Ethical Studies (F. H. Bradley, 1876) ========================================================== The great idealist ethics: self-realization against hedonism and Kantian formalism. Public domain. Internet Archive full text (ethicalstudies00bradgoog). Google This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online. It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover. 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BRADLEY FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD -• J J .J ^ -' , V J -^ J 3 u Die Philosophic m>U nicht erst die substamtielle Wahrheir geben, tiocl^^&it d'tk" * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Menschhelt erst atif die Philosophic /u warlen gchabt. urn das Bewudjtseyn d«7" „. ' :^ j; Wahrheit zu empfangcn.— Hegel. -._'^ '^*^ jo--^ ^ b J » • J t -f « t* ^ ANASTATIC REPRINT 1904. ..- : ,.;, Q.E. STECHERT & CO. NEW YORK. ' -i # J » 1 HENRY S. KING & CO., LONDON 1876 ;;;V • • • • • • • • • • ••••* «• • • • • • • .V.v. • • • • • • •• • • •••• :;;;: > • • • • •• Y::/. • 4 • • • < • • • \}y. •••• • • • % m • • • • • • •• •••• • • • • . •» • •. • ••• •• •• • • • • • • •* • ••. •• ..••• • • c • • • • •• • ••«.* • • • • • ..'•V. /7^ : 092 ^ • •' V'S^^ ;» PRE F A C E nPHE object of this volume is not the construction. of a system of Moral Philosophy. It is very far from attempting either an exhaustive or a systematic treatmeilt of- ethical questions. Nor is the Author so much as pre- pared to define the sphere of Moral Philosophy, to say what does fall within it and what does not. The writer's object in this work has been mainly critical. He sees that ethical theories rest in the end on pre- conceptions metaphysical and psychological. He believes that many of the fundamental ideas now current, especially in England, are confused or even false; and he has en- deavoured, by the correction of some of these, at least to remove what seem obstacles to the apprehension of moral facts. These Essays are a critical discussion of some lead- ing questions in Ethics, and are so far connected that, for the most part, they must be read in the order in which they stand. The writer knows how much is demanded by his task. It demands an acquaintance with the facts of the world which he does not possess ; and it demands that clearness of view on the main conceptions which govern our thoughts, which comes, if at all, to the finished student of metaphysic. The reader must not expect this either. These Essays may be dogmatic and one-sided. They ETHICAL STUDIES viii Contents. ESSA V IK PAGE DUTY FOR duty's SAKL, . . . . .128 The end is the Good Will {tzZ-rag). This is the universal form (130-131). What * ought ' means (x3i-x3aX Principle of non-contradiction (133)1 This contradicts itself (134-136). Duty and duties (X37-X38). Psychological objection (138-X39X Practical uselessness of non-contradiction (X39-X4X). Collision of duties unavoidable (X4X-X43). ESSA V V. MY STATION AND ITS DUTIES, . . . • HS Present result (X45-X46). Advance to a higher point of view (146-148). Individualism criti- cized (X48-X56). The end is realization as member of a community (157). The moral ox:gamsm seems to be the solution of ethical problems (X58-X06). Satisfactoriness of this view (x66-x7x). Relative and absolute morality (T71-X74). Intuitive character of moral judgments (X74-X80). Morality not a mere private matter (180-X83). Criticism of the above view (183-X86). Note. Rights and Duties (X87X ESSAY VL IDEAL MORALITY, . .193 No limit to the moral sphere (x93-x97)> Content of the ideal self (198-903). Collisions of moral elements (903-306). Morality not simply equal to self-realization (a»6X What it is (906-3x3)1 Difficulties as to its nature (3x2-230). In what sense is it approximative? (S90-93SX ESSA V VIL SELFISHNESS AND SELF-SACRIFICE, . * . 226 Statement and refutation of the argument for general selfishness, which is founded on the confusion as to ' motive ' (337-335X What is the idea of a pleasure ? (236). Psychological genesis of the voluptuary (337- 345). What selfishness {5(345-347^. (General problem of the good and bad self (347-348X Hereditary theory insufficient (249). Content of good and bad selves (350). Genesi« of the good self (251-261). Genesis of the bad self (36X-965X Origin of morality proper (365-37 x). Nature of the morally good and bad selves (97x-a75]t What self-sacrifice is (376). CONCLUDING REMARKS, . . . . 279 ETHICAL STUDIES. ESS A Y I. The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility in connection with THE Theories of Free-Will and Necessity, Tl rHAT is ncf the scope of this essay? We must begin with ^ ^ that, for round the phrases which appear in our title there exist * perverse associations/ which may lead our readers to expect, some this, and others that And, because we think that some of these expectations will be disappointed, we will start with saying what it is tliat we do not propose to treat of. The scope of this essay miglit have been the solution of one, or both, of two difficult problems. We might have asked what responsibility at bottom is ; whetlier it implies necessity or free- dom, and what these mean ; and then we should have come to questions of abstract metaphysic. Or again, our task might have been the limitation of our accountability with reference to legal imputation, and here we should have had a juridical enquiry. But our object is not the solution of either one or the other of these questions. What then is the end which we do set before us? It is a three fold undertaking: to ascertain first, if possible, what it is that, moughly and in general, the vulgar mean when they talk of being responsible ; to ask, in the second place, whether either of the doctrines of Freedom and Necessity (as current among our- selves) agree with their notions ; and, in case they do not agree, n ETHICAL STUDIES Ethical Studies^ substance ; he can not put them onone side, and himself on the other, and say, * It is not mine ; I never did it.' What he ever at any time has done, that he i> now ; and, when his name is called, nothing, which has ever been his, can be absent from that which answers to the name. In this (real or supposed) juridical sphere the familiar saying of Agathon, ayevf^ra frottTy d which takes on the will more than belongs to it, and hopelessness and self-desertion, which lets itself become really what it is not yet, because it thinks it is so alreadyi In morality the past is real because it is present in the will ; and con* versely, what is not present in the will is only past. Where the act was only voluntary, where there was no conscious volition, and where volition was psychically impossible, there wc are responsible only so far as we ourselves have made the impossi- bility. If this fs not so, we can plead cx)mpulsion. But we foresee the objection that will at once be made. * This doctrine,' it will be said, ' excuses well-nigh everything. For when we gp wrong, we do not always say, '* I will^ " and so act. We 44 Ethical Studies. The doctrine that our will can be forced to voluntajy acts should not, I think, alarm or distress u& It seems to me by no means an immoral doctrine; and that charge holds good £ur more against the teaching that there is alwa3rs a possibility of resistance to evil and performance of good at any moment, and under any previous and present conditions. Possibility of com^ pulsion should make us see more clearly the need of so strengthen- ing our will for good, as to make that compulsion impossible for us, except in theory. It should also make us afraid of circum- stances, of which most people seem to me not enough afraid, being encouraged in some cases by the doctrine of libertas arbitriu £ut what we, who reject that doctrine, should encourage our* selves with, is the clear fact that again and again, and by the weak^ what we should have said beforehand it was impossible to resist has been resisted, and simply because they had made their will one with the good. This is all we have to say on compulsion in relation to responr sibility, and we know we have not done justice to it The compulsion which makes irresponsible is absolute compulsion.^ Relative compulsion, no one would say, relieves us from respon- sibility ; for this means not an unconditional ' must,' bjat a ' must,' only in case I make up my mind to have this, or decide that I can not face that. Here we can collect ourselves to take which course we choose. And at this point we should stop ; but I should like to wasider beyond the subject so far as to call atlentioil to a matter ay that what solicits the character to 48 Ethical Studies. and stimulus ? If so, if the act issues from an3rthing beside the character, then it is downright false to say, ' Same character, same act ; ' unless all you mean is, ' Supposing that to take place which perhaps does not ever take place, supposing that you never had anything but character, then you would have the same act' Thus, really to appreciate the truth of ' same character, same act,' we have to keep in view, (i) That characters are alterable; (2) That acts do, or may, proceed from something beside the character. And these two qualifications, which are closely con- nected, we must try to understand more fully. Character is fixed, but only relatively fixed. When we see how the first comes about, we see that the latter is true. The material of the character is disposition in relation to circumstances. The character is what I have made myself into from these elements, and the reason it remains fixed is that the conditions have so to speak been used up and realized into the individuality. What I am I have made myself, out of, in relation to, and against my raw material with its external conditions. The external con- ditions are more or less permanent, and the raw material is more or less systematized. Hence well-nigh everything is now subsumed under, and takes its quality from my character. The self is more and more determined and realized, and so excludes possibilities, fixes and closes itself; in short, gets hardened. Hence, knowing a man to be a certain system (conscious or unconscious), we can tell how things wiD present themselves to him, and how he will manifest himself against particular stimuli. And we say the man is settled and made, and we know what he is and have a practical certainty that he win always keep so, because we are sure that nothing will happen to him which he has not had before in some form, and which has not some principle in his character under which it will be brought. This is what we mean by the character being fixed. But the fixedness is not more than relative. There is always a theoretical possibility of change, and sometimes a good deal more than this. The reason is twofold, (i) We can not exhaust all possible external conditions; (2) We can never systematize the whole self. (i) You never can say, a man has withstood all sorts of tempta- tions and all combinations of them ; and thus there remains the theoretical possibility of some unknown and fatal kind. And (2) the man's self and his chaiacter never quite coincide. The diaracter is always the narrower; and moreover, its materials shift, or may shift This must be, because a man's body changes through change of climate, disease, or af e, and so too 50 Ethical Studie^^ chaotic, it must be variable and subject to mere accident ; nor, .^ven a fresh combinaition of the elements, so far as I can se«, is It possible theoretically to deduce the result The result is not a mere * resultant' It has been remarked that before the time comes it is not possible to have an absolutely certain knowledge, how we shall act The reason partly, no doubt, is that particular knowledge of details is wanting to us; but this is not ail the reason. The act does not answer to the mere theoretical application of a principle. The desire in the presence of the object can not be excluded from the calculation, nor can that desire always be fore- realized by the presentation of the object before the understanding and imagination. In tSie act the wiU is the reaction of the wh(^ self against the presented object, and we can know how that will be determined^ only so far as the self, which we have not halHtu- ated and do not know, can be excluded. Thus the self we have habituated ourselves into, is the only self to be counted on, and so none of us are quite safe. Many of us show selves to ourselves and the world, which are not the realization of another element which we take about with us, and which quietly, or it may be longingly, remains below the * floor of consciousness,' perhaps never to appear, perhaps to burst out in we know not what, in light and love, or in • dkt and fire.' But this should be a mere theoretical possibility ; and if it really comes about, yet the self that we know should be strong enough to make the best of it This consideration (though in most cases there is little need for it) will help to explain mysterious conversions and changes; but we must bring this npte to an end. Our result is that we may have practical certainty that a man will not change ; and hence, knowing his ways, we may be pretty sure what he will do. But since the conditions he will meet with can not be theoretically exhausted, and his habituated self does not cover his whole nature, therefore theoretical possibility of fresh act and change of character remains ; ' and this is important ; for we see, on the whole, that it is only a part of the facts which is covered by ' same character and stimulus, same act' • This !>ears on a practical difficulty. Olten we feel tolerably sure ^at this or that old reprobate is hopelessly hardened^ but we can not sav there is n» chance of his tuminfr agaiia. Hence the theoretical justification o/fhe practical religious maxiai not to give up auy man as lo^t. 52 Ethical Studies. even define them theoretically; and keep them distinct ? Is the opposite of a false view always true? Is it not much rather often (and always in some spheres) just as false?'; and to both, 'So long as you refuse to read raetaphysicy so long will meta- physical abstractions prey upon ^ Or to put the same thing in a ghtly different way. "^^e all wani- freedom. Well then, what is freedom? * It means not being made to do or be anything. " Free " means " free frotn*^ * And are we to be quite free ? * Yes, if freedom is good, we can not have too much of it* Then, if * free '=r 'free yn^w,' to be quite free is to be free from everything— -free from other men, free from law, from morality, from thought, from sense, from — Is there anything we are not to be free from ? To be free from everything is to be — nothing. Only nothing is quite free, and freedom is abstract nothingness. If in death we cease to be anything, then there first we are free, because there first we are — not. Every one sees this is not the freedom we want * " Free " is " free from," but then / am to be free. It is absuid to think that I am to be free from myself. I am to be free to exist and to assert mysel£' Well and good; but this is not what we began with. Freedom now means the self-assertion which is nothing ^/ self-assertion. It is not merely negative — it is also positive, and negative only so far as, and because, it is positive. * I am to assert myself and nothing else, and this is freedom.' So far as this goes we quite agree ; but it tells us scarcely anything. I am to assert myself, but then what action doa assert myself; or rather, what action does nvf assert myself? And if I am to assert nothing ^t myself,vWhat can I do, so as to do this and nothing but this ? What, in snort, ts this self, the assertion of which is freedom ? * Mv self,' we shall hear, * is what is mine; and mine is what is not yours, or what does not belong to any one else. I am free when I assert my private will, the will peculiar to me.' Can this hold? Apart from any other objection, is it freedom? Suppose I am a glutton and a drimkard ; in these vices I assert my private will ; im 1 then free so far as a glutton and drunkard, oi am I a slave — the slave of my appetites ? The answer must be, * The slave of his lusts is, so far, not a free man. The man is free who realizes his true self.' Then the whole question is, What is this true self, and c-an it be found apart from something like law ? Is there any * perfect freedom' which does not mean * service ' ? Reflection shows us that what we call freedom is both positive and negative. There are then two questions — What am 1 to be free to assert? What am 1 to be free from? And these are answered by the answer to one question^ — What is my true self? 54 Ethical Studies. we believe is false. Bath virtue and the asking Why? seem rational, and yet incompatible one with the other ; and the better course will be, not forthwith to reject virtue in (avour of the question, but rather to inquire concerning the nature of the Why ? Why should I be virtuous ? Why should 1 ? Could anything be more modest ? Could an5rthing be less assuming? It is not a dogma; it is only a question. And yet a question may contain (perhaps must contain) an assumption more or less hidden ; or, in other words, a dogma. Let us see what is assumed in the asking of our question. In * Why should I be moral ? * the ' Why should I ? ' was another way of saying. What good is virtue ? or rather. For what is it good ? and we saw that in asking, Is viitue good as a means, and how so ? we do assume that virtue is not good, except as a means. The dogma at the root of the question is hence clearly either (i) the general statement that only means are good ; or (2) the particular assertion of this in the case of virtue. To explain; the question For what? V^hereto? is either uni- versally applicable, or not so. It holds everjrwhere, or we mean it to hold only here. Let us suppose, in the first place, that it is meant to hold everywhere. Then (i) we are taking for granted that nothing is good in itself; that only the means to something else are good ; that * good/ in a word, = ' good for,' and good for something else. Such is the general canon by which virtue would have to be measured. No one perhaps would explicitly put forward such a canon, and yet it may not be waste of time to examine it The good is a means : a means is a means to .something else, and this is an end. Is the end good ? No ; \^ we hold to our general canon, it is not good as an end : the good was alwuys good fc^ something else, and was a means. To be good, the end raus( be a means, and so on for ever in a process which has no limit. If we ask now What is good ? we must answer, There is nothing which is not good, for there is nothing which ms^y not be regarded as conducing to something outside itself Everything is relative to something else. And the essence of the good is to exist by virtue of something else and something else for ever. Everything 56 Ethical Studies. we have, I hope, made it clear that the question Why should I be moral? rests on the assertion of an end in itself, which is not morality ; ^ and a point of this importance must not be taken for granted. It is quite true that to ask Why should I be moral? is ipsofacU to take one view of mprality, is to assume that virtue is a means to something not itself. 3ut it is a mistake to suppose that the general, asking of Why? affords any presumption in &vour of^ or against, ajiy one theory. If any theory could stand upon the What for ? as a rational formula, which must always hold good and be satisfied ; then, to that extent, no doubt it would have an advan- l tage. But we have seen that all doctrines alike must reject the I What for ? and agree in this rejection, if they agree in nothing ^ else ; since, they all must have an end which is not a mere means. And if so, is it not foolish to suppose that its giving a reason for virtue is ^ny argument in favour of Hedonism, when for its own eiid it can give no reason at all ? Is it not clear that, if yoii have any Ethics, you must have an end which is above the Why? in the sense of What for ? ; and that, if this is so, the question is now, as it was two thousand years ago, .Granted that there is an ^viA^ what is this end? And the asking that question, as reason and history both tell us, is not in itself the presupposing of a Hedonistic answer, or any other answer. The claim of pleasure to be the end, we are to discuss in .another paper. But what is clear at first sight is, that jto tak e virtue^a&.a mere. means to an ulterior end is in dir e ct antagoni sm to the voice of the moral consciousness. That consciousness, when unwarped by selfishness and not blinded by sophistry, is convinced that to ask for the Why ? is simple immorality ; to do good for its own sake is virtue, to do it for some ulterior end or object, not itself good, is never virtue ; and never to act but for the sake of an end, other than doing well and right, is the mark of vice. And the theory which sees in * *The question itself [Why should I do right?] can not be put, except in a form which assumes that the Utilitarian answer is the only one which can possibly be given. . . . The words "Why should I" mean "What ^aU f get by," *• What motive have 1 for " this or that course of conduct ? * — Stephfn, Liberty t Ac, p. 361, ed. ii. 58 Ethical Studv^. satisfied, and so far as you are satisfied, do see whether It is not because^ and so far as, you are false to your theory; so far as yoa are living not directly with a view to the pleasant, but with a view to something else, or with no view at all, but, as you would call it, without any * reason.' We believe that, in your heart, your end is what ours is, but that about this end you not only are sorely mistaken, but in your heart you feel and know it; or at least would do so, if you would only reflect. And more than this I think we ought not to say. What more are we to say? If a man asserts total scepticism, y^yk-tssi not argue with him. You can show that he omtradicts •himself; but if he says, * I do not care' — there is an end of it So, too, if a man sayjs, ' I shall do what I like, because I happen to like it ; and as for ends, I recognize none' — ^you may indeed show him that his conduct is \n fact otherwise ; and if he will assert anything as an end, if he will but say, *I have no end but myself/ then you may argue with him, and try to prove that he is making a mistake as to the nature of the end he alleges. But if he says, ^ I care not whether I am nioral or rational, nor how much 1 con- tradict myself,' then argument ceases. We, who have the power, believe that what is rational (if it is not yet) ait lea^t is to be real, moral philosophy, unless that has to do with the means whereby we are simply to get pleasure or avoid pain. The theory not only confuses morality and religion, but reduces them both to deliberate selfishness. Fear of criminal proceedings in the other world does not tell us what is morally sight in this world. It merely gives a selfish motive for obedience to those who believe^ and leaves those who do not believe, in all cases with less motive, in some cases with none^ I can. not forbear remarking that, so far as jbj experience goes, where future .punishments are firmly believed in, the fear of tliem has, in most cases, but little influence, on the- mind. And the: facts do not allow us to consider the fear of punishment in this world as the main motive to morality. In most cases there is,, properly speaking, «v ulterior motive. A man is moral because he likes being moral ; and he likes it^ partly because he has been brought up to tlie habit of liking it, and partly because he finds it gives him what he wants, while its opposite docs not do so. He is not as a rule kept 'straight * by the contemplation of evils to be inflicted on him from the outside ; and the shame he feels at the bad opinion of otheis is hot a mere external evil, and is not feared simply as such. In short, a man is a human being, something larger than the abstraction of an actual or possible criminaL 6o Ethical Studies. will be said, • which are not myself, which fall outside my activity, and which, nevertheless, I do realize, and think I ought to realize.' We must try to show that the objection rests upon a misunder- standing; and, as a statement of fact, brings with it insuperable difficulties. Let us first go to the moral consciousness, and see what that tells us about its end. Morality implies an end in itself: we take that for granted. Something is to be done, a good is to be realized. But that result is, by itself, not morality : morality differs from art, in that it can not make the act a mere means to the result Yet there is a means. There is not only something to be done, but something to be done by me — / must do the act, must realize the end. Morality implies both the something to be done, and the doin^ of it by me; and if you consider them as end and means, you can not separate the end aiid the means. If you chose to change the position of end and means, and say my doing is the end, and the * to be done ' is the means, you would not violate the moral con- // sciousness; for the truth is that means and end are not applicatie ' here. The act for me means my act, and there is no end beyond the act. This we see in the belief that failure may be equivalent , morally to success — in the saying, that there is nothing good except /a good will In short, for morality the end implies the act, and the act implies self-realization. This, if it were doubtful, j would be shown (we may remark in passing) by the feeling of \ pleasure which attends the putting forth of the act For if I pleasure be the feeling of self, and accompany the act, this 1 indicates that the putting forth of the act is also the putting j forth of the seli^ But we must not lay too much stress on the moral conscious- ness, for we shall be reminded, perhaps, that not only can it be, but, like the miser's consciousness, it frequently has been ex- plained ; and that both states of mind are illusions generated on one and the same principle. I^et us then dismiss the moral consciousness, and not trouble ourselves about what we think we ought to do ; let us try to show that what we do do, is, perfectly or imperfectly, to realize ourselves, and that we can not possibly do anything else ; that all we can 6t2 Ethical Studies. practically when I see that the engine is going to run off the line, and it lioes so. A desired object (as desired) is a thought, and my thought; but it is something moi^, and that something more is, in short, that it is desired by me. And we ought by tight, before we go furthei, to exhibit a theory of desire ; but, if we could do ^at, we could / not stop to do it However, we say with confidence that, in desiie, . ^ what is desired must in all cases be self. If we could accept the theory that the end or motive is always the idea of a pleasure (or pain) of our own, which is associated with the object presented, and which is thai in the object which moves us, and the only thing which does move us, then from such a view itr would follow at once that all we can aim at is a state of ourselves. We can not, however, accept the theory, since we believe it both to ignore and to be contrary to facts (see Essay VIl.) ; but, though we do not admit that the motive is always, or in most cases, the idea of a state of our feeling self, yet we think it is d^r that V nothing moves unless it be desired, and that what is desired is. ourself. For all objects or ends have been associated with oqir satisfaction, or (more correctly) have been felt in and as our- selves, or we have felt ourselves therein ; and the only reason why they move us now is that, when they are presented to our mindg as motives, we do now feel ourselves asserted or affirmed m them. The essence of desire for an object Would thus be the feeling of our affirmation in the idea of something not ourself, felt against the feeling of ourself as, without the object, void and negated ; and it is the tension of this relation which produces motion. If so, thai nothing is desired except tha,t which is iden tified with oursel v^ sund we can aim at nothing, except so far as we aim ^aLOUiEsdxeSL in it But passing \sy the above, which we can not here expound and which we lay no stress on, we think that the reader will probably go with us so far as this, that in desire what we want, so far as we want it, is ourselves in some form, or is some state of ourselves ; and that our wanting anything else would be psychologically inexplicable. Let us take this for granted then ; but is this what we mean by 64 Ethical Studies, in the body of acts which carry it out. We need not stop here, because the existence of larger ends, which embrace smaller ends, can not be doubted ; and so far we may say that the self we \' realize is identified with, wholes, or that the ideas of the states of self we realize are associated with ideas that stand for wholes. But is it also true that these larger wholes are included in one whole ? I think that it is. I am not forgetting that we act, as a rule, r\o\, from principle or with the principle before us, and I wish the reader not to forget that the principle may be there and may • be our basis or our goal, without our knowing anything about it And here, of course, I am not saydng that it has occurred to eveiy one to ask himself whether he aims at a whole, and what that is; because considerable reflection is required for this, and the amount need not have been reached. Nor again am I saying that every man's actions are consistent, that he does not wander from his end, and that he has not particular ends which will not come under his main end. Nor further do I assert that the life of every man does form a whole ; that in some men there are not C9-ordinated ends, which are incompatible and incapable of sub- ordination into a system.* What I -am saying is, that if the life of the normal man be inspected, and the ends he has in view (as exhibited in his acts) be considered, they will, roughly speaking, be embraced in one main end or whole of ends. It has been said that ' every man has a different notion of happiness,' but this is scarcely correct, unless mere detail be referred to. Certainly, however, every man has a notion of happiness, and /its notion, though he may not quite know what it is. Most men have a life which they live, and with which they are tolerably satisfied, and that life, when examined, is seen to be fairly systematic ; it is seen ^.to be a sphere including spheres, the lower spheres subordinating to themselves and qualifying particular actions, and themselves subordinated to and qualified by the whole. And most men have more or less of an ideal of life — a notion of perfect happi- ness, which is never quite attained in real life ; and if you take v * The unhappiness of such lives in genera], however, points to the fact that the real end is a whole. Dissatisfaction rises from the Vnowing or feeling thai ihe self is not realized; and not realized, because not realized as a system. 66 Ethical Studies. direction, have closed with A or B, For we are aware besides of ourselves^ no( simply as something theoretically above A. and B, but as something also practically above them, as a CQncentration which is not one or the other, but which is the i)ossibility of either, which is the inner side indifferently of an act which should realize A, or one which should realize B ; and hence, whi<^ is neither, and yet is superior to both. In short, we do not simply feel our- selves in A and B, but have distingubhed ourselves from both, 9& what is above both. This is one &ctor in volition, and it is hard to find any name better for it than that of the universal factor, or side, or moment^ We need say much less about the second foe- tor. In order to will, we must will something ; die universal side by itself is not will at all. To will we must identify ourselves widi this, that, or the other ; and here we have the particular side, and the second factor in volition. Thirdly, the volition as a whole (and first, as a whole, is ii volition) is tlie identity of both these factors, and the projection or carrying of it out into external existence; the realization both of the particular side, Uie this or that to be dene, and the realization of the inner side of self in the domg of it, with a realization of self in both, as is proclaimed Dy the feeling of pleasure. This unity of the two factors we may caU the individual w^ole, or again the concrete universal ; and, although we are seldom conscious of the distinct factois, yet every act of will will be seen, when analysed, to be a * As we saw in our last Essay, there are two dangers to avoid here, in the shape of two one-sided views, Scy}la aod Gharybdis. The 6rst is the ignoring of the universal side altogether, even as an element ; the second is the assertion of it as ^ more than an element, as by itself will. Against this second it. is necessary to insist that the will is what it wiUs, that to will you must will something, and that you can not will the mere form of the will? further, that the mere foimal freedom of choice not only, if it were real, would not be true freedom, but that, in addition* it is a metaphysical fiction \ that the uaiversal is real only as one side of ^he whole, and takes its character firom the whole ; &nd that, in the most deliberate and would-be formal volition, the self that is abstracted and stands above the particulars, is the abstraction not only from the particular desire or desires before the miud» but also from the whole self, the self which embodies all past acts, and that the abstractum is ittermined by that from whuh U is abstracted, no less than itself is a moment in the determination of the concrete act 68 Ethical Studies. do not possess it until I find my will in k; and I do i\x^pt find that, until what I have is a hannony or a whole in system. Both in theory and practice my end is to realize myse* whole. But is this all ? Is a consistent view all that we theory? Is a harmonious life all that we want in pr^ Certainly not A doctrine must not only bold together, must hold the facts together as welL We can not rest in it because it does not contradict itsel£ The theory must take lis the facts, and an ultimate theory must take in all the Bu:ts. Sol again in practice. It is no human ideal lo lead ' the life of an of •""^^ We have no rigbt first to find out just what we happen to bfe^^^ to have, and then to contract our wants to that limit WeCcfin aot do it if we would, and morality calls to us that, if we try to do jit^ we are false to ourselves. Against the sensuous facts around u^ and ^j^ within us, we must for ever attempt to widen our empire ; we ^must I at least try to go forward, or we shall certainly be driven backv_ / / 1 So self-re^ization means more than the mere assertion of the I self as a whole.' And here we may refer to two principles, which Kant put forward imder tlie names of ' Homogeneity ' and ' Speci- fication.' Not troubling ourselves with our relation to Kant, we may say that the ideal is neither to be perfectly homogeneous^ nor simply to be specified to the last degree, but rather to combine botli these elements. Our true being is not the extreme of unity^ nor of diversity, but the perfect identity of both. And ^Realize <>^^ ^ yourself* does not mean merely * Be a whole,' but * Be an infinite / whole.' At this word, I am afraid, the reader who has not yet despaired of us will come to a stop^ and refuse to enter into the region of nonsense. But why should it be nonsense ? When the poet and the preacher tell us the mind is infinite, most of us feel that it is so ; and has our science really come to this, that the beliefs which answer to our highest feelings must be theoretical absurdities? Should not the philosophy, which tells us such a thing, be very * I leave out of sight the important question whether any partial whole can be self-consistent If (which seems the better view) this can not be, we shaU not need to say 'Systematise and widen,' bat the second will be implied in the first 70 Ethical Studies. justice. However that be, T know of no answer to it ; and until we find one, we must say that it is not true that the mind is finite. If I am to realize mjrself, it must be as infinite ; and now the question is, What does infinite mean ? and it will be better to say first what it does not mean. There are two wrong views on the subject, which we will take one at a time. (i.) Infinite is not-finite, and that means ^eud-less.' What does endless mean ? Not the mere negation of end, because a mere negation is nothing at all, and infinite would thus = O. The endless is something positive , it means a positive quantity which has no end. Any given number of units is finite ; but a series of units, v/hich is produced indefinitely, is infinite. This is the sense \ of infinite which is in most common use, and which, we shall see, is what Hedonism believes in. It is however clear that this infinite is a perpetual self-contradiction, andy-^so far as it is real, is only finitie. i^ny real quantity has ends, beyond which it does not go. * Increase the quantity ' merely says ' Put the end further off;' but in saying that, it does say ' Put the end.' 'Increase the quantity for ever* means, * Have for ever a finite quantity, and /or ever say that it is not finite.' In other words, * Remove the end * does imply, by that. very removal and the production of tlie series, the making of a fresh end; so that we still have a finite quantity. Here, so far as tlie infinite exists, it is finite: it is told to exist,'!! is told a^ain to be ngthiog ^t Jlp]^ (2.) Or, secondly, the infinite is m?