ia tn toe tye ayers qe AOE one a NRT CTE BEI I IW . be tt 2 ety tee Tee 7 ae RTE NE at, EO vy eA REO a EH, NIE 50-61 28 March 1961 “ESTIMATE TELLIGENCE. IN MAING LOC OUT AND A. I ST: Beas “ A [IE i Sutealited dy the. CTOR OF CENTRAL aa DIRE “4 acy Lof > t Staff. ents icipated in the Central Intel of the ce Ager tm. en The Join tell ‘the Depar ind ‘organizations part he izations din by ag 2 » ence s estimate: T be. Organ Concurre ‘intell a: ligene ing tion of th ‘and. the inte State, the Army, The ‘followi prepara ED STATE CE BOARD. aN UNIT nm. 28 March > LIGE $ INTE Fri Cone. ntelli- ZI f tant Chie} ar. © ‘The Direct é€ mg wer Deportment of § a4 1961: d Research, oO Sts rmy; the As the As ent of the A ions Untellig tate sist tof the: ° the .. tmen Depar 2 en . ’ ence) Steff, Intellig e, d Operat tant. Ch Depart ence lig yal f Staf for Intel ant Chlejf of Na the Assis tor ‘for, Intell gence an N ef i Ps ce, USAF of Agee Aes bfect ~ 10 : and the. Director tons; e Atom “and Energy Com-" d, the su the Assistant Di-’ Assistant adstaine isdlction, ion, qur Th ney. the USIB,: eir Special Operat ty Ag 0) et ureau of Investigal gence, Joint Staff; the Curt ¢ v Secretary of Defense, of the National Se outside of th roy ntat r, Federal B i ing * ar be jon Represe recto a 2 tree 3 Pore iy gee ohne ie a ee Ma, ‘ Pirin Jars em ne Og wnat wee Ft. a TABLE OF CONTENTS THE PROBLEM... 20. es 6 BE ax wee a GONGLUSIONS 4.6 ng vd Seis a SO EERE oo 1 4 DISCUSSION 4 4 2.4 422M ee ee oS Gaede es ae ‘|. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE . 0 6 0 0 ee ee ee 8 = Ii. TRENDS IN THE ARGA © ook et ake ae Ge he ee 4 A. Conditions and Trends Affecting Internal Development. . . 4 B. Conditions and Trends Affecting International Orientation . 5 Ill. MAJOR PROBLEMS AND OUTLOOK IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COUNTRIES . 2. 1 6 ee ee ee ee ea se ee > ; BUNS: go rds te. Se Ae: DY ee Tee Ate ge tah ey tes en Acta Se OS The Military and Political Situations . . 6... ee ee 6 Oullook . 1. 2s. SE eee EW ee AS - 6 . South Vietnam... .. So die oar cia Meteen ning ee WPveeten bata ae? UE O PhaiANG . 6G Gvg oS toes WOAOR We Pe eae a a a ee . Cambodia . 2... eee oo Bice Be we Whe! ae a AS . Malaya ..... Bh foie: AE ee Satie wae eRe at eat ee AS mist Ot yy = S » & IV. PROBABLE EFFECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OF MAJOR COM- 7. MUNIST GAINS IN LAOS OR SOUTH VIETNAM... . - 14 : inks we at 4S Ree Ot oh OUTLOOK IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA THE PROBLEM a. To analyze the basic political and sre conditions and trends in mainland Southeast Asia;* b. To icentify potential political-military crisis situations and to estimate prob- able developments over the next year or so in domestic stability and international orientation of the countries of the area; and 2 c. To estimate the probable effects on the peoples and governments of these oa ‘countries in the event there were significant Communist gains in Laos or South ~ Vietnam. CONCLUSIONS 1. Most Southeast Asian countries are This would increase the likelihood of the either now experiencing or willencounter disintegration of the Laotian Army and in the next year or two serious political _ the subsequent collapse of the non-Com- crises arising out of foreign iatervention, munist position. The Laotian crisis has domestic strains, or a complex of factors become a matter of contention among the attributable to their basically unstable major powers and its resolution rests pri- and unhealthy political, social, and eco- marily in non-Laotian hands. (Paras. nomic structure. Byfarthemostserious 28-30) s problems ae Ee Sele iorating sihuaviow 3. In South Vietnam, the situation of the x in Laos and the mounting Communist pion government seems likely to become threat and precarious governmental situ- increasingly difficult, not only because of ation in South Vietnam. (Paras. 22-68) rising Communist guerrilla strength and | "| 2. The Pathet Lao probably havea greater declining internal security but also be- = - military capability than they have yet cause of widening dissatisfaction with fyi 6 chosen to exercise. They could sharply .. Diem’s government. Since the coup at- ~ - step up the action at any time and prob- tempt of November 1960, Diem has re- ably achieve a series of local victories. asserted his control of the government on and made some cautious moves toward ‘Laos, South Viclnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Bur- : yn, and Malaya. - government reform; he has taken action Copy A gi RTE am Be aes nase Lac Naar Nas iT Rab Sees Son iiabis, ints won Bae Pek actac st el arona de decade: Roe racer bel bas GECRET=a 2 to improve the antiguerrilla capabilities of the army and stepped up military ac- tivities against the Viet Cong. Nonethe- less, the factors which gave rise to the November 1960 coup attempt still exist, and we believe that the odds favor another coup atternpt by non-Communist ele- ments in the next year or so. The Com- munists would attempt to expleit any new efforts to unseat the povernment. We are not confident that the army would ke able to keep the situation from getting out of hand. (Paras. 36-38) 4. There is deep awareness among the countries of Southeast Asia that develop- ments in the Laotian crisis, and its out- come, have a profound impact on their . future. The governments of the area _ tend to regard the Laotian crisis as a symbolic test of intentions, wills, and strengths between the major powers of the West and the Communist Bloc. (Para. 69) 5. Those countries which are in close alignment with the US favor stronger measures to assure at least a non-Com- _-munist and preferably an anti-Commu- nist, western-oriented regime in Laos; neutralist Burma and Cambodia, as well as Malaya, favor a neutralist but not Communist-dominated government. ‘These latter governments favor some form of international political agreement to end the crisis: They would be alarmed if Laos were lost under conditions which indicated to them that the US position in the area had gravely weakened. (Para. 70) 6. The loss of Laos to the Communists, or perhaps even the division of the coun- try, would alrnost certainly incline the Thai toward accommodation to Commu- nist power in Southeast Asia. A pre- dominantly Communist-controlled Laos would vitally threaten South Vietnam's independence: it would greatly extend the Communist frontiers with South Viet- nam; it would bring substantially greater Communist military power to bear on the crucial Saigon defense complex; and it would greatly facilitate Communist in- filtration and subversion. The close proximity of a Comrnunist state would make more difficult Western efforts to starch up local resistance. In short, the loss of Laos would severely darmage the US position and its influence in Thailand and South Vietnam. (Para. 72) 7 The future course of all of the countries of Southeast Asia would be strongly in- fluenced by the actuai circumstances in which the loss or division of Laos had oc- curred as well as the local appraisal of the attitude and actions of the US in re- sponse to the situation. The extent to which these countries would go in resist- ing Bloc pressures or in withstanding local Communist threats would depend in great degree on whether they still assessed that the US could stem further Commu- nist expansion in the area. They would feel more keenly than before a strong temptation to take a neutral position between the two power blocs, even though they recognized that the US is the only country with sufficient power to op- pose the Communist Bloc in the area. Although they probably would be deeply disillusioned regarding US resolution after the loss or division of Laos, they would nonetheless welcome demonstra- _ tions of US firmness and might in re- sponse modify their appraisal of their own future in due course. (Para. 73) od aisha “ps “2d copy ero oe Dlnaerdebneoue Ts Tabi2 2! SECKET’ 3 8. Although the Communist threat to South Vietnam has reached serious pro- portions, the chances of a Communist takeover in the next year or so are con- siderably less than they are in Laos. Nevertheless, Peiping and Hanoi alrnost certainly attach greater importance to thei: efforts in South Vietnam than they do to their efforts in Laos. US prestige and policy are particularly deeply en- gaged in South Vietnam. Diern’s policy of close alignment with the US is on trial in the current crisis. All countries of the area would attach great importance to a failure of ‘the South Vietnam Govern- ment to cope successfully with the rising tempo of Communist subversion and armed insurrection. If South Vietnam were to fall to the Communists or be forced to swing toward neutralism, the irnpact upon the countries of Southeast Asia would be similar in kind but con- siderably more severe than that resulting from the loss or division of Laos. (Para. 74) DISCUSSION I. