CERTRAL THTELLIGENCE AGENCY 8 September 1964 ~ SUBJECT: SHIE 53-G6h: CHANCES FOR A STABLE GOVERMMENT IN SOUTH VIEGTAM _ . THE PROBLEM Zo assess the chances for th2 erergence of a stable non- ———- == Communist regime in South Vietnam. COICILSTON | Scns A -- At present the odds are against the emergence of a stable See ee fikeg verrnent capable of effectively prosecuting the var in South " ""Vietnom. Yet the situation is not hoveless: if a vieble regime volves fron the present confusion it may even gein strength from the release of Jong-pent pressures end the ecbering effect of the current crisis. Of the men on the scene, General Kh —— ___. _+.__-:: probably hes the best chance of mustering sufficient support to | t - restore a reasonably stable end vorkeble government. GROUP, bach eo Laphrere downey i457 e$857 1S deolissifica Declassfied by C28 252-——— ELC wip. ‘iy . date ped at 6 @ scrertacime Fe Ty | LYN DON BAINES Jonson LIBRARY e * e aati DISCUSSION 1. he dcvefell of the Diem regime released poverful political forces previously suppressed or underground. Religious grovys, princimlly the Buddhists, the students, Jabor, ond the Giverse ezray of intellectuals end peliticdeng both at hone end $n exile moved qaiczly to voice their aspiretions end nake than- seives felt. These cross currents vere reflected vithin the military esteblichtert, particnlerly enong the sentor officers. whe struggle anovz these various forces can be expected to === =. continue until en eccepteble balance is struck, oue group proves strong enough to doaimate the others, or -the febric of centrai —--. goverment is torn apart. “@- Whe convulsions of recent weexs have surfaced and exacer- “>>> ——“yated these deep-seated divisions and strains.. They have “inten- sificd reciprocal suspicions between the military leadership and segnents of the populace, et least In urban areas, increased __- disunity vithir. the militery estcblishrent itself, ani prodvce@ serious Giscora, including religious etrife, smong the civilicns. The present situation is far nore serious then that of Yoverber 1963, for the Vict Cong ere now stronger, end in 1983. popular enthusiasa over Bien's ouster gave his iImuediate ‘guccessors e degree of generel sugpert end period of grace the pracentus hazy goverrment does not have. Furthermore, the events ee COPY « * 7 6 Fe LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY gto epee ss rere maces aif ten of Pe Aan RR ( 1 Se OK LAL ud — of the past nine months have tinevitebly increased sentiments of wer veeriness ond frustration, end probably caused “neutralisia” (i.e., an end to the constant struggle) to appear increasingly ettractive to many. Also, the factors inherent‘in the us/GVN rela- tionship have caused some rise in anti-Americcn foeling, which probably will grov. 3. The situation is fragile ani walnerable to attack or exploitation from ell sides. It e?fords obvious opportunities to eny person or group reckless or embitious enough to undertake a coup. There are indications of such plotting by at least tvo groups: disgrmtied Dai Viets allied with officers vho presently comand key .litery units, and another group influenced by ~ CoLonel Pham Kgoe Theo. Among the civilian population some Buddhist and Catholic leaders appear to be trying to avoid new =" vtolence, but the ssectre of religious strife has not been laid _to rest.— Recent Buddhist deronds have alarmed the Catholics and _... . militants of either persuasion ray provoke fresh crises. Wirile Sone civilian politicans wish to ple a constructive role, moet - remain more concerned vita perconal pover and prestige than national unity. The students seen to be calning dem, but this volatile group yevains vulnereble to manipniation fron verious SS ? including the Viet Cong end, perhavs, the French. PO CON FE ee ee toe © COPY LYNDON es 5 JOHNSON LIBRARY ME @ eco eres geet ee ts eee, s SR Se A re s & e a . crisis over goversuental arrongerents, however, there is the question of k, The present governnental arrangements are likely to undergo several changes curing the next few weekse The shaky solu- ticn evolved anid riot ond discord -- a sixty-doy caretaker govera- went headed by en ostensible triunvirate of rival generels -- vas yatently a stepgap. Sone other orranzecerts will be tried -- perhaps in ecanection with the proposed National Congress, Beyond the imasdiate