/ the finite, no longer in the sense of being moie in quantity, but in the sense of being some- thing else^ which is different in quality. The infinite is not in the world of limited things; it exists in a sphere of its own. The mind {e. g.) is something ^^i^/ii^ the aggregate of its states. God is something beside the things of this worid. This is the infinite believed in by abstract Duty. But here once more, against its will, infinite comes to mean merely finite. The i nfinite is a some- thing over against, beside, and outside "the finite; and hence is itself also finite, because limited by something else. \ In neither of these two senses is the mind infinite. What then is the true sense of infinite ? As before, it is the negation of the finite ; it is not-finite. But, unlike both the false infinites, it does not leave the finite as it is. It neither, with (i), says 'the finite is 72 Ethical Studies. tells us we are not concluded in ourselves not perfect, but that there exists a not-ourself, which never does wholly become oursel£ And, apart from morality, it is obvious that I and you, this man and the other man, are finite beings. We are not one another ; more or less we must limit each other's sphere ; I am what I am more or less by external relations, and I do not fall wholly within myself. Thus I am to be infinite, to have no limit from tl^ie out- side j and yet I am one among others, and therefore am finite It is all very well to tell me that in me there is infinity, the perfect identity of subject and object : that I may be willing perhaps to believe, but none the less I am finite,' We admit the full force of the objection. I am finite ; I am both infinite and finite, and that is why my moral life is a perpetual progress. I must progress, because I have an other which is to be, and yet never quite is, myself; and so, as I am, am in a state of contradiction. It is not that I wish to incrtiase the mere quantity of my true self It is that I wish to be nothing but my true self, to be rid of all external relations, to bring them all within me, and so to fall wholly within myself. I am to be perfectly homogeneous ; but that I can not be unless fully specified, and the question is. How can I be extended so as to take in my external relations ? Goethe ^ has said, ' Be a whole or\ovcL a whole,* but to that we must answer, * You can not be a whole, unless you join a whole.' The difficulty is ; being limited and so not a whole, how extend myself so as to be a whole ? The answer is, be a member in a whole. Here your private self, your finitude, ceases as such to exist; k becomes the function of an organism. You must be; not a mere piece of, but a member in a whole ; and as this must know and will yourself. The whole, to which you belong, specifies itself in the detail of its functions, and yet remains homogeneous. It lives not many lives but one life, and yet can not live except in its many members* ^ ' Immer strebe zum Ganzeu, und kannst du !»elbei kein Ganzes Werden, als dienepdes Glied schliess' an ein Ganzes dich an.' 74 Ethical Studies. when your personal will is wholly made one with it, then you also have reached the extreme of hcmiogeneity and specification ia one, aiid have attained a perfect self-realization. Hie foregoing will, we hope, become clear to the teader of this volume. He must consider what has been said so far as the text, which the sequel is to illustrate and work out in detail Mean- while^ our aim has been to put forward the formula of self-realiza- tion, and in some measure to explain it The following Essa>$ will furnish, we hope, something like a commenta^ and justifica- tion. We shall see that the self to be realized is not the self as ^ collection of particulars, is not the universal as all the states of a v^> certain feeling; and that it is not again an abstract universal, as the form of duty ; that neither are in' hatmony with life, with the moral consciousness, or with themselves ; that when the self is identified with^ and wills, and realizes a concrete universal, \ real totality, then first does it find itself, is satisfied, self-determinedt and free, * the free wiU that wills itself as the free will* "* Let us resume, then, the results of the present Essay. We have attempted to show (i) That the formula of 'what for?' must be rejected by every ethical doctrine as not universally valid; and that hence no one theory can gain the smallest advantage (except over the foolish) by putting it forward. That now for us (as it was for Hellas) the main question is, There being some end, what is 1 , 'that end? And (2), with which second part, if it fall, the first need not fall, we have* endeavoiured briefly to point out that the final end, with which morality is identified, or under which it is included, can be expressed not otherwise than by self-realization* 76 Ethical Studies. under a difTerence, to be the same. It does suppose that what was in the mind is carried out ; and, unless you Ibf nk that something can be in the self and carried out by the self, without being of Uie nature of the self ^and you would find the duficuUies of such a view insuperable), then you must say that vcdition is self-realization But doubtless there are many persons who, not isuskig meti* physical or psychological questions, but standing merely on £M:ts, would say, ' Theory apart, surely when I act I do realize moie than myself I quite see that I may not do so ; but when I devote myself to a cause, and at my own e}q[>ense help to cany it out, how then am 1 realizing only myself?' The difficulty no doubt is very serious, and we can not pretend here to go to the bottom of it. But we may point out that, it arises from a preconception as to the self (i. e, the identilicatioo of it with the particular self), which can not be defended. It is dear that, on the one side, selves do exclude one another. I am not you, you are not he ; and, resting on this notion of exclusiveneai^ we go on to look at the self as a repellent point, or, as we call k, a mere individual. Biit, apart from metaphysics, facts soon com- pel us to see that this is not a reality, but an abstraction of our minds. For, \sHithout troubling ourselves about the relation of one person to others, as soon as we imagine this mere 'individual' acting, we see he must bring forth something, and, todotha^ must have something in him, must have a content ; and, if so, is not znj longer a bare point, which we now perceive to be a mere form. Hence we now try to give him a content which falls wholly within himself, and is not common to him with others, and, finding it im- possible to account for facts on tiiis supposition j suddenly we turn round and fiy to the other extreme, and now siqqx>se him to realize the sheer suppression of himself; not seeinjg that now we have abjured our premises without having refuted them, and ait face to face with the psychological difficidty of how a man is to bring out of himself what was not in himseUf and part of himsd^ and with the facts which testify that action without interest is a fiction. But if firom a better metaphysic, or attention to facts, we are willing to give up those metaphysical preconceptions we took for fact, and now see to be futile, then we may also see that, tfiough certainly one person can not be 'like Cerberus, three gentlemen at once,' yet that, beside being thus exclusive, none the less in respect of their content (and that makes them what they are) persons are not thus exclusive; that I am what I will and will what I am, that the content qualifies me, and that there iskio E S SA Y III. Pleasure for PleasiTre's Sake. IT is an old story, a theme too worn for the turning of sentences, and yet too living a moral not to find every day a new point and te break a fresh heart, tliat our lives are wasted in the pursuit of the impalpable, the search for the impossible and the unmeaning. Neithex tonday noi yesterdayi but throughout the whole life of the race, the complaint has gone forth that all is vanity ; that the ends for which we live and we die are * mere ideas,' illusions begotten on the bcain by the wish of the heart — poor phrases that stir the blood, until experience or reflection for a little, and death for all time, bring *with it disenchantment and quiet Duty for duty's sake, life for an end beyond sense, honour, and beauty, and love for the invisible — all these are first felt, and then seen to be dream and shadow and unreal vision. And our cry and our desire is for something that will satisfy us, something that we know and do not only think, something that is real and solid, that we can lay hold of and be sure of, and that will not change in our hands. We have said good-bye to our tianscendent longings, we have bidden a sad but an eternal farewell to the hopes of our own and of the world's too credulous youth; we have parted for ever from our early loves, fi-om our fancies and asjpira- tions beyond the human. We seek for tlie tangible, and we find it in this world ; for the knowledge which can never deceive, and that is the certainty of our own well-being; we seek for the palpable, and we feel it ; for the end which will satisfy us as men, and we find it, in a word, m happiness. Happiness ! Is that clinmx, or bathos, or cruel irony? Hap- piness is the end ? Yes, happiness is the end which indeed we all reach after ; for what more can we wish than that all should be well with us — ^thai our wants should be filled, and the desire of 8o Ethical Studies. school alone, but round us in life, we see that to identify in the beginning pleasure and happiness, leads in the end to the confes- sion that there ' is nothing in it,- Mat/ioviav oXug &6\i¥aro¥ %fytu. The ' pursuit of pleasure ' is a phrase which calls for a smile or a sigh, since the world h^s learnt that, if pleasure is the end, it is ao end which must not be made one, and is found there most where it is not sought If to find pleasure is the end, and science is . the means, then indeed we must say Die hohe Kraft Der Wissenschafty Der ganzen Wdt verborgen I Und wer nicht denkt, Dem wird sie geschenkt, £r hat sie ohhe Sorgen.* Common opinion repeats its old song, that the search for plea- sure is the coarsest form of vulgar delusion, that if you want to be happy in the sense of pleased, you must not think of pleasure, but, taking up some accredited form of living, must make that your end, and in that case, with moderately good fortune, you will be happy; if you are not, then it must be your own fault ; but that, if you go further, you are like to fare worse. You had better n^ try elsewhere, or, at least, not for pleasure elsewhere. So far the weight of popular experience bears heavily against the practicability of Hedonism. But Hedonism, we shall be told, does not of necessity mean the search by the individual for the pleasure of the individual. It is to such selfish pleasure-seeking alone that the proverbial condemnation of Hedom'sm applies. The end for modem Utilitarianism is not the pleasure of one^ but the pleasure of all, the maximum of pleasurable, and minimum of painful, feeling in all sentient organisms, and not in my sentient ^ Thus rendered in Mr. C Kegan Paul's version of Faust. The highest might » Of science quite Is from the world concealed I But whosoe'er Expends no care. To him it is revealed 84 Ethical Studies. X certainly include the feeling of pleasure ; but if the alliemative is presented to us of lower functions with less pains and greater pleasures, or higher functions widi greater pains and less pleasures, then we must choose the latter. And the alternative is conceivable. If it is impossible in fact that a stage of progress could come, where by advancing further in the direction of what seems to it highest, humanity would decrease its surplus of pleasure (and I do not see how it is to be proved impossible),' — ^yet, at all events, the alternative can be brought directly before the mind. Advance in this direction (the higher) at the cost of pleasure, on the whole, after the pleasure of advance is counted in; advance in that direction (the lower), with the gain of pleasure, on the whole, even after the r^rets of the non-advance have been subtracted. The necessity for choice can be imagined ; and there is no doubt, on the one side, what the choice of the moral man would be ; there is no doubt, on the other side, what, if pleasure were the end, it ought to be. In such a case, what we think the most moral man and people would be therefore the most certain to act immorally, if Hedonism is morality. But these consequences, it will be urged, do not apply to modem Utilitarianism. That creed, we shall be told, whether for ' Mr. MilPs scssertion that * most of the great positive evils of the world «re In themselves removable' {UtUitarianisMj p. 21), calls for no remark ; but the reader may perhaps think that Mr. Spencer^s doctrine of the Evanescence of Evil {Social Statics, p. 73, foL) should be noticed. His proof seems (so fieir as I understand it) to rest on the following assumptions : — (i) The natural environment of mankind is stationary. Can this be proved? (2) The spiritual environment of mankind is stationary. Not only can. this not be proved, but the opposite is, or ought to be, supposed by the doctrine of evolutioiL Progress must alter the environment (3) Apparently children are to be bom in harmony with their surroondings^ and remain so till death. (4) Moral evil, in the sense of moral badness, is to disappear. It will be impossible to oppose one's private good to the general good, an4 act according to the former. Self-will will- cease, and with it the pain it brings. All these assumptions, I think, are wanted. Nos. 3 and 4 represent absolute impossibilities, so far as I understand the matter. Na 2 is impossible on the supposition of continual progress. No other siq)positi(m can be proved to be true ; and No. i can not, I believe, be proved. How for Mr. Spencer's own teaching contradicts these assumptioiis is <^ no importance here. 86 Ethical Studies. pleastire'; and whether that pleasure is to be got iii morality, or merely by morality, yet tlie getting of the pleasure is the ultimate / aim. Pleasure for pleasure's sake is the end, and nothing else is I an end in any sense, except so far as it is,a means to pleasure. \ This, we repeat once more, is absolute^ irreconcileable with ordinary moral beliefis. And not only is Hedonism repudiated by those beliefs as immoral ; but as we saw, so far as the popular mind I has pronouncedupon it^ it is also declared to be mapi agticable. ( These two points we wished to make clear, and with this resul^ we i^have finished the first or introductory part of our undertaking. It remains to ask in the second p}ace, Why \a it that pleasure^ seeking, as the search for my pleasure, is declared vain, and pleasure itself impalpable and misleading, a something which gives us no standard to work by, and xio end to aim at, no system to realize in our lives ? We must look for an answer to the nature of pleasure. Pleasure and pain are feelings, and they are nothing but fedr ings. It would perhaps be right to call them the two simple modes of x^^feeling ; but we are not here concerned with psych(>> logical accuracy. The point which we wish to emphasize, and . which we think is not doubtful, is that, considered psychically, they are nothing whatever but states of the feeling sel£ Tlds means that they exist in me only as long as I feel them, and only as I feel them, that beyond this they have no reference to any- thing else, no validity and no meaning whatever. They are Subjective' because they neither have, nor pretend to, reality beyond this or that subject They are as they are felt to be, but they tell us nothing. In one word, th^ have no content : they are as states of us, but they have nothing for us. I do not think it is necessary to dwell on this matter. Let us proceed to the application. The practical end, if it is to be a practical goal and standard, must present itself to us as some 4 definite unity, some concrete whole that we can realize in our acts, and carry out in our life. And pleasure (as pain) we find to be nothing but a name which stands for a series of this, that, and the other feelings, which are; not except in the moment or moments that they are felt, which have as a series neither limitar tion of number, beginning nor end, nor in themselves any refer- 88 Ethical Studies. Hedonism, or of the seeking happiness in pleasure. Happiness, for the ordinary man, neither means a pleasure nor a number of l^asures. It means in general the finding of himself or the satisfaction of himself as a whole, and in particular it means the realization of his concrete ideal of life. ' This is happiness, ' he s«ys^ not identifying happiness with one pleasure or a number of them, but understanding by it, ' in this is become fact ^at I hav^ at heart But the Hedonist has said, Happiness is pleasure, and the Hedonist knows that happiness i$ a whole. ^ How, then, if pleasures make no system, if they are a number of perishing particulars, can the whole that is sought be found in them ? It is < the old question, how find the universal in mere particulars? And the answer is the old answer, In their sum. The self is te be found, haj^iness is to be realized, in the sum of the moments of the feeling self. The practical direction is, get all jdeasures and you will have got happiness; and we saw above ite wdt known practical issue in weariness and dissatis^ction. The theoretical reason is simple. The sum, or the All of pleasures is a self-contradiction, and therefore the search for it is futile. A series which has no beginning, or, if a beginning, yet no end, can not be summed ; there is no All, and yet the All is postulated,, and the series is to be summed. But it can not be summed tiM we are dead, and then, if we have realized it, we, I suppose, do not know it, and we are not happy ; and before deadi we can not have realized it, because there is always more to come^ the series is always incomplete. 'What is the sum of pleasure^ * I am quite aware that with some Hedonistic writers ' happii^ess ' is nft distixiguished from ' pleasure. ' They are said to be simply the same. This is an outrage on language, whidi avenges itself in the confusion described below, foot-note, p. 109. But the aigument of the text is not affected bj it. If happinea 3= pleasure, then ' get hapjHness '= * get pleasoie. ' What is pleasure ? It is a general name, and * get happiness ' will mean ' get a general name. ' But a general name is not a reality, and can not be got. The reality is the particular. ' Get happiness ' will mean then, 'get some one pleasure.' Is that it ? No^ we are to get all the happiness we can. And so, after all our quibbling, ^ get happiness ' does mean ' get the largest possible sum or collection of pleasures.' Mr Green, in his Introduction to Hume's Treatise (IL 7), has made this so deai^ that one might have hoped it could not have been misunderstood. On (he whole subject of this Essay let me recommend the student to consult hinu 90 Ethical Studies. unsatisfied and hands empty, driven on and beyond for ever in pursuit of a delusion, through a weary round which never advances. There remains, then, to Hedonism either the assertion that happi- ness is completed in one intense moment, or the confession that happiness is impossible, or the attempt to place it elsewhere than in the siim of pleasures. The first is the ' mdlo vivere comilto^ It is the giving up of any practical goal or any rule of life, and we are not called upon to consider it further. The second is inevitable, if happiness is equal to the sum, or the greatest possible amount, of pleasures; for one and the other are the same unreal fiction. The end, in this I sense, exists only in the head of the Hedonistic moral man. His morality is the striving to realize an idea, which can never be realized, and which, if realized, would be ipso facto annihilated He would feel it no objection to his theory, nor any comfort in his sorrow, if we said to him that, if happiness could be, then the tale would be made up, the end would be reached, the search would be over, and with it all morality ; for his morality is nothing to him as an end, but only as a means ; and the bitterness of his lot is filled up by the thought, that the means he does not care for are. always with him, and the end he lusts after away from him. ■ I II I Ml II M ■— — ^1 ■ Mil ■■■» ■■ IPW ■ !■ — I ■ I ■ — ^— ^1— ^— — 1^— i^— ^MMW— ^—i ^MWi— ^— — ^— ^M^M^^^I^M^^— ^a^— i^— *^— ^^^^ if you please, The end is an illusion, and the effort worthless in itself, bat this particular effort gives a specific pleasure, which is the end. Bat if you do this, then you either (a) sink considerations of quantity, and the greatest happiness principle is givc^' up ; or (b) the same problem as above breaks oat with respect to the sum of specific pleasure^ If you admit that to get the 'greatest sum in life is unmeaning, then arises the question, Can you approximate, and make approximation the end ? I will not raise the question, Can you approximate to a confessed fiction? and to avoid that, let us say, The end is for me, at any given moment of life, to be having then the greatest possible number of units of pleasure. Here we fall into the dilemma given in the text. Either happiness is never reached, or there is no one who does not reach the most perfect happiness imaginable. (i) If happiness means the greatest possible number of units, then I never reach it Whatever I have is finite, and beyond every finite sum another unit is conceivable. (ii) i^ happiness means having all I can get, no matter how much or how little, then, given the truth of the common Hedonistic psychology, every man at every moment has absolute happiness. This is very obvious. ' Why so ?' comes the objection ; * if Mr A. had done otherwise, he would have had more pleasure.' ()2 Ethical Studies. t 1: 1 / to our minds, and not a mere means. In short, we have got interests, and these are objects of desire not thought of as means to pleasure. We have adopted happiness in the vulgar sense, and really have given up Hedonism, as the consistent hunt after pleasure for pleasure's sake. Yet pleasure is still nominally the end, and hence the above view of life lies open to the following objections :— ' You tell me that pleasure is my end ; and yet you tell me not to make it my end, but to make some accredited type of life my end, and take the pleasure as it comes from that I am to make getting pleasure my aim, though only by the way and at odd times. And in this manner you assure me that, in the long run, I shall secure the greatest amoimt of pleasurable feeling. It seems strange to have a mark one mu^t not look at, but I should not care for that if I were sure to hit Yet this is what I can not tell if I shaH da t see men die, having reaped for themselves a harvest of painfiil self-denial ; and the pleasure they made by it was but gleanings ftr others, when they were in the grave. Did they attain their end? - And I, since our life at any moment may cheat us, shall I put off a present certainty for the sake of a doubtful future ? ' The answer must be. That is true enough ; there is no certainty in life ; but still it is more reasonable to act on probabilities. Yon may die, but the chances are you will live. You had better sup- pose that it will be so, and, taking the rules for living, the monl ' Nautical Almanack,* * direct your course by them ; for, if yoa live as l<»ig as most men, you will certainly in this way get the Qost pleasure. And perhaps this answer may satisfy. But a new and serious difficulty arises. It being admitted that life b to be r^^ulated on proixibilities, the question then occurs. Who is to judge of the pso- babilities ? The mond end is for me to get the most pleasure I can ; the mular lopinion and Hedonism as the search for pleasure; we huifi jshown, in the second place, the reason why the seeking of iv^ /pleasure gives no practicable end in Ufe. On boUi points we have dwelt, perhaps^ at unnecessary length ; but we have not yet done justice to the doctrine which makes virtue a means, not to my pleasiure, but to the pleasure of the ' whole sentient creaticm ' — ^to modem Utilitarianism, which may be called, I suppose, our most £Eishionable moral philosophy. This we must now notice, but only so far as our subject compels us. A more detailed examina- tion is not called for here, and, as we think, would not repay us anywhere. The end, as before, is the greatest amount of pleasurable feeling, yet not now in me, but in the sentient world as a whole. The first thing to observe is that (as we noticed above), if happiness means this, happiness is unrealizable — it can by no possibility be reached. If the greatest happiness, in the sense of the maximum of pleasure, was, as applied to the individual, a mere * idea,' or rather a self-contradictory attempt at an idea, which we saw by its very nature could not exist as a fact ; then a fortiori^ I 96 Ethical Studies. directly opposed to popular morality. If, by being changed into pigSy we secured an absolute certainty of a greater amount of pleasure with a less amount of pain, we (I speak for the ordinary person) should decline the change, either for ourselves or the race, and should diink it our duty to do so. But, if we believe that the greatest amount of pleasure is ' the end, it would be our duty to strive after, and accept such a change. And some sudi choice is not a mere theoretical possibility. Unless Fourier be much belied, his scheme of 'phalansteries' was a practical proposal to seek for pleasure as the ^id, and all else as means. The ordinary moral man refuses to discuss such a proposal He repudiates the end, and the means with it. But the ' greatest amount of pleasure' doctrine must accept the end, and calmly discuss the means ; and this is not tiie moral point of view. It is surely imaginable (I do not say it is likely), that we might have to say to a large and im-^ moral majority, ' If I wanted to make you happy, which I do not, I should do so by pampering your vices, which I will not' (Stephen, Uberty^ p. 287.) So much for the morality of the theory. Let us now consider its practicability and consistency. The end, as the pleasure of all, is, like my pleasure, not something which I can apprehend and carry out in my life. It is not a system, not a concrete whole. There are no means included in it : there are none which, in them- selves, belong to the end. Wanting to know what I am to do, * Increase the pleasure of all ' gives me, by itself, no answer. * But there is no need that it should,' will be the reply. The experience of mankind has discovered the means which tend to inorease plea- sure; these are laid down in the moral Almanack (Mill, p. 36), and they may fairly be considered as included in the end Here I think that Hedonism does not see a most serious difficulty. It is the old question, What is the nature of the authority of the Almanack, and are its rules laws ? If they are Jaws, on what do they rest ? If they are not, are there any other moral laws ; and without laws can you have morality ? Let me explain the objection. You can not, I object to the Hedonist, make these laws part of the end, and identify them therewith \ for the end was clearly laid down as pleasurable feeling, and there is no essential coimection between that end and the laws 98 Ethical Studies. in the teeth of my own judgment? I may be perfectly aware that acting on rules is, speaking generally, the way to reach the end I may even admit that the departure from rules in most cases has produced, and must produce, an effect detri- mental to the end. I might, if I pleased, for argument's sake admit (though it would be contrary to fact, and no one could ask for such an admission) that every previous departure from rules has been a failure, and has decreased the surplus. But now the matter stands thus : I have taken all pains to form an opinion, and I am quite certain that my case is an exception. I have no doubt whatever that in this instance the breaking of a rule will increase the surplus. To say that I am a fool does not touch the question ; to say that I must be mistaken does not touch the question ; to say that I ought not to tibink as I do, or ought not to act accordingly, begs the question. The moral end is clear ; I, after having thought over all considerations up to my lights, am clear as to the means. What right have you, what right has the world to tell me to hold my hand, to make your uncertain opinion the standard rather than the certain end ? How shall I answer for it to my own conscience * if I do ? What is this rule that is to come between me and my moral duty? Let us repeat our illustration. The rule says, Do not commit adultery. I wish to commit adultery. I am sure I do not want to please myself at all ; in fact rather the contrary. I am as positive as I can be of anything, that the case is either not contemplated by the rule, or, if it is, that the rule is wrong, that the proposed act must diminish the sum of the pain, and must increase the sum of the pleasure of the sentient world as a whole, and this too after all consequences thai ' I can reckon (and I can reckon no more) have been counted in. Is it immoral then to break the rule ; or rather is it not immoral to keep it, to sacrifice a real good to a mere idea? My conscience is clear; and my dreams will not be broken by * the groans of an abstraction.' (Mill, Dissert,, i. 21.) Now, if it be answered here that, on any theory of morals, ' ■■ ■ I ■■ ■ — • — • — - — 1 — - — -' ■ ' * And to my God/ I might add, against those who drag the Deity into the question. lOO Ethical Studies. \ to make possible, to justify, and even to encourage, an incessant 1 practical casuistry ; and that, it need scarcely be added, is the I death of morality. Before I proceed, however, let me entreat the reader to remember that the question, Are Utilitarians immoral ? is one question, and the question. Is their theory immoral ? altogether another, and the only one which we are concerned with. And (2), if it were true that no other moral theory was in a happier plight, what are we to say but *so much the worse for all moral theories,' and not *so much the better for Hedonism.' Thpjnoral consciousness is the touchstone of moral theories, and ^ ^vj2V^/^^^« moral consciousness, I appeal to it in every man, hsus laws ^ -^hich are a great deal more than niles. To that consciousness * Do not commit adultery ' is a law to be obeyed ; it is not the prescription of a more or less questionable policy. It is not a means, which in the opinion of A, B, and C will or may conduce to an end other than itself, and in the opinion of D may or will not do so. Let the Hedonist refute thrice or four times over, if he pleases, his rival theories j but he does not thereby establish . his own, and is no nearer doing so than before. I I To proceed — the conclusion we have reached is that, supposing (i) that the whole rests.' 1 am ashamed to have to examine such reascnmg, but it is necessary to do so, sinct it is common enough. Is it not palpable at 6rst sight, th«t(i) and (3) are X bsolutely incompatible, that each contradicts the other flatly ? You must choi»se between them, and, whichever you c)ioose, the proof of Utilitarian ism goes, l>ecause that springs from the unnatural conjunction of both. The only escape that I can see is to say in (2) that something is desirable though npt desired, and write 'not desired but deshable' for 'desired and desirable.* But not only is this perhaps altogether unmeaning, hut alto the conclusion now disappears ; yoti can get nothing from the premises. Because A is desired tmd B is desirable, it does not follow, I suppose, that a hash of A and B is desired and desirable. io6 Ethical Studies, higher and lower. The former are superior, the latter are inferior; and hence, in preferring the higher pleasures, we are true to Hedonism, and yet are at one with the moral consciousness. We must briefly examine this doctrine. It has two forms. One of these takes quality simply as quality ; the other takes quality in relation to quantity, and looks on it as the index or result of quantity. The latter, we shall find, keeps true to the principle of the greatest surplus of pleasure, but it says nothing new. The former leaves the principle imawares, and moves unknowingly to other ground, but can get no standing- place for morality. Let us first discuss the latter; but, before we begin, we must call attention to the phrases ' higher ' and * lower** Higher and lower (forgive me, dear reader) are 'relative': they are comparatives, and they hence mean more or less of something. Higher means nearer some top, or it means nothing. Lower means nearer some bottom, or it means nothing. This being established, when we talk of 'higher' and Mower' pleasure, we ought to know what our top and our bottom are, or else we risk talking nonsense. Next let me observe (and forgive me, if you can, reader) that top and bottom, as a rule, are ' relative * and depend on the way in which you look at the matter. If the top is the ' end,* you may put the end anywhere: benevolence is (morally) higher than selfish- feeling, not the whole of what is felt. Then we have to ask, Does this 'what is felt/ which qualifie. the pleasure^ and malces it of one sort and not of another, make part of the mere pleasure itself, as pleasure? Or have we to say, Pleasure is itself always one and the same, and differs only in degree ; sorts of pleasures are degrees of the same pleasure in reference to sorts of other feelings^ which, as such, are not pleasures as such? Or more briefly. Has pleasure any content in itself? If not, then il has no qualitative dis- tinctness in itself, but only by its reference to that which it goes with. Is not pleasure, as such, the abstraction of one element of a whole psychical state from that state ; and when so abstracted, are there differences oikind in it, or only of degree? Not wishing to give a positive opinion on this point, I have not introduced it into the text as affecting the argument. ' But the thoughtful reader will at once perceive its bearing. Hedonism, when if ceases to aim at pleasure as such and nothing but pleasure, is false to its principle and becomes incoherent But if pleasure, as such, is not qualitatively distinguishable, then ve must have regard to nothing but quantity. io8 Ethual Studies. \ tributes on the whole to the existence of a larger number of degrees of pleasure liere the principle of the greatest amount of pleasure is adhered to ; that is the top, and what approaches to it or contributes to it is nearer the top. But since the moral * higher' is here, as we see, the more pleasurable or the means to the more pleasurable, we come in tlie end to the amount, the quantity of pleasure without distinction of kind or quality, and having already seeu that such an end is not a moral end, we get nothing from the phrases * higher' and Mower' unless it be confusion. (2) The second view is that which distinguishes pleasures by their w^rif quality. The * higher' pleasure here is not the more V intense pleasure; it is not the pleasure connected with the maximum of pleasure on the whole without distinction of kind. It is the preferable kind of pleasure (Mill, 6?//., p. 12). The first point to be noticed is that our theory gives up and abandons the greatest amount of pleasine principle. If you are to piefer a higher pleasure to a lower without reference to quantity — then there is an end altogether of the principle which puts the measure in the surplus of pleasure to the whole sentient creation. fit is no use saying all pleasures are ends, only some are more {^ends. It is no use talking of ^estimation' and ^coropanson' (Mill, pp. 12, 17), You have no standard to estimate by, no measure to make comparisons with. Given a certain small { quantity of higher pleasure in collision with a certain large quantity of lower, how can you decide between them ? To work ■ the sum you must reduce the data to the same denomination. You must go to quantity or nothing; you decline to go to quantity, and hence you can not get any result But if you refuse to work the sum, you abandon the greatest amount of pleasure principle. There is no harm in doing that : but what else have we to go to? The higher pleasures? And what are the higher pleasures? Wo find higher pleasure means nothing but the pleasure which those who have experienced both it and others do as a fact choose in preference. Higher then, as we saw above, has no meaning at all, unless we go to something otUside pleasure, for we may not go to quantity of pleasure. But, if we go outside pleasure, not only no Ethical Studies. we then I think are in good company, but in no better case. For an opponent will hold to the fact that he does knowingly prefer what is called bad to good, and will hence, by our argument, con- elude first that bad is really good, and next that nothing can be '^ either good or bad, since bad to one man is good to another. And if we, on the other hand, persist that the fact is impossible (I do not know how we are to prove it so), and that no one ever did or could choose what we call bad, when he had in his mind what we call good, then we identify immorality with ignorance, and moral obligation disappears. For every man not only does, but must do, the best on every occasion, so far as he knows it ; his knowledge is an accident which has nothing^ to do with his will ; he must act up to the ought, so far as he has an ought, and he can not do what he thinks is wrong. To proceed — the basis of our moral theory is now. There is a scale of pleasures ; some persons know all, and others only some ; but you necessarily choose the pleasures you know according to the scale. I e, g. know the alphabet of pleasures, always or some- times, up to M. ' Immoral man to choose M, when you should have chosen P or R or even X.' But I do not know what they are. * And therefore you are immoral, for I and a good many other people do.