesting that Communist main force units were generally content to abide by the standdown while continuing to reposition troops for future offensives (Paras. 2-6). , II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: President Thieu's government appears to be under mounting criticism from political leaders in Saigon (Paras. 1-2): Thieu's inability to exert forceful _ leadership has adversely affected.the performance of both the executive and legislative branches (Paras. 3-4). Vice President Ky is steering clear of the government and its problems (Para. 5). Thieu appears to be taking a relaxed attitude. toward the criticism (Para. 6). The strikes by Vietnamese workers against Pan American and Air America airlines are continuing (Para. 7). III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: 3.3(h)(2) the North Vietnamese may have 3.3(N)(2) utilized the Christmas holiday bombing standdown to 3.5(c) 3.5(c) TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 3,5(c) ( TOP a soe 3.5(c) resupply and reinforce Communist forces in the south- ern DRV, the DMZ area, and in South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces (Para. 1). 3.3(h)(2) V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report. VI. Other Major Aspects: The motorable portion of Laotian Route 110 has been extended eastward into South Vietnam. (Paras, 3.3(h)(2) 1-3). 25 December 1967 ii TOP-SECRET t Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 ; - 3.5(c) ( TOP SECKET = aes | 3.5(c) I. .MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1. Allied forces have resumed offensive ground and air operations against the Vietnamese Communists following the Christmas holiday truce. _. 2. While the holiday cease-fire brought major ground fighting. in the South to a virtual standstill, preliminary reports from American officials in the field charge the Communists with at least 92 truce violations during the 24-hour pause (1800 24 Decem- ber-1800 25 December-Saigon time) declared by the. allies. Twenty-nine of these violations are consid- ered "major," in that they resulted in allied casualties. 3. Statistically, the great majority of the 92 Communist truce violations reported thus far occurred in South Vietnam's I and III Corps areas (36, includ- ing 9 major ones in I Corps and 29, including: 10 major violations. in III Corps). Over-all allied casualties resulting from enemy-initiated contacts during the truce period included 2 killed (2 US), 40 wounded (23 US, 16 GVN, 1 ROK), and 3 tissing (2 US, 1 GVN). Communist losses numbered 28 killed and four captured. 4. Most of the violations consisted of harass- ing fire against allied outposts and base camps or. were the product of Communist reactions to intensified allied ground and air reconnaissance activities. In one case a US Marine observation plane was downed by ground fire in the Communist-infested A:Shau Valley area of northwestern Thua Thien Province. No major enemy attacks occurred, however, suggesting that North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong main force units were generally content .to abide by. the standdown. _ 5. Significant repositioning of major enemy units in southern I Corps, the DMZ area, and the western highlands continued to be reflected in ‘SIGINT during the holiday period, suggesting possible impending Communist initiatives in these regions in 25 December 1967 I-1 . TOP SE ET | ue Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 ( TOP SBeRET (°° 3.8(0) 3.5(c) the near future. The most immediate threat would appear to be in the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province area where SIGINT has evidenced a major buildup of. enemy units. The 2nd NVA Division, main and pro- vincial Viet Cong units subordinate to Military Region 5, and a new communications group tenuously associated with the 320th NVA Division--elements of which have been detected in southward deployment , since early November--are involved. 6. The allies will observe a second 24-hour cease-fire on New Year's Day and a 48-hour standdown for Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, in late Jan- uary and early February. The Viet Cong have an-— nounced a 72-hour pause for New Year's Day and a seven-day respite for Tet (27 January-3 February). 25 December 1967 TOP. RET 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 | | - 3.5(c) ( TOP_SECRET C. ~ 3.5(c) II. POLITICAL: DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1. Saigon. politicians are continuing to grumble about the lackluster performance of the Thieu govern- ment. - 2. Their.major complaint is that President Thieu has failed to provide the kind of dynamic leadership needed to break the inertia which has gripped the government since it was installed two months ago.. One high-ranking government official asserts that Thieu has been delinquent in not establishing a close work- .ing relationship with Prime Minister. Loc, whose politi- cal inexperience and retiring personality has proved to be a major i 3. The leadership vacuum has affected the per- formance of ministries in-the executive branch. Al- though some progress has been made in. clearing the decks for implementing new programs and carrying out added responsibilities, reorganization has been pain-. fully slow. The foreign and économy ministries have been cited by observers as examples of departments which are almost certain to face critical new problems in the coming months but which are still caught.in the grip of: bureaucratic indecision. 