i es ‘ ; ’ Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Tm? cea . : Bale . COPY NO. 49 TL | OCI NO. 5647/58 CURRENT _ INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY DOCUMENT nO, NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI 0) BECLASSIAED : GLASS, CHANGED TO: S$ NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HA 70-2 vated: O27 PEVIEWER: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE . 0 ARCHIVES werteiea y . ore ws me wed! fh, Ae Zp gZ8 SYs// Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 ~ DETER ' Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 December 1953 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST MOSCOW MANEUVERS TO DIVIDE WEST ON BERLIN ISSUE The USSR appears to be preparing for the next phase of a major political offensive on the German question, fol- lowing its proposals of 27 November on Berlin, Soviet diplomats in Hoscow and vari- ous European capitals have Stated privately that the So- viet Union is willing to in- clude East Berlin in 4 demili- tarized free city guaranteed by the United Nations, to Place atyr and land access routes to Berlin under UN con- trol, and to remove the East German capital to another city. Those modifications, which would make Khrushchev's origi- Hal proposal more attractive to those elements who. favor some form of disengagement in Burope, would be designed to maintain the Soviet initiative and keep the West off balance. Ambassador Thompson be- lieves Moscow probably has va~- rious "fallback positions" on Berlin for eventual use and further moves planned for the next six months. He suggests that if the West seems to re- ject the tdea of including both sectors of Berlin in a free city, the Soviet leaders might be encouraged to put the offer forward officially. He believes they may still do so, _ however, even though they ex- pected to be called on to in- ae the plan. Mikoyan told that Moscow ad given very careful consid- eration to this possibility and hinted that the USSR would be prepared to consider a con- federation scheme for all Ber- lin along the lines of its pro- posuls for German’ reunifica~ tion. The Russians probably are confident they would stand to gain major advantages from either Western acceptance or rejection. Acceptance would require the withdrawal of West= ern garrisons and negotiations with -the East Germans for creating an access corridor to Berlin controlled by the UN. Such negotiations would lead to at least a large meas- ure of international recogni- tion of the East German regime. Rejection by the West, in Moscow's view, would great- ly strengthen the Soviet posi- tion for carrying out the pre- viously announced plans to transfer control over Allied access to West Berlin to the Rast Germans. The Soviet lead- ers probably also expect that a negative Western reaction would stimulate increased pres- sure on Western governments from opposition parties, par- ticularly in West Germany and Britain, for a fresh approach. based on various disengagement schemes which would lead to the demilitarization and neu- tralization of a. reunbfied Germany. The idea of inclucing all of Berlin in a free city has already attracted some support in Western Europe. The French Foreign Ministry, immediately after receiving the Soviet note of 27 November, was con- sidering this as a possible Western counterproposal. Pro- ponents of disengagement in CONFIDENTIAL wake PART J OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 7 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ll December 1958 ‘the British Labor and the West German Social Democratic par- ties may agree with West Ber- | lin Mayor Willy Brandt that a free-city status for the en- tire city might be acceptable as a "last resort," Other Solutions Khrushchev has indicated he is determined to settle the Berlin situation on his own terms. Referring to Berlin as "a bone in my throat," he told Senator Humphrey on 1 De- cember he would be ready to consider any “reasonable” West- era counterproposal on the sub- ject. In particular he under- lined the similarity between the Soviet proposal on Berlin and the creation of a neutral Austria under four-power "guar- antee"--a line also taken in the Soviet note on 27 November. Although Khrushchev told Humphrey that the Berlin prob- lem should be kept separate from the broader issue of Ger- man reunification, his remarks appear to forecast further So- viet proposals, linking set- tlement of the Berlin question with broader plans for a gen~ eral German and European set= tlement. Such an approach emerged in a recent assertion by East German Premier Grote- wohl that "the same basic at- titude which we assume in the Berlin question is also valid for the solution of the German problem."" He