BENTHAM'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OP MORALS AND LEGISLATION. AN INTRODUCTION TO TBK PRINCIPLES or MORALS AND LEGISLATION. BY JEREMY BENTHAM, ESQ. BBMCHIR OF UNCOUl'i fllll f ABB LATB OF QUBBB's COLLBGBy OXFORD, M.A. IN TWO VOLUMES. A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED BY THE AUTHOR. . ••••• •• • • » » • • • • . • . • • • " » - » , - ' - - - • ' ■ LONDOlf: '*'' '^ PRINTED FOR W. PICKERING, ubcolb's-ibn fiblds; AKD B. WILSON, ROTAL BXCHAN6B. 1828. THE FIRST KDITIOK OF THIS WOR^ WAS PRINTED IN THE YEAR 1780; AND FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1789. • •••: B. Renjilej, Bolt Court, Fleet Stnret. CONTENTS. CHAP. XIII. Cases unmeet far punUhmeKi. § 1. General view ofcasei unmeet for fnmuhtment Page 1 HE end of law is, to augment happiness 1 But puDishment is au evil ib. What concerns the end, and several other topics, relative to pupishment, dismissed to another woric ib. Concise view of the' ends of punishment 2 Therefore ought not to be admitted • ib. 1. Where groundlea 3 2. Inefficacious ib. 3. Unprofitable ib. 4. Or needless ib. § 2» Cases in which punishment is graundiess, 1 . Where there has never been iov^ mischief : as in the case of emaenM ib. 2. Where the mischief was . outioe^M : as in preeaution against Cfdamxt^iy and the exercise of powers 4 3. —or will, for a certainty, be cured by compentatiam ib. Hence the favours shown to the offences of responsible offenders : such as simple mercantile frauds 5 § 3. Cases in which punishment must be inefficacious, 1. Where the penal provision comes too laite: as in l.An ejc-pott-faeto law. — 2, An ultra-legal sentence ib. 2. Or is not made known : as in a law not sufficiently promulgated .... 6 3. Where the wiU cannot be deterred from any act, as in, [a] Infancy ib. [b] Insanity ib. [c] Intoxication • ib. In infancy and intoxication the case can hardly be proved to come under the rule 7 The reason for not punishing in these three cases is com- monly put upon a wrong footing ..,.,. ib. VOL. II. c • • U CONTENTS, Page 4. Or not firom the indimdudl act in question, as ia, , • • 7 [a] UnintentumalUy 8 [b] Uncomeioumest ....••.• ib. [c] Mittupposal • ib. 5. Or is acted on by an opposite superior force : as by, ib. [a] Physical danger 9 [b] Threatened miseh^f : ib. Why the influence of the moral and religums sanctions is not mentioned in the same view I . • ib. 6.— or the bodily organs cannot/ol^to its detemunation : as under physi- cfU compulsion or restrtant ib. § 4. Cases where punishment is unprafitahh. 1. Where, in the sort of case in question, the punishment would pro- duce more evil than the offence would 10 Evil producible by a jMimifcawiit--4ts four branches — ^viz. [a] B^straint ib. \Yi\ AjppnhienAon ••..• «».» .t* ib. [c] SufferaniM ..•••••«•••... • 11 [d] Bsrtoatuw- evils •••• ib. The ewl of the cffencsy being different according to the nature of the offence, cannot be represented here • ib. 2,-— Or, in theindmdual case in question : by reason of 12 [a] The multitude of delinquents ib. ' [b] The value of a deUnquent^s service ib. [c] Tbedispleassi/re ot the people ..\ ib. [d] The disi^easure of >r«igit powers ,• ib. § 5. Cases where punishment is needless, 1. Whert die mischief is to be prevented at a cheaper rate : as by in- * structioif 13 CHAP. XIV. OfAe Proportian between punishments and offences, Redtpitulation • • 14 Four eHilects of punishment ib. 1st Object— 4o prweent aU offences • ib. 2d Object— to prevent the worst • • . . . ib. 3d Object— to keep down the misckirf , 15 ^ 4th Object—to act at the least espense ; ib. CONTENTS. iii Rulef ofpropmiitm between pumalmraCi aad offences i 15 The sames rules applicable to motiom in general ib. Rule l.—Oiib. Rule 13. — For timpHeity't sake, small disproportions may be neglected 27 Proportionality carried veiy far in the present work—- why 28 Auxiliary force of the phytkal, moral, and religwue mnetiont, not here allowed fo^ — why , , w ib. Recapitulation , • 29 The nicety here observed vindicated from the chaige of inutility . . 30 iv CONTENTS. CHAP. XV. Of the Properties to be given to a lot of punishment. Page Pntperties are to be governed by proportion 33 Property 1. VariabUity ib. Property 2. Equability -. * 34 Punishments ^hich are apt to be deficient in this respect 36 Property 3. Commmmrability to other punishments ib. How two lots of punishment may be rendered perfectly commen- surable • 37 Property 4. Characteriglicalnea 38 The mode of punishment the most eminently characteristic^ is that of retaliation 39 Property 5. — Exemplarity • , 40 The most effectual way of rendering, a punishment exemplary is by means of analogy 41 Property 6. Frugality .« ib. Frugality belongs in perfection to pectmiary punishtnient 42 Exemplarity Andfrugality in what they differ and agree ib. Other properties of inferior importance 43 Properly 7. Subserviency to reformation , ib. — applied to qffencet originating in iU'will 44 — ^to offences originating in indolence joined to pecuniary interest .... 45 Property 8. Efficacy with respect to disablement ib. —-is most conspicuous in capital punishment 46 Other punishments in which it is to be found ib. Property 9. Subserviency to compensation 47 Property 10. PoptUarity , ib. Characteristiealness renders a punishment^ \, memorable: 2. exeH^phry: 3. popular 48 Mischiefs resultitt|p from the unpopularity of a punishment — discontent among the people, and weakness in the law 49 This property supposes a prejudice which the legislature ought to cure ib. Property 11. RemissUnUiy 60 To pbiiuti all these properties, punishments must be mixed 53 The foregoing properties recapitulated 54 Connexion of this with the ensuing chapter , , , , 55 CONTENTS. V CHAP. XVI. Division of offences, % 1. Classes oj offences. Page Method pursued in the following division 56 Distinction between what are offences and whatougftt to he ib. No act ought to he an offence but what is detrimental to the community 58 To be so, it must be detrimental to some one or more of its members ib. These may be assignable ornot ib. ^ Persons assignable, how ib. If assignable, the offender himself, or ethers 59 Class 1. Private offences ib. Class 2. Semi-public offences ib. Limits between private, semi-public, and public offences, are, strictly speaking, undistinguishable 60 Class 3. Self-regarding offences 61 Class 4. Public offences ib. Class 5. MuUiform offences, viz. 1. Offences by falsehood. 2. Offences against trust ib. The imperfections of language an obstacle to arrangement ib. Irregularity of this class 63 — which could not be avoided on any other plan ib. § 2. Divisions and sub^divisions. Divisions of Class 1. 1. Offences against person, 2 — Property. '3 — ^Reputation. 4 — Condition. 5— Person and reputation. 6 — Person and property « 53 In what manner pleasure and pain depend upon the relation a man bears to exterior objects 54 Divisions of Class 2. 1. Offences through calamity 58 Sub<4livisions of offences through calamity, dismissed 70 2. Offences of mere delinquency, how they correspond with the divi- sions of private offenceyB ^ ib. Divisions of Class 3. coincide with those of Class 1. 71 Divisions of Class 4 72 •Exhaustive method departed from ib. Connexion of the nine first dimdons one with another •.....• 73 Connexion of offences against religion with the foregoing ones .... 83 Connexion of offences against the natumal interest in general with the rest M 85 VI COVTBNTS. Page Sub'divisions of dcus 5. enumerated 85 1. Divisions of offences by falsehood 86 Offences by falsehood, in what they agree with one another 87 — in what they differ ib. Sub*divisum8 oi offences by falsehood are determined by the divisions oi the preceding classes • . • • 88 Offences of this class, in some instances, change their names ; in others, not « 89 Airusi, what 90 Power and right, why no complete definition is here given pf them ...... ^ .. , ib. Offences against irusi, condiHoth and properly, why ranked under separate divisions 95 Offences against trust — t^eir connexion with eaeh other 100 Prodigality in trustees dismissed to Class 3. . .- 120 The suh'divisions of offences against trust are also determined by the divisions of the preceding classes 121 Connexion between offences by falsehood and offences against trust ib. » Genera ofcktss 1. Analyils into genera pursue^ no further than Class 1 122 Offences against an individual may be simple in their effects or complex • 123' Offences against person-^their genera ib. Offences against reputation 127 Offences Vi^n&i property 130 Payment, wliat • , 132 Offences against /^er^on and reputation , 140 Offences against jverMa and property •...•> 142 Offences against C0mSfton.---Conditions domestic or civU 144 Domestic conditions grounded on natural relationships 145 Rdations-''^o resist from eyery two objects 146 Domestic relations whidi are purely rf legal institution 149 Offences touching the eon(&tion of a master • 154 Various modes of servitude 157 Offences touching the condition of a servant 158 Gwtrdkmsbip, what-^Necessity of the institution . . «. « . . 162 DuraUenXDh^ given to it , 166 Powers that may, and diuUes that ought to be, annexed to it .... 167 OffonoetXiouikoxkgibitcondiiumcXvL guardian 169 Offences touching the condition of a ward 172 \ • • CONTENTS. VU Page Oflfences touching the conditioii of a parent • 175 Offences toudiing the filial condition 178 Condition of a husband. — Povoers, duties, and rights, that may be an« nexed to it 182 Offences touching the condition of a husband 1B4 OffSences touching the condition of a wife 189 Civil conditions . . . , 195 § 4. Advantages of the present method. Geueral idea of the method here pursued 212 Its advantages 216 •^1 . It is conveoient for the apprehension and the memory ib. — 2. It gives room for general propositions 217 — 3. It points out the reason of the law 219 ~4. It is alike applicable to the laws of all nations 220 § 5. Characters of the classes. Characters of the classes, how deducible from the above method . . 221 Characters of class 1. ib. Characters of class 2 224 Characters of cio«s 3 226 Characters o! class 4 228 Characters of class 5 230 CHAP. XVIL Of the Limits of the penal branch of jurisprudence. § 1. Limits between private ethics and the art of legislation. Use of this chapter 232 Ethics in general, what * 234 Private ethics ib. The art of government : that is, of legislation and admimstratim ib. loterests of the irferior animals improperly neglected in legislation ••••• • 235 Art of education • •.• •••• 236 £thics exhibit the rules of, I. Pntdmce, 2. ProbUy. 3. Bm^fieenes 237 Probity and beneficence how they connect with prudence 238 Every act which is a proper object of ethics is not of legislation • . 239 The Umits between the provinces of privaU^ethiet and kgiAUum, marked out by the cases unmeet for punishment • • • 240 VUl CONTENTS. 1. Neither ought to apply where punishment is gtvundleu 241 2. How far private ethics can apply in the cases where punishment would he inefficacious ib. How far, where it would be unprofitable 243 'Which it may be, 1. Although confined to the guilty 244 2. By enveloping the innocent 247 Legislation how far necessary for the enforcement of the dictates o{ prudence 248 •—Apt to go too far in this respect 251 — Particularly in matters of religion ib. — How far necessary for the enforcement of the dictates of prdnty 253 — of the dictates of beneficence 254 Difference between private ethics and the art of legislation re- capitulated 255 § 2. JunspnufencCj its branches. Jurisprudence, expository— -censorial 256 Expository jurisprudence, authoritative — unauthoritative 257 Sources of the distinctions yet remaining ib. Jurisprudence, local — universal 258 '^intemel and international .".... 260 Internal jurisprudence, national and provincial, local or particular . . 262 Jurisprudence, ancient — living 263 Jurisprudence, statutory — customary rr 265 Jurisprudence, civil — penal — criminal .' ib. Question, concerning the distinction between the civil branch and the penal, stated ib. I. Occasion and purpose of this concluding note • , • 266 II. By a law here is not meant a statute 267 > III. Every law is either a commandf or a revoccOion of one .... ib. IV. A declaratory law is not, properly speaking, a law ib. V. Every coercive law creates an offence 268 VI. A law creating an offence, and one appointing punishment are distinct laws ^ ib. VII. A discoercive law can baiie r^ punitory one appertaining to it but through the intervention of a coercive one ib. Ylft. But a punitory law involves the sknply imperative one it belongs to 269 IX. The simply imperative one might therefore be spared, but for its expoKtory matter ib. X. Nature of such expository matter ib. CONTENTS. IX Page Xf. The yasineis of its comparative bulk is Dot peculiar to leg^lative commands 270 XIJ. The same mass of expository matter may senre in com- mon for many laws ib« XIII. The imperaHv§ character essential to law, is apt to be cm- cealed in and by opoRtory matter 271 XIV. The concealment is fiayoured by the multitude of mdirut forms in which imperative matter is capable of beings couched ib. XV. Number and natun of the laws in a eod§, how determined . . 272 XVI. General idea of the Unuts between a civil and a ptnml cod$ ib. XVII. Contents of A civU code 273 XVIII. Contents of a penal code » ib. XIX. In the Code Frederic the imperative character is almost lost in the expository matter ib. XX. So in the Roman law ^4 XXI. In the ifarbarian codes it stands conspicuous ib. XXII. ConnUtutional code, its connexion with the two others .... ib. XXIII. Thus the matter of one law may be divided amon^ ail three coda 275, XXIV. Expository matter a great quantity of it exists everywtot, in no other form than that of common ov Judiciary law • • ib. XXV. Hence the deplorable state of the science of legislation, considered in respect of its form 276 XXVI. Occasions affording an exemplification of the difficulty as well as importance of this branch of science ; — attempts to Umt the powers of supreme representative legislatures . . ib. XXVII. Example : American declarations cf rights. 277 VOL. II. *. \ \ V ( I I I AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION. ■ J \ CHAP. XIII. I § I. OBNBRAL VIEW OF CASES UNMEET POR PUNISHMENT. The general object which all laws have, orTi^endot ought to have, m common, is to augment theangnwiit total happmess of the community ; and therefore,^ in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be^ every thing that tends to subtract from that hap- pmess : in other words, to exclude mischief. * II. But all punishment is mischief : all punishment Bat punish- m itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if cni. it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude 8ome greater evil ♦. * What follows, relative to the sabject of punishment what coo- ought regularly to be preceded by a distinct chapter on the ^JJ^^gp. ends of punishment. But having little to say on that par- ven&l other ticular branch of the subject, which has not been said before, tivVto pu-' it seemed better, in a work, which will at any rate be but nj^hmeut, ^ *' djsmissed to too voluminous, to omit this title, reserving it for another, another hereafter to be published, intituled The Theorrj of Punish-^ ^**'^* VOL. II. B CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. XIII. "*' T^^I^foi^ It is plain^ therefore, that in the following bl^idn!itted° ^^^^ punishment ought not to be inflicted. ment *. To the same work I must refer the analysis of the several possible modes of punishment, a particular and mi- nute examination of the nature of each, and of its advantages and disadvantages, and various other disquisitions, which did not seem absolutely necessary to be inserted here. A very few words, however, concerning the ends of punishment, can scarcely be dispensed with. Concise j*]^q immediate principal end of punishment is to controul view ot the '- ^ * ends of pa- action. This action is either that of the offender, or of nis ment. q^j^^^s : that of the offender it controuls by its influence, either on his will, in which case it is said to operate in the way oi reformation } or on his physical power, in which case it is said to operate by disablement : that of others it can in- fluence no otherwise than by its influence over their wills ; in which case it is said to operate in the way of example, A kind of collateral end, which it has a natural tendency to answer, is that of affording a pleasure or satisfaction to th.^ party injured, where there is one, and, in general, to parties whose ill-will, whether on a self-regarding account, or on th^ account of sympathy or antipathy, has been excited by th0 offence. This purpose, as far as it can be answered gratis-^ is a beneficial one. But no punishment ought to be aUottetl- merely to this purpose, because (setting aside its effects ia the way of controul) no such pleasure is ever produced by punishment as can be equivalent to the pain. The punish- * This u the work which, from the Aatbor's papers, has since been pub* , lished by Mr. Dumont in French, in company with The Theory of Reward added to it, for the purpose of mutual illustration. It is in contemplation to publish them both in English, from the Author's manuscripts, with the benefit of any amendments that have been made by Mr. Dnn^put. CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. 1. Where it is groundless ; where there is no Chaf. mischief for it to prevent ; the act not heing mis- >jjv — ' idueyous upon the whole. groandieii. 2. Where it must be inefficacious: where itJ-incffic*- cannot act so as to prevent the mischief. 3- Where it is unprqfUabkt ^r too earpensvoe ; *• Unpro- where the mischief it would produce would be greater than what it prevented. 4. Where it is needless : where the mischief may 4. Or need- be prevented, or cease of itself, without it : that b, at a cheaper rate. §. 2. Cases in which punishment is groundless. These are, IV. 1. Where there has never been any mischief: i. where where no mischief has been produced to any body ^^ b^ bj the act in question. Of this number are those ^^^^^ in in which the act was such as might, on some ^^^ ^^ ment, however, which is allotted to the other purpose, ought, 18 ffur as it can be done without expence, to be accommo- dated to this. Satisfaction thus administered to a party in- jured, in the shape of a dissocial pleasure *, may be stiled a Tindictive satisfaction or compensation : as a compensation, adttinidteted in the shape of a self-regarding profit* or stock of pleasure, may be stiled a lucrative one. See B. I. tit. vi. [Compensation.] Example is the most important end of all, in proportion as the number of the persons under temptation to offend is to one, i I I ■ • See ch. x. [Mothres.] 4 CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. Chap, occosions, be mischievous or disagreeable, but the ' — v-^ person whose interest it concerns gave his consent to the performance of it *. This consent, pro- vided it be free, and fairly obtained *, is the best proof that can be produced, that, to the person who gives it, no mischief, at least no immediate mischief, upon the whole, is done. For no man can be so good a judge as the man himself, what it is gives him pleasure or displeasure. v. ft. Where 2. Where the mischief was outweighed : al- WM oi^ * though a mischief was produced by that act, yet iTpreLu-" th® same act was necessary to the production of a ^amC* ^^^^fi* which was of greater value f than the exerchie of Miischicf. This may be the case with any thing powers. j^^^ jg ^Qjjg jjj j^Q y^Q^ Qf precaution against instant calamity, a$ also with any thing that is done in the exercise of the several sorts of poweriJ necessary to be established in every community, to wit, domestic, judicial, military, and supreme J. VI. 3. -K)rwiii, 3. Where there is a certainty of an adequate taintybe Compensation: and that in all cases where the coniperiMi- oflfeuce cau be committed. This supposes two ^°°' things : 1 • That the offence is such as admits of an adequate ^compensation : 2. That such a compensation is sure to be forthcoming. Of * See B. I. tit. [Justifications.] f See supra, ch. iv. [Value.] I See Book L tit. [Justifications.] CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT . ^ these suppositions^ the latter will he found to he a Chaf. merely ideal one : a supposition that cannot^ in ^ — v — ' the universality here given to it, he verified hy fact. It cannot, therefore, in practice, he num- hered amongst the grounds of ahsolute impunity. It may, however, he admitted as a ground for an ahatement of that punishment, which other considerations, standing hy themselves, would seem to dictate*. § 3. Cases in which punishment must be inefficacious* These are, VII. 1 . Where the penal provision is not established i. Where until after the act is done. Such are the cases, proviaoo 1 . Of an ex'post-facto law ; where the legislator Se fas in, himself appoints not a punishment till after the pott-fa^ act is done. 2. Of a sentence heyond the law ; dui-ie^° where the judge, of his own authority, appoints a "^^^^^ * This, for example, seems fo have been one ground, at Hence the least, of the favour shewn by perhaps all systems of laws, to '*^o"«" such offenders as stand upon a footing of responsibility: the offences shenhi, not directly indeed to the persons themselves ; but to bij^fend-" such offences as none but responsible persons are likely to e^s • ^^^^ « have the opportunity of engaging in. In particular, this cantile seems to be the reason why embezzlement, in certain cases, "^"^'* has not commonly been punished upon the footing of theft: nor mercantile frauds upon that of common sharping f. t See tit* [Simple mere. DefcaudmeutJ ^ CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. Chap, punishment which the legislator had not sp-^ ^—v — ' pointed. VIII. «. Oris 2. Where the penal provision, though est»- not nsde known: as bUshcd, is not conocyed to the notice of the persoB sufficiently ou whom it sccms intended that it should operate. gated. Such is the case where the law has omitted to employ any of the expedients which are necessary, to make sure that every person whatsoever, who is within the reach of the law, be apprized of all the cases whatsoever, in which (being in the station of life he is in) he can be subjected to the penalties of the law ♦. IX. 3. Where 3. Where the penal provision, though it were the will can- , ^ not be de^ convevcd to a man's notice, could produce no g/- terred from • • t • any acts as yfe(*^ ou him. With rcspect to the preventing him from engaging in any act of the sort in ques* [a] Infancy, tion. Such is the casc, 1. In extxeme infancy ; where a man has not yet attained that state or disposition of mind in which the prospect of evils so distant as those which are held forth by the [b]insanitj. law, has the effect of influencing his conduct. 2. In insanity ; where the person, if he has attained to that disposition, has since been deprived of it through the influence of some permanent though [c]intoxi- unseen cause. 3. In intoxication ; where he has been deprived of it by the transient influence of a I * See B. II. Appendix, tit. iii. [Promulgation.] CAS£S UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. 7 visible cause : such as the use of wine, or opium, ^"j J'- . or othar drugs, that act in this manner on the ner- ^ — v — ' vous system : which condition is indeed neither , more nor less than a temporary insanity produced by an assignable cause*. X. 4. Where the penal provision (although, being 4 or not conveyed to the party's notice, it might very well dividual act prey^ot his engaging in acts of the sort in ques- as in, . * Notwithstanding what is here said, the cases of infancy lu infancy and intoxication (as we shall see hereafter) cannot be looked ^^qq ^\^Q' upon in practice as affording sufficient grounds for absolute ^,f"?^ impunity. But this exception in point of practice is no ob- proved to jection to the propriety of the rule in point of theory. The J^eniye " ground of the exception is neither more nor less than the difficulty there is of ascertaining the matter of fact : ^iz. whetl^er at the requisite point of tii^ae the party was actually in the state in question ; that is^ whether a given case comes really under the rule. Suppose the matter of fact capable of being perfectly ascertained, without danger or mistake, the impropriety 6f punishment would be as indubitable in these cases as in any other f. ilie reason that is commonly assigned for the establishing The reason an exemption from punishment in favour of infants, insane u^jj'^q^"" persons, and persons under intoxication, is either false in these three , , cases IS com* fact, or confusedly expressed. The phrase is, that the will mooiy put of these persons concurs not with the act ; that they have ^ron/foot- no vicious will ; or, that they have not the free use of their iog* will. But suppose all this to be true? What is it to the purpose ? Nothing : except in as far as it implies the reasoi^ given in the text. t See B. I. tit. it. [Exemptions] and tit. vii. [Extenuations.] ® CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. tion^ provided he knew that it related to those acts) could not have this effect, with regard to. the individual act he is about to engage in : to wit^ because he knows not that it is of the number of those to which the penal provision relates. This t5]Up*«°- may happen, 1. In the case of unintentionality ; where he intends not to engage, and thereby knows not that he is about to engage, in the act in which eventually he is about to engage*. [b] Uncon- g. In the case of unconsciousness ; where, although scioiuiiess. 11- • 1 he may know that he is about to engage m the ad itself, yet, from not knowing all the material cir- cumstances attending it, he knows not of the tendency it has to produce that mischief, in con- templation of which it has been made penal in [c]Mis- most instances. 3. In the case oi mis-supposal ; '"''^ where, although he may know of the tendency the act has to produce that degree of mischief, he supposes it, though mistakenly, to be attended with some circumstance, or set of circumstances, which, if it had been attended with, it would either not have been productive of that mischief, or have been productive of such a greater degree of good, as has determined the legislator in such a case not to make it penal f. XI. 5. Or is act- 5. Where, though the penal clause might ex- opposite 8u. ercise a full and prevailing influence, were it to perior force*' Mby, ___ _ — .^ * See ch. viii. [Intentionality.] f See ch. ix. [Consciousness.] CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. act alone^ yet by the predominant influence of some opposite cause upon the will, it must necessarily be ineffectual; because the evil which he sets himself about to undergo^ in the case of his not engaging in the act^ is so greats that the evil denounced by the penal clause^ in case of his engagmg in it, cannot appear greater. This may happen, 1 . In the case of physical danger ; where W Phy wad the evil is such as appears likely to be brought about by the unassisted powers of nature. 2. In [b] Threat. the case of a threatened mischief ; where it is such chief. as appears likely to be brought about through the intentional and conscious agency oi man*. XII. 6. Where (though the penal clause may exert a 6. -^ the full and prevailing influence over the a;/// of the gans caimoc party) yet his physical faculties (owing to the pre- tenninatioo: as under * The influences of the moral and religious sanctions, or, in Why the other words, of the motives of love of reputation and religion, "bc'raoral*^ are other causes, the force of which may, upon particular oc- ^^ i^l'gi- casions, come to be greater than that of any punishment tions is not which the legislator is able, or at least which he will think ™«'J*^«^ proper, to apply. These, therefore, it will be proper for him view, to have his eye upon. But the force of these influences is variable and different in different times and places : the force of the foregoing influences is constant and the same, at all times and every where. These, therefore, it can never be proper to look upon as safe grounds for establishing absolute impunity : owing (as in the above-mentioned cases of infancy and intoxication) to the impracticability of ascertaining the matter of fact. ^^ CASES UNMBET FOR PUNISHBIENT. Chap, dominant influence of some physical cause) are not ^ — V — * in a condition to follow the detennination of the will : insomuch that the act is absolutely irwolufh Physical toiy. Such is the case of physical compulsion or or restraint, rcstromt, by whatavcr means brought about ; where the man's hand^ for instance^ is pushed against some object which his will disposes him not to touch ; or tied down from touching some object which his. will disposes him to touch. § 4. Cases where punishment is unprofitable. These are, XIII. t. Where, 1 . Where, on the one hand, the nature of the of caL^i^ offence, on the other hand, that #f the punishment, ?he pu^- ^re, in the ordinary state of things, such, that when J«IdoM°^^ compared together, the evil of the latter will turn th^thf ^^* ^ ^ greater than that of the former. offence ytv would. AlV. ^ Evflprodu- Kow the cvil of the punishment divides itself pmAihmwit i^o four branches, by which so many different b^Ae'i^L sets of persons are affected. 1 . The evil of coer- siraMt. ^^ ^^^ ^' restraint : or the pain which it gives a man not to be able to do the act, whatever it be, which by the apprehension of the punishment he is deterred from doing. This is felt by those by [b] Appre- whom the law is observed. 2. The evil of appre- hension: or the pain which a man, who has exposed himself to punishment, feels at the thoughts of undergoing it. This is felt by those by who;n CA8BS UNMBET FOR PUNISHMENT. > 11 the law ha$ been broken, and who feel themselves Chap. m danger of its being executed upon them. 3. The .YT^"^ evil of sufferance* i or the pain which a man f^eis, •°ce. in virtue of the punishment it^elf^ from the time when be begins to undergo it. This is felt by those bj whom the law is broken^ and upon whom it comes actually to be executed. 