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE §. Throughout their histories the countries and- peoples of Southeast Asia have been caught in the crossfire. of outside influences. _ In early times they lived in the shadows of __the great civilizations of India and China fron. _ which they derived many characteristics of their diverse cultures and social orders. Later, _ during. the period of colonial domination, Western civilization left its stamp on cultural, _ social, and political institutions of the area. More recently, Southeast Asia has been caught up in the competition between the two great modern political and ideological movements— Communist totalitarianism and representa- tive democracy. 10. Since 1940 the peoples of Southeast Asia have been involved in a revolutionary experi- ence which has few parallels in history for diversity, scope, and speed. During this pe- riod, Southeast Asia has experienced major - war, the military defeat in World War II of the Western colonial powers by an Asian ~ power, a disillusioning occupation by Japan, a preat upsurge of nationalism, the defeat of France in Indochina, and the rapid growth of Communist pressures end influence. Since the end of the Second World War, a wave of independence has swept mainland Southeast Asia, leaving in its wake a number of new sovereign states. Traditional social and cul- tural patterns and values have been under- going change. Economic and political prob- lems have multiplied in number and increased in complexity. Every state in Southeast Asia, except Thailand, has experienced Communist insurrection or invasion. Their immediate neighbor---Communist China—has emerged as a new and threatening Asian power, and the US, partly in response, has greatly in- creased its activitics and presence in their ‘area, Thus, regardless of the wishes of the peoples and goverrments of the area, the issues of the global cold war between two preat world power blocs have focused sharply in Southeast Asia, Historically, the peoples and leaders of Southeast Asia, when caught between overwhelming outside forces or in- fluences, have taken the line of least resistance and have accommodated to superior power. 11. There is great political, cultural, ethnic, and historical diversity among the countries and peoples of Southeast Asia. There is among them no sense of regional unity, Most of the peoples of the area identify themselves with their ethnic groups. More recently, and thus far only within limited circles, they have bepun to identify themselves with their na- &SEGRST “LES ; ae yy So ere ree EE TOE oN qomerrerrarenet or patna sr aon 5 ek ae ihe a eg : i COPY ae = acs t Ne? a Pes +. i ee ee a ~ teed ison Te. ay She ier eS , Peerage 7 Pi ee SHEET 4 tions. Despite their great diversity the peoples and leaders of the arca face in com- mon a nurnber of basic problems concerning economic developmeni, political stability, ethnic antagonisms, Communist pressures, and national security. They also share, al- though to varying degrees, an emotional na- tionalisin compounded of anticolonialism, racism, and a growing demand for equality, respect, and prestige among nations. ll. TRENDS IN THE AREA A. Conditions and Trends Affecting Internal Development 12. No strong sense of national unity has yet ..developed arnong the diverse peoples within the countries of Southeast Asia. They all contain sizable unassimilated ethnic minori- ties. In Malaya, for example, the population is split chiefly between the indigenous Malays and the Overseas Chinese. The ethnic Lao constitute only about half the population of Laos; the remainder are made up of a num- ber of ethnic and tribal groups, several of which overlap into the adjoining countries of Burma, China, and North Vietnam. Even in Cambodia and Thailand, which have the advantage of considerable linguistic, cultural, and ethnic homogeneity, there are large unas- similated Chinese and Vietnamese communi- ties which wield economic influence dispro- porticnate to their size. The historic suspi- cions and antagonisms among the various ethnic groups continue, and there are very few instances of a trend toward mutual ac- commodation or assimilation, 13. None of the nations cf Southeast Asia has yet firmly established’ institutions and traditions necessary for peaceful and orderly political change. British tutelage has made a promising impact on the political life of Malaya and Burma, but this is largely offset in the former case by the potential for insta- bility which exists in the communal nature of Malaya’s society. Throughout the area there exists an unwillingness among the moderate and conservative national leaders to submerge their individual or group ambi- ‘tions and rivalries for the sake of national welfare. We can discern no trend toward in- creasing’ cohesion among the moderate and conservative leadership groups. 14. Despite postwar efforts ta establish parlia- mentary democracy, the present trend is for political authority to become increasingly con- centrated in very small groups. In most in- stances, political power also means economic power and personal gain, and in many in- siances political power is regarded as the means and economic power the end. The proups in power are but a small part of the educated elite in each country. Although the elite groups are at least superficially attracted to Western political concepts, the political and social realities in their countries retard, and in some cases preclude, the development of concepts of a loyal opposition and an orderly transfer of governmental authority. 15. There is a vast intellectual, economic, and social gulf between the leadership elites and governing circles on the one hand and the mass of the population on the other. In all the countries of the area 75 to &5 percent of the population are peasants or village dwell- ers. For the most part they are illiterate, suspicious of central authority, and out of touch with national and international de- velopments. Many of therm live outside the national moncy economy. Although most of the peasants tend to be politically apathetic, they are often resentful of local and provincial officials, and they are gradually becoming aware of the vast difference between their Jot and that of the leadership elites. A simi- Jar pap exists between the elites and the bulk of the people who live in the urban centers, where the dissatisfaction prowing out of the situation is more acute. The smali govern- ing groups are under increasing pressurcs from the educated elites and, to some extent, even from the masses whose political aspira- tions and economic expectations are on the rise. Consequer:tly, governments in the area are finding it increasingly difficult to evoke positive public support. 