called for "en-~ ergetic steps" to reach a Ger~ man peace treaty, stating: UThe peace treaty 18 the part of the German problem which offers the best chances of achieving certain settlements and serves as a start for the . SOlution of all vital prob- lems," ! | | | F Such a settlement would include a rapprochement between the two Germanys,. an all-Euro- pean collective security sys~- tem,and a nuclear-free zone in central Europe as proposed in the Rapacki Plan. Like the Soviet leaks on including East Berlin in a free city, suggestions for a rap- prochenent between the two Germanys. are calculated to Stimulate efforts by opposi- tion parties, particularly in West Germany and Britain, to press for fresh approaches to the German problem. Meanwhile, however, recurrent assertions ‘by East Germans that Rerlin is their capital and that the GDR expects to receive control as of 1 June of Western access to the city are designed to main- tain pressure for a speedy so- lution, Polish Fears To underline Polish soy- ereignty over the Oder-Neisse territories which passed to Poland under the Potsdam ac- cord, a top-level East German delegation headed by party boss Walter Ulbricht is now visiting Poland. The Poles seporheadly fear. that . Khru- - shchev's statement that the Potsdam Agreement should be considered nullified jeopard- izes Poland's possession. of these territories, Gomulka and Ulbricht are both empha~ sizing the close ties between Poland and East Germany under the Warsaw Pact, and Gomulka has declared he now considers that the Polish line of de- fense is on the Elbe River. No Change in Berlin Although the USSR appar—- cutis dis continuing to reduce SECRET PART I OF [MMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 7 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 December 1958 the personnel of its Military Liaison Mission to the British Army in West Germany=-now three officers instead of the - former 11--Seviet officials io Berlin appear to have taken ao further steps to turn over their functions to the East Germans, The Soviet governor of Spandau prison, which is administered by the four pow- ers, recently said he believed Khrushchev did not mean to in- clude the prison in the pro- posed "free city" and asserted that "there would probably be . other functions we..would con- tinue to perform." East Ger- main Spokesmen are nevertheless continuing to emphasize they may make changes in the exist-— ing structure of communications. In the latest threat, politburo member Matern on 4 December questioned the right of West- ern civilian aircraft to over- fly #ast Germany en route to West Berlin. Western Positions The Western governments are reserving their positions on answering the Soviet note pending the outcome of the NATO foreign ministers' meet- ing from 16 to 18 December. Although “there’:ig’: general: -: - agreement that a “free-city" Status for West Berlin ig un- acceptable and that Moscow's unilateral abrogation of the four-power status of the city should be rejectad, there are indications that Bonn, Paris, and London may differ on their approaches to the Berlia prob- lem. Chancellor Adenauer em-~ phasized publicly that Berlin must not be left "hanging in the air" in case broad negotia- tions on Germany and European security are proposed. Foreign Minister Brentano has proposed ‘ : the Soviet note to refute Mos-~- cow's charges against the West in relation to Potsdam and Ger- han rearmament . London, however, Seema more inclined toward countering Mos- cow's Berlin moves with a pro- posal for discussion of the en- tire German problem, possibly at a summit mecting. An urgent re~- quest by Adenauer to meet with Macmillan-~a request subsequent— ly withdrawn because of the chancellor's ilinass--was prob- ably an effort by Adenauer to determine to what extent the British would advance various disengagement proposals in con- hection with the East-West talks. The French Foreign Ministry has prepared a preliminary draft . Feply to Moscow stating France would be prepared to enter. into d@iscussions on German reunifica- tion and Buropean security, through which sone "arrangement" ‘might be worked otit concerning Berlin. -. : In the West Berlin elections on 7 December, the East German Communists were decisively de- feated, polling only 1.95 per- cent of the vote as contrasted with a 2,7-percent share in 1954. The 52-percent majority wonby Mayor Willy Brandts Social Democratic party (SPD) will strengthen Socialist contentions that a Berlin settlement must be included in talks on the German question. The election campaign, however-~-and particularly Ade- nauer’s partisan intervention-- has disrupted attempts toe form a bipartisan policy in Bonn, but Brandt's inclusion in the German a@elegation to the NATO meeting may de something to restore in- terparty cooperation as weil as refute reports of growing dis- cord batween Brandt and Bonn . over the approach to the Berlin a strong preliminary reply to question. