DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Mobutu and the Congo Special Report _ WEEKLY REVIEW Ne Dees OF aerate 23 June 1967 ween Sl SID SC No. 00775/67A | copy Leosaoa Baine'a Tohasay Liber B & sate, SLGRET MOBUTU AND THE CONGO its future looks brighter at present than at any tine since independence. Opposition elements have been effectively subdued, bringing -to the country a degree of political stability...The. central gov- ernment is exercising reasonable control over disparate regional-elements, and for the first time since independence seems to be directing or influencing events throughout the vast interior. --The predominant position of control once held by | the Belgians has diminished somewhat. Relations with neighboring African states have improved and will probably continue to do so, The general ; economic decline since_independence has been largely arrested, at least temporarily. A great deal of the credit for this progress is due to President Joseph Mobutu, who, with careful and skillful exercise of power, plus an unusual amount | i Although the Congo still faces hard times, | | i | i of luck, has brought the Congo to its present pac- ified position. The African Chief rule, enbodied in the two post- : - a ae independence Congolese constitu--——---~- Mobutu's approach to gov- tions, are strange and, in the ernment derives from the African final analysis, unattractive to traditions of chieftainship lib- the Congolese. erally interspersed with ideas ~from his favorite political Mobutu-has-had a good deal theorist, Machiavelli. Mobutu—____ ] of success with his own ideas” “believes that the Congolese--whom during his nineteen months as -——WW—~—}-— he describes as but one genera- president.. Not particularly pop- tion removed from the villages-- Wiar at the time of his 1965 take~ expect a strong chief who must be over, he has risen tremendously=———— the unquestioned authority and in public esteem, His Machia--———--——~-|---- the sole source of power. The vellian approach to cementing his ~~ Congolese, he says, are used to position has drawn admiration... tutelage from their years under from almost everyone, and most both tribal and Belgian rule, Congolese respect him for his and are more comfortable when power and for effectively bring- told exactly what is expected of ing a degree of order to the them. Mobutu also believes that country. foe Western concepts of parliamentary Page 1 SPECIAL REPOFT - 23 Jun 67 COPY Lyndon BaineX fohason Librar Mobutu Consolidates His Position In the first months after he came to power in November 1965, Mobutu sought to eliminate his opposition by either absorbing it or neutralizing it. Fortunately for him, one crucial manifesta- tion of opposition--the rebellion which had broken out in 1964--was en the decline when he came to power. Ee helned the process along by cultivating neighboring states which haé been aiding the rebels and by offering an amnesty to rank-and-file rebels. From the beginning, however, the re- bellion was not a major concern and Mobutu could concentrate on other matters. Immediately after his take- over, Mobutu announced an absolute ban on political activity in an effort to put an end to the six years of intrigue that marked we ea ‘ Se ee a a tey s #: > Congolese politics. He enforced this order by effectively utiliz- ing the army to discipline errant politicians. In June 1966, he provided a grim example=--the hanging of four plotters in the Kinshasa public square--for those who had still not gotten his message. When, in the spring of 1967, Mobutu_-formed his own uni-_ - tary political party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR), most local politicos quickly jumped on the bandwagon. Mobutu's strategy included the removal of Moise Tshombé--~ currently in exile in Madrid--as a potential threat and the de- struction of Tshombé's support in his old stronghold of Katanga... . Through a well-organized propa- - ganda campaign, Tshombé became identified as the Belgian stooge who, as Congolese premier, sold. out the. country to foreign busi- ness interests and as the archi- tect of a new Katangan secession... ~~ By the time of Tshambé's March 1967 trial in absentia for treason, — Many Congolese believed that he truly was a traitor, and those:..