. > aboot de : ceca neath i's ath waite Sh SAP Ene Car when 8 AS TR LT te hata! Rev ine be Kb ca Seb ek LA EE BAR Anon AD a5 CaP ain eh alka ahah aie iad AM BBE po he Soe f - pee Bak | ; | | 2 NIE 61-56 , . 4 | _ 2 10 April 1956 seer Bove & te ante Cass } NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 61-56 Subdmitied by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations perticinated in the preparaiion of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence orgaiizations of the Deparinients of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Tie Joint Staff. : ; a Concurred in by the , INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMIYVTEL on if April 1956. Concurring were the Specicl Assistant, _ intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Stafi, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director o} Naval Intelligence; the Directer of Inteliigence, USAF; and the Deputy Director yor intelligence, The Joint Staff. The : Atomic Exergy Commission Representative to the IAC and the’ i Assistant Director, Federal Sureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. a . ‘in f / : COPY NO. -- -} ‘g rey ere _ a fi ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ONE Declassified by OfBe75——8 data ti Movember 975 EPEAT AEE. SPE ON CET I STREET SIMTRLET AF Se orn eae gear: are, ae eryemanp no, iat ome! «seers peste nee wR Pe Te Boot * woe oS _ s s 3 . . + « 2 + so 4 wD aiid aioe 9° fo: teaietae Shree (Fo RE RS Bas BE Sta Ma A EE tla Sas ha BE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per- - sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of State . Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army . Lirector of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy . Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force Leputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stait Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission: . Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency mromehhomao o 2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli- cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange- ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission shovid be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. ae WARNING mition affecting ogo States e espionage laws, BCS. tm, 794, the trans~ ce 34 hich Wye ny manner mauthorized person is prohi by law. inet apes it aes 2s cated eabi DISTRIBUTION: White House National Security Council Department of State Pepartment of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomie Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation La faci Te eke a Be Ean wen co wud ciscbsan AAR Rad sy ink ca Ain ae SAL etd daetiibind ae id Mite wit tn SORTS Niner Pane mCTEME COT Ty eC OID SSeS CNA ea ia Sr aos a Ciara Io eee a PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA THE PROBLEM To analyze recent trends in Burma and to estimate probable developments cver — the next few years, with particular emphasis on Burma’s international orientation. CONCLUSIONS _ 1. The political life of Burma is and will _ probably continue for the next few years to be dominated by a handful of leaders who share a common outlook based on Marxist economics, Western political principles, and Burmese nationalism. Al- though in terms of basic values Burma identifies itself with the free world, resid- ual anticolonial sentiment and ‘fear of provoking Communist China have Jed it to adopt a neutralist position. (Paras. 9, 11, 53, 64) 2. Both the current stability and the fu- ture growth of Burma’s economy are heavily dependent on the export of rice... The world price of this commodity has fallen substantially in the last couple of years and Burma has had difficulty. in marketing its rice. Burma’s economic development will remain limited not only by the price of rice, but also by the lack of competent administrators and trained technicians and by the in- ternal disturbances which hamper trans- portation and disrupt agricultural pro- duction. However, it is unlikely that Burma’s freedom cf maneuver. - 49-50. 70) economic conditions will seriously affect — political stability during the next year ‘or so. (Paras. 34, 38, 42, 52, 67-68) 3. Although Burma’s need for markets for its rice has provided the basis for a. significant expansion in. Bloc-Burmese relations, particularly in the trade and. technical assistance fields, Burma will almost certainly try to continue to bal- ance its economic and political relations between the West and the Bloc. While trade with the Bloc will account for a large share of total Burmese trade and carries potential dangers, Burma’s eco- nomic involvement alone will not, at least - for the next year, be so great as to destroy (Paras. 4. However, Burma is now a major Bloc target, and over the longer run there is danger of a substantial increase in Bloc influence as a result of economic arrange- ments already concluded or under nego- tiation and Burma’s likely receptivity to further Bloc offers of trade and technical _ assistance. Other factors which may in- crease Burma’s vulnerability are: (a) the probable susceptibility of Burmese stu- dents and other potential leadership giouns to the current pattern of Commu- nist propaganda; (b) Communist China's ability to exert diplomatic or if necessary military pressures on Burma; and (c) U Nu’s apparent belief that he can deal with the Bloc without losing his freedom of action. (Paras. 69, 71-73} 5. The extent to which the Communists realize their potential in Burma will de- pend in part on the actual economic gains realized by the Burmess and in part on the skill and restraint with which the Comraunists comport themselves; ore- mature efforts to apply pressw could result in alarming Burmese leaders. The Burmese have been disturbed by Com- munist China’s sale of rice to Ceylon, and this concern would be intensified should the Bloc re-export increasing amounts of Burmese rice to traditional Burmese mar- kets. But to a major extent, Burniese receptivity to Communist offers and in- fluence will depend on the abili:y of Burma. to dispose of its export commodi- ties, especially rice, in non-Communist markets. (Paras. 75-77) DISCUSSION 6. For several years after its peaceful transi- tion to independence in 1948, the Union of Burma maintained a precarious and uncertain existence. Following the assassination in 1947 of Burme’s strongest leader and popular na- tional here, Aung San, “here was danger that the small leadership group would fall apart in personal struggles for power. Due to the al- most complete wartime destruction of Bur- ma’s smal modern industrial sector and to the widespread disorders that hindered agricul- ture and transport, production fell to less than half of prewar levels. The ethnic minoritics which constituted one-third of the total popu- lation ef 19 million posed serious problems of control. Insurgency was rife, and for a time Communist and cther rebel forces frequently operated within sight of Rangoon. 