Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 pee _ oe see CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - a! Directorate af Intelligense Intelligence Memorandum “Comments on Ambassador Sullivan's Cable on ne Air Operation in Laos, Novenber 1967 ae Project S- 254.3 ‘ December: 1967 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 Pain _—Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686__ 3.5(c) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Comments on Ambassador Sullivan's Cable on Air Operation in Laos, November 1907 Summary 1. Ina cable of 27 November 1967 commenting on the air war in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan stated that 1) the total of trucks destroyed in Laos in November would in all probability exceed 600, 2) an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills" had been on Routes 911 and 912 and as a result practically none of the North Vietnamese dry season cargo is reaching as far south'as Route 9, and 3)". . . if this rate of success continues, the entire inven- ; tory of trucks which the North Vietnamese hold for the Ho Chi Minh , ee Trail activity will be wiped out before the end of this calendar year." 2. During November, Seventh Air Force pilots reported 531 trucks v destroyed and 198 damaged, the highest monthly rate of destruction Fy reported in Laos during the past two years (see Table 1). Ninety- : eight.percent of the trucks reported destroyed in Laos during Novem- ‘ber and 95 percent of those reported damaged were found in the Panhandle (Steel Tiger) Area of Laos. The number of trucks reported destroyed in Laos in November has been exceeded in North Vietnam only during the months of July and August 1967 when 603 and 743 respectively were reported destroyed (see Table 2). »3. The record level of reported destruction of trucks in = November results from a combination of factors; (1) exceedingly , 3 good, weather in Laos and the highest number of sorties over Laos since April, (2) the first full month of the dry season and an increase in traffic densities, and (3) possibly poor convoy dis- cipline resulting from the use of inexperienced truck drivers. We know of no change in US tactics or weapons systems that would account for the increased effectiveness of US air attacks. Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 3.5(c) ‘ Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 i 4, We agree with Ambassador Sullivan that air operations in Laos were especially effective in November. Even allowing for the inflation known to exist in pilot reporting, a continuation of such heavy losses would seriously erode the North Vietnamese truck in- ventory in Laos and North Vietnam unless imports from the Communist countries increased substantially. It is to be noted, however, that reported truck losses in North Vietnam in November were light, ar only 50 destroyed and 66 damaged. : : 5. We disagree with Ambassador Sullivan's claim that practi- cally no traffic is reaching as far south as Route 9. While road watch teams report little traffic south of Route 9, recent aerial reconnaissance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at least 15 percent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operat- ing on Route 9 or south of Route 9. Finally, there are anomalies in the data for November which cannot yet be explained. In November relatively more trucks were destroyed than damaged than in any pre- vious period. In addition, only 6 sorties were required per truck destroyed or damaged compared to 35 sorties per truck destroyed 6nd damaged in November 1966, when about the same number of sorties were flown but only 115 trucks were destroyed. .6. We believe that the November experience is heartening but it is still too early to conclude that a major turning point has been reached in the US air interdiction campaign in Southeast Asia. Based on past experience there is considerable doubt that the November performance in Laos can be sustained. | oa Comments 7. Exceedingly good weather prevailed in Laos south of Mu Gia Pass in November which made it possible to identify trucks at night to a much greater extent than is normally possible. Truck activity in Laos takes place almost exclusively during the hours of darkness, and approximately half of the 4,400 attack sorties in November were flown during these hours. Bad weather over much of North Vietnam made more attack sorties available for Laos (see Tables 1 and 2). ae November was the first full month of the current dry season in Laos, me ee prompting the Communists