16. The military has generally come to play an increasingly important political role in the area except in the cases of Cambodia and Malaya. Thailand has been ruled almost con- = epee £0 PEeperommer Meter mya . tia aa = _ | mt ted nee ot i 6 ea ACH PNR AB RIP RARHM LON Ao ay PrCRET 5 tinually since 1932 by a military junta. Mih- tary leaders throughout the area account for a significant part of the educated elite, and they are becoming increasingly conscious of their potential political power and increasingly dissatisfied with the perforrnance of their civilian governments. Their grievances in- clude governmental inefficiency and corrup- tion, and dissatisfaction with the govern- ment’s means of dealing with internal promo- tions within the military. As a result, the governing groups cannot count so heavily as they once did on military backing in a time of political crisis. For their part, military leaders in the Southeast Asia couniries are prone to factionalism. In general, the more they become involved in political and eco- nomic affairs, the wider spreads the circle of corruption among their ranKs and the more acute their factional rivalries tend to become. 17, No matter how well motivated, the military leaders have at tirmnes shown themselves to be : _..__ politically inept and incapable of sustained united political action. Moreover, they have __not. been_able to overcome the historical tendency of the peoples of the area to regard the military with suspicion and hostility. On the other hand, despite their shortcomings as political instruments, the armies of the South- east Asian nations have been important stabi- lizing forces on the national scene and major factors in inhibiting Communist advances. They constitute the largest and best organized single element in the society of these nations. B. Conditions and Trends Affecting International Orientation 18. Most of the peoples of Southeast Asia are only vaguely aware of developments outside their local communities. Among the edu- cated and semieducated groups in the urban areas, however, there has developed an active interest in international affairs. In general, these groups are highly nationalistic and acutely sensitive to real or imagined slights to their nation’s sovereignty. Many of the edu- ~ cated, particularly those dissatisfied with their economic or political lot, are attracted to Marxist and Socialist economic theories with- out in many instances understanding thern. Anticolonial and antiwhite sentiments are likely to be strong and vocal among these urban groups. 19, The peoples of Southeast Asia are pre- occupied with their own problems and aspira- tions. They have no desire to see their coun- tries as a battlefield in the cold war aid resent being treated as pawns by the major powers. There is a growing tendency arnong them to view the Communist Bloc as on the rise and the West as on the wane in the rhythm of history. They have no real enthusiasm for aligninent with either the Communist Bloc or the West, and among them there is a growing tendency to believe that neutralism provides preater security and freedom of action at less risk than close relations with the West. 20. To the educated elites and the small gov- erning groups alike, the proximity of Com- munist China, with its vast population and growing military power, is an omnipresent fact of life. The foreign policy question con- stantly before the Southeast Asia governments is how best to deal with the looming threat of China--whether to depend upon Western policy and strength, or to make some degree of accommodation with Communist China. In either case, the intent is the same—to pre- serve national integrity and independence— and the methed is similar-—to avoid complete commitment and to maintain the maximum flexibility. . 21, In sum, while the Southeast Asians are in no hurry to place themselves at the Bloc’s mercy, they are in general becoming more reluctant to assume a strong stand in opposi- tion to China in the absence of certain guaran- tees of swift, successful, and painless Western protection. This is caused principally by re- luctance to offend an increasingly powerful China; prowing concern over involvement in modern war; uncertainty, fed by recent events in Laos, as to US consistency and promises of support; a belief that they can survive and successfully play off East and West through neutralist tactics; and concern that growing Sino-Soviet power may deter the US from effec- _ COPY - f COUT te teeta Lethon po toenl te { t f i t ia t tive action to prevent an eventual Chinese Communist hegemony in Southeast Asia. til, MAJOR PROBLEMS AND OUTLOOK IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COUNTRIES 22. The following serics of brief country esti- mates concentrates on the two or three situa- tions in each country which have reached crisis proportions or are likely to do so in the near future. Except for the situations in Laos and South Vietnam, the most pressing prob- lems are the result of particular interns! cir- curnstances rather than Cornmunist activity. 93. The Communist threat in Laos is critical and has reached serious proportions in South Vietnam. Elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia the immediate security situation is reasonably good. The protracted Communist insurrection in Malaya is virtually liquidated and the major Comraunist effort there has shifted fromm arrmed “national liberation” to the establishment of a base for future political activities. in Thailand, Communist assets are still quite limited. Local Communist ac- tivity within Burma and Cambodia appears to be proceeding in a low key. A. Loos? The Military and Political Situations 24, Laos is a country divided by two contend- ing factions. The pro-Communist forces con- trol Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, Phong Saly, and large parts of Luang Frabang provinces. They are consolidating their political and ad- ministrative authority in these areas without _effective resistance. The Pathet Lao and the Bloc capitals still claim Souvanna Phouma to be the legal Prime Minister. A government rivaling that at Vientiane has been installed at Xieng Khouang, with Khamsouk Keola act- ing as Premier while Souvanna remains out of the country, The Fathet Lao have begun See also, SNIE 63-60, “The Situation and Short- ees Outlook In Laos,” dated 6 December 1560; SNIE 63-2-60, “probable Communist Intentions in Laos,” dated 29 Deceniber 1960; and SNIE 55-61, “Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action With Respect to Laos,” dated 21 February 1961. ha) aoe Fs ‘i P co P PY Seah bce PR SRL FF THT, Retr, Oe So ei hg tae lt Da oe ah betas APR aE * : a oe 7 ek a 4 : ne eae as moet : SEC ET 6 to organize the territory under their control along Communist lines. 25. The Laotian Government of Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi is ineffective and has become increasingly corrupt. It is not a broadly representative government and its efforts to generate non-Communist support have been largely inept and unsuccessful. ‘The National Assembly delegates are for the most part apathetic, neither opposing the gov- ernment nor providing it strong support. Badly needed social and political reforra pro- grams have been pushed into the background by. the exigencies of the military situation. 26. The military situation in Taos has de- generated into sporadic civil war. Military action has been characterized by repeated Pathet Lao probing actions, Laotian Army withdrawsls, and subsequent regroupings. Since the Communist Pathet Lao-Kong Le forces seized the Plaine des Jarres in January they have concentrated rnuch of their strength in that area and appear to have initiated a major training effort. The logistic buildup has reached substantial proportions. The Soviet airlift into Laos, especially into Xieng Khouang province, continues at a high and sustained rate. Additional supplies are being brought in by truck from North Vietnam. Some North Vietnamese artillery crews are working with the Fathct Lao forces. In addi- tion North Vietnam is providing training as- sistance and tactical guidance. 