4. The pain of M Dmr*- sympathy^ and the other der^ivatwe evils resulting to the persons who are in connectian with the several classes of original sufferers just men- tioned f. Now of these four lots of evil, the first will be greater or less, according to the nature of the act from which the party is restrained : the seeond and third according to the nature of the punishment which stands annexed to that offence. XV. On the other hand, as to the evil of the 43&nce, (The evU o« this will also, of course, be greater or less, accoidr beLg dif- ing to the nature of each offence. The propwtion ^^i^ between the one ^vil and the other will therefore JJ^thc oT be different in the case of each particular offence. ^'^'J^ The cases, therefore, where punishment is unpro- P^;ted Stable on this ground, can by no other means be discovered, than by an examination of each parti- cular offence ; which is what will be the business of the body of the work. * See cb. v. [Pleasures and Pains.] t See ch. xii. [Consequences] iv. *^ CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT- XVI. f— orin ^' Where, although in the ordinary state of iJlL/"^'*^* things, the evil resulting from the punishment is question : by not OTeater than the benefit which is likely to reason of " ^ result from the force with which it operates, during the same space of time, towards the ex- cluding the evil of the offence, yet it may have been rendered so by the influence of some occor siondl circumstances. In the number of these [a] Ti.e circumstances may be, ] • The multitude of delin- delinquents, qucuts at a particular juncture ; being such as would increase, beyond the ordinary measure, the quantum of the second and third lots, and thereby also of a part of the fourth lot, in the evil of the [b] The punishment. 2. The extraordinary value of the deiinquem'ft scrviccs of somc ouc delinquent', in the case where the effect of the punishment would be to deprive the community of the benefit of those services. [c] The dis- 3. The displcaisure of the people ; that is, of an pleasure of ^ ^ ^ r r ^ the people, indefinite number of the members of the same community, in cases where (owing to the influence of some occasional incident) they happen to con- ceive, that the offence or the offender ought not to be punished at all, or at least ought not to be [d] The dis- punished in the way in question. 4. The dis- forri^ ° pleasure of foreign powers ; that is, of the govern- powers. .^^ body, or a considerable number of the members of some foreign community or communities, with which the community in question, is connected. CASES UNMEET FOR PUNISHMENT. 1^ § 5. Cases zvhere punishment is needless. These are, XVIL 1 . Where the purpose of puttinff an end to the i. Where . thcmiichicl practice may be attained as effectually at a is to be pro- cheaper rate : by instruction, for instance, as well cheaper as by terror : by informing the understanding, as well as by exercising an- immediate influence on the will. This seems to be the case with By imtmo. tion. respect to all those offences which consist in the dissemmating pernicious principles in matters of duty; of whatever kind the duty be; whether political, or moral, or religious. And this, whether such principles be disseminated under, or even without, a sincere persuasion of their being bene- ficial. I say, even without : for though in such a case it is not instruction that can prevent the writer from endeavouring to inculcate his prin- ciples, yet it may the readers from adopting them : without which, his endeavouring to incul- cate them will do no harm. In such a case, the sovereign will commonly have little need to take an active part : if it be the interest of one indivi- dual to inculcate principles that are pernicious, it will as surely be the interest of other individuals to expose them. Buf if the sovereign must needs take a part in the controversy, the pen is the pro- per weapon to combat error with, not the sword. [ 14 ] CHAP. XIV. OF THE PROPORTION BETWEEN FUNIS! IMSNTS ANI> OFFENCES. I. Recaphui*. We have seen that the general object of all laws is to prevent mischief ; that is to say, when it is worth while ; but that, where there are no other means of doing this than punishment, there are four cases in which it is not worth while. II. Four objects When it is worth while, there are four subor- of punish- ment. diuatc dcsigus or objects, which, in the course of his endeavours to compass, as far as may be, that one general object, a legislator, whose views are governed by the principle of utility, comes natu- rally to propose to himself. III. tst Object 1. His first, most extensive, and most eligible —to prevent all ofl^ces. object, is to prcvcut, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever * : in other wordsy so to manage, that no offence whatsoever may be committed. TV. nd Object— 2. But if a man must ne6ds commit an offence to prevent ^ the worst, ot some kind or other, the next object is to induce • ••••'••■• • * By 0 fences I meaiiy at present, acts which appear to him to have a tendency to produce mischief. PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES. IS bim to commit an offence less mischievoHs^ rather than one more mischieyous: in other words^ to choose always the least mischievous^ of two of- fences that will either of them suit his purpose. V. 3. When a man has resolved upon a particular sd object offence^ the next object is to dispose him to do no down the more nnschief than is necessary to his purpose : m other words, to do as little mischief as is con- sistent with the benefit he has in view. VI. 4. The last object is, whatever the mischief be, *^ ^i«* which it is proposed to prevent, to prevent it at ^ ^^^ as cheap a rate as possible. VII. Subservient to these four objects, or purposes. Roles of must be the rules or canons by which the pro-C^^^^ portion of pumshments* to offences is to be aodofl^ncei. governed. VIII. 1. The first object, it has been seen, is to pr^2c*''^^ot ___^-««,.»___ *^ oflfence. * [Punisbments.] The same rules (it is to be obsenred) The same may be applied, with little variation, to rewards as well as ^| *^I^ punishment: in short, to motives in general, which, accord- tives in ing as they are of the pleasurable or painful kind, are of the nature of reward or punishment : and, according as the act they are applied to produce is of the positive or nega- tive kind, are stiled impelling or restraining. See ch. x. [Motives] xliii. l^ OF THE PROPORTION BETWEEN Chip. yeht. in as far as it is worth while, all sorts of XIV. nr. 1 /. offences ; therefore, Tfie value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit* of the offence^. If it be, the offence (unless some other consi- derations, independent of the punishment, should intervene and operate efficaciously in the cha- Profit may • [Profit.] By the profit of an offence, is to be understood, DC Oi BOV Other kind, i^ot merely the pecuniary profit, but the pleasure or ad van- as well as taee, of whatever kind it be, which a man reaps, or expects pecuniary. ° ' r ' r to reap, from the gratification of the desire which prompted. him to engage in the offence %. Tmproprietj It is the profit (that is, the expectation of the profit) of the' that the po- offence that constitutes the impeUing motive, or, where there mshment g^jg several, the sum of the impelling motives, by which a OQght Dot to . . . increase man is promted to engage in the offence. It is the punish- temptation. ^^^^9 ^^^^ ^s, tlie expectation of the punishment, that consti- tutes the restraining motive, which, either by itself, or in conjunction with others, is to act upon him in a contrary direction, so as to induce him to abstain from engaging in the offence. Accidental circumstances apart, the strength of the temptation is as the force of the seducing, that is, of the impelling motive or motives. To say then, as authors of great merit and great name have said that the punishment ought not to increase with the strength of the temptation, is as much as to say in mechanics, that the moving force or momentum of the power need not increase in proportion to the momentum of the burthen, t Beccaria, dei diletti, § 6. id. trad. par. Morellet, § 23. t See ch. x. [Motives] § 1. PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES. 17 Chap. racter of tutelary motives ♦) will be sure to be committed notwithstandingf : the whole lot of * See ch. xi. [Dispositions] xxix. t It is a well-k^own adage, though it is to be hoped not a trae one, that every man has his price. It is commonly meant of a man's virtue. This saying, though in a very different sense, was strictly verified by some of the Anglo- saxon laws : by which a fixed price was set, not upon a man's virtue indeed, but upon his life : that of the sovereign him- self among the rest. For 200 shillings you might have killed a peasant : for six times as much, a nobleman : for six-and- thirty times as much you might have killed the king {• A king in those days was worth exactly JflOO shillings. If then the heir to the throne, for example, grew weary of waiting for it, he had a secure and legal way of gratifying Us impatience : he had but to kill the king with one hand, and piiy himself with the other, and all was right. An earl Godwin, or a duke Streon, could have bought the lives of a whole dynasty. It is plain, that if ever a king in those days died in his bed, he must have iiad something else, besides this law, to thank for it. This being the production of a remote and barbarous age, the absurdity of it is presently recognized : but, upon e:(amination, it would be found, that the! freshest laws of the most civilized nations are continally &lling into the same error §. This, in short, is the case wheresoever the punishment is fixed while the profit of de- linquency is indefinite : or, to speak more precisely, where the punishment is limited to such a mark, that the profit of delinquency may reach beyond it. X Wilkin's Leg. Anglo-aax. p. 71, 79. See Hume, Vol. I. A pp. I. p. 219. j See in particolar tbe Engluh StatvXe Uxwt throughout, Bonaparte $ Penal Code, and the recently enacted or not enacted Spomth Penal Code. Note 5y the Author, July, 182f . VOL. II. C XIV. 18 OF THE PROPORTION BETWBBN y" V ' punishment will be thrown away : it will ' — V — ' altogether inefficacious*. IX. The pro- The above rule has been often objected to, priety of , , , taking the account of its Seeming harshness : but th|s <; the tempta- oulv have happened for want of its beinir propa He^ understood. The strength of the temp^ lo ^jSn cateris paribus, is as the profit of the offence : i tot lis roc quantum of the punishment must rise with 1 profit of the offence : ceteris paribus, it mi therefore rise with the strength of the temptatii This there is no disputing. True it is, that.1 stronger the temptation, the less conclusive is i indication which the act of delinquency affords the depravity of the offender's disposition f. far then as the absence of any aggravatiop, aifisi from extraordinary depravity of disposition, m operate, or at the utmost, so far as the preseu of a ground of extenuation, resulting from t innocence or beneficence of the offender's dispo tion, can operate, the strength of the temptati may operate in abatement of the demajld \ punishment. But it can never operate so £eu* to indicate . the propriety of making the punij ment ineffectual, which it is sure to be wh brought below the level of the apparent profit the offence. * See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet] § 1. t See ch. xi. [Dispositions] xlii. PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES. IS^ The partial benevolence which should prevail ^"^' for the reduction of it below this level, would ' — v — ' counteract as well those purposes which such a motive would actually have in view, as those more extensive purposes which benevolence ought to have in view : it would be cruelty not only to the public, but to the very persons in whose behalf it pleads : in its effects, I mean, however opposite in its intention. Cruelty to the public, that is cruelty to the innocent, by suffering them, for waiii; qf an adequate protection, to lie exposed to tlife mischief of the offence : cruelty even to the offender himself, by punishing him to no purpose, and without the chance of compassing that bene- ficial end, by which alone the introduction of the evn of punishment is to be justified. ■ ■ ■ . X. Rule 2. But whether a given offence shall be prevented Rule 2. .•11 • ... /» • 1 Venture m a given degree by a given quantity ot punish- more against ment, is never any thing better than a chance ; ©^^ than For the purchasing of which, whatever punishment * *°**^^ °°^ is employed, is so much expended in advance. However, for the sake of giving it the better chance of outweighing the profit of the offence, ITie greater the mischief of the offence, the greater is the eapencCy which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment* . * For example, if it can ever be worth while to be at the Incendi^ expence of so horrible a punishment as that of burning alive, *".8™ »"^ 20 OF THE PROPORTION BETWEEN XL Rule 3. Rule 3. The next object is, to induce a man to choose Cause the , , least of two always the least nuschievous of two oflfences; offences to , ^ • be pre- therefore Where two offences come in competition^ the pumslh ment for the greater offence must be sufficient <9 induce a man to prefer the less*. XII. Rale 4. Punish for chief. Rule 4. When a man has resolved upon a particnlar ,] each particle offcuce, the uext objcct is, to induce him to do no more mischief than what is necessary for his piu^, pose : therefore The punishment should be adjusted in such manmr.\ to each particular offence y that for eoery part ofthk mischief there may be a motive to restrain the of' fender from giving birth to eVf . it will be more so in the view of preventing such a crfane ai that of murder or incendiarism, than in the view of pre?eiit- ing the uttering of a piece of bad money. See B. I. tit [Defraudment touching the Coin] and [Incendiarism.] * £spr. des Loix, L. vi. c. 16. Example.— f I^ ^^y one have any doubt of this, let him conceive tlie. ^^1^^ offence to be divided into as many separate offences as theie are distinguishable parcels of mischief that result from it Let it consist, for example, in a man's giving you ten blows, or stealing from you ten shillings. If then, for giving joa ten blows, he is punished no more than for giving you five^ the giving you five of these ten blows is an offence for whidi In blows given money stolen. PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES. ^1 XIII. Rule 5. The last object is, whatever mischief is guarded ^?*« ?- against, to guard against it at as cheap a rate as ~^^ possible : therefore ciai reason. The punishment ought in no case to be mare than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given. XIV. Rule 6. It is further to be observed, that owing to the Rule 6. different manners and degrees in which persons circum. under different circumstances are affected by the fiaencing" same exciting cause, a punishment which is the*^* ^^' same in name will not always either really pro- duce, or even so much as appear to others to there is no punishment at all : which being understood, as often as a man gives you five blows, he will be sure to give you five more, since he may have the pleasure of giving you these five for nothing. In like manner, if for stealing from you ten shillings, he is punished no more than for stealing five, the stealing of the remaining five of those ten shillings is an ofience for which there is no punishment at all. This nde is violated in almost every page of every body of laws I have ever seen. The profit, it is to be observed, though frequently, is not constantly, proportioned to the mischief : for example, where a thief, along with the things he covets, steals others which are of no use to him. This may happen through wantonness, indolence, precipitation, &c. &c. 29 OF THE PROPORTION BRTWREN XIV. produce, in two different persons the same d< ' — V — ' of pain : therefore. That the quantity actually inflicted on each vidual offender niay correspond to the quantity inti for sinUlar offenders in general, the several m stances iijfiuencing sensibility ought always to be ti into account''^. XV. Commpara- Of the above rules of proportion, the four the^abore ^ we may perceive, serve to mark out the limits od3 "'"* the side of diminution ; the limits below which f punishment ought not to be diminished : the the limits on the side of increase ; the limits abami which it ought not to be increased. The five firstt^j are calculated to serve as glides to the legislator:^; the sixth is calculated, in some measure, indeed^ for the same purpose ; but principally for guiding the judge in his endeavours to conform, on both ■\ sides, to the intentions of the legislator. XVI, Into the ac- Let US look back a little. The first rule, in count of the value or A order to render it more conveniently applicable punishment, . i ■■. ^ must be to practicc, may need perhaps to be a little more t&Kcn its deficiency particularly unfolded. It is to be observed, then, ceitiLty*' that for the sake of accuracy, it was necessary, imity.'°* iustcad of the word quantity to make use of the less perspicuous term value. For the word quanr tity will not properly include the circumstances * See ch, vi. [Sensibility.] P0NI8HMBNTS AND OFFENCES. 2^ r Ittier of certainty or proximity : circumstances <^"^r* in estimating the value of a lot of pain or ' — v^ must always be taken into the account*. ^, on the one hand, a lot of punishment is a f of pain ; on the other hand^ the profit of an is a lot of pleasure^ or what is equivalent it. But the profit of the offence is commonly certain than the punishment, or, what comes the same thing, appears . so at least to the of- It is at any rate commonly more imme- It follow43, therefore, that, in order to tintam its superiority over the profit of the ice^ the punishment must have its value made 'Jsp in some other way, in proportion to that irhereby it falls short in the two points of certainty ad pr^jdnuty. Now there is no other way in iHbkh it can receive any addition to its value, but by receiving an addition in point of magnitude. Wherever then the value of the punishment falls short, either in point of certainty, or of proximity, of that of th# profit of the offence, it must receive a proportionable addition in point of magnittule f . xvn. Yet ferther. To make sure of giving the value Aiao. into • • 1 /• i_ the account of the punishment the supenonty over that ox the of the nus- * See ch. iv. [Value.] fit is for this reason, for example, that simple compensa- tioD is never looked upon as sufficient punishment for theft or robbery. ^^ OF THE PROPORTION BETWEEN y"iv ' offence, it may be necessary, in some cas^, to take Al V • cWrf^^ into the account the profit not only of the indm- profit of the ^^^/ offence to which the punishment is to be ofitBace, the •■■ miBchief annexed, but also of such other offences of the and profit of other of. same sort as the offender is likely to have already the same Committed without detection. This random mode of calculation, severe as it is, it will be impossible to avoid having recourse to, in certain cases : in such, to wit, in which the profit is pecuniary^ the chance of detection very small, and the obno:dou8 act of such a nature as indicates a habit: for. example, in the case of frauds against the cpin. If it be not recurred to, the practice of committing . the offence will be sure to be, upon the balaiiee of the account, a gainful practice. That being., the case, the legislator will be absolutely sure of . not being able to suppress it, and the whole. . punishment that is bestowed upon it .will be , thrown away. In a word (to keep to the same, expressions we set out with) that whole quantity of punishment will be inefficacious. xviii. Rule 7. Rule 7. These things being considered, the three fdi- Waut of e- certwDty lowiug rulcs may be laid down by way of i^uppl made up in mcnt aud explanation to Rule 1. magnitude. To enable the value of the punishment to outzveigk that of the profit of the offence^ it must be encreasedy in point of magnitude^ in proportion as it falls short in point of certainty. PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES* S& XIX. Rule 8. Punishment must be further encreased in ptnnt of Rule s. magnitude^ in proportion as it falls short in point ^of pros- ^ . .. iinity. proximity. Rule 9. Where the act is conclusvoely indicative of a habit y pj^^^^ sudi an encrease must be gvoen to the punishment as ^^^^^^ may enable it to outweigh the profit not only of the ^^f^ indioiduat offence, but of such other like offences as are likely to have been committed with impunity by » the same offender. XXI. There may be a few other circumstances or?^'?**'*^ •^ ing rules are considerations which may influence, in some small ^f few im- '' ^ portauce. degree, the demand for punishment : but as the propriety of these is either not so demonstrable, or not so constant, or the application of them not so determinate, as that of the foregoing, it may be doubted whether they be worth putting on a level with the others. XXII. Rule 10. When a punishment, which in point of quality is ^« ^^ particularly well calculated to anszver its intention, of qoaiit^^, increase io canned exist in less than a certain quantity^ it may qnantkj. sometimes be of use, for the sake of employing it, to stretch a little beyond that quantity which ^ on other - accounts, would be strictly necessary. ^ OF TH£ PROPORTION BSTWBEN XXIII. Rule 11. Rule lu In particular, this may sorAetimes be the case, fbramorai whcre the pumshmcnt proposed ts of such a nature as to be particularly tvell calculated to answer the purpose of a moral lesson*. XXIV. Rule 12. Rule 12. The tendency of the above considerations is^ to Attend to . . i • i i circsmstaQ. dictate RU augmentation in th^ punishment : the majr render foUoiying rulo opcratos iu the way of diminution* unprofitobie. There are certain cases (it has been seenf ) in which^ by the influence of accidental circum- stances^ punishment may be rendered unprofit- A punish- • A punishment may be said to be calculated to answer plied by the purpose of a moral lesson, when, by reason of the ig* monU [ iiiomy it stamps upon the offence, it is calculated to inspire what the public with sentiments of aversion towards those per- nicious habits and dispositions with' which the offence appears to be connected; and thereby to inculcate the' opposite beneficial habits and dispositions. Example. — It is this, for example, if any thing, that must justify the corponS* application of so severe a punishment as the infamy of a injuries. public exhibition, hereinafter proposed, for him who lifts up his hand against a woman, or against his father. See B. I. tit. [Simp, corporal injuries.] Example— It is partly on this principle, I suppose, that military lawT^*^**^ legislators have justified to themselves the inflicting death on the soldier who lifts up his hand against his superior officer, t See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet.] § 4. PUNISHliENTS AND OFFENCES. S7 able in the whole: in the same cates it may chance to be rendered unprofitable as to a part only. Accordingly, In adjusting the quantum of pumshment, the cir- cumstances, by which all punishment may be rendered unprofitable, ought to be attended to. XXV. Rule 13. It is to be observed, that the more various and ^i« i^- , . Forsimpli- mmute any set of provisions are, the greater the city's iak<^ . .. • iinalJ di»- ehance is that any given article in them will not proportioof be I^me in mind : without which, no benefit can ^J^. ensue firom it. Distinctions, which are more com- plex than what the conceptions of those whose conduct it is designed to influence can take in, will even be worse than useless. The whole system will present a confused appearance : and thus the effect, not only of the proportions estab- lished by the articles in question, but of whatever is connected with them, will be destroyed*. To draw a precise line of direction in such case seems impossible. However, by way of memento, it may be of some use to subjoin the following rule. Among provisions designed to perfect the propor- tion betzveen punishments and offences, if any occur, which, by their awn particular good effects, would * See B. II. tit. [Purposes.] Append, tit. [Composition.] S8 OF THE PROPORTION BETWEEN Chap* not make up for the harm they would do by adding to ' — >^— ^ the intricacy of the Code^ they should he omitted. XXVI. AnxUiafy . It may be remembered^ that the political sanc- pbj^sicai, tioiij being that to which the sort of punislmient reiigioat bclongs^ which in this chapter is all along in view, here aUowed is but onc of four sanctions^ which may all of them ~'^*^' contribute their share towards producing the , same effects. It may be expected^ therefore^ that in adjusting the quantity of political punishment, allowance should be made for the assistance it may meet with from those other controuling powers. True it is, that from each of these several sources a very powerful assistance may sometimes be derived. But the case is, that (setting aside the moral sanction, in the case where the force of it is expressly adopted into and modified by the poli- tical*)-) the force of those other powers is never determinate enough to be depended upon. It can never be reduced, like political punishment, into exact lots, nor meted out in number, quantity. Proportion- * Notwithstanding this rule, my fear is, that in the very Srh ^^^iiing model, I may be thought to have carried my en- the present deavours at proportionality too far. Hitherto scarce any attention has been paid to it. Montesquieu seems to have been almost the first who has had the least idea of any such thing. In such a matter, therefore, excess seemed more eligible than defect. • The difficulty is to invent : that done^ if any thing seems superfluous, it is easy to retrench. ■ t See B. I. tit. [PunishiottentsJ PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES. 99 and value. The le^lator is therefore obliged to ^^'* provide the full complement of punishment^ as if ^ ^ ' he were sure of not receiving any assistance what- ever from any of those quarters. If he does^ so much the better : but least he should not, it is necessary he should, at all events, make that pro- vision which depends upon hunself. xxvn. It may be of use, in this place, to recapitulate R«cipitiiii^ the several circumstances, which, in establishing the proportion betwixt punishments and offences, are to be attended to. These seem to be as fidllows : I. On the part of the offence : 1 . The profit of the offence ; 2. The mischief of the offence ; 3. The profit and mischief of other greater or lesser offences, of different sorts, which the offender may have to choose out of; 4. The profit and mischief of other offences, of the same sort, which the same of- fender may probably have been guilty of already. II. On ike part of the punishment : 5. The magnitude of the punishment : com- posed of its intensity and duration ; 6. The deficiency of the punishment in point of certainty ; 7. The deficiency of the punishment in point of proximity ; * OF THfc PROPORTION BETWEEN 8. The qtiality of the punishment ; 9* The accidental advantage in point of qua- lity of a punishment^ not strictly needed in point of quantity ; 10. The use of a punishment of a particular quality, in the character of a moral lesson. III. On the part of the offender : 1 1 . The responsibility of the class of persons in a way tOx offend ; 1 2. The sensibility of each particular offender; 13. The particular merits or useful qualities of any particular offender, in case of a punishment which might deprive the community of the benefit of them ; 14. The multitude of offenders on any parti- cular occasion. IV. On the part^ of the public ^ at any particular conjuncture ; 15. The inclinations of the people, for or against any quantity or mode of punish- ment; 1 6. The inclinations of foreign powers. V. On the part of the lawi thiat is, of the public for a continuance : 1 7. The necessity of making small sacrifices, in point of proportionality, for the sake of simpficity. xxvm. h^re"(!b^^^ There are some, perhaps, who, at first sight. pvNisHiirarro and offencbs. si may look upon the nicetj employed m the ment of such rules, as so much labour lost : for served nn- grofis ignorance, they will say, never troubles ^ca*^fi«»> itself about laws, and passion does not calculate, o^^ioutifity. But the evil of ignorance admits of cure * : and as to the proposition that passion does not calculate, this like most of these very general and oracular propositions, is not true. When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake, and these in the highest degree (the only matters, in short, that can be of importance) who is there that does not calculate ? Men calculate, some with less exactness, indeed, some with more : but all men calculate. I would not say, that even a madman does not calculate f. Passion calculates, more or less, in every man: in different men, according to the warmth or coolness of their dis- positions : according^ to the firmness or irritability of their minds : according to the nature of the motives by which they are acted upon. Happily, of all passions, that is the most given to cdcula- tion, from the excesses of which, by reason of its strength, constancy, and universality, society has most to apprehend J: I mean that which corres- * See Append, tit. [Promulgation.] t There are few madmen but what are observed to be afraid of the strait waistcoat. I See ch. xii. [Consequences.] xxxiii. /■ 39 OF THB PROPORTION BETWEEN, &e. x" v'' P^^^ *^ t^® motive of pecuniary interest : so that these niceties, if such they are to be called, have the best chance of being efficacious, where efficacy isofthemostiihportance. C 83 ] CHAP. XV. OP THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. I. It has been shewn what the rules are, which Properties ought to be observed in adjusting the proportion ^^*ly *" between the punishment and the offence. The p"*p^'**'*"* properties to be' ^ven to a lot of punishment, in every instance, will of course be such as it stands ' in need of, in order to be capable of being ap- plied, in conformity to those rules : the quality will be regulated by the quantity. II. The first of those rules, we may remember, p^pcrty i. was, that the quantity of punishment must not be ^'*™*^"J^- less, in any case, than what is sufficient to out- weigh the profit of the offence : since, as often as it is less, the whole lot (unless by accident the deficiency should be supplied from some of the other sanctions) is thrown away : it is ineffica' ciaus. The fifth was, that the punishment ought in no case to be more than what is required by the several other rules : since, if it be, all that is above that quantity is* needless. The fourth was, that the punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each individual offence, that every part of the mischief of that offence may haTe a penalty (that is, a tutelary motive) to encounter it : other- VOL. II. D 34 OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO wise^ with respect to so much of the offence as has not a penalty to correspond to it^ it is as if there were no punishment in the case. Now to none of those rules can a lot of punishment be conformable^ unless^ for every variation in point of quantity, in the mischief of the species of offence to which it is annexed, such lot of pmush- ment admits of a correspondent variation. To prove this, let the profit of the offence admit of a multitude of degrees. Suppo'se it, then, at any one of these degrees : if the punishment be leas than what is suitable to that degree, it will be inefficacious ; it will be so much thrown away : if it be more, as far as the difference extends^ it wffl be needless ; it will therefore be thrown away dso in that case. The first property, therefore, that ought to ha given to a lot of punishment, is that of being yi- riable in point of quantity, in conformity to every variation which can take place in either the profit or mischief of the offence^ This property mighty perhaps, be termed, in a single word, variability. III. Property 2. A sccoud proDcrty, intimately connected wUi Equability. mi the former, may be stiled equability. It will avail but little, that a mode of punishment (proper in sl\ other respects) has been established by the legislator ; and that capable of being screwed up or let down to any degree that can be required ; if, after all, whatever degree of it be pitched upon, A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. 