to increase their truck traffic to and in Laos at this time. Truck traffic has increased substantially in November 1967 as compared with 1966. During two weeks from 1-14 November 1966, pilots reported sighting _— ‘about 160 trucks in the entire Panhandle of Laos. In the two weeks from 4-17 November 7 aan : . . aoe. oa oo a au, ae Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 inlpaaT | | _— Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 1967, however, pilots reported seeing 1,722 trucks in the same area, These reports also showed substantial increases in truck movement on Routes 912 and 911 in 1967 as compared with 1966. No Road Watch Reports are available for Route 912, but for Route 15 these reports show about the same average number of trucks moving south per day for the period 1-25 November in both 1966 and 1967, but a considere ably higher number moving north in 1967 than in 1966. 8, The desire to increase truck traffic during the month prob- ably forced the Communists to use less experienced truck drivers new to the Laotian roads which may have lad to poorer convoy dis- ciplinesthus making the trucks easier to identify and more vulner- able to air attacks. 9, During January through October 1967 it required 24 sorties to destroy and damage one truck but in November it required only 6 sorties. The only previous period which witnessed the same effectiveness in Laos was in April and May 1966, also periods of high traffic density, when it took only 8 and 6 sorties, respectively, ‘40 destroy and damage one truck, The average for all of 1966 in the Laotian Panhandle was 16 sorties. In North Vietnam the average for the period January 1966 - to date has been 22 sorties. Undoubte edly good weather and a large number of trucks on the road contri- — buted to the increase in the kill ratio. We cannot fully explain its dramatic improvement in November and past experience suggests that it will not be possible to maintain it month after month. 10. The relationship between the number destroyed and the nun- ber damaged also changed considerably in November reporting. From January 1966 through October 1967 about half of the trucks attacked in the Laotian Panhandle were reported to be destroyed and the other half damaged (see Table 3). In November, however, nearly 75 percent were reported destroyed and the remainder damaged. Similar data for North Vietnam show 55 percent destroyed since January 1965. Although there has been a shift in favor of destroyed in the report- ing from both North Vietnam and Laos during 1967 compared with 1966, the ratio of destroyed to damaged for November in Laos is the highest ever experienced in either country. We cannot explain this sudden change. It may merely reflect.a change in the criterion used by . pilots in their reporting, rather than a real change in efficiency of operations. : 11, Pilots'claims of trucks destroyed or damaged are not an accurate measure of actual destruction rates. Operational condi- tions make it virtually impossible for pilots always to report -3- / : Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 3.5(C) SELET | . or for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 ‘accurately as to whether a truck is destroyed or damaged. There is also duplication in reporting which analysts in OER attempt to eliminate. In addition, the Communists have the capability to cannibalize and repair some "destroyed" and damaged trucks. To take into account operational problems in reporting, duplicate counting and repair capability, OER and DIA have agreed to consider 75 percent of the trucks reported by pilots as destroyed and 25 . percent of the trucks reported by pilots as damaged to be effectively lost. Applying these factors to the trucks reported destroyed and ermal in Laos during November 1967, effective losses become about 50. 12, Ambassador Sullivan's statement that ". . . the entire inventory of trucks which we believe the North Vietnamese hold for the Ho Chi Minh Trail activity will be wiped out before the end of the calendar year." has little meaning. The entire North Viet- namese inventory is the one of importance. If the November truck loss rates for effective losses in Laos can be maintained, and losses in North Vietnam increased, the North Vietnam truck inven- tory would be seriously eroded unless imports from other Communist countries are increased substantially. From January 1966 through November 1967 North Vietnam,imported about 7,950 trucks, an average of about 345 per month. This rate has been sufficient to maintain the truck inventory at between 11,000 and 12,000 trucks since January 1966. 