whether any stable regine can emerre, cap ble of effectively prosecuting the var. On present evidence, chances of this out- ome must be rated as less than even. 5. The situation in South Vietnem is so fluid and complex, ~-hovever, that those developnents vhich appear most likely will rot necessarily occur -- as, indeed, they have not on many occasions in toth ancient an@ recent Vietnamese aaa Ag There is a chence, even if it be slight, that the experiences of the last week or so msy ultimately prove salutery, that the situation had to get vorse before 1t could get better. In the political chaos and conflict, some longstanding pressures have been released, , sone smoldering Prielences end quarrels have been aircd and possibly encliorated, and the dengers implicit in continued arift have _been rade more real, It is not Impossible that acroit leader- - shin could turn ShESe conditivas to edventeze In convincing -&. nN NEA eer ane mae tt mm RE > en i Sen en ne ee mre eee Wie oC 608 em On oe ewes © eee arate oe SARS SEND ER SH AO Sars me £ 7 pare spirk ge er 4 ~ ry oo LYNDON oe Joxttson LIBRARY. Sp Sees eee a . a; © . « nS aE ecm involved in the present situation are gbscure.* It is not clear _ Weakness in the face of Budéhist and student disorder. On the other hand, his manifest reluctance to use force against pro- $nfluential figures of the need for national unity under avail- able leaders, inperfect as they mey be. 6. The real relotionships of the persons and groups how much pover General Khernh actually reteins or what role he will play in forthcoming weeks. In seme respects, recent events beve damaged him politically. At least ecte of his military’ Cn nn ce emeanemananammnntanaiitiedada colleagnes are Oovicutly unhappy at vhat they regard as his testing civiliens may ley to rest longstanding civilian suspicicrs that he is a neo-Diemist emcious to reverse the ver- ~ Aiet of Kov exber 1963 and restore a Can Lao dictatorship. His ee willingness to stand alone end unarmed amidst demon- etrating crowds von him personel respect. Te In the context of present realities Khanh probably has a better, chance than any other pbstous figure of providing Ris success in this venture, hovever, is fer from assured. Even the ‘leadership eround vhich a stable govermrent could be buflt. if he himself shovs the necessary astuteness and villingness ’ LL LOT ORES ot RR RIN A 2 NE A I I NN “enuY POM men oe sip ve eminem IY Mtoe bse ta FASTENER EOL et Oe Ue le GW tnt ap eaten ee, panes ree rena ne er Sateen na COPY s LYNDON BAli JOUNSON LiBeaRy te stearate eae dee ed get, enim, é . * cE € He . to tackle the task his success vill depend to 9 great degree on the willingress of other influential figures (e.g-., General Khien, General. Hinh, end Tri Quanz) to lend him support or, et ee A ninimim, to refrain from working ectively for his damfell. _..-.-. Gensrel Minh in varticular probably retains enough prestige so that e goverment which did not have his participation, or et least his approval, vould have considerably lessened chences z ___ then a government in which Khanh ploys the peramount role. Some new fimure may erise or some elready prominent ‘personality __ hey prove to have hidden talents or unsuspected support. How- ever, at the moment every likely alternative candidate has individuel drevtecks or enough knoun opposition to cast serlous doubt on his ability to provide unifying lcedership. Several groups or figures seem strong enough to exercise vhat amounts to a ge facto veto in the business of creating e government, Although it is possible that soue individual or faction my succeed in overthrowing the present government, none +-~ ieee than Fhath -- presently seems capable of holding powere ree _ . .... 9. The longer the present vastable situation lasts, the __mpre eifficult it will be to fori & governzent which can Gis i 1 of survival. ~ 8. ‘There are, of course, several possibilities other | | SOE SE Cae OW EF One ieee ee oles So ae cast (ect Sig sete et eS Tae a ee ee ae 3 ys ieee — cele COPY. : | LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY Me fete eset pee * . . . +e z * increase, together with the danger that a loosely organized coalition vould energe vhich could teke advantage of frustration end var weariness to seek a neutralist solution. In the pro- Jonged ebsence of firm central direction from Saigon, the morale end effectiveness of indivicval unit cormenders in the field will decline, and there is even the Ganger that some might make “their own accommodations vith the Commmist enemy. There is e@lso a chence that sone province or region vill secede, and eae a --_. {here ere alreaty rumors of SCparatist tencencies in Huce 20. On the other hend, except for tensions in Hue, there ~~ 4s es yet Little sign of the imminerce of such dire develop- nerts.