37. The Lactian Government forces are supe- rior in number to the Pathet Lao and have a greater amount of equipment available to them. However, problems of internal security and transportation prevent them from con- centrating their strength. The Laotian Army is poorly led and in general Jacks a will to fight. It has been very slow to initiate any effective military operations and will be un- able to retake the Plaine des Jarres and Xieng Khouang in the near future. Outlook 28. Present Pathet Lao tactics appear to be to consolidate, politically and militarily, their positions in the north. However, the Paihet a, * RON sn Fe ge, des EP ong cy grr ee SNE eS TERY ENERO IH OE A A RTA CE I TOIT PCO, A ET LOR ome A 5 OR RAREST are SEGRE: v Lao has a greater military capability in both the Plaines des Jarres and Plateau des Bolovens areas than they have thus far chosen to exercise. They could sharply step up their military activities at any time and could em- ploy a variety of tactics. They could expand their attack on such government concentra- tions as Lueng Prabang with sizable forces or they could launch widespread guerrilla activ- ity throughout Laos. Southern Laos is par- ticularly vulnerable at this time to such guer- rilla activity. 29. A dramatic, though limited, victory by the Pathet Lao, or a series of local victories, could occur at any {ime. In turn, such a develop- ment could cause a collapse of the non-Com- munist position, lead to a general disintegra- tion of the Laotian Army, and to the establish- ment of a pro-Communist “neutralist” regime in Vientiane. 30. Assurning that the Laotian Army does not - Gissolve under military pressure or lose all its will to resist, it is possible that, in time, some _basis for negotiated settlement may be de- vised. However, a “solution” to the Laotian crisis has become a matter of contention among the major powers. Any agreement which would end the armed struggle in Laos and resolve the political impasse in that coun- try rests primarily in non-Laotian hands. B. South Vietnam 3 31. An extremely critical period for President Ngo Dinh Diem and the Republic of Vietnam lies immediately ahead. During the past six months the internal security situation has _ continued to deteriorate and has now reached _Serigus proportions. Communist North Viet- nam has stepped up its covert direction and _ support of the Viet Cong, its paramilitary arm in South Vietnam, and intensified its political and propaganda pressures on South Vietnam. During this same period, non-Communist po- litical opposition toe Diem and his regime has - developed mnarkedly, and there are increasing signs of dissatisfaction within the Vietnamese military establishment, Both factors were in- ‘Supplements SNIE 63.1-60, “Short-Term Trends ir, South Vietnam,” dated 23 August 1960. volved in the abortive coup d’etat of last No- vember. 32. The Internal Security Problem. Tne mili- tary phase of the North Vietnamese drive for “reunification” has been proceeding at a rising level since late 1959. Since that time, the size of Viel Cong guerrilla-terrorist apparatus in South Vietnam has increased greatly and now numbers approximately 8,000-10,000, as a result of infiltration and increased Jocal re- cruitment. Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Com- munist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied te all governinent authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in on the city. There has been an increase in guerrilla activity in the central highlands, notably in regions directly bordering on Laos. The guerrillas have increased their terrorist attacks on villagers and local officials. Oper- ating often in sizable groups of 30 to 80 or more, they have moved with growing boldness against the Vietnamese Army itself, Over 2,600 civilians, mostly governrnent officials and sympathizers, were assassinated or kidnapped by the Viet Cong in 1960. Despite growing Vietnainese Army aggressiveness and substan- tial casualties inflicted by the army, the Viet Cong guerrillas continue to retain the initia- tive in the field. 33. Political Problems, The deterioration in the position of the Diern government reached a new extreme in November when army para- troop officers joined forces with a number of civilian oppositionists in a narrowly defeated attempt to overthrow Diem. On the surface, Diern’s position appears to have improved somewhat since then. He has reasserted his control of the government, made some cautious moves toward government reform, and proceeded with plans for the presidential election to be held in April. He has taken action to improve the antiguerrilla capabilities we send 2S APRS aa hoes rakcerem en She SITE ee TAREE AE SRA a ene ma ee) men oat mn eh een eee onsen enon nee ON eal adele t SHER 8B of the army and stepped up military activities against the Viel Cong. However, the factors which gave rise to the coup attempt have not been seriously dealt with and still exist. Dis- content with the Diem government continues to be prevalent among intellectual circles and, to a lesser degree, among labor and business groups. There has been an increasing dispo- siticn within official circles and the army to question Diem’s ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Cormmunists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his toleration of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls. Moreover, the people in the countryside are becoming increasingly. disillusioned regarding the gov- ernment’s ability to protect them from depre- dations and taxation by the Viet Cong. 34. The Novernber coup attempt encouraged the North Vietnamese to strengthen their po- litical and propaganda drive against Diem. New efforts are being made by the Communists to stimulate “united front” action by individ- uals and groups in South Vietnam which are known to oppose Diem. The objective is to intensify and exploit anti-Diem sentiment, and to supplement their guerrilla activities with a political campaign against the regime. 35. The Vietnamese Army has also been af- fected by the present political situation. A significant part of the November coup group came from hitherto trusted army units. In view of this and the apparent hesitancy of some top military leaders to act quickly in his support, Diem is now more suspicious of the army as a potentially serious source of antigovernment activity. The coup attempt has probably opened the eyes of many army officers to their political potential. Outlook 36. The key issue facing the }iiem govern- rnent over the next six months arises from. the Communist internal threat. If the army is able to make substantial progress toward - subduing the Viet Cong guerrillas, the politi- cal position of the government will be substan- tially improved. However, if there is no dis- cernible improvement in the internal security situation and Diem continues to be arbitrary in dealing with the military and government leaders, their support for Diern will become increasingly uncertain. There would be grow- ing likelihood of a-definite split in the army and government leadership between those backing Diem and those opposed to him, Such a situation would substantially add to the regime’s instability and increase the pros- pect for another coup attempt. 37. Given Diem's precarious political situa- tion and the strength of Cornrnunist guerrilla and subversive pressures, we believe that the odds favor a second coup atternpt sometime in the next year or so. The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive opera- tions including “united front” efforts are di- rected toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup atternpt which occurs over the next year or so will originate arnong non-Communist elements, perhaps a combina- tion of disgruntled civilian officials and opposi- tionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt, If such a coup appeared to have good prospects of succeeding, various groups such as the sects and labor unions probably would join in. We believe that if this were to happen such a coup attempt would have a better than even chance of succeeding. 