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST : Page 3 of 7 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 atte oT ET MAREEE amen ee eee he a ra CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 December 1958 THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY The reintroduction of the Berlin issue in international politics comes at a time when party boss Walter Ulbricht has solidified his control of the Rast German regime. The Purge and Its Causes Between mid-October 1957 and February 1958, Ulbricht forced a reluctant party cen- tral committee to adopt a sweep- ing program to speed up social- ization--a move probably coor- dinated with Khrushchev during his visit to Bast Germany in August 1957. Party elements headed by Karl Schirdewan, who had generally been regarded as Ulbricht‘'s successor, strongly condemned the proposed measures 4S unrealistic and likely to lead to dangerous public unrest; they called instead for a pro- gram tailored to the country's needs. Schirdewan himself ap-~ parently felt that a slower pace would facilitate eventual Ger- man reunification, since drastic secializgation of East Germany would make union extremely dif- ficult, Pragmatic economists ‘— like Fred Oelssner, Heinrich Rau, and Fritz Selbmann pointed to the economic disorganization they thought would result from Ul= bricht‘s decentralization measures. The decisive clash between Ulbricht and the Schirdewan_ faction came at the 35th party plenum in February 1958. Ina B@aring attack, Erich Honecker, Ulbricht's hatchet man, charged Schirdewan and former State Se- curity Minister Ernst Wollweber with "fractional" activities-- a major Communist crime--as well as with softness toward SECRET , PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES PART III Page 3 of ‘15 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Pee of te AED Vert oe CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 December 1958 counterrevolutionaries and, in the case of Schirdewan, opposi- tion to Ulbricht. Hoth were removed from the central com- mittee, Former party theoreti- ULBRICHT cian Oelssner was accused of “opportunism™ in agricultural policies and opposition to Ulbricht'’s decentralization proposals, and was dropped from the politburo. Schirdewan, Wollweber, “and others" were further charged with “revision- ist views” and faulty ideolog- ical interpretations. The purge was completed last July at the fifth party congress-~attended by Khru- Bhehev—--when no fewer than 17 central committee members and 10 candidate members were elim- inated. Both Qelssner and Selbmann fell at this time. Other high-level func- tionaries who have at times wavered in their support of Ulbricht survived, at least temporarily. These included Rau, who was retained as a politburo member and deputy premier, and Premier Grotewhl, who went on "a rest cure of several weeks" in the USSR af- ter the plenum--lending support to reports that his position was shaky. PR IE AS At A I TP Effect of Purge The purge restorad party “unity,” but uncertainty and unrest were rampant throughout the party apparatus. Since Schirdewan had headed the par- ty's personnel office, many functionaries were personally linked with him and fearful for their positions. The elimination of Schir- dewan and others who had had some meagure of popular approval confirmed for East Germans, es-=- pecially the intellectuals, that there was little hope for any real improvement in political conditions. To replace the purgees, Ulbricht installed several new central committee secretaries, including Honecker and certain district party secretaries. Control of the party personnel organization was turned over to Berlin party boss Alfred Neu- mann, thus marking him as a man of increasing importance. Ul- bricht's pergonal toady, Erich Mielke, had earlier replaced Wollweber in the Ministry of State Security. Dlbricht then rammed through the party congress his political and economic program SEEGRET PART ITI PATTERNS ARD PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 15 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Il Dacember 1958 keyed to overtaking West Ger~- many in consumer-goods produc- tion and food consumption by 1961 and pushing ahead to com- plete the “building of social- ism" by 1965. The implementa: | tion of economic decentraliza- tion actually was designed to give Ulbricht even closer con~ trol over all East German eco- nomic life, since the measure provided for greatly increased authority to the State Planning