a Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 - . Pocuw 3 ae (SUN) 4. 22°01 £6:02/ST. 16: 00/NO. — @ Poo (Oy ~ UYanela sorted | nol R23 EIS IME = ; FROM: f CTA Office/Desk: Phone: ae a . mag Ate dae? DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: . Pipes a2?! (Including Cover) , FROM cMN SITE 3A re NOTE: FURNISH AFTER-DUTY-HOURS CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIERING AFTER DUTY HOURS DELIVERY [J iM MEDIATELY/URGENT [] HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS TRANSMITTED TO OFFICE/ROOM PHONE NUMBER/ RECIPLENT NUMBER FAX NUMBER U07933:,./04 Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 bes 4 a 4 . FROM CMN SITE 3A = (SUN) 4. 22°01 16:02/8T. 16:00/NO. 3760655364 F 2 FOR USE ON BACKGROUND ATTRIBUTABLE TO US. OFFICIALS 22 April 2001 The Peruvian Air Bridge Denial Program and the 20 April incident Authorities . Congress passed a law in 1994 {in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995) which allows USG employees to assist foreign nations in the interdiction of aircraft. when there is “reasonable suspicion’ that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The 1994 law provides that this can be done if (1) the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug tratficking; and (2) the President of the United States has determined that (a) interdiction is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of that foreign Country, and (b) the country “has appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent loss of life in the air or on the ground in connection with interdiction, which shail at a minimum Include effective.maans to identify and wam an aircratt before the use of force directed against the aircraft. President Clinton issued the requisite “determination® regarding Peru on December 8, 1994. . Program History Jan 21, 2001. There are no known previous Incidents where non-drug traffickers where harmed In any way as part of this program. Procedures Clear rules on engagement were established at the onset of the program. Tipper information comes from a variety of sources including DoD , DEA, the Peruvian military and elsewhere. In some cases, U.S. aircraft detect Suspect flights while on patrol. The U.S. crew's only mission in the intercept pracess is detecting and tracking suspect aircraft. Once the Peruvian Air Force (PAF) decides to launch interceptor aircraft , the mission is under the contro! of the PAF. During a typical mission an aircraft ts manned by a US pilot, copifot.and systems operator and a host country rider (HCR). The NCR, a Peruvian Air Force officer, serves as the relay between the Peruvian command center “and the Peruvian interceptor aircraft. He is under the direct command and control of the tocal PAF commander. The U.S. crew is fat in the chain of command for decisions regarding how intercepts are ended, A process of mutually agreed upon procedures is folowed when intardicting suspect aircraft. First, U.S. and/or PAF detection and monitoring systems locate and track any aircratt—based on tipper information or visual observation-- Passing through the specially designated Air Defense identification Zone (ADIZ) airspace, Next, the PAF wil atternpt to identify an aircraft as a legitimate filght. This will include ‘determining whether the aircraft is on a Previously filed flight plan and by attempting to ‘Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 ; Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 « \ t . 3@ . . : ‘ Fiom CMN SITE 3A ‘ (8UN}) 4. 22°01 16:02/S8T. 16:00/NO. 3760655364 P 3 establish radio communication with the aircraft. When control centers (ground and/or air radars) detect an overflight of any aircraft, they will attempt to identify it through correlation of fight plans and by electronic means -- through use of IFF or radio communications. - Following the detection of an unidentified aircraft, a three-phased intercept Is initlated. The specific phases of the military operation are carefully established in an effort to minimize casuakies. Phase one: if the PAF determines that an aircraft flying in the ADIZ is not.on a previously approved flight plan, and if it is not possible to establish communication and confirm the aircraft's identification as an innocent aircraft, the Commanding General of the Peruvian Air Force Sixth Territorial Air Region (Vi RAT) may direct the launch of Peruvian interceptor aircraft to visually identify the aircratt, verify its registry, attempt to establish radio contact, and, if necessary, cause the aircraft to proceed to a safe and adequate air strip where the PAF will require the aircraft to land — using intercept procedures consistent with Internationa! Civ Aviation Organization guidelines. If radia, communication is established during the intercept, but the PAF is not satisfied that the aircraft is on a legitimate mission, the PAF may direct the aircraftto land ata Safe and adequate air strip. If radio contact is not possible, the PAF piot must use a series of internationally recognized procedures to make visual contact with the suspect aircraft and to direct the aircraft to fotiow the intercepting aircraft to a secure airfield for inspection. Ptiase two: if the aircraft continues to ignore the intemationally recognized instructions . toland, the PAF pitot - only after gaining permission of the Commanding General of the VURAT or in his abeence the Chief of Staff — may fire waming shots in accordance with specified PAF procedures. Phase three: if the waming shots are ignored, and only after gaining permission of the Commanding General of the Vi RAT or in his absence the Chief of Staff, the PAF pilo? may use weapons against the suspect aircrafi with the goal of disabling it. Finally, if such fire does not cause the intercepted pilot to obey PAF instructions, the Commander Vi RAT may order the intercepted aircraft sho! down. The PAF and US tracker aircraft engage in extensive training and practice of established interception procedures. After an incident in August 1997 in which a PAF pilot failed to follow such procedures, the PAF committed to having its ground schools conduct a bi- weekly mandatory review. All PAF personne! involved with the program signa Statement acknowledging full understanding of procedures. 20 April Incident The following is based on information available as of 1300 hours 22 April. Times are approximate. This account is based upon observations of the highly experienced U.S. crew and an initial analysis of available information. At 09:43 am local time on April 20, 2001, a U.S, operated aircraft notified its base of the radar sighting of an aircraft that crossed 3-4 miles into Brazilian territory. A second 2 Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 if Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338 ° y e ‘ . FROM CMY SITE 3A (SUN 4. 22°01) 16:02/ST. 16:00/NO. 3760655964 P 4 | Sighting was called in 12 minutes later, as the unidentified aircraft re-entered Peruvian air space. Per standard procedures, the crew requested the PAF Officer in Charge (OIC) in Pucalipa to determine if the aircraft was on an approved flight plan. The PAF OIC was unable to locate a flight pian for an aircraft in that area. As the unidentified aircraft was in the ADIZ, apparently without a flight plan, the PAF decided to launch an interceptor to determine the aircraft's Identity end intentions. The tracked aircraft was identified as a single engine high wing float plane. The Peruvian officer flying aboard the U.S. aircraft attempted to communicate in Spanish with tha suspect aircraft on three separate irequencies, but heard no response. The Peruvian officer aboard the U.S. aircraft then told the Peruvian A-37 alrcralt to move to “phase two” and then quickly requested permission to move to “phase three.” It Is unclear whether warning shots were fired and, if they were fired, whether the plot of passengers of the suspect aircraft saw them. Our information shows that the US crew attempted repeatedly to slow down the Intercept process and when the Peruvian HCR fold the Peruvian A-37 pilot to move to “phase three,” the U.S. crew voiced objections. The US crew asked that the Peruvian A-37 pilot acquire the aircraft's tall number and attempt visual recognition by flying along side the aircraft. The tail number, while obtained, apparently was not called back to the PAF OIC by the HCR for verification. At approximately 10:43 AM, despite serious concerns raised by the US crew, shootdown was authorized by PAF authorities. Initial assessment of this incident indicates that well established procedures in conducting air interdiction operations may not have been fully or properly adhered to by some PAF personnel involved in this matter. Although the U.S. crew was not in the Peruvian military chain of command and had no authority or operational control over the HCR, they repeatedly expressed their concer that the nature of ie suspect aircraft had not been determined. . #8 Approved for Release: 2018/07/23 C06709338