: “SNE 27.2-2-61 ¥ : 4 iu ~, ’ an a Z . a3 oy a bok wee ' ot ; See S ” ’ Us a * all - * . *. = o a . 4 - 27 June 1 1961, ; ea er és 7 4, , fe aa oe. Peo : + ee ry / ron Bua 4 prey er ee : 4 ohm aad ee re ze 8 if > aon 4 : ae a = = a ; a » ? = » 2 * 2 oye “SPE ECIAL” “NATIONAL "INTELLIGENCE cesar " NUMBER 27.2-2-61: es (Supplements SNIE m8 THE ‘OUTLOOK FOR, RETENTION OF US AZORES BASE RIGHTS | IN THE EVENT OF CERTAIN 7 COURSES | oF US ACTION Loe yt a Way etre asy cite hn ie ae i ca aa a A “ ad o. ey oR oa Submitted by the eos q ; DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE | 3 “The jollowing intelligence organizations participated in the a ' preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency it -. @nd the intelligence organizations of the Departments of Z a ‘State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and bbe Joint hails ra % ash ae Concurred in by the * Tats - lt ee UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A "on 29 June 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelli- ‘| gence and Research, Department of State; the Asststant Chief - of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Asstst- ant Chief of Naval Operations (intelligence), Department of? Intelligence, USAF; the the Navy; the Assistant Chief o; Steff, Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; ros Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; of the National Security Agency. Phe Atomic Eneroy Com~ mission Representative to the USI8, and the Assistant Di- rector, Federal Bureau of Investigction, abstained, the subject being oulside of the'r jurisdiction. the Assistant to the and the Director Sele hea. eget ae Ute tte te Baye nate ca! aha % = : Daclaasiticd by 228 cy ; oa - data 98. shinee a.’ a ._ ShGN fame i. ae 4 THE OUTLOOK FOR RETENTION OF US AZORES BASE RIGHTS IN THE EVENT OF CERTAIN COURSES OF US ACTION THE PROBLEM To estimate the short-term outlook for US base rights in the Azores if the US con- tinues to exert pressure on Portugal to institute reforms leading towards self- deter- mination for its African territories and to couperate with the UN. THE ESTIMATE 1. As the time approaches for renegotiation of US military base rights in the Azores, which expire 31 December 1962, Portugal is beset by many difficulties and is becoming increasingly isolated internationally. The rebellion in An- gola continues unchecked, marked by unusital cruelty on both sides. Portuguese policies in Africa are under attack in the UN, and the US is applying pressure on a reluctant Salazar to implement reforms rapidly. Because Sala- zar appears unwilling to respond construc- tively to these pressures the differences be- tween the US and Portugal could come to a head at any time—perhaps even before the renegotiation question arises. Much will de- pend on the developing situation in Angola and on the stability of the other-Portuguese territories. 2. Sajavar’s reaction to two US votes in the UN critical of Portugal and to several US Gemarches on the subject of his African poli- cies has been one of pained disapproval. He apparently feels not only that the US is Gravely misguided in endorsing African as- pirations for self-determination, but that it has misbehaved as an ally by failing to sup- port actively the Portuguese position. His regime permitted noisy anti-US demonstra- tions to occur in Lisbon, Luanda, an@ olher cities in March on the occasion of our first vote of disapproval in the UN. Since then, however, and especially as the Angolese situ- __ ation has worsened, official and popular criti- 9 cism of the US has been somewhat muted. 8. Salazar apparently now recognizes more ~ fully than in the past the gravity of the Por- tuguese situation. Ee has publicly admitted that social progress has not been advanced as fast as it might have been in the overseas territories and has stated that some reforms _. might be forthcoming soon. He has taken —__ personal command of the Defense Ministry | _ and is sending to Angola Portugal’s most ef- ..- fective civilian and Inilitary officials. How- |: ever, Salazar sincerely believes that self-deter- | mination for the Africans at this time or | within the foreseeable future would be cata- — Strophic for the West as well as for Portugal. Moreover, his personal indisposition toward — taking vigorous action in any direction and the anachronistic character of his government probably preclude the institution of any sig- nificant reforms in the near future. 4. During the dry season (June--October) there is a chance that the Portuguese could re-establish a reasonable degree of public order in the disturbed area of northern Angola. Should this happen, and if no further out- breaks of rebellion occurred in Portuguese erritorles during this perlod, it might permit. alazar to announce revisions in his overseas holleles sufficient to relax tensions belween ortugel and the US and to open the way or negotiations, However, Salazar would probably attempt to secure from the US at jeast ani implicit commitment to abstain from ‘publicly criticizing his pojicies in the African ‘territories. 5. It is-almost certain, however, that the sit- ‘ nation in Portuguese Africa will worsen within ‘the next year. We believe that Portugal will ‘be faced with continuing and growing dis- ’ orders in Angola, the nozthern sector of which is now almost completely under rebel control, ‘and that revolt could erupt in Portuguese _ Guinea at any time. The Portuguese military establishment would be severely strained by ‘any such combination of revolts, and might ’ soon lose control of all but the principal towns and communication lines in Angola, and all put the port areas in Guinea. 6. In this circumstance of continuing deteri- oration the chances that the US could secure a satisfactory renewal of the five-year agree- ment on the bases by negotiation, while main- taining its position with respect to colonial reforms, would be poor. Salazar would prob- ably attach political conditions requiring a. ,evision of US policy toward the African ter- ritories. In the meantime, should US actions be interpreted by Salazar as giving active en- - couragement to the rébels, the chances would be about even that he would denounce the existing treaty and demand US evacuation before the present rights had expired. How- ever, until the designated withdrawal dead- line was reached, the Portuguese would prob- ably not significantly hamper US operations. 7, Amuch more delicate situation would arise if the US should be faced with a serious in- ternational crisis, e.g., exacerbation of the Ber- lin problem this fall. Salazar would probably be constrained from atlempting to force the US to evacuate during the height of such a crisis by his basi¢ pro-Western orientation, vw acme CO 2. by pressure from the UK, France, West Ger- | many, and other NATO allies, and by appre- hension lest the US stay on after being or- . dered out. However, Salazar would regard our increased need for the Azores facilities as strengthening his bargaining position. vis- a-vis the US. 8. Thus, he would probably seek to drive a bargain with the US whereby renewal oi the Azores base agreement was made dependent on provision of some measure of US support for the Portuguese position in Africa. Should the US prove unresponsive, Salazar’s position would harden. He might, depending on the seriousness of the breach that had developed petween the two countries, require the US to leave the Azores when the international crisis had passed. However, he might temper such an expulsion order by a.tempting to ne- gotiate a new arrangement for the bases with another aily, presumably the UK. — 9, Although the Salazar regime appears in no serious danger at the moment. and, the dictator appears to Wa ‘ia good health, it is pasible that he will be replaced in office - pefore renegotiation of the Azores agreement. ~~ ‘Considerable opposition to the rigidly con- servative policies of his regime has developed in recent months and is bound to increase if the situation in Africa deteriorates. As yet, the opposition is leaderless and Salazar’s se- cret police is )ikely to keep it that way. How- ever, there is some slight chance that Portu- guese military officers, who are already appre- hensive of fighting a colonial war on more then one front, may organize to remove Sala- zar and that they could succeed in so doing. 10. A successor military regime would be no less anxious than Salazar’s to retain the Afri can territories, but would probably act on co- jonial reforms with greater vigor and effect. For this reason, and because of its probable desire for US and other Western acceptance, it might prove more tractable in negotiating the US over the retention of the Azores ASCS,