Commission, which is headed by Vlbricht's tool, Bruno Leusch-~ ner, This far-reaching economic program was based on closer eco- nomic ties with the USSR. As & measure of Soviet economic aid, East Germany's annual pay=- ments for the maintenance of Soviet occupation forces, esti- mated at approximately $150, = 600,000, were-canceled effec- tive 1 January 1959. Special targets for socialization were small businesses and agricul- ture, while the professional classes=--notably doctors--were to be brought into state-con= trolled organizations, Communist indoctrination was te be stepped up in schools through "“polytechnical'' ecduca- tion~-i.e@., combined physical labor and study obligatory for all students above the age of eleven. By 1960 all prospec- tive university students were to have served for one year in a factory, in agriculture, or in the armed forces, These measures were ac~— companied by intensified ef- forts to limit contacts with West Germany through curtailed travel and by more stringent police méasures against defac- tors and those who aided them. Consequences of Hard Course The new program vastly in- creased smoldering popular dis- content and seriously disrupted certain areas of the economy, notably retail trade, Regime promises were treated with de- vision. Essentially, however, political oppression and sev~ @rance of ties with the West constituted the main grievances. According to a reliable ‘Western corréspondent who visited LEUSCHNER. - Leipzig in September, no one could complain of "really crit- ideal shortages of the main things people eat and wear," but Lelp- zigérs were apprehensive 1i the face of advancing socialization. Small shopkeepers feared they would be wiped out in the next few months. The correspondent &lso noted that people referred to the 17 June 1953 uprising as if it had happened yestorday. Even more than the “bour- geois remnants," East Germany's intellectuals--professional men, seclentists, technicians, univer- sity professors, and students-- began to despair of a change for the better. Already hard hit by repression and increasingly barred from contact with West Germany and Western culture, intellectuals were subjected to unremitting demands for ideo~ logical subservience. In the universities, politically un- reliable professors were dis- missed and students were forced to take an oath to support the regime. Twenty-four Jena Uni- varsity students and young work~ erg were secretly tried in early October for allegedly plotting against the regime and propos- ing reunification with West SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 15 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 . Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 1l December 1958 Germany on the basis of free elections. A Jena University official who defected said these students became the "toast of the Soviet Zone." East Germans now knew the truth of Paster- nak's description--"'the feeling of the state closing in on in- dividual privacy." Oppréssion of the middle class and intellectuals led-- as the Schirdewan froup had warned--~to a mass cxodus to the West. Professional men, scien« tists, and technicians whom the regime could i11 afford to lose constituted an increasingly large proportion of the refugees. Many were party members, In the first nine months of 1958, more than 250 university professors and instructors, 2,393 school- teachers, and many youths os- - caped, The loss of 813 doc- tors, approximately 8 percent of East Germany's total, left some areas temporarily without medical care. The flight of business executives, retailers, and artisans left dangerous gaps in the economy. Opposi- tion in the higher levels of tha party to Ulbricht’s eco- nomic policies was mounting, reportedly centered as before ‘among the pragmatic economists in the government, including the State Planning Commission. Re- flecting such opinions, 4 fairly “EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET ZONE Som = ei 3 _ alae PART ITI PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES ‘reliable source reported that Reinrich Rau had warned Koscow that mass disaffeetion of farm-~ ers, workers, and intellec- tuals was building up. Shift to Softer Party Line By early September it ap- parentiy becamé clear even to Ulbricht that a drastic change in the party line was required to reduce popular unrest and stem the refugee flow. The new line wag unveiled with an announcement of far-reaching concessions to doctors to per- mit private practice, do away with ideological qualifica- tions, and permit travel to the West. To implement the new policies, two special politburo commissions were set up under Kurt Hager: one received sweep- ing powers to make "all possible” concessions