7. Despite these handicaps and the reluctance of the strongly nationalist government to seek major assistance from the West, ihe govern- ment has retained its cohesion and has made steady progress in rehabilitation and internal security. Although insurgency and chronic banditry are still serious, the government’s major concern is to develop economic stability. The failure to dispose of a heavy rice surplus in traditional non-Communist markets led to a considerable budget deficit, balance of pay- -ments difficulties, and curtailment of the large economic development program to which the leadership had committed itself. 8. These circumstances have provided an _9pening for the economic, political, and prop- aganda tactics of the Bloc. Over the past year, the Bloc has agreed to take large armounts of Burmese rice in exchange for Bloc gods and technical advisors, and Burma is being sub- jected to various Bloc political and pro aganda moves designed to reduce western in fluence, to increase the aceeptability of Com munism, and to prepare the ground for an in- crease in direct Bloc influence. In this sitiua- tion, the key question is the extent to which Burma will be responsive to Bloc offers and susceptible to Bloc pressures and propaganda. |. PRESENT SITUATION The Political Situation 9. The political life of Burma is dominated by a handful of top leaders in ihe Anij-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), the war- -born coalition of nationalists that in 1946 threw off Cormmunist attempts to contra! it, - in 1947 negotiated the country’s independence and draficd Burma’s constitution, and in 1948 formed the provisional government. Since the first election in 1951-1952, the AFPFL has enjoycd a parliamentary majority of abou 80 percent. ae: 10. The stability of the government since in- dependence has been made possible not only by the commanding majority of the AFPFL, but also by the strength and discipline of. its principal component, the Burma Socialist Party (BSP), which controls nearly half of the seats in parliamert. Most of the impor- tant Burmese political leaders, except Prime Minister U Nu, are BSP members. Ba Swe, Minister of Defense and Minister of Mines, is @ member of the party presidium and leader of the influential Trade Union Congress (Burma), which has successfully kept most union locals from aifiliation with the.Com- munist controlied Burma Trade Union Con- gress. Kyaw Nyein, Minister of Industries and ofttimes acting Foreign Minister, is the party's secretary-general and the leading party theoretician and planner. U Nu, the most important member of the coalition, remains the best known and most popular Jeader in Burma. His prestige among: Bud- dhist circles and minority peoples has served to offset some of the distrust which these groups feel towards the dominant BSP. 11. Most of the AFPFL leaders share a com- mon cutlook based on Marxist economics, Western political principles, and Burmese nationalism. They worked together in the nationalist movement at the University of Rangoon during the 1930’s and through study groups came to accept Marxist-Socialist ideas on imperialism and economic development. However, in large measure because of British influence and in part by reason of their own Buddhist heritage, Burmese leaders tended to reject Leninist-Communist concepts of party organization and political struggle. Although the constitution is based on doctrinal socialist provisions ior state ownership or regulation of most of the economy, Burmese socialism has in practice resembled the more pragmatic approach of the British Labor Party. Finally, the peaceful granting of independence weak- ened the extremis! influence in nationalist circles. However, anticolonial sentiments con- tinue to exert a significant influence on for- eign policy, and have contributed to the development of neutralist attitudes. - 12. The AFPPFL has no significant conserva- .. tive opposition, and the attitude of the majer- . ity of the Burmese toward the government is one of passive acceptance. The weak and in- experienced civil administration is gradually being improved through technical training, strengthened central control, and the reduc- tion of insurgency. , 13. Administration of the ethnic minorities, who were given special protection by the Brit-_ ish and who fear loss of their cultural identity in a Burman ' state, has posed the most serious political problem. To mitigate the fears of these groups and to win their loyalty to the Union the constitution provided special ad- ministrative regions for the largest of the mi- nority groups: Shan, Kayah (Karenni), Ka- ren, and Kachin States, and the Chin Hills Special Division (see map). Moreover, the constitution gives to the first three of these states the right to secede from the Union after January 1958, though the procedure pre- scvibed would be complicated and time con- suming. The powers of the states are limited to those specifically granted in the constitu- tion, and the Union Prime Minister appoints the state executives. In practice, the AFPFL has been able to insure the protection of na~- tional interests in the minority states by se- curing the election of acceptable candidates | to important state offices and to the central parliament. 14. Although there have been personal fric- tions and differences on tactics, the leaders generally share the same concepts and beliefs. Kyaw Nyein has been more inclined to take a hard line with domestic Communists than Ba Swe, and is reported to question some of . U Nw’s arrangements with Moscow. There have also been differences within the coalition on the pace of economic development, on mi- nority policies, and on U Nu’s lavish use of — - *Throughout this estimate the term Burman ts used to describe the majority ethnic group; the term Burmese is used to describe all nationals of _ the Union of Burma, a - EIS ARNIS TRG 3ST EEO RIT PTR RGR = AAS OOS OA 2 SPINE AA ETERS NI SIPS LORE ERE TMI OT LOEMED FEET TION MERSIN o .F . Oe a government funds to foster a Buddhist revival. Although these issues are not likely to split the AFPFL before the national elections sched- uled for April-May 1956, or even to attain the level of major intraparty disputes, they could become significant issues in the future if economic progress were stalled. They also provide an opening for possible Communist — efforts to split the coalition. 15. Communism as a political force. The Communist movement in Burma has been aivided since 1946 inte two main factions. The smaller and less important group—Com- munist Party, Burma (CPB) —1led by Thakin Soe, split off at that time over personal and tactical issues and has since operated pri- marily as a minor guerrilla movement. The Burma Communist Party (BCP), led by Than Tun, is primarily a guerrilla organization. It also has links into a legal political front, the Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP). The BWPP membership and the Communist insurgent groups combined probably number no more the 10,000. The BCP and the BWPP have been responsive to the international Communist line on all important issues. 