35 that same degree shall be liable, according to cir- eumstances, to produce a very heavy degree of pain, or a very slight one, or even none at all. In liiis case, as in the former, if circumstances happen one way, there will be a great deal of pain pro- duced which will be needless : if the other way, there will be no pain at all applied, or none that will be efficacious. A punishment, when liable to this irregularity, may be stiled an unequable one: when free from it, an equable one. The quantity of pam produced by the punishment will, it is true, depend in a considerable degree upon circumstances distinct from the nature of the punishment itself: upon the condition which the offender is in, with respect to the circum- F stances by which a man's sensibility is liable to be [ influenced. But the influence of these very cir- • comstances will in many cases be reciprocally in- fluenced by the nature of the punishment : in other words, the pain which is produced by any node of punishment, will be the joint effect of the punishment which is applied to him, and the circumstances in which he is exposed to it. Now there are some punishments, of which the effect may be liable to undergo a greater alteration by the influence of such foreign circumstances, than the effect of other punishments is liable to un- dergo. - So far, then, as this is the case, equability or unequability may be regarded as properties belonging to the punishment itself. 36 OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO IV. Panisb- ^ example of a mode of punishment which w ments which ^pt to be uneouable^ is that of banishment, when •re apt to '^ 1 ' ' ^ be deficient the locus a quo (oF place the party is banished spect from) is some determinate place appointed by the law, which perhaps the offender cares not whether he ever see or no. This is also the case With pecuniary, or quasi-pecuniary punishment, when it respects some particular species of propertji which the offender may have been possessed oi^ or not, as it may happen. All these punishments may be split down into parcels, and measured out with the utmost nicety : being divisible by time, at least, if by nothing else. They are not, there^ 1 fore, any of them defective in point of variability : and yet, in many cases, this defect in point - offences they are to be applied. Those which follow are of less importance^ either as referring only to certain offences in particular^ or depend- ing upon the influence of transitory and local circumstances. In the first place^ the four distinct ends into which the main and general end of punishment is dimible*, may give rise to so many distinct properties^ according as any particular mode of punishment appears to be more particularly - adapted to the compassing of one or of another of those ends. To that of example^ as being the principal one, a particular property has already been adapted. There remain the three inferior ones of reformation^ disablement y and compensation. XV. A seventh property, therefore, to be wished for Property r. in a mode of punishment, is that of subserviency to ency to re- reformation^ or reforming tendency. Now any punishment is subservient to reformation in pro- portion to its quantity: since the greater the punishment a man has experienced, the stronger * See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet] par. ii. note. i4 OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO 9^^,i'* is the tendency it has to create in him an aversion "" — V — ' towards the offence which was the cause of it : and that with respect to all o^ences alike. But there are certain punishments which, with regard to certain offences, have a particular tendency to produce that effect by reason of their quaUty :■ and where this is the case, the punishments in question, as applied to the offences in question^ will pro tanio have the advantage over all others. This influence will depend upon the nature of the motive which is the cause of the offence : the punishment most subservient to reformation will be the sort of punishment that is best calculated to invalidate the force of that motive. XVI. -applied Thus, in offences originating from the motive )ri^nati!^ of ill-will*, that punishment has the strongest niu-wiji. j.gfQj;.jning tendency, which is best calculated to weaken the force of the irascible affections. And more particularly, in that sort of offence which consists in an obstinate refusal, on the part of the offender, to do something which is lawfully required of himf, and in which the obstinacy is in great measure kept up by his resentment against those who have an interest in forcing him to compliance, the most efficacious punishment seems to be that of confinement to spare diet. * See ch. x. [Motives.] t See B. I. tit. [Offences against Justice.] A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. 45 XVII^ Chap. XV. Thus, also, in offences which owe their hirth to ^ y ^ —to otrences the joint influence of indolence and pecuniary ?"g*"«|»ng interest, that punishment seems to possess thej<"°^.^ pecuniary strongest reforming tendency, which is best cal- interot. culated to weaken the force of the former of those dispositions. And more particularly, in the cases of theft, embezzlement, and every species of defraudment, the mode of punishment best adapted to this purpose seems, in most cases, to be that of penal labour. XVIII. An eighth property to be gpiven to a lot of Property i £fficEcy punishment in certain cases, is that of efjicacv ^'^^^ respect ... to disable- with respect to disablement, or, as it might be stiled ment. more briefly, disabling efficacy. This is a property which may be given in perfection to a lot of punishment ; and that with much greater cer- tainty than the property of subserviency to re- formation. The inconvenience is, that this property is apt, in general, to run counter to that of fru- gality : there being, in most cases, no certain way of disabUng a man from doing mischief, without, at the same time, disabling him, in a great measure, from doing good, either to himself or others. The mischief therefore of the offence must be so great as to demand a very considerable lot of punishment, for the purpose of example, before it can warrant the application of a punish- ^^ OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO ment equal to that which is necessary for the purpose of disahlement. . XIX. The punishment^ of which the efficacy in this OODSpiCQOOf .. in capital way is the greatest^ is evidently that of death. In this case the efficacy of it is certain. This accordingly is the punishment peculiarly adapted to those cases in which the name of the offender^ so long as he lives^ may be sufficient to keep a whole nation in a flame. This will now and then be the case with competitors for the sovereignty, and leaders of the factions in civil wars : though, when applied to offences of so questionable a nature, in which the question concerning criini* nality turns more upon success than any thing else ; an infliction of this sort may seem more to savour of hostility than punishment. At the some time this punishment, it is evident, is in an eminent degree unfrugal ; which forms one among the many objections there are against the use of it, in any but very extraordinary cases*. XX. Other pu- jjj ordinary cases the purpose may be suffi- nishments ■' r i: j in which ciently answered by one or other of the various it is to be ^ ^ found. kinds of confinement and banishment : of which^ imprisonment is the most strict and efficacious. For when an offence is so circumstanced that it cannot be committed but in a certain place, as is See B. I. tit. [Punishments.] A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. 47 the csae, for the most part^ with offences agamst 9^^'* the person^ all the law has to do, in order to ^ — ^ — ' disaUe the offender, from committing it, is to prevent his being in that place. In any of the offences which consist in the breach or the abuse of any kind of trust, the purpose may be com- passed at a still cheaper rate, merely by forfeiture of the trust : and in general, in any of those offsnces which can only be committed under favour of some relation in which the offender stands with reference to any person, or sets of persons, merely by forfeiture of that relation : that is, of the right of continuing to reap the advantages belonging to it. This is the case, for instance, with any of those offences which consist in an abuse of the privileges of marriage, or of the liberty of carrying on any lucrative or other occupation. XXI. The ninth property is that of subserviency /(? Property 9. compensation. This property of punishment, if it e^y to^m- be vindictroe compensation that is in view, will, ^"*^°"' with little variation, be in proportion to the quan- tity : if lucrative, it is the peculiar and character- istic property of pecuniary punishment. XXII. In the rear of all these properties may be Pk>- . pertjlO. introduced that of popularity ; a very fleeting and Popuii«ty, indeterminate kind of property, which may belong to a lot of punishment one moment, and be lost 48 A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. C"AF. by it the next. By popularity is meant the pro- perty of being acceptable^ or rather not unac- ceptable^ to the bulk of the people^ among whom it is proposed to be established. In strictness of speech^ it should rather be called absence of unjHh pulariiy : for it cannot be expected, in regard to such a matter as punishment, that any species or lot of it should be positively acceptable and grateful to the people : it is sufficient, for the most part, if they have no decided aversion to the thoughts of it. Now the property of character- isticalness, above noticed, seems to go as far towards conciliating the approbatipn of the people to a mode of punishment, as any \ insomuch that popularity may be regarded as a kind of secondary quality, depending upon that of characteridtiical« ness*. The use of mserting this property in the catalogue, is chiefly to make it serve by way of memento to the legislator not to introduce, with- out a cogent necessity, any mode or lot of punish- ment, towards which he happens to perceive any Character * *^® property of characteristicalness, therefore, is useful isticalness in a mode of punishment in three different ways: !• It renders a * ^ '' punishment, renders a mode of punishment^ before infliction, more easy bieTTet^ to be borne in mind : 3. It enables it, especially after inflic- emplary : tion, to make the stronger impression, when it is there ; that ^^' is, renders it the more exemplary : 3. It tends to render it more acceptable to the people, that is, it renders it the more popular* A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. ^^ violent aversion entertained by the body of the Ch^'* people. ^ — ^'^"^ XXIII. The effects of unpopularity in a mode of pu- iriachiert nishment are analogous to those of unfrugality.f^'^„„. The unnecessary pain which denominates a pu-^ap^luh- Bishment unfrugal, is most apt to be that which ZS^*' is produced on the part of the offender. A portion ^^^^^^ of superfluous pain is in like mamier produced J^^ "^ when the punishment is unpopular : but in this case it is produced on the part of persons alto- gether innocent^ the people at large. This is akeady one mischief; and another is, the weak- ness which it is apt to introduce into the law. When the people are satisfied with the law, they voluntarily lend their assistance in the execution : when they are dissatisfied, they will naturally withhold that assistance ; it is well if they do not take a positive part in raising impediments. This contributes greatly to the uncertainty of the punishment ; by which, in the first instance, the frequency of the offence receives an increase. In process of time that deficiency, as usual, is apt to draw on an encrease in magnitude : an addition of a certain quantity which otherwise would be needless*. XXIV. This property, it is to be observed, necessarily This pro- perty 8up- * See eh. xiii. [Cases unmeet] § v. VOL. II. E cure. ^ OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO Cj?^'- supposes, on the part of the people, i^omeprejQ- ' — V — ' dice or other, which it is the business of the larfa- poiies a pre- ' *> judice which jator to endeavour to correct. For if the aversion toe legulator rnS?* *^ *^ *^® punishment in question were grounded on the principle of utility, the punishment wduld be such as, on other accounts, ought not to -be employed : in which case its popularity or tUHpo- pularity would never be worth drawing into ques- tion. It is properly therefore a property nofr«o much of the puirishment as of ' the people : a disposition- to entertain an unreasonable dnlike against an object which merits their approbMittL It is the 'sign* ^ also of 'toother property, >4o' it^it, indolence'or weakness, on the part of *he kgis- lator: in ' Sufiering *the ' people, for Ihe wa&t'of some instructibn, whifeh ought to' fee atid nugiit'te given them, to quarrel with- th^ir own^ iirterttt Be this ts it may, so long as any such dMMb- faction subsists, it behoves the legisliator toktive an eye to it, as much as if it were ever so^wdl grounded. Every nation is • liable -to ha^e ' 4ts prejudices and its toprices; which 'it ii? thd bnskiia of 'the legislator to look out for, to study> ttll^Mff cure*. XXV. Projiertj^ii. The eleventh and last of all the propertied >duit litj. seem to be requisite in a lot of punishment, is * See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet] § iv. par. iv. _j A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. 51 that of remissibility* . The general presumption is^JJiat when punishment is applied^ punishment is needful : that it ought to be applied^ and there- fore cannot want to be remitted. But in very particular^ an^ those always very deplorable cases, it may by accident happen otherwise. It may happen that punishment shall have been inflicted, where, according to the intention of the law itself, it ought not to have been inflicted : that is, where the sufferer is innocent of the offence. At the time of the sentence passed he appeared guilty: but since then, accident has brought his inno- cence to light. This being the case, so much of the destined punishment as he has suffered already, there is no help for. The business is then to free him from as much as is yet to come. But is there any yet to come ? There is very little chance of their being any, unless it be so much as consists of chromcql punishment: such as im- prisoiunent, banishment, penal labour, and the }ike. So much as consists in acute punishment, to wit where the penal process itself is over pre- sently, however permanent the punishment may be in its effects, may be considered as irremissible. TMs is the case, for example, with whipping, branding, mutilation, and capital punishment. The most perfectly irremissible of any is capital punishment. For though other punishments can- * See View of the Hard Labour Bill, p. 109. 5« OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO not, when they are over, be remitted^ they may be compensated for ; and although the unfor- tunate victim cannot be put into the same con- dition, yet possibly means may be found of putting him into as good a condition, as he would have been in if he had never suflFered. This may in general be done very eflFectually where the pu- nishment has been no other than pecuniary. There is another case in which the property of remissibility may appear to be of use : this 18, where^ although the oflFender has been justly punished, yet on account of some good behaviour of his, displayed at a time subsequent to that of the commencement of the punishment, it may seem expedient to remit a part of it. But this it can scarcely- be, if the proportion of the punish- ment is, in other respects, what it ought to be. The purpose of example is the more important object, in comparison of that of reformatian ♦. It is not very likely, that less punishment should be required for the former purpose than for the latter. For it must be rather an extraordinary case, if a punishment, which is sufficient to deter a man who has only thought of it for a few moments, should not be sufficient to deter a man who has been feeling it all the time. Whatever, then, is required for the purpose of example^ must abide at all events : it is not any reformation * See ch xiii. [Cases unmeet] ii. note. 3 1 A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. '^^ on the part of the offender, that can warrant the 9^^'"' remitting of any part of it : if it could, a man ' ^^ ' would have nothing to do but to reform imme- diately, and so free himself from the greatest part of that punishment which was deemed necessary. In order, then, to warrant the remitting of any part of a punishment upon this ground, it must first be su{^>08ed that the punishment at first appointed was more than was necessary for the purpose of example, and consequently that a part of it was needless upon the whole. This, indeed, is apt enough to be the case, under the imperfect systems that are as yet on foot : and therefore, during the continuance of those systems, the pro- perty of remissibility may, on this second ground likewise, as well as on the former, be deemed a useful one. But this would not be the case in any new^onstructed system, in which the rules of proportion above laid down should be observed. In such a system, therefore, the utility of this property would rest solely on the former ground. XXVI. Upon taking a" survey of the various possible To obtain modes of punishment, it will appear evidently, properties, . o ^ t punbhoieuis that there is not any one of them that possesses must be all the above properties in perfection. To do the best that can be done in the way of punishment, * it will therefore be necessary, upon most occasions, to compound them, and make them into complex lots, each consisting of a number of different modes of punishment put together : the nature 54 OF THE PROPERTIES TO BE GIVEN TO Chap, and proportions of the constituent parts of each ' — V — ' lot being different, according to the nature of the offence which it is designed to combat. XXVII. The forego- It may uot bc amiss to bring toother, and ties recapi- exhibit iu onc view, the eleven properties abcive established. They are as follows : Two of them are concerned in Establishing a proper proportion between a single onehce and its punishment ; viz. 1. Variability. 2. Equability. One, in establishing a proportion, between more offences than one, and more piinishineiits than one ; viz. ] 3. Commensurability. I A fourth contributes to place the punishment in that situation in which alone it can be (effica- cious ; and at the same time to be bestowing^ on it the two farther properties of exemplarity and popularity ; viz. 4. Characteristicalness. Two others are concerned in excludiiig aH use- less punishment ; the one indirectly, by heighten- ing the efficacy of what is useful ; the otiier lii a direct way ; viz. 5. Exemplarity. 6. Frugality. Three others contribute severally to the three inferior ends of punishment ; viz. 7. Subserviency to refonnation. A LOT OF PUNISHMENT. ^^ 8* Efficacy in disabling. 9- Subserviency to compensation.. Another property tends to exclude a collateral mischief, which a particular mode of punishment is liable accidentally to produce ; viz. 10. Popularity. The remaining property tends to palliate a mischief^ which all punishment, as such, is liable accidentally to produce ; viz. 11. Remissibility. The properties of commensurability, charac- teristicalness, exemplarity, subserviency to re- formation, and efficacy in disabling, are more particularly calculated to augment the pr^ which is to be made by punishment : frugality, subserviency to compensation, popularity, and re- missibility, to diminish the expence : variability and equability are alike subservient to both those purposes. XXVIII. We now <^me to take a geaeral survey of ^^^^^° the system of offences : that is, of such acts to ^^ ensuing which, on account of the mischievous consequences they have a natural tendency to produce, and in the view of putting a stop to those conse- quences, it may be proper to annex a certain artificial consequence, consisting of punishment, to be inflicted on the authors of such acts, according to the principles just established. [ 56 1 CHAP. XVI. § I. GLASSES OF OFFENCES. I. Distinctiou ♦ It is necessarv^ at the outset, to make a distinc' between ^ '* what are tioii between such acts as arc or may be, and offences and what ought ,.________^__— to be. Method * This chapter is an attempt to put oar ideas of offences the following ^^^^ ^^ exact method. The particular uses of method are divisions, various : but the general one is, to enable men to under- stand the things that are the subjects of it. To understand a tripg, is to be acquainted with its qualities or properties. Of these properties, some are common to it with other things ; the rest, peculiar. But the qualities which are -pe- culiar to any one sort of thing are few indeed, in comparison with those which are common to it with other things. To make it known in respect of its difference^ would, therefore be doing little, unless it were made known also by its genw. To understand it perfectly, a man must therefore be informed of the points in which it agrees, as well as of those in which it disagrees, with all other things. When a number of objects, composing a logical whole, are to be considered together, all of these possessing with respect to one another a certain congruency or agreement denoted by a certain name, there is but one way of giving a perfect knowledge of their nature ; and that is, by distributing them into a system of parcels, each of them a pait, either of some other parcel, or, at any rate, of the common whole. This can only be done in the way of bipartitiony dividing each superior branch into two, and but two, immediately subordinate ones ; begin- ing with the logical whole, dividing that into two parts, then 1 1 CLASSES OP OFFENCES. &7 such as might to be offences. Any act mmf be an <^^'* offence^ which they whom the community are in each of those parts into two others ; and so on. These first- distinguished parts agree in respect of those properties which belong to the whole : they differ in respect of those proper- ties which are peculiar to each. To divide the whole into more than two parcels at once, for example into three, would not answer the purpose ; for, in fact, it is but two objects that the mind can compare together exactly at the same time. Thus then, let us endeavour to deal with offences ; o^ rather, strictly speaking, with acts which possess such pro- perties as seem to indicate them fit to be constituted offences. The task is arduous ; and, as yet at least, perhaps for ever, above our force. There is no speaking of objects bi#by their names : but the business of giving them names has always been prior to the true and perfect knowledge of their natures. Objects the most dissimilar have been spoken of and treated as if their properties were the same. Objects the most similar have been spoken of and treated as if they had scarce any thing in common. Whatever discoveries may be made concerning them, how different soever their con- ^encies and disagreements may be found to be from those which are indicated by their names, it is not without the utmost difficulty that any means can be found out of ex- pressing those discoveries by a conformable set of names. Change the import of the old names, and you are in perpe- tual danger of being misunderstood : introduce an intire new set of names, and you are sure not to be understood at all. Complete success, then, is, as yet at least, unattainable. But an attempt, though imperfect, may have its use : and, at the worst, it may accelerate the arrival of that perfect system, the possession of which will be the happiness of some ma- turer age. Gross ignorance descries no difficulties; im- 5d CLASSES OF OFFBMCES. ^^f* the habit of obeying shall be pleased to make ' — V — ' one : that is, any act which they shall be pleased to prohibit or to punish. But, upon the prin- ciple of utility, such acts alone ought to be made offences, as the good of the community requires should be made so. II. No act The good of the community cannot reqim^e^. an offence that auv act should be made an offence, n^iidft is but what u , . , ^ detrimental not liable, iu somc way or other, to be dtetri- to the com- • . « munitj. mental to the community. For in the case of such an act, all punishment is groundless*. III. To be 80. it flht if the whole assemblage of any number ol most be de- ••»•••» t % • t •* ^•^^« • trimentai to moiyiduals be considered as constituting an ima- iome one or ji t t r •! i*j«i more of its guiary compouud bocty, a community or political ™*™ * state ; any act that is detrimental to any one or more of those members is, as to so much of its effects, detrimental to the state* IV. pese may An act canuot be detrimental to a state, but be assign- able or not by being detrimental to some one or more of the individuals that compose it. But these indivi- duab may either be assignable^' or unassignable. perfect knowledge finds them out, and struggles with them : it must be perfect knowledge that orercomes them. * See eh. xiii. [Cases unmeet] § ii. 1. Persons t [Assignable.] That is» either by name, or at least by assignable, description^ i& such manner as to be sufficiently distinguished Blames op opfsncbs. 