CENTRAL TNTELLIGENCE AGENCY 20 May 1966 SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 8-66 SUBJECE: The Currerh Political Situation and Prospects in Tropical Africa : ; SUMMARY . Africa today 1s groping for new answers and reassuring guide- ines. O14 rostrums such ag Fan-Africenism and one-man, one-party rule have failed to deliver prosperity or dislodge white regimes in southern Africae Radical natioaalists such as Wscumah, who oace seemed to be the wave of the future, have proved to be poor managers, and enthusiasm for their brand of militant chenge hes lost steam. But moderates Like Balewa egually have been, turned out of office. The military are increasingly becoming the decisive power group, but they lack Ideas end stature. During recent political skizmisning both Moscow and Pelping suffercd notable setbacks. We think current politicel floundering will contimue for some © “"”* considerable time without any African or external force or ideology becoming deminant. If anything, Africa's problems are likely to v gpread. For example, frictions be ‘een Arabs and Africens seem @radually to be emerging in countries on the fringe of the Sahara. There ts also en increasing Taiiure to meet current food require- nents. Africa's mood of the moment 1s lergely cne of drift ond doubt, and intractable econemic problems will contimue to trouble nesxiy all African leaders. But the entrencred white regimes will provide a@ convenient target for those Africans who wish to divert attention from their internal difficulties and to restore thelr political, Co SehoLe how lie Zebrodactlon ; . 1. A nuchex of recent evanbs have ckheken Atricen selt- confidence. A rash of coups tes toppled radieal and moderate regimes. Rvidence hes come to light which is disiliusioning those who ‘believed that the USSR end Ching were merely disinterested providers of ald. The staying power of white Rhofesia is en en~ barrassing contrast to the stagnation of black "“Wtberation movax ments", For mich of the African political elite, it seems to be a tine of subdued reappraisal. She Current Situation _@e bn amportant resuti of the recent political upheavals was, of course, to dramatize the fragility of Africa's political institutions and regines» Thiet was reflected in the recent con- ference of 12 East and Centro! Afrleen states, during which they tacitly agreed to cease interfering in the effairs of notghboring states end to curtail. the political activities of xefugees Zrom other Buack African states. There are some who are evading this agreement, @.G+, the Somalis in Kenya, and others who are unable to control all refugee activity, eG+» Burundi, but by ond large there is a stronger Aispositicn on the part of a aunber of Africen » Bu govermenis nob to da unto others What they would not want done to themselves, 3. Recent political developments represent a setback’ for the proponents sf African "rsdicalism”. Many Africans, yarbicularly the young educated slite, set considerable store ‘by the maxing of political showmen such as Nkrumah end Toure. ‘hese Inaders succeeded an representing their brand of radicalism, including . nllitency, Yepld change, and close links with ‘the Communist povers, as the wave of the future. Riding the political crest » they carved out a role in Afro-Asian circles di proportionate to ‘their countries’ power. Then the radicals suffered a major setback with the humiliating &i seppearance of their colleague Ben Bella. Nov, Mrumsh's ouster, Toure's troubles, the near economic Denke ruptoy of all the radical regimes have at Least temporactly sapped J much of their political appeal. won neneeaeene 4, However, the radicals retain a considerable potential . for trovblemaking. Indeed, they still dominate regimes in Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), and Zanziber, among others. Figures “COPY: woo 3AINES ES JOHNSON weSial aCaBablaD ny such as Bubu end Odinga are not without influence and funds ” Another distuxbing factor is the crewing aurber of nxmed exiles, aspeelally in Bast and Centrel Afelea, many of them extranely : prinitive and beady ere) hitch on to any cause. More importeuntiy, there remain substantial numbers ef discontented intellectuals and youth even in uoderute states such as Senegal end Nigeria. But the polities image, so eruelal. dn Afvlea, of radical notables has suffered grievous domage » ead Lor the moment the radicals seen wngdle to fire Africa's imagination or to marebal mch in the way of political backing. 5. At the same time, so-called "moderate" ox "consexvative!! goveruents have encountered a full measure of trouble. Balewa's assassination, the ouster of Presidents Dacko (Central African Repubiic) and Yemeogo (Uppex Vote), and growing preasure on Eatle Selassie are manifestations of verious kinds of discoutant arising from various causes. Ta some places, goveraments have been mukanmeneiatenamatonenl ® Their edherents and other like-minded extremists recently formed the Loogely-orgunized and Commaist-financea "East _ African Front", designed to promote mutual, Interests in trade unions, youth groups, and women's organizations, and to prouote radical policies in the Orgenization of African | Unity (OAV) and Afro-Asien orgatizations. wha " overbirned because of beleted attempts to impose a little “susterLty"; in others appexentiy because of extravagance and misnsnageneut In some instances, trival end regional cousidera- tions have probably. played a major role; elsewhere they seexi to have had little effect an setting political forces. in motion. IncGeed, in moderate as im radical states, as often as not potite cal. change occurs when growing disillusion with ‘the eae leader eoncerts with the disposition of a snail organized group «= usually militery or labor -- to take action. 6. Although military leaders have deuonstsated a growing eS ERE ga en rch eer tee ns os Lanes siiatoanees to take power, it is doubtful whether military eeansesd offer a panacea for Africa's problems. Probably the lees sophisti« cnked. amy leaders are closer to the simple Pecgle in the ‘bush then are the Western~educated prcrereicoey politiciens, who now constitute something resembling a "class" of their ow. But the scauate thin layer of military leadership is i211 at ease with the “eauented 4, - elite" and the bureaucracy, though they diet @epend upon them (ana the bureaucrats so far find it adventégeots to go along). mn those eases where the military has chosen to return nominal. power to eivilien authority while retaining its essentials, e.g., Togo, Dahomey, the politicians have again become quickly mired in ee es COPY: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON | familiar aifrieultios. Waon the wilitary chooses to hold on to 7 power, other preblens come into focis. the exes , Like the — : politicians, are frequently beset by tribaliaa, ¢ O87 Migeria, and corruption in thelr ranks is nou unknown y C-Bes Ugenda. . 