* But let us drop the matter here; on such a theory, the reader will assent, moral obligation is unmeaning. > ^ At the risk of hypercriticism I will make one or two further remarks on Mill's view. According to it, pleasures must stand in a kind of order of merit, represented, let us say, by the letters of the alphabet All pleasures, because pleasures, are good in themselves. A pleasure is immoral only when taken where a higher was possible, now or as a consequence. Then eveiy pleasure is moral, because it has a supposable pleasure below it ; every pleasure is immoral, because there is always a supposable pleasure above it No man is moral, because his knowledge is limited, and he therefore can not always take the highest conceivable pleasure ; but if so, then all men are equally moral, for they all take the highest pleasure they know. Or, passing by this, let us suppose the pleasures- divided into two classes, higher and lower. If the lower are to be cpnsidered at all, then, as we have said, in the event of a collision the problem is insoluble, because what is not of the same denomination can not be compared. Let us suppose then that the lower are not to be considered, and we are left with the higher. Here the same pro- blem breaks out. For these pleasures are no system ; if you make the idea of a system your end, and regulate the pleasures by that, you have deserted 112 Eihual Studies. may not, by means of these influences, be made to act on the human mind with ail the authority of conscience ' (p. 44). The feeling of obligation then, we see, does not refer itself essentially to anything in particular. And further,^ this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to ' (p. 42). *• The sanction, so far as it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself, and ttie notion, therefore, of the transcendental moralists must be that this sanction will not exist in the mind, unless it is believed to have its root out of the mind, and that, if a person is able to say to himself, This which is restraining me and which is called my conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind, he may possibly draw the conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases, and that, if he find the feeling inconvenient, he may disregard it and endeavour to get rid of it * (pp. 42, 43). This is a serious matter; and I should say that any theory which maintains that a man may get rid 'of his sense of moral obligation if he can, and that, if he does so, the moral obligation is gone, is as grossly immoral a theory as ever was published. Does Mr. Mill repudiate the doctrine? Not at all; he evidently accepts it, though he prefers not to say so. The passage goes on : * But is this danger confined to the Utilitarian morality ? ' etc. Now I am ashamed of repeating it so often, but J must entreat th€ reader not to have dust thrown in his eyes in tins way, and not to be dis- tracted by * transcendental moralists ' or any other bugbears. The question is, Is theory A true, or are we obliged to say that either theory A is false or the facts are a lie? The question is not, Have theories B arid C the same fault as A? When we have done with A, we will then, if we choose, go to B and C j and if they turn out all false, that does not prove one true/ These pleader's devices are in place in a law-court, but philosophy does not recog* nizethem. If then all that the moral 'ought' means is tliat I happen to have a feeling which I need not have, and that this feeling attaches itself now to one set of pleasiu'es and now to another set according to accident or my liking, would it not be better alto- gether to have done with the word, and, as some have done, openly to reject it and give it up, since already we have given up all that it stands for ? But if we give up the word, then we have 114 Ethical Studies. We agree that happiness is the end; and therefor^ we say pleasure is not the end. We agree that pleasure is a good ; we say it is not the good. We agree (strange fellowship !) with the author of the Essay an Liberty in affirming the 8 flrao'/ ^x«? toW that t the sole end of the individuaL In this plight, notliing is left to Hedonism but an appeal to the facts of sodety. If these show that th ogress so far involves increase of pleasure (and here, on the question of fact. Hedonism has to meet Pessimism), that does not prove it will be aiwajrs so ; still less does it prove that the idea of increase of pleasure is the moving cause of progress, and even less that it oughi to be. NOTE TO ESSAY III. There are two questions suggested by the above — (i) Is pleasure good, and if so, in what sense is it goo^? (2) Is pain evil, and in what way is it evil ? Let us take the latter first Considered psychically pain is an evil, because it is the feeling of the negation of the self or life. The good is the affirmation of the self, and hence pain is counter to the good. If we are asked to suppose a pain which is a feeling of negation, but not a felt negation, /. e, which is not really in any way the negation of func- tion or the cause of such negation, .and are then asked. Is such hypothetical pain an evil ? we can not say it would he, because we can say nothing about it at all. It seems to us to be an unreal abstraction. Real pain is the feeling of the negatedness of the self, and therefore, as such, it is bad. It is bad also, because it further acts in the direction of the general lowering of life. Both as felt diminution of the good, and as the cause of further diminution, it is an evil. If, where pain comes from negated function, but the function is supposed to be indifferent, we are asked. Is then the pain bad ? we reply that it is so, because the whole self is negated; /feel pain, and am therein lowered directly or indirectly. In passing we may ask. Is then pain on the whole an evil ? We can not say that. We know that pain often is a good ; and we should have a right to say of any pain that it was an absolute evil, only if we knew that it was pain per se, ue. mere negation. Bui that is what we can not know. Speaking generally, you can noi have mere pain, the negative without the positive; painlessness means death ; pain appears to involve reaction; and again, wherever there is an active conscious self, it seems there must be pain. To say that pain is an absolute evil, we should have to answer in the affinnative the question. Can you have the positive without the negative, or the negative in this form? And I do not see how we can give this answer. We know that pain is often a stimulus; without some pain little is produced — ^perhaps nothing. We know that the pain of the part is often the good of the whole ; that that good demands sometimes even the destruction of the part The life of the whole is the ISO Ethical Studies. apart from some present function or activity pleasure could exist The questions to be answered would be, how &r in what seem the most, or mere, ^passive pleasures' of sense function is con- cerned ; how £u: in contemplative pleasures activity of contempla- tion comes in ; how far, lastly, the very feeling of self, which is pleasure, in being felt implies an activity. To a tired man, for instance, the pleasure of lying down in bed is great; he wants no more ; it is complete affirmation of his will, perfect ^tisfiednes& But as he grows more and more sleepy, does his pleasure increase? When he is asleep does he feel pleasure? On die other hand, is he less satisfied? and if so, in what- sense? If his pleasure has been diminished or has ceased, is not that because the reaction, the function of the feeling centre lias ceased or been diminished; and is not that reaction what is felt idien pleasure is felt ? Let us, however, pass by this question, as without answering it decidedly we hope to show how far pleasure is good. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish pleasures of activity and passivity ; pleasure which comes with our doing something, and pleasure which we do nothii^ to get' Let us ask with each class when pleasure is good, and when it is bad, if it is bad We will first take pleasures of activity. {i) {a) When are they good? When the activity is good the pleasure is good, because the. two are a psychical whole. You cannot have the function without the pleasure: tlie absence of the pleasure would weaken and perhaps destroy the function, and also generally lower the self to tike detriment of other functions ; whereas presence of pleasure tends to the heightening of functions in general, beside its own function. — ^Then what activities are good? Detail is impossible; but, generally, those which directly realize the good will in a living man, or which indirectly Increase life and so the possibility of a higher realization of the good in a living man or men. Or rather the two can not be divided, life is a whole ; and life is not only the condition of the good, but may be taken as another name for it 'The end of life is life,' and (speaking generally) what heightens life heightens the good Pleasure then is not a means to the good, but is included in it and belongs to it. {b) What pleasures of activity are bad then? for admittedly there are such. The pleasure is bad when the activity is bad ; and the activity is bad when, in its immediate or ulterior results, it lowers ' We need not distinguish further the pleasure of havii^ something done to n!«. It will, I think, be covered by oui answer, and il is a somewhat com- plicated state of mind. T22 Ethical Studies. that too much is bad. But between enough and too much^ as in the pleasures of eating and drinking, there comes a neutral territory. It is probably good for you to have say not less than two glasses of wine after dinner. Six on ordinary occasions is per- haps too many ; but, as to three or four, they are neither one way nor the other. If asked, is the pleasure of these intermediates bad ? we say No. If asked, is it good ? I do not think we can say Yes. If asked, is it not a positive addition to the surplus of pleasure ? I do not think we can say No. We should put the whole question aside as idle. We should say the pleasure is neither good nor bad, or at least we do not know that it is. So far the ordinary man. Now whether this margin is scientifically defensible, whether there must not be a point say of number of drops or fractions of drops, which is good, and beyond which acme you fall at once into badness, we shall not discuss. It is not an easy question ; and fortunately the answer matters nothing to our argument. But for the ordinary man clearly some pleasures are neither good nor bad, and this because (for him) they do neither harm nor good. (2) To come now to the question. Is any pleasure a gQod per sef we are in a position, I think, to answer it in the negative. Ordinarily it does sound absurd to say mere pleasure is not an end, since at fir^ sight it seems desirable. The foregoing, how- ever, should have removed this difficulty. We have seen that the pleasures pronounced desirable are so because they are inseparable from and heighten life ; and hence these pleasures are not pleasures p^r se. And further, if the doctrine of the indifferent margin were indefensible (we believe that it is not so), then no pleasure could be a pleasure /^r 5^, and our present question would disappear. But supposing that there exist pleasures which are only pleasur* able and, so to speak, end in themselves, then these may certainly be desired, but i think they are not considered desirable or good. And, if that is so, then, in denying that pleasure in itself is good, we are not in collision with the ordinary consciousness. To illus- trate. Having had three glasses of wine, I may say I think so much was desirable. I certainly may have another if I like, and I suppose it will give me a certain amount of pleasure and no pain, or lessen- ing of pleasure, now or afterwards. Is the surplus good ? Is it desirable? Clearly, though a pleasure, and though not bad, it may not be good; and such is the case, I think, with all innocent pleasures, as e. g. those of physical exercise, sports and games, sight-seeing, &c If this be so, however, then common con-, sciousness does not hold pleasure per se to be desirable or good. And as for philosophical arguments, what and where are they ? We have now seen that pleasure is good so far as inseparable 124 Ethical Studies. Thirdly (c) if you maintain more pleasure and higher function to be on the whole inseparable, you may at once be challenged as to the truth of that assertion ; and if you are not allowed to assume it, you can not assume that miore plesusure is ah end. But allowing you for the present to assume that higher function and more pleasure go together, so that to have one is to have the other, why (I would ask), if these two are one whol^ will yoo persist in isolating one side of that whole ; since surely it is tho less knowable side ? The coincidence of the two is an extremely general truth; it need not be true for this man or generation; and, if so, how is it possible to aim at progress except b^ aiming at function ? The function must (on the whole affid in the end) cany the pleasure with it, and it is surely a more definite mark- Is it not preposterous to think of aiming at more pleasure, in the end and on the whole (not in any future that we can see), in order, by making this the end, to get along with it some higher function which we know nothing about ? Is it not U, g,) hopelessly vague, if we want to find out what the divine will is, to attempt to define it by some idea of pleasure in the end and on the whole, and not to ourselves or any one else in any time that we can see ? Is it not less vague to study that will by con- sidering the previous evolution of it, and to accept what seems a higher step in that evolution, as an end in itself? Must we not say that this going together of function and pleasure is a mere general faith, which we can not verify by experience in every case, and so can not use to determine our particular course ? Of course one sees quite clearly that, generally speaking, it is a good thing to aim at the increasing of pleasure and diminisJiing of pain ; but it is a good thing because it increases the actuality and possibility of life. To make function the end justifies and demands the increase of pleasure and gives you all you can fairly ask in that way. But to say more pleasure is all the end, and Mq a mere accompaniment to that, is another matter. And again, when we are doubtful what is higher in progress, it may be a safe course to increase pleasure and diminish pain, because that heightens the good function we have. But to look on the increase of pleasure as the mark to aim at always and simply, when we aim at progress, is again a very different course. But, leaving this subject, we must observe that we have no right to assume that higher function and more pleasure do on the whole go together. We have bitter proof that in particular cases and stages of progress this is not the case, and so are forced to separate the two in our minds. We can imagine fimction widiout pleasure, since we have eaq)erienced 126 Ethical Studies. pleasure. But I do not think that the Utilitarian wishes to teach that doctrine ; and whatever he wants to teach he can teach with- out making pleasure the end. To repeat it once more, if self- realization is the end, then pleasure is a relative end and good, because a condition without which good is impossible ; and hence to increase pleasure is good, though we need not add * for pleasure's sake/ And unhappiness is evil, if it is a psychical state which tends to exclude the good, and may be treated as an evil, which it is our bounden duty to fight against, without our being forced to say * it is the evil itself, and there is no evil beyond it' If again it is objected that the end is vague and has no con- tent, the following Essays will to a certain extent, I hope, remove the objection. Here we may reply that to take human progress as the end, and lo keep our eye on past progress, is not an usele^ prescription ; and if any one wants a moral philosophy to tell him what in particular he is to do, he will find that there neither is nor can be such a thing, and at all events will not find it in Hedonism. One word on the unconscious or latent Hedonism of society in its progress. That is no argument for making pleasure the end, as the reader who has followed me so far will, I trust, at once see. Taking for granted the asserted fact, that society tends to identify what brings pleasure with what is good, we altogether deny the Hedonistic inference. If society tends to realize life more highly and perfectly, it is obvious that it must also realize the conditions of such life. The fact that life can not exist without pleasure does not prove pleasure to be the end of life, unless we are prepared to say (the illustration is not a good one) that because as a man rises in society he wears better clothes, therefore to be dressed like a gentleman was the conscious or unconscious end of his advance- ment. Of course it might have been, but do we say tihat it was? Or, again, a mother may have desired her daughter's health not for her healtli's sake, but for the sake of her looks ; but would it not be an unfounded inference to conclude that it must have been so ? The argument we have noticed holds against asceticism, but we must entreat the reader to bear in mind that the opposite of a false view may be every whit as false ; and that you could argue from the denial of asceticism to the assertion of Hedonism only if you had previously made good your alternative, your * either-^r * of the two. Finally (as we have already gone beyond all bounds), let us make a remark on the phrase ^ Utilitarianism.' It is a thoroughly bad name, and misleads a great many persons. It does indeed express the fact that, for Hedonism^, virtue and action are not the end, but are useful as mere means to something outside them. £SSA V IV. Duty for Duty's Sake. IN our answer to die question, Why should I be monil ? we found that, explicitly or by implication, all Ethics pre- supposed something which is the good, and that this good (what- ever else may be its nature) has always the character of an en^ The moral good is an end in itself, is to be pursued for its ^^'own sake. It must not be made a means to something not itself. We have now seen further that pleasure is not the good, is not the end; that, in pursumg pleasure as such, we do not pursue the good. Hedonism we have disirissed, and may banish it, if we please, from our sight, while we turn to develope a new view of the good, another answer to the question, What is the end ? In Hedonism we have criticiied a onesided view; we shall have to do here with an opposite extremity of on©- ^ sidedness. The self to l>e realized before was the self or selves as 'a maximum quantity or number of particular feelings: in the theory which awaits us the self to be realized has a defect which is diametrically opposed to the first, and yet is the same defect Its fault is the opposite, since for mere particular it substitutes mere universal ; we have not to do with feelings, as this and that, but with a form which is thought of as not this or thatr Jfe fault is the same fault, the failing to see things as a whole, and the fixing as rea l one eleme nt which ye t is xmreal when apart fipom the jtHerT" Xn'a word, we nnd mbotli a onesided view, ana their ' common vice may be called abstractness. So much by way of anticipation, and now we must betake ourselves to our task. ' What is the moral end ? We know already in part what it is * What follows, the reader must be warned, is very far from being meant to be a statement of Kant's main ethical view; as such it would be neithei 130 Ethical Studies. is the end. It does- not say what will is the end ; and we want to know what the good will is. What is the good will ? We may call it indifferently the Free will, or the Universal will, or the Autonomous will, or finally the Formal will. (i) It is the universal will. The very notion of the moral end is that it should be an end absolutely, not conditionally. It is not an end for me without being one also for you, or for you and me and not for a third person ; but it is, without limitation to any this or that, an 'end for us all. And so the will, as end, is not the par- ticular will of particular men, existing as this, that, and the other : series of states of mind. It is the same for you and me, and, in the character of our common standard and aim, it is above you ; and me. It is thus objective and universal. (2) It is the free will. It is not conditioned by, it does not owe its existence and attributes to, it is not made what it is by, and hence it can not (properly speaking) be called forth by, anything which is not itself. It exists because of itself and for the sake of itself. It has no end or aim beyond itself; is not constituted or determined by anything else. Hence we see it is not determined by anything in particular. For, as we saw it, was universal ; and universal means not par- ticular; and so no more than a verbal conclusion is wanted to show that, if determined by something particular, it would be determined by something not itself. And this we l*ave already taken to be false. (3) It is autonomous. For it is universal and an end to itself The good will is the will which wills the universal as itself and ; itself as the imiversal, and hence may be said to be a law to itself I and to will its own law. And, because it is universal, hence in willing what is valid for itself it wills what is valid for alL It legislates universally in legislating for itself, since it would not legislate for itself did it not legislate universally. (4) And lastly, it is formal. For, in willing itself, it wills the universal, and that is not - particular. Any possible object of desire, any wished-for event, any end in the shape of a reisult to be attained in the particular existence of myself or another, all are this or that something: they have a content, they are * material.' 132 Ethical Studies. self forcing the sensuous self, and here first can we attach a meaning to the words ' ought * and * duty .' ' If our self were nothing beyond the series of its states, if it were nothing above and beyond these coexistent and successive pheno- mena, then the word ^ ought ' could have no meaning. And again, if our self were a pure, unalloyed will, realizing itself apart from a sensuous element^ the word ^ oi^ht ' would still be meaningless. lit is the iantagonism of the two elements in one subject which is ithe essence of the ought. The ought is a command; it expresses something which neither simply is or is not, but which both is and is not ; something, in short, which is to be. Further, when ad- dressed to myself, it puts before me something which is to be done, and which I am to do. A command is the doing of something by me, which doing is willed by a will, not me, and presented as such by that will to me.' In the ought the self is commamled, and that self is the sensuous self in me, which is ordered, and which, if I obey, is forced by the non-sensuous formal will which stands above the empirical element, and, equally with that, is myself. The ought is the command of the formal will, and duty is the obedience, or, more properly, the compulsion of the lower self by thai will, or the realization of the form in and against the recal- citrant matter of the desires. ^ Duty must be for duty's sake, or it is not duty. It is not enough that my acts should realize and embody the universal form, and so far be conformable thereco. It is not enough that the act com- manded be done by me. The end, as. we have seen, is not a result beyond and outside the activity. It is not the realizedness ' In a lower sense we can use, and do use, ' oo^t ' outside the moral woild. Wherever 'law' has a meaning, 'oi^ht' has also a meaning. Where the par- ticular phenomenon does not answer to its conception, we say ' ought. ^ ^A man (e*g^ "ought '* to have two eyes.' ' Ice of that thickness " ought" to h{iTe borne.' Somethii^ has interfered in the\:ase, so that the fact is nor an exhibi* tion of the law. But the moral ' ought ' means much more than this. There the particular fact or phehMmenon is this or that willy which, moreover, is or can be aware ofUsposUum as snch in relation to the law or general conception. This makes an enormous difference. *A command may contain a promise or threat It i^ not of its essence that it should do so. 134 Ethical Sttidies. /ever act embodies a self-contradiction is immoral. Whatever act /is self-consistent is legal. Whatever act is self-consistent, and is /done for the sake of realizing self-consistency, and for the sake of / nothing else, is moral. This is simple, this is practical ; and there surely is cause for thankfulness in the arrangement of things which has placed the standard and test of all that is most important, of everything which really is important, in a form wbich even the unlettered can understand, and a child can apply. ' Stated as we have stated it above, the theory of duty for duty's sake carries with it little or no plausibility. Criticism of it may appear to the reader., to be superfluous, but nevertheless it will repay us to see briefly sec forth the inner contradictions in which it loses itself, and which destroy its claim to practical value. The theory contradicts itself; and, reduced to a simple form, the contradiction is as follows : — Self-realization is the end, and the self to be realized is the negative of reality ; we are to realize, and must produce nothing real. Let us explain. The good is the will. The will is the carrying of the inner mind out into the world of fact ; it is the identity of thought and existence, the process in which the ideal passes over into reality, and where the content on both sides is the same, subject always to the diversity of the t\vo different elements. Mere thought is not will — that is the inner side only. Mere existence in time and space, or time, is not will — that is the outside only. For will we want both sides, and both sides in one. And from the above we see at once that, if the two sides are to correspond, there must be some cor- respondence in the nature of what they contain ; and, starting here from the side of existence, we may say, you can realize nothing, unless that which you are to realize have in it already the char- I acter which distinguishes reality. j I To realize means to translate an ideal content into existence, ' As I said before, this is not a statement of the Kantian view ; that view is far wider, and at the same time more confused. As a system it has been annihilated by Hegel's criticism (i. 335, foil. ; and ii. 437, foil.), to which*^! owe most of the following. Compare also Schopenhauer, iv. Grundproblemc, p. 117-178. But the reader must bear in mind that only I am responsible for what I say. 136 Etkkal Studies^ opposite of particular. * Realize the particular ' means, fealize the opposite of the universal ; and so, if you particularize the universal, you hav6 not realized //, L e. not the universal you had to realize; or, in other words, if you materialize the form, it is no longer formal On the other hand, * realize* means materialize, it means partic ularize. 'Realize' asserts the concrete identity of matter and form whitlT" * formal will* denies; and we are left with the hopeless con* tradiction of an order, which tells us in one breath that only the formal (/. e, the «^/-real) will is good, and that for the sake df the good we are to realize {i.e. unformalize) the formal will Or less abstractly — ^we have two elements in one subject, the sensuous nature and the pure wilL The pure will is to be kept pure; it is for its sake that we act, and action consists in the forcing of the sensuous nature. Th e ord er is he re , * Real ize the pure will in the se nsuous natur^ ^* ^nd the contradiction is ^ above. 'I'he pure will means the non-sensuous will, and * realize ll'^lrheans, translate it into an element which destroys its essence. The formal will, when realized, is no longer formal, is material- ized, is sensusdized, is no longer pure. If you do not want to sensualize the will, why do you say make it real ? What is the use and meaning of realizing ? Or if you say the will is and means realization, then do you not see that the will means the identity of the pure and sensuous nature, that it implies the two sides, and that 'formal will' says, 'have both sides, but be sure you have only one ; ' or, more briefly, that pure or formal will is nonsense? In its simplest form the contradiction is this. * Realize non- contradiction ' is the order. But * non-contradiction' = bate form : ' realize ' =. give ccmtent to : content contradicts form withoiit content, and so 'realize non-cbntradiction' means 'realize a contradiction'.' (2) In our remarks on the self-contradiction of the principle. ' The hopeless inconsistencies of the dualistic moral theory, the standing contradictions of its moral theology and practical postulates generally, arc beyond our subject . The whole point of view has been criticized in the second of the passages from Hegel referred to above. We may remark in passing a contradiction involved in the doctrine of the 138 Ethical Studies. your duties ; that general doing good may mean doing no good in particular, and so none at all, but rather perhaps the contrary I of good. Everybody knows that the setting out, whether in religion, morals, or politics, with the intent to realize an abstrac- tion, is a futile endeavour ; and that what it comes to is that either k you do nothing at all, or that the particular content which is ) necessary for action is added to the ab3traction by the chance of circumstances or caprice. Everybody suspects, if they do not feel sure, that the acting consciously on and from abstract principles means self-deceit or hypocrisy or both. (3) A more psychological consiaeration leads us still to the futility of duty for duty^s sake. A will which does not act is no will, and every act is a particular event : an act is this or that act, and an act in general is nonsense. But how can a formal act be this or that act? Even where the abstraction has been specialized into definite * material ' ends and aims to be accom- plished, yet even there for the particular volition the special circumstances of time, place, &c. are wanted. They may not be essential to the act ; they may make no practical difference to the content If I have resolved to kill a man in a certain way, the place, time, &c. are psychically necessary for the particular act of killing, but they may not enter into the essence of the act (So it is with one's ordinary duties.) The more specialized and materialized the previous intent, the less is added to it by the particular circumstances; and the less specialized the contenr, the more is added. If I run out into the street to kill a man, ; chance » decides who it is I kill. So with duty. If I intend to do duty generally, chance decides what duty I do ; for what falls outside the preconceived intent is chance, and here everything i falls outside saving. the bare form. To act you must will something, and something definite. To will in general is impossible, and to will in particular is never to will nothing but a form. It must at best be to will a chance case of the form, and then (speaking psychologically) what moves is chance (desire). The bare form can not move. Will, when one ^ Chance, that is to say, relatively to my intent ; because my intent does not essentially involve the particular person killecL X40 Ethical Studies. ^ ^ priation a negation, an exclusion. In this sense not only is the definite content in contradiction with die form, but it also in itself involves contradiction. This, however, is not the meaning of the rule of non-contradic- tion. The meaning of that is diat you must not posit a deterxni- nation and with it its own negation. You must not have an act which embodies the rule to negate anything^ for that is a self- contradiction. A rule * negate A ' contradicts itself, for if A is negated you can not negate it * Steal property ' is a contradic- ti on, for it des troys property, and with it possibility of theft. We have no need here to push further a metaphysical argument against this view, for it supplies us at once with a crushing instance against itself. The essence of morality was a similar contradic- tion.* * Negat e the s ensuous self' But if the sensuous self U negated, possibility of morality disappears. . Morality is thus as inconsistent as theft 'Succour the poor' both negates and presupposes (hence posits) poverty : as Blake comiodly says, Pity would be no more, If we did not make somebody poor. If you are to love your enemies, you must never be without them ; and yet you try to get rid of them. Is that consistent ? In short, every duty which presupposes something to be negated is no duty ; it is an immoral rule, because self-contradictory. No rule must be stated negatively then, but all positively; and then comes the very serious question, whether there is any rule vrhich can not be stated positively. The canon is an empty form, * Let A be A' It is a tautology ; and it requires no great skill to put anything and everylhing into the form of a tautology, and so to moralize it ' Let property be,' * let no -property be ; ' Met law be,' *let no-law be;' *let love be,' Met hate be;' *be brave/ *be cowardly;' 'be kind,' 'be cruel,' *be indifferent;' Met succour be,' * let no-succour be ; ' or riches, or poverty, or pleasure, or pain. Wheie is the canon? It is nowhere. Poverty is poverty, and is an affirmative tautology. Hate is hate, as much as ' Hegel {loc, cit,) poshes this ruthlessly even against the postulate of immor^ tality. In what immediately follows we are drawing from him very largely. 142 Ethical Studies. tions that, in many cases, you might as well have left it alone altogether. We certainly have laws, but we may not be able to follow them all at once ; and to know which we are to follow is a matter of good sense which can not be decided any other way. One should give to the poor — in what cases and how much? Should sacrifice oneself — in what way and within what limits ? Should not indulge one's appetites — except when it is right Should not idle away one's time — except when one takes one's pleasure. Nor neglect one's work — but for some good reason. All these points we admit are in one way matter of law ; but if. you think to decide in particular cases by applying some " cate- gorical imperative," you must be a pedant, if not a fool.' Ordinary morality does not hold to each of its laws as inviolable, each as an absolute end in itself. It is not even aware of a colli- sion in most cases where duties clash ; and, where it perceives it, and is confronted with collisions of moral laws, each of which it has been accustomed to look on as an absolute monarch, so to speak, or a commander-in-chief, rather than as a possible subordinate officer, there it does subordinate one to the other, and feels uneasiness only in proportion to the rarity of the necessity, and the consequent jar to the feelings. There are few laws a breach of which (in obedience to a higher law) morality does not allow, and I believe there are none which are not to be broken in conceivable (imaginable) circumstances, though the necessity of deciding the question does not practically occur. According to ordinary morality (the fact is too palpable to be gainsaid), it is quite right to speak falsely with intent to deceive under certain circum- stances, though ordinary morality might add, * I don't call that a lie.' It is a lie; and when Kant and others maintained that it must always be wrong to lie, they forgot the rather important fact that in some cases to abstain from acting is acting, is wilful neglect of a duty, and that there are duties above truth-speaking, and many offences against morality which are worse, though they may be less painful, than a lie. So to kill oneself, in a manner which must be called suicide, may not only be right but heroic ; ' homicide may ' The story of the imprisoned Italian who, knowing that he was being drugged to disorder his intellect and cause him to betray his comrades, opened 144 Ethical Studies. overruled, and that its form and its absolute imperative are imprac- ticable. What after all remains is the acting for the sa]:e of a good will, to realize oneself by realizing the will which is above us and higher than oiurs ; and the assurance that diis, and not the self to be pleased, is the end for which we have to live. But as to that which the good will is, it tells us nothing, and leaves us [with an idle abstraction. 