59 V. CWAF. xvr. When there is any assignjable indiyidnai tOj^p^ whom an offence U detrimental^ that person may »*»*«• ^« ^' either be a person other than the offender, or th6 ^» <» ^- otlicn, offender himself. VI. Offences that are detrimental, in the first in- cuw i. stance, to assignable persons other than the of- fences, fender, may be termed by one common name, offences against individuals. And of these may be composed the 1st class of offences. To contrast them with offences of the Sd and 4th classei^> it nl^y also sometimes be convenient to stile them pritiate offences. To contrast thein ait the wtne time with offences of the 3d class, they may be stiled private eo'tra-regarding oflfences. VII. When it appears, in general, that there are Class «. , . • . . . Semi-poblic persons to whom the act m question may be de- offences. trimental, but such persons cannot be indivi- dually assigned, the circle within which it app'eai^ii that they may be found, is either of less extent than that which comprizes the whole community, 6f not. If of less, the persons comprized within this lesser circle may be considered for thii^ puinposiB as composing a body of themselves; from all others; for instance^ by the circamstance of being the owner or occopier of snch and such godds. See B. i. tit. [Personation.] Supra, ch. m, [Consequences] xv. 60 CLASSES OF OFF£NC£S. c^^'* comprized within, but distinguishable from, the ^ — ^ — ' greater body of the whole community. The circumstance that constitutes the union between the members of this lesser body, may be either their residence within a particular place, or, in short, any other less explicit principle of union, which may serve to distinguish them from the remaining members of the community. In the first case, the act may be stiled an offence against a neighbourhood : in the second, an offence against a particular class of persons in the community. Offences, then, against a class or neighbourhood, may, togethe?,. constitute the 2d class of offences*. Tofbntrast ^m with private offences on the one hand, and public on the other, they may also be stiled semi-pulffic offences. Limits be- * With regard to offences against a class or neighbour- ▼ate, Kmi ^^^9 ^^ *s evident,, that the fewer the individuals are, of pubiic, and ^hich Such class is composed, and the narrower that neio:h- public of- , '^ ° fences, are, bourhood is, the more likely are the persons, to whom the speokhie, offc^^cc is detrimental, to become assignable ; insomuch that, undjs- in some cases, it may be difficult to determine concerning a * given offence, whether it be an offence against individuals, or against a class or neighbourhood. It is evident also, that the larger the class or neighbourhood is, the more it ap- proaches to a coincidence with the great body of the state. The three classes, therefore, are liable, to a certain degree^ to run into one another, and be confounded. But this is no more than what is the case, more or less, with all those ideal compartments under which men are wont to distribute objects for the convenience of discourse. CLASSES OF OFFENCES. ^^ VIII. Chap. XVL Offences, which in the first instance are detri- \>^ ^^ ' Class 3. mental to the offender himself, and to no one eke, Seif-regard- mg offeiioei. unless it be by their being detrimental to himself, may serve to compose a third class. To contrast them the better with offences of the first, second, and fourth classes, all Which are of a iransitvoe nature, they might be stiled intransitive* offences ; but still better, self-regarding. IX. The fourth class may be composed of such acts ciass 4. •^ * Public of- as ought to be made offences, on account of the fences. distant mischief which they threaten to bring upon an unassignable indefinite multitude of the whole number of individuals, of which the com- munity is composed : although no particular indi- vidual should appear more likely to be a sufferer by them than another. These may be called public offences, or offences against the state. X. A fifth class, or appendix, may be composed of cian 5. such acts as, according to the circumstances mofiences^m. 1 Offcnccj which they are committed, and more particularly bj fidsebood according to the purposes to which they are agamsttmsu applied, may be detrimental in any one of the ways in which the act of one man can be detri- mental to another. These may be termed multi- form, or heterogeneous offences^. Offences that * See ch. vii. [Actions] xiii. t 1. Offences hyfaUehood: 2. Offences against trtut ^^^^^Jf ^ CLASSES OF OFFENCES. C"AF. are in this case may be reduced to two great ])yei^: I. Offences hyfalsehqod: and, 2. Offences 9gim^t trust. language an also par. XX. to XXX. and par. LXVI. Maturer views 2^^g®*° have suggested the feasibility, and the means, of ridding ment the system of this anoipoialous excrescence. Instead of .considering these as so m^any divisions of. o^ences, divided into genera^ correspondent and collateral to the several genera distinguished by other appellations, they may be considered as so many specific differences, respectively applicable to those genera. Thus, in- the case of a simple P^sonalir^ury^ in ^e operc^^pn. of which apian of falsehood . has been employed: it seems mpre simple and more natural, to consider the offence Jthus committed as a particular species or modification of the genus of offence termed a simple 'personal injury, than to consider the simple personal injury^ when effected by such means, as a modification of the dt- vuion. x>f offences entitled Offences through falsehood. By Jhis^^gies^ps t^e, circumstances of , the intervention pf false- hood as an^ip^trument, and of , the existence of a ^par- ticular obligation of the nature of a trust, will be reduced to a par with various other classes of circumstances capable of affording grounds of modification, commonly of ' aggravation or extentuition, to various genera of offences : ^infitaAce, JPrenk^4itation, ^d conspiracy ^ on the one baud ; rJProvocafion received, and intoxication, on the other. . This qlasat will appear, but too plainly, as a kind of botch in comparison of the rest. But such is the fate 'of science, and more particularly of the moral branch ; the distribution of things must in a great measure be dependent on their names : arriangement^ the work of n^ature reflection, must be ruled by nomenclature, the work of popular caprice. In the book of the laws, offences must therefore be treated ' QhAdtmSi OF. oFnwf^s. ^ XI. iLet US. see by what method these classes ffkay DmiiQi»of be fsurtfaer suh-divided. Firsts then^ with r^ard i. ofi^ioes ounces: agamst individuals. m^^Prol of as much as possible under by reason of the word relation, i^i^ part of the divi- "j*°°®^ sion should appear obscure, the unknown term may be got CLASSES OF OFFENCES. ^5 mentioned exterior objects may happen to bear, in ^'^'• the way of causality (See ch. vii. Actions, par. 24.) ^ — "^ — ' to his happiness. Now in as far as a man is in a rid of in the following manner. Our ideas are derived, all and painde- of them, from the senses; pleasurable and painful ones, ^^J^ij^^ therefore, among the rest : consequently, from the operation "**" bear* to i» • 1 ■ t 1 • exterior ob- of sensible objects upon our senses. A man s happmess, jects. then, may be said to depend more or less upon the relation he bears to any sensible object, when such subject is in a way that stands a chance, greater or less, of producing to hiiii, or averting from him, pain or pleasure. Now this, if at all, it must do in one or other of two ways ; 1. In an active way,^ properly so called ; viz. by motion : or, 2. In a passive or quiescent way, by being moved to, or acted upon: and in either case, either, 1. in an immediate way, by acting upon, or being acted on by, the organs of sense, without the intervention of any other external object : or, 2. in a more or less remote way, by acting upon, or being acted on by, some other external object, which (with the intervention of a greater or less number of such objects, and at the end of more or less considerable intervals of time) will come at leng^ to act upon, or be acted upon by, those organs. And tiuB is equally true, whether the external objects in question be things or persons. It is also equally true of pains and pleasmres of the mind, as of those of the body : all the dif- ference is, that in the production of these, the pleasure or pain may result immediately from the perception which it accompanies : in the production of those of the mind, it can- not result from the action of an object of sense, any other- wise ihdJih^. association; to wit, by means of some connection which the perception has contracted with certain prior ones, lodged already in the memory \ > ^ See ch. v. [I'leasores and Pains] xv. xzxi. Ch. x. [Motives] xxxix. note. VOL. II. F ^ CLASSES OF OFFENCES. Chap, way to derivc either happiness or security from any object which belongs to the class of things^ such thing is said to be his property , or at least he is said to have a property or an interest therein : an offence, therefore, which tends to lessen the facility he might otherwise have of deriving happiness or security from an object which be- longs to the class of things, may be stiled an offence against his property. With reg£u:d to persons, in as far as, from objects of this class, a man is in a way to derive happiness or security, it is in virtue of their services : in virtue of some services,' which, by one sort of inducement or another, they may be disposed to render him*. Now, then, take any man, by way of example^ and the disposition, whatever it may be, which he may be in to render you service, either has no other connection to give birth or support to it, than the general one which binds him to the whole species, or it has some other connectiini more particular, In the latter case, such a cat^ nection may be spoken of as constituting, in your favour, a kind of fictitious or incorporeal object of property, which is stiled your condition. Aa \ offence, therefore, the tendency of which is to lessen the facility you might otherwise have of deriving happiness from the services of a person ; thus specially connected with you, may be stiled * See ch. X. [Motives.] J CLASSES OF OFFENCES. ^7 an oflfence against your condition in life^ or simply against your condition. Conditions in life must evidently be as various as the relations by which they are constituted. This will be seen more particularly farther on. In the mean time, those of husband, wife, parent, child, master, servant, dtizen'of such or such a city, natural-born subject of such or such a country, may answer the pur- pose of examples. Where there is no such particular connection, or (what comes to the same thing) where the disposition, whatever it may be, which a man is in to render you service, is not considered as de- pending upon such connection, but simply upon the good-will he bears to you ; in such case, in order to express what chance you have of de- riving a benefit from his services, a kind of ^ fictitious object of property is spoken of, as being constituted iii your favour, and is called your reputatiim. An offence, therefore, the tendency of which is to lessen the facility you might other- wise have had of deriving happiness or security frgm the services of persons at large, whether connected with you or not by any special tie, may be stiled an offence against your reputation. It appears, therefore, that if by any offence an individiual becomes a sufferer, it must be in one or other of the four points above-mentioned ; viz. his person, his pr6perty, his condition in life, or his reputation. These soures of distinction, then^ I ^ CLASSES OP OFFBNCES. ^f^' may serve to form so many subordinate divisions. ^ — V — ' If any offences should be found to affect a person in more than one of these points at the same time, such offences may respectively be put under so many separate divisions ; and such compound divisions may be subjoined to the preceding simple ones. The several divisions (simple and compound together) which are hereinafter estar blished, stand as follows : 1. Offences against person. 2. Offences against reputation. 3. Of- fences against property. 4. Offences against condition. 5. Offences against person and pro- perty together. 6. Offences against person and reputation together*. XII. pivisions of Ncxt with regard to semi-public offences. Pain, ' 1. Offences cousidcrcd with reference to the time of the act.j lamity. ^ from which it is liable to issue, must, it is evident, be either present, past, or future. In as far as'^it * Subsequent consideration has here suggested sevml. ] alterations. The necessity of adding, to property, power, in the character of a distinguishable as well as valuable ob^ ject or subject-matter of possession, has presented itself l# >iew : and in regard to the fictitious entity here termed coi^, dition (for shortness instead of saying condition in life,) it been observed to be a sort of composite object, compounderij of property, reputation, power, and right to services, Fofcj this composite object the more proper place was therefore tAj the tail of the several simple -ones. — Note by the Edii July, 1822. w CLASSES OP OFFENCES. ^ is either present or past, it cannot be the result Chap. of any act which comes under the description of a s^mi-public offence : for if it be present or past, the individuals who experience, or who have experienced, it are assignable*. There remains that sort of mischief, which, if it ever come to •xist at all, is as yet but future : mischief, thus circumstanced, takes the name of danger \. Now, then, when by means of the act of any person a whole neighbourhood, or other class of persons, are exposed to danger, this danger must either , be intentional on his part, or unintentionalX. If unintentional, such danger, when it is converted into actual mischief, takes the name of a calamity: offences, productive of such danger, may be stiled xnu-pubUc offences operating through calamity; or, more briefly, offences through calamity. If the danger be intentional, insomuch that it might be produced, and might convert itself into actual mischiei^ without the concurrence of any calamity, it may be said to originate in mere delinquency : oSknces, then, which, without the concurrence of any calamity, tend to produce such danger as disturbs the security of a local, or other subor- dinate class of persons, may be stiled semi-public offences operating merely by delinquency^ or more briefly, offences of mere delinquency. ^ Supra, iv. note. t See eh. xii. [CoDsequances.] I See Ch. viii. [Intentionality.] \ I rO CLASSES OF OFFENCES. XIII. Sub^^mT With regard to any farther suWivisions^ of- offences ^^^^^es agaiiist calamity will depend upon the through ^— ' too unsettled, and too open to controversy, to be laid down with that degree of confidence which is implied in the exhibition of properties which are made use of as the groundwork of an arrange- ment. Properties for this purpose ought to.be such as shew themselves at first glance, and appear to belong to the subject T)eyond dispute. XVI. Divisions of Public offeuces mav be distributed under eleven Class 4. -^ , . divisions*. 1. Offences agamst ea:temal secnnty. Exhaustive * ^^ ^^^® P^^ ^^ ^^® analysis, I have found it necessary method de- to deviate in some degree from the rigid rules of the exhaus- partedfrom, , . tive method I set out with. By me, or by some one else, this method may, perhaps, be more strictly pursued at some ma- turer period of the science. At present, the benefit that might result froo^ the unrelaxed observance of it, seemed so precarious^ that I could not help doubting whether it would pay for the delay and trouble. Doubtless such a method is eminently instructive : but the fatigue of following H out is so great, not only to the author, but probably also to the reader, that if carried to its utmost length at the first at- tempt, it might perhaps do more disservice in the way of disgust, than service in the way of information. For know- ledge, like physic, how salutary soever in itself^ becomes no longer of any use, when made too unpalatable to be swal- lowed. Mean time, it cannot but be a mortifying circum- stance to a writer, who is sensible of the importance of his subject, and anxious to do it justice, to find himself obliged to exhibit what he perceives to be faulty, with any view, how indistinct soever, of something more perfect before his eyes. DIVISION OF OFF£NCES. 73 2. Offences agaiust justice. 3. Offences agamst the preoentive branch of the police. 4. Offences against the pubUc /orce. 5. Offences against the pantioe encrease of the national felicity. 6. Of- fences against the pubUc wealth. 1. Offences against population. 8. Offences against the natvmal wealth.' 9* Offences against the saoerdgnty. 10. Offences against religion. 11. Offences against the national interest in general. The way in which these several sorts of offences connect with one another, and with the interest of the public, that is, of an unassignable multitude of the indi- viduals of which that body is composed, may be thus conceived. XVII. ' Mischief by which the interest of the public as of the nine above defined may be affected, must, if produced fintdin- at all, be produced either by means of an influence with an- exerted on the operations of government, or by other means, without the exertion of such in- If there be any thing new and original in this work, it is to the exhaustiTe method so often aimed at that I am indebted for-it. It willy therefore, be no great wonder if I should not be able to quit it without reluctance. On the other hand, the marks of stiffness which will doubtless be perceived in a multitude of places, are chiefly owing to a solicitous, and not perfectly successful, pursuit of this same method. New instruments are seldom handled at first with perfect^ease. " ^ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, flueiice*. To hesm with the latter case : mischief, XVL ^ be it what it will, and let it happen to whom it will, must be produced either by the unassisted powers of the agent in question, or by the in- strumentality of some other agents. In the lat- ter case, these agents will be either persons or things. Persons again must be either not mem- bers of the community in question, or members. Mischief produced by the instrumentality of per- «,n., may accordingly be produced by the iiv strumentality either oi external or of mtemal adver- saries. Now when it is produced by the ageirt's own unassisted powers, or by the instrumentidity of internal adversaries, or only by the instru- mentality of things, it is seldom that it can show itself in any other shape (setting aside any in- fluence it may exert on the operations of goveror ment) *than either that of an offence against assignable individuals, or that of an offence against a local or other subordinate class of persons. If * The idea of goyernmenty it may be obseryed, is ioItq^ duced here without any preparation. The fiact of its being established^ I assume as notorious, and the necessity bf it «s alike obvious and incontestible. Observations indicating that necessity, if any 9uch should be thought worth looking al in this view, may be found by turning to a passage in a former chapter, where they were incidentally adduced for the purpose illustration. See ch. xii* [Consequences] § xvii* DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 75 there should be a way in which mischief can be ^'^'* produ^ed^ by any of these means, to individuals altogether Unassignable, it will scarcely be found conspicuous or important enough to occupy a title by itself: it 'may accordingly be referred to the miscellaneous head of offences against the na- tumal interest in general.*. The only mischief, of any considerable account, which can be made to impend indiscriminately over the whole number of members in the community, is that complex kind of mischief which results from a state of war^ and is produced by the instrumentality of external adversaries ; by their being provoked^ for iniltance, or invited, or encouraged to inva- ^on. In this way may a man very well bring down a mischief, and that a very heavy one, upon the whole community in general, and that with- out taking a part in any of the injuries which came in consequenqe to be offered to particular individuals. * See infra, liv. note. Even this head, ample as it is, and vague as it may seem to be, will not, when examined by the principle of utility, serve, any more than another, to secrete any offence which has no title to be placed there. To show the pain or loss of pleasure which is likely to ensue, ii a problem, which before a legislator can justify himself in adding the act to the catalogue of offences, he may in this case, as in every other^ be called upon to solve. 76 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Next with regard to the mischief which an offence may hring upon the puhlic by its influence on the operations of the government. This it may occasion either, 1. In a more i];nmediate w^y> by its influence on those' operations them- selves : 2. In a more remote way, by its influence on the instruments by or by the help of which- those operations should be performed : or 3. In a more remote way still, by its influence on die sources from whence such instruments are to be derived. First then, as to the operations- of go- vernment, the tendency of these, in as far as it is conformable to what on the principle of utility it ought to be, is in every case either to avert mis- chief from the community, or to make an addition to the sum of positive good*. NowNinischief we * For examples, see infra, liv. note. This branch of the business of government, a sort of work of supererogation, as it may be called, in the calendar of political duty, is com- paratively but of recent date. It is not for this that the untutored many could have originally submitted themselves to the dominion of the few. It was the dread of evil, not the hope of good, that first cemented societies together. Necessaries come always before luxuries. The state of lan- guage marks the progress of ideas. Time out of mind the military department has had a name : so has that of justice: the power which occupies itself in preventing mischief, not till lately, and that but a loose one, the police: for. the power which takes for its object the introduction of positive DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ' ' have seen, must come either from external ad- versaries, from internal adversaries, or from ca- lamities. With regard to mischief from external adversaries, there requires no further division. As to mischief from internal adversaries, the ex- pedients employed for averting it may be dis- tinguished into such as may be applied before the discovery of any mischievous design in particular, and such as can not be employed but in conse- quence of the discovery of some such design : the former of these are commonly referred to a branch which may be stiled the preoentive branch of the police: the latter to that of justice ♦• Second, goody no peculiar name, however inadequate, seems yet to have been deyised. * llie functions of justice, and those of the police, must be apt in many points to run one into another : especially as die business would be very badly managed if the same per- sons, whose more particular duty it is to act as officers of the police, were not upon occasion to act in the capacity of officers of justice. The ideas, however, of the two functions may still be kept distinct : and I see not where the line of iqparation can be drawn, unless it be as above. As to the word police, though of Greek extraction, it seems to be of French growth : it is from France, at least,that it has been imported into Great Britain, where it still retains its fiireign garb : in Germany, if it did not originate there, it has at least been naturalized. Taken all together, the idea be- longing to it seems to be too multifarious to be susceptible for conciseness sake, the military force. The rest may be characterised by the collective ap- pellation of the public wealth. Thirdly, with re- gard to the sources or funds from whence these instruments, howsoever applied, must be derived, such of them as come under the denomination of persons must be taken out of the whole number of persons that are in the community, that is, out of the total population of the state : so that the greater the population, the greater may cateris paribus be this branch of the public wealth ; and the less the less. In like manner, such as come under the denomination of things may be, and iQost of them commonly are, taken out of the sum total of those things which are the separate properties of the several members of the com- munity : the sum of which properties may be termed the national wealth * ; so that the greater lodbed upon as being no longer members of the state, but as ttanduig altogether upon a footing with external adversaries. (Sve force enough to robbery, and it swells into rebellion : pye permanence enough to rebellion, and it settles into hos- tifity. * It must be confessed, that in common speech the dis- takAim here establisfhed between the public wealth and the WSmA wealth is but indifferently settled : nor is this to be [Wtadered at; the ideas themselves, though here necessary > be distinguished, being so frequently convertible. But I 80 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, the national wealth, the greater ceteris paribus,' may be this remaining branch of the public wealth ; and the less, the less. It is here to be observed, that if the influence exerted on any occasion by any individual over the operations of the government be pernicious^ it must be in one or other of two ways : 1 . By causing, or tending to cause, operations not to be performed which ought to be performed ; in other words, by intr peding the operations of government. * Or, 2. By causing operations to be performed which ought not to be performed ; in other words, by fmsdi-' reding them. Last, to the tot^ assemblage of the persons by whom the several political open^ tions above-mentioned come to be performed, we set out with applying the collective appeUatiott .■ of the government. Among these persons tfa^re commonly* is some one person, or.lJody of per^. i am mistaken if the language will furnish an(y other two words that would express the distinction better. Those in quet- -^^ tion will, I imagine, be allowed to be thus far well choao^ that if they were made to change their places, the import. given to them would not appear to be quite so proper at^j that which is given to them as they stand at present, * I should have been afraid to have said neeessarihf, the United Provinces, in the Helvetic, or even in the Ghri; manic body, where is that one assembly in which an abi power over the whole resides ? where was there in the Commonwealth? I would not undertake for' certain to, an answer to all these questions. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 81 sons^' whose office it is to assign and distribute to ^^j'* the rest their several departments, to determine the conduct to be pursued by each in the perform- ance of the particular set of operations that belongs to him, and even upon occasion to ex- ercise his function in his stead. Where there is any such person, or body of persons, he or it may, 'according as the turn of the phrase requires, be termed the saoereign, or the saoereignty. Now it is evident, that to impede or misdirect the opera- tions of the sovereign, as here described, may be to impeide or misdirect the operations of the se- veral departments of government as described above. . « From this analysis, by which the connection between the several above-mentioned heads of offences' is exhibited, we may now collect a de- finition for each article. By offences against ex- temal security, we may understand such offences whereof the tendency is to bring upon the public a mischief resulting from the hostilities of foreign ' adversaries. By offences against justices, such of- fences whereof the tendency is to impede or mis- direct the operations of that power which is em- ployed in the business of guarding the public against the mischiefs resulting from the delm- quency of internal adversaries, as far as it is to be done by expedients, which do not come to be ap- plied in any case till after the discovery of some particular design of the sort of those which they YOL. II. ft 80 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. , • - ._ ,ences agaimt the the national wealth, the greater^j^ ^^J^^ ^^^^^ may he this remaining bran*^^ ^^ ^.^^^^ ^^^ wealth; and the less, the \eQ^^ .^ employed in observed, that if <^e "ifl-^ resulting from tiie occasion by any "^^^d^^^j^ersaries, by expedients the government be r .J|^ beforerhand; or of that or other of two wr ^^ guardmg against the mis- to cause, opera ^^^» ^ occasioned by physical cala- ought to be '^^^ against the public force, such peding the .^ • /jv #^^ ^j^^ tendency is to impede or causii^ ' ^^ ^ operations of that power which is ^^ *^ J^"^ gaard the public from the mischiefs *"^ bc^gy result from the hostility of foreign *^ it^^\fles, a^d> ^^ ^^s® ^^ necessity, in the ca- ^ of nuJMsters of justice, from mischiefs of /^ ^mb^r ^^ those which result from the delin- ncy of internal adversaries. By offences against the increase of the national rjji^jf, such offences whereof the tendency is fp impede or misapply the operations of those powers that are employed in the conducting of various establisments, which are calculated to make, in so many different ways, a positive ad- dition to the stock of public happiness. By g/- fences against the public wealth, such offences whereof the tendency is to diminish the amount or misdirect the application of the money, and other articles of wealth, which the government reserves as a fund, out of which the stock of in- DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 93 struMents employed in the service above-men- CnAy. tioned may be kept tip. By offences against po- ' — v— pulatian, such offences whereof the tendency is to dmdiiish the numbers or impair the political value of the sum total of the members of the com- munity. By offences against the national wealth such offences whereof the tendency is to diminish the quimtity^ or impair the value, of the things which compose the separate properties or estates of the several members of the community. XVIII. In this deduction, it may be asked, what place Connection is left for region ? This we shall see presently, against re- For combating the various kinds of offences above ^^fore^. enumerated, that is, for combating all the offences "^ ^^^ (those not excepted which we are now about considering) which it is in man's nature to com- mit, the state has two great engines, punishment and reward: punishment, to be applied to all^ and upon all ordinary occasions : reward, to be applied to a few, for particular purposes, and upon extraordinary occasions. But whether or BO a ttlAn has done the act which renders him an object meet for punishment or reward, the eyes of those, whosoever they be, to whom the ma- nagement of these engines is entrusted cannot always see, nor, where it is punishment that is to be administered, can their hands be always sure to reach him. • To supply these deficiencies in point of power, it is thought necessary, or at least •4 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. useful, (without which the ti^uth of the doctrine would be nothing to the purpose) to inculcate into the minds of the people the belief of the ex- istence of a power applicable to the same pur- poses/ and not liable to the same deficiencies • the power of a supreme invisible being, to whom a. disposition of contributing to the same ends to i which the several institutions already mentioned \ are calculated to contribute, must for this pur- J pose be ascribed. It is of course expected that j this power will, at one time or other, be employed * in the proirioting of those ends : and to keep up aiid strengthen this expectation among men, is spoken of as being the employment of a kind of allegorical personage, feigned, as before *, for convenience of discourse, and styled religion. To diminish, then, or misapply the influence of re- ligion, is pro tanto to diminish or misapply what power the state has of combating with.eflfect any '^ of the before enumerated kinds of offences ; thali:^ is, all kinds of offences whatsoever. Acts thiA^ appear to have this tendency may be styled fences against religion. Of these then may composed the tenth division of the class of fences against the state f. * See par. xvii. with regard to justice, t It may be observed, that upon this occasion I codsm religion in no other light, than in respect of the influenoftj may ^ have on the happiness of, the present life. As to ^iFects it may have in assuftng us of and preparing lis fc DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 85 XIX. Cb^'* XVI. If there be any acts which appear liable to ^ — >^t^ •^ ^^ Connecnon affect the state in any one or more of the above °^ °^"^*^ f against the ways, by operating in preju^ce of the external nationjii in- security of the state, or of its internal security ; general with 01 the public force ; of the encrease of the na- tional felicity ; of the public wealth ; of the na- tional population, of the national wealth ; of the sovereignty ; or of religion ; at the same time that it is not clear in which of all these ways better life to come, this is a matter which comes not within the cognizance of the legislator. See tit* [Offences against religion.] I say offences against religion, the fictitious entity : not offences against God, the real being. For, what sort of pain should the act of a feeble mortal occasion to a being unsus- ceptible of pain ? How should an offence affect him ? Should it be .an offence against his person, his property, his reputa- tion/ or his condition ? It has commonly been the way to put offences against re- hgion foremost. The idea of precedence is naturally enough connected with that of reverence. Ex Am^ a^vf/xa^a. But for expressing reverence, there are other methods enough that are less equivocal. And in point of method and per- spicuity, it is evident, that with regard to offences against religion, neither the nature of the mischief which it is their tendency to produce, nor the reason there may be for pu- sii^ing them, can be understood, but from the consideration ' *" of the. several mischiefs which result from the several other sorts of offences. In ,a political view, it is only because r those others are mischievous, that offences against religion are so too. 86 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, they will affect it most^ nor but that, according ■Aw J • ' — N/ — ' to contingencies, they may affect it in one of these ways only or in another ; such acts may be collected together under a miscellaneous division by themselves, and*s<;yled offences against the tHt- tianal interest in general. Of these then may be composed the eleventh and last division of the class of offences against the state. XX. ffo^^of* ^® come now to class the fifth : consisting of C'^s^enu- multiform offences. These, as ^ has been already 1. Divisions intimated, are either offences by falsehood, or of- of offences , ' by false- feuccs concemiug trust. Under the head of hood. offences by falsehood, may be comprehended, 1. ^ Simple failsehoods. 