- who had lingering doubts were Sinaart enough to remain silent. When Godefroid Munongo, Tshombd's former strong man, became too poverful in Katanga politics, he was called to Kinshasa and re- SRL ATS Fem: 4 ’ Sy, MOBUTU + Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT placed by a military officer, With Tshombé gone and his lieu- tenants dispersed, Katanga fell in line--at_least for the present-- with other provinces in support of the central government. Mobutu's New Congo Having reduced his opposi- tion, Mobutu found himself ina (a ied a 23 Jun 67 Copy Tandon Baines Tohason Librar CENTRAL SUDAN Qa REPUBLIC ow ea om RI r SLAF 1CAN : \ BANGUI af © iy es et os “1” CAMEROON ed a ~~ _— “ Ww Ao Se, ee a ee ae ORIENTALE “* ao ‘ : / % vis UATEUR ate = a peer) aaa eee __f _ al) EMbandaka (Coquitatvte) _ ‘ See tecan ee _ : Qo : My i ei ; Oma Garrcs kor EOE , rat = PON ete pmoane ANGOLA ‘ ‘ ay (Port.) OS eengunay (Banningyitte) = | HA R UND? ) [Buoys “ BRAZZAVELE gfhan® A N ol iu ND U eae ae : as RB ae EO ASA (ee. ‘ "} ve 7 Sat ois awe dave? \ Bo x és ran JN ees N. Sie cee ee =3 bass CENTRAL OCCIDENTAL N) KAsAaLoRENTaL } \ : : Nb qb pSonaaiala- gy - ) ‘uluabourg | ary" } i i vt CANES aaa ne ied (ep a § is Waker rt \ ¥ Semen DEMOCR ATIC REPUBL Ic OF THE CONGO oes Province toundary Province capital 390 Mier 490 Kilometers, position to restructure the Congo as he saw fit. A military wan, Mobutu first tried using the army... as his base and establishing strong military control. He de- clared a state of emergency in troubled areas and sent a military governor to contain political ac- ‘civity there. After brief experi-— Page 3 SPECIAL | BSUSEAR? NCPRESERTATION (8 JUN DS N ET ESTARILY AUTH QRITATIVE ments on these lines, however, he reverted to using civilian admin- _istrators.. Faceé with a history of petty provincial politics, Mobutu de- vised a scheme to switch elected governors to other provinces, making the provincial head an REPORT 23 Jun 67 COPY eyrlon Baines Toho aon Libear + agent of the central government. This maneuver curtailed local patronage and, to a limited ex-_. tent, detribalized provincial. __ . politics, The system worked so vo |os>> well that Mobutu apparently was. convinced that the civilian route== was the way to go. He then-haad~—— a new constitution drafted in) 2. the spring of 1967 which concen- trated all effective power _in-the— hands of the president and gave legal sanction to the close cen= => tral control Mobutu had_already established ever provincial gov- ernments. The draft constitution was approves in a referendum early ~ this month and is to go into ef==== fect on 24 June. his new political party and his. most recent attempt to organize mass-support,-— — Mobutu and the Military -s==Itiis: significant that Mobutu--o---- Fe - is-not "using the military as the ae fe basis for the-r-litical structure. -.... 04... he has developed for the Congo. ___ : The core-of-his own strength re-. : mains the army; he cultivates its... as officers’ and looks after its ineq2...2 222! —-- terests. Nevertheless, in working= °°: 22} out a new administration for the... |]. country he-reverted to a civilian---9---. i - System-after-the brief experiment -- : with military governors-for the ~~ = provinces (2. Mobutu made several _unsuc-——— cessful attempts to mobilize the---- masses behind his regime, Imme---=— —ss==His_effort to keep the army. in-the- background may have been od ae stimulated-by-several considera- ~~ = =|> : ~ diately after he assumed. power, -_-| tions. Mobutu, aware of the. army ' Soo ie ee he started a "roll up the sleeves"—| reputation with the populace, ee Hpossibly-wants—to divorce himself. . from the military.in the- public Hnind<=—Fear that a military satrap... in the provinces-might be able to the campaign--to the point that...--| build up an independent power.base in some areas one dared not be was. probably:2 another factor. caught without his sleeves. Lite==[== ee : —---= Mobutu's own: ‘prejudices, show=-~ | | ing up everything from filth in: the streets to corruption-inzcgov ernment. Many eagerly adopted-—~ erally rolled MEer Ue the program -- soon drifted. ever, may be just: as important .— Sear (eer O£ all_the_military leaders who (°° ~>> -p Then Mobutu sought to or==-—=~| have°come.to-power in black Africav*=-0 |" ganize a mass movement called the over the past few years, Mobutu > Volunteer Corps of the Republic” ~~; alone is not.a-professional_sol==- "°°: a (CVR). Although performing some ---}| dier,-although he did become-a~ > > = useful tasks initially, members high=ranking NCO during his six” eee ae of the CVR-began associating with----]| years of service with the colonial” . .. the radical youth group from-———==} arny~=—From-_his: preindependence =e Congo-Brazzaville, and_the CVR_--. | experience _as-a—journalist and—--- | turned _into a band of roving ——--— | student~he retains elements_of a - es vigilantes. Mobutu skillfully =<_] nonmilitary outlook, ; | disbanded it by appointing-its*2=-= |---3 3-5 ese ce ae i leaders to positions in the MPR, — x Sa pe Page 4———SPECIAL-REPORT~ ~~~ 23 gun 67 Copy Lyndon Baines Tohason Libsar” 7 carmen een inabttntemmnpmneemtsnent nN ee seRe AKER SEGREF- Mobutu_as_an Administrator of young intellectuals, In keep-- ing with the spirit of Machia- ; velli's advice, he generally avoids The Congo