13. We agree that an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills" during November were probably on Routes 911 and 912 (see the Map). But this does not necessarily mean that practically none of the dry season cargo reached as far south as Route 9. There is no assurance that all trucks moving south were destroyed. The Road Watch Team in the Mu Gia Pass Area, outside the target area, reported 343 trucks moving north and only 242 trucks moving south during the period 1- 25 November. Moreover, our most recent report of aerial reconnais- sance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at least 15 per- cent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operating on Route 9 or south of Route 9. Furthermore, this report also.indicated that, of the total of 1,464 trucks observed during this two. week period on the routes north of Route 9, only 267 or about 18 percent were destroyed and damaged. For these reasons we think it highly unlikely that the North Vietnamese have been unable to move cargo as far south as Route 9 during November. ye ‘ Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 exe er i aoe . een SSE De meee fae a ss, ope 1966 | Jan Trucks Reported Destroyed . OL _Approv ed 4 and Damaged Destroyed Damaged Total — Whe. 52 90 “‘1h6- 421 314° 102 143 144 377 387 "115 hy re he Table 1 Laos: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed and Damaged by Air Operations 233 ees 798 701 217 / 78 38 50 45 6 |. Attack Sorties 8,000 5,262 - 6,247" 6,206 4 her 3,540 2,207 820 1,265 1,568 4,369 4,808 48,713 22910 6,752 : 5,326 net 3.5(C) for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 a 1966 and January-November 1967 * Number of Sorties Flown Per Truck Destroyed and Damaged 83 23 2k 23 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 wh 4 H Nie 3.5(C) A ; : i pproved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 ( Table 1 = continued Laos! Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed and Damaged 7 by Air Operations 1966_and January-November 1967 * a ~ Trucks Reported Destroyed Number of Sorties and Damaged ' Attack Flown Per Truck ets Destroyed Damaged Total oe Sorties Destroyed and Damaged te 1967 ~ continued ; ; ; " ‘ Apr 133. 92s 5H 54160 BB ae May - * 95 62 aa 2,523 -'——s« i Jun oy Se Lf ; Jul 26 29 55 1,299 ok : Aug 37 ah Gin <4 1,21 - . p86 | (ee Sep 18. 27 45 1,668 ' 37 ie Oct; 60 73 133 2,922 22 i! SC 7: 6 Total . i > ta (10 months) 731 — 698 1,429 333902 - ek Total | | : | (11 months) 1,262 896 =. 2,158 38,302 18 rotel 2,630 2,501 5,132 87,015 17 ue ReeG.enaie ET a EES ate oH ' months 1967 aeeecr eee a TLDS AAAS AALS LC * These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots. Both CIA and DIA ae accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed and only 25 percent of the trucks reported to be damaged as effective losses. Mm 3.5(c) (MERE INET CT met erate sree: ste tite teense cannes pages Lesh Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 - 3 | Wile i / | . 3.5(C) . _” Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 Table 2 North Vietnam: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed 2 e and Damaged by Air Operations pee 1966 and January-November, 1907 * eee —Thmber of Attack iy Numbers of Trucks Number of Sorties Per Truck feb Destroyed Attack Destroyed and oe Destroyed Damaged and Damaged Sorties Damaged “ “ 1.966: : 7 , ia . Jan - * nee 130 nea Feb 22 wy 36 =—S——s«, BLO ne: 7 Mar sO 124 == 209,sti‘“<*«‘“ HQ 21 2 Apr 83 96 179s 5 50 30 s : May 105 m » am °° 4k7o 25 Jun 178 164 34200 7,790 23 n Jul 389 3222 TL —s«i10,200 14 ’ Aug 496 —-393—~Ci<“‘;;*‘«OBQQ 11,310 13 feo Sep 259 292 551 =, 350 Eee ve Oct eo a6 154 = 267 «8B 700 | 33 | a Nov «137 128 = 265 —s«*ST BECO an my Dee 68 - 4O 108 .. 6,710 — 62 ia 1966 > 7 : | Y a atial Totals 1,935. 1,801 3,736 81,670 » ge 1967: bea an \ a tf aera HHS ae eden ss pir ges Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 . ' Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 Ss VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION SYSTEM mms Communist roadnet i — Principal Communist trail t omnes § Other road “ \ . if ae a Se. 60 75 Mites ( 1A° , t gy OBD 7B Kilometers C Phu Olen Chau ; CHINA —SECRET— HAINAN : ) ee New, Vinh a _ “ ) [ Linh Cag w ; - ) 2 -t pé - ab He Tinh ; GULF ; OF TONKIN Pe ae F No \ Kham Na @\ 7 \ ‘ ity Gia Poss Ban Ny Pha Quang Khe N 101 Y Balt Phone Mouang Dr Yi fiaina Hien ¥ 56717 6-67 CIA Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03164686 Sone ee