2. Forgery. 3. Personation. 4. Perjury*. Let us observe in what particulars * This division of falsehoods, it is to be observed, is i^ot regularly drawn out : that being what the nature of the case will not here admit of. Falsehood may be infinitely diversified in other ways than these. In a particular case, for instance, simple falsehood when uttered by writing, is distinguished from the same falsehood when uttered by word of mouth ; and has had a particular name given to it accordingly. I mean, where it strikes against reputation ; in which case, die instrument it has been uttered by has been called a iid^L Now it is obvious, that in the same manner it might have re- ceived a distinct name in all other cases where it is uttered by writing. But there has not happened to be any thing in* particular that has disposed mankind in those cas^s to give it such a name. The case is, that among the infinity of cif- J DIVISION or OFFENCES. S7 these four kinds of falsebood agree^ and in what ^^^^ they differ. ^ v ■ ^ XXI- Offences by falsehood, however diversified inOflencesby • • • fidfebood* other particulars, have this in common, that they inwbatthey consist in some abuse of the faculty of discourse, oneanotber. or rather as we shall see hereafter, of the faculty of influencing the sentiment of belief in other men*, whether by discourse or otherwise. The use of discourse is to influence beUef, and that in such tnanner as to give other men to understand that things are as they are really. Falsehoods, of whatever kind they be, agree in this : that they give men to understand that things are otherwise than as in reality they are. XXII. Personation, forgery, and perjury, are each of ~"* Ji^^ them distinguished from other modes of uttering &lsehood by certain special circumstances. When a falsehood is not accompanied by any of those circumstances, it may be styled simple falsehood. These circumstances are, 1 . The form in which / cnmstances by which it might have been diyerslBed, those which constitute it a libel, happen to have engaged a pecu- Kar fibare of attention on the part of the institutors of hm* gaage ; either in virtue of the influence which these circum- stances havie on the tendency of the act, or in virtne of any particular degree of force with which on any other account they may have disposed it to strike upon the im^nation. * See B. I. tit. [Falsehoods.] 88 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. the falsehood is uttered. 2. The circumstance of its relating or not to the identity of the person of him who utters it. 3. The sol^nity of the oo- casion on which it is uttered*. The particular application of these distinctive characters may more commodiously be reserved for another place f. XXIII. Sub-divi- lYg come now to the sub-divisions of oflEences sions of of« SteTo^ by falsehood. These will bring us back into the are deter- regular track of analysis^ pursued^ without de- the divi. viation, through the four preceding classes. sions of the i> i . , . ^. preceding By whatcvcr means a mischief is brought abput^ whether falsehood be or be not of the number^ the individuals liable to be affected by it must either be assignable or unassignable. ,It assignable^ there are but four material articles in respect to which they can be affected : to wit, their persons their properties, their reputations, and their con- ditions in life. The case is the same, if, though unassignable, they are comprisable in any class subordinate to that which is composed of the * There are two other circumstances still more material ; viz. 1. The parties whose interest is affected : by the false- hood. ^ The point or article in which that interest is ai^ fected. These circumstances, however, enter not into the composition of the generical character. Their use is, as we shall see, to characterize the several species of each genus.. See B. I. tit. [Falsehoods.] t Ibid. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 89 whole number of members of the state. If the falsehood tend to the detriment of the whole state^ it can only be by operating in one or other of the characters^ which every act that is an offence against the state must assume ; viz. that of an offence against external security^ against justice^ against the preventive branch of the police, against the public force, against the encrease of the na- tional felicity, against the public weath, against the national population, against the national wealth, against the sovereignty of the state, or against its religion. XXIV. It is the common property, then, of the offences oflfeoces of that^belong to this division, to run over the same some i"" *" ground that is occupied by those of the preced- ch^c their ing closes. But some of them, as we shall see, "S^^^^ are apt, on various occasions, to drop or change the names which bring them under this division : this is chiefly the case with regard to simple false- hoods; Others retain their names unchanged ; and even thereby supersede the names which would otherwise belong to the offences which they denominate : this is chiefly the case with regard to personation, forgery, and perjury. When this circumstance then, the circumstance of falsehood, intervenes, in some. cases the name which takes the lead, is that which indicates the offence by its effect ; in other cases, it is that which indi- cates the expedient or instrument as it were by 90 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. « the help of which the offence is committed. FalBe- hood^ take it by itself^ consider it as not being accompanied by any other material circumstances^ nor therefore productive of any material effects^ can never, upon the principle of utUity, constitute any offence at all. Combined with other cir- cumstances^ there is scarce any sort ofpemicious effect which it may not be instrumental in pro- ducing. It is therefore rather in compliance with the laws of language, than in consideration of the nature of the things themselves, that falsehoods are made separate mention of under the name and in the character of distinct offences.. All this would appear plain enough, if it were now a time for entering into particulars : but that is what can not be done, consistently with any prin- ciple of order or convenience, until the inferior divisions of those other classes shall have been previously exhibited. XXV. A trust— We come now to offences asfainst trust. A what. . ... trust is, where there is any particular act which one party, in the exercise of some power, or some right*, which is conferred on him, is bound to Power wnd * Powers, though not a species of rights (for the two sorts no wmpletc ^^ fictitious entities, termeid a power and a right, are altoge- definition ther disparate) are yet so far included under rights, that of them. wherever the word power may be employed, the word right ^ may also be employed : The ifeason is, that wherever you may ^ speak of a person as having a power, you may also speak of DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^1 perform for the benefit of another. Or, more c«ap. fully, thus : A' party is said to be invested with a him as haying a right to such power : but the converse of this proposition does not hold good : there are cases in which, though you may speak of a man as having a right, you can not speak of him as having a power, or in any other way make any mention of that word. On various occasions you have a right for instance, to the services of the magis- trate : but if you are a private person, you have no power over him : all the power is on his side. This being the case, as the word right was employed, the word power might, per- haps, without any deficiency in the sense, have been omitted^ On the present occasion however, as in speaking of trusts this word is commonly made more use of than the word r^htp it seemed most eligible, for the sake of perspicuity, to iniiert them both. It may be expected that, since the word trust has been here ei^pounded, the words power and right, upon the mean- ing of which the exposition of the word trust is made to depend, should be expounded also : and certain it is, that no two words can stand more in need of it than these do. Such exposition I accordingly set about to give, and indeed have actually drawn up : but the details into which I found it ne- cessary to enter for this purpose, were of' such length as to take up more room than could consistently be allotted to theiji in this place. With respect to these words, therefore^ and a number of others, such as possesswn, title, and the like, which in point of import are inseparably connected with them, instead of exhibiting the exposition itself, I must content myself ^th giving a general idea of the plan which I have pursued in framing it : and as to every thing else, I most leave the import of them to rest upon whs^ver footing it may happen to stand upon in the apprehension of each reader. Power and right, and the whole tribe of fictitious en- 92 DIVISION OF. OFFENCES. Chap: tiust, whcii, being invested with a power, or with a right,, there is a certain behaviour which, m the tities of this stamp, are all of them in the sense which belongs to them in a book of jurisprudence, the results of some mani- festation or other of the legislator's will with respect to such or such an act. Now every such manifestation is either a prohibition, a command, or their respective negations ; Viz. a permission, and the declaration which the legislator makes (of his will when on any occasion he leaves an act uncom- manded. Now, to render the expression of the rule more concise, the commanding of a positive act may be repre- sented by the prohibition of the negative act which is opposed to it. To know then how to expound a right, carry your eye- to the act which, in the circumstances in question^ would be a violation, of that right : 'the law creates the right by prohibiting that act. Power, whether over a man's own person, or over other persons, or over things, is constituted in the first instance by permission : but in as far as the law takes an active part in corroborating it, it is created by pro- hibition, and by command : by prohibition of such acts (on the part of other persons) as are judged incompatible with the exercise of it ; and upon occasion, by command of such acts as are judged to be necessary for the removal of such or such obstacles of the number of those which may occur to impede the exercise of it. For every right which the law confers on one party, y^hether that party be an indi- vidual, a subordinate class of individuals^ or the public, it thereby imposes on some other party ^ duty or obligattan But there may be laws which command or prohibit acts, that is, impose duties, without any other view than the benefit of the agent : these generate no rights : duties, therefore, may be either extra-regarding or self-regarding: extra-regarding have rights to correspond to them : self-regarding, none. -That the exposition of the words power and right must» in DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 9S XVI. exercise of that power, or of that right, he' is ^^^p. bound to maintain for the benefit of some other order to be correct, enter into* a great variety of details, may be presently made appear. One branch of the system of rights and powers, and but one, are those of which pro- perty is composed : to be correct, then, it must, among other things, be applicable to the whole tribe of modifications o£ which property is susceptible. But the commands and pro- hibitions, by which the powers and rights that compose those several modifications are created, are of many different forms : to comprize the exposition in question within the compass of a. single paragraph, would therefore be impossible : to take as many paragraphs for it as would be necessary, in order to exhibit these different forms, would be to engage in a detail so ample, that the analysis of the several possible species of property would compose only a part of it. This labour, uninviting as it was, 1 have accordingly undergone : but the result of it, as may well be imagined, seemed too ?oluminous and minute to be exhibited in an outline like the present. Happily it is not necessary, except only for the scientific purpose of arrangement, to the understanding of any thing that need be said on the penal branch of the art of legislation. In a work which should treat of the civil branch of that art, it would find its proper place : and in such a work, if conducted upon the plan of the present one, it would be indispensable. Of the limits which seem to sepa- rate the one of these branches from the other, a pretty ample description will be found in the next chapter : from which some further lights respecting the course to be taken for developing the notions to be annexed to the words r^ht and power, may incidentally be collected. See in particular, § 3. and 4. See also par. Iv. of the present chapter. I niight have cut this matter very short, by proceeding in the usual strain, and saying, that a power was a faculty, and 94 DIVISION OP OFFENCES. ^"vL P*^*y* ^^ ^^^^ ^^^' *^^ party first mentioned is styled a trustee : for the other party^ no name has ever yet been found: for want of a namie^ there seems to be no other resource than to give a new and more extensive sense to the word benefit danfy or to say at length the party to be benefitted* . that a right was a privilege, and so on, following the beaten track of definition. B&t the inanity of such a method, in cases like the present, has been already pointed out:t a power is not a — any thing : neither is a right a — any thing : the case is, they have neither of them any superior genus : these, together with duty^ obligation, and a multitude of others of the same stamp being of the number of those fic- titious entities, ^f which the import can by no other means be illustrated than by showing the relation which they bear to real ones. * The first of these parties is styled in the law langus^e, as well as in common speech, by the name here given to him. The other is styled, in the technical language of the English law, a cestuy que trust : in common speech, as we have observed, there is, unfortunately, no name for him. As to the law phrase, it is antiquated French, and though complex, it is still elliptical, and to the highest degree ob-^ scure. The phrase in full length would run in some such manner as this : eestuy al use de qui le trust est cr66 : he to whose use the trust , or benefit is created. In a particular case, a eestuy que trust is called by the Rqman law, Jldei- commissarius. In imitation of this, I have seen him some- where or other called in English d^ fide-committee. This term however, seems not very expressive. A fide-committee, or, as it should have been, a ^c{«i-committee, seems, literally t See Fragment of Gorernmeut, ch. v. $ 6, note. DIVISION OF OFFBNCBS. 95 The trustee is also said to have a trust cofrir f erred or imposed upon him^ to be mcested with a trusty to have had a trust given him to execute^ to perform^ to discharge^ or to ful£Q. The party to be benefitted^ is said to have a trust established or created in his favour: and so on through a variety of other phrases. ' Oflfencca against XXVI. Now it may occur, that a trust is oftentimes speaking, to mean one who is committed to the good faith of another. Good faith seems to consist in the keeping of a promise. But a trust may be created without any promise in the case. It is indeed common enough to exact a promise, in order the more effectually to oblige a man to do that which he is made to promise he will do. But this is merely an accidental circumstance. A trust may be created without any such thing. What is it that constitues a legal obliga- tion in any case ? A command, express or virtual, together inth punishment appointed for the breach of it. By the same means may an obligation be constituted in this case as well as any other. Instead of the word beneficiary, which 1 found it necessary to adopt, the sense would be better ex- pressed by some such word as beneficiendaryt (a word anala- gous in its formation to referendary) were it such an one as the ear could bring itself to indure. This ^ would put it more effectually out of doubt, that the party meant was the party who ought to. receive the benefit, whether he actually receives it or no: whereas the word beneficiary might be understood to intimate, that the benefit; was actually received : while in offences against trust the mischiefs commonly is, that such benefit is reaped not by the person it was designed for> but by some other : for instance, the trustee. 96 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, spoken of as a species of condition * : that a trust >-v — ' is also spokeii of as a species of property : and ' trust, con- * r ^ r r ^ ditk)ii,and that a conditioii itself is also spoken of -in the property, ^ •■■ why ranked same li^ht. It mav be thouffht, therefore, that under sepa- , ... rate divi- m the first class, the division of oflPences against condition ' should have been included under that of the offences against property : and that at any rate, so much of the fifth class now before us as contains offences against trust, should have been included under one or other of those two divi- sions of the first class. But upon examination it will appear, that no one of these divisions could with convenience, nor even perhaps with pro- priety, have been included under either of the other two. It will appear at the same time, that there is an intimate connection subsisting amongst them all : insomuch that of the lists of the offences to which they are respectively exposed, any one may serve in great measure as a model for any other. There are certain offences to which all * It is for shortness* sake that the proposition is stated as it stands in the text. If critically examined, it might be found, perhaps, to be scarcely justifiable by the laws of lan- guage. For the fictitious entities, characterized by the two abstract terms, trust and condition, are not subalternate but, disparate. To speak with perfect precision, we should say that he who is invested with a trust, is, on tha.t account, spoken of as being invested with a condition : viz. the con- dition of a trustee. We speak of the condition of a trustee as we speak of the condition of a husband or a father. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^* trusts as such are exposed : to all these offences ^^' every sort of condition will be found exposed : at the same time that particular species of the of- fences against trust will^ upon their application to particular conditions, receive different parti- cular denominations. It will appear also, that of the two groupes of offences into which the list of those^^ against trust will be found naturally to divide itself, there is one, and but one, to which property^vtaken in its proper and more confined sense, 'stands exposed : and that these, in their a{^libiation to the subject of property, will be found^^ susceptible of distinct modifications, to which: the usage of language, and the occasion there is: for distinguishing them in point of treat- menty make.it neciessary to find names. ^ In th^ first place,' as there are, or at least may b(i''(as we shall see) conditions which are not trusts*; so there are trusts of which the idea would not be readily' and naturally understood to be included under the rword condition : add to which, that of those conditions which do include a trust,; the greater number include other ii^edients along with it : so that the idea of a condition, if on the one hand it stretches beyond the idea of a trust, does on the other hand fall short of. it.^ Of the several sorts of trusts, by far the most important are those in which it is the public that * Infra; Iv. VOL. II. H 98 ' DIVISION OF OFFBNCBS. Chaf. stands in the relation of beneficiary. Now these trusts^ it should seem^ would hardly present themselves at first view upon the mention of Ihe word , condition. At any rate^ what is more ma- terial^ the most important of the offences against these kinds of trust would not seem to be included under the denomination of offences against con- dition. The offences which by. this latter ap- pellation would be brought to view> wouM be such only as seemed to affect the interests of an individual: of him^ for example^ who is con- sidered as being invested with that ccnddition. But in offences against public trust> it is the in* fluence they have on the interests of the public that constitutes by much the most materii^ P^ of their pernicious tendency : the influence th^. have on the interests of aay individual^, the only part of their influence which would be. rea^lifyi brought to view by the appellation ofioflfencec against condition^ is comparatively as nothing. The word trust directs the attention at onoe tO^ the interests of that party for . whom the person' in question is trustee : which party^ upon the ad^ dition of the epithet pubUc^ is immediately uQ|to^ stood to be the body composed of the whole as- semblage^ or an indefinite portion of the But the import of the phrase iiffect of prcfperty, and in consequence the import of the ' word property, has been made to take a much wider ' range. In almost every case in the law does any thing for a man's benefit |tr advantage, men are apt to speak of it, on some don or .other, as conferring on r^ femon, as is not the object of a monopolyy imports nO; such thing ; and yet^ by possessing this rights a man is said to possess a condition : .and by for- feiting it^ to forfeit his condition. Aft^.all^ it will be seen, that. there must be cases in n^ch, according to the usage of lan- guage,, the same offence may, with more or. less appearance of propriety, be referred to the head of offences' against condition, or that of offences agaiqust property indifferently. In such cases. the foUowing ^rule may serve for drawing the line. Wherever, in virtue of your possessing a pro- perty, or being the object of a property possessed by anotiier, you are characterised, according to the usage; of language, by a particular >name> such as mafigter,' servant, husband, wife, steward, .agent, attorney, or the like, there the word condition may be eiqployed in exclusion of the word property : and an offence in which, in virtue of your bear- ing such relation, you are concerned, eitiier in &e capacity of an offender, or . in that of a .party injured, may be referred to the head of oflfences against condition, and not to that of offences ; against property. To give an example: Being r bound, in the capacity of land steward to a certain person, to oversee the repairing of a certain bridge, you forbear to do so : in this case, as the services 106 DIVISION OF OPFENClBil. you are bound to render are of the number of those which give occasion to the party^ from whom they are due^ to be spokeb of under a certain generical name> viz. that of land steward> the offence of withholding them may be referred to the class of offences against ccmdition. .But sup- pose that, without being engaged in that general and miscellaneous course of service, which with reference to a ^ particular person would deno- minate you his land steward, you were bound, whether by usage or by contract, to render him that single sort of service which consists in the providing, by yourself or by others, for the re- pairing of that bridge : in this case, as there is not any such current denomination to which, in virtue of your being bound to l^ender this service, you stand aggregated (for that of architect, ma- son, or. the like, is not here in question) the of- fence you commit by withholding such service can not with propriety be referred to the class of offences stgainst condition : it can only therefcnre b^ I'eferred to the class of offences against pro- perty. By way of further distinction, it may be re-^ )narkcd, that where a man, in virtue of his being bound to render, or of others being bound to nender him, certain services, is spoken of as pos- sessing a condition, the assemblage of services is generally so considerable, in point of duration,^ mVISION OP Ot^FBNCBS. 107 • to constitute a course of considerable length, so Cha». 'as cm a variety of occasions to com^ to be varied 4ufl repeated : and in most cases, when the con«- 'dition is not of a domestic nature, sometimes for ^the -li^aefit of one person, sometimes for that of another. Sendees which come to be rendered to I a particular person on a particular occasion, espedally if they be of short duration, have sel- dom the effect of occasioning either party to be spoken of as being invested with a condition. The particular occasional services which one man may come, by contract or otherwise, to be bound to render to another, are innumerably various : but the number of conditions which have names may be counted, and are, comparatively, but few. If after all, notwithstanding the rule here given for separating conditions from articles of property, any object should present itself which should appear to be referable, with equal pro- priety, to either head, the inconvenierice would not be material ; since in such cases, as will be seen a little farther on, whichever appellation were adopted, the list of the offences, to which tiie object stands exposed, would be substantially the same. These di£Sculties being cleared up, we now proceed to exhibit an analytical view of the se- veral possible offences against trust. 106 . DIVISION OF OFFENCES. xxni. ^^ ^^^ ^ Offences against trust may be. distinguished, in agwiist trust the first place,, into such asji[;Qncem the existence —their con- "^ nection with of the trust iu the hands.of such or such a person, each other. and such as cohcemthe exercise of the. functions that bdong to it*. First then, with regard tp i^C* * We shall have occasion, a little farther on, to speak of the person in whose hands the trust exists, under the^ de- scription of the person who possesses, or is in possession of it, and thence of the possession of the trust abstracted from the consideration of the possessor. However different the expression, the import is in both cases the same. So irre- gular and imperfect is the structure of language on this head, that no one phrase can be made to suit the idea on all the occasions on which it is requisite it should be brought to view : the phrase must be continually shifted, or new modi- fied: so likewise in regard to conditions, and in regard to property. The being' invested "with, or possessing a condir tion : the being in possession of an article of property, that is^ if the object of the property be corporeal ; the having a legal title (defeasible or indefeasible) to the physical possession of it, answers to the being in possession of a trust, or the being the person in^ whose hands a trust exists* In like manner, to the exercise of the Junctions belonging to a trust, or to a condition, corresponds the enjoyment of an article of pro-' perty ; that is, if the object of it be corporeal, the. oceupaikm. These verbal discussions are equally tedious and indis- pensable. Striving to cut a new road through the wilds of jurisprudence, I find myself continually distressed, for want of tools that are fit to work with. To frame a com- plete set of new ones is impossible. All that can be done is> to make here and there a new one in cases af absolute DIVISION OF OFFBNCES. 109 such as relate to its existence. An offence of C'^'- XVI. ibis description^ like one of any other description^ if an offence it ought to be^ must to some person or other, import a prqudice. This prejudice may be distinguished into two branches : 1 . That which may fall on such persons as are or should be in- vested with the trust : 2. That which may fall on the persons for whose sake it is or should be in- stituted^ or on other persons at large. To begin with the former of these branches. Let any trust be conceived. The consequences which it is in the nature of it to be productive of to the pos- sessor, must, in as far as they are material^, be either of an advantageous or of a disadvantageous nature ; in as far as they are advantageous, the trust may be considered as a ben^ or privilege : necessity, and for the rest, to patch up from time to time the imperfections of the old. As to the bipartition which this paragraph sets out with, it must be acknowledged not to be of the nature of those wUcli to a first glance afford a sort of intuitive proof of their beu^'exhausthre* There is not that marked connection and opposition bietween the terms of it, which subsists between contradictory terms and between terms that have the same common genus. I imagine, however, that upon examination it would be found to be exhaustive notwithstanding: and ftat it might even be demonstrated soto.be. But the de-- monstration would lead us too far out of the ordinary track ofhrnguage. * See Cap. vii. [Actions.] 111. 