16. During the prewar pericd Burma’s Com- munists worked within the nationalist move- ment and, until Burma entered negotiations for independence in 1946-1947, nationalist leaders were generally unaware that the Com- munist leaders had separate political aspira- tions. Some of the key present-day Com- munists played leading roles in forming the wartime resistance movement which in 1944 evolved into the AFPFL. Than ‘un was the first secretary-general of the AFPFL, and was at one time acclaimed by U Nu to be the most able man in Burma. Nationalist suspicions were aroused by Communist activities within the AFPFL, however, and by 1947 all impor- tant Communist leaders had been expelled. Following the call to armed insurrection is- sued by the Communist Asian Youth Confer- ence in 1948, Than Tun and his BCP went underground. Communist attempts to over- throw by violence the anticolonial, newly in- dependent government had a profoundly dis- iNusioning effect on non-Communist leaders. Poorly planned and harshly executed attempts by the Communists to conduct “lJand reform” and their continued raiding for supplies alien- ated much of the peasantry. These tactical blunders, together with government measures : to safeguard peasant ownership of land and to improve peasant welfare, and possibly the in- fluence of Buddhism, have combined to de- prive the Communist movement of mass appeal. , 19. Although the government has conducted a continuing campaign against the Commu- nist insurgents, it has permitted the Commu- _hist-front BWPP to operate as a legal politi- cal party since its formation in 1950. The BWPP has an estimated membership of 4,500 and controls several minor peace, cultural, and labor fronts. It has a nine-man parlia- mentary delegation. The BWPP is strongest in Rangoon, where it receives guidance and support from the Chinese Communist and So- viet embassies. 18. The Communists also control the Kan-. goon University Students Union and other student groups throughout Burma. Although we have no evidence that Communist electoral successes within the Student Union indicate more than student protests against specific situations on the campus, the government is | concerned about Communist, influence on the campus. The BSP students on the campus have been unable to displace Communist con- trol of the students’ organization. Because of the shortage of trained Burmese, students assume positions of relatively great impor- tance almost immediately upon graduation. The Communist line as it develops in the current phase of Sino-Soviet Bloc tactics may have a mcre profound influence on the stu- dents. Khrushchev’s speech at Rangoon University and his offer to build and staff a technical institute in Burma are indicative of Communist efforts to exploit their already ° favorable situation amc~-g the students. 19. The BCP and the BWPP have been de- manding a “coalition” government for several years. In the past few months the BCP has intensified its efforts to obtain recognition as a legal party in return for cessation of guer- rilla activity. These recent raaneuvers, which may have included direct contact with some AFPFL leaders, are consistent both with the current Bloc emphasis on united front tactics and with a realistic appraisal of the diminish- ing fortunes of the guerrilla movement. The Communists probably hope to promote a united front movement and to split the AFPFL, thus opening the way for eventual Communist participation in a new coalition government. 20. The Communist efforts to obtain more liberal terms for surrender have achieved some success, but the government still insists that the insurgents must give up their arms and renounce the use of force, terms which the guerrilla leaders have been unwilling to meet. Although the government's surrender offer ex- pired March 31 and the government is main- taining heavier pressure than heretofore on the Communist guerrillas, if may be willing to moderate its terms, since U Nu appears to believe that Communism as a legal political movement would be less troublesome than the costly insurrection. 21, Overseas Chinese. The integration into the Burmese community of the 300,000 Chi- nese who reside in the country is further advanced than elsewhere. in Southeast Asia, and the majority of the Chinese appear at present not to be concerned with politics. However, the Chinese press in Burma gener- ally reflects pro-Communist sympathies, and Commiunisis hold influential positions among the Chinese organizations in Rangoon and other cities. Chinese Communists control a large number of the Chinese schools. In addition some 4,000 young Chinese have gone to Communist China to attend school, al- though the rate of departures has declined since 1952 following Burmese government action to deny re-entry. Problems of Internal Security 22. Communist rebels, minority dissidents, and Chinese Nationalist irregulars continue to place a serious burden on government re- sources, to frustrate rehabilitation and devel- opment in important areas, and to complicate Burma’s foreion relations. However, insur- eoree ‘ | 5 gent strength has declined by two-thirds since 1949 and in total probably does not now exceed 15,000. 23. Communist insurgents. Over-all Commu- nist rebel strength is about 5,500, of which the 3,000-man BCP is the most important group. Efforts to weld Cornmunist insurgent unity during the past several years have achieved only limited success beranse of personal rival- ries and doctrinal differences. Although skied in guerrilla tactics, the Communist rebels are handicapped by a paucity of arms and supplies, and have been dispersed into small groups by the government forces. They — apparently have not received significant as- sistance from the Chinese Communists. The BCP leadership prababiy has little expectation of receiving such support during the current phase of Sino-Soviet tactics. 24, Minority insurgents.. Dissatisfaction with the dominant Burman character and policies of the National government has produced armed rebellion among cerfain ethnic minori- ties and has prompted rumors that Shan State and Kayah State, both located in east-central Burma, may attempt to secede from the Union in 1958. The Karen National Defense Organi- zation (KNDO), with about 4,500 armed men, is the most important minority insurgent group. With the passive or active support of many of the estimated 2,000,000 Karens, the KNDO has carried on a guerrilla struggle to attain greater autonomy for the Karen people. The KNDO has been weakened by the loss of its major centers, by the disper- sion of its armed forces, by personal rivalries, and by discord over the issue of collaboration with the Communists. However, it continues to hamper government administration and economic development in southern and east- ern Burma. | 25. The government also has a difficult task with the frontier tribesmen who cross the pocrly demarcated boundaries to mingle with their ethnic kin in Yunnan, Lacs, and Thai- . land. The movement of the north Burma tribes complicates the government’s problem of extending its control over the border areas which Peiping considers are part of China. 