has no dependable—— administration system except where= the few thousand foreigners-- becoming dependent on either set : ! or letting them know exactly what => oe the is thinking. _: | SE a Pace : i i mostly Belgians~-or the-few trained and relatively uncorrupted Congo=_ iese have been able to impose... some order. Duplication-and -con===|== tradiction of efforts are common, ==]-"==: Despite the installation of an. .fJ 0. — American cemputer to match wits with seasoned Congolese_bureaur__ crats, only a few improvements ---——. have been made. > ' Mobutu's Advisers ————— Ministers Victor _Nendaka_and oe es 2 Justin Bombcko, who have been... close to Mobutu for years; are elias the advisers in whom Mobutu has — > =~} the greatest confidence. .... teal 1 They ;. with Mobuta,.. have been deep_in Congolese poli= tics.since_indepéendence and have. acquired: considerable- experience Se in_the_ups_and-downs_of. ‘conqolesa= aa affairs Mobutu_has_also brought into | his_regime elements of_young, _ Tae ee university-graduate = | and has given them high-level ad-_ visory and coordinative positions. — : He has-a_dual rationale behind. =. .--- this:*°hé believes that-this ean group will be ruling the Congo___. within the next generation: and=—-— == wants to. be_identified-as- their patron; also, he views them as. potential opposition-to be con~-___ trolled by bringing them into his-——"_-/-- Mobutu has two principal sets of advisers--a handful-of ~~~ long-time associates and a group —- camp.” He has respect for and. = enjoys being with this_group,. but has been-careful to keep a check on-them and not give them free Page 5 SEGRE SPECIAL _REPORT e rein, 23_Jun 67 Copy Lynton Baines Tohason Libs er Rene SEGRE Relations With African Neighbors __ Congolese relations with—-—__ neighboring African states were in disrepair in late 1965, and Mobutu appeared reluctant at first Sidering re-establishing diplo- matic relations with the Soviet ‘Union to underline his nonaligned position. The most obvious manifesta- to devote much attention to_the—___|-tion of-Mobutu's ambitions has subject. Because good relations been his attempt to move the seat ~ with the states which cee: Se “the Organization of African supported the rebellion were.in-_ Unity.-(OAU). from Addis Ababa to his interest, however, Mobutu. Kinshasa. “Mobutu may have naively found himself being pushed into. the role of an inter~African i Statesman. Wary warmed cons role and hee: lally, Mobutu has ably to his new un te project... himself more and more as a major African leader. He believes that=— the Congo, by virtue of its_size, its strategic position and its potential wealth, should be one ~ of the greatest powers in Africa.—_-]. This probably is the basis for-—-—— Big oi his eagerness to mediate African ~—-|- | | assumed that he need only issue ' the invitation and the OAU would. | come running; he may also have eee gotten an_exaggerated impression — | of African dissatisfaction with the OAU's Ethiopian hosts from -radical_OAU_Secretary General DIF=.: allo Telli. At any rate,. Mobutus. = ~has-apparently learned the facts of African life; he seems content--+---—--——| for the time being at least--with =-*. -:: ‘the— Prospect of hosting the organi--—-——|—- + zation's September 1967 summit: con-———— ference in Kinshasa's brand-new --.-- “OAU city." pe CERES problems. He has persistently =! offered to help the Nigerians 7 solve their secessionist diffi-~~ culties, taken a paternal atti------=]-- tude toward easing tensions be- tween Rwanda and Burundi, and ___ tried last year to promote numer-——|Belgium ous conferences in Kinshasa, .......-- Mobutu has made a_conscien-. tious effort to create for him- self the image of a trne African nationalist. He has been willing to mouth African slogans and, occasionally if reluctantly, to ——— promote the cult of the "martyred" Patrice Lumumba, the Congo's first~™ premier. He agreed to get rid of the South African mercenaries imported by ' Tshombé to quell the rebellion. Mobutu is also con- ‘SECRET SPECIAL REPORT Page 6 -and-sincerely believes that they the ¢ Congo! s _Fconomic Problens ——_- sa.