146 Ethical Studies. because real in no particular content, or always and everj'where realized, because equally reconcileable with any content And so, 33 before with happiness, we perceived that morality could have no existence, if it meant anything more than the continual assevera- \ tion of an empty formula. And, if we had chosen, we might have gone on to exhibit the falsity of asceticism, to see that the } self can noj J^ig jrealized as its own mere negation, since moraliT jir^iactice, is will to do somemiffgj iir^df-ainrmation : an3 that a wnrfo deny one s will is not self-realization, but rather is, stnctly speaking, a psychical impossibility, a self-contradictory illusion. And the possibility, again, of taking as the self to be realized the self which I happen to have, my natural being, and of making life the end of life in the sense that each should live his life as he happens to find it in his own nature, has been precluded before- hand by the result derived from the consideration of the moral consciousness, viz. that morality implies a superior, a higher sel^ dr at all events an universal something which is above this or that self, and *o above mine. And, to complete the account of our negations, we saw further, with respect to duty for duty's sake, that even were it possible ^as it is not) to create a content from the formula, and to elaborate in his manner a system of duties, yet even then the practice required by the theory would be impossible, anr? so too morality, since in practice particular duties must collide ; and the collision o^ duties, if we hold to duty for duty's sake,, is the destruction of all duty, save the unrealized form of duty in general. But let us view this result, which seems so unsatisfactory, from the positive side; let us see after all with what we are left We have V / self-realization left as the end, the self so far being defined as neither a collection of particular feelings nor an abstract universal The self is to be- realized as something not simply one or the other ; it is to be realized further as will, will not being merely the natu ral will, or the will'as it'Eapperi? to'exTsf and' findsltself he re or ther e, but the will as the ~^bd? wiir,~/. /. the "will tftat realizes an end which is above this or that man, sUpenor to mem, and capable of confronting them in the shape' of' a law or an ought This superior something further, which is a possible law or oug^t to the individual man, does not depend for its existence on his choice or opinion. Either there is no morality, so says the moral conscious- \ 148 Ethical Studies. living soul that penetrates and stands fast in the detail of actual existence. It is real, and real for me. It is in its affirmation that I affirm myself, for I am but as a ' heart-beat in its system.' And I am real in it; for, when I give myself to it, it gives me the fruition of my own personal activity, the accomplished ideal of my life which is happiness. In the reahzed idea which, superior to me, and yet here and now in and by me, affirms itself in a ,i " continuous process, we have found the end, we have found self- (realization, duty, and happiness in one ; — yes, we have found ourselves, when we have found pur station and its duties, oar Function as an organ in the social organism. S-. ' Mere rhetoric,' we shall be told, ' a bad metaphysical dream, a stale old story once more warmed up, which can not hold its own against the logic of facts. That the state was prior to the individual, that the whole was sometimes more than the sum of (he parts, was an illusion which preyed on the thinkers of Greece. But that illusion has been traced to its source and disp^ed, ojid is in plain words exploded. The family, society, the state, and generally every commimity of men, consists of individuals, and there is nothing in them real except the individuals. Individuals have made them, and make them, by placing themselves and by standing in certain relations. The individuals are real by them- selves, and it is because of them that the relations are real. They make them, they are real in them, not because of them, and they would be just as real out of them. The whole is the mere sum of the parts, and the parts are as real away from the whole as they are within the whole. Do you really suppose that the individual would perish if every form of community were destroyed? Do you think that anything real answers to the phrases of universal and organism? Everything is in the organism what it is out, and the universal is a name, the existing fact answering to which is particular persons in such and such relations. To put the matter shortly, the community is the sum of its parts, is made by the addition of parts ; and the parts are as real before the addition as after ; the relations they stand in do not make them what they are, but are accidental not essential to their being; and, as to the whole, if it is not a name foi the individuals that compose it, is 1 50 Ethical Studies. their organic structure and the assertion of the whole body as of paramount importance in comparison with any of the members, then they must fall back on their metaphysic. And the point we wish here to emphasize is this, that their metaphysic is mere dogmatism. It is assumed, not proved. It hi^s a right to no refutation, for assertion can demand no more than counter-assertion ; and what is affirmed on the one side, we on the ether side can simply deny, and we intend to do so here. A discussion that would go to the bottom of the question, What is an individual ? is certainly wanted. It would certainly be de- sirable, showing first what an individual is, to show then that ' individualism ' has not apprehended that, but taken an abstraction for reality. But, if I could do that (which I could not do), this would not be the place ; nor peiiiaps should I have to say very much that has not been said before, and has been not attended to. But we are not going to enter on a metaphysical question to which we are not equal ; we meet the metaphysical assertion of the * individualist ' with a mere denial ; and, turning to facts, we will try to show that they lead us in another direction. To the assertion, then, that selves are ' individual ' in the sense of exclu- sive of other selves, we oppose the (equally justified) assertion, that this is a mare fancy. We say that, out of *^heory, no such individual men exist ; and we will try to show from fact that, in fact, what we call an individual man is what he is because of and by virtue of community, and that communities are thus not mere names but something real, and can be regarded (if we mean to keep to facts) only as the one in the many. And to confine the subject, and to keep to what is familiar, we will not call to our aid the life of animals, nor early societies, nor the course of history, but we will take men as they are now ; we will take ourselves, and endeavour to keep wholly to the teaching of experience. Let us take a man, an Englishman as he is now, and try to point out that, apart from what he has in common with others, apart from his sameness with others, he is not an Englishman — nor a man at all ; that if you take him as something by himself, he is not what he is. Of course we do not mean to say that he can not go out of England without disappearing, nor, even if all the I $2 Ethical Studies. while we yet maintain the previous dogma, 'resemblance' is brought in, — 2l conception which (I suppose I need not add) is not analyzed or properly defined, and so does all the better. Against these assertions I shall put some others, viz. that identity and diversity, sameness aiid difference, imply one another, and depend for their meaning on one another ; that mere diversity is nonsense, just as mere identity is also nonsense ; that resemblance or likeness, strictly speaking, falls not in the objects, but in the per- son contemplating (likening, ver-gleichend) ; that * is A. really like B ? ' does not mean • does it seem like ? ' It may mean * would it seem like to everybody ? ' but it generally means * is there an " objective identity " ? Is there a point or points the same in both, whether any one sees it or not ? * We do not talk of cases of 'mistaken likeness;' we do not hang one man because he is * exactly like ' another, or at least we do not wish to do so. We are the same as we were, not merely more or less like. We have the same faith, hope, and purpose, and the same feelings as another man has now, as ourselves had at another time, — not understand- ing thereby the numerical indistinguishedness of partioriar states and moments, but calling the feelings one and the same feeling, because what is felt is the same, and not merely like. In short, so far is it from being true that ' sameness ' is really * likeness,' that it is utterly false that two things are really and objectively 'like,' unless that means 'more or less the same.' So much by way of counter-assertion ; and now let us turn to our facts. The * individual ' man, the man into whose essence his com- munity with others does not enter, who does not indude relation to others in his very being, is, we say, a fiction, and in the light of facts we have to examine him. Let us take him in the shape of an English child as soon as he is bom ^ . for I suppose we ought not to go further bacL Let us take him as soon as he is sepa- rated from his mother, and occupies a space clear and exclusive of all other human beings. At this time, education and custom will, I imagine, be allowed to have not as yet operated on him or lessened his ' individuality.' But is he now a meie * individual,' in the sense of not implying in his being identity with others ? We can not say that, if we hold to the teaching of modem physiology. Physiology would tell us, in one language or another, that even ;i54 Ethical Studies. that aptitudes are developed, and are latent in the child at birth ; and that it is a very different thing, even apart from education, to be born of civilized and of uncivilized ancestors. These * civilized tendencies,' li we may use the phrase, are part of the essence of the child : he would only partly (if at all) be himself without them ; he owes them to his ancestors, and his ancestors owe them to society. The ancestors were made what they were by the society they lived in. If in answer it be replied, * Yes, but individual ancestors were prior to their society,' then that, to say the least of it, is a hazardous and unproved assertion, since man, so far as history caui trace him back, is social ; and if Mr. Darwin's con- jecture a6 to the developement of man from a social animal be received, we must say that man has never been anything but social, and society never was made by individual men. Not, if the (baseless) assertion of the priority of individual men were allowed, would that destroy our case ; for certainly our more immediate ancestors were social ; and, whether society was manu* factured previously by individuals or not, yet in their case it certainly was not so. They at all events have been so qualified by the common possessions of social mankind that, as members in the organism, they have become relative to the whole. If we suppose then that the results of the social life of the race are present in a latent and potential form in the child, can we deny that they are common property ? Can we assert that they are not an element of sameness in all ? Can we say that the individual is this individual, because he is exclusive, when, if we deduct from him what he includes, he loses characteristics which. make him himself, and when again he does include what the others include, and therefore does (how can we escape the con- sequence?) include in some sense the others also, just as they include him ? By himself, then, what are we to call him ? I confess I do not know, unless we name him a theoretical attempt to isolate what can not be isolated ; and that, I suppose, has out of our heads no existence. But what he is really, and not in mere theory, can be described only as the specification or particular- ization of that which is common, which is the same amid diversity, and without which the ' individual ' would be so other than he is that we could not call him the same. 156 Ethical Studies. them in indelibly He grows up in an atmosphere of example and general custom, his life \iidens out from one little world to other and higher worlds, and he apprehends through successive > stations the whole in which he lives, and in which he has b'ved i Is he now to try and develope his * individuality,' his self which lis not the same as other selves? Where is it? What is it? 'Where can he find it? The soul within him is. saturated, is filled, is qualified by, it has assimilated, has got its substance, has built itself up from, it is one and the same life with the C\ universal life, and if he turns against this he turns against himself; I if he thrusts it from him, he tears his own vitals ; if he attacks it, 1 he sets his weapon against his own heart He has found his life in the life of the whole, he lives that in himself, ' he is a pulse- beat of the whole system, and himself the whole system/ * The child, in his character of the form of the possibility of a moral individual, is something subjective or negative ; his growing to manhood is the ceasing to be of this form^ and his education is the discipline or the compulsion thereof. The positive side ^ and the essence is that he is suckled at the breast of the universal Ethos, lives in its absolute intuition, as in that of a foreign being first, then comprehends it more and more, and so passes over into the universal mind.* The writer proceeds to draw the weighty conclusion that virtue ' is not a tronbling oneself about a peculiar and isolated morality of one's own, that the striving for a positive morality of one's own is fiitile, and \r\. its very nature impossible of attainment ; that in respect of morality the saying of the wisest men of antiquity is the only one which is true, that to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of oneVcountiy ; and in respect of education, the one true answer is that which a Pythagorean gave to him who asked what was the best education for his son, If you make him the citizen of a people with good institutions.' ' But this is to anticipate. — So far, I think, without aid from meta- physics, we have seen that the 'individual' apart ftxjm the community is an abstraction. It is not anything real, and hence not anything that we can realize, however much we may wish to » Hegel, L 389. V- 158 Ethical Sttidies. ! makes it In short, man is a social being ; he is real only because he is social, and can realize himself only because it is as social that he realizes himself. The mere individual is a delusion of theory ; and the attempt to realize it in practice is the starvation and mutilation of human nature, with total sterility or the production of monstrosities. Let us now in detail compare the advants^s of our present view with the defects of * duty for duty^s sake.' The objections we found fatal to that view may be stated as follows : — (i) The uni- versal was abstract. There was no content which belonged to it and was one with it ; and the consequence was, that either nothing could be willed, or what was willed was willed not because of the universal, but capriciously. (2) The universal was ' subjective.' It certainly gave itself out as ' objective,' in the sense of being inde- pendent of this or that person, but still it was not real in the v/orld It did not come to us as what wasy it came as what (merely) was to be, an inner notion in moral persons, which had not power to c^rry itself out and transform the world. And self-realization, if it- means will, does mean that we put ourselves forth and see ourseJves actual in outer existence. Hence, by identifying our- selves with that which has not this existence, which is not master of the outer world, we can not secure our self-realization ; since, when we have identified ourselves with the end, the end may still remain a mere inner end which does not accomplish itself, and so does not satisfy us. (3) Thie universal left a part of ourselves out- { side it. However much we tried to be good, however determined I we were to make our will one with the good will, yet. we never succeeded. There was always something left in us which was in j contradiction with the good. And this we saw was even necessary, because morality meant and implied this contradiction, unless we accepted that form of conscientiousness which consists in the simple identification of one's conscience with one's own self (unless, /. ^., the consciousness of the relation of my private self to myself as the good self be degraded into my self-consciousness of my mere private self as the good self); and this can not be, if we are in earnest with morality. There thus remains a perpetual con- tradiction in myself, no less than in the world, between the * is to i6o Ethical Studies. itself the particulars of all lives, and here and now in my life has this and that function in this and that case, in exercising which through my will it realizes itself as a whole, and me .in it (2) It is 'objective;' and this means that it does not stand over against the outer world as mere * subject * confronted by mere * object' In that sense of the words it is neither merely * objec- tive ' nor merely * subjective ; ' but it is that real identity of subject and obiectwhich, as we have seen, is the only thing that satisfies our desires, ... The inner side does exist, but it is no more than the inside ; it is one factor in the whole, and must not be separ- ated from the other factor ; and the mistake which is made by the (morality which confines itself to the individual man, is just this attempt at the separation of what can not be sepattited. The inner side certainly is a fact, and it can be distinguished from the rest of the whole ; but it really is one element of the whole, depends on the whole for its being, and can not be divided from it Let ^ ^us explain. The moral world, as we said, is a whole, and has two \ sides. There is an outer side, systems and institutions, from the family to the nation ; this we may call the body of the moral world. And there must also be a soul, or else the body goes to pieces; every one knows that institutions without the spirit of them are dead. In the moral organism this spirit is in the will of the organs, as the will of the whole which, in and by the organs^ carries out the organism and makes it alive, and which also (and this is the point to which attention is requested) is and must be \felt or known in each organ as his own inward and personal will. It is quite clear that a nation is not strong without public spirit, and is not publicnspirited unless the members of it are public- spirited, /. e, feel the good of the public as a personal matter, or have it at their hearts. The point here is that you can not have the moral world unless it is willed ; that to be willed it must be willed by persons ; and that these persons not only have the moral world as the content of their wills, but also must in some way be aware of themselves as willing this content This beingin wardl] aware of ones elf as willin g the go od will falirin"tIie"S5i 3eQi moral whole : we may call it the soul : and it is the sphere of per* IS&nai molality," or morality i n the narrower s ense of the consaous- ness of the relation of my private self "to the inwaSly presented 1 62 Ethical Studies. \ ourselves (or into itself). The outer universal which I have been taught to will as my will, and which I have grown to find myself in, is now presented by me inwardly to myself as the universal which is my true being, and which by my will I must realize, if \ lieed be, against my will as this or that man. So this inner un'- ^ Wersal has the same content as the outer universal, for it is the \ Jouter universal in another sphere; it is the inside of the outside. \ There was the whole system as an objective will, including my station, and realizing itself here and now in my function. Here is the same S)rstem presented as a will in me, standing above my will, which wills a certain ai.t to be done by me as a will which is one with the universal will. This universal will is not a blank, but it is filled by the consideration of my station in the whole with reference to habitual and special acts. The ideal self appealed to by the moral man is an ideally presented will, in his position and circumstances, which rightly particularizes the general laws which answer to the general functions and system of spheres of the moral organism. That is the content, and therefore, as we saw, it is concrete and filled. And therefore also (which js equally important) it is not X^merely * subjective.* If, on the inner side of the moral whole, the universal factor were (as in would-be morality it is) filled with a content which is not the detail of the objective will particularizing itself in such and such functions, then there would be no true identity of subject and object, no need why that which is moral should be that which is real, and we should never escape from a practical postulaU, which, as we saw, is a practical standing contradiction. But if, as we have seen, the universal on the inside is the universal on the outside reflected in us, or (since we can not separate it and our- selves) into itself in us ; if the objective will of the moral organism IS real only in the will pf its organs, and if, in willing morally, we will ourselves as that will, and that will wills itself in us, — ^then we must hold that this universal on the inner side is the will of the whole, which is self-conscious in us, and wills itself in us against the actual or possible opposition of the false private self. This being so, when we will morally, the will of the objective world wills itself in us, and carries both us and itself out into the world of the moral will, which is its own realm. We see thus that, when 164 Ethical Studies. infinite process, an unending * not-yet ' ; a continual ' not ' with an everlasting * to be/ or an abiding * to be ' with a ceaseless * not' From this last peevish enemy we are again delivered by ' my station and its duties/ There I realize myself morally, so that not only what ought to be iii the world is, but I am what I ought to be, and find so my contentment and satisfaction. If this were not the case, when we consider that the ordinary moral man is self-contented and happy, we shouJd be forced to accuse him of immorality, and we do not do this ; we say he most likely might be better, but we do not say that he is bad, or need consider him- self so. Why is this ? It is because ' my station and its duties ' teaches us to identify others and ourselves with the station we fill ; to consider that as good, and by virtue of that to consider others and ourselves good too. It teaches us that a man who does his work in the world is good, notwithstanding his faults, if his faults do not prevent him from fulfilling his station. It tells us that the heart is an idle abstraction^ we are not to think of it, nor must we look at our insides, but at our work and our life, and say to ourselves. Am I fulfilling ray appointed function or not ? V Fulfil it we can, if we will : what we have to do is not so much better than the worTa that we can not do it ; the world is there waiting for it ; myduties are my jj^ts.. On the one hand, I am not likely to be much better than the world asks me to be, on the other hand, if I can take my place in the world I ought not to be discontented. Here we must not be misunderstood ; we do not say that the false self, the habits and desires opposed to the good will, are extinguished. Though negated, they never are all of them entirely suppressed, and can not be. Hence we must not say that any man really does fill his station to the- full height of his capacity; nor must we say of any man that he can not perform his function better than he does, for we all can do so, and should try to do so. We do not wish to deny what are plain moral facts, nor in any way to slur them over. How then does the contradiction disappear? It disappears by my identifying myself with the good will that I realize in the world, by my refusing to identify myself with the bad will of my private self. So far as I am one with the good will, living as a member in the moral organism, I am to consider myself real, and i66 Ethical Studies. now is not distinct from his ' artificial self.' He is related to the i living moral system not as to a foreign body ; his relation to it is * too inward even for faith/ since faith implies a certain separation. It is no other-world that he can not see but must trust to : he feels himself in it, and it in him ; in a word, the self-consciousness of himself is the self-consciousness of the whole in him, and his will is the wi)^ which sees in him its accomplishment by him ; it is the free will which knows itself as the free will, and as this beholds its realization and is more than content The non-theoretical person, if he be not immoral, is at peace with reality; and the man who in any degree has made this point of view his own, becomes more and more reconciled to the world and to life, and the theories of * advanced thinkers ' come to him more and more as the thinnest and most miserable abstractions. He sees evils which can not discourage him, since they point to the strength of the life which can endure such parasites and flourish in spite of them. Li the popularizing of superficial views inclines him to bitterness, he comforts himself when he sees that they live in the head, and but little, if at all, in the heart and life ; that still at the push the doctrinaire and the quacksalver go to the wall, and that even that too is as it ought to be. He sees the true account of the state (which holds it to be neither mere force nor convention, but the moral organism, the real identity of might and right) unknown or * refuted,' laughed at and despised, but he sees the state every day in its practice refute every other doctrine, and do with the moral approval of all what the explicit theory of ^ scarcely one will morally justify. He sees instincts are better and ' stronger than so-called 'principles.' He sees in the hour of need what are called * rights ' laughed at, * freedom,' the liberty to do what one pleases, trampled on, the claims of the individual trodden under foot, and theories burst like cobwebs. And he sees, as of old, the heart of a nation rise high and beat in the breast of each one of her citizens, till her safety and her honour are dearer to each than life, till to those who live her shame and sorrow, if such is allotted, outweigh their loss, and death seems a little thing to those who go for her to their common and nameless grave. And he knows that what is stronger than death is hate or love, hate 1 68 Ethical Studies. I ( viduaJizes itself, is in its reality interlaced with the action of all The work of the individual for his needs is a satisfaction of the ("Jl needs of others as much as of his own ; and he attains the satis- ) faction of his own only through the work of the others. The individual in his individual work thus accomplishes an universal work — he does so here unconsciously ; but he also further accom- plishes it as his conscious object : the whole as the whole is his work for which he sacrifices himself, and from which by that very sacrifice he gets again his self restored. — Here there is nothing taken which is not given, nothing wherein the independent individual, by and in the resolution of his atomic existence, by and in the negation of his self, fails to give himself the positive significance of a being which exists by and for itsel£ This unity — on the one side of the being for another, or the making oneself into an outward thing, and on the other side of the being for oneself-^this universal substance speaks its universal language in the usages and laws of his people : and yet this imchaiiiging essence is itself nought else than the expression of the single individuality, which seems at first sight its mere opposite ; the laws pronounce nothing but what every one is and does. The individual recognizes the substance not only as his universal outward existence, but he recognizes also himself in it, particularized in his own individuality , and in that of each of his fellow-citizens. And so in the universal (mind each one has nothing but self-certainty, the assurance of finding in existing reality nothing but himsetf. — In all I contem- plate independent beings, that are such, and are for themselves, only in the very same way that I am for myself ; in them I see existing free unity of self with others, and existing by virtue of me and by virtue of the others alike. Them as myself, myself as them.' ' Let me ilhistrate from our great poet : — So they loved, as love in twain Had the essence but in one ; Two distincts, division none : Number there in love was slain. Hearts remote yet not asunder ; Distance, and no space was seen- 170 Ethical Studies. I The truth of individualism is saved, because, unless we have intense life and self-consciousness in the members of the state, the whole state is ossified. The truth of despotism is saved, because, unless the member realizes the whole by and in himself, he fails to reach his own individuality. Considered in the main, the best communities are those which have the best men for their members, and the best men are the members of the best communities. Circle as this is, it is not a vicious circle. The two prdi^ms of the best man and best stat e are two sides, two dist inguishabl e aspects of the one problem, how TolgaitZe "in human nature the perfect unity of hbinogenei^anE^pec^ when we see that each of these without the other is unreal, then we see that (speaking in general) the welfare of the state and the welfare of its individuals are questions which it is mistaken and ruinous to separate. Personal morality and political and social institutions can not exist apart, and (in general) the better the one^he better the other. The community is moral, because it realizes personal f^morahty; personal morality is moral, because and in so far as it realizes the moral whole. It is here we find an answer to the complaint of our day .on the dwindling of human nature. The higher the organism (wc are told), the more are its functions specified, and hence narrowed. The man becomes a machine, or the piece of a machine ; and, though the world grows, * the individual withers.* On this we may first remark that, if what is meant is that, the more centralized the system, the more narrow and monotonous is the life of the member, that is a very questionable assertion. If it be meant that the individual's life can be narrowed to * file-packing,' or the like, without detriment to the intensity of the life of the whole, that is even more questionable. If again it be meant that in many cases we have a one-sided specification, which, despite the immediate stimulus of particular function, implies ultimate loss of life to the body, that, I think, probably is so, but it is doubtful if we are compelled to think it always must be so. But the root of the whole complaint is a false view of things, which we have briefly noticed above (p. 73). The moral organism is not a mere anin:ial organism. In the latter (it is no novel remark) the mem- ber 18 not aware of itself as such, while in the former it knows 172 Ethical Studies. 4 ■ ■ » 1-. the true idea of man; in other words, by realizing man as an infinite whole (p. 68). This realization is possible only by the individual's living as jnember in a higher life, and this higher life is slowly developed in a series of stages. Starting from and on the basis of animal nature, humanity has worked itself out by gradual advances of specification and systematization ; and any other progress would, in the world we know, have been impossible. The notion that full-fiedged moral ideas fell down from heaven is contrary to all the facts with which we are acquainted. If they had done so, it would have been for their own sake ; for by us they certainly could not have been perceived, much less applied. At any given period to know more than he did, man must have been more than he was ; for a human being is nothing if h« is not the son of his time ; and he must realize himself as that, or he will not i do it at all. Morality is * relative,' but is none the less real. At every stage there is the solid fact of a world so far moralized. There is an objective morality in the accomplished will of the past and present, t a higher self worked out by the infinite pain, the sweat and blood f of generations, and now given to me by free grace and in love and '; faith as a sacred trust It comes to me as the truth of my own i nature, and the power and the law, which is stronger and higher ; than any caprice or opinion of my own. ' Evolution,' in this sense of the word, gives us over neither to chance nor alien necessity, for it is that self-realization which is the progressive conquest of both. But, on another understanding of the term, we can not help asking. Is this still the case, and is * my station ' a tenable point of view? Wholly tenable, in the form in which we have stated it, it is not. For if, in saying Morahty has developed, all we mean is that something has happened different from earlier events, that human society has changed, and that the alterations, so far as we know them, are more or less of a certain sort ; if * progress ' signifies that an advance has been set going and is kept up by chance in an unknown direction ; that the higher is, in short, what is and what before was not, and that what will be, of whatever sort it is, will still be a st^p in progress; if, in short, the movement of history towards a goal is mere illusion, and the stages of that 174 Ethical Studies, of realization is evolution through stages, and hence existence in some one stage which is not final ; here, on the other hand, all morality is * absolute/ because in every stage the essence of man is realized, however imperfectly ; and yet again the distinction of right in itself against relative morality is not banished, because, from the point of view of a higher stage, we can see that lower stages failed to realize the truth completely enough, and also, mixed and one with their realization, did present features contrary to the true nature of man as we now see it Yet herein the morality of every stage is justified for that stage ; and the demand for a code of right in itself, apart from any stage, is seen to be the asking for an impossibility. The next point we come to is the question. How do I get to know in particular what is right and wrong ? and here again we fmd a strangely erroneous preconception. It is thought that moral philosophy has to accomplish this task for us ; and the con- clusion lies near at hand, that any system which will not do this is worthless. Well, we first remark, and with some confidence, that there can not be a moral philosophy which will tell us what in particular we are to do, and also that it is not the business of philosophy to do so. All philosophy has to do is * to understand A«. what is,' and moral philosophy has to understand morals which exist, not to make them or give directions for making theixL Such . a notion is simply ludicrous. Philosophy in general has not to bring out nothing but what was in, and bring it out, not from external com- pulsion, but because it is in. And further, unless what is at the end is different from that which was at the beginning, there is no evolution. That which developes, or evolves itself, both is and is not It is^ or it could not be U which developes, and which at the end has developed. It is not, or else it could not become. It becomes what it is ; and, if this is nonsense, then evolution is nonsense. Evolution is a contradiction ; and, when the contradiction ceases, the evolu- tion ceases. The process is a contradiction, and only because it is a contradic- tion can it be a process. So long as progress lasts, contradiction lasts ; so long as anything becomes, it is not. To be realized is to cease to progress. To be at the end (in one sense) is to lose the end (in another), and that because (in both senses) all then comes to the end. For the process is a contradiction, ind the solution of the contradiction is in every sense the end of the procesc 176 Ethical Studies. the point that I do wish to establish here is, I think, not at all obscure. The reader has first to recognize that moral judgments are not discursive ; next, that nevertheless they do start from and rest on a certain basis ; and then if he puts the two together, he will see that they involve what he may call the * intuitive imder- standing,' or any other name, so long as he keeps in sight the two elements and holds them together. On the head that moral judgments are not discursive, no one, I think, will wish me to stay long. If the reader attends to the facts he will not want anything else ; and if he does not, I confess I can not prove my point. In practical momlity no doubt we may reflect on our principles^ but I think it is not too much to say that we never do so, except where we have come upon a difficulty of particular application- If any one thinks that a man's ordinary judgment, ' this is right or wrong,' comes from the having a rule before the mind and bringing the particular case under it, he may be right \ and I can not try to show that he is vrong. I can only leave it to the reader to judge for himself. We say we ' see ' and we * feel ' in these cases, not we * conclude.' We prize the advice of persons who can give us no reasons for what they say. There is a general belief that the having a reason for all your actions is pedantic and absurd. There is a general belief that to try to have reasons for all that you do is sometimes very dangerous. Not only the woman but the man who deliberates may be lost First thoughts are often the best>' and if once you b^in to argue with the devil you are in a perilous state. And I think I may add (though I do it in fear) that women are remarkable for the fineness of their moral perceptions * and the quickness of their judgments, and yet are or (let me save myself by saying) * may be ' not remarkable for corresponding discursive ability. Taking for granted then that our ordinary way of judging in morals is not by reflection and explicit reasoning, we have now ' It is right to remark that second thoughts are often the ofTspring of wrong desire, but not always so. They may arise from collisions, and in these cases we see how little is to be done by theoretical deduction. * Not, periiaps, on a// matters. Nor, again, will it do to say that everywhert women are pre-eminently intuitive, and men discursive. But in prttctiaU matters there seems not much doubt that it is so. 178 Ethical Studies. If a man is to know what is right, he should have imbibed b^y precept, and still more by example, the spirit of his community, its general and special beliefs as to right and wrong, and, with this whole embodied in his mind, should particularize it in any new case, not by a reflective deduction, but by an intuitive sub- sumption, which does not know that it is a subsumption ; ' by a carrying out of the self into a new case, wherein what is before tlie mind is the case and not the self to be carried out, and where it is indeed the whole that feels and sees, but all that is seen is seen in the form of this case, this point, this instance. Precept is good, but example is better; for by a series of particulars (as such forgotten) we get the general spirit, we identify ourselves * Every act has, of course, many sides, many relations, many ' points of view from which it may be regarded,' and so many qualities. There are always seveial principles under which you can bnng it, and hence there is not the smallest diflficulty iu exhibiting it as the realization of either right or wrong. No act in the world is without scme€vdA capable of bein^ subsumed under a good rule ; e, g. theft is economy, care for one's relations, protest against bad institutions, really doing oneself but justice, &c. ; and, ii all else fails, it probably saves us from something worse, and therefore is good. Cowardice is prudence and a duty, courage rashness and a vice, and so on. The casuist must have little ingenuity, if tliere is anything he fails to justify or condemn according to his order. And the vice of casuistry is that, attempting to decide the particulars of morality by the deductions of the reflective understanding, it at once degene- rates into finding a good reason for what you mean to do. You have principles of all sorts, and the case has all sorts of sides ; which side is the essential side, and which principle is the principle here^ rests in the end on your mere private choice ; and that is determined by heaven knows what No reasoning will tell you which the moral point of view here is. Hence the necessary immorality and the ruinous effects of practical casuistry. (Casuistry used not as a guide to conduct, but as a means lo the theoretical investigation of moral principles, the casuistry used to discover the principle y^^^xn the fact, and not to deduce the fact from the principle — is, of course, quite another thing. ) Our moralists do not like casuistry ; but if the current notion that moral philosophy