4. Thieu's ‘Snapa tity to. exert strong leadership has also contributed to the problems which the National. Assembly has encountered in getting organized. A num- ber of deputies have commented that. the work of the legislature, especially in.the politically fragmented lower house, would be. assisted considerably if. Thieu or Loc made a real effort to organize a progovernment bloc to push Fheougn: he administration's programs. 5. Vice President Ky, meanwhile, is taking pains to steer.clear of the government. and its problems. According to one of his followers, Ky is turning aside complaints about Thieu's performance with assertions that Thieu and Loc deserve the opportunity to run the country's affairs without interference. Ky's with- drawal. from active PREEACepseron: in. the government, 25 December 1967 3.5(c) TOP RET . 3.5(C) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 : _ ,3.5(C) ( TOP _SBERET |_ 3.5(0) however, has given rise to speculation that he is only biding his time until he can play a more prominent role... on , 6. Thieu appears to be taking a relaxed attitude toward the mounting criticism of his government. He recently told a civilian adviser that he appreciated the need for more forceful leadership and that he was. disappointed in the performance of some of his offi- ‘cials. He also stated, however, that popular dissatis- faction stemmed, at least-in part, from the unrealis- tic expectations of the, Vietnamese people, and that they must be taught not to expect too much from the government. — Strike Activity 7. The strikes by Vietnamese workers against Pan American and Air America airlines are continuing. According to a labor minister conciliator, negotiations between the companies and the workers have: been ex- acerbated by managements insistence on firing the Strike leaders. An additional: problem is Pan America's use of management and US military personnel to keep its military-associated Operations running. Air America activities have been brought to a virtual Standstill. The US Embassy believes that the strike against Pan American is essentially for union recogni- tion, with wage demands a peripheral issue. The next negotiating round is’ scheduled for. 29 December, al- though labor leaders have expressed interest in getting talks resumed:.sooner.’ 25 December 1967 TOP RET 3.5(¢) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 ( TOP SECKET (— = 3.50) 25 December 1967 TII-1 TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3,3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 . 3.5(c) . 3.5(c) . IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS . 3.3(h)(2) 1. Signals from radar, 3.3(h)(2) have been - northwest of Haiphong. The actual number of intercepted six times since 20 November in an area radars in.North Vietnam is not known. 3,3(h)(2) -2, The an early’ warning radar 3.3(h)(2) provides ‘ground control’ intercept information. The: relocation of -a tactical air control outstation to the Haiphong - Cat Bi area in mid-November! 3.3(h)(2) | suggests that the North Vietnamese are ina ground control intercept role. , 3.3(h)(2) 3. | | ~)have been added '. border since mid-November. along. the North Vietnamese 3.3(h)(2) along the Vietnamese and of almost.all of North Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin, © 5.5( Laotian borders, providing early warning coverage 3.3(N)(2) southwest China, and parts of Laos. 25 December 1967 IV-1: 3.5(c) TOP. ET 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 : 3.5(c) ( TOP_SECKET | ( V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1. ‘There is nothing of significance to report. - 25 December 1967 3.5(c) TOP. RET 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 -- i | ( 3.5(c) ~ L£OP RET . 3.5(c) VI. OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS extended eastward across the northeast extremity of Cambodia and about one mile into South Vietnam. 2. The new construction is visible to within four miles of SVN Route 512 which hooks up with SVN Route 14 in the Dak To region of the central highlands. The: Communists already have access to this area via foot trails and the motorable route will aid in supply movements. A second two-mile southerly extension of Route 110 into Cambodia is also under construction, but there are no motorable Cambodian roads in the area and this construction is probably to aid in moving supplies to the adjacent regions of South Vietnam. 3.3(h)(2) 3 1. the motoraple portion Of Laotian Route 110 has been 3 3. the Cambodian Tonle Kong and a small section of Route 97 along the Laotian border are being used to send supplies--mainly rice-- into Laos. At least 15 tons per day are estimated to have reached Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam, largely via these routes, during the 1966-67 dry season. 25 December 1967 VI-1 oe Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 3.5(c) 3.5(c) " Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 ( Top et Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 . 106 \ NorTH “‘\ vieTNAM =| Demilitarized Zone oe COMMUNIST Sree - TRI-THIEN — ae MILITARY REGION A &, — Fs QUANG. TIN 4 ‘ oan Pru Quoc GULFOF " — - ~ coves ~ ° SIAM BAC LIEU IV CORPS ae SOUTH VIETNAM Go 3.5 ( C) 2 25 50 75 100 Miles te) 25 50 75 100 Kitometers io Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 { 4 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216 NORTH VIETNAM oean Hans Phya Bao et 9 Virachei Anda ef Mo) fe} ao . New road construction 25 DECEMBER 3.5(c) 69034 12-67 CIA Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216