110 CLASSES OF OFFENCES. in as Seu" as they are disadvantageous^ it may be considered as a burthen *. To consider it then upon the footing of a benefit. The trust either is of the number of those which ought by law to subsist f; * If advantageous, it will naturally be on account of the powers or righU that are annexed to the trust: if disad^nm* tageous» on account of the dxAet. t It may seem a sort of anachronism to speak on the present occasion of a trust, condition, or other possession, as one of which it may happen that a man ought or ought not to have had possession given him by the law, for the plan here set out upon is to give such a view all along of the laws that are proposed, as shall be taken from the reasons which there are for making them : the reason then it would seem should subsist before the law : not the law before the reason. Nor is this to be denied : for, unques- tionably, upoiiK the principle of utility, it may be said with equal truth of those operations by which a trust, or any other article of property, is instituted, as of any oth^r operations of the law, that it never can be expedient they should be performed, unless some reason for performing them, deduced from that principle, can be assigned. To give property to one man, you must impose obligation on. another: you must oblige him to do something which. he^ may have a mind not to do, or to abstain from doing ^ome* thing which he may have a mind to do : in a word, you musjt^ in some way or other expose him to inconvenience. Every, such law, therefore, must at any rate be mischievous in the first instance ; and if no good effects can be produced to set against the bad, it must be mischievous upon the whole*; Some reasons, therefore, in this case, as in every other, there . ought to be. llie truth is, that in the case before us, die CLASSES OF OFFENCES. Ill that is^ which the legislator meant should be ^^• established ; or is not. If it is^ the possession which at any time yon may be deprived of^ with respect to it^ must at that time be either prdsent or to come : if to come (in which case it may be regarded either as certain or as contingent) the investitive event, or event from whence your > 1 . ■■ I ■ '■ ■ reasons are of too various and complicated a nature to be iMTOug^t to view in an analytical outline like the present. Where the offence is of the number of those by which person or reputation are affected, the reasons for prohibiting it lie on the surface, and apply to every man alike. But property ^ before it can be offended against^ must be created, and at the instant of its creation distributed, as it were, into parcels of different sorts and sizes, which require to be assigned, some to one man and some to another, for reasons, of which many lie a little out of sight, and which being different in different cases, would take up more room than could con- sistently be allotted to them here. For the present purpose, it is sufficient if it appear, that for the carrying on of the several purposes of life, there are trusts, and conditions, and other articles of property, which must be possessed by somebody: and that it is not every article that can, nor e?ery article that ought, to be possessed by every body. What articles ought to be created, and to what persons, and in what cases they ought to be respectively assigned, are questions which cannot be settled here. Nor is there anyteason for wishing that they could, since the settling them one way or another is what would make no difference m d&e nature of any offence whereby any party may be ex- posed, on the occasion of any such institution to sustain a detriment. 11^ CLA^BS OF OFFENC^. t possession of it should have taken its' commence-' ment^ was either an event in the production^ of ^ which the will of the offender should have.becn^ instrumental^ or any other event at large : in the: former case^ the pffence may be termed wrongfuh non^inoestment of trust: in the latter case^ wrmgful interceptum of trust ^. If at the time of the of-; fence whereby you are deprived of it, you were already in possession of it, the offence may be stiled wrongful dvoestmeni of trust. - In any of these cases, the effect of the offence is either to put somebody else into the trust, or not : if not, ' it is wrongful divestment, wrongful interception, or wrongful divestment, and nothing more : if it be, the person put in possession^is either the > * In the former case it may be observed, the act is of the negative kind: in the latter, it will commonly be of the positive kind. As to the expression non-investment of trust, I am sensibly ' that it is not perfectly consonant to the idiom of the Ian-' guage : the usage is to speak of a person as being invested ' (that is clothed) with a trust, not of a trust as of a thing/* that is itsdf invested, or put on. The phrase at length would - be, the non -investment of a person with a trust: but* this' phrase is by much too long-winded to answer the purpose of - an appellative. I saw, therefore, no other resource than to - venture upon the ellipsis here employed. The antient law- ^ yers, in the construction of their appellatives, have indulged ' themselves in much. harsher ellipsises without scruple. See*. ' above, xxv. note. It is already the usage to speak of a trusitl '^ as a thing that vests, and as a thing that may be divested* '- »f. DIVISION OP OFFENCES. ^^^ F. XVL wrong doer himself^ in whict case it may be stiled ^"^ usurpation of trust; or some other person^ in which case it may be stiled wrongful investment, or attri- bution^ of trust. If the trust in question is not of the number of those which ought to subsist^ it depends upon the manner in which one man de- prives another of it^ whether such deprivation shall or shall not be an offence^ and^ accordingly, whether non-investment, interception, or divest- mentj shall or shall not be wrongful. But the putting any body into it must at any rate be an offence : and this offence may be either usurpation or wrongful investment, as before. In the next place, to consider it upon the footing of a burthen. In this point of view, if no other interest than that of the persons liable to be invested with it were considered, it is what ought not, upon the principle of utility, to subsist : if it ought, it can only be for the sake of the persons in whose favour it is established. If then it ought not on any account to subsist, - neither non-investment, interception, nor divest- ment^ can be wrongfiil with relation to the persons first-mentioned, whatever they may be on any other account, in respect of the manner in which they happen to be performed : for usurpa- tion, though not likely to be committed, there is the same room as before : so likewise is there for wrongful investment; which, in as far as the trust is considered as a burthen, may be stiled VOL. II. I 114 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. wrongful imposition of trust. If the trust, being still of the burthensome kind, is of the number of those which ought to subsist, any offence that can be committed, with relation to the existence of it, must consist either in causing a person to ^ in possession of it, who ought not to be, or in causing a person not to be in possession of it who ought to be : in the former case, it must be either usurp- ation or wrongful divestment, as before : in the latter case, the person who is caused to be not in possession, is either the wrong doer himself, or some odier : if the- wrong doer himself, either at the time of the offence he was in possession of it, or he was not : if he was, it may be termed wrongful abdication of trust ; if not, xxyrongftd rfe- trectation* or non-assumption: if the person, whom the offence causes not to be in the trust, is any other person, the offence must be either wrongful divestment, wrongful non-investment, or wrongful interception, as before : in any of which caseSy j to consider the trust in the light of a burtheiii it might also be stiled wrongful eootmptwn Jr6m trust. Lastly, with regard to the prejudice which dttt persons for whose benefit the trust is instituted|(f] . . : : rf * [Detrectation] I do not find that this word has ytt been received into the English language. In the LatiBf however, it is very expressive, and is used in a sense exacdy suitable to the sense here given to it. MilUiam detrectarif ] to endeavour to s^void serving in the army, is a phrase nol' unfrequently met with in the Roman writers. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 115 or any other persons whose interests may come Chap. to be aflfected by its existing or not existing in such or such hands^ are liable to sustain. Upon examination it will appear^ that by every sort of o£fence whereby the persons who are or should be in possession of it are liable^ in that respect^ to sustain a prejudice^ the persons now in ques- tion are also liable to sustain a prejudice. The prejudice^ in this case, is evidently of a very diferent nature from what it was of in the other : but the same general names will be applicable in tins case as in that. If the beneficiaries, or per- sons whose interests are at stake upon the exer- dse of the trust, or any of them, are liable to sustain a prejudice, resulting from the quality of ihe person by whom it may be filled, such preju- dice must result from the one or the other of two causes : 1. From a person's having the possession of it who ought not to have it : or 2. From a person's not having it who ought : whether it be a benefit or burthen to the possessor, is a circum- ; stance that to this purpose makes no difference. In the first of these cases the ofiences from which ihe prejudice takes its rise are those of usurpa- tion of trust, wrongful attribution of trust, and wrongful imposition of trust : in the latter, wrong- ful non-investment of trust, wrongful interception of trust, wTongftd divestment of trust, wrongful abdication of trust, and wrongful detrectation of trust* lie DIVISION OF OFFENCES. So much for the oflPences which concern the existence or possession of a trust: those which concern the exercise of the functions that belong to it may be thus conceived. You are in posses- sion of a trust : the time then for your acting in it must, on any given occasion, (neglecting, for simplicity's sake, the then present instant) be either past or yet to come. If past, your conduct on that occasion must have been either conforma- ble to the purposes for which the truiSt was insti- tuted, or unconformable : if conformable, there has been no mischief in case : if unconformable^ the fault has been either in yourself alone, or in some other person, or in both : in as far as it has lain in yourself, it has consisted either in your not doing something which you ought to do, in which case it may be stiled negative breach of trust ; or in your doing something which you ought not to do : if in the doing something which you ought not to do, the party to whom the prejudice has accrued is either the same for whose benefit the trust was instituted, or some other party at large : in the former of these cases, the oflPence may be stiled positive breach of trust ; in the other abuse of trtist^* 1 -1 ■J * What is here meant by abuse of trust, is the exercise, of 1 a power usurped over strangers, under favour of the poweijl properly belonging to the trust. The distinction betweea what is here meant by breach of trust, and what is here meant by abuse of trust, is not very steadily observed incoia*< mon speech : and in regard to public trusts, it will even in DIVISION OF OFFENCES. H7 In as far as the fault lies in another person, the Chjip, A V l« offence on his part may he stiled disturbance of trust.' Supposing the time for your acting in the trust to he yet to come, the effect of any act which tends to render your conduct unconformable to the purposes of the trust, may he either to render it actually and eventually unconformable, or to produce a chance of its being so. In the former of these cases, it can do no otherwise than take one or other of the shapes that have just been men- .tioned. In the latter case, the blame must lie either in yourself alone, or in some other person, or in both together, as before. If in another per- son, the acts whereby he may tend to render your conduct unconformable, must be exercised either on yourself, or on other objects at large. If ex- ercised on yourself, the influence they possess must many cases be imperceptible. The two offences are, however, ilk themselves perfectly distinct: since the persons, by whom the prejudice is suffered, are in many cases altogether dif- ferent. It may be observed, perhaps, that with regard to abase of trust, there is but one species here mentioned ; viz. that which corresponds to positive breach of trust : none being mentioned as corresponding to negative breach of trust. The reason of this distinction will presently appear. In fa- Tonr of the parties, for whose benefit the trust was created, the trustee is bound to act; and therefore merely by his doing nothing they may receive a prejudice : but in favour of other persons at large he is not bound to act : and therefore it is only from some positive act on his part that any pre- judice can ensue to them. 118 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. either be such as operates immediately on your body, or such as operates immediately on your mind. In the latter case, again, the tendency of them must be to deprive you either of the know- ledge, or of the power, or of the inclination*, which would be necessary to your maintaining such a conduct as shall be conformable to the purposes in question. If they be such, of which the tendency is to deprive you of the inclination in question, it must be by applying to your will the force of some seducing motive f. Lastly, This mo- tive must be either of the coercvoe, or of the alluring kind; in other words, it must present itself either in the shape of a mischief or of an advantage. Now in none of all the cases that have been mentioned, except the last, does the ofience receive any new denomination ; according to the event it is either a disturbajice of trust, or an abortive attempt to be guilty of that offence. In this last it is termed bribery ; and it is that particular species of it which may be termed cictvoe bribery, or bribe-giving. In this case, to consider the matter on your part, either you accept of the bribe, or you do not : if not, and you do not after- wards commit, or go about to commit, either a breach or an Stbuse of trust, there is no offence, on your part, in the case : if you do accept it, whether * See infra ; and ch. xviii. [Indirect Legislation.] + See ch, xi. [Dispositions] xxix. 1 J ■i DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 11*-^ you eventually do or do not commit the breach or Chap. the abuse which it is the bribe-givers intention you should commit^ you at any rate commit an offence which is also termed bribery : and which^ for dis- tinction sake may be termed passive bribery^ or bribt4aking* . As to any farther distinctions, they will depend upon the nature of the par- ticular sort of trust in question, and therefore bel<»ig not to th6 present place. And thus we ha¥e> thirteen sub-divisions of offences against trust; viz. 1. Wrongful non-investment of trust 2. Wrongful interception of trust. 3. Wrongful divestment of trust. 4. Usurpation of trust- s' Wrongful investment or attribution of trust* 6. Wrongful abdication of trust. 7. Wrongful detrectation of tru3t. 8. Wrongful imposition of trust. 9- Negative breach of trust. 10. Posi- tive breach of trust. 1 ] . Abuse of trust. 1 2. Dis- turbanee of trust. 13. Bribery. * To bribe a trustee, as such, is in fact neither more nor ks8 than to nthmn him to be guilty of a breach or an abuse of trost. Now subornation is of the number of those accessary ofenceflf which every principal offence, one as well as another, is liable to be attended with. See infra, and 6. I. tit. [Ac- cessory (fences.] This particular species of subornation however, being one that, besides its having a specific name framed to express it, is apt to engage a particular share of attention, and to present itself to view in company with other offences against trust, it would have seemed an omission not to have included it in that catalogue. ISO DIVISION OP OFFENCES. XXVIII. From what has been said, it appears that there in trustees caniiot be any other oflFences, on the part of a dismissed to^, , i*-! i /* * • Class 5. trustee, by which a beneficiary can receive on any particular occasion any assignable specific preju- dice. One sort of acts, however, there are by which a trustee may be put in some danger of re- ceiving a prejudice, although neither the nature of the prejudice, nor the occasion on which he is in danger of receiving it, should be assignable. These can be no other than such acts, whatever they may be, as dispose the trustee to be acted upon by a given bribe with greater eflPect than any with which he could otherwise be acted upon : or in other words, which place him in such circum- stances as have a tendency to encrease the quan- tum of his sensibility to the action of any motive of the sort in question*. Of these acts, there seem to be no others, that will admit of a descrip- tion applicable to all places and times alike, than acts of prodigality on the part of the trustee. But in acts of this nature the prejudice to the beneficiary is contingent only and unliquidated ; while the prejudice to the trustee himself is certain and liquidated. If therefore on any occasion it should be found adviseaWe to treat it on the footing of an oflFence, it will find its place more naturally in the class of self-regarding ones. * See ch. vi. [Sensibility] ii. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. IS'l XXIX. As to the sub-divisions of offences airainst trust, ^ . ^ '-' Ine sub- these are perfectly analogous to those of offences djjiaoiw of by falsehood. The trust may be private, semi-pub- «g«"«t timt / ,. • .^ X •'are also de- hc, or public : it may concern property, person, tennined by • 1 . • A tbe divinoitt reputation, or condition; or any two or more ofofthepre- those articles at a time : as will be more particu- das^ larly ei^lained in another place. Here too the oflfence, in running over the ground occupied by the three prior classes, will in some instances change its name, while in others it will not. XXX. ^ Lastly, If it be asked. What sort of relation there Connectioo subsists between falsehoods on one hand, and fences bj ' offences concerning trust on the other hand ; the anToffenoes answer is, ihey are altogether disparate. False- ■«**"* ^^** hood is a circumstance that may enter into the oomposion of any sort of offence, those concerning trust, as well as any other : in some as an acci- dental, in others as an essential instrument. Breach or abuse of trust are circumstances which, in the diaracter of accidental concomitants, may enter into the composition of any other offences (those against falsehood included) besides those to which they respectively give name. *^^ DIVISION OF OFFBNCES. Genera of Class I. XXXI. Aiwiysisinto Returning now to class the first, let us pursue gaitra pur- , , sued no far- the distribution a step farther, and branch out the Class 1. several divisions of that class, as above exhibited, into their respective genera, that is, into such mi- nuter divisions as are capable of beang charac- terised by denominations of which a great part are already current among the people*^ In this place the analysis must stop. To apply it in the same regular form to any of the other classes seems scarcely practicable: to semi*public, as also to public offences, on account of the interference of local circumstances : to self-regarding ones, on account of the necessity it would ereate of de- ciding prematurely upon points which may appear liable to controversy : to offences by falsehood, and offences gainst trust, on account of the de- pendence there IS between this clasaand the three former. What remains to be done in thb way, ■ ■■"»■ I ■ II I p»n a ■ ■ ■■III >ii ■ n ,1 ■ I ■ I I ■>>■■<■ > I I II ■ ■ I I I > II ^^mmtmmt^mmmmlMt^ % * In the enomeratioii of diese genera, It Is att almig to-be observed, that offences of an aceessory nature are itot men* tioned ; except unless it be here and there where they hare obtained current names which seemed too much in vogue to be omitted. Accessory offences are those which, without being the very acts from which the mischief in question takes its immediate rise, are, in the way of causality, connected with those acts. See ch. vii. [Actions] xxiv. and B. I. tit. [Accessory offences.] ♦ DIVISION OF OFFENCBS. l"^ with reference to these four classes^ will require Cha». discussion^ and will therefore be introduced with ""— v'"^ more propriety in the body of the work^ than in a preliminaiy part, of which the business is only to draw outlines. XXXII. An act, by which the happiness of an individual OflRences , . against an is disturbed, is either simple in its effects or complex. indiTiduai It may be stiled simple in its effects, when it pie in their Cutsets Of aflfects him in one only of the articles or points in complex. which his interest, as we have seen, is liable to be afibcted : complex, when it affects him m several of those pmnts at once. Such as are simple in ther efifects must of course be first considered. :;pcxiii. In a simple way, that is in one way at a time, a Offences man's happiness is liable to be disturbed either ^—tho^'^ 1. By actions referring to his own person itself ; ^'"• or 2. By actions referring to such external objects on which his happiness is more or less dependent. As to his own person, it is composed of two dif- fe]:ent parts, or reputed parts, his body and his mind. Acts which exert a pernicious influence on his person, whether it be on the corporeal or on the mental part of it, will operate thereon either immediately, and without affecting his will, or me- diately, through the intervention of that faculty : viz. by means of the influence which they cause his will to exercise over his body. If with the inter- vention of his will, it must be by mental coercion : ^^^ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. that is, by causing hinx to will to maintain, and thence actually to maintain, a certain conduct which it is disagreeable, or in any other way per- nicious, to him to maintain. This conduct may either be positive or negative ♦ : when positive, the coercion is stiled compulsion or co;2straint: when negative, restraint. Now the way in which . the coercion is diagreeable to him, may be by pro- ducing either pain of body, or only pain of mind. If pain of body is produced by it, the offence will come as well under this as under other denomina- tions, which we shall come to presently. More- over, the conduct which a man, by means of .the coercion, is forced to maintain, will be determined either specifically, andoriginally by the determina- tion of the particular acts themselves, which he is forced to perform or to abstain from, or generally and incidentally, by means of his being forced to be or not to be in such or such a place. But if he is prevented from being in one place, he is con- fined thereby to another. For the whole surface of the earth, like the surface of any greater or lesser body, may be conceived to be divided into two, as well as into any other number of parts or spots. If the spot then, which he is confined to, be smaller than the spot which he is excluded from, his condition may be called confinement : if larger, . * Ch, vii. [Actions] viii. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. )S5 banishment^. VHiether an act, the effect of which ^^f* is to exert a pernicious influence on the person of him who suffers by it, operates with or without the intervention of an act of his will, the mischief it produces will either be mortal or not mortal. If not mortal, it will either be reparable, that is tem- porary ; or irreparable, that is perpetual. If re- parable, the mischievous act may be termed a siny^k corporal injury ; if irreparable, an irreparable corporal injury. Lastly, a pain that a man expe- riences in his mind will either be a pain of actual sufferance, or a pain of apprehension. If a pain of apprehension, either the offender himself is repre- sented as intending to bear a part in the produc- tion of it, or he is not. In the former case the offence may be siWed menacement : in the latter case, as also where the pain is a pain of actual sufferance, a simple mental injury. And thus we have nine genera or kinds of personal injuries ; which, when ranged in the order most commo- dious for examination, will stand as follows ; viz. 1. Simple corporal injuries. 2. Irreparable cor- poral injuries. 3. Simple injurious restrainment. * Of these^ and the several other leading expressions which there is occasion to bring to view in the remaining part of this analysis, ample definitions will be found in the body of the work, conceived in lermvm legis. To give parti- cular references to these difinitions, would be incumbering the page to little purpose. 196 DIVISION OP OFFENCES. XVI. Cha». 4, Simple injurious compulsion*. 5. Wrongful con- finement. 6. Wrongful banishment. 7. Wrong- ful homicide. 8. Wrongful menacementf . 9* Sim- ple mental injuries J. * Injurious reBtrainment at large, and injurious compalsion at larg^y are here stiled «tm/>Ze, in order to distinguish them from confinement, banishment, robbery, and extortion; all which are, in many cases, but so many modifications of one or other of the two first-mentioned offences. To constitute an offence an act of simple injurious restrain- ment, or simple injurious compulsion, it is sufficient if the in- fluence it exerts be, in the first place, pernicious ; in the next place, exerted on the person by the medium of the will : it is not necessary that that part of the person on which it is ex- erted be the part to which it is pernicious : it is not even ne- cessary that it should immediately be pernicious to either of these parts, though to one or other of them it must be perni- cious in the long-run, if it be pernicious at all. An act in which the body, for example, is concerned, may be very disi^ greeable, and thereby pernicious to him who performi it, though neither disagreeable nor pernicious to his body : for instance, to stand or sit in public with a label on his back or under any other circumstances of ignominy. t It may be observed, that wrongful menacement is in- cluded as well in simple injurious restrainment, and simple injurious compulsion, except in the rare case where the mo- tives by which one man is prevented by another from doing a thing that would have been materially to his advantage, or induced to do a thing that is materially to his prejudice, are of the alluring kind. I Although, for reasons that have been already given, (supra xxxi.) no complete catalogue, nor therefore any ex- DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 1 27 XXXIV. xVl' We come now to offences against reputation offend " against ■ ■ repatation. haustive view, of either semi-public or self-regarding of- fences, can be exhibited in this chapter, it may be a satisfaction, however, to the reader, to see some sort of list of them, if it were only for the sake of having examples before his eyes. Such lists cannot any where be placed to more advantage than under the heads of the several divisions of private extra-regarding oifences, to which the semi-public and self-regarding offences in question respectively corres- pond. Concerning the two latter, however, and the last more particalarlj, it must be understood that all I mean by insert- ing them here, is to exhibit the mischief, if any, which it is of the nature of them respectively to produce, without deciding upon the question, whether it would be worth while [See ch. xiii. Cases unmeet] in every instance, for the sake of com- bating that mischief, to introduce the evil of punishment In the course of this detail, it will be observed, that there are several heads of extra-regarding private offences, to which die correspondent heads, either of semi-public or self-re- garding offences, or of both, are wanting. The reasons of these deficiencies will probably, in most instances, be evident enough upon the face of them. Lest they should not^ they are however specified in the body of the work. They would take up too much room were they to be inserted here. I. Semi-public offences through calamity. Calamities, by which the persons or properties of men, or both, are lia- ble to be affected, seem to be as follows: 1. Pestilence or contagion. 2. Famine, and other kinds of scarcity. 3. Mis- chiefs producible by persons deficient in point of under- standing, such as infants, idiots, and maniacs, for want of their being properly taken care of. 4. Mischief producible by the ravages of noxious animals, such as beasts of prey, 1^8 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, merely. These require but few distinctions. In point of reputation there is but one way of suffer- locusts, &c. &c. 5. Collapsion, or fall of large masses of solid matter, such as decayed buildings, or rocks, or masses of snow. 6. Inundation or submersion. 7. Tempest* 8. Blight. 9. Conflagration. 10. Explosion. In as far as a man may contribute, by any imprudent act of his, to give birth to any of the above calamities, such act may be an offence. In as far as a man may fail to do what is incumbent on him to do towards preventing them, such failure may be an offence. II. Semi-public offences of mere delinquency. A whole neighbourhood may be made to suffer, 1. Simple cor- poral injuries : in other words, they may be made to suffer in point of health, by offensive or dangerous trades or manufac- tures : by selling or falsely puffing off unwholesome medicines or provisions : by poisoning or drying up of springs, destroy- ing of aqueducts, destroying woods, walls, or other fences against wind and rain : by any kinds of artificial scarcity ; or by any other calamities intentionally produced. 2 and 3. Simple injurious restrainment, and simple injurious compulsion : for instance, by obliging a whole neighbourhood, by dint of threatening hand-bills, or threatening discourses, publicly delivered, to join, or forbear to join, in illuminations, ac- clamations, outcries, invectives, subscriptions, undertakings, processions, or any other mode of expressing joy or grief*, displeasure or approbation ; or, in short, in any other course of conduct whatsoever. 4. and 5. Confinement and banish* ment : by the spoiling of roads, bridges, or ferry-boats : by destroying or unwarrantably pre-occupying public carriages, or houses of accommodation. 6. By menacement : as by in- cendiary letters, and tumultuous assemblies : by newspapers or hands-bills, denouncing vengeance against persons of DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 129 ing, which is by losing a portion of the good-will Ch ap. of others. Now, in respect of the good-will which others bear you, you may be a loser in eithier of two ways : 1 . By the manner in which you are thought to behave yourself; and 2. By the manner in which others behave, or are thought to behave, towards you. To cause people to think that you yourself have so behaved, as to have been guilty of any of those acts which cause a man to possess less than he did before of the good-will of the community, is what may be stilefl dtfamation. But such is the constitution of human nature, and such the force of prejudice, that a man merely by manifesting his own want of good-will towards you, though ever so unjust m itself, and ever so unlawfully expressed, may m a manner force others to withdraw from you a particular denominations : for example, against Jews, Catho- lics, Protestants, Scotchmen, Gascons, Catalonians, Sic, 7. Simple mental injuries : as by distressful, terrifying, ob- scene^ or irreligious exhibitions ; such as exposure of sores by beggars, exposure of dead bodies, exhibitions or reports of counterfeit witchcrafts or apparitions, exhibition of ob- scene dr. blasphemous prints : obscene or blasphemous dis- courses held in public: spreading false news of public defeats in battlC; or of other misfortunes. in. Self-regarding offences against person. 