has to tell you what to do is well founded, then casuistiy, so far as I can see, at once follows, or should follow. * But the ordinary moral judgment is not discursive. It does not look to the right and left, and, considering the case from all its sides, consciously subsume under one principle. When the case is presented,, it fixes on one quality in the act, referring that unconsciously to one principle, in which it feels the whole of itself, and sees that whole in a single side of the act. So far as right and wrong are concerned, it can perceive nothing but this quality of this cas^ and t^ t • 1 80 Ethical Studies. This intuition must not be confounded with what is sometimes mis-called 'conscience.' It is not mere individual opinion or caprice. It presupposes the morality of the community as its basis, and is subject to the approval tiiereof. Here, if anywhere, the idea of universal and impersonal inorality is realized. For the final arbiters are the q>p6vifj,ot^ persons with a will to do right, and not full of reflections and theories. If they fail you, you must judge for yourself, but practically they seldom do fail you. Their private peculiarities neutralize each other, and the result is an intuition which does not belong merely to this or that num or collection of men. * Conscience ' is the antipodes of this, li wants you to have no law but yourself, and to be better than the ^ world. But this tells you that, if you could be as* good as youi ' world, you would be better than most likely you are, and that to wish to be better than the world is to be already on the threshold of immorality. This perhaps * is a hard saying,' but it is least hard to those who know life best ; it is intolerable to those mainly who, from inex- perience or preconceived theories, can not see the world as it is. Explained it may be by sa3dng that enthusiasm for good dies away — the ideal fades — Dem Herrlichsten, was auch der Geist empfangen, Dr&ngt immer fremd und fremder Stoif sich an ; but better perhaps if we say that those who have seen most of the world (not one side of it) — old people of no one-sided profession nor of immoral life — know most also how much good there is ia it They are tolerant of new theories and youthful opinions that everything would be better upside down, because they know that this also is as it should be, and that the world gets good even from these. They are intolerant only of those who are old enough, and should be wise enough, to know better than that they know better than the world ; for in such people they can not help seeing the self-conceit which is pardonable only in youtli. Let us be clear. What is that wish to be better, and to make the world better, which is on the threshold of immorality ? What is the 'world' in this sense? It is the morality already existing i82 Ethical Studies. We have thus seen the community to be the real moral idea, to be stronger than the theories and the practice of its members against it, and to give us self-realization. And this is indeed limitation; it bids us say farewell to visions of superhuman morality, to ideal societies, and to practical * ideals ' generally. /| But perhaps the unlimited is not the perfect, nor the true ideal l\ And, leaving * ideals ' out of sight, it is quite clear that if any- I \ body wants to realize himself as a perfect man without trying to / / be a perfect member of his country and all his smaller com- / munities, he makes what all sane persons would admit to be i a great mistake. There is no more fatal enemy than theories which are not also facts; and when people inveigh against the vulgar antithesis of the two, they themselves should accept their own doctrine, and give up the harbouring of theories Of what should be and is not Until they do that, the vulgar are in the right ; for a theory of that which (only) is to be, is a theory of that which in fact is not, and that I suppose is only a theory. There is nothing better than my station and its duties, nor any- thing higher or more truly beautiful. It holds and will hold' its own against the worship of the ' individual,' whatever form that may take. It is strong against frantic theories and vehement passions, and in the end it triumphs over the fact and can smile at the literature, even of sentimentalism, however fulsome in its impulsive setting out, cm: sour in its disappointed end. It laughs at its frenzied apotheosis of the yet unsatisfied passion it calls love ; and at that embitterment too which has lost its illusions, and yet can not let them go — ^with its kindness for the genius too clever in general to do an}^hing in particular, and its adoration of star- gazing virgins with souls above their spheres, whose wish to be something in the world takes the form of wanting to do something with it, and who in the end do badly what they might have done in the beginning well ; and, worse than all, its cynical contempt for what deserves only pity, sacrifice of a life for work to the best of one*s lights, a sacrifice despised not simply because it has iJEuled, but because it is stupid, and uninteresting, and altogether unsentimental And all these books (ah ! how many) it puts into the one scale, 1 86 Ethical Studies. better does not always directly involve relation to others. The production of truth and beauty (together with what is called * culture ') may be recognized as a duty ; and it will be very hard to reduce it in all cases to a duty of any station that I can see. If we like to say that these duties to myself are duties to humanity, that perhaps is truej but we must remember that humanity is not a visible community. If you mean by it only past, present, and future human beings, then you can not show that in all cases my culture is of use (directly or indirectly) to any one but mysel£ Unless you are prepared to restrict science and fine art to what is useful, /. e, to common arts and * accomplishments,' you can not hope to * verify ' such an assertion. You are in the region of belief, not knowledge ; and this equally whether your belief is true or false. We must say then that, in aiming at truth and beauty, we are trying to realize ourself not as a member of any visible community. And, finally, against this ideal self the particular person remains and must remain imperfect. The ideal self is not fully realized in us, m any way that we can see. We are aware of a ceaseless pro- cess, it is well if we can add progress, in which the false private self is constantly subdued but never disappears. And it never can disappear: we are never realized. The contradiction remains; and not to feel it demands something lower or something higher than a moral point of view. Starting from these objections, our next Essay must try to make more clear what is involved in them, and to raise in a sharper form the difficulties as to the nature of morality. And our Conclu4- ing Remarks will again take up the same thread, after we have in some measure investigated in Essay VII. the difficult problems of the bad self and selfishness. 1 88 Ethical Studies. such. * This answers the question, Has a beast rights ? He is the object of duties, not the subject of rights. Right is the universal in its relation to a will capable of recognizing it as such, whether it remain mere command or is also carried out in act Wherever in the moral world you have law you have also right and rights. These may be real or ideal The first are the will of the state or society, the second the will of the ideal-social or non- social ideal. ( Vide Essay VI.) It is in order to secure the existence- of right in the acts of par- ticular wills that compulsion is used. But compulsion is not necessary to the general and abstract definition of right, and it can not be immediately deduced from it. What is duty? It is simply the other side of right It is the same relation, viewed from the othei pole or momrehension of the cardinal truth that what is natural can not be moral, nor what is moral natural. 'What is natural does not reflect, and without reflection there is no morality. Hence, where we aie natural because we do not reflect, there we can not be moral.' So runs the perversiorL But here it is forgotten that we 198 Ethical Studies. thus we are led to tlie enquiry, what is the content of this ideal self.' From our criticism on the foregoing Essay we can at once gather that the good self is the self which realizes (i) a social, (2) a non-social ideal ; the self, first, which does, and, second, which does not directly and immediately involve relation to others. Or from another point of view, what is aimed at is the realization in me (i) of the ideal which is realized in society, of my station and its duties, or (2) of the ideal which is not there fully realized ; and this is (a) the perfection of a social and (b) of a non-social self. Or again (it is all the same thing) we may divide into (i) duties to oneself which are not regarded as social duties, (2) duties to oneself which are so regarded, these latter being (a) the duties of my station which I happen to be in, (b) duties beyond that station. Let us further explain. The content of the good self^ we see, has a threefold origin ; and (i) the first and most important contribution comes from what we have called my station and its duties, and of this we have spoken already at some length. We saw that the notion of an individual man existing in his own right independent of society was an idle fancy, that a human being is human because he has drawn his being from human society, because he is the individual embodiment of a larger life ; and we saw that this larger life, of the family, society, or the nation, was a moral will, an universal the realization of which in his personal will made a man's morality. We have nothing to add here except in passing to call attention to what we lately advanced, viz. that the good man is good throughout all his life and not merely in parts ; and further to request the reader to turn to himself and ask himself in what * On the genesis of the ideal self and of the good self, or the self whose will is identified with its ideal, we shall say what seems necessary in other connections. * I may remark that a duty which is not a duty to myself can not possibly he a moral duty. When we hear of self-regarding duties we should ask what is meant. A * j«^-regarding duty ' in one sense of the word says no more than * a duty * ; in another sense it says * a duty which is the direct opposite of what a duty is,* f . e* a selfish duty : or again, it means a non-social duty. Con- fusion on this head leads to serious mistakes. 200 Ethical Studies. questions, What was the historical genesis of the ideal ; by what steps did it come into the world ? And again, What is its genesis in us? And these can scarcely be separated fipm one another, or from the further enquiry. What is its content ? The historical genesis we shall not enter on; and as to the genesis in the individual, we will merely remark that we seem first to see in some person or persons the type of what is excellent ; then by the teaching, tradition, and imagination of our own and other countries and times, we receive a content which we find existing realized in present or past individuals, and finally detach from all as that which is realized wholly in none, but is an ideal type of human perfection. At this point we encounter a question of fact, namely, how far the ideal which serves as a guide to conduct is presented in an individual form. No doubt two extremes exist A large number of men have, I think, no moral ideal beyond the station they live in, and of these some are even satisfied with the presen- tation of this or that known person as a type ; while again in the highest form of morality the ideal is not figured in the shape of an individual.* But between the extremes must be endless gradations. We have previously said something as to the way in which the ideal is made use of in moral judgments, and what remains is to call attention to the content of this social ideal. It is obvious at once that it is a will which practises no other kind of virtues than those which we find in the world ; and we can see no reason for supposing this presented ideaj self to be anything beyond the idealization of what exists in human natiure, the material idealized being more or less cosmopolitan, and the abstraction employed being more or lesjj one-sided. And with these cursory and insufficient remarks we must dis- miss the ideal of a perfect social being. But (3) there remains in the good self a further region we have not yet entered on ; an ideal^ the realization of which is recognized as a moral duty, but which yet in its essence does not involve * The difficulty ererywhere is, Is the embodiment used to fire the imagina- tion, while the type is not that of this or that individual ; or is it otherwise ? 'The solution is to be found in the answer to the question, Is the impersonation modified ; and if modified, how, and by what, and to suit what is it modified ? 202 Ethical Studies. » be carried on, is also true ; but neither truth goes to show that society is the ultimate end, unless by an argument which takes the basis of a result as its final cause, and which would prove the physical and physiological conditions of society to be the end for which it existed. Man is not man at all unless social, but man is not much above the beasts unless more than social. If it be said that, morally considered, the realization of the social self is an end, and that of the non-social nothing but an outward means, and that hence science and art are not to be pursued independently, no doubt it would be possible to meet such an assertion by argument from and upon its own ground. We might urge that science is most useful, when treated as more than useful. But we decline by doing this to degrade and obscure the question. We repeat that the assertion is both unproven and false, and the decision is left to the moral consciousness of the reader. And if again it be said that the social self is the one end, but yet none the less science and art are ends in themselves, and to be pursued independently ; they are included in the social self, and therefore, as elements in the end, are themselves ends and not mere means — then, in answer, I will not reply that this is false (for indeed I hope it may be true), but only that it is utterly unproven. It is on the assertor that the burden of proof must lie. To us it seems plain that the content of the theoretical self does not in its essence involve relation to others : nothing is easier than to suppose a life of art or speculation which, as far as we can see, though true to itself, has, so far as others are concerned, been sheer waste or even loss, and which knew that it was so. This is a fairly suppo^able case, and no one I think can refuse to enter on it. Was the life immoral? I say, No, it was not therefore immoral, but may have been therefore moral past ordinary moral- ity. And if I am told Yes, it was moral, but it was social : it did in its essence involve relation to others, because there is a necessary connection (nothing short of this proves the conclusion) between theoretic realization in this and that man, and the realization of him therein and thereby in relation to others, and perhaps also of society as a whole — then I answer, You are asserting in the teeth of appearances ; you must prove this necessary connection, and, I think I may add, you can not do it. What you say may be true, 204 Ethical Studies. from the complexity of individual cases, and this can be dealt with solely by practical insight, not by abstract conceptions and discursive reasoning. It is no use knowing that one class of duties is in the abstract higher than another r moral practice is not in abstradOy and the highest moral duty for W is my duty; my duty being the one which lies next me, and perhaps not the one which would be the highest, supposing it were mine. The man who can give moral advice is the man of experience, who, from his own knowledge and by sympathy, can transport himself into another's case ; who knows the heart and sees through moral illusion ; and the man of mere theory is in the practical sphere an useless and dangerous pedant. And now in particular the relation of the two ideal spheres to the real sphere is precisely what subsists inside the real sphere between its own elements We saw (p. 141) that, as in no one action can all duties be fulfilled, in every action some duties must be neglected. The question is what duty is to be done and left undone here ; and so in the world of my station neglect of duties is allowed. And, apart from the difficulty (often the impossibility) of distinguishing omission and commission from a moral point of view, we saw [ibid!) that positive breaches of moral law were occasionally moral. And hence if an artist or man of science considers himself called upon, by his duty to art or science, to neglect, or to commit a breach of ordinary morality, we must say that, in the abstract and by itself, that is not to be condemned. It is a case of colliding duties, such as happens every day in other fields, and its character is not different because extra- ordinary. And further, if a claim be set up, on the ground of devotion to no common end, to be judged in one's life by no common stand- ard, we must admit that already within the sphere of my station that claim is usually allowed. We excuse in a soldier or sailor what we do not excuse in others, from whom the same duties are not expected. The morality of the pushing man of business, and still more of the lawyer and the diplomatist in the exercise of their calling, is not measured by the standard of common life ; and so, when the sennice of the ideal is appealed to in justification of neglect and breaches of law, we say that the claim is valid in 2o6 Ethical Studies. The highest type we can imagine is the man who, on the basis of everyday morality, aims at the ideal perfection of it, and on this double basis strives to realize a non-social ideal But where collisions arise, there, we must repeat, it is impossible for mere theory to offer a solution, not only because the perception which decides is not a mere intellectual perception, but because no general solution of individual difficulties is possible. To return to our main discussion — the field of morality we find is the whole field of life ; its claini is as wide as self-realization, and the question raised before (p. 59) now presents itself. Are morality and self-realization the same and not different? This appears at first sight to be the case. The moral end is to realize the self, and all forms of the realizing of the self are seen to fall within the sphere of morality; and so it seems natural to say that Y^ morality is the process of self-realization, and the most moral man is the man who most fully and energetically realizes human nature. Virtue is excellence, and the most excellent is the most virtuous. If we say this, however, we come into direct collision with the ' moral consciousness, which clearly distinguishes moral from other excellence, and asserts that the latter is not in itself moral at all ; and, referring back (p. 129), we find the deliverance of that con- sciousness in the emphatic maxim that nothing is morally good save a good will. This maxim we shall forthwith take to be jjtrue, and so proceed. 1 Morality then will be the realization of the self as the good ^ ^\ will. It is not self-realization from all points of view, though all I self-realization can be looked at from this one point of view ; for all of it involves will, and, so far as the will is good, so far is the realization moral. Strictly speaking and in the proper sense, morality is self-realization within the sphere of the personal will We see this plainly in art and science, for there we have moral be committed. The first is a matter of fact it would not profit us to discuss in connection with the abstract question ; and the second in our opinion can not be theoretically determined. Which duty or duties weigh heaviest in this or that case is an aflfair for perception, not reasoning. We may remark, however, that the doctrine of tlie text will not be found to err on the side of laxity. 2o8 Ethical Studies good will A will which obeys no law is not moral, a law which is not willed is nothing for morality. Acts, so £ar as they spring from the good will, are good, and a temper and habits and charac- ter are good so far as they are a present good will, result from it and embody it ; and what issues from a good character must thus likewise be morally good. That the good will for morality is my will is obvious enough, and it is no less plain (pp. 130, 147) that it is presented as universal That does not mean that everybody does or has to do wliat I do, but it means that, if they were I, they must do as I have to do, or else be immoral j it means that my moral will is not the mere will of myself as this or that man, but something above it and beyond it And further, again, the good will is presented as one will; in collisions, going to our moral consciousness, we are told that, if we knew it, there is a right, that the collision is for us, and is not for the good will We can not bring before us two diverse good wills, or one good will at cross purposes and not iu harmony with itself; and we feel sure that, if our will were but one with the universal, then we too should be one with ourselves, with no conflict of desires, but a harmony and system. Such is the will presented to itself by the moral consciousness, but for the moral consciousness that is ideal and not real Within the sphere of morality the universal remains but partially realized : it is something that for ever wants to be, and yet is not We saw that the will of the social organism might be called an universal will, and a will which was visibly real, as well as ideal ; but we saw too tliat the sphere of my station and its duties did not cover the whole good self ; and further, even within that sphere, and apart from difficulties of progress, for morality in the strict sense ideal and real remain apart The bad self Is not extinguished, and in myself I see an element of will wherein the imiversal is unrealized, and against which it therefore remains (so fJEu- as my morality is concerned) a mere idea, for, even if we assume that society gets no hurt, yet I do not come up to my special type. For morals then the imiversal is not realized within my station, and furthermore the moral consciousness does not say tliat it is realized anywhere at all The claim of the ideal is to cover the 2IO Ethical Studies. Thus morality, because its end is not completely realized, is after all ideal ; and what we have next to see is that it is not simply positive; it is also negative. The self^ which, as the good will, is identified with our type, has to work against the crude material of the mitiual wants, affections, and impulses, which, though not evil in themselves, stand in the way of good, and must be disciplined, repressed, and encouraged. It is negative again of what is positively evil, the false self, the desires and habits which embody a will directly contrary to the good will And further it belongs to its essence that it should be so negative of both, because a being not limited, and limited by evil in himself, is not what we call moraL (Cf. p. 131.) A moral will must be finite, and hence have a natural basis ; and it must to a certain extent (how &r is another matter) be evil, because a being which does not know good and evil is not moral, and because (as we shall see more fully hereafter) the specific characters of good and evil can be known only one against the other, and furthermore can not be apprehended by the mere in- tellect, but only by inner experience. Morality, in short, implies a knowledge of what the ' ought ' means, and the ' ought ' implies contradiction and moral contradiction. So we see morality is negative ; the non-moral and the immoral must exist as a condition of it, since the moral is what it is only in asserting itself against its opposite. But morality is not merely negative ; it is a great mistake to suppose that the immoral is there already,^ and that morality consists simply in making it not to be.- The good will is not that which merely destroys the natural or the immoral ; it does indeed destroy them as such, but this by itself is not morality. It is when it destroys them by its own assertion, and destroys them by transmuting the energy contained in them, that the will is moral The good self is not real as the mere abolition of reality. On its affirmative side (and it is moral only when it is affirmative) it is ' By its very essence immoFality can not exist except as against morality : a purely immoral being is a downright impossibility. The man who has be- come entirely mimoral has ceased to know good and evil, has ceased to belong to the moral sphere, is morally speaking dead. Ideal Morality. 2 1 1 the position of the universal will, as the true infinite, in the per- sonal will of this or that man ; and here it has reality, not complete, not adequate, but still certain. You can not separate negation and affirmation without destroying the moral world. The abstract non-existence of the non-moral is nothing : and the existence of nothing (if that were possible) is not a moral end. The a.sser- tion of the moral, the positive realization of the good will to the negation of the natural and bad will, is morality, and no one element of this whole is so; for in the destruction of the bad it is only the affirmation of the good which is desirable (cf. p. 25). The realization of the good in personal morality is the habituated will, the moral character of individuals. It is actual in the virtues uf the heart, and those virtues are the habits which, embodying good acts of will, have become part of the man's self, and which answer to the various sides of his station, or more generally to his various* relations to the ideal. Morahty then is a process of realization, and it has two sides or elements which can not be separated; (i) the position of an ideal self, and the making of that actual in the will; (2) the negation, / which is inherent in this, the making unreal (not by annihilation | but transformation) of the forever unsystematized natuiai material, i and the bad self. And this account removes many of the diffi- culties we encountered in Essay IV. It docs not remove them all. Morality does involve a contra- diction ; it does tell you to realize that which never can be reahzed, and which, if realized, does efface itself as such. No one ever was or could be perfectly moral ; and, if he were, he would be moral no longer. Where there is no imperfection tliere is no ought, where there is no ought there is no morality, where there is no self-contradiction there is no ought The ought is a self-con- tradiction. Are we to say then that that disposes of it ? Surely not, unless it also disposes of ourselves ; and thai can not be. At least from this point of view, we are a self-contradiction : we never are what we feel we really are ; we really are what we know we are not ; and if we became what we are, we should scarcely be our- selves. Morality aims at the cessation of that which makes it possible.; it is the effort after non-morality, and it presses forward 2 12 Ethical Studies. beyond itself to a super-moral sphere where it ceases as such to exist." It is at this point we find problems too great for us, and, if we follow any further, it will be only in our Concluding Remarks, and merely with a view to clear up what has gone before. But at our present point of view we must remain, till we have answered some objections and attempted to remove some difficulties. The rest of this Essay will have to do with a'xopiai which arise in respect of morality, and the next one will try to make more clear what we mean by the bad self which opposes the good. The first one-sided view of morality which must engage us may be put as follows : * Morality is not the realization of a content, but the identification of the will with the universal. The moral end is consequently the production of a system, a harmony in the desires, the heart and will ; and therefore we may and must sup- press aspiration in order to get moral harmony.' We answer — It is true morality is not the mere realization of a content, since in itself that content is not, strictly speaking, moral. The perform- ance is not moral apart from the will. That is one side. But on the other side the will which is not the will to perform is not moral at all. To try to be good not in science, art, or any other ideal pursuit, nor to be good socially, but to be virtuous simply in oneself, or to realize the good will with no content to it, is not to be moral in any way. A mere formal harmony is not a moral end : the end is not system, but the systematic realization of the self whose will is in harmony with the ideal. For example, if the question arises, Am I to advance as a good man or a good artist ? morality says, * Of course as a good man ;' but then the whole matter turns on this, What line of action, the doing of what, does make me the best man ? In collision of morality with morality it does not hold that the higher the morality the more harmonious * It does not concern me to go out of my way to say more on endless mord progress. I have already (p. 140) referred to Hegel's annihilating criticism. Progress to an end which is completeness and the end of progress and morality, is one thing. Endless progress is progress without an end, is endless incom- pleteness, endless immorality, and is quite another thing. 214 Ethical Studies. For the moral consciousness tells us that a man is not good morally according as he stands in the scale of human progress ; that a man's morality may in one sense be higher than another man's, yet he himseJf may be, strictly speaking, morally lower. It tells us thar, if we judge by a purely moral standard, the low savage may be, not a higher, but a better man than the civilized European ; and, we see, (i) the most moral man is the man who tries most to act up to what his light tells him is best But in that v.e must lemember is included the getting the. best light which, ui> to his light, he can. (2) Suppose now that the lights of two men are equal, can we then look to the greater or lesser realization of their ideal, and judge them accordingly ? Morality says. No. It says the formal energy in all men is not the same ; and, unless selves are equal to start with, they can not be morally compared simply with an eye to their respective realization. (3) And again men vary, not only in light and in fonnal energ}', but also in disposition. Disposition no doubt is not moral character ; that does not begin until a man is self-conscious, and by volition the good and bad selves get their specific character one against the other ; ^ but none the less is natural disposition the material from which the moral self is built up. And dispositions or natures vary indefinitely: some are more harmonious than others, and some again are more chaotic and lead inevitably to jars and painful contradictions. The material of some men offers more resistance to the systematizing good will, and gives more openings for the increase and strengthening of the bad self, than does that of others. And, unless in this too individuals are equal, you can not simply compare them by the result. (4) And further we have to consider external circumstances in relation to disposition, as bearing on the facility of appropriating the good, and again on the difficulty of controlling the bad self; and our conclusion at present is this. Men equal in light, formal energy, natural disposition, and circumstances, and equal also in present extent and intent of their good and bad selves, are morally equal. *■ See more in following Essay. 2i6 Ethical Studies. (i) In 'in itself indifferent ' the in itself \% the important point So far as the bad self thwarts the good by direct opposition, no one would call it indifferent And then, beside its open hostility, it creates consequences which thwart the good, and in addition appropriates to itself a share of the gencxal energy, which should have gone to the good, and so weakens it And all this no one would call indifferent But * in itself indifferent ' does not mean this.' It means, the bad self matters so far as it lessens the good, but by itself it is only a negation; and, after you have allowed for its negative properties, you need not consider it at all. The more or less of position of the good self in relation to light, energy, disposition, and circumstances, constitutes the more or less of morality. The bad self only takes from that position ; so that you need only find out what position after all you have, and then there is no occasion to consider the bad self. If in two men with equal light, energy, &c., the good selves are equal, it does not matter whether one has more bad self than the other, and we can strike tliat out of the account This is the first proposal. Is it satisfactory ? I think we must say it is not. Practically it might never mislead us, because the consequences of tlie affirmation of the bad self in immoral acts result in a weakening of the good will far more extensive than might seem at first sight The doctrine might not take us wrong, but we are asking. Is it theoretically accurate as an exposition of the moral consciousness ? and this we must deny, since for that consciousness the bad self is not in itself indifferent. (2) Considered otherwise, and not in relation to morality, the bad self may be only the negative condition of the affirmation of the good ; the presence of which is necessary for morality, but of which anything more than the mere presence is the decrease of the affirmation. It may be something to work against, a ' The reader no doubt is aware that there is a view which reduces the distinction of good and bad to a mere quantitative difference ; virtue and vice differ only in being a little more or a little less of the same thing. This view makes great play with its * all is relative,* * it all depends on which way you look at it,' and the rest of the phrases behind which shallowness tries to look like wisdom. But we shall not stop to discuss it 2iS Ethical Studies. a third has never been fdx either one way or the other ; how do we judge these morally ? Is it fair not to count the past ? The answer is that a man's morality, on the one hand, is not the summing up of a past result ; and we can consider only the present state, can look only at the will as it is now. This is one side. But on the other hand the will is what it has done ; and the present is thus also the past. Evil deeds must survive in a present evil will which is a positive evil, just as good deeds are not lost, but live in a present good will. No one gets bad or good all at once, however much they may sometimes seem to do so. And we believe that at the last the existing positive bad and positive good available energy of will (after making all the proper qualifi- cations and allowances, which include, of course, bodily changes) is the true representative of the good and evil the man has done. If in the sphere of morality we are to measure men's lives morally as wholes, this perhaps is how we are to do it, if we do it at all ; though from another point of \dew, and not by us, it may perhaps be done differently. In conclusion, we must warn the reader against supposing that morality is to be estimated by the intensity of the moral conscious- ness. It is true that a man who has never known himself to be good or bad is as yet not strictly either, is not yet within the moral sphere. Knowledge of good and evil is necessary for morality, and that (see Essay VII.) depends on a self-conscious volition with which responsibility begins, and after which we are answer- able for acts of will not self-conscious, because now we know their character, and ought to have them under our control Self-con- sciousness is necessary for a moral being, but it is a dangerous mis- take to think that all morality must therefore be self-conscious. To be moral, a man need not know that he is acting rightly ; still less need he know that he is acting righdy for the sake of morality, and for no other sake. It does not follow, because self-conscious- ness is the condition of imputation, that therefore everything which is imputed must be done with self-consciousness. The will both for good and evil need not be deliberate volition, still less the deliberate volition of the good simply because it is good, or the evil because it is eviL To will the evil because it is evil is, we think, impossible ; to will the moral because it is moral, and for Ideal Morality. 219 the sake of morality, demands a certain pitch of culture, and then is not common. To will the right as the right, though not for the sake of rightness, is common enough ; but, in most of our moral actions, we do not do so much as this, because we act from habit and without reflection. Habits are all-important, and habits need not be self-conscious : and yet habits are imputable, because what makes the habit is within the region of conscious volition, and can not be disowned by it. The habits we encourage or sufler, we are aware of or might be aware of; we know their moral quality, and hence are responsible for them. Our character formed by habit is the present state of our will, and, though we may not be fully* aware of its nature, yet morally it makes us what we are.