=Much-of Mobutu's economic pol==— . icy revolves around his efforts to... -achieve economic independence’ from Mobutu-is deeply con- .cerned--indeed,-nearly obsessed--——__— with Belgian domination of the - ae Congolese economy; although he rec- |e ognizes the necessity of keeping. —— Belgian technicians and hence of conceding many*=rights to the Bel- ~ -~-~- gians. He distrusts the Belgians”. ~—- ~~ are-out-to cheat-and to steal- from =_-- tt the Congo. Much of his time and attention-have been directed toward the Katanga mining firm, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK), and the conflict between them 23 Jun 67 capy Lyndon Laine’ Johason Libsar SEGREEs. . _ . “reached dramatic proportions- when Mobutu seized the company's Con- golese assets in January 1967. Mobutu has demonstrated lit- tle ability to handle the mechan- ics of economics. His solutions to economic problems are rudi-..._ mentary and often political in orientation. He has little con- ception of the consequences of de=— laying action on economic problems and seléom follows through on his decisions. This past spring, for. example, Mobutu sought a rework- ing of the arrangements between Sabena and Air Congo and began-——— negotiations, bkut has lost inter- est for moment. Negotiations have since stalemated.. In another incident, a 10-percent consumption tax was levied in April 1966 on-—— all petroleum products, but-oil—— - he companies were forbidden to_raise.__ ally secks the advice of foreign i businessmen. Short-term prospects fcr the Congolese economy are not espe- cially good, While some mines and factories are producing at a fairly high level, most-are hampered by.__ example;: the loss of a major part of the -foreign—exchange and reve-— nues during the early 1967 copper crisis is now causing shortages io... of food_and supply, plus high —_ prices. The large northeastern plantations are still mainly-de===-==--- 4. => ‘serted as.a result of the 1964-65 —- rebellion and, as a result, agri- cultural production is still. far...- below preindependence levels,.=. De-=s: | supply and transport problems,-—For.. — clining copper prices, among. other —— ‘things, suggest-hard times ahead : for the economy; even without. the.) threat -of-erratic government acm" prices to absorb the tax... Pro- “tion, testing that they would make: now profit, the companies suspended operations for several weeks. ......-— Subsequently Mobutu agreed that— they could stall their tax_payment - until the end of 1966, Nothing. rection, enormous problems remain.-—.—- more has been said and the taxes=--—|-The-military;-having acquired a have not been paid. Numerous-——=>-—— |] taste for_politics and national similar government actions_vere==22]. deferred, but not rescinded, and-—~ their questionable status has ~~ > created confusion and anxiety on the part of the foreign business community. Mobutu, however, has begun to realize how little he really knows and has begun to seek-more~ — expert afivice. He has been dis- cussing purely econgmic problems with the competent Congolese head of the Nationzl Bank and occasion- Outlook —--- Although :Mobutu has gotten the Congo started in the_right=di=== leadership, -may~not quietly accept —— being_pushed:back into-a-strictly >=: 55 +1 Whether the Cons seeran bereee| role, siveness or “peliability for an ex- tended_period of time certainly eee -subject - to question. More- over, i-:-anything happens to Mo- Buti cageeseination or retirement--__.. the military may think it is time~——— for _a second coup. Regional disaffection, not---—---- ably in Katanga, has merely been——~——_—|~ “SECRET Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT 23 Jun 67 COPY Lyndon Baines Johnson Librar » : suppressed, not eliminated. Addi- Fund,.Mobutu has agreed to major tionally, most of the eastern part | monetary. reforms, including de- of the Congo still must be reha- valuation of the Congo's currency. : bilitated...Large_ portions of the ; vss es i population have literally gone back to the bush. Health condi--- ‘All of the problems which i tions are deplorable; services, have traditionally plagued the 9 5 so 0: nonexistent. Despite lip service _|_Congo.still.remain.. Tribal con--—. - ae paid to the needs of these people, [| flict has been subdued, but mainly Mobutu has done little to get re- -|[~ because of.weariness and. fear; - construction started. basic antagonisms continue to fer= ment beneath the surface. The need for hundreds of trained,-com-s==—-- | ber terribcee Over the next few years, the | petent young Congolese administra= ee ih Congo may make some economic prog-_{ tors and craftsmen still.exists, Seeger stars ress. Mobutu's major contribu-———|—and-is-only-slowly-being met. 2 tion has heen to pacify the coun~ _ - Purther_ frictions with the Bel- : try, i : eet ee portation routes Eat ieciy. satenlt * Sevtod. of “stability. brings NG oe, but in deteriorated condition. ~~~ Congo to another threshold: from ~ i If political stability continues, | here it can continue to work-out coe the Congolese leaders and foreign _}|. its-social and economic problems, ~~ business interests can exert _their:|.or it can take merely a breather” >} energies toward improving the gen--|--from its traditional peuding and ya eral economy. Under the quidance = ee Shah = eo of the International Monetary H i i t = = 4 a | i \ | | I i x *- x | | | | | - SECRET... _ Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT ~~ 23> gun 67- cory Lyndon Baines Tohnsog ibrar _