26. Chinese Nationalist irregulars. After the Communist victory in China, some 12,000 Chi- nese Nationalist troops entered Burma under Nationalist General Li Mi. Following a Bur- mese appeal to the UN for relief, some 7,600 of these troops were evacuated to Taiwan in 1953-1954 under the auspices of a joint US- Thai-Chinese Nationalist committee and with Burmese cooperation. Another 2,000 are in agricultural settlements in Thailand under surveillance by the Thai government, and sev- eral hundred are believed to have crossed into northern Laos. 27. Burmese military cperations against the remaining 3,000 irregulars who are scattered in small pockets along the Thai border and in the southern Shan State have not been very successful, and the government now ap- pears willing to negotiate with them. The Burmese apparently have no objection to the Chinese staying in their present areas if they give up their arms, but so far they have refused to da so. 28. The partial evacuation of Chinese Nation- alist troops has largely climinated the once heated question of US assistance to these troops as a complicating factor in Burmese- US relations. Burmese-Thai relations have also been improved by cooperation along the border during Burmese army operations against the Chinese forees. Nevertheless, their presence in Burma provokes continued fears of passible Chinese Communist pressures and of internal meddling by Taiwan and the US. 29. Security forces. Since 1948 the Burmese armed forces have been committed almost entirely to the restoration of internal security. During the past three years Burmese armed strength has increased from about 60,000 to about 78,000 men (including an estimated 60,000 in the army, 14,000 in the Naiicnal Union Military Police, about 2,200 in the navy, and 1,900 in the air force), but the army still lacks sufficient streneth to mount simuitane- ous offensives against all the insurgent forces . in Burma. Funds allocated to defense have averaged 30 percent of government expendi- tures in the past several years, and in fiscal 1956 defense funds account for 35 percent of the total budget. 30. The morale and prestige of the army have improved over the past five years largely be- cause of operational successes which reflect a greater degree of combat effectivencss. However, poor training and lack of equip- ment continue to handicap the army. It has the capability gradually to reduce the in- surgent menace, but could offer no serious resistance to a Chinese Communist invasion. 31. The Burmese navy, with 29 miscellaneous small ships, is capable only of support opera- tions in coastal and inland waters. The air force of 86 aircraft (including 33 old piston fighters, 16 transports, and 8 jet trainers) provides fairly effective support to the ground forces in operations against insurgents. 32. Burma depends almost completely on foreign sources for its military equipment. Until 1954 Burma obtained such equipment : entirely from the UK. In that year the Bur- mese, uncasy at the degree of British influ- ence implicit in this situation and dissatisfied with the rate of British deliveries, terminated the exclusive arrangements. Burma has since purchased arms from Italy, Switzerland, Israel, and Yugoslavia, as well as from the UK. These purchases have further diversified: the arms supply and have complicated train- ing, maintenance, and operations. 33. The Burmese would like to modernize their armed forces. However, Burma has in- © sufficient funds to support simultaneously a major modernization program of its armed forces and a modest rate of economic develop- ment. As the government is probably un- willing to accept a substantial cut-back in its economic program, Burmese military leaders are likely to seek arms on a credit or a re- duced-price basis from the US. If this ap- proach fails the Burmese may turn to the Bloc, if necessary using a portion of the eredits accumulating under existing rice barter agreements for military rather than consumer goods. The Economic Sitction 34. The Burmese economy fits the general pattern of an underdeveloped country: agri- - World War II. . most of the oil installations (including all five -refineries) were destroyed, and the principal Mines which produced lead, zinc, silver, tin, culture is the primary occupation, the export of a single commodity — rice — provides the: main source of foreign exchange and govern- ment revenues, and per capita income is well below $100 per year. 35. Burma suffered heavy damage during The rail system was wrecked, 2nd wolfram were heavily damaged. Much tice land reverted to jungle. In the postwar jieriod, widespread civil strife and banditry bas handicapped efforts to restore transporta- tion and communications facilities and has continued to disrupt agricultural production. Rehabilitation has been further retarded by the lack of incentive for foreign private capi- tal. 36. AS a result, Burma has not been able to restore its economy to prewar levels — the Brpss national product of about $1 billion in 1955? was roughly 12 percent below pre-World Wir II. Burma’s foreign trade, which pro- vices between 60 and 70 percent of Burma’s ceitral government revenues, was in calendar 1954 still only about two-thirds of the prewar level. Rice production in 1955 was about 15 percent below the prewar average of 7.4 mil- lion tons, and the export of 1.6 million tons of ricg was only half what it had been in prewar yeers. Moreover, because exports of raw materials such as timber and minerals have not been restored, rice now accounts for near- ly 30 percent of total export earnings com- pazed to a little above 40 percent before the war. 37: Burma has a considerable potential for increasing the living standards of its peopie. Pecpulation density is low (less than one- fourth that of India and only one-third greater than that of the US), and population is increasing at an annual rate of only one percent. In lower Burma, the principal agri- cultural area, the land under cultivation could probably be doubled. Although known i Data series, unless ctherwise specified, are based jon the Burmese fiscal year, 1 October-30 Sep- ‘tember. reserves of minerals and petreleum were s2ri- ously depleted in prewar years, geological formations suggest the existence of undis- covered subsoil deposits. Timber reserves are large. Hydroelectric potential is consider- able. The country has excellent natural har- bors, extensive inland waterways, and a basic rail and highway network. 