* Our will is not this, that, or the other conscious volition, nor does it exist just so far as we reflect upon it. It is a formed habit of willing, such a potential will as, apart from counteracting causes, and given the external conditions which we have a right to expect, must issue in acts of a certain sort. It is such a will as this which makes a man moral, and it need not everywhere and in all its acts be aware of what it is doing. To sum up, in estimating morality you take the amount of the\ present extent and intent (conscious or unconscious) of the will for good, less the present extent and intent of will (conscious or unconscious) for bad, and all in relation to what maybe called , chance, /. e, the amount of obtainable light, formal energy, natural \ disposition, and external circumstances of every kind, under which head must come that increase or decrease of general energy for which we are not accountable. Morality, in the sense of personal ) f *- morality, may either be self-con'^^cious or not so. It wills the end explicitly and directly as a meal end, as one not outside the heart and inner will, and so far it is self-conscious. Or again, it wills the end for its own sake, simply and direcdy, and not as an end within the heart and will ; and further, it need not always even be aware that it is acting rightly: in these cases it is not self- ^ We have consciously^ and with knowledge of their moral character, coni> mitted ourselves to volitions with which our habits are essentially connected, or have failed to do so when we might have done so \ and hence those habits are ours, and constitute our standing wilL 220 Ethical Studies. I conscious. But morally considered one morality is not higher than the other. Personal morality, then, is the process of the assertion of the ideal self, considered not directly as the position of its content but with respect to the intensity of the process as will. And W must be taken in relation to natural energy, disposition, and all circumstances; and again with respect to the intensity of the negation of the false self, since this negation is an inseparable element. It further includes the willing of psychical changes in the self, in the way of systematization, since these are means to the assertion of the ideal, and the negation of the bad self And the ground and result of morality is habit or state, which answers to process as its psychical embodiment and basis, and which, as standing will in a man for good, is virtue, just as the habitual will for bad is vice. Or otherwise, morality is the systematization of the self by the realization therein of the ideal self as will ; such ideal taking its content from (i) the objective realized will, (2) the not yet real- ized objective will, (3) an ideal, the content of which can not (without going beyond morality) be realized as objective will. ' It is the process of self-realization from one point of view, 1. e. as the negation of the will which has a content other than the true content of the self, and the affirmation of the will whose content is that ideal in which alone the self can look for true realization. And being a process, involving a contradiction as the sim qua non of its existence, it tries to realize the for ever unreal, and it does desire its own extinction, as mere morality, in desiring the suppression of its finitude. Morality is approximative; and, before we proceed, we must learn more accurately how this is to be understood. The reader, recalling our criticism of the Hedonistic chief good (p. 89), may now object that the contradiction we discovered there is inherent in all morality : that in all we aim at a mark we do not hit, and endeavour to get nearer to an impossibility. We must try to clear up this matter. (i) That in morality we fail altogether to realize the end is not 222 Ethical Studies. though the good will can legitimately be considered from one point of view as a number of units of a certain sort of energy, yet mere size is not the essence of the matter, and to say that moral perfection must rise and fall with the addition or subtraction of such units would be absolutely false. These questions at every point have done their best to draw us beyond our depth into the abstract metaphysic which in the end they turn upon. And now we come to one which threatens to involve us more deeply, and our answer to which must remain superficial. What sense have the words ^ higher 'and * lower ' when applied to morality ? (i) Tn the strict meaning of * moral ' we have discussed this /I above (p. 214). Strictly speaking, a higher stage in historical progress is not more moral than a lower stage. For in personal morality we consider not the relative completeness of the ideal aimed at, but the more or less identification of a given sum of energy with the particular ideal. And on this head we have dwelt as long as seemed necessary. (2) But in the \\nder sense of * moral ' there is a question which we have not properly discussed. If human history is an evolution (p. 171 foil.), how is one stage of it morally higher than another? For in one sense the European certainly is morally a higher being than the savage. He is higher, because the life he has inherited and more or less realized is nearer the truth of human nature. It combines greater specification with more complete homogeneity. And he is higher morally^ not only because the good will is better \ according as the type it aims at is truer, but also because that stage of the progressive realization of human nature from which the European gets his being is the historical product of a will w^hich in the main was for good, and now at any rate is the present living embodiment of the good will. Thus if we hold tnat in evolution one stage is higher than another, we can say also that one stage is more moral than another. But (as before) in the strict sense general hunfkn progress is not moral, because it abstracts from the collision of good and bad in the personal self. And here we might perhaps stop, did not a fresh question irresistibly intrude. Is there such a thing as progress ? Does not progress mean the perpetual * more,' the would-be approxima- 224 Ethical Studies. I know of no answer but this, that the perfect is that in which we can rest without contradiction, that the lower is such because it contradicts itself, and so is forced to advance beyond itself to another stage, which is the solution of the contradiction that existed in the lower, and so a relative perfection. If there is a whole which is not finite, and if this whole exists in the finite, the reader will see at once that the finite must be discrepant, not only with what is outside itself, but also with itself. The movement towards the solution of this contradiction consists in the extension of the lower so as to take in and resolve its con- flicting elements in a higher unity. And this is the reason why the advance consists in greater specification and more intense homogeneity, and therefore, to a certain extent, can be measured by quantity. On this view the higher is above the lower, not because it contains a larger number of units, but because it is the harmony of those elements which in the lower were a standing contradiction. And this conclusion I will ask the reader to take, not as positive doctrine, but as matter for his reflection. But if any one says he must go further, and objects, * Well, but in every stage the whole is realized, and in no stage is it realized free from all contradiction. It is actual and complete in the one as in the other, — As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart, As full, as perfect, iu vile man that mourns, As the rapt seraph that adores and bums ; To him no high, no low, no great, no small ; He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all,' here I confess I can not follow, nor, if I could, would my theme allow of it. For the moral point of view holds good only within the process of evolution. ^ The question. Is evolution or progress the truth from the / highest point of view ? raises problems which nothing but a system ^ of metaphysic can solve. We are forced to believe in the many, we can not help believing in the one \ and^ whether we desire it or not, these thoughts come together in our minds, and we say, The process of change is the truth. Is then process, still more is evolution, what we can think without contradicting ourselves? Ideal Morality. 225 To whom in England can we go for an answer ? And yet one might have thought that a part of the energy now spent in preaching the creed of evolution would well have been spent on the enquiry, What in the end is process in general, and, in particular, what is evolution ? Is it, or is it not, a self-contradiction ? And, if it is, what conclusions follow? But dogma is more pleasant than criticism, and as yet we have no English philosophy whose basis is not dogmatic But, whatever evolution may be. Ethics is confined within it To ask what it is is to rise above it, and to pass beyond the world of mere morality. £SSAV VII. Selfishness and Self-sacrifice. npO say that selfishness and self-sacrifice are equally selfish does -^ seem to the unthinking person a mere foolish remark ; which, if suspected to be true, would fill him with astonishment and horror. But the view of such emotions should the rather tend to recommend the doctrine to the thinker. For wonder, as he knows, is the beginning of philosophy : and a shudder comes over the not yet initiated, when the deeper mysteries are unveiled. But seriously, is it not strange that men can believe in a world of universal self-seeking, and men whose theories (the phrase is not mine) have not come from * raking into that filthiest of all jakes, a bad mind/ but whose lives in many cases were self-denying, and who were better and wiser than ourselves ? This on one side is a fact, just as, on the other side, the common belief in self-sacrifice is a fact; and such facts as these should engage our attention. For what we most want, more especially those of us who talk most about facts, is to stand by «// the facts. It is our duty to take them without picking and choosing them to suit .our views, to ^plain them, if we can, but not to explain them away ; and to reason on them, and find the reason of them, but never to think ourselves rational when, by the shortest cut to reason, we have reasoned ourselves out of them. But our present undertaking has narrow limits^ We intend, so far as possible without reference to others, to ask, and in our o\vti way to develope, the question, VVhat is selfishness, and what self- sacrifice? and to include: in that the enquiry. What ground is there for the denial of unselfishness ? And with this last let us begin, not with reference to particular theories, but striving to Si'itisfy ourselves. If selfishness is self-seeking, and if to seek self is never to act 228 Ethical Studies. Without want no action : want, is my want : I do what I want ; and therefore, whatever my outward act may be, my motive and my heart is seliish ; and for morals the act is qualified by the heart and motive. Such is the groimd we may assign for the theory of selfishnes^ and we shall see that, in a certain sense, that ground is firm. iVhat would be the answer of the practical man ? The practical man, I suppose, would say something of this sort • ' True it is that a man does what he has a mind to, or, if you will, what he wants to do ; but I call a man selfish or not according to what it is that he wants and likes. Some men care to do the right, others to do only what they want, to please no one but themselves ; and the moral character of each depends on the nature of what pleases him.' If we pressed him further and said, * Yes, but the difference is superficial ; what pleases a man is what he desires, and hence in all cases alike he must do what he Hkes, and because he likes it : why he does it is the point, and the * why* is his perso..:' aesire or aversion; hence he is always at bottom selfish,' — ^then I thmk our supposed practical man would imagine you wished to impose upon him. These questions about the * why ' he would take to be misleading nonsense. He accepts it as a fact that some men want good and others mere pleasure, and he feels sure that for that fact there is no further reason, in the sense we have suggested. He believes that we are tr3dng to persuade him that he and others seek the good and avoid the bad, in all cases, with an ulterior object, — as a means, that is to say, to something else which is the end : and this idea he indignantly repudiates. He considers our question of the motive either an idle triviality, because asking what everybody knows ; or an attempt to mislead, because presupposing what is palpably false. And he is right That I do what I want to do, is an idle proposition. That it should lead to a new result would be strange, unless truth were to be found in the barest tautologies. Like the doctrine of the ' relativity of knowledge,' what significance it has, it has only as the nega.tive of unmeaning fictions, and, as a positive result, it has no significance at all. ' I know what I know,' ' I experience what I experience,' * I want what I want,' indeed * here 2^o Ethical Studies. that it is either senseless or false. If 'because I want' means that it is want or desire which moves me to act, then it is sense- less; because, while professing to tell us something, it merely repeats ' I do what I want' But if * because I want ' means that I do everything as a means to an end, which I represent to m)rself as the feeling of my private satisfaction, then it is false, and it is grossly ^se. Let us dwell on this point, for to do so will repay us. (i) Everybody knows that there are actions which we say We do with- out a motive ; there are acts, in the first place, not preceded even by the (conscious) idea of the act to be done; and in the second place (and these latter are more important), there are acts which are done thinkingly and on purpose, and which yet are done without any ulterior intent beyond the act itself. In* both of these cases we have no motive before our minds, no thought of any end to be reached, out of and beyond the act itself; and here for our minds there is no * because ' — ^we do what we want, and it is simply a mistake to suppose that in and for our minds there is another or further end represented, which suggests the act, or to which the act is a means. (2) And where we act, as we say, with a motive, where we have in our minds a reason, an aim, an object beyond the act, which the act subserves, there these motives, these thoughts of ends or objects to be realized, are of very different kinds. The motive to the act may be the thought of another particular act, or of the whole of a complex scheme ; it may be the idea of an end which my action is to bring about, the pleasmre or tlie happiness, the pain or the ruin of another ; in a word, the idea of any event the thought of whose realization by certain means excites desire or want, and so is a motive. In none of all these is the thought of my future feeling of satisfaction what I have before me : but this again may be my motive, and sometimes is. The pleasant feeling which is to result from an act may be pre- sented in imagination, and thought of as the end to be reached ; or the thought of myself to be pleased as much 'as possible generally, and here by such means and in such a way, may be the end which I take as the principle and motive of my actionu Let us illustrate the above : I may eat because I am hungry, instinctively and unconsciously, or simply purposing to eat this or / 232 Ethical Studies. you willy seems) pleasant, and only what is pleasant is desired^ It is the pleasure which moves, and pleasure is my pleasure, and therefore it must follow that in this sense my pleasure is ray motive, and hence that I always am selfish.' Let us examine this. ' All that is desired is (or seems) pleasant : ' this is questionable, as we have seen, if extended to instinctive appetites. We may ask, for instance, is it pleasure which first sets the child sucking? ' — but this by the way. When the assertion is limited to the desire, where objects are before the consciousness, then we think it is always true that in desire the desired is pleasant, and nothing but the pleasant can be desired. * It is the pleasure that moves : ' then, understanding by this that what immediately determines the will is a feeling of pleasure, let us for argument's sake admit it to be true.* * And pleasure is my pleasure : ' yes, undoubtedly — I feel what I feel, and nothing but what I feel ; but such a formal assertion, as we saw, tells us nothing about the self which feels ; it tells us that the mere fee^ ing self is there, it does not tell us that any other self is not there. ' And hence my pleasure is my motive \ for it is my pleasure (or, if you will, my pain) which moves me to act ; and therefore I am selfish.' Or, putting it separately, * My pleasure or pain moves me ; ' to this we say Yes. * And my pleasure is my motive ; ' to this we say No, non sequitur. The reasoning we have develc^ed rests, in a word, on the con- fusion between a pleasant thought and the thought of a pleasure ; between an idea of an objective act or event, contemplation of which is pleasant, and of which I desire the realization, and the idea of myself as the subject of a feeling of satisfaction which is to be. Both ideas move us ; both we desire to realize : but the ideas are radically different. One, we repeat, is the mental re- presentation of an act of will or thought, or an outward event, the ' To save space I have omitted all consideration of aversion from pain. But o avoid pain is> in respect of selfishness, admittedly the same as to seek pleasure ; so we need not treat it separately. * I believe, on the other hand, that, when put in this way, it is false. What directly moves is a felt contradiction, and this is not pleasant, though it implies an element of pleasure, and though the whole state may be pleasant (cf. p. 63, and below, p. 259). This, however, does not matter hece. t 234 Ethical Studies.^ stimulus to action. What moves to action, whether that action be merely voluntary or also volitional, whether it does or does not involve a formal act of choice or resolve, is, in all and every case, the desire or the desires ; and the real stimulus in desire, tlie direct and actual mover (whether it be pleasant or painful), is and must be always felt, and can never be thought* It is impossible to bring it before the mind in such a way as to make it our object, without, as a consequence, destroying its very nature:* the thinking it makes a motive of it, which how, as au idea, is not a desire, but is the object of a new desire. If it were necessary that the psychical antecedent which directly produces the act should be a motive;, then no instinc- tive act would be possible. And in this respect what holds good of one act holds good of all; the stimulus is a feeling. My pleasure (if it be pleasure), which moves me to act, is, because it moves, therefore not my motive ; and my motive, because it is my motive, therefore can not be the pleasure which moves. Admit that of several desires the strongest prevails, admit that of alternative pleasant objects we must choose the most pleasant, yet this is not to admit that we choose between the ideas of pleasures ; it is not to admit that, if my choice is determined, I therefore choose that which immediately determines it Out of the present ideas of pleasures, as such, to be had, to choose always what seems to be the greatest is selfish, but to choose what pleases me most is not selfish nor unselfish. It merely means that I choose, and says nothing whatever about what I choose. Let us close this discussion. — Pleasure is the feeling of self- realizedness ; it is affirmative self-feeling, or the feeling in the ^ Of course, while being pleased by the contemplation of an object, jrou can transfer the pleasure, in idea, to that object, so that they form an int^;ral whole. But then a new feeling must be excited by that whole in order to move you. * I do not mean that it can not be theoretically apprehended, and so trans- formed by the observing intellect, while at the same time and none the less as feeling it moves us practically. What I mean is that, so far as transformed, it is destroyed. The ideal representation of the feeling, so long as only theoretical, may coexist side by side with the practical feeling ; but that representation as practical, tL ^. as an idea which generates new practical feeling, is ipso facto the destruction of the old feeling as such. 236 Ethical Studies. occurs to us to identify the two, and say selfishness is this pursuit Can we do this ? Or shall we find that, though the pursuit cer- tainly is selfishness, yet selfishness is more than it, is a wider term than mere pleasure-seeking ? That we shall see better, when we know more accurately what pleasure-seeking is, a question which as yet we have not asked. Confusion here is inevitable unless we are cautious. We talk of pleasure and pleasures as if they were something by themselves, and apart from the pleasant ; as if a pleasant activity were simply a pleasure, and as if a pleasant feeling had no other content than its pleasantness. This is clearly unjustifiable. Pleasure we have called the feeiing of self-assertion, but we must remember that there is no such thing as the mere abstract assertion of the self. The self is affirmed in this or that, and the this or that of the particular affirmation must be felt : the self-feeling is not one thing by itself^ which is divisible from what is felt in the self: the feeling, and the feeling myself affirmed or denied, are not parts but elements or aspects of one whole, to be distinguished and not divided. It may indeed possibly be maintained that the general feeling of pleasure, which goes with the pleasant^ can be distinguished in such a way as to be brought before the imagination by itself, and apart from this or that particular pleasant feeling, and it does not concern us here to contest such a proposition ; but what is quite clear, and what we insist upon, is that the representation of this feel- ing of pleasure as such would not be what is ordinarily called the idea of a pleasure. If the abstraction can be nuide and brought before the mind, yet people do not commonly do this. A pleasure for them means something pleasant : in a pleasant feeling they do not separate the pleasure from what in particular is felt ; they follow jj3«a and not n^ovr^. This or that pleasant is not aimed at simply as a pleasure ; and the pursuit of pleasure in general for pleasure's sake would mean the abstraction from the pleasant of its pleasant- ness, and the setting that as an object before the mind. Such an end, the notion of the self simply to be pleased, is an intellectual abstraction, and the consistent pursuit of it exists only in theory. The ideal voluptuary desires only pleasure, and the pleasant merely as a means thereto ; but this ideal is not to be found, and his supposed consistent hunt is a practical impossibility. 238 Ethical Studies. the water; before I did not. What makes the difference? Can we say, * Yes, now I drink because the perceived water suggests ideas of pleasure, and the ideas suggest (directly or through their feelings) the activities with which their archetypes were connected' ; or otherwise, * The pain of thirst suggests through the water the relief from pain, which is the idea of a pleasure, and that suggests the action, and so I drink ' ? All this again (apart from other objections^) would be an inaccurate description of the facts. It is not true as a matter of fact that in the second case, where I drink, the water has ideas associated with if which it had not associated with it in the first case, where I did not drink. And the whole phraseology is both clumsy and misleading. In more ordinary language this is what really happens. Water has a certain meaning to me ; and, when I see water and recognize it, I can have before my mind either all its meaning or only a part One part of that meaning is that water quenches thirst ; 1. e. it contains the ideas of certain activities, results, and feelings. These ideas, in the first case, we purposely called up ; they were there, and yet that did not move us to drink. In the second case we are moved to drink, but the question is, when we want the water, have we any more ideas than when we did not ? * Yes,' we shall be told, ' you have now the idea of pleasure to be had by drinking, and therefore you drink : that is the new idea, and before you did not drink because you did not have it, or did not have it strong enough,' Taking the last part first, if it were true that we had the idea of future pleasure, then weak and now strong, and it was * We are not here concerned with the lowest stages of the will, but we may remark that the 'association' theory is not only helpless before the fact that yneasiness and pain are stimuli to action, and is driven by it to open inconsist- encies or palpable fictions (let the reader peruse Bain, EmoHons, £d. iL pp. .312-13 ; Ed. iii. pp. 316-18) ; but that also the real thesis with which it stands and falls, viz. the general priority of activity to all feeling, it fails even to recognize as the vital question, and obscures it by showing, what is nothing to the point, the priority of general activity to the special sensations of the senses {Emotions, 303). But if the dischai^e of energy from the -physical centre (lower or higher) be preceded by any specific feeling, and accompanied by any specific feeling, then, {/ this is so^ surely here is the place to look for the psychical genesis of the will, and not in the unverified postulate of a discharge, not felt in its origin or itself, and yet followed by pleasure. fi40 Ethical Studies. before the mind ; that is the object of desire, and it would be the motive, if it were the indirect object : for motive means an ulterior end. The felt stimulus of pleasure in the idea against pain in the reality is what moves, /. e, is the imniediate psychical prius of the putting forth of energy : and this, as we have seen, can never be the motive or the object, because a feeling which is an object is so far not a feeling. Or take the instance of a lump of sugar. That means to me mainly, or here at least, the sweet-tasting thing ; and I do aot want it In comes a child ; to him it means also, as it did to me, the sweet-tasting thing, but he cries for it. * Yes,' we shall be told, * in one case there is the idea of a pleasure, in the other not' Supposing we have in the child simple appetite, I deny the state- ment In both cases there is the idea of a sweet taste, and, if that idea is felt to be pleasant, it moves because it creates want, /. e. a state of contradiction, where the absence of sweet taste becomes uneasiness or pain ; such a state as I can produce in myself perhaps by eating something' sour. But it is a mistalce to say that I want the sweet thing because, so to speak, I discount for myself the promised pleasure to be got from eating it Whether the pleasure create the uneasiness, or the uneasiness suggest the pleasure, in any case the essence of desire is feeling. The child does not cry for the sugar on Tuesday, because he remembers he had a pleasure on Monday, and thinks he should like another to-day ; but because the feeling of sweet taste, now transfeixed as an idea to the sugar and made objective in it, is recalled in idea by its perception, and, being recalled, excites a feeling which, against the felt absence of sweet taste, is felt as want, and accord- ingly moves. An object of simple appetite (using appetite as desire for recog- nized objects, not as a name for the lowest form of want) is this or that thing or process, with the perception or image of which are con- nected (directly or through the idea of activities) certain feelings, which, against the feeling of privation, are pleasant Whether in any case now want precedes the pleasure or the pleasure excites the want, makes no difference. Whether the original satisfaction first came unneeded, or was preceded by and followed on the feeling of privation^ at the present stage again makes no difference. 242 Ethical Studies. pass into what may be called, for convenience sake, lust. Here it is no longer the ideal satisfaction of appetite, felt as pleasant in this or that objective thing or process, which excites desire. The object does not remain sensuous ; but by its relation to the per- manent self it has been made into an idea, which itself, as against this or that moment of sense, is relatively permanent, and in the absence of perception can yet come before the mind. Hence, by the return of the feeling of satisfaction or the feeling of want, or in other ways, it is suggested to the mind when nothing is before the eyes.* But this is not all. Not only is the idea of the object a thought now independent of sense, but the pleasant feeling of satisfaction is reflected on and, as pleasant, is transferred to the object. The feeling of self-affirmation in the possession of the object has now, itself as an idea, become part of the idea of the object j and so not only is the object thought of when absent, but it is thought of as what is wanted, and what pleases when possessed With the ideal possession of the object is integrated the ideal pleasant satisfaction ; it is not the mere idea of the activities and feelings which give satisfaction, but the idea of these as pleasant, which is part of the content of the object. I think of the object habitually as that which gives pleasure when possessed, and hence, from time to time, when I do not possess it, the idea of the pleasarit feeling as pleasant excites the feeling of assertion, and this, against the present absence of real assertion, tends to awaken the feeling of privation, and hence desire.* The content of the I I ' ■ 'I I . » ^ We may notice in illustration that what is never absent, what I can always have, seldom becomes an object of lust * Lust ihust be based on appetite natural or artificial. The reason furthei why th^ water, when by reflection it was thought of as pleasant, did not awake desire was that, though ideas of pleasant feeling were in one way ' associated ' with it, yet they did not make part of its meaning ; they were not inseparable from it. Desire for water always remains simple appetite, partly because we can get it when we want it, partly because the ordinary pleasure of drinking is not very gseat Hence by reflection and abstraction we may bring the pleasure of drmklng before the mind, yet, because the feelings of the process excited by th^jdea are not pleasant, as against our present state of satisfaction, appetite. IS not awakened. The idea of pleasure excited feeling of pleasure, but, because that did not' iteake us feel our present state as privation, therefore it did not move. 244 Ethical Studies. again but tlie old delusion, for our ideal has no reality., and h can have none. The r&ality it calls for is its own, and it cails for it in that which is alien to its nature. It is permanent, and moments of sense are fleeting ; it is objective, and they are not ; it stays with us, and they must go. We have tried to find ourselves as this or that, and we are not this or that, and soon discover that not one nor any number of transitory sensations is our realization. We have made an end of the satisfaction of an appetite ; the satis- faction of an appetite does not last, but an end does last, because in it we have set ourselves before ourselves to be realized; and if an end is to satisfy us, it must be a permanent objective something, which when possessed we still have, and find ourselves really there. We need not repeat how the idea of the act which, as an ideal satisfaction, remains present and survives the particular act, goes on to institute a process with no end (p. 87) We may notice how the thought of an end makes possible the artificial creation of appetite as a means to sensuous satisfaction, and further that here again is the origin of loathing. The perpetual unsatisfied want and disappointment, with their pain, are themselves trans- ferred to and objectified in the idea of that which is lusted after, and now is both longed for and hated. So far we have seen the nature of lust as compared with appetite ; but the ideal voluptuary is not merely the man who lusts and is not satisfied. He reaches a level which, intellectually con- sidered, is still higher. The failure of the objects of lust to give satisfaction, and the disappointment which ensues, provoke reflection which may take this turn. * My ends are objects irt which I am to find pleasure, but I do not find it; and so there must be something wrong somewhere. I have made a mistake as to the end ; the deceit was "an illusion of close association"; I wanted pleasure in the ends, and so I thought I wanted the ends ; and the ends have fooled me. The attempt to realize the objective ends as ends in themselves was a delusion ; I have proved by experience that none of these objects is the end I really want I want them all, and yet I want none for itself; and that shows there is something in all which I want What is this? It is my pleasure. The idea of my pleasure, apart from any particular sort of pleasant feeling, and apart from 246 Ethical Studies. yet all are hot called selfish. I^astly, it is not a general name for the bad self, because all sorts of wrong-doing are not indiscriminately called scjlfish. Weak yielding, self-conceit, pride, revenge and other vices are not so called. It would be absurd, for instance, to say * Jw^ selfish ! ' when we hear of a murder ; and we see at once that, thoiigh selfishness belongs to the bad self, it is not co-extensive with it If we ask what selfishness is, the readiest answer will be perhaps * thinking only of yourself;' and this appears to be right, though it needs explanation. Thinking only of oneself implies first that we think, that we are self-conscious reflecting beings ; and hence it seems a misnomer to call a beast or a young child selfish. Secondly, we think of nothing but ou^ selves ; and this means that the ends we set before us have not an objective content which is desired for itself, and without regard to its relation to our private selves. The selfish man, so far as he is selfish, hasT objects of desire which are not subordinated to any principle higher than his private satisfaction. If you ask what is the general end which includes his ends, you can point to none ; but you find that he tj;eats all objects as means, that he cares for none in itself, but will sacrifijce any with readiness ; and when you enquire what is common to them all, you find that they minister to his personal comfort ; this comfort being a certain quantum of the pleasant and of absence of pain^ which satisfies him, and which he either consciously aims at or unconsciously uses as a measure of all objects of desire. The ideal voluptuary consciously piursues pleasure in abstraction ; the real voluptuary consciously pursues the pleasant feelings which come from the satisfying of certain desires ; the selfish man pursues the generally pleasant, and avoids the painful in general, neither separating the feeling of pleasure as an explicit end, nor troubling himself with hunting for the pleasant for the sake of the pleasant, but making objects his end, either consciously or unconsciously, only so long as they are pleasant. If he separated pleasure from the pleasant and hunted for the maximum of that, he would be the ideal voluptuary : if he hunted for a certain sort of pleasant feeling as such, he w^ould be the real voluptuary. He is neither; he is characterized not so much by his end as his absence of end, by his readiness to use anything as a mere means^ to be let go when it ceases to serve the 248 Ethical Studies. \ to the other. Nor is it only at different times that I feel so different, but also at one and the same time \ I feel in myself impulses to good in collision with impulses to bad, and I feel myself in each of them ; and, whichever way I go, I satisfy myself and yet fail to do so. If I yield to the bad self, the good self is dissatisfied ; and if I yield to the good self, the bad self is dis- contented; and I am driven to believe that two souls, two opposing principles, are at war in me, and make me at war with myself; each of which loves what the other hates, and hates what the other loves. In this strife I know that tlie good is the true self, it is certainly more myself than the other ; and yet I can not say that the other is not myself, and when I enter the lists against it, it is at my own breast that I lay my lance in rest No doubt this account, as a description of every one, would be much overcharged There are persons, no doubt, who know the bad self, not as an active enemy of the good, but merely as an opposing dr^. It is, however, better to see the whole extent of the facts we have to explain. The two selves do not present themselves as a mere collection of desires and habits, some of which we call good and some bad. We are not only conscious of ourself in them, but in each we are conscious of self in a certain character, as good against bad, bad against good. We are conscious of ourselves as willing them each in that specific character, and we recognize and refer our desires and acts, not to what seem to be certain headings, but rather each to an apparent active centre, embodied in our will, which has asserted itself and does assert itself in us, and in which we have assert.ed and do assert ourselves, not as a collection or series, but as a real being, as what we call our good and bad self A being which is not self-conscious, and morally self-conscious, can not know a division in himself of good and bad will ; and this by itself is a fatal objection against the theory which explains the two selves as hereditary groups of habits, 'egoistic' and 'altruistic,' which oppose each other. I am far from denying that this view has a considerable value and sheds light on the subject, but, as a sufficient explai.ation of the collision in the self, it fails in two ways. In the first place, as we have just seen, the theory fails because the fact to be explained is a double self, and 250 Ethical Studies. What, then, is the origin of the two selves ? And how are they developed from the crude material of the natural disposition ? This is the question we have to answer ; but let us first be sure we know what their content is. > / The good self is the self which is identified with, and takes ■ pleasure in, the morally good ; which is interested in and bound ; up with pursuits, activities, in a word, with ends that realize the good will. The good will is the will to realize the ideal self; and the ideal self we saw had a three-fold content, the social reality, the social ideal, and the non-social ideal We i need say no more, then, but that the good self is the self whose = end and pleasure is the realization of the ideal self. What is the content of the bad self ? Here we find no general head, no objective unity, to which, as an end, its content is subor- dinated. All we can say is that the content of the bad self in a man is the habits and pursuits which are antagonistic to the good ; the bad will is the will which is identified with the bad, and the bad is whatever is willed against the good. Its content is not mere pleasure-seeking as such, for that implies abnormal reflection and abstraction : nor, again, is it selfishness, because many bad deeds are done without conscious or unconscious regard to personal comfort. The content of the bad self has no principle, and iotms no system, and is relative to no end. Pride, hate, revenge, passionateness, sulkiness, malice, meanness, cowardice, and reck- lessness have no one thing common to the content of all : I please myself and my worse self in all ; and, if you abstract what is common, you must say, since the worse self as such can not be an end, that hence the end, under which all are subsumed, is private pleasure j but all that is true in that assertion is that there is no other end. The bad self has indeed, as we have seen and hatve yet to see, some sort of unity, because we are self-conscious in it ; but that unity does net lie in its content ; the content can be generally described only by reference to the good self, as what contradicts and opposes it, and can not be defined except against it in a man, you will not necessarily find all that he has icheritedy which was good in his parents, on the good side ; and all of the bad in them^ which he has inherited, on his bad side. A man's character is not the grouping of two descended heaps. 