38. Any coup group not primarily sponsored and supported by the Communists would be likely to maintain South Vietnam’s pro-US orientation and to seek US help in resisting Viet Cong attempts to capitalize on the coup. The leaders of any anti-Diem coup originating within the present government or the army would probably maintain Vietnam's pro-US orientation. Nevertheless, Hanoi would seek to exploit the confusion attending a revolu- tionary change of government in South Viet- nam and it is uncertain that the army would be able to keep the situation from getting out of hand. \ 39. Diem’s removal from office would probably result in a scramble for power. Under such circumstances, Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho would seem to have a slightly better than COPY ™~ lyndon Bainss Johnson Tibrar a ee a a A mc a A Ba Reaeeeert | SbCRET 9 even chance of succeeding Diem. Tho is the constitutional suceessor. He is generally re- spected within the government and considered to be one of its most influential members. Moreover he has sore support within the army and he has been on good terms with two of Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Luyen and Roman Catholic Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc. However, Tho or any other successor would probably exercise less personal power than Diem, and would have to control or accommo- date to the power of the army which will al- most certainly play a major role in any new governinent. 40. The presidential election now scheduled for early April provides a potential occasion for explosive developments on the political scene. The Viet Cong almost certainly will attempt to exploit the confusion that normally -attends election campaigns in South Vietnam, and they may seek to force the governrnent to postpone the elections. They may attempt to activate their announced National Front for Liberatiow, publicly establishing it in Viet Cong-held territory in South Vietnam and offering support to all anti-Dierm nationalist elements. On the government side, members of Diem’s regime will probably tamper with _ the elections and as a result his victory may be an overwhelming one. If these efforts are blatant, major demonstrations and riots may occur in Saigon. c. Thailand 41. Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat came to power in 1957 through a military coup d’ctat and is the undisputed leader of the present -- ruling group. Throughout the course of his ~yule, Sarit has kept Thailand closely aligned with the US and the West, The US in turn has been instrumental in building up the Thai ~- military establishment (a major source of Sarit’s political strength) and in helping de- velop the ‘Chai economy. There is some dis- content with the existing political order, es- pecially among urban and educated groups. However, the majority of the Thai people, es- pecially those in the countryside, feel little concern with the political activitics in SECRET a SB a eee Bangkok, and tend to focus their loyalty on the King. 42. Political. The immediate course of po- litical events within Thailand hangs prirnarily upon Prirne Minister Sarit’s uncertain health. If Sarit should depart from the political scene because of incapacity or death, it is probable that General Thanorn Kittikachorn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, would succeed to the Premiership. Thanom, who served as Prime Minister for 10 months in 1958, has been named by Sarit as the heir ap- parent. He appears at this time to have the support of the powerful and ambitious Min- ister of Interior, General Praphat Charusa- thien. 43. Members of the middle grade officer eche- lon are dissatished with their present status and their share of the graft available to mem- bers of the regime. Another weakening of Sarit’s physical condition conceivably could encourage an attempt to grab power by some of these officers. 44. Sarit’s death or incapacity would almost certainly be followed by increasing tensions within the ruling military group. Latent dif- ferences between Generals Thanom and Pra- phat could develop into a scrious schism, In the event of a serious power struggle within the ruling group, prospects would be for a relatively brief period of government insta- bility, followed by the eventual assumption of power by one of the contending factions and the continuation of military control of the government essentially along present and past _ lines, 45, Foreign Policy. Thai foreign policy is highly sensitive to the Thai assessment of developments in the Far East, particularly those involving Laos, and of US reaction to these developments. Neither the present leadership nor any successor military ruling group is likely to divest itself of its close ties with the US and the West as long as it con- siders that these connections provide adequate assurance of Thailand’s survival as a free and independent nation. On the other hand, if Thai leaders should reach the conclusion that the US is either unwilling or unable to guaran- Corr ‘ 4 { . Iyndon Baines Johnson Library: i) SHELLL, 10 tee the security of the kingdom, they would coming active, At a time of unprecedented probably seek an accommodation with the Burmese rapprochement with Communist Communist Bloc. Thai society in general is China, US relations with Burma have become not sympathetic to communism; Thailand’s inflamed over the issue of the Chinese Na- traditional enemy is China, Communist or tionalist irregulars in Burma. non-Comrmunist. Nonetheless, Thailand’s for- eion policy is pragmatically based, and the Thai would react to a real or apparent swing of the balance of power in favor of the Corn- munists in the Far East, 48. Political. The 1960 elections were a great personal triumph for U Nu who returned to head a government with a two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies, U Nu’s personal , prestige throughout Burma rernains high 46. Although US-Thai relations rernain close, despite growing factional dissension within developments since the August 1960 Kong Le — his own Union Party and despite accuraulating coup in Laos have at times strained the rela- | unresolved political problems, many of them tionship. ‘he Thai leaders not only consider involving the ethnic minorities. The most im- aneutralist and Communist-influenced Laosa = mediate threat to the stability of Nu’s govern- threat to Thai security, but also view US ment lies in the increasing factionalism within actions in J.aos as a test of US intentions and the Union Party, and the scramble among strength in Southeast Asia. They have almost competing groups for control of party ma- certainly undertaken a private reassessment chinery and organization. U Nu will probably of their unequivocal alignment with the US beable to avert an open break in the party, but and the West, and they have made gestures _ internal disputes will probably continue. The toward the USSR which were probably in- unsettled condition of the Union Farty will tended as a warning to the US. Although continue to detract from the government’s they have apparently concluded that the time _ ability to act decisively. has not arrived for any significant policy shift, : there is a clear hardening of attitude toward the US among a number of top Thai leaders, including Sarit, who believe that their co- operation with the US has not been fully recornpensed. A perennial source of irrita- tion to the Thai is the US policy of dispensing cornparatively large amounts of aid to neu- - vals, particularly to neighboring Cambodia. Ffiorts to convince Sarit and most other gov- ernment leaders that US assistance to neu- trals, even Cambodia, benefits the Free World, including -‘Thailand,. have met with little success, 49. Probably the most difficult problem con- fronting U Nu arises from his election cam- paign promise to make Buddhism the state re- ligion. This has caused growing unrest among many Christian and non-Buddhist tribal groups in Burma, particularly the