-- Furthermore, in veighing the situation in South Vietnan it is inportent not to focus exclusive attention on events in urven arces. During the past month, the war in the provinces hes been carrying on, the amy shows no signs of slackening ee its efforts end, indeed, has recently scored tvo major successes. ~~ Inga officials have yrobcbly edopted the traditional Vietnenese yeit end see attitude rather then taking actions which might ° preserve even the appeararce of unity and determination. In : such circunstences, neutralist sentiment vould almost certainly gue jeopardize their ovn position. Prolonged discord in the cities CE 4 EO are OF HA ON ew IES &. 2 nen 1, a q | j -_ k i i. : LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ae ote es ee te 2 OES .@ * « ‘a . « ( oR CCT a Hie ( : will inevitably effect ‘the rural pacification effort, tut so : fer the Micited oceentun’ which the counterinsurgency effort bad in the provinces h:s not diwinished, 11. The Viet Cong obviously are not indifferent to South Vietnam's current troubles. Hanol and Viet Cong propaganda emphasizes that the Commmnists expect victory to come prinarily from South Vietnazese political feilures end instability. There yhich led to urban upheaval, but the Cormunists have almost certainly been actively encouraging discord end violence (eleven _of those arrested as directly responsible for the worst of recent disorders in Saigon were cleimed ty the police to be known vc agents). ‘Militarily, recent weeks have been marked by an actual decline in VC attacks, though this "luli" is probably a normal "phase end there are signs thet the VC may now be preporing to ‘step up their ectivity. Judging from past experience, it will =... -.-_ eke sone tine for the VC to ready themselves to teke full j- advantage of recent developments, Also, the Communists may wish ae to_avoid the risk of increasing the obvious VC threat to a point See oe -yhere it night unify anti-Commumists presently engaged in intexnecine political strife. H 4 i | i | ers is no evidenee that the Viet Cong triggered the recent actions | esawe® 4ge eure Ot ae Ocoee qwloune eS a CR LO LTCC OER: = erRnTT | flerenNp ne Sn tm—penenenee” Sntue rater —R Pe TP HNRNP sei i, = a a enenmnmanenmmnnaamnenmntanile Silat nal COPY. LYNDON BAINES JOHNS EO dee se ee a ON LIB “* fa we - « cay RE aot oe eg a 12. Some of the recent egitation against Kharh's govern- ment has head enti-Amcrican un@ertones. In same circles there is e belief thet the US prodécd Khanh Into atterpting to eliminate “Minh ab chief of state and Into resiming the kind of tight con- trols formerly exercised by Dien. Minh himself is manifestly resentful of vhat he regards as US undercutting of his posttion (though Khanh too has been uneasy about vhat he considers US enieavors on Minh'e behalf). There has been a groving anti- Aaerteen feeling enong sone Catholics vho blame the US for Diea's overthrow and resent vhat they consider US favoriticnm of the Buddhist cause. In sone militery quarters (e.g., General _ Kaien) end probably in some civilien circles as well there is resentrent at what is inevitably viewed as US "meddling" in internal Vietnomesee affairs. 33. Cormaaist --‘and possibly also French -- egents have enccuraged and exploited anti-US sentinents. The idea is aleo being cirevlated thet South Vietnem is really a battlefield on which tvo elien powers, the US end Cocuunist China, are waging var by proxy. It is ltkely that enti-Aericon sentiment will grow. AEE ns AONE Ftd ae no ete meet Ree ne aesent nie em me nt { os PECTS ee Ure OG me GIR ee felines & Cee EE EEE A Cory. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIGRAR 68 gees sito rsag ey iiahaiaitedaiieneaaaidiataeainrmatan EER ANNEX POLITICALLY INFLUENTIAL INDIVILUALS AND PRINCTPAL POWER FACTORS IN SOUTH VIEINAM i. General Neuyen Khanh: Ehanh, who remained titular Frenier ard a nember of the ruling triunvirate in the governmental _ structure devised on 23 August, hos come ovt of seclusion and taken over the reins of control agzin -- at least temporerily. Qn 1 September, leading rilitery officers swore allegiance and JOHNSON LIBRARY LYNDON BAINES te femroco mes 99 eee e 6 . * ° * ide ace * « . ANNEX called Yhenh a “US punpet", end seid he vas tired of having the fmericens peddle in internal Vietnamese affairs. His degree of influence and authority in the military establishment gives him con- - siderable political pover, but he yrebably has too meny poverful ogponents to be able to serve as the head of a stable povernuent. a. Cther lilitery Figures: The military establishnent still holds the key to stability in South Vietnam, but its leaders nov ere probably shaken by en avareness that they cannot dictate to a recalcitrant whlic. Furthermore, the milltery renains fection: alized around vorious generals. Most of the. genexals, including the three discussed above, may prefer to bide their time while trying to voxk out a base of pover or a political alliance vith various groups. ‘There is a good chance, hovever, that “gore nilitery faction -- the Dei Viets, perhaps with Khicn, or _ Hou, or others -- rsy try to seize control by a military coup. | \ iia ‘¢eonstant Intriguers such as Colonel Phew Egoc Thao, General 6. Zhe Delat Generals: Generals Le van Kim, Tran ven Don, | Ton thet Dinh, and Mai huu Xuen -- the quartet arrested when Khanh oo = hidelines. Kharh's ettexpt to have then participate in the -Hilitery Revolutionary Committee meetings of 26 and 27 August was ~ Ab « tool: over tn January 1054 -- still secu to be on the political t ERE CRE ar BE ek SR ee eee oo, , COPY: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY We geckos pen eet a ee tng a oe . * e * 4 voted down by e majority of the MRC. Nevertheless, there ere still friends end forner vroteges of these officers vho feel they i | have been unjustly trzated end the fact that their status has not really ocen resolved to anyone's entire satisfaction constitutes “@ continuing political irritent, especially in the military establish- ment. If, instead of cooperating, the present yerumount generals (especially Kherh, Khien,end Minh) shovld knock each other out of the ring, the Delet quartet (particulorly Kim or Don) might assume : & more active role. ‘They are unlikely to lend much support to Kharh, _ but might well form en ellience with Minh, particulorly if the object of thet alliance vere to unseat Kharh. 7. Meerven Xmwe Conh: Vice Prenier Uguyen Xuan Oenh, a Sone re eng gee Se a ? === Kheth's absence, now seens to have step, ed down, but could still. . | | wo Fae Fo Marverd-treined economist who served as "eeting premier" in . | pee . energe In a key position. Garh is a technically conpetent ednin- istratox not known to be allied with any political or military | fection. As such, he may prove to be a neutral figure vho can keep th: government machinery running until the situation is eccehos stabilized. Qarh is probably deemed acceptable to the Americans 2 although Generel Khanh personally docs not like hides | Oerh's Political ebilities eve questionable, end he seems unlikely to emerge es a real leader. SAS ad . eG Cote Lan BREN Kee cramer te ne acer pens we im ernment ee i CUPY. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY MES oti see, Aotereeminn erate cnmefee eo ty meant « a oy « ‘ = * € ? ware: a teen ne att A ER tN NEESER 1 ee RpONAt As MRR RE NE REC MERTEN HEE RAEI ENN OE ENEMA TAS NT AARC END “METRE ey “OIA TY i ‘ AWEEX i &. Eeuyen Ton Hoan end the Dai Viets:* Nguyen Ton Hoan, | Vice Pronier for Facificaticn, end leader of the southern f stdon - = of the Pui Viet Party, has tercered his resignation from the government and is now on “vacation” in Hong Kong. His political ~ future is uncertoin. All Dai Viet elenents, particulerly Koan's fection end to a lesoer extent the predominantly northern splinter group to which Foreign Minister Quet belorgs, exe critical of Kherh. Khanh's public denunciation of Hoan has almost certeinly reeled out exy future eccommodation with the southern Pai Victs. fais group has only a sieol2 populer base, but has been using its semi-officiel position to recruit in the provinces. It retains echerents in scme key militery commands end security positions. The Dei Viets now secm to be allying with Generel Khiem, with Hoan hoping UPLInEtehy