252 Ethical Studies. his pleasant or painful activities and feelings the content of things. There are other objects round him, which please him apart from appetite, and of these not a few are permanent ; they are continually with him, and do not disappear when enjoyed. On the contrary, they remain when possessed ; and, so long as the child has them, he does not want them or desire them, but feels affirmed and satisfied in them. The feelings they excite, which are pleasant, are transferred to them as ideas, and are made part of their content, so that their mere presence gives pleasure ; the will is asserted ia them, and their perceived ideas by habituation enter into the content of the child's standing self-feeling (not as yet self-con- scious), so that, in their absence, he is uneasy, he feels himself as something which is not fully there; or without them (in the homely phrase) he does not ' feel his self* at alL Now, here we have not mere appetite, or tension between an actual empty and ideal full self, such as is felt in the presence of this or that sensuous object. The satisfaction is not preceded by a feeling of contradiction, and it is permanent. And further, we have no selfishness, because we have no reflection and abstrac- tion ; the presence of the environing pleasant objects excites the general habitual pleasant self-feeling. It is most incorrect and misleading to talk of ideas of pleasure being * associated ' with them. The fact is that the idea of the object (imagined or per- ceived) gives a feeling of pleasure ; and it does so, because for the child its very meaning is objectified pleasant actions and feelings. And the point is that for the child it is a permanent pleasant; it is not a permanent cause of pleasure. It is not a means to an end out- side itself. Whether its content is felt to be pleasant, or in addition is known to be so, in neither case is the pleasantness separated in idea from the objective content, and it can not be made an end apart from that. The child likes it for itself, and he will not give it up for another means to the same end, because he has not thought of an end apart from the things he likes.* * At this point for clearness' sake it may be well to put certain results together. And, passing over the stage of mere want or felt need, not referred to an object, we have (i) Simple Appetite. Here a sensuous image is presented, with which are 254 Ethical Studies. other feelings, in the relation of the dog, or at least most dogs, to the master; and here again the rule is that the dog a man has brought up is most attached to him. Even later in life, with regard to some people, we feel something of the same sort, though here again the feeling is probably mixed. We like to be with them, their presence is pleasant. And in all these cases the ideas of pleasure and their external connection are fictitious, and the 'illusion of close association' is only there for the deluded theorist Nor is It merely in the absence or presence of what is dear that the child feels its will negated or affirmed ; it does so, too, in the negation or affirmation of the object Natural sympathy (into the ultimate nature of which we do not enter) no doubt plays a great part here; but, apart from sympathy, there are obvious reasons why the manifested well-being and pleasure, or again the discomf', 9X all events goes deep into the whole subject 264 Ethical Studies. !, propensities, which, as they are and exist, can not be systematized They must be made into a system by repression here and en- couragement there ; and even then, with all the conditions at the best, some element of the material is sure to give trouble. The will can be made one with the good by nothing but a process oi habituation, and this takes time. All the while the child is Uving from moment to moment what must, under any conditions, be the chance life of a finite being. It is simply impossible that this or that bad satisfaction should not take place ; impossible that desire for what is bad should not be awakened, and equally impossible that such temptation should not be yielded to. And here we have the inevitable affirmation of the self in what is bad; and this is also permanent y It is permanent because, in one word, the self is permanent, because the self is not a perishing flux or collection. Bad satis- factions are not gone when the moment is by, but in their results they remain in us. Apart fi*om reflection, indulgence strengthens I propensity, and, if repeated, forms habit ; ^ and, given the pre- sence of positive conditions, and absence of checks, habit wiH pass into the class of act which produced it It is a state of the standing will And reflection makes an idea^ independent of this or that sensuous thing, which remains ready to rise before us, and so provokes temptation, and reacts upon habit to the further intensification of both. The self is made one with the bad by abiding habit and lasting idea, and thus gets a content, not past but present, which is discrepant with the content of the good will -I And here we must remark that this content has no unity in itself; it is not subordinated to a single controlling principle. It is a chance collection, united partly by interlacing of habits, ' It is surprising that a writer of talent could allow himself twice to publish the exquisitely silly remark, 'Failure is to form habits.' The saying is sense- less in relation to fact ; for every (xie knows that we can not choose between habits and no habits, but at most between good and bad habits. In connection with the remaining views of the writer it is, if possible, still more senseless ; for habit with him is a word that can mean notiiing ; and, to be consistent, he must say, 'It matters not. what habits you think yoxi have; for they are a delusion, and so are you.' Selfishness and Self-sacrifice. 265 partly by relative subordination to this or that bad end ; but its various habits and ends are self-contradictoiy, €, g, lust and lazi- ness, pride and greediness, hatred and cowardice. There is no one end, and there is no identity, no bond of unity at all, except the affirmative self feeling which, under differences, is the same tiiroughout The bad is contrary to itself, as well as to the good, imd, for these two reasons, is already painful, and, apart from this or that external check, fails to satisfy. But at this stage in what sense is it contrary to the good ? Is the bad known as bad against the good, and in that character willed? Not so, for the moral self-consciousness is not yet awakened. The bad is not brought under the general head of bad against good. Bad actions are attempted or willed, and, when willed, are found in collision with good ; there is a sense of jarring and contradiction, accompanied at most by a perception of incompatibility, and followed by pain and dissatisfaction. The good and bad selves do not confront each other as unities : so far as they come explicitly before the mind (especially the bad self), they are only collections. Bad acts are known, as this or that, to be against the will of the superior, but they are not yet done as contrary. Through correction the act may have painful associa- tions, but may be done in despite of these, yet still not consciously against the general good will. As yet the child does not have before it the will of the superior, together with this or that desire, recognized as against the will of the superior, and deliberately realize itself in the known contrary. Hence there is no common \ predicate for evil things ; they are sought because desired as this » or that ; and the discrepancy with the good is at most felt And further, we must remember that in the begiiming all, and after- wards many, bad actions are done quite innocently^ and without the smallest feeling that they are out of harmony with anything else. So far we have seen the growth of the good and bad wills in what we may call their unconscious and non-moral stage ; we have \ now to pass into the moral sphere. But let us first see clearly what that implies. Three elements are involved in it, knowledge of *- good, knowledge of bad, and self-conscious volitioiL You can / J 266 Ethical Studies. not have the first without the second, nor the second without Hsxt first, nor either without the third. Evil implies knowledge o{ good, else it can not be known as opposite to good , and, where it is not known, there is no morality proper : and the same with good. If a subject does not know what evil is, the words moral goodness are devoid of meaning to it You can not define moral goodness without bringing in evil : if you leave that out, you have a natural or a superhuman subject ; in either case morality as such goes, because the * ought' means nothing.* And the next point, on which we must insist, is that to know moral good and evil without willing them is simply impossible. These ideas are not ideas of anything external, nor of anything that can by any process of analogy be gathered from the external : their originals are in the subject, and, if he does not know them there first, he will nevei know them at ail. Knowledge of morality is knowledge of specific forms of the will, and, just as will can be known only because we know our will, so these forms of will demand personal and immediate knowiedge. Hatred of evil means feeling of evil, and you can not be brought to feel what is not inside you, or has nothing analogous witihin you. Moral perception must rest on moral e^erience. And, lastly, for morality is required self-conscious volition. It ill not do for the subject merely to be identified with good on the one side, bad on the other, to perceive their incompatibility and feel their discrepancy. He can not know them, imless he knofw? them against each other ; and for that he must have them both before him at once. He must have before his mind himself as desiring two things in oi^osition to eiach odier at cme moment, each being seen to belong to a certain class ; he stands above them, and in his conscious identification of his whole self in act with one or the other arises the knowledge of himself, as asserting himself as the good or bad will. This is the condition m * The question of the exact extent to which evil xnust^^o in order to awake conscience has of course (though here again evil takes the form of sin) a coo« siderahle interest for theology, but it does not concern us here. It is discussed by Vatke, pp. 275-6b 268 Ethical Studies. realizations the self knows it is bad. It knows itself in them as self, because, in volition, it now asserts itself consciously ; having willed them, it is aware that they are its will : and it knows itself in them as bad self, because, in the doing of them, the self was asserted in that very character. The particular evil act is done as an instance and case of evil ; the general is realized as such in the particulars ; and, when the particulars are reflected on, they possess within themselves, as their identity, the self-conscious assertion of the self, as the will which is bad and which knows itself bad. This or that evil action or desire is now referred to the general badness ; the general badness is carried out in this or that bad act ; and, answering to the thought unity, there exists a common specific feeling, which binds all together; so that one evil self is felt in all, and all are felt as one self, which opposes the good, and which acquires its fixity by habit and l^ the conscious- ness which reacts on habit y The unity of the bad self is opposition to the one good self, and it has no other unity. But the good is one, not merely against the bad, but also in itself. We saw that in the good will there was subordination and system ; and all that is wanted for its self- conscious unity is that, by volition, the self should be asserted in it as one will against particular evil desires, which are recognized in their general character of opposition to it Good acts are now done as good, and realize a principle which in them is aware of itself. The unity of self-consciousness is bestowed on the good will ; but the point to keep in sight is this, that it was one before. The good self is now morally good ; and there is no need for us to trace its upward developement It knows itself at first as the will which, against the temptation of the bad, wills in its acts, and wills its acts as, the will of a superior outside itself, whether that be a person or tribe. The higher will is here felt, but not yet known, to be the will of the obeying self; and the process of developement, whether in morals or religion, has for its result the end where this higher will is known as the true will of the self, where law ceases to be external and becomes autonomy, and where goodness, or the identity of the particular will with the universal, is only another name for conscious self-realization. Why in the good self we realize ourselves, and in the bad self ^^o Eikic4d Studies. TtaSlie die clui ig es is scazcdf possible. And here, wbere a fdt discrqxmcj giadnaBy siiaipeiis itsdf into a perceived contxadic- tioa, we can redace die gcncial coarse, but can not recover die detailed ezpexienccs, eadi one of niikh told, and added to the whole. From die first the incompatibility of pleasare in the good and in die bad must be in some waj fidt ; and as the two sides by habit harden themsdves and grow moie connected, this feeling must become more definite: There mnst come more or less of a perception of the good as a whole, a more or less dear ins^t that this or that bad act was incompatible, and the disapproval of the superior mnst to a certain extent be reflected on as attaching to a class of actSw There are dawnings of the moxal consdoiiaiess which never torn to day, and acts not quite moral, while hardly non-moral ; but aU that we can accomplish is to see clearly that the two sides are not perceived as such until perceived in their specific character, one against the other ; and that morality proper does not begin until, being so apprehended, they are consciously made the piindples of the particular acts. Growth up to the appearance of the specific moral consdous- ness is thus not strictly moral, and up to this time, I think, we are not accountable But, after this time, we must be considered so, although moral growth is still to some extent unconscious. To take the last first, it is quite certain that the awakening of the con- sdence does not mean its sudden application to the whole of life. It is only by slow degrees that our acts take spontaneously the colour of good and bad, and the process, owing to new material and fresh combinations of the old, remains incomplete to the end of our days. For all that, we are responsible ; and if theory must fix some point at which imputation begins, it can not be elsewhere than here. From this time we are a will which knows itself as good and bad, and knows that the good has exdusive daim. We have with full consciousness identified ourselves with good and evil ; and from that twofold identification of the will, which begins a new life, and is no transitory accident but a standing sdf, we are bound to condude that our particular acts now proceed. The burden of proving the contrary lies in all cases upon ourselves ; and, to escape imputation of evil or good, we must show, by establish- 2/2 Ethical Studies. nature of the case, they must be perpetuall)'^ ia the way of one another. Thus the bad is no unity, no system, no concrete universal. And, secondly, being thus what it is, when formally willed it is contrary to the self that wills it That self both is, and feels and knows itself to be one, a permanent universal, and a whole ; and in the assertion of itself in the bad it puts itself into what does not answer to its nature, and in that objectification must feel that, though the self is gone out, yet the self is not there. \^ For what in the end is this bad self? It is nothing but a col* lective self formally asserted as an unity. We have come at last, really and in fact, to the collection which is affirmed as not a col- lection ; but this, we must never forget, is possible only because it belongs to that which is more than a collection. The actual unity of the bad self is a group of centres of bad habits and desires, in which the self-conscious self has affirmed itself, and in which the self feels itself in a sp>ecific manner against the good. But the one self is affirmed there formally and not really ; evil deeds are acts of the whole self, but if you ask, * where then in ihem is the whole self realized ? ' you can find it nowhere ; and the specific feeling of being bad, which is common to all the evil, attaches to it by virtue of its opposition to the one good, not in virtue of any one common quality that it has in itself A specific feeling of con- trariness to the good, this or that more or less solid group of associated bad habits, the fonnal and unreal assertion of the whole self therein, and the reflection on all evil, as what by its general opposition to the good is known as one, this is all the unity of the bad self. It is an universal in the sense of a collection of ali, not in the sense of being a whole and an organic system. It is a group of bad tendencies, adhering by the association of habit into relative centres, with nothing common to all save the specific feeling of opposition to the same unity, and by formal self-con* sciousness and reflection made for our apprehension into a whole, while in reality nothing but a heap of particulars. The bad self can not as such be self-conscious ; if it were so, it would realize the ideal of a self-conscious collection. It is the whole self which therein is aware of itself as what it is not, as a collection ; and hence the contradiction, hence tlie indignant 274 Ethical Studies. ance is this, that a being which desires evil, not as this, that, and the other evil, but as mere negation of good, is not a being which knows what good is. We have seen that, unless the will is identified with good, good can not be known. If good is not willed, it is not known, and therefore can not as such be hated : and if good is not willed, evil is not known as eviL In short, with the total absence of will for good goes the absence of knowledge both of that and of evil, and, with that, desire for evil as such. The simplest way to put it is to say that to hate good is to hate oneself, and no one can altogether hate himself. To hate good is to hate oneself, because our being is affirmative through; indeed, we are position and affirmation itself^ and ood is the one and only true form of positive realization. I do ' iiot mean that in this and that evil we do not affirm ourselves positively, but I say that we do not do so truly. We know our- selves to be one and a whole, and we know that we have not tnily and really produced and got ourselves in any mere this or that as such, or in anything but that which reflects and realizes our nature, as a being which can not believe that its reality is of the the positive desire for self-assertion and nothing but self-assertion. And this positive desire can be directed against the good only jfifr acadens. The abstract negation of the good we can not really aim at ; but, having this or that desire, we negate what opposes it, because and so far as it oppoees it, in' order to assert ourselves positively. To hate one's life is possible only sohras one abstracts from it ; and here it is self-affirmation, however abstract^ which is our positive end. There is only one class of facts where evil seems done for its own sake, I. f, to n^ate the good ; and in these we find a psydiolc^cal illusion. The illusion is that the good is a foreign will, which represses us from the outside. Breaches of discipline seem done for their own salce; but they really ax>e done not because evil, but because the self asserts itself in them against what it mistakes for another finite will. Removal of discipline soon destroys the zest of illicit pleasure ; then the subject finds out it does not care for the evil as such, a knowledge bought dear. If the subject goes on to say^ 'I wish I could think it wrong, because, since I ceased to do so, the pleasure has gone,* we have the nearest approach to mxoXmeim, But this rests on the illusion as to a foreign wilL Other phenomena of the sort can. be reduced to the head of the wish 'to spite oneself/ a curious state of mind which involves the takmg of oneself, in this or that character or quality, to be a self foreign and external to one's present self. 2y6 Ethical Studies. all identification of the will with the ideal, demands the suppres- sion .of the self in some form ; and so, though self-realization, it yet at the same time is self-sacrifice. Can we say, then, that self-sacrifice consists in following the higher and crushing the lower, and that, conversely, all such action is self-sacrifice ? No, the latter would be false ; for it is not what in the ordinary sense self-sacrifice means. In morality, as a rule, what you give is returned to you with interest ; and the bestowal of the self on the good is rewarded by the general heightening of individual life. If happiness is the realization of one's ideal in one's own existence, the attaining one's end as a whole in the private self and by and for the private self, then, so far as men can be happy, in the main it is true that virtue is happiness ; and virtue does not necessarily imply self-sacrifice. Self sacrifice is more than this. It implies the identification of the will with an object, which entails in the effort to realize it the probable or certain negation of our priyate existence. And by private existence (other phrases, if this be objected to, will serve) I mean the existence which is ours, J do not say apart from but, distinct from others, what is centred in us as this or that person. The extensive and intensive affirmation of our will, as this 'I' or that *You,' whether in bodily well-being, psychical harmony, influence on others, or appropriation of physical or spiritual good things, — ^all these assert our particular personal existence, and all that opposes the actuality or possibility of these lowers it. Self-sacrifice is knowingly to give up this existence to that which is higher. In it we bestow our will on what, we believe, either will or may lessen the extensive and intensive assertion of our private self. It is not giving up our will, for that is mere nonsense ; nor our will as this or that man, that also is nonsense : if any one likes so to look at it, it is something less, but it is also and therefore a great deal more. It is the will of us, as this or that, to realize an object which means the lessening or total suppression of us as this or that. It is the good, self ; it is the identification of our will with the ideal ; it is self-realization, and as such has a pleasure of its own ; it does assert the private will, but it asserts il to its own negation ; and the content of the self it rea]izes, it does not get for itself and have as a personal Selfishness and Self'SOLcrifice. 277 — ' ^ ■ ■ II . good of its own, but by sight or faith beholds its accomplishment, if at all, outside of and beyond its individual existence. Answers to two more questions, and then we have done. The first is, Can there be self-sacrifice for the bad; for the bad, that is, when known as bad ? It is perhaps a matter for doubt, but we incline to the negative view. We have seen that the bad is not desired in its quality of bad for the sake of that quality ; but the difficulty which remains is that, for the sake of something known to be bad, persons do seem to give up their existence, while aware that they will or may do so. A closer consideration may, however, dispose of these cases. They may be divided into two classes, passionate and deliberate. In the former an element of self-sacrifice is wanting, /. e, the having the consequences in view. Fierce hate and hot lust for a mortal pleasure lead men to death ; as the poet says, Our natures do pursue. Like rats that ravin down their proper bane, A thirsty evil ; and when we drink we die. But the point here is this, Is the end only before the mind, with blindness to the possible result ; or is that result considered ? If it is not considered, there is no self-sacrifice proper. The second class is the deliberate pursuit of bad objects, with a readiness to consider and face all consequences, even one's own death ; sacrifice of oneself, in short, for a bad cause. Here the important point is this, Is .the cause really known as bad : or is the conscience con- fused, so as to take bavill identified with a non-temporal will ; and that here (whether it call itself so or not) we have religion. But this, I think, will not hold. Of . course, if self- I 278 Ethical Sttulies. sacrifice for the bad be admitted, we can not see in that the assertion of the divine will And further, if the question be narrowed to self-sacrifice for good, still we must say that it need involve nothing properly to be called religion. The cause, with which the will is identified to the negation of the temporal self, need not therefwe be apprehended as non-temporal, or that which is above the finite ; but only as a finite realization, which is above and superior to this or that finite. And thus, too, my will may be identified with some bad interest, which, though finite, is sl^i superior to my finite existence. The doubt which remains is whether, in cases where the personal existence is felt as utterly worthless in comparison of the good to be attained, the good is not so qualified by the comparison that we have passed into the religious consciousness, or at least into that which springs from and depends on it. Here, however, on the other side we must take account of the • abstract self-consciousness,' which stakes its existence on a trifle, not because it cares for this or that content, but because, in its abstract assertion, it cares for no particular content as such, not even that of its own finite existence. But this, as well as the consideration of the former difficulty, besides others no doubt which we have omitted or failed to throw light on, we will leave tp the reader (if such there be) who, in spite of its treatment by the writer,, remains yet unwearied by the subject 28o Ethical Shulies, tempted to say something more ; however fragmentary, however much in the form of an appendix.' Y- f- Reflection on morality leads us beyond it. It leads us, in short, to see the necessity of a religious point of view. It cer- tainly does not tell us that morality comes first in the world and then religion : idiat it tells us is that morality is imperfect, and imperfect in such a way as implies a higher, which is religioa Morality issues in religion : and at this word * religion ' the ordinary reader is upon us with cries and questions, and with all the problems of the day — God, and personal God, immortality' of the soul, the conflict of revelatiQn and science, and who knows what beside ? He must not expect any answer to these questions here : we are writing a mere appendix ; and in that our object is to shew that religion, as a matter of fact, does give us what morality does not give ; and our method is simply, so far as our purpose requires, to point to the facts of the religious conscious- ness, without drawing conclusions to the right .or left, without trying to go much below the surface, or doing anything beyond what is wanted in this connection with morality. We purpose to say nothing about the ultimate truth of religion : nothing again about its origin in the world, or in the individual We are to take the religious consciousness as an existing feet, and to take it as we find it now in the modern Christian mind, whether that mind recognizes it or whether it does not And lastly, space compels us to do no more than dogmatically asseit what seems to us to be true in respect of it Tliat there is some connection between true religion and morality €very one we need consider sees. A man who is ' religious ' and does not act morally, is an impostor, or his religion is a fabe- one. This does not hold good elsewhere. A philosopher may be a good philosopher, and yet, taking him as a whole, may be immoral ; and the same thing is true of an artist, or even of a theologian. They may all be good, and yet not good men ; but no one who knew what true religion was would call a man, who on the whole was immoral, a religious man. For religion is not the mere * Throughout the sequel I have to acknowledge my indebtedness to Vatke's book, DU Menschliche Freikeit : 1^41. Concluding Remarks. 2.81 knowing or contemplating of any object, however high. It is not mere philosophy nor art^.because it is not mere seeing, no mere theoretic activity, considered as such or merely from its theoretical side. The religious consciousness tells us that a man is not religious, or more religious, because the matter of his theoretic activity is religious ; just as the moral consciousness told us that a man was not moral, or more moral, simply because he was a moral philosopher. Religion is essentially a doing, and a doing which is moral. It implies a realizing, and a realizing of the good self. Are we to say then that morality is religion ? Most certainly not In morality the ideal is not : it for ever remains a * to be.' The reality in us or the world is partial and inadequate ; and no one could say that it answers to the ideal, that, morally con- sidered, both we and the world are all we ought to be, and ought to be just what we are. We have at furthest the belief in an ideal which in its pure completeness is never real ; which, as an ideal, is a mere * should be.' And the question is, Will that do for religion ? No knower ^of religion, who was not led away by a theory, would answer Yes. Nor does it help us to say that religion is ' morality touched by emotion ; ' for loose phrases of this sort may suggest to the reader what he knows already with- out their help, but, properly speaking, they say nothing. All morality is, in one sense or another, * touched by emotion.' Most emotions, high or low, can go with and * touch' morality; and the moment we leave our phrase-making, and begin to reflect, we see all that is meant is that morality * touched ' by religious emotion is religious ; and so, as answer to the question What is religion ? all that we have said is, * It is religion when with morality you have — religion.' I do not think we learn a very great deal from this.* ■ !■■*■■ I ' ■ i < M ■ I I I I I • ' Compare (Mill, Dissertations, i. 70-1) the definition of poetry as 'Bum's thoughts tinged by his feelings ;* where the whole matter again is, 7vhat feelings ? Anything in the way of shallow reflection on the psychological form, anything rather than the effort to grasp the content All that Mill saw wanting in this 'definition' was that it missed *the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener.' However, to make sure of hitting the mark, he, so to speak, set it down as hit beforehand, and in his own * definition ' of poetry introduced * the poet's mind.' This is much as if we were to say, * Religion is the sort of thing you hare in a religious man.* 282 Ethical Studies. Religion is more than morality. In the religious consciousness we find the belief, however vague and indistinct, in an object, a not-myself ; an object, further, which is real. An ideal which is not real, which is only in our heads, can not be the object of religion : and in particular the ideal self, as the * is to be ' which is real only so f^r as we put it forth by our wills, and which, as an ideal, we can not put forth, is not a real object, and so not the object for religion. Hence, because it is unreal, the ideal of personal morality is not enough for religion. And we have seen before tliat the ideal is not realized in the objective world of the state ; so that, apart from other objections, here again we can not find the religious object. For the religious consciousness that object is real ; and it is not to be found in the mere moral sf^ere. But here once more ' culture ' has come to our aid, and has shown us how here, as everywhere, the study of polite literaturei which makes for meekness, makes needless also all further educa«> tion ; and we felt already as if the clouds that metaphysic had wrapped about the matter were dissolving Jn the light of a fresh and sweet intelligence. And, as we turned towards the dawn, we sighed over poor Hegel, who had read neither Goethe nor Homer, nor the Old and New Testaments, nor any of the literature which has gone to form ' culture,' but, knowing no facts, and reading no books, nor ever asking himself * such a tyro's question as what being really was,' ' sat spinning out of his head those foolish logo- machies, which impose on no person of refinement Well, culture has told us what God was for the Jews ; and we learn that ' I am that I am ' means much the same as ^ I olow and grow, that I do,' or ' I shall breathe, that I shall ; ' and this^ if surprising, was at all events definite, not to say tangible. How* ever to those of us who do not think that Christianity is called upon to wrap itself any longer in * Hebrew old clothes,' all this is entirely a matter for the historian. But when ' cultui^ ' went on to tell us what God is for science, we heard words we did not understand about * streams,' and * tendencies,' and * the Eternal : * and, had it been any one else that we were reading, we should have said that, in some literary excursion, they had picked up a * Cu7tt, KevieiVf xxiv. 988. 