to doctors; the second was to supervise school affairs, In a move to stem the flight of small businessmen and artisans, Ulbricht hin- self announced a slowdown in the socialization of small business enterprises, giving notice that “in one or two years" such individuals would probably enter a socialized agency "voluntarily." Party activists and officials were E SOVIET SECTOR OF BERLIN Page 6 of 15 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 December 1958 accused of arbitrarily raising ‘work norms or being overzealous in carrying owt party direc« tives to collectivize inde- pendent farmers, and their co- ercive measures were stigma-. tized as "distortions" of party congress directives. Although Ulbricht probably had discussed his modifications of the hard line with Khrushchev during his visit to the USSR in August, a delegation of ten high-level Soviet party func~ tionaries was sent to Bast Ger- many in early September to sur- vey the situation and to impress East Germans that the shift in policy had the Kremlin's bless- ing. The further demotion of . Fritz Selbmann at this tine from hts post as deputy pre- mier and his removal from the staff ‘of the party theoretical journal probably were meant as a warning to Ulbricht's party opponents not to misinterpret the shift-to a softer line. Pressure for More Concessions pallet ies herd tide ciediemiotal Ulbricht's reversal imn- mediately began to backfire. j clave in the bloc. Many ‘people conceived the idea that the regime's difficulties could be oxploited to gain con- cessions for themselves, par~+ ticularly since the approach~- ing elections made the regime somewhat more responsive to public opinion. The populace in general became more open in its criticism. An American officer during a tour talked with many East Germans who were "highly derisive and sarcastic” about the Russians and the East German regime, He noted that he had never before heard such bitter and outspoken critician expressed so openly, Workers in the important Lewna works were openly cynical about the elections, . Responding to these preg- sures, the regime instituted further concessions to improve living conditions. On 3 Noven- ber the politburo announced | that more consumer goods would be available, damanded that ‘ private retailers receive ade« quate supplies, and sharply re~ proached government officials for permitting price inercases. As did the purge of the Schirdewan group, Ulbricht's manguvers increased iutraparty strains. Party officials ~-: found it difficult to adapt ‘themselves to the new line. The Berlin Gambit Against this background, the introduction of the Berlin issué appears designed at least in part to strengthen the East German regime by emphasizing its “sovercignty” and eliminating West Berlin as a Western en- Moscow's handling of the affair has played up Ulbricht's authority, and his adherents in the party are reported gloating over the adoption of "his" policies by Khrushchev, SECRET PART T11 PATTERRS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 15 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 December 1958 Ulbricht in the meantime appears to be taking even more decisive steps to tighten his control over the party organ= igation. A source with connec-= tions on the East German party céntral committee reports that an internal screening of offi- cials in the central party ap- paratus now is in progress. As a résult, morale is said to be low among these employees, and tension and mutual distrust are rising daily. Since Schirdewan's dis- missal, no other party figure has emerged as a potential con- tender for power or even ag heir apparent among the top party “leadership. Of «the: possible successors, Hermann Watern and, more recently, Alfred Neumann appear to hold the edge; Moscow-trained Erich Honecker might in time aspire to the mantle. ¢ ee The outlook for the East German people is gloomy. Dlbricht's recent concessions . were purely tactical, and he has not basically retreated from MATERN his intention to impose Commu- nism on the people. Recent ‘developments, moreover, have made Kast Germany increasingly dependent on the USSR both politically and economically. If access to the Fest through West Berlin is cut off--the to- terzonal borders are already. largely sealéd--little hope of escape will remain for East Germans, who will be forced to make their peace with Ul- bricht on his terms. Ul-« bricht and his party will still be faced with an essentially unstable internal situation-- one of such magnitude that the USSR knows it cannot safe- ly withdraw its tr long time to come. (Concurred in by ORR) PART fiI PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES — Page & of 15 Approved for Release: 2026/03/16 C06531945