1. Fasting. Abstinence from venery, self-flagellation, self-mutilation, and other self-denying and self-tormenting practices. 2. Glut- tony, drunkenness, excessive venery, and other species of intemperance. S. Suicide. VOL. II. K ISO DIVISION OF OFFENCES. part of theirs. When he does this by words, or by such actions as have no other e£fect than' in as far as they stand in the place of words, the offence may be stiled vilification. When it is done by such actions as, besides their having tfak effect, are injuries to the person, the offence may be stiled a personal insult ': if it has got the length of reaching the body, a corporal insult: i£ it stopt- short before it reached that length; it nHr|r be stiled insulting menacement. And thus 'T^e^have two gen&a^or kinds of offences against rejputaibion. merely ; to wit, 1 . Defamation : and, 2. Vilifica^ tion, or Revilement*. As to corpora insults;^ and insulting meiiacement, they beloiig to the- compound title of ofifences against person and reputation both together. XXXV. Offences If the property of one man suffers by the de- j &E3II18t. n propertj. linquency of another, such property either was in ' J trust with the offender, or it was nbt : if it was , in trust, the offence is a breach of trust, and of j whatever nature it may be in other respects, may, , be stiled dissipation in breach of trust, or dissipatum ^.^ ofpfvperty in trust. This is a particular case •: the * I. Semi-public offences. 1. Calumniation and tiIi- ^<^ fication of particular deBorainations of persons ; suck at' jjj Jews, Catholics, &c. II. Self-beg ARDiNG offences. I. Incontinence in females. % Incest. ■A DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 131 opposite one is the more common : in such case c«ap, thle several ways in which property may, by possi- bility, become the object of an offence, may be thtts conceived. Offences against property, of whatever kind it be, may be distinguished, as hath been already intimated *, into such as concern the. legal possession of it, or right to it, and such as concern only the enjoyment of it, or, what is the same thing, the exercise of that right. Under tlie former of these heads come, as hath been abready intimated f , the several offences of wrong-- ful nohrinoestment^ wrongful interception, zvrongful dhestntentf usurpaticn, and wrongful attribution. When in the commission of any of these offences a falsehood has served as an instrument, and that, as it is commonly called, a wilful, or as it might more properly be termed, an advised % one, the mifihet fraudulent may be prefixed to the name of Ae o£fence, or substituted in the room of the [word wrongful* The pircumstance of firaudulency may serve to characterise a particular ies, comprisable under each of those generic : in like manner the circumstance of force, ^hich more a little farther on, may serve to ^acterise another. With respect to wrongful *ceptipn in partictdar, the investitive event by ich the title to the thing in question should e accrued to you, and for want of which such • Supra xxvii. f lb. X See ch. ix. [Consciousness] ii. 1S« DIVISION OF OFFENCES. CHAr. title is, throiagh the delinquency of the offender, as it were, intercepted, is either an act of his own, expressing it as his will, that you should be con- sidered by the law as the person who is legally in possession of it, or it is any other event at large : in the former case, if the thing, of which you should have been put into possession, is a suiA of money to a certain amount, the offence is that which has received the name of insolvency; which branch of delinquency, in consideration of ^ the importance and extent of it, may be treated on the footing of a distinct genus of itself ♦. Paj^ment, * The light in which the offence of insolvency is here ex- hibitedy may perhaps at first consideration be apt to appear not only novel but improper. It may naturally enough ap- pear, that when a man owes you a sum of money, for in-; stance, the right to the money is your's already, and that what he withholds from you by not paying you, is not thftJ legal title to it, possession of it, or power over it, but die physical possession of it, or power over it, only. But upoaal more accurate examination this will be found not to be w case. What is meant by payment, is always an act of ini titive power, as above explained, an expression of an act the will, and not a physical act : it is an act exercised relation indeed to the thing said to be paid, but not in physical sense exercised upon it. A man who owes you j pounds, takes up a handful of silver to that amount* lays it down on a table at which you are sitting. If then words, or gestures, or any means whatever, addressing self to you, he intimates it to be his will that you should up the money, and do with it as you please, he is. said DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ISS Next, with reffard to such of the offences c»^'- ^ XVI. against property as concern only the enjoyment ^ have paid you : but if the case was, that he laid it down not for that puqpose, but for some other, for instance, to count it and examine it, meaning to take it up again himself, or leave it for somebody else, he has not paid you : yet the physical acts, exercised upon the pieces of money in question, are in both cases the same. Till he does express a will to that purport, what you have is not, properly speaking, the legal possession of the money, or a right to the money, but only a right to have him, or in his default perhaps a minister of justice, compelled to render you that sort of service, by the rendering of which he is said to pay you : that is, to express such will as above-mentioned, with regard to some corporeal article, or other of a certain species, and of value equal to the amount of what he owes you : or, in other words, to ex- ercise in your favour an act of investitive power with relation to some such article. True it is, that in certain cases a man may perhaps not be deemed, according to common ax^ceptation, to hdivepaid you, without rendering you a further set of services, and those of another sort: a set of services, which are. rendered by the exercising of certain acts of a physical nature upon the very thmg with which he is said to pay you : to wit, by transfer- ring the thing to a certain place where you may be sure to find it, and where it may be convenient for you to receive it. But these services, although the obligation of rendering them shoald be annexed by law to the obligation of rendering &ose other services, in the performance of which the opera* tioQ of payment properly consists, are plainly acts of a dis- tinct nature * nor are they essential to the operation : by themselves they do not constitute it, and it may be performed without them. It mtut be performed without them wherever I . / 13* DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^^' of the object in question. This object must be ^ — ^^^ either a service, or set of services*, which should have been rendered by some person, or else an article belonging to the class of things. In the former case, the offence may be stiled wrongful withholding of services f. In the latter case it may admit of farther modifications, which mi^y be thus conceived : When any object which you ^v^ Jf^ the physical occupation or enjojrment of, oeases, in any degree, in consequence of the act of anoflier man, and without any change made in so much the thing to be transferred happens to be already as much within the reach, physically speaking, of the creditor, as by any act of the debtor it can be made to be. This matter would have appeared in a clearer light had it been practicable to enter here into a full examination of the nature ! of property y and the several modifications of which it is susceptible : but every thing cannot be done at once. * Supra xxvi. t Under wrongful withholding of services is included breach of contract : the obligation to render services may be ground- ed either on contract, or upon other titles : in other words, the event of a man's engaging in a contract is one out of many other investitive events from which the right of receiv- ing them may take its commencement. See ch. xvii. [limits] Mr. Were the word services to be taken in its utmost latitude 1. ■ (negative included as well as positive) this one head would cover the whole law. To this place then are to be referred such services only, the withholding of which does not coin- cide with any of the other offences, for which seperate deno- minations have been provided. PITISION OF OFFENCES. 135 of that power as depends upon the mtrinsic phy- Chaf. skal condition of your person, to be subject to that power ; this cessation is either owing to change in the intrinsic condition of the thing itself, or in its exterior situation with respect to you, that is, to its being situated out of your reach. In tSie-fmnercase, the nature of the change is either sucii as to put it out of your power to make any use of Jt.«t all, in which case the thing is said to be deg^^oyidf and, the olfence whereby it is retreated maylK'teiaiied xi;roir2^M/ : or such only as. to render the uses it is capable of being put to of less (Value than before, in which case it is said to be damaged, or to have sustained damage, and the offence may be termed wrongful endamagement. Moireover, in as far as the value which a thing is of to you is considered as being liable to be in some d^ree rimpaired, by any act on the part of aay crt^er person exercised upon that thing, aL though on a given occasion no perceptible damage should ensue, the exercise of any such act is com- monly treated on the footing of an offence, which may be termed wrongful using or occupation. If the cause of the thing's failing in its capa- city of being of use to you, lies in the exterior situation of it with relation to you, the offence may be stiled wrongful detainment*. Wrongful ♦ In the English law, detinue and detainer : detinue ap- plied chiefly to moveables ; detainer, to immoveables.^ Under 136 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^^J» detainment^ or detention, during any given period of time, may either be' accompanied with the in- tention of detaining the thing for ever, (that is for an indifferent time) or not : if it be, and if it be accompanied at the same time with the inten- tion of not being amenable to law for wh^t is done, it seems to answer to the idea commonly annexed to the word embezzlement , an offence which is commonly accompanied with breach of trust*. In the case of wrongful occupation, the physical faculty of occupying may have been obtained with detinue and detainer cases are also comprised, in which the offence consists in forbearing to transfer the legal possession of the thing • such cases may be considered as coming under the head of wrongful non-investment. The distinction be- tween mere physical possession and legal possession, where the latter is short-lived and defeasible, seems scarcely hitherto to have been attended to. In a multitude of in*, stances they are confounded under the same expressions. The cause is, that probably, under all laws, and frequently for very good reasons, the legal possession, with whatever certainty defeasible upon the event of a trial, is, down to the time of that event, in many cases annexed to the appearance of the physical. * In attempting to exhibit the import belonging to this and other names of offences in common use, I liiust be un- derstood to speak all along with the utmost diffidence. The truth is, the import given to them is commonly neither de- terminate nor uniform : so that in the nature of things,^ no definition that can be given of them by a private person can be altogether an exact one. To fix the sense of them be- longs only to the legislator. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 157 or without the assistance or consent of the pro- .prietor, or other person appearing to have a right to afford such assistance or consent. If without such assistance or consent^ and the occupation be accompanied with the intention of detaining the thing for ever, together with the intention of not being amenable to law for what is done, the o£fence seems to answer to the idea com- monly annexed to the word thtft or stealing. If in the same circumstances a force is put upon the body of any person who uses, or appearsrto be disposed to use, any endeavours to prevent the act, this seems to be one of the cases in which the oflfence is generally understood to come under the name of robbery. ^ If the physical faculty in question was obtained with the assistance or consent of a proprietor, or other person above spoken of, and still the occu- pation of the thing is an offence, it may have been either because the assistance or consent was not fairly, or because it was not freely obtained. If not fairly obtained, it was obtained by falsehood, which, if advised, is in such a case termed fraud : and the offence, if accompanied with the intention of not being amenable to law, may be termed fraudulent obtainment or defraudment * . If not * The remaining cases come under the head of usurpation, or wrongful investment of property. The distinction seems hardly hitherto to have been attended to: it turns like an- 1^ DIVISION OF 0FFBNCB8. Chaf. frtdy obtained, it was obtained by force: to wit, either by a force put. upon the body, which has been already mentioned, or by a force put upon the mind. If by a force put upon the mind^ or in other words, by the application of coeieiye motives «, it must be by producmg the appiieheii- sion of some evil : which evil, if the act is an offence, must be some evil to which on the occasion in question the one person has no right to .expose the other. This is one case, in which, if the of- fence be ^ompanied with the intention of detain- ing the. thing for everi whether it be or be not accompanied with ihe intention c€ not being amenable to law, it seems tQ agree .with the idea of what is commonly meant by ejctortkm. Now »the piart a man takes in exposing another to ^e eyil in question, qiust be either a positive or a negative part. In the former case, again, cthe •evil must either be present or dirtant. In the case then where the itssistance or consent is obtained by a force put upon the body, or wkere, if by a foice put iqMUi. the mind, die part taken in the exposing a man to: the apprehension of the evil is positive, the evil present, and the object of it his person, and if at any rate the extortion, thus applied, be accompanied with the intention of not being amen- other, mentioned above^ upon the distinction between legal possession and physical. The same observation may be ap- plied to the case of extortion hereafter following. * Vide supra, xxvii. .DIy|^IQN OF OFF^CBS. 139 able to law^ it seems to agree with the remaining Chap. case of what goes under the. name of robbery. As to dissipation in breach of trusty .this^ when productive of. a pecuniary profit to the trustee, seems , to be . one species pf what is commonly meant by peculation. Another, and the only re- maimng one, sefinns to consist in acts of occupation zeroised by the trustee upon the things which are ihe objects pf the fiduciary property, for his own benefit, and to the damage of the beneficiary. As to robbery, this ofience, by the manner in which the assistance or consent is obtained, be- comes an offence agaipist property and person at the vSame time. . Dissipation in breach of trust, ai^d. peculation, may perhaps be more commo- dipusly treated of under the head of offences against trust ♦. After these exceptions, we have thirteen genera or principal kinds of offences against; property, which, when ranged in the order most commodious for examination, may stand as foUows, viz, !• Wrongful non-investment of pro- perty. 2. Wrongful interception of property. S. Wrongful divestment of property. 4. Usurpation *, TJ^UTjf wiuph, if it must be an offence, is an offence committed with consent, that is» with the consent of the patty supposed to be injured, cannot merit a place in the catalogue of offences, unless the consent were either unfairly obtained or unfreely - in the first case, it coincide^ with de- fraudment ; in the other, with extortion. 140 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, of property. 5. Wrongful investment of property, ' — N^ 6. Wrongful withholding of services. 7. Wrong- ful destruction or endamagement. 8. Wrongful occupation. 9. Wrongful detainment. 10. Em- bezzlement. 11. Theft. 12. Defraudment. IS. Extortion *. We proceed now to consider offences which are complex in their effects. Regularly, indeed, we should come to offences against condition ; but it will be more convenient to speak first of offences by which a man's interest is affected in two of the preceeding points at once. XXXVI. Offences First then, with regard to offences which affect ton and re- pcrsou and rcputatiou together. When any man, putation. ^y ^ mode of treatment winch affects the person. ♦ I. Semi-public offences. 1. Wrongful divestment, interception, usurpation, &c. of valuables, which are the pro- perty of a corporate body ; or which are in the indiscriminate occupation of a neighbourhood ; such as parish churches, altars, relicks, and other articles appropriated to the pur- poses of religion : or things which are in the indiscrimi- nate occupation of the public at large ; such as mile-stones, mai'ket-houses, exchanges, public gardens, and cathedrals. S. Setting on foot what have been called bubbles, or fraudu- lent partnership, or gaming adventures ; propagating false news, to raise or sink the value of stocks, or of any other denomination of property. II. SsLF-BEOARDiKO OFFENCES. 1. Idlcncss. 2. Ga- ming. 3. Other species of prodigality. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. # 1*1 injures the reputation of another, his end and Chap. purpose must have been either his own immediate pleasure, or that sort of reflected pleasure, which in certain circumstances may be reaped from the suffering of another. Now the only immediate pleasure worth*egarding, which any one can reap from the person of another, and which at the same time is capable of affecting the reputation of the latter, is the pleasure of the sexual appetite ♦. This pleasure, then, if reaped at all, must have been reaped either against the consent of the party, or with consent. If with consent, the con- sent must have been obtained either freely and fairly both, or freely but not fairly, or else not even freely ; in which case the fairness is out of the question. If the consent be altogether want- ing, the offence is called rape : if not fairly ob- tained, ^eduction simply : if not freely, it may be called /orciWe seduction. In any case, either the offence has gone the length of consummation, or has stopt short of that period ; if it has gone that length, it takes one or other of the names just mentioned : if not, it may be included alike in all cases under the denomination of a simple lascivious injury. Lastly, to take the case where a man in- juring you in your reputation, by proceedings that regard your person, does it for the sake of that See ch. v. [Pleasures and Pains.] 14t DIVISION OP OFFENCES. xvl' ^^^ of pleasure which will sometimes result from ^"^^r^ the contemplation of another's pain. Under these circumstances either the offence has actually gone the length of a corporal injury, or it has rested in menacement : in the first case it may he stiled a corporal inmU ; in the other, it may come under the name of insulting menacement. And thus we have six genera, or kinds of offences, against person and reputation together; .which, when ranged^ in the order most commodious for consi- deration, will stand thus : 1 . Corporal insults. 2. Insulting menacement. 3. Seduction. 4. Rape. 5. Forcible seduction. 6. Simple lascivious in- juries ♦. XXXVII. Offences Sccoudly, with respect to those which affect against per-" !' , ... son and persou ahd property together. That a force put upon the person of a man may be among the means by which the title to property may be un- lawfully taken away or acquired, has beeii already stated f. A force of this sort then is a circum- stance which may accompany the offences of wrongful interception, wrongful divestment, usur- piation, and wrongful investment. But in these cases the intervention of this circumstance does * I. Semi-public x)FFENCEs — none. II. Self-beoabdino OFFENCES. 1. Sacrifice of virgi- nity. 9,, Indecencies not public, t Supra. DIVISION OP OFFENCES. 148 not happen to have given any new dencHmnatioia ^Af' to the offence*. In all or any of these cases^ however, by prefixing the epithet ^^cii/e, we may have so many names of offences, which may either be considered as constituting so many species of the genera belonging to the division of offences against property, or as so many genera belonging to the division now before us. Among the offen- ces that concern the enjoyment of the thing, the case is the same with wrongful destruction and wrongful endamagement ; as also with wrongful occupation and wrongful detainment; As to the offence of wrongful occupation, it is only in the case where the thing occupied belongs to the class of immoveables, that, when accompanied by the kind of force in question, has obtained a par* ticular name which is in common ujse: in this case it is caXlei forcible entry: forcible detainment; as applied also to immoveables, but only to im* moveables, has obtained, among lawyers at least, the name oi forcible detainer f . And thus we may * In the technical language of the English law, property 80 aoqiiked is said to be acquired by duress. t Applied to moveables, the circumstiuDee of force has never, at least by the technical part of the language, been taken into account : no such combination of terms 9a forcible occupation is in current use. The word detmue is applied to moveables only: and (in the language of the law) the word forcible has never been combined with it. The word appliied 144 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. xvh distinguish 10 genera^ or kinds of offences^ against "■^^ person and property together, which, omitting for conciseness sake the epithet wrongfuU will stand thus: 1. Forcible interception of property. 2. Forcible divestment of property. 3. Forcible usurpation. 4. Forcible investment. 5. Forcible destruction or endamagement. 6. Forcible occu- pation of moveables. 7. Forcible entry. 8. For- cible detainment of moveables. 9- Forcible de- tainment of immoveables. 1 0. Robbery ♦. XXXVIII. Offences We comc uow to offcnccs ag^dnst condition. A SSotu— ^ man's condition or station in life is constituted by ' domeldc ot the legal relation he bears to the persons who are about him ; that is, as we have already had occa- sion to shewf, by duties, which, by being imposed on one side, give birth to rights or powers on the other. These relations, it is evident, may be almost infinitely diversified. Some means, how- ever, may be found of circumscribing the field to immoveables is detainer : this is combined with the word forcible : and what is singular, it is scarcely in use without that word. It was impossible to steer altogether clear of this technical nomenclature, on account of the influence which it has on' the body of the language. * I. Semi-public offences. 1. Incendiarism. ^. On-" minal inundation. II. Self-eegabdino offences— none. t Supra. XXV, note. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 146 within which the varieties of them are displayed. Chap. XVI In the first place, they must either he such as are ^ — sr^ capable of displaying themselves within the circle of a private family, or such as require a larger space. The conditions constituted by the former sort of relations may be stiled domestic: those constituted by the latter, civil. XXXIX. ' As to domestic conditions, the legal relations by Domestic which they are constituted may be distinguished ^und^on into 1 . Such as are superadded to relations purely ra^tiorahi^. natural : and 2. Such as, without any such na- tural basis, subsist purely by institution. By re- lations purely natural, I mean those which may be said to subsist between certain persons in virtue of the concern which they themselves, or cer- tain other persons, have had in the process which is necessary to the continuance of the species. These relations may be distinguished, in the first place, into contiguous and uncontiguous. The uncontiguous subsist through the intervention of such as are contiguous. The contiguous may be distinguished, in the first place, into connubial, and post-connubial^. Those which may be termed * By the terms connubial and post-connubialy all I mean at present to bring to view is, the mere physical union, apart from the ceremonies and legal engagements that will after- wards be considered as accompanying it. 146 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. connubial are two : 1 . That which the male bears towards the female : 2. That which the female bears to the male*. The post-connubial We either productive or derivative. The productive is that which the male and female above-mentioned bear each of them towards the children who are Relations— * The vague and undetermined nature of the fictitious f^mlvery entity, called a relation, is, on accasions like the present, apt two objectH. to be productive of a good deal of confusion. A relation is either said to be borne by one of the objects which are parties to ity to the other, or to subsist between them. The latter mode of phraseology is, perhaps, rather the more common. In such case the idea seems to be, that from the consideration of the two objects there results but one relation, which belongs as it were in common to them botb.^ lD>some easel, this perhaps may answer the purpose very well: it will:^ however, in the present case. For the present purpose it will be necessary we should conceive two relations as re- sulting from the two objects, and bomCf since such is tbe phrase, by the one of them to or towards the other: atk relation borne by the first object to the second : afiirtfaff relation borne by the second object to the first. This is n^ cessary on two accounts : 1. Because for the reiatioi^ theia* selves there are in many instances sepd.rate names: for example, the relations of guardianship and wardship: ta which case, the speaking of them as if they were but onei may be productive of much confusion. 2. Because the tivo different relationships give birth to so many conditions'* which conditions are so far different, that what is predicate^ and will hold good of the one,^ will, in various particularSi til we shall see, not hold good of the other. j DIVISION OF OFFENCES, 147 the immediate fruit of their union ; this is termed the relation of parentality. Now as the parents must be, so the children may be, of different sexes^ Accordingly the relation of parentality may be distinguished into four species: 1. That which a father bears to his son : this is termed paternity. 2. That which a father bears to his daughter : this also is termed paternity. 3. That which a mother bears to her son : this is called maternity. 4. That which a mother bears to her daughter : this also is termed maternity. Uncontiguous natural relations may be distinguished into imme" diate and remote. Such as are immediate, are what one person bears to another in consequence of theii: bearing each of them one simple relation to some third person. Thus the paternal grand- &ther is related to the paternal grandson by means of the two different relations, of different ^ds, which together they bear to the father : the brother on the father's side, to the brother by means of the two relations of the same kmd, which together they bear to the father. In the aame manner we might proceed to find places in the system for the infinitely-diversified relations which result from the combinations that may be fbnned by mixing together the several sorts of re- lationships by ascent y relationshipis by decent , col- lateral relationships, and relationships by affinity : which latter, when the union between the two parties through whom the affinity takes place is 148 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, sanctioned by matrimonial solemnities, are termed relationships by marinage. But this, as it would be a most intricate and tedious task, so happily is it, for the present purpose, an unnecessary oiie. The only natural relations to which it will be necessary to pay any particular attention, are those which, when sanctioned bylaw, give birth to the conditions of husband and wife, the two re- lations comprized under the head of parentality, and the corresponding relations comprized under the head filiality or filiation. What then are the relations of a legal kind which can be superinduced upon the above-men- tioned natural relations? They must be such as it is the nature of law to give birth to and establish. But the relations which subsist purely by institu- tion exhaust, as we shall see, the whole stock of re- | lationships which it is in the nature of the law ijo ^ give birth to and establish. The relations then \ which can be superinduced upon those which are j purely natural, cannot be in themselves any other than what are of the number of those which ' subsist purely by institution : so that all the difference there can be between a legal relation of the one sort, and a legal relation of the other sort is, that in the former case the circumstance which gave birth to the natural relation serves as a maii^ to indicate where the legal relation is to fix : in the ■ latter case, the place where the legal relation is to attach is determined not by that circumstance but DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 149 by some other. From these considerations it will Chap. Jx V !