7 Discipline is often lax, and they tend to deal harshly with the populace, es in the Congo. Also » milttery figures sich 2s , Colonels Lamizans (Upper Volta) oz Bokassa (Central Africen Re~ public}, or slighty more impressive individtals such 26 Mobutu, simply lack the steture and skits to do mach more ‘then keep their tedioas limping aloxg. . As a whole, the African military extablish« nents display little of the administrative and organizational talens: for nation-building apparent im same military regimes else- where,’ Bay, Pekistan, or some of the better examples in Letin _ Americas Te In geueral, the lusty coufidense and assurance that marked African polities in the wake of independence has eroded, to be replaced by something of a "morning after” syndroue. Afri« can political situens and institutions no Longer seem to generate mich excitement. Pan-Africanisn is in the doldrums, end "Negri- v tude" failed to eatch on. Even the one-man, one-party nyeten often eleimed by Africans to be their unique contribution to the née of goverment, 1s increasingly on triel as it appears that these parties are used as a mechanism. to control or indoctrinate Ye the: ‘populace as in the ease of Mownsh's Convention People's e : ‘Perky. Meanwhile 2 titre-African cooperation bas been slight in eS ‘nearly every field, though it is always possible to get a measure oe or. agreement on anticolonial ismes. ‘he most. generous view of | ‘the OAU is that it has held together. me Organisation Commme | Africaine et ‘Malgache (ocam) end its predecessors have been slightly more effective in practical tems, but this has ‘been due : chiefly to Houphoust -Boigay's subsidies and interest. Finally, | ‘the only regional. organization Which ‘has ‘worked in the past, end ‘ which ‘was set up. under British rule,. the East African Common Ser- vices’ Organization, shows = ‘signs of breakup.” , 8. At the same tine, the "Laberation movenent's” seeking . political change in southern Africa have come nearly toa FO stop. ‘he African Liberation Committee (axe), effiliatea with . the OAU, has been an acknowledged fatlure. It is short of funds, end several states have indicated a desive to pull out. The | guerrilla movements im Angola and Mozambique also have failed to % flourish, though they continue to tie down large muibers of Porte- Guese troops. Nationalists in Rhodesia are ineffective, end those in South Africa have been forced into trifling clandestine activity. =Te y j t FT 4 é H i i t 4 if 4 " activity throughout the continent, aud in Kenya. the depth of 9» The Communist powers have also suffered some political setbacks in Afvica recently, The most important of these undoubt- edly were in Chana, where Moscow and Peiping seperately had established close Links with Niruzah’s clandestine operations and were Ja a good position to abet subversion and guerrilla Communist involvement in Hhewe matters is now widely publicized an Africa. However, Communist setbacks are not due merely to" exposure of clandestine cperetions, but are in large part caused . by the every day hazards. of the African scene. , For exemple, . despite suv: stantial ecoammie end ndlitary aid, events continue to go badly for the Soviets in Saselia, and the Chinese have lost Ground with the mercurial Toure and, momentarily perhaps, in Mali. However, this is a continually matting situation, ond as against these difficulties, the Soviets seem to be improving their position | in Uganda and the Chinese are apparently ‘becoming even more deeply °* entrenched in. Zanzibar, 10. As they contemplate the larger world scene, many Afri- cans have had to recognize that their influence on international politics is. not going to measure up to their earller extravagant dreams, They have succeeded to a large extent in remaining outside -~8.~ rwttn uehimxenteaaee™ the Cold War. But they have not Imposed a nen normality on the bad old powers, nor have they become a decisive factor in extra- African effeizs. Adjustment te these facts of life has been going on slowly for some time; the recent troubles within Africa itself? have probably brougitt the process slong a little further. ‘Prospects 11. These developments could be healthy if they encouraged Africen states to turn to the work of internal cevelopuent, to, atop meddling in thelr neighbor's affairs, and to cease their international posturing. The record of upsets, frustrations, and . Aisiliusiomments should constitute a strong case for discarding — the sloganeering and the cliches in favor of a pragmatic cone centration upon the enormous tasks at home. 22. ‘The recens decline of some of the radicals will provide a@ breathing spell fox the West end additional time for moderate Africans to work for economic end social progress under somewhat tess politieal pressure. But this atmosphere is partly conditional on a modicum of economte progress, a "sense of success". For the attraction for grand preseriptions Is far from dead. It is hard to see where new ones will came from; Kouphouet-Bolsny’s economic ~9- Subueneae? | “COPY-. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON Liberelism, despite acknowledged achievements, is not exciting ‘enough, and the military regines ere welahely to ereate poplar concepts, aus uncertainty, floundering, and apathy will, almost certainly combinue to be the hallmerks of African politics for _ bone time to come. 13. This is not to suy that extremist and radical. figures may not come to power or prove to be very troublesome from time to time, : This eventuality seems almost certain to recur in a. region with #0 matty weak, one~nen shows. Additional military v. coups, particularly in the extremely backward states of ex-French’ West Africa, are likely. As the military regimes fet to make . headvay on fundamental national problems, factiosalization and VW internal. conflicts within the African armed forces probsbly will grow. It is worth noting that three large Atricen countries | an which the US feels @ considerable stake, 1,e., Ethiopia, Wigerta, and the Congo, are among those beset by major problems which in large part Involve the loce!.