to becure prine minister. ‘the Dal Viets do not epoeer wedded, however, to e solution syvely ing leadership by either Kniem or Koen. They probably vould support Minh if he vould pormit the perty an influential role. In eny cvent, the Dei Viets, particulerly Hoan's Faction, seem more Interested in obtaining pover then in contributing fo nationel unity. + eae * She Nationalist Perty of Greater Vietnam, commonly called the Det Victs, vas rounded during the 1930's end reached its height weiter the Boo Fai regins (1929-2954) with its chief influence in Uorth Vietnam. It sphintsred Into nuwicrous fections efter 195, enong vhich vere the northern > factions heeled by Drs. Fram Huy Quat and Dang Van Sung end e smaller but more militant southern faction headed by Dr. Hoan. - £5 « : Z ia ese Rae GO Ee om ee me MBE i occreeticeb abe eeinoed ness Panam caste COPY. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRAR OE pete peesaermaee aman pe aes deieto +s : * a 9. The Reddhist. Leadership: The goels of the Buddhist Jeadership are still unclear. There are signs of contiming internal divisions smong them despite the fact that the militant Thich Tri Quank obviously has been thelr peremount spokesman in the current crisis. Quang hes a low personal yegari Tor Generel Hirh, but is prone to give Minh public racking ap 4 counterpoise to other generels the Buddhists do not like. He con- spiders Khiea encthena, more becouse of Khien's association with the Dien regine then because of his nominal Catholicism, even “though Guang equates the two. The Buddhists vere Jukevarm tovard Sfrensteaegnat _ Khenhts te takeover last January, end enbittered by his 316 August — . charter. — Nevertheless, they are presently back jing Khenh's leader~ ship partly beceuee of his apparent willingness to come to terms with then in an effort to curd his om rivals, and partly because the Suddhists fear the consequences of his overthrow. The Buddhists apperently vent to retain their new-found politicel leverage and fear nre-omergence of Diea's follovers end of Catholic influence. 10, Thich Tri Queng: Tri Quang may symbolize Buddhist ains, but his personal rotives ave more complex. He is the head of the oo Association of Buddhist Morks in Central Vietoon and one of the most influcntiel and militant menbers of the Buddhist hierarchy. its | CRO SE ERE KU FE Ore Gi e eee OO =. aie CUP py : “s. LYNDON BAINES Joison LI BRARY ee cee ae Se * ae se . ba ‘ x Z % - ‘ * er" ey ANTEX There Sele taes to be no firm evidence thet Tri Quang is pro- Communists, Of pro-nentralist. There is little question, hovever, that he aspires to be - poverful behind-the-scenes political force. Shere 1s considerable question ebout the compatibility of his vitinate aims with US Interests. Jl. She Catholics: Catholics have been epprehenisve since the overthrow of the Dien regine. Althouagn more favorably inclined toward Khenh then towerd Minh, they remain vary of Khanh's in- -tentions: They strongly endorsed the 16 August charter, vhich SS peemed to promise a firmer direction of the var against the flet Cong, but they now seem to regerd Kharh as having capituleted com- =: : : pletely to the Seddhists ani students. They apparently ‘ock to __ General. Khien es their preferred leader andi they may be incre singly symathetic to elements of the Dai Viet Party, elthough up to now - “the Buddhist lebelling of the Dai Viet as a pro-Cetholic party has been unjustified. Most Vietnamese Catholics vould probably be satisifed with .-s government giving promise of effective leader- ship and guaranteeing then equal rights end equal participation. "A. pilitent minority identified with Father Hoang Quyrh, fearing both ‘Buddhist vengeance end loss of Catholte. privileges, continues to GA strust alnost all Boddnists end to press for a Catholic- oriented regime. This ninority has complicated the events of SI yecent days exd is capsble of creating fresh crises et any tine. ~ AB - astereentmee aaa si dh at a a eh ae oe C; ° 3M . COPY. : LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY. wee goum = Sa gama ag ae are ate ee a a * oe . le. The Students: Buddhists, end Tri Quang in perticular, exercise a strozg influence on Victnenese students, vhose sympathy ‘with the Buddhist campaign ageinst Diem brought thon fer the first time into a national political role. Students vere the first to agitate egeinst Khonh's a a of “dictatorial power." They seem to have been moved by e@ yartety of factors: fdcalisn, Tear of a return of Dienist rule, ver-weariness, ani opposition to conscription. They may elso have been manipulated by rival political factions, by Buddhist lesders, by politically winced professors, by the Viet Cong, by the French -- or, nost likely, by all of these ct various times end in various ways. The students \ ere almost certainly not under full control of Tri (veng, despite his boasts, and e few of them now beck Khanh. There are several resteensible student leaders, but students represent a potential feoter for instebility. 