Ka- chins in the north. There has been a con- siderable resurgence of political activity by Communist and left-wing elernents since U Nu returned to power and dropped the army-im- posed measures directed against them. The Burmese political scene will probably be marked by increasing turbulence and insta- bility over the next year. However, U Nu will probably continue to head the government at D. Burma least for the next year. 47. Over the past year, since control of the 50. The Army. During late 1960 considerable government was returned to Prime Minister pressure built up within the army for new Nu and the politicians by General Ne Win and political action to reinstitute army control. the Burmese military, economic and social ‘This pressure was leading to a serious con- conditions in Burma have generally declined. frontation between General Ne Win and a Frice levels have begun to rise again, local number of army political activists. Ne Win crime rates are up, and the security of the wanted no change in the political situation, countryside has worsened. The ruling Union at least until the China-Burma border de- Party is showing signs of coming apart at the marcation now underway was completed, Seams, and local Communists are again be- while the other army group bsligved that a | Tyndon Baines Johnson Library RE-ORISS. . so ncaa ON here at a a Adie ae lg: Dat Cte eat oe eee pe Beale alk SECRET 11 new rove against the government was needed immediately. The matter apparently was settied in February 1961 when General Ne Win summarily directed the resignation or reas- signraent of a substantial number of the army's most senior officers. An atternpt by these officers to counter Ne Win’s action prob- ably would not succeed. 51, We believe that Ne Win will continue to dominate army policy and that he will not for the time being choose to involve the army directly in national political affairs. Nis at- titude could change if U Nu’s party frag- mented and serious political instability ap- peared to be threatening the country. If that happened Ne Win would probably move to shore up U Nu’s position and effect some work- ing arrangement with him which would in- crease army participation in government and administration. 52. Foreign policy. The Nu government has raade no major changes in Burina’s traditional foreign policy of nonalignment in the cold war and of general cooperation with the neu- tralist Asian countries. However, owing partly to the personal initiative of U Nu— - who strongly desired to reaffirm “peaceful co- existence” as the cornerstoné of Burmese neu- tralism and to complete the settlement of the Sino-Burmese border question initiated by General Ne Win—Burma has established con- siderably more friendly diplomatic relations and closer economic ties with Communist China than have existed heretofore. In Janu- ary 1961, Burma signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation providing for a Chinese Communist long-term interest- free loan of about $84 million to finance Chi- ~ nese equipment and technical advice for Bur- mese economic development projects. This loan agreement, the largest Communist China has offered to any non-Communist country, is to come into force in October 1961, with repayment over a 10-year period beginning in 1971. $3. Utilization of Communist China’s prof- fered assistance in Burma’s Four-Year Plan tay give Feiping substantial influence over the general orientatioa of Burma's economic planning efforts. Closer Sino-Burmese trade relations will probably develop if, as expected, Burma concludes trade arrangements for in- creased rice exports to China during the next months. However, in keeping with Burma’s avowed policy of accepting aid from both Blocs, the Nu government will probably con- tinue to draw on existing US grant and loan aid. Burma will probably also seek economic, and perhaps military, assistance from the So- viet Union sometime in the near future. 54, US-Burimese relations have recently de- teriorated sharply as a result of developments involving the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in northeast Burma. Acting under a secret agreement providing for joint action to pro- tect the teams engaged in demarcating the Sino-Burmese border, the Chinese Commu- nists launched an attack into Burra against the Nationalist units in December 1960. The Burmese Army later joined in. By February 1961, the forces of the two countries had suc- ceeded in capturing the major Nationalist bases and driving most of the irregulars across the Mekong into Laos and Thailand, although this was apparently done at the cost of severe casualties to the Burmese Army, Substan- tial quantities of Nationalist arms and equip- ment, much of it US made, were captured by the Burmese, As news of the fighting and the capture of US-manufactured arms in the hands of the Nationalist irregulars became known, an army-inspired press campaign bepan to grow, aimed in part at the Taiwan regime but chiefly at the US as the country primarily responsible. The fact that Chinese Communist troops helped the Burmese Army in the attack on the irregulars has been kept from the Burmese public and U Nu has pub- licly and emphatically denied the presence of any Chinese Communist troops on Burmese soil. 55. In February, the Burmese Government brought to the attention of the UN the matter of the Nationalist irregulars and their con- tinning support from Taiwan. Whipped up by the press campaign, student and labor groups have led anti-US riots in Rangoon and Mandalay. A number of the US advisers to the Burmese Army have been requested to leave prior to the expiration of th@Pifours in Iynmdon Baines John3on Tbr, SECRET tty ampere toa ee TL y gErernrT 12 April. US relations with the Burmese mili- tary, which once were quite close, have suf- fered a sharp decline. Although U Nu prob- ably wishes to avoid serious damage to US- Burmese relations, he probably will seek to exploit public and army feeling over the sup- posed US role in supporting the Chinese Na- tionalist irregulars in order to force the liqui- dation of the problem posed by the irregulars. To this end the Burmese Government will probably continue a generally anti-US line over the next several months. E. Carnbodia 56. Cambodia is dorninated by Prince Noro- dorn Sihanouk, the 39-year old ruler who has been variously King, Prime Minister, and Chief _of State of his country. Whatever his posi- tion at any given time, Sihanouk is in fact the center of power within Cambodia. More- over, he fully controls Cambodian foreign policy. As his views of the world scene have changed, Cambodia's relations with the East and West have changed. His dominance has been responsible for the many sharp swings, right and left, of Cambodia’s foreign policy in the past. The one constant throughout Sihanouk’s rule has been his conviction that the key to Carnbodia’s domestic stability and international security lies in following a policy of neutrality. 