• appear manifestly enough, that for treating of the ' — v — ' several sorts of conditions, as well natural as purely conventional, in the most commodious order, it will be necessary to give the precedence to the latter. Proceeding throughout upon the same principle, we shall all along give the priority, not to those which are first by nature, but to those, which are most simple in point of description. There ia no other way of avoiding perpetual an- ticipations and repetitions. XL. We come now to consider the domestic or Domestic family relations, which are purely of legal insti- which are tution. It is to these in effect, that both kinds b^i fnstiiu- of. domestic conditions, considered as the work of ^^^ law, are indebted for their origin. When the law> no matter for what purpose, takes upon itself to operate, in a matter in which it has not operated before, it can only be by imposing obligation*. Now when a legal obligation is imposed on any man, there are but two ways in which it can in the first instance be enforced. The one is by giving the power of enforcing it to the party in whose favour it is imposed : the other is by reserving that power to certain third persons, who, in virtue of their possessing it, are stiled ministers of justice. In the first case, the party favoured is said to * See ch. xvii. [Limits] § iii. 150 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. possess not only a right as against the party obliged, but also a power over him : in the second case, a right only, uncorroborated by power. In the first case, the party favoured may be stiled a superior, and as they are both members of the same family, a domestic superior, with reference to the party obliged : who, in the same case, may be stiled a domestic inferior, with reference to the party favoured. Now in point of possibility, it is evident, that domestic conditions, or a kind of ficti- tious possession analogous to domestic conditions, might have been looked upon as constituted, as well by rights alone, without powers on either side, as by powers. But in point of utility* it * Two persons, who by any means stand engaged to live together, can never live together long, but one of them will choose that some act or other should be done, which the other will choose should not be done. When this is the case, how is the competition to be decided ? Laying aside generosity and good-breeding, which are the tardy and uncertain fruit» of long-established laws, it is evident that there can be no certain means of deciding it but physical power : whidi indeed is the very means by which family, as well as othdr competitions, must have been decided long before any such ofifice as that of legislator had existence. This then being the order of things which the legislator finds established by nature, how should he do better than to acquiesce in it? The persons who by the influence of causes that prevail e/ery where, stand engaged to live together, are, 1. Parent and child, during the infancy of the latter : 2. Man and wife : 3. Children of the same parents. Parent and child, by necessity : since, if the child did not live with the parent (or DIVISION OF OFFENCES. does not seem expedient : and in point of fact, pro bably owing to the invariable perception which with somebody standing in the place of the parent) it could not live at all : husband and wife, by a choice approaching to necessity : children of the same parents, by the necessity of their living each of them with the parents. As between parent iind child, the necessity there is of a power on the part of the parent for the preservation of the child supersedes all farther reasoning. As between man and wife, that necessity' does not subsist. The only reason that applies to this case is, the necessity of putting an end to competition. The man would have the meat roasted, the woman boiled : shall they both fost till the judge comes in to dress it for them ? The woman would have the child dressed in green ; the man, in blue : shall the child be naked till the judge comes in to clothe it ? This affords a reason for giving a power to one or other of the parties : but it affords none for giving the power to the one rather than to the other. How then shall the legislator determine ? Supposing it equally easy to give it to either, let hiia lookeV'er^so long for a reason why he should give it to the one ratjier than to the other, and he may look in vain. 0 But how does the matter stand already ? for there were men and wives (or, what comes to the same thing, male and female living together as man and wife) before there were legislators. Looking round him then, he finds almost every where the male the stronger of the two ; and therefore possessing already, by purely physical ijneans, that power which he is thinking of bestowing on one of them by means of law. How then can he do so well as by placing the legal power in the same hands which are beyond comparison the more likely to be in pos- session of the physical ? in this way, few transgressions, and few calls for punishment : in the other way, perpetual trans- gressions, and perpetual calls for punishment. Solon is said to have transferred the same idea to the distribution of state 151 ,. Chap. XVI. 152 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, xncii must have had of the inexpediency, no such conditions seem ever to have been constituted by such feeble bands. Of the legal relationships then, which are capable of being made to subsist within the circle of a family, there remain those only in which the obligation is enforced by power. Now then, wherever any such power is conferred, the end or purpose for which it was conferred (unless the legislator can be supposed to act without a motive) must have been the producing of a benefit to somebody : in other words, it must have been conferred for the sake of somebody. The person then, for whose sake it is conferred, must either be one of the two parties just mentioned, or a third party : if one of these two, it must be either the superior or the inferior. If the superior, such superior is commonly called a master ; and the inferior is termed his servant : and the power may be termed a beneficial one. If it be for the sake of the inferior that the power is established^ powers. Here then was generalization : here was the worfe of geniiis. But in the disposal of domestic power, eve legislator, without any effort of genius, has been a Solon, much for reason"^: add to which, in point oi motives \, thai^^ legislators seem all to have been of the male sex, down to th^ days of Catherine. I speak here of those who frame law^ ^ not of those who touch them with a sceptre. • Social motives: sympathy for the public : love of reputation, &c. t Self-regarding motives : or social motives, which are social in a \es.^ extent : sympathy for persons of a particular description : persons of thi^ same sex. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 153 the superior is termed a guardian ; and the inferior Chap. his. ward : and the power, being thereby coupled with a trust, may be termed a fiduciary one. If for the sake of a third party, the superior may be termed a superintendant ; and the inferior bis subordinate. This third party will either be an assignable individual or set of individuals, or a set of unassignable individuals. In this latter case the trust is either a public or a semi-public one : and the condition which it constitutes is not of the domestic, but of the civil kind. In the former case, this third party or principal, as he may be termed, either has a beneficial power over the superintendant, or he has not : if he has, the su- perintendant is his servant, and consequently so also is the subordinate : if not, the superintendant is the master of' the subordinate; and all the advantage which the principal has over his super- intendant, is that of possessing a set of rights, uncorroborated by power ; and therefore, as we have seen*, not fit to constitute a condition of the domestic kind. But be the condition what it may which is constituted by these rights, of what na- ture can the obligations be, to which the superin- tendant is capable of being subjected by means of them ? They are neither more nor less than those which a man is capable of being subjected to by powers. It follows, therefore, that the functions of * Supra, note, page 150. IM DIVISION OF OFFENCES. a principal and his superintendant coincide with those of a master and his servant ; and consequently that the offences relative to the two former condi- tions will coincide with the offences relative to the ^two latter. XLI. to^togthc Offences to which the condition of a master, omd^tim of jy^.^ ^j^y other kind of condition, is exposed, may, as hath been already intimated*, be distinguished into such as concern the existence of the condi- tion itself, and such as concern the performance of the functions of it, while subsisting. First then, with regard to such as affect its existence. It is obvious enough that the services of one man may be a benefit to another : the condition of a master may therefore be a beneficial one. It stands exposed, therefore, to the offences of wrong- fid mn4rrvesinient , wrongful interception, usurpa^ tionyzvrongful irwestment, and wrongful dix^stmeM. But how should it stand exposed to the ofifences of wrongful abdication, wrongful detrectation^ and wropgjul .imposition f Certainly it c^pi^ot, of .it- self; for services, when a man has the power of e;!^^ing thpni or not, as he thinks fit, can never be a burthen. But if to the powers, by which thecondition.pf a master is constituted, the law thinks fit to annex any obligation on the part of ^ the nukster ; for instance, that of affording main- * Vide supra, xxvii. DinSION OF OFFENCES. 155 tenance^ or giving wages, to the servant, or pay- ing money to any body else, it is evident, that in virtue of such obligation the condition may become a burthen. In this case, however, the condition possessed by the master will not, properly speak- ing, be the pure and simple condition of a master : it will be a kind of complex object, resolvable into the beneficial condition of a master, and the burthensome obligation which is annexed to it^ Still however, if the nature of the obligation lies withm a narrow compass, and does not, in the manner of that which constitutes a trust, interfere with the exercise of those powers by which the condition of the superior is constituted, the latter, notwithstanding this foreign mixture, will stiU retain the name of mastership *. In this case, therefore, but not otherwise, the condition of a master may stand exposed to the offences of wrongful abdication, wrongful detrectationy and wrongful imposition. Next as to the behaviour of persons, with reference to this condition, while considered as subsisting. In virtue of its being a * In most civilized nations there is a sort of domestic con- dition, in which the superior is termed a master, while the inferior is termed sometimes indeed a servant, but more par- ticalarlyand more frequently slu apprentice. In this case^ though the superior is, in point of usage, known by no other name than that of a master, the relationship is in point of fact a mixt one, compounded of that of master and that of fiuardian. 156 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^^^- benefit, it is exposed to disturbance. This disturb- ""^^ — ' ance will either be the offence of a stranger, or the oflFehce of the servant himself. Where it is the offence of a stranger, and is committed by taking the person of the servant, in circumstances in which the taking of an object belonging to the class of things would be an act of theft, or (what is scarcely worth distinguishing from theft) an act of embezzlement, it may be termed seroant'Steal- ing. • Where it is the offence of the servant him- self, it is stiled breach of duty. Now the most flagrant species of breach of duty, and that which includes indeed every other, is that which consists in the servant's withdrawing himself from the place in which the duty should be performed- This species of breach of duty is termed elopement. Again, in virtue of the power belonging to this condition, it is liable, on the part of the master, to abuse. Biit this power is not coupled with a trust. The condition of a master is therefore not exposed to any offence which is analogous to breach of trust. Lastly, on account of its being exposed to abuse, it may be conceived to stand, in point of possibility, exposed to bribery. But considering how few, and how insignificant, the persons are who are liable to be subject to the power here in question, this is an offence which, on account of the want of temptation, there will seldom be any example of in practice. We may therefore reckon thirteen sorts of offences to which the condition of a master DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 157 is exposed ; viz. 1 . Wrongful non-investment of Chaf. mastership. 2. Wrongful interception -of master- '^ — v — ' ship. 3. Wrongful divestment of mastership. 4. Usurpation of mastership. 5. Wrongful invest^ ment of mastership. 6. Wrongful abdication of mastership. 7. Wrongful detrectation of master- ship. 8. Wrongful imposition of mastership. 9. Abuse of mastership. 10. Disturbance of mastership. 11. Breach of duty in servants. 12. Elopement of servants. 13. Servant-stealing. XLII. As to the, power by which the condition of a Various master is constituted^ this may be either limited or semtude. unlimited. When it is altogether unlimited, the condition of the servant is stiled pure slavery. But as the rules of language are as far as can be conceived from being steady on this head, the term slavery is commonly made use of wherever the limitations prescribed to the power of the master are looked upon as inconsiderable. Whenever any such limitation is prescribed, a kind of fictitious entity is thereby created, and, in quality of an incorporeal object of possession, is bestowed upon the servant : this object is of the class of those which are called rights : and in the present case is termed, in a more particular manner, a liberty : and sometimes a privilege, an immunity or an ea:- emption. Now those limitations on the one hand, and these liberties on the other, may, it is evident, be as various as the acts (positive or negative) 156 DIVISION OF OFFENCBS. / which the master may or may not have the power of obliging the servant to submit to or to perform. Correspondent then to the infinitude of tliese liberties^ is the infinitude of the modifications which the condition of mastership (or^ as it is more common to say in such a case^ that of servitude) 4idmits o£ These modifications^ it is evident^ may, in different countries, be infinitely diversified* In different countries, therefore, the offences charac- terised by the above names will, if specifically con- sidered, admit of very different descriptions. If there be a spot upon the earth so wretched as to exhibit the spectacle of pure and absolutely un- limited slavery, on that spot there will be no such iiiing as any abuse of mastership ; which means neither more nor less than that no abuse of mas- tership will there be treated on the footing of an offence. As to the question. Whether any, mijd what, modes of servitude ought to be established or kept on foot ? this is a question, the solution of which belongs to the civil branch of the ^rt of legislation. XLIII. Q^j^nccs Next, with regard to the offences that may ^n^^^^f concern the condition of a servant. It might ascrrant. g^gj^ ^^ f^^^ sight, that a couditiou of this kind could not have a spark of benefit belonging to it: that it could not be attended with any other con- sequences than such as rendered it a mere burthen. But a burthen itself may be a benefit, in compar DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 1^ rison of a greater burthen. Conceive a man's situation then to be such^ that he must^ at any rate, be in a state of pure slavery. Still may it be material to him, and highly material, who the person is whom he has for his master. A state of slavery then, under one master, may be a bene- fbial state to him, in comparison with a state of slavery under another master. The condition of a servant then is exposed to the ' several offences to which a condition, in virtue of its being a be- neficial one, is exposed ♦. More than this, where the power of the 'master is limited, and the limi- tations annexed to it, and thencd the liberties of the servant, are considerable, the servitude may even be positively eligible. For amongst those limitations may be such as are sufficient to enable the servant to possess property of his own : being capable then of possessing property of his * It may seem at first, that a person who is in the condi- tion of a slave, could not have it in his power to engage in such course of proceeding as would be necessary, in order to give him an apparent title to be reckoned among the slaves of another master. But though a slave in point of right, it may happen that he has eloped for instance, and is not a slave in point fact : or, suppose him a slave in point of fact, and ever so vigilantly guarded, still a person con- nected with him by the ties of sympathy, might do that for him which, though willing and assenting, he might not be • Bble to do for himself: might forge a deed of donation, for example, from the one master to the other. ICO DIVISION OF OFFENCES, Chap, own, he may be capable of receiving it from his master : in short, he may receive wages, or other emoluments, from his master ; and the benefit resulting from these wages may be so considerable as to outweigh the burthen of the servitude, and, by that means, render that condition more be- neficial upon the whole, and more eligible, than that of one who is not in any respect under the controul of any such person as a master. Accord- ingly, by these means the condition of the servant may be so eligible, that his entrance into it, and his continuance in it, may have been altogether the result of his own choice. That the nature of the two conditions may be the more clearly ^under- stood, it may be of use to shew the sort of cor- respondency there is between the ofiPences which aiTect the existence of the one, and those which affect the existence of the other. That this cor- respondency cannot but be very intimate is ob- vious at first sight. It is not, however, that a given offence in the former catalogue coincides with an offence of the same name in the latter catalogue : usurpation of servantship with usur- pation of mastership, for example. But the case is, that an offence of one denomination in the one catalogue coincides with an offence of a different denomination in the other catalogue. Nor is the coincidence constant and certain: but liable to contingencies, as we shall see. First, then, wrong- ful non-investment of the condition of a servant, if DIVISION OP OFFENCES. 1^1 it be the offence of one who should have been the ^^' master^ comcides with wrongful detrectation of mastership : if it be the offence of a' third person^ it involves in it non-investment of mastership, which, provided the mastership be in the eyes of him who should have been master a beneficial thing, but not otherwise is wrongfiil, 2. Wrong- fill interception of the condition of a servant, if it be the offence of him who should have been master, coincides with wrongful detrectation of master- ship : if it be the offence of a thu-d person, and the 'mastership be a beneficial thing, it involves in it wrongful interception of mastership. 3. Wrong- fill divestment of seri^antship, if it be the offence of the master, but not otherwise, coincides with wrongfiil abdication of mastership : if it be the offence of a stranger, it involves in it divestment of mastership, which, in as far as the mastership is a beneficial thing, is wrongful. 4. Usurpation of servantship coincides necessarily with wrongful imposition of mastership : it will be apt to involve in it wrongful divestment of mastership : but this only in the case where the usurper, pre- viously to the usurpation, was in a state of servi- tude under some other ^master. 5. Wrongful in- vestment of servantship (the servantship being considered as a beneficial thing) coincides with imposition of mastership ; which, if in the eyes of the pretended master the mastership should chance to be a burthen, will be wrongful. 6. Wrongful FOL. 11. M 162 DIVISION OF OFFENCl^S. abdication of servantship coincides with wnmgful divestment of mastership. 7. Wrongful detrecta- tion of servantship, with wrongful non-investment of mastership. 8. Wrongful imposition of servant- ship, if it be the offence of the pretended master, coincides with usurpation of mastership : if it be the offence of a stranger, it involves in it impo- sition of mastership, which, if in the eyes of the pretended master the mastership should be a burthen, will be wrongfiiL As to abuse of mas- tership, disturbance of mastership, breach of duty in servants, elopement of servants, and servant^ stealing, these are offences which, without any change of denomination, bear equal relation to both conditions. And thus we may reckon thir- teen sorts of offences to- which the condition ; of a servant stands exposed: viz. 1. Wrongful nour investment of servantship. 2. Wrongful inter- ception of servantship. 3. Wrongful divestm«3t of servantship. 4. Usurpation of servantship. 6. Wrongful mvestment of servantship. 6. Wrong- ful abdication pf servantship. 7. Wrongftil de- trectation of s^rantship. 8. Wroiigful imposi- tion of servantship. 9- Abuse of mastership. / 10. Disturbance of mastership. 1 1 . Breach of duty in servants. 12. Elopement of servants. 13. Serviant-stealing. XLIV. Oardian- We uow comc to the offences to which the condi- " tion of a guardian is exposed. A guardian is one who 1 \ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. l^S is invested with |K)wer over another^ living within ^"jf/* fte <^^. of fte .«ne t^,, ^cm^.y,^; ^^^ the power being to be exercised for the benefit of *?«*"*^^"' the ward. Now then^ what are the cases in which itcim be fpt the benefit of one man^ that another^ living widiin the compass of the same family, should exercise power over him? Consider either of the parties by himself, and suppose him, in point of understanding, to be on a level with the other, it seems evident enough that no such cases can ever exist*. To the production of happiness on the part of any given person (in like manner as to the production of any other effect which is the result of human agency) three things it is ne- cessary should concur: knowledge, inclination, and physical power. Now a^ there is no man who is so sure of being inclined, on all occasions, to pro- mote your happiness as you yourself are, so neither is there any man who upon the whole can have had so good opportunities as you must have had of knowing what is most conducive to that pur- pose. For who should know so well as you ■^*' V * Consider them together indeed, take the sum of the two interests, and the case, as we have seen (supra, xl.) is then, the reverse. That case, it is to be remembered, proceeds only upon the supposition that the two parties are obliged to liye together ; for supposie it to be at their option to part, the necessity of establishing the power ceases. 464 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. CnAw. do what it is that gives you pain or pleasitfe* ? Moreover, as to power, it is manifest that no superiority in this respect, on the part of a stranger, could, for a constancy, make up for so great a deficiency as he must lie under in respect x)f two such material points as knowledge and inclination. If then there be a case where it can be for the advantage of one man to be under the power of another, it must be on account of some palpable and very considerable deficiency, on the part of the former, in point of intellects, ox (which is the same thing in other words) in point of knowledge or understanding. Now there are two cases in which such palpable deficiency is known to take place. These are, 1. Where a man's intellect is not yet arrived at that state in which it is capable of directing his own inclina- tion in the pursuit of happiness : this is the case of infancy f. 2. Where by some particular known or unknown circumstance his intellect has either never arrived at that state, or having arrived at it has fallen from it : which is the case of insanity. By what means then is it to be ascertained whether a man's intellect is in that state or no ? For exhibiting the quantity of sensible heat in a . human body we have a very tolerable sort ot instrument, the thermometer ; but for exhibitiBg * Cb. xvii. [limits] § i. f See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet] § S* DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^^^ the quantity of intelligence^ we have no such ^^• instrument. It is evident, therefore, that the line which separates the quantity of intelligence which is sufl&cient for the purposes of self-government from that which is not suflScient, must be, in a great measure, arbitrary. Where the insufficiency is the result of want of age, the sufficient quantity of intelligence, be it what it may, does not accrue to ail at the same period of their lives. It becomes therefore necessary for legislators to cut the gordian knot, and fix upon a particular period, at which and not before, truly or not, every person whatever shall be deemed, as far as depends upon age, to be in possession of this sufficient quantity*. In this case then a line is drawn which may be the same for every man, and in the description of * In certain nations, women, whether married or not, have been placed in a state of perpetual wardship : this has been eyidently^founded on the notion of a decided inferiority in point of intellects on the part of the female sex, analogous to that which is the result of infancy or insanity on the part of the male. This is not the only instance in which tyranny has taken advantage of its own wrong, alleging as a reason for the domination it exercises, an imbecillity, which, as far as it bas been real, has been produced by the abuse of that very power which it is brought to justify. Aristotle, fascinated by tEe prejudice of the times, divides mankind into two distinct species, that of freemen, and that of slaves. Certain men were borne to be slaves, and ought to be slaves. — Why ? Because they are so. 166 DIVISION OF OFFENCfiS. ^HAi?. which, such as it is, whatever persons are con- ^-^=vr-f cerned may be certain of agreeing : the therefore, can be allotted to them here. XLVII. By what has been said, we are the better pre^ ^^ pared for taking an account of the offences to ^!^ili^f which the condition in question stands exposed. Ghiardianship being a private trust, is of course exposed^ to those offences, and no others, by which a private trust is Ijuble to be affected. Some of them, however, on account of the spe- cial quality of the trust, will admit of some further particularity of description. In the first place, breach of this species of trust may be termed mismanagement of guardianship: in the second plafce, of whatever nature the duties are, which are capable of being annexed to this con- dition, it must often happen, that in order to fulfil them, it is necessary the guardian should be at a certain particular place. Mismanagement of guardianship, when it consists in the not being, on the occasion in question, at the place in ques- tion, may be termed desertion of gfuardianship.^ \ no DIVISION OP OFFENCES. Cbap. Thirds It is manifest enough^ that the object which the guardian ought to propose to himself^ in the exercise of the powers to which those duties are annexed^ is to procure for the ward the greatest quantity of happiness which can be pro- cured for him^ consistently with the regard which is^ due to the other interests that have been mentiwied : for this is the object which the ward would have proposed to himself^ and might and ought to have been allowed to propose to him- self, had he been capable of governing his own conduct. Now, in order to procure this happi- ness, it is necessary that he should possess a certain power over the objects on the use of whidi such happiness depends. These objects are either the person of the ward himself, or other objects that are extraneous to him. These other objects are either things or persons. As to things then, objects of this dass, in as far as a man's happiness depends upon the use of them, are stiled his property. The case is the same with the servicei^ of any persms over whom he may happen to pos- sess a beiieficial power, or to whose services he may happen to possess a beneficial right. Now when property of any kind, which is in trust, suffers by the delinquency of him with whom it is in trust, such offence, of whatever nature it is in other respects, may be stiled dissipation in breach of trust : and if it be attended with a profit to the trustee, it may be stiled pecula- L DIVISION OP OFFENCES. 171 tian*. Fourth^ For one person to exercise a power c^'* of any kind over another^ it is necessary that tbe latter should either perform certain acts^ npon being commanded so to do by the former^ or at least should suffer certain acts to be exercised upon himself . In this respect a ward must stand upon the footing of a servant: and the condition of a ward must^ in this respect^ stand exposed to the same offences to which that of a servant stands exposed : that is^ on the part of a stranger, to disturbance, which in particular circumstances, will amount to theft : on the part of the ward, to breach of duty: which, in particular circumstances, may be effected by elopement. Fifth, There does not se^m to be any offence concerning guardian- ship tihat corresponds to abuse of trust: I mean in the tfense to which the lastrmentioned denomina- tion has been here confined f. The reason is, ihat guaardiamshipj being a trust of a private nature, does not, as such, confer upon the trustee any power, either over the persons or over the pro- perty of any party, other than the beneficiary himself If by accident it confers on the trustee a power over any persons whose services constitute a part of the property of the beneficiary, the trustee becomes thereby, in certain respects, the mast^ (^ such servants ;{;• Sixth, Bribery also is a sort of offence to which, in this case, there ■ — . " ■■■-...- ..IIP ♦ Sdpra, xxxT. t Vide supra, xxv. t Vide sapra^ xh 1T2 DIVISION OB* OFFENGEli* ^^' is not commonly much temptation. It is an ^ V ^ oflfence^ however, which by possibility is capable of taking this direction: and must therefore be aggregated to the number of the offences to which the condition of a guardian stands exposed. And thus we have in all seventeen of these offences : viz. ] • Wrongful non-invei^tment of guardianship. 2. Wrongfiil interception of guardianship* 3. Wrongfiil divestment of guardianship. 4. Usur- pation of guardianship. 5. WrongM investment of guardianship. 6. Wrongful abdication of guar- dianship. 7. Detrectation of guardianship. 8^ Wrongful imposition of guardianship. 9* Mis- management of guardianship. 10. Desertion of guardianship. 11. Dissipation in prejudice of wardship. 1 2. Peculation in prejudice of wardship* 1 3. Disturbance of guardianship. 14. Breach of duty to guardians. 15. Elopement from guar- i dians. 16. Ward-stealing. 17. Bribery in pre- judice of wardship. XLViir. Offesaoes Ncxt^ with regard to offences to which the con- coSi^ (if dition of wardship is exposed. ' Those which first affect the existence of the condition itself are as follows: 1. Wrongful non-investment of the^