284 Ethical Studies. object of the religious consciousness. The reality, which answers to the phrases of culture, is> we suppose, the real existence of the phrases as such in books or in our heads ; or again a number of events in time, past, present and future (/. e, conjunctions of virtue and happiness). We have an abstract term to stand for the abstraction of this or that quality ; or again we have a series or collection of particular occurrences. When the literary varnish is removed, is there anything more ?' But the object of the religious consciousness must be a great deal more. It must be what is real, not only in the heads of this person or set of persons, nor again as this or that finite something or set of somethings . It is in short very different from either those thin abstractions or coarse 'verifi- able * facts, between which and over which there is for our ' culture' no higher third sphere, save that of the literary groping which is helpless as soon as it ceases to be blind. But let us turn from this trifling, on which we are sorry to have been forced to say even one word ; let us go back to the religious consciousness. Religion, we have seen, must have an object ; and that object is neither an abstract idea in the head, nor one particular thing or quality, nor any collection of such things or qualities, nor any phrase which stands for one of them or a collection of them. In short it is nothing finite. It can not be a thing or person in the world ; it can not exist in the world, as a part of it, or as this or that course 6f events in time ; it can not be the * All,' the sura of things or persons, — since, if one is not divine, no putting of ones together will beget divinity. All this it is not Its positive character is that it is real; and further, on examining what we * * Is there a God ? * asks the reader. * Oh yes,' replies Mr. Arnold, * and I can verify him in experience. ' * And what is he then ? ' cries the reader. * Be virtuous, and as a rule you will be happy,' is the answer. * Well, and God ? * •That is God ;* says Mr. Arnold, 'There is no deception, and what more do you want ? * I suppose we do want a good deal more. Most of us, certainly the public which Mr. Arnold addresses, want something they can worship ; and they will not find that in an h3rpostasized copy-book heading, which is not much more adorable than * Honesty is the best policy,' or * Handsome is that handsome does,' or various other edifying maxims, which have not yet come to an apotheosis. Concluding Remarks, 285 find in the religious consciousness,* we discover that it is the ideal self considered as realized and real. The ideal self, which in morality is to be, is here the real ideal which truly is. For morals the ideal self was an *■ ought,' an * is to be ' that is not ; the object of religion is that same ideal self, but here it no longer only ought to be, but also is. This is the nature of the religious object, though the manner of apprehending it may differ widely, may be anything from the vaguest instinct to the most thoughtful reflection. With religion we may here compare science and art The artist and poet, however obscurely, do feel and believe that beauty, where it is not seen, yet somehow and somewhere is and is real ; though not as a mere idea in people's heads, nor yet as anything fn the visible world. And science, however dimly, starts from and rests upon the preconception that, even agaii?ist appearances, reason not only ought to be, but really is. Is then religion a mere mode of theoretic creation and con- templation, like art and science ? Is it a lower form or stage of philosophy, or another sort of art, or some kind of compound mixture ? It is none of these, and between it and them there is a vital difference. In the very essence of the religipjft^ consciousness we find the relation of our will to the real ideal self We find ourselves, as this or that will, against the object as the real ideal will, which is not ourselves, and which stands to us in such a way that, though real, it is to be realized, because it is all and the whole reality^ A statement, no doubt, which may stagger us ; but the statement, we maintain, of a simple fact of the religious consciousness. If any one likes to call it a delusion, that makes no difference; unless, as some people seem to think, you can get rid of facts by applying phrases to them. And, however surprising the fact may be to the reader, it certainly ought not to be new to him. We find the same difficulty, that the real is to be realized, both in art and science. The self dimly feels, or fore-feels, itself as full * The reader must carefully distinguish what is for (or before) the religious consciousness, and what is only in it, Bzidfor us as we investigate iL 286 Ethical Studies. of truth and beauty, ai\d unconsciously sets that fulness before it as an object, a not-itself which is against itself as this or that man. And so the self goes on to realize what it obscurely foreknows as real ; it realizes it, although, and because, it is aware of it as real. And in this, so for, art, philosophy, and religion are the same. But, as we saw, they are also different €n art and science the will of the man who realizes is not of the essence. The essence of the matter is that a certain result should be produced, that, of the unseen object w^hich is divined to be real, a part at least should become visible, that in short, however it comes about, some element of the real should be seen to be realized. Here the end is the sight of the object, as such, and the will which procure* that sight is not taken into account No doubt it would be a great mistake to forget that art suid science involve will, and the will of particular persons, and that it is this will which realizes the object ; and that hence, since the object of science and art is at least partly identical with the object of religion, both science and art may so far be said to imply religion, since they imply the relation of the particular will to the Teal ideal For suppose that the human-divine life is one process, and suppose again that art and science and religion are distinguishable elements or aspects of this one whole process. Then, if this is so, neither art nor science nor religion can exist as a thixig by itself, and the two former will necessarily imply the latter. . But on the other hand, though we may not divide, yet we have to distinguish ; and when by an abstraction we consider one side, e. g, the side of science or that of art, by itself, and take them as mere theoretic activities, then we must say that in this character neither of them is religion ; and they are not religion because the will of this or that man, over against the real ideal as will, is not an element in the scientific or artistic process as such. The real ideal of science and art is not will, and the relation of my will to it falls outside them ; arid we must say, and we think that the reader will agree, that, so soon as the philosopher or artist is conscious of his will in relation to the real ideal, as a will which has demands on him, he ceases to be a mere philosopher or artist as such (which after all no human being is), and becomes also religious or ineligious. To proceed, we find in the religious consciousness the ideal 288 Ethical Studies. can not stay to develope this doctrine, and must content ourselves with pointing out that the opposite is Utterly incomprehensible. The two poles are what they are, because they are against each other in consciousness. In them the self feels itself divided against itself ; and, unless they both fall within one subject, how is this possible ? We have not the felt struggle of ourself against a perceived or thought external object ; we have the felt struggle in us of two wills, with both of which we feel ourselves identified And this relation of the divine and human will in one subject is a psychological impossibility, unless they are the wills of one subject. Remove that condition, and the phenomena in their specific character instantly disappear. You can not understand the recognition of and desire for the divine will ; nor the con- sciousness of sin and rebellion, with the need for grace on the one hand and its supply on the other ; you turn every fact of religion into immeaning nonsense, and you pluck up by the root and utterly destroy all possibility of the Atonement, when you deny that the religious consciousness implies that God and man are identical in a subject.' ' On this whole matter, and not specially with reference to religion, it is worth while to consider the position of our philosophy. People find a subject and object correlated in consciousness ; and, having got liiis in the mind, they at once proje<;t it outside the mind, and talk as if two independent realities knocked themselves together, and so produced the unity that apprehends them ; while, all the time, to go out of that unity is for us literally to go out of our minds. And when the moiistrous nature of theii position dawns on some few, and they begin to see that without some higher unity this • correlation' is pure nonsense, then answering to that felt need, they invent a third reality, whidh is neither subject nor object but ihe ' Unknowable* or the Thing-in-itscif (there is no difference). JBut here^ since the two correlates are still left to- gether with, and yet are not, the Unknowable, the question arises, How does this latter stand to them? and the result is that the Unknowable becomes the subject of predicates (see Mr. Spencer's First Principles), and it becomes impossible for any one who cares for consistency to go on calling it the Unknowable. So it is necessary to go a step farther, and, giving up our third, which is not the correlates, to recognize an Identity of subject and object, still however persisting in the statement that this identity is not mind. But here again, as with the Unknowable, and as before with the two correlated realities, it is forgotten that, when mind is made only a part of the whole, there is a question which must be answered ; ' If so, how can the whole be known, and Covxluding Remarks. 289 For it "is the atonement, the reconciliation (call it what you please, and bring it before your mind in the way most easy to you), to which we must come^ if we mean to follow the facts of the religious consciousness. Here, as everywhere, the felt con- tradiction implies, and is only possible through, an unity above the discord : take that away, and the discord goes. The antithesis of the sinful and divine will is implicitly their union \ and that union, in the subject, requires only to be made explicit, for the subject, by thought and will. But for the subject it is not yet explicit; and it is only we who reflect upon the religious consciousness, that see the matter thus. That consciousness as such has not the insight that the divine will is the will of its own true and inmost self : I may know that, as a fact, in God there is the unity of the two natures ; but for me God is (here at least) only not my self; the divine is an object between which and me there is a chasm ; my inner self may desire it, but can only desire it as aa other and a beyond. True for the mind ? If about any matter we know nothing whatever, can we say anything about it ? Can we even say that it is ? And, if it is not in conscious- ness, how can we know ii ? And if it is in and for the mind, how can it be a u'hole which is not mind, and in which the mind is only a part or element ? If the Ultimate unity were not self or mind, we could not know that it was not mind : that would mean going out of our minds. And, conversely, if we know it, it can not be not mind. AU in short we can know (the psychological form is another question) is the self and elements in the self. To know a not- self is to transcend and leave one's mind. If we know the whole, it can only be because the whole knows itself in us, because the whole is self or mind, which is and knoMrs, knows and is, the identity and correlation of subject and object*. There is nothing in the above which has not been before the world for years, and it is time that it should be admitted or refuted. I think it wiU not be much longer disregarded. Much against its will English thought has been forced from the correlation as far as the identity ; and, if it means to hold to the doctrine of ' relativity of knowledge,' it must go on to mind or self in some sense of the word, as this identity of inner and outer. Perhaps not that ; but if not that, then I think we must begin on a fresh basis, or else give up the attempt to have any theory of first principles. But if we do (as perhaps we may do) the latter, then let me conclude this note by observing that amongst the other doctrines which must go is the doctrine of Kelativity. U 290 Ethical Studies. that the object is already the identity of God and num, but man does not include me : that object is not in me, it is only for me; it remains an object, and I remain outside. And for the religious consciousness the problem is, How can I be reconciled with this will which is not mine ? And the answer is that in the object the reconciliation of the divine and human is real ; the principle is there already ; and in its reality, the reality of the reconciliation of the human as such, is ideally contained my reconciliation. Yes, mine is there if only I can take hold of it, if only I can make it my own ; but how with the sin that adheres to me can this ever be? How can the human-divine ideal ever be my will ? The answer is, Your will it never can be as the will of your private self, so that your private self should become wholly good. To that self you must die, and by faith be made one with the ideal. You must resolve to give up your will, as the mere will of this or that roan, and you must put your whole self, your entire will, into the will of the divine. That must be yoiur one self, as it is your true self; tiiat you must hold to both with thought and will, and all other you mus»t renounce ; you must both refuse to recognize it as yours, and practtcaUy with your whole self deny it You must believe that you too really are one ivith the divine, and must act as if you believed it. In short, you must be justified not by / ^ works but solely by faith. This doctrine, which Protestantism, to its eternal glory, has made its own and sealed with its blood, is the very centre of Christianity; and, where you have not this in one form or another, there Christianity is nothing but a name. In mere morality this faith is impossible. There you have not a real unity of the divine and human, with which to identify your- self; and there again the self, which is outside the ideal, is not known as unreal, and can not be, since the ideal is not all reality. But what is faith? It is perhaps not an easy question to answer, but in some sort it must be answered ; and to neglect it as worthless, or stand aloof from it as a mystery, are both wrong positions. It is easy to say what faith is not It is not mere belief, the simple holding for true or fact ; it is no mere theoretic 292 EthiceU Studies. such and such a kind of knowledge. Faith is incompatible with common immediate sensuous knowing, or with a higher knowledge of the same simple direct nature : and, because our knowledge of the highest is, in religion, not thus immediate, therefore we are said to have only faith ; and fiaiith is, by a confusion, supposed to exclude, not one kind of certainty, but all kinds. Whence the above mistake, which, however, has a truth in it Why is it then that faith is incompatible with sensuous know- ledge ? It is because, in religious language, faith is a rise beyond ' this world,' and a rise in which I stay here. What does this mean ? Does it mean that the object must not be a part of th« visible world ? It means this, and more ; &ith implies the rise in thought, but not that only ; it implies also the rise of the will to the object, which is not seen but thought And this presupposes the practical separation for me of myself and the object In the mere theoretic rise I do not think of myself, but only of the object: in faith I must also have myself before me; I must perceive the chasm between myself, as this or that unreal part of the unreal finite world, and at the same time must perceive the ideal- real object, which is all reality, and my true reality. And it is this presupposed consciousness of absolute separation (which, m terms of space or time, we express by ' this world ' and the ^ other world ') which is necessary for faith, and which survives therein as fi suppressed element Hence, where this is not, faith can not be. Faith then is the recognition of my true self in the religious object, and the identification of myself with that both by judg- ment and will ; the determination to negate the self opposed to the object by making the whole self one with what it really is. It is, in a word, of the heart ^ It is the belief that only the ideal is ' 'True faith is no mere thought nor admission of the truth of a history.' ' The true Christian is not the man who knows histoiy. ' ' Christianity should know that faith is not merely a history or a science. To have faith is nought else than for a man to make his will one with God's, and take up God's word and might in his wiU^ so that these twain, God's will and man's will, torn to one being and substance. Thereupon in the man Christ, in his passion, his dying, his death, and upxising, m ^£a own humanity, is reckoned for righteous- ness, so that the man becomes Christ, that is after the spiritual man. . . « . He who teaches and wills otherwise is yet in the whoredom of Babylon.' — J. 69HME. Con clmding Remarks. 293 real, and the win to realize therefore nothing but the idead, the theoretical and practical ass eition that only as ideal is the self real Justification by £uth means that, having thus id^itified myself with the object, Ifed myself i ithatidenti5catkxito be already one with it, and to enj<^ the bliss of being, all ^Jadiood overcome, what I truly am. By my daim to be one with the ideal, which com- prehends me too, and by assertion of the non-reality of all that is opposed to it, the evil in die woiM and the evil incarnate in me through past bad acts, all this &2ls into the unreal : I being one with the ideal, this is not mine, and so imputation of offences goes with the change of sel^ and a{^es not now to my true self, but to the unreal, which I npudiate and hand over to destruction.* In one way ^th is of course only ideal, for the bad self does not cease. Yet rdigion is here very different £rom morality. Recalling to the reader what we said as to the meaning of 'evolution' or 'progress' (p. 173), we say here that morality is an evolution or progress. The end, which is involved in these, is becoming realized in the evolution or progress, and therefore is not yet real \ and so in morality' we have the end presented as what claims to be real, together with the process of its realization, and that means its non-reality. Here we are not what we are, and must welcome a progress ; though that means a contradiction, which again we know we are not But for religious faith the end of the evolution is presented as that which, despite the fact of the evolution, is already evolved ; or rather which stands above the element of event, contradiction, and finitude. Despite what seems, we feel that we are more than a progress or evolution, in fact not that at all, but now fully real : and this full realit>' of ourselves we present to ourselves as an object, and by recognizing, both by judgment and will, in that object our real sel^ we sjiAticipate, or rather rise above the sphere of, progress. Ourselves * Hear again the vehement expression of mysticism. * WTien reason tells thee, ' Thou art ontside God,' then answer thou, ' No, I am in God, i ara. m heaven, in it, hi him, and for eternity wiif never leave him. The devil may keep my sins, and the world my tiesh ; I li^e in God's will, his life shall be my life, his will my will; I will be dead in my reason that he may live ia me, und ft& my deeds shall be his deeds.' } > 294 Ethical Studies. being one with that object, we say we are a whole, and harmonious now. So far as we are not so, we are mere appearance ; and by the standing will to negate that seeming self, we are one with the true and real self. For this point of view and in this ^sphere (not out- side it) imputation ceases, though the bad self is still a fact; and in this sense faith remains only ideal But that it is in any other sense merely ideal, is a vulgar and gross error, which, so far as it rests on St Paul, rests on an entire misunderstanding of him. In faith we do not rise by the intdlact to an idea, and leave our will somewhere else behind us. Where there is no will to realize the object, there is no faith ; and where there are no works, there is no will. If works cease, will has ceased ; if will has ceased, faith has ceased. Faith is not the desperate leap of a moment; in true religion there is no one washing which makes clean. In Pauline language, that ' I have died,' have in idea and by will anticipated the end, proves itself a reality only by the fact that ' I die daily,' do perpetually in my particular acts will the realization of the end which is anti- cipated. Nor does faith mean simply works ; it means the works ^ faith; it means that the ideal, however incompletely, is realized. But, on the other hand, because the ideal is not realized com- pletely and truly as the ideal, therefore I am not justified by the works, which issue from faith, as works ; since they remain im- perfect I am justified solely and entirely by the ideal identifica- tion ; the existence of which in me is on the other hand indicated and guaranteed by works, and in its very essence implies them. What we have now to do is to ask, What is the object with which the self is made one by faith ? For our answer to this question we must go to the facts of the Christian consciouuiess. But the reader must remember that we shall touch these facts solely so far as is necessary to bring out the connection between religion and morality. We are to keep to a minimum, and the reader must not conclude that we repudiate whatever we say nothing about The object, which by faith the self appropriates, is in Christianity nothing alien from and outside the world, not an abstract divine which excludes the human; but it is the inseparable unity of 296 Ethical Sttidies. and what there was in a manner visible is here invisible ; (2) the relation of the particular subject to the whole was there immediate unity by unreflecting habituation and direct perception ; here it involves the thought which rises above the given, and the con- sciousness of a presupposed and suppressed estrangement Here, as in the world of my station, we have the objective side, the many affirmations of the one will, the one body, the real ideal humanity^ which in all its members is the same, although in every one it is different ; and which is completely realized not in any one this or that, nor in any mere * collective unity * of such particulars, but only in the whole as a whole. And we have the subjective personal side, where the one will of the whole is, in its unity with the conscious members, self-conscious, and wills itself as the personal identity of the universal and j^articular will* Such is the object, the fore-realized divine ideal ; and by faith the particular man has to make that his, to identify himself therewith, behold and feel himself therew^ith identified, and in his own self-consciousness have the witness of it. And this, as we explained, is done by the dying to the private self as such, by the bestowal of it on the object, and by the living in the self which is one with the divine ideal that is felt and known as the only real self, and now too as my self To our previous remarks on this ' By faith, and so far as faith holds, the ideal as the self, and the self as ^e ideal, is all that is real ; and so, on the external side of my works, I r^ard myself as, with othei-s, the member or function of the divine whole. What falls outside, however much a fact, is still unreal. Again, on the in.side, tlirough faith I, as the mere this me, no longer am ; but only I as the self< conscious personal will of the divine, the spirit of the whole, which, as that spirit, knows itself in me. On both sides, though the form is not swallowed up nor lost, yet the mere particular content of the self has for faith disappeared. But there is a difference on the two sides, which was also there in ' My Station,' but the losing sight of which was there not likely to lead to con- fusion ; while here a confusion on this head may happen, and is a serious matter. 1 o explain — on the inside the particular self knows and feels itself now immediately one wiih the universal, which is the will of all selves ; but on the outside, its realization in works, it is only one member of the whole, one function or set of functions which is not, and which fails outside of, other sides or sets of fuuclioxis. So long as it remains on the inside, the self is not 298 Ethical Studies. is, and what we are to do is done. Wliether it is thought of as what is done now, or what will be done hereafter, makes in this respect no practical difference. They are different ways of look- ing at ^ke same thing ; and, whether present or future, the reality is equally certain. The importance for practice of this religious point of view is that what is to be done is approached, not with the knowledge of a doubtful success, but with the fore-felt cer- tainty of already accomplished victory. Morality, the process of realization, thus survives within religion. It is only as mere morality that it vanishes; as an element it remains and is stimulated. Not only is strength increased by assurance of success, but in addition the importance of success is magnified. The individual life for religion is one with the divine ; it possesses infinite worth, a value no terms can express. And tlie bad gains a corresponding intensity of badness. It is infinitely evil, so that, for the religious consciousness, difierent amounts of badness are not measurable. All men are equally, because utterly, sinful. But this extreme of evil is therefore the more easy to subdue. It is not a reality against a mere ideal, but a mere fact which is contrary to the whole reality, an unutterable contradiction. Other incentives to good also come in. For the religious consciousness evil is an offence against what we love, and what loves us, not against something not real, which no one can well love. This makes evil worse, and more painful, and increases accordingly the power of good. All external control disappears, and in its place is gratitude to that which has conquered, confi- dence in it, and inability to be false to it* It is the same objective will, which in * My Station ' we see accomplished, in ideal morality know should be accomplished, and in religion by faith believe accomplished, which reflects itself into itself on the subjective side ; and thence reasserts itself explicitly as the real identity of the human and divine will And ' We had this, too, in * My Station and its Duties.' Let me remark that, if humanity is a collection, active gratitude to it is impossible, without the most childish self-delusion. Unless there is^a real identity in men, the * Inasmuch as ye did it to the least of th^e * tecomes an absurdity. And I have never heard of anyone who, owing a debt to one man, thought he could pay it by giving to another man who was like the first, no matter how like. 300 Ethical Studies. Instead of trying to give direct answers, the best way to clear the matter will be to begin with the extreme of a one-sided view : and, first, there is an opinion which may be said simply to identify religion mth orthodoxy, with the holding for true what is true. No doubt right doctrine is a very important matter, but does that make it religion ? Put it to the religious consciousness, and the answer is. No. It is the belief * with the heart ' that is wanted ; and where that is not, religion is not. Else even the very devils would be religious ; for they, as we are told, go further even than is required of them, and add to orthodoxy the fear of God. So, in morality, a man must know what is right ; but no one is moral simply because he has that knowledge. In both cases you can not do, without knowing what you are to do ; but mere know- ing, ai)art from doing, is neither religion nor morality. The next modification of this one-sided opinion is the view, which is all too popular, and says, * No doubt it is true that to know is not enough ; action ought to follow ; but, for all that, it is religion when I say my prayers, or meditate, or go to church, and that whether it goes any further, and whether anything comes of it, or not' By denying such a doctrine we ought not to give offence to Christians. Whether we shall give offence or not is another matter. We are sorry if it is so ; but nevertheless we deny the assertion, and we think that on our side we have the religious consciousness * and the New Testament. There we do not have the love of God and man put side by side, as things which exist or can exist apart, but, where the latter fails, there fails also the former, and with it, I suppose, religion. There we are told that * pure religion ' means duty to the afflicted, and the * world,' by which we are not to be spotted, is hardly all spheres outside our devotions, not every region where the authority of the clergyman ceases. We maintain that neither church-going, meditation, nor prayer, except so far as it reacts on practice and subserves that, is religious at all. Esthetic or speculative contemplation it may be ; it may be a production of the feeling which results from the satisfied religious v/ill ; but religious it is not, except so far as it means will I I am happy to say lh*it * reiigieux ' has no English equivalent. 302 Ethical Studies. opinions, or in orthodoxy. But as we have seen, the presence of the religious object for the theoretical consciousmess, in any fonn, is not religion. (2) The second mistake is more common. In morality what we know we feel or see; and can not doubt There is nothing to believe against appearances. We have a daim and the con- sciousness that this is satisfied or unsatisfied, but nothing beyond oiurselves to hold for true ; except so far as ia the social object it is before our eyes. But in rehgion, despite of appearances, we have to believe that something is real. We must have an inward assurance that the reality is above the facts ; and we must carry that out against facts in which we can not see the inward reality, and seem to see what is contrary diereto. It is by faith in our recon- cilement with the invisible one reality that we are justified. That inward assurance, the self-consciousness that we are one with the divine, and one with others because one with the divine, natiurally does not exist wi'^hout expressing itself. And moreover it is right that it should express itself; because that exf^ession reacts most powerfully upon the self-consciousness, to intensify it, and so strengthen the conviction and will in which faith consists. It is right that the certainty of identity with the divine, and with others in the divine, should be brought home by the foretasted pleasure of unalloyed union ; and that in short is the rationale of the cultus. The cultus is a means to the strengthening of faith, and is an end in itself by subserving that end. As anything more and beyond it is not an end ; it may be harmless, and again it may be the destruction of true religion. And the religious community entails signs of communion ; and these, as the cultus generally, entail ministers; and it is generally found more convenient to have certain persons set apart, just as again the state generally finds it convenient to support and regulate one or more religious communities.' These ministers, ^ Religious communities may be called ' churches ; ' but churches in this sense must not be confounded with the Church proper. That is the whole body of Christ, and whether it is limited cm- not depends on the answer to the question whether the spirit of Christ is limited ; whether it is visible or not, is answered with that answer ; as also the questions whether it can be divided, re-united, and so forth. A true view of the Church is of the last importance. From 304 Ethical Studies. excess of them, against which we have to protest. Whatever is the expression of the religious spirit, which carries itself out in the world, is religious and good, unless it goes to excess : and the excess is measured by the failure to strengthen or the weakening of the will. Just so any institution, observance, or discipline (it matters not what) which strengthens the religious will, is good, provided it does so strengthen it as a whole, and is not in other ways contrary to religion and morality. The same holds good in the moral sphere ; there we may have ascetic exercises which strengthen the will, and are therefore, and so far as they do that, good ; but not good, or even bad, when they go beyond. But as to what in detail is legitimate or not, all this is matter of particular fact, with which we have nothing to do. To repeat, public and private exercises are religious and good as the simple voice of, or as means to the strengthening of, the religious will. That will consists in the faith that overcomes the world, by turning it into the Christian world which for faith it is. The inner sphere of religion, which brings home to itself its assurance and its bliss, is only the inner sphere, and by itself is not religion. By itself it is not even the fnner, for it is so only when it is the inner of the outer ; and that outer, where faith fails, is not, and with it goes the inner as such. A sensuous or semi- sensuous gloating over the pleasures of the anticipated result is, in morals as in religion, when considered in reference to the will, a mere debauchery.. Here as there it is the Hedonism which kills practice; and considered as tf •«/»/«, it belongs to art or science, not religion at all. Furthermore sensitiveness or intensity of the religious consciousness is no more rehgion than that of the moral consciousness is morality ; nor again is a right perception in these matters any more than a right perception. It is religion only when the divine will, of which for faith the world is the realization, reflects itself in us ; and, with the personal energy of our ownVand its Self-consciousness, cairies out both its and our will into the world, which is its own and ours, and gives us, in the feeling which results from function, that inner assurance of identity which pre cedes and accompanies the action of our wDl. And thus for religion and morality the content of the will is the same, though the knowledge and the spirit are widely different Conchiding Remarks. 305 If this is so, then our Essays have, in a way too imperfect, yet brought us to the end, where morality is removed and survives in its fulfilment. In our journey we have not seen much, and much that we have seen was perhaps little worth the effort, or might have been had without it Be that as it may, the hunt after pleasure in any shape has proved itselt a delusion, and the form of duty a snare^ and the finite realization of * my station ' was truth indeed, and a happiness that called to us to stay, but was too narrow to satisfy wholly the spirit*s hunger ; and ideal morality brought the sickening sense of inevitable failure. Here where we are landed at last, the process is at an end, though the best activity here first begins. Here our morality is consummated in oneness with God, and everywhere we find that * imniortal Love,* which builds itself for ever on contradiction, but in which the contradic- tion is eternally resolved. Hie nullus labor est, ruborque nuUus ; Hoc juvit, juvat, et diu juvabit ; Hoc non deficit, incipitque semper. Note, — While these last sheets were going through the press- Mr. Harrison's article {Cont. Rev.y May 1876) appeared, and touches so nearly on much that I have said, that it seems advisable to make some remarks upon it, taking it as it stands, and without any reference to Comte's own views^ with which I am not acquainted. What I have to remark first is, that with the leading idea of Mr. Harrison's creed, a man may be familiar, and substantially, perhaps, in agreement, without having come into contact, direct or indirect, with Positivism. Whoever may claim to have originated it, it was distinctly set forth forty years ago by Strauss, m intimate connection with the speculative metaphysic of the first quarter o{ the century. (See an interesting article in the same number of the C, R,) It took its place in German literature as a metaphysical interpretation of the central doctrine of Christianity. Mr. Harrison appears to believe that in his case the element of metaphysic at least is absent. And here, I think, he makes a great mistake. For what is implied in his credo? He seems to hold that humanity is the evolution of an organic whole, while at the same time he asserts that it is 'a collective unity,' and that its evolution is *a collective evolution.* Here we are at once in the X 3o6 Ethical Studies, midst of metaphysJc ; and, so far as I understand the matter, of bad meta- physic To me the evolution of a collection m^ans the evolutions of the units of that collection, and it means no more. To Mr. Harrison it seems to mean a great deal more. He seems to believe that in his collection there is a real identity, which under changes of component parts is permanent and the same; an identity, further, not of mere material particles or of force in general, but a human identity. If this is his belief, what is the basis of it ? What is the ground for his assertion that in past, present (and future ?) human beings there is a real self«>sameness ? I find no hint of any ground in the article ; and while no one, who knows what metaphysic is, can doubt that in the above assertion we have metaphysic, it is hard to stifle the doubt whether we have not also mere dogmatic metaphysic. But I may be doing the writer a wrong. Perhaps he does not affirm that, under differences, humanity is one and the same real being. Perhaps all that he means is that the summed particular effects of past and present human lives are existing in, and can be recognized by, the individual, f f so, then, unless we aie once more to have a metaphysical doctrine of the identity of cause and effect, this commonplace mechanical vieinr is but a small foundation for Mr. Harrison's superstructure. Collective humanity is at any rate organic ; and that seems to be the reason for the somewhat strange denial of a 'collective force* to the universe as a whole (p. 874). In his definition of an organism the writer seems to me to introduce the ideas of identity and teleology (877). If so, we have once more metaphysical doctrine. If not so, then (vid. Essay V. p. 173) the evolution of humanity is a phrase which has no meaning. In the one case what becomes of the writer's position against the metaphysicians? In the other, what becomes of his religion and his rhetoric ? But, passing by this, what reason is put forward for the belief that humanity is an organism ? Mr. Harrison starts from the social organism — a conception, by the way, not wholly unknown to the metaphysic of the beginning of this century. Let that be as it may, how are we to go from the organism of the state to the organism of humanity ? Admit the metaphysical assertion, that civilization is ' the activity of a being just as real us you or I, and far more permanent' (879) — but does history, after all, verify the belief that all or most of the perished millions who have covered this globe have entered into the main stream of civilization ? Does observation of facts no^ show that all or most of the dwellers on this globe are organically connected ? To show mere reciprocal influence is not enough ; for that holds good also of mere physical phenomena. Will observation warrant more than the hope that some day, we know not when, humanity may beconu an organic whole (cf. Trendelenburg, Naiurrechtj 610)? After all this, it may be idle to say anything about religion ; but I must point out that, even if himianity be more than the name of an imaginary collec- tion, even if it really is a self-same being which evolves itself amid change of particles, and in which we are members— even then it can not be the object of Note, 307 modem religion. Our minds and hearts are not bounded to one among the phenomena of this one among the bodies in the universe ; and to attempt to set this finite phenomenon before us as an object of worship is an attempt to turn the history of religion backwards, and to close on us once more those Jewish fetters which Christian civilization, after so many efforts, has burst through. If humanity is adorable, it is so only because it is not merely the last product of terrestrial developement, but because the idea of the identity of God and man is the absolute truth, because (inrte rational mind (wherever it exist) is not merely such, but, in another sense than physical or animal nature, is the self-realization of tlte Spirit in which all moves and lives, and so is: an organic whole in that unity. Such a thesis I do not affirm, and to the enormous difhculties which beset it I am not blind. A scicntitic basis can be given to it, if at all, by a critical metaphysic, whose problems begin where Mr. Harrison's end, and which asks where he dogmatizes. But whether such a science is possible or impos- sible, after all a great religion is still a great religion ; nor is it easy to believe that it will not be so, when another of the sects which have lived and live in its life has gone the way it seems likely to go. THE END. edinouruh: i'kinteo by colston and son.