57. Although Sihancuk professes neutrality, several factors have combined at times to make him incline toward the Soviet Bloc. These factors include Cambodia’s proximity to Cornraunist China; Sihancuk’s apparent feeling that communism and Communist China represent the ‘wave of the future,” par- ticularly in Asia; his fear of Communist strength and ruthlessness, particularly that -of China; and Cambodia’s traditional enmity with Thailand and Vietnam, accentuated in modern days by their differing foreign policies. __ At the same time, Sihanouk takes great care | to assure the Soviet Bloc that his acceptance of US or French military assistance does not modify his basic policy of neutrality. ~~ §8. In domestic policy, Sihanouk attempts to keep left-wing and Communist influences in ‘check. From time to time he has suppressed domestic Comrnunist activity and Communist- oriented newspapers. Sihanouk’s fear of in- ternal subversion, both Communist and West- ern, causes him to rnaintain a high state of internal vigilance. This fear, and that of losing Western econoric and military aid, have probably been the main reasons for his continued refusal to accept military aid from the Soviet Bloc. 59. Although Sihanouk has been careful to watch out for subversion in its militant forms, he has been lenient in other fields where the danger is less immediate. Thus Communist propaganda, despite occasional suppression, is widespread and is having a serious impact on the increasing number of literate end edu- cated Cambodians, Bloc economic aid is well publicized and contributes to an effective pro- Cornmunist impact. Sihanouk himself, by his public tirades against the West at times of tension with Thailand and South Vietnam, has also contributed to this impact. His desire to enlist the support of leftist-oriented edu- cated youth leads him to overlook the po- tential danger they pose to his neutralist policy abroad and nationalist policy at home. While Sihanouk may be justifiably confident at this time of his ability to control or direct public opinion, he or his successor may in time have to be responsive to a public opinion increasingly faverable to the Communist Bloc, an opinion which he helped to create and permitted to develop. 60. Sihanouk will continue to dominate the political scene in Cambodia for the foreseeable future. Economie considerations are not likely to provoke significant internal political pressures. Sihanouk will continue to steer Cambodia along a middle course, committed to neither major power group and seeking aid and assistance from ke“ Within the limits of his neutralist policy, oiianouk will turn his smiles or tirades toward the West or the Bloc and back apain, according to his {ccling for the situation. The balance between East and West in Southeast Asia is a most important determinant for Sihanouk, and this could be affected greatly by developments ing§jpyLao- tian crisis. Lyndon Raines Johnson Liz egress ce ser nme mere Eras a 4 eh se REET REL OORT TT ’ ‘ F ‘ thes ARE MIR mI REA RE Ht SE SOM a OHH GED PIERO ** 7 BE f ‘ ' a ‘ ears -a strong majority in Parliament. LAL Ee Spe Lo ARE ER OT i DS Be Bh ee Pibelsaea eer Sh pintcsa eins 6 peed ae ie ‘safaeS Macs prim, oe maltaee at aot Pan ea me rere oe net ee oe ad pee ile wore es &&-6-R-EP 13 61. Although Sihanouk would probably adjust quite readily to almost any resolution of the Laotian crisis, the solution he would almost certainly prefer would be a neutral belt com- posed of Laos and Cambodia, guaranteed by the great powers. He would not like to see Laos under Comraunist domination, but his sympathies clearly He with the neutralist course Souvanna Phourna has advocated for Taos. Sihanouk probably places Boun Oum and Phoumi in the satne general category as Diern and Sarit, his major antagonists in the Southeast Asia area. Sihanouk’s propasal for a 14-nation conference to negotiate a solution to the Laotian crisis was @ serious effort on his part to seck an end to a situation which he regards as a serious one for Cambodia. F, Malaya 62. Malaya is one of the most prosperous na- tions in Asia and has a stable and conservative government. Under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, the ruling Alliance Party has Rahman has shown considerable ability since Malaya gained independence in 1957 in managing the government in a competent and efficient manner. AS a Inember of the British Com- monwealth, Malaya has generally pursucd a pro-Western foreign policy and has shown little sympathy for Communist causes. It is further tied to the West by the Anglo-Ma- layan Defense Agreement, concluded at the time of andependente, which specified that the UK wiil provide assistance for Malaya’s armed - forces and for its external defense. Although Prime Minister Rahman has recently advo- cated the admission of Communist China to the UN along with an independent Formosa, Malaya has refused to establish diplomatic relations with tnembers of the Communist Bloc.” 63. The 12-year long state of emergency re- sulting from the armed Communist insurrec- ~~ tion was officially ended by the government on 31 July 1960. The rebel force has now been reduced to a few hundred individuals confined largely to the Malaya-Thailand border region, and Communist tactics have Shifted from armed iasurrection to clandestine political organization and the penetration of labor and student groups. The Communists hope thereby to build a base for political and national front activities. b4. Political linplications of Communal Ri- valry. The racial cornposition of Malaya is its most. important political determinant. Only 50 percent of the Federation’s popula- tion is Malay; 36 percent is Chinese, and 11 percent Indian and Pakistani, Although the Chinese and Malays have lived in relative harmony siacs fadependence, racial antagon- isms are nonetheless deep-seated. The ener- getic Chinese, who control much of the na- tion’s economic life, tend to look down on the Malays as indclent, inefficient, and culturally inferior, Many still regard mainland China as their mnotherland, an attitude which has been enhanced by China’s growing interna- tional importance. The predominantly Mus- lim Malays in turn regard the Chinese as pork-eating foreigners, atheists, and economic exploiters. - 65. The economic and cultural differences are further complicated by the fact that, by con- stitutional mandate, the Malays are assured of control over the civil and security services and are given special consideration in land development as well. The constitution estab- lishes Malay as the national language but provides for the use of English as an official language for 10 years (i.e., until 1967). It requires for citizenship that non-Malays have a knowledge of Malay and meet certain resi- dence requirements. These conditions tend to discriminate against the Chinese. . There is a clear tendency among the younger elements of both racial proups toward radicalism—the Malays attracted to extremist nationalistic movements and the Chinese youth attracted to left-wing causes and groups, The older, more moderate Chinese and Malay leaders, who now dominate the government and the major political parties, appear to be unable to halt the trend toward political polarization. Any serious infringement of Chinese economic status would sharply increase Chinese resent- ment of Malay domination and thus accelerate this trend. Although friction CtWeen the Malays and the ChijuatoniBodmtiaudahng onl bra ~ | SECRs-F | id probably spark occasional outbursts of vio- lence, a major communal showdown is not likely for several years. Over the next year, Malaya’s prosperity will probably continue to submerge the nation’s racial differences. 66. Relations with Singapore. Singapore, which became a serniautonomous state within the British Commonwealth in 1959, wants to merge with Malaya, but its advances are not welcomed by the Federation’s Malays who fear ‘Chinese dornination. The Chinese, who are jin an overwhelming majority in Singapore, would constitute 44 percent of the population in a combined unit while Lhe Malays would be reduced to about 43 percent of the total. Initial Malay suspicion of the left-wing People’s Action Party government formed in Singapore in 1959 has added to the difficulties between the twoareas. Asa result, the Feder- ation has sought to eliminate its historic de- pendence upon Singapore's financial and part _ facilities by setting up its own. Singapore's economic and political prospects, without ac- _cess to the Malayan “hinterland,” would be extremely poor over the long run. 67. At present, there is a trend among top officials of the Federation toward a more “sympathetic approach to Singapore’s prob- lems, largely as a result of their growing _Tealization of the threat which instability in Singapore would pose for the Federation. Representatives of the two governments have been mecting from time to time to explore the prospects for a limited common market. There are, in addition, some indications that the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Min- ister of the Federation have been exploring the possibility of a limiled merger, but one ““ which would preserve Malay hegemony. Al- though no striking developments are likely during the coming year, there will probably be closer cooperation between the two areas ~~ than in the recent past. Over the long run there raay be a significant move toward a confederation of Malaya and Singapore that would also include Brunei, Sarawak, and British Borneo. 