38. However, Burma’s ability to exploit its potential is hampered by the primitive nature of its economy, & Jack of capital and particn- jarly a stringency in foreign exchange re- sources, a lack of competent administrators and trained technicians, and continued civil disorder. Moreover, fhe buik of the Burmese people has by tradition and by temperament been relatively uninterested in material prog- ress. 39. Economic development program. In 1952 the government initiated an eight-year $1.6 bi2ion development program. The over-all goal of the program was to raise Burma’s na- tional product from about $780 million to about $1,500 million in 1960 in constant prices. However, the program goals would ‘raise per capita output only four percent above prewar levels. Formulated with the aid of American consultants, the program en- visaged the development of a more balanced agricultural economy reinforced by a modest industrial sector. 40. Increased output wa‘; to be sought pri- marily through investment in agriculture, mining, and forestry, with supplementary in- vestment in transport, communication, and power facilities. Crude petroleum output was to be only one-third of prewar production, railways were to equa) prewar Jevels, and pro- duciion in forestry, electric power, and crops like cotton and peanuts were to exceed prewar levels. The pian also called for fairiy heavy investment in health, housing, and education, including technical training. However, the various parts of the plan have never been fully coordinated. 41. The government hoped that about a third of the total planned investment would be undertaken entirely by private enterprise. LP Taree mara mreapteevenne omarysnen anette npetpteres mm saat The government was to be responsible for the remainder either alone or in partnership with private enterprise. The government was counting on its sizeable foreign exchange re- serve and the earnings of government enter- prises, particularly the rice monopoly, to pro- vide its share of investment capital and to finance necessary imports. Foreign exchange requirements of the plan were estimated to be about $575 million over the eight-year period. The estimates of domestic capital and foreign exchange resources available to support the program were based primarily on the assumption that international rice prices would remain at about the 1951 level. 42. Burma’s economic crisis. In 1953 the price of rice declincd sharply. Asa result, the value of Burma’s rice exports fell from $214 million in 1953 to $169 million in 1954. More- over, even though the volume of rice exports increased slightly in the latter year, a surplus of rice began to accumulate as Burmese pro- duction rose. The volume of exports was probably less than it might have been because of the government’s reluctance to adjust its prices to the market. 43. As a result of the sharp Gecline in export earnings and a rising level of imports, Burma in 1954 suffered a balance of payments deficit © of about $87 million, the first since 1948. Moreover, the sieady growth of GNP was drastically checked. GNP in current prices (US $ millions) 1951 TIS 1952 858 1953 970 1954 962 1955 1,016 (estimated) 44. The Burmese government, apparently hoping that the price trend would be reversed or that substantial foreign capital could be obtained, took no action until mid-1955 to reduce nonessential imports or the rate of domestic investment. Indeed, domestic in- vestment continued to increase: i Investment as percentage of GNP 1952 18 percent 1953 19 percent 1954 22 pereent 1955 27 percent To maintain this rate, the government re- sorted to deficit financing, which created a serious budgetary situation. Government financial transactions for the first 11 months of FY 1955 (exclusive of borrowing from the banking system) showed a deficit of about $65 rnillion compared with a surplus of about $29 million for the first 11 months of FY 1954. Moreover, the government depleted its for- eign exchange reserves, which fell from $272 million in June 1953 to the critically low level of $76 million in July 1955. , 45. During 1955 and early 1956 the Burmese government took a series of actions to meet the foreign exchange crisis. For immediate relief if: (a) negotiated with India a $42 million-equivalent rupee eredit, convertible ‘into sterling; (b) obtained from the Interna- ticnal Monctary Fund a $15 million foreign exchange credit; (c) concluded negotiations with the US for $21 million in surplus agri- cultural products under PL 480; and (d) re- duced consumer goods imports. Burma is negotiating with the IBRD for loans of $21-24 million covering a series of projects, and some of this assistance is likely to mate- rialize this year. Burmese officials have also approached the US for loans. 46. In addition, under the terms of the 1954 reparation agreement with Japan, Burma will receive some $20 million worth of goods in each of the next ten years. The Japanese have also agreed to invest up to $50 million in joint undertakings in which the Burmese are to have a 60 percent interest. To improve its internal finances the Burmese government has, in the 1956 budget, reduced the invest- ment item to about one-third below the 1955 level, and has raised excise taxes. 47. The Burmese government has given some encouragement to domestic and foreign pri- vate investment. Except in the sectors re- served for public ownership, the government will give a ten-year guarantce against nation- faa ee eae _ asain eka aca sig ces ae Eclat Soca aS ea as Sr ; | | alization, equitable compensation in the event of nationalization after the agreed pericd, permission to remit current earnings and repatriate investment, and other privileges. With respect to foreign private investment, the government appears to be interested pri- marily in joint ventures on an operating contract basis. Most significant instances of private participation thus far are in joint ventures for the exploitation of lead, silver, zinc, and petroleum. 48. Burma has also taken action to increase the quantity and quality of its agricultural production and to develop new markets. It has made plans to obtain Israeli and Soviet agricultural advisors, and is seeking techni- cal assistance from the Internationa: Bank. Most importantly, the government took steps to ease its rice surplus situation and its foreign exchange shortage by the conclusion of government-to-government barter agree- ments. In addition to agreements with Yugo- Slavia, Israel, Indonesia, Japan, and India, major deals were concluded with the Sino- Soviet Bloc. However, Burma in March 1956 still had a surplus of some 600,000 tons of rice. 49. Economic relations with the Communist Bloc. Beginning in November 1954, Burma entered into a series of barter agreements with Communist China, the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. As a result, Burmese exports to the Bloc, which had previously averaged about one percent of Burma’s total trade, and most of which went to Communist China, rose during calendar 1955 to around $45 million, or almost 20 percent of total Burmese exports. If all agreements with the Bloc which have been concluded or are pending are fully imple- mented, Burma’s annual rate oi exports to the Bloc could reach a level of $'70-90 million, or equivalent to a quarter to one-third of Burma’s estimated 1956 exports.