13. Other Non-Communist Political Groups: The only other political party with eny dissesnible influence, the Kationalist Perty of Vietnem (VEQDD), has a base of strength primarily in the northern provinees of South Vietnam. There is some evidence that the Buddhists, en? some of the bore radical Rue University vrofes SOPs vho opposed both Khanh end Khiem, have ViQUD ties. Many of the traditions] Seigon politicians aspire only to positions of personal « AD - oe Pome Cus War Be ms Bote me RE We EE NEE ED aI pape LYNDON i on uhany E86 gees eee SE RE a Ene . . ® a . * tee pover, elthough they cre nore favorably inclined towerd Ninh than Kheuk or Khien. Ih. ime religtous sects, the Cuo Def end Hoe Hoo, have taken ‘no Btend in the recent crisis. Their military cooperation vas first sought by Minh, but brought to vruition under Khanh, end they probably still support Kharh. The gruving Importance of the sects as a source of recruits for Regional Force conpanies in several delta provinces may make then en increesing political force. 15. Whe Viet Cong: There is no evidence that the Viet Cong instigated or are responsible for recent actions which have led os to urdan end political upheaval in South Vietnem, though some of the recent violence end some of the anti-fueriecn manifestations were probably due to, or intensified by, Viet Cong agent activity. Tne success of the Budéhist campaion against Diem has “Jed the Cocummists increasingly to eaphasize the inportance of the "political strugsle" in the cities; end provegenda from both Hanoi ‘and the - “Kational Léberation Front" emphasizes that the Communists expect victory to come primarlly from political paralysis in ~8aigon.- In a fluid confused situation, the Commmists obviously = have considerable coreity for mischief meking. There are some 7 « ALO - ap TO tee mw ne og oe me. ww ioee Mace ae meena teenage ‘f CUP bah | | : { i ' i ° LYNDON BAINES ; JOHNSON LIBRARY EO 6 ee ee Si ales a oo eereneecearceneeentent aie SSP. ‘. . . AUINEX grounds for susnecting thet, in eddition to contributing to urban . violence in Saigon and elcevhere, the Coermmnists moy be In same neasure behind current political tensions end manifestations of seraratist tendencies in Bre. (Le Khee Cuyen, the Hue professor who __hes recently foméed a “Kational Salvation Council" and seers to be actively opzosing all conpronfises reached In Saigon to defuse the current situation, hes long been eccused by his opponents of ee ‘having Conrentst effilfetions.) Commmists opportunities for maneuver, pressure, end Gisruption villi obviously increase if political irstability and uncertainty in Saigon is prolonged and if popular ——-————-- passions continze to be eroused over religious cifferences. __ 6. Khe French: Ve have no evidence of any direct or indirect | | { ry 4 French hand in recent South Vietnasese political difficulties, which axe being vievei in Paris as en "inevitsble" development. Hovever, the volotile students certeinly constitute the element of South Vietnenese society to which the French have the greatest access | (through their educations influences, especially the teachers | France provides). At ant nina, it is evident that recent South | Vietnamese difficulties have been helpful to the French policy of eévocating neutralisn era recotiation by creating an atmosphere which | lends eupport to the arsurent on vhich this policy is ostensibly | i ; based e~ dete, the axrgment that the politicel situation in South | Victron is bound to deteriorate and that no anti-Communist group : fe capable of gererating enough popular support to be eble to defeat | the Vict Cong. Ca Ln Al. % SED CG LTE EE Org MEER ee ER EmS © MEMES yen = = LYNDON BAINES rieesi ON LIBRARY me © sate ee e * .