68. Economic Vulnerabilities. Although the -- Federation of Malaya is the most prosperous nation in Southeast Asia, the economy is t heavily dependent on rubber and tin, which account for 75 percent of the nation’s exports and finance the import of essential foodstuffs. About 60 to 70 percent of the total population is dependent on rubber for a livelihood. The prices which Malaya receives for its rubber are largely deterrnined ty non-Malayans. Since’ rubber trees take at least six years to mature, production cannot be shifted quickly in the event of a price collapse. Malaya is still pros- perous, but hard times for the rubber industry, as a consequence of competition from syn- thetic rubber, for example, could result in a generally depressed economic situation. This in turn could bring to the surface many of the Federation’s now dorrnant political and social problems. However, the demand for natural rubber is expected to remain high during the coming year. Consequently, no serious de- cline in the Federation’s economy is envisaged during this period. IV. PROBABLE EFFECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OF MAJOR COMMUNIST GAINS iN LAOS OR SOUTH VIETNAM 69. There is decp awareness among the coun- tries of Southeast Asia that developments in the Laotian crisis, and its outcorne, will have a profound impact on their future. The gov- ernments of the area tend to regard the Lao- tian crisis as a symbolic test of intentions, wills, and strengths between the major powers of the West and the Communist Bloc. They fear the possibility that the hostilities, by mis- calculation or design, may spread to their own territory. In one way or another they all regard the US as responsible in large degree for the present state of affairs in Laos, The governments of South Vietnam and Thailand, for example, are convinced that if the US had given the anti-Communist elements bold and prompt support, the Laotian crisis would not have reached serious proportions and would long ago have been resolved. However, Diern and Sarit both reserve their most severe criti- cism for the attitudes of France and the UK. They believe that the two European powers have restrained the US and made decisive ac- tion by SEATO unlikely if not impossible. The governments of Cambodia, Budeey and Lyndon Baines Johnson Lis SSHGRET BE Tag ijucns Wa BE eo ig Fat oh Te TS Sy AM TERI CRO EE ETON, H . ‘ Se cine a Cen lier za Unt eel dd oak ' Cran Vi a be) fie ‘ a ate aE LE SR EIT EMTS I POE ES ORE RED) Se erEGRET 18 Malaya favor a political scttlement and a neutralist Laos. 70. In short, the general attitudes of the gov- ernments of mainland Southeast Asia are split along the lines of their general foreign policy orientation: those in close alignment with the US favor stronger measures to assure at least a non-Cormmunist and preferably an anti- Communist, western-orientated regime in Laos; and the neutralist governments, as well as Malaya, favor a neutralist but not Com- runist-dominated government. The neu- tralist governments, recognizing that the course of events in Laos will be determined - by the major powers instead of the opposing Laotian factions, favor some form of interna- tional political agreement to end the crisis, _guch as_UN intervention, a new conference among the powers which negotiated the Geneva agreements, or a broader international conference such as that proposed by Sihanouk. Thajland and South Vietnam would welcome some form of UN representation in Laos, but with a limited function, ie., to stop Bloc aid to the Pathet Lao-Kong Le forces. 71, Cambodia and Burma would view with satisfaction an international political settle- ment of the Laotian crisis which provided for & neutral Laos and reduced the ‘possibilities that the armed conflict would spread. How- ever, both countries realize that a continuing strong US posture and influence in the area is necessary to keep in check Chinese Com- munist expansionist aspirations and to enable Cambodia and Burma to maintain flexibility in their neutralist policies. Consequently, they would be alarmed if Laos were to be Jost to the Communists under conditions which would seem to indicate that the US position in - the area had been seriously weakened. 72. The loss of Laos to the Communists or per- haps even the division of the country, would almost certainly incline the Thai toward ac- cornmodation to Communist power in South- __.east Asia. Depending upon where the line Inight be drawn, a divided Laos would pose almost as many difliculties for the Thai as would a completely Communist Laos, particu- larly if Thailand shared a common border With the. Communist-controlled portion of Laos. A predominantly Comrounist-con- troied Laos would vitally threaten South Vict- narn's independence: it would greatly extend the Communist frontiers with South Vietnam; it would bring significantly greater Commu- nist military power to bear on the crucial Sai- gon defense complex; and it wou!d greatly facilitate Cornrnunist infiltration and subver- sion. The close proximity of a Cormmunist state would xeake more difficult Western efforts to starch up local resistance. In short, either a divided Laos or a predominantly Com- munist Laos would severely damage the US position and its influence in Thailand and South Vietnain. 73. The future course of all of the countries of Southeast Asia would be strongly influenced by the actual circumstances in which the loss or division of Laos had occurred as well as the © local appraisal of the attitude and actions of the US in response to the situation. The ex- tent to which these countries would go in re- sisting Bloc pressures or in withstanding local Communist threats would depend in great de- gree on whether they still assessed that the US could stem further Communist expansion - in the area, They would feel more keenly than before a strong temptation to take a neu- tral position between the two power blocs, even though they recognized that the US is the only country with sufficient power to oppose the Communist Bloc in the area. Al- though they probably would be deeply dis- illusioned regarding US resolution after the loss or division af Laos, they would nonetheless welcome demonstrations of US firmness and might in .response modify their appraisal of their own future in due course. 94. Although the Communist threat to South Vietnam has reached serious proportions, the chances of a Communist takeover in the next year or so are considerably less than they are in Laos. Nevertheless, Peiping and Hanoi almost certainly attach greater importance to their efforts in South Vietnam than they do to their efforts in Laos. US prestige and policy are particularly deeply engaged in South Viet- nam. Diem’s policy of close alignment with the US is on trial in_the, current OF All . Tynd SECREL. i ERG lhe elk i ing a Sapien RR At ammeter nine NTI NY Ba ORD Mi EibonwEe te ET ESI RO RGR SP SRLS IN ore 7 RET er ere oe ee ae on Baines Johnson Idt: , Sg ci A Om Re, eo SSE T 16 countries of the area would attach great irn- to fali to the Communists or be forced to swing portance to a failure of the South Vietnam — toward neutralism, the impact upon the coun- Government to cope successfully with the tries of Southeast Asia would be similar in _ sising tempo of Communist subversion and kind but considerably more severe than that “armed insurrection. If South Vietnam were resulting from the loss or division of Laos. COPY Iyndon Baines Johnson Ia’. BROREE i.