* °This projection includes a supplementary ar- rangement with the USSR, signed in April 1956, which raises Burmese rice exports to the USSR from 150-300,060 tons to 400,000 tons for each of the next four years, and a 3-year agreement with Rumania, signed in February 1956, for around 207,000 tons of rice annually. 50. These deals with the Bloc have substan- tially boosted the immediate prospects for the export of rice, but the total gain to Burma is not yet clear. Some skepticism has been voiced in Burma over the quality, price, and delivery schedules cf Bloc goods. Moreover, since the Bloc countries offered capital equip- ment and the services of technicians in re- turn for the rice, the Burmese are having to modify various programs to fit the types and kinds of Bloc equipment available to them. Concern is also felt regarding the re-export of rice to Burma’s traditional markets. 51. Burma’s economic prospects. The volume of production in ail fields on which statistical information is available has been climbing steadily since 1950, and there are a number of factors which favor continued economic progress. These include a steady growth of fixed capital formation, some recognition that private enterprise or investment has a role to play, employment of skilled foreign tech- nical advisors, the gradual training of Bur- mese technicians, increasing experience in management, the Japanese reparations agree- ments, and the financial assistance which is available or probably will be forthcoming from India, the United States, and the IBRD. 52. However, there are a number of obstacles to continued economic progress: continued insurgency in many parts of the country, and the lack of experienced government officials, capable managers for industrial enterprise, and skilled workers. Finally, Burma’s eco- nomic progress will remain dependent on the export of rice at a time when the world market price for rice remains depressed. Foreign Relations 53. In terms of basic values, Burma remains oriented toward the free world and the West, put a fear of provoking Communist China, and residual anticolonial sentiment, have led to the adoption of a foreign policy position in- dependent of the major power blocs. Although the AFPFL leadership is united on the basic objectives of Burma’s foreign policy, its direc- tion and moralistic tone are often attributable to Prime Minister U Nu. He has increasingly sought an active role in world affairs, in the x ry belief that Burma can act as a mediator be- tween the great powers. His apparent will- ingness to accept Sino-Soviet pledges at face _ value while questioning the motives of the Western powers frequently has led U Nu to take positions favorable to the Bloc. Within the past year, moreover, Burma’s econornic difficulties have provided the basis for a sig- nificant expansion in Bloc-Burmese relations. D4. Relations with the West. Because inde- pendence was achieved without violence, Burma’s anticolonialism has lacked the viru- lence exhibited in some former colonies. The majority of Burmese prefer the democratic system as developed in the West, and several Burmese have publicly described the Soviet system as a new form of imperialism. Bur- mese-British relations, in particular, have been cordial and the Burmese government gives a respectful hearing to official British opinions. 55. Ail Burmese state scholars and virtually all private students (except overseas Chinese) going abroad for study still go to the US or to other free nations. The great majority of printed and visual information media are non- Communist in nature. The government sanc- tions the anti-Communist publishing program of the Burma Translation Society, and several of the lay Buddhist societies have anti-Com- munist overtones. Some responsible officials frequently reiterate a preference for Western rather than Bloc ecenomic and technical as- sistance, were it possible to pay for it with surplus rice and to avoid political commit- ments. 56. Anticolonialist attitudes persist, nonethe- less, and to a considerable degree the United States has inherited Britain’s former position as the principal “imperialist” threat. While no responsible Burmese suspects the US of coveting Burmese territory, there has in the past been considerable apprehension lest Burma and other weak nations fall victim to some new and perhaps unintended form of economic impcrialism. Moreover, US-Bur- mese relations have been strained by the activ- ities of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars, and more recently by US sales of rice in Asian mar- kets. The Burmese are crifical of the US position on such matters as trade controls, Taiwan, and disarmament, and they feel that US policy in general is too inflexible and too narrowly centered on the military aspects of the Communist threat. The Burmese also fear that too close alignment with the US or the West might provoke Communist China or lead to involvement in war. These fears and irritants account in large measure for Burma’s reluctance to undertake not only the pledges required in US legislation but even im- plied political commitments in return for the receipt of economic and military assistance. 57. Despite these complications, the Burmese recognize the need for good relations with the US. Although Burma felt obliged to cancel the US technical assistance program in 1953 when it brought the Chinese Nationalist troops issue to the UN, the government re- tained private US firms to fulfill some of the projects. Under appropriate conditions, the Burmese would probably like to obtain US arms and economic and technical assistance. 58, Relations with non-Communist Asian states. Since independence, Burmese-Indian relations have been close, and Burma’s inter- national policy has been similar to that of India. Burma’s ties with other Asian neigh- bors were slow to develop, but the increased importance of these relations has been re- flected in membership in the Arab-Asian . group in the UN, planning of the Bandung Conference, and participation in the Colombo Plan. In addition, Burma was the prime mover in staging the Sixth World Buddhist Council in Rangoon, and in organizing the Asian Socialist Conference. Past relations with Thailand and the Philippines have been minimal, due to the feeling that these coun- tries were tied too closely with the US, and, in the case of Thailand, because of the long history of conflict. Relations with Thailand have improved greatly during the past year, but Burma has no interest in following Thai- land into such direct relationships with the US as SEATO provides. 59. Despite the bitterness caused by wartime . ocrupation and destruction, Burmese-Japa- nese relations have developed on an increas- ingly friendly basis since the conclusion of a Saeaeee: TOA LS SE NE CAT POET I NET! ARES OREN PENI TAO Hert THe | aban ceg- a” nn Se See ee racmaer ze ea reparations agreement in September 1954. The Burmese appear to welcome Japanese par- ticipation in Burma’s economic development. 60. Relations with the Bloc. Burma was the first non-Communist nation to extend recog- nition to the Peiping regime, acting from a combination of: (a) fear of possible encroach- ment by a powerful neighbor which histori- cally had shown expansionist tendencies whenever unified and strong; (b) vicarious pride in the emergence of a strong Asian na- tion; and (c) distaste for the Chinese Nation- alist government. Since 1952, relations with Communist China have grown steadily ciaser. Burmese interest and admiration has bean aroused by the Chinese Communist economic deveiopment program, and Burmese cistaste for the ruthlessness of Chinese methods is tempered by an uneasy awe of Chinese mate- rial accomplishments. A series of cultural, religious, and athletic missions have been exchanged, a major bilateral trade agreement was signed in April 1954, and U Nu made an official visit to Peiping in December 1954. Burma favors the admission of Communist China to the UN and during the past year has publicly supported Peiping’s claims to Taiwan. 61. As a result of U Nu’s visit to Peiping, the large Chinese Communist embassy staff in Rangoon has been supplemented by a consu- late at Lashio, which could further facilitate Chinese contacts with Burmese Communists as well as with Overseas Chinese. The re- opening of the Burma road and agreements on postal facilities and air transport will in- crease direct contact and permit Chinese flights into Burma. The 1955 renewal of the trade agreement again permits Chinese Com- munist purchases of commodities which, if shipped, could create a barrier to US assist- ance through conflicts with provisions of the Battle Act. 62. Chinese governmcats have long claimed — at least through official maps — considerable territory the Burmese consider theirs, and the agreement concluded during U Nu’s visit to Peiping in 1954 called for negotiations to set- tle these boundary questions. If these nego- tiations eventuate, Burma’s stand on. the force in the AFPi'L, border issue may provide a test of Burmese readiness to resist Chinese Communist en- croachment. 63. Until the past year, Burmese-Sovict rela- tions had not been close. Although the USSR recognized Burma soon after independence, the official line followed by most Communist parties until 1951-1952 was that the Burmese government was 2 surviving “tool of the im- perialists.” However, in July 1955 a barter agreement was concluded in which the USSR agreed to exchange industrial equipment for surplus Burmese rice. Soon afterwards Blec leaders began to praise Burma for its inde- pendent status and its posture of neutrality. The growing rapprochement was highlighted - by an exchange of visits--U Nu journeying tc Mczeow in October and Khrushchev and Builganin touring Burma for nine days in De- cember. In the joint communiques issued in conjunction with these visits, Burma endorsed many of the major themes in Soviet propa- ganda, and agreements were made for Burma to obtain Soviet technical assistance, in addi- tion fo capital equipment, in exchange for its rice. li. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS Internal Developments 64. The AFPFL will almost certainly win the elections in the spring of 1956 with a large majority because of its control of the election machinery, the lack of an effective opposition, and the general acceptance of AFPFL policies. The new government will probably again be a broad coalition, and U Wu will probably re- — main as Prime Minister because of his national prestige and because he serves as a unifying It is possible that the Socialists will feel themselves wel] enough organized to form a government which did not include U Nu. Such a development, however, would probably not result in major changes in Burma’s domestic and foreign. policies. 65. The BWPP may increase its representation slightly in the parliament, but its over-all position will probably not be greatly strength- ened in the short run by the increase in Burmese-Bloc relations. The organizational strength of the BWPP would be improved if scSialiabelbng T the BCP guerrilia cadres should obtain an amnesty. The Communist insurgents are un- likely to accept present terms for surrender, but will continue to maneuver for a cease-fire on terms that provide them some credit for making peace and some provision for resum- ing overt political activity. 66. Ethnic minority dissatisfaction with gov- ernment policies will continue, but the gov- ernment will probably be successful in preventing secession. The strength of the in- surgents will probably be further weakened, but dissident and bandit activity will continue to place a heavy burden on government finances and to hamper economic develop- ment. : 67. During the next year or so Burma will confront the same economic problems that have impeded its progress for the last two years. At the same time, it will probably have larger resources at its disposal, chiefly from deliveries under Sino-Soviet commitments and assistance from non-Communist sources. Bal- . ance of paymenis and fiscal problems will continne as long as the price of rice remains depressed and the availability of other export commodities does not materially increase. Production from new projects will not begin to save significant amounts of foreign ex- change for at least the next two or three years. To carry out even its recently curtailed devel- opment program, Burma will have to be suc- cessful in disposing of its increasing rice production. Unless free world markets in- crease substantially, Burma will remain sus- ceptible to Bloc barter agreements. Burma will probably receive sizeable amounts of aid from the US and UN agencies, and may draw upon a large credit from India and from Japa- nese reparations. The government is unlikely further to relax current resirictions on for- eign private capital. 68. It is unlikely that economic conditions in themselves will affect internal stability during the next year or so. The increese in national output is expected to continue at a sufficiently high rate to permit a steady growth in per capita consumption. Judging by the general apathy of the population thus far towards ‘ kets. government economic policies, it is unlikely that the state of the economy will become a popular political issue, Probable Trends in Burma's Orientation 69. Burma is now a major target of Bloc efforts to extend its influence by political, economic, and psychological means. During the short run, the Bloc will probably attempt only to reinforce Burma’s tendency to adopt positions similar to the Communists on cer- tain international issues and to establish con- ditions favorable to the increase of Commu- nist influence within burma. In the long ' term, Bloc leaders may hope to reduce Burma to a virtual captive of the Bloc through a combination of economic pressures and united front maneuvers, which could be reinforced - at any time by the application of military threats along Burma’s long frontier with China. 70. During the next year or two Burma, de- Spite Bloc tactics, will almost certainly try to continue to balance its economic and po- litical relations between the West and. the Bloc. There will probably be no important internal pressures for closer political alien- ment with the Bloc, and Burma will continue - to have a variety of economic ties with the ‘West and non-Communist Asian countries, including the Japanese reparations agree- ment, the US PL 480 program, the Colombo Plan, and the sale of rice in traditional mar- On the other hand, Burma’s economic relations with the Bloc will probably increase, and Bloc trade may account for 30 percent of total Burmese trade. While trade of this © magnitude with the Bloc carries potential dangers, the Burmese government will con- tinue to have room to maneuwver to avoid Bloc political pressures for at least the next year. W1. However, in the longer run the situation in Burma, combined with Bloc capabilities, offers the Bloc important advantages in pur- suit of its long-range objectives. Because of its political organization, the Bloc can nezoti- ate economic agrecments quickly. It offers long term credits at low interest rates, and can accept agricultural and other raw ma- terials in payment for capital goods or as service on credits. It is able to exploit Burma’s anticolonial sentiments and desire to remain free of foreign entanglements by offering economic arrangements on the basis of “mutual self-help” with “no strings attached.” Burmese receptivity to Bloc offers has been increased by the continuing decline in the world market price for rice, the com- plexities of economic negotiations with the US, and the disposition of some Burmese leaders to take Bloc assurances at face value . while remaining distrustful of Western in- tentions. 72. If the Bloc exercises skill and restraint, and if non-Communist markets for Burmese rice do not expand, the situation favors a con- siderable growth of Communist influence in Burma. Economic commitments already made will tend to increase Burmese-Bloc eco- nomic intercourse. Accordingly, Burma is likely to become dependent on the Bloc in many instances for maintenance and repair, supplies, and servicing. There will probably be a relatively heavy influx of technicians and experts accompanying this equipment, assist- ing in agriculturai development, and staffing the new technical institute. To some extent these people will encroach on the area in which non-Bloc assistance is being or may be offered. 73. In the resulting atmosphere of increased goodwill towards the Bloc, the BWPP might be strengthened by adding BCP cadres and by luring additional independents and some socialists into a new opposition group. The appeal of Communism, and particularly the attraction of Communist methods of building an industrial economy, would probably in- crease among students. Direct Communist influence in the government would probably be increased. 74. If the Bloc were able to convince the Burmese that it should accept a large credit in order to accelerate its economic develop- ment, the Bloc’s opportunity for exercising influence in Burma would expand significant- ly. Such credits in addition to the existent level of trade with the Bloc would orient the Burmese economy foward the Bloc on a long term basis, and Western influence would be sharply curtailed. 75. However, there are also obstacles to the success of Bloc tactics in Burma. There is no significant political prez:ure on the govern- ment to drop its present pay-as-you-go policy on development, and, unless it does so, Burma is unlikely to increase greatly its present de- gree of economic dependence on the Bloc. Burmese economic ties with the West are substantial; Burma’s leaders have no desire to become economic dependents of any bloc; and Burma wilt prefer to export to the maxi- mum extent possible to markets where it can earn convertible currencies. Despite in- creases in economic and cultural relations with the Bioc, Burmese nationalism, Bud- dhism, and memories of past Communist in- trigues will tend to discourage the develop- ment of a strong domestic Communist move- ment. 76. The actual course of events in Burma will also be influenced by a number of contingen- cies, particularly Cammunist conduct and Western courses of action. Communist pros- pects would be adversely affected if Bloc representatives appearcc to meddie in domes- tic Burmese affairs or if the Bioc moved too soon to extract concessions. Kyaw Nyein and. impor tant_anny leaders. are believed to.be con- cerned t that Burma is already too dependent ~~ Sharp. increases in Bloc influ- change “pr “even “to pone Lis Burmese vigilance would also be increased by Chinese Communist aid to dissident or Overseas Chi- nese elements in Burma, or by excessive Chi- nese claims during boundary negotiations. Moreover, Burmese distrust of the Commu- nists would also be stimulated by clear-cut Communist aggression in Laos, and possibly Vietnam or even Taiwan. 77. Communist prospects would also be af- fected adversely if Bloc economic performance falls seriously short of expectations, or if Bur- mese economic relations with the non-Com- munist countries expanded significantly. The delivery schedules and quality of Bloc capital goods may suffer in comparison with Western performance. Communist China has already evidenced difficulty in providing more than nonessential consumer goods in return for Burmese rice and rubber. The Burmese have 14 been disturbed. by Communist China’s sale of rice to Ceylon, and this concern would be intensified should the Bloc re-export increas- ing amounts of Burmese rice to traditional ‘Burmese markets. TIA LANE go POPE ta ea Sic nea nae GENE ” i j a i i. H i i { { 3 ; i ! j i 1 : i i i i i i ; i i i i 3 i 4 i d i 4 SSH at a" . SS BORONGA.15, ean A, ww cuepuea NE BAY OF BENGAL “<5 PREPARIS 5, ouse UNOS BURMA — ——o-=m— Dwision of state boundary (1954) ——+— Selected railroad ————— Selected connecting road ® Natonal capital ie © _ Dwision of state headquerters Selected canal Cross-ruled aces comprice the states sad spacial division ef the Union of Burma. internatonal Boundanes KLEE, demarcated LEIS ondemarcatet W indebnite ‘Scale 1:9,400,000 o a5 8D TZN Mdes ‘- YB 40° SO LAr Auometers CAR NICOBAR uNaD fomauing ” 5 ; 's _ . Yenangtaune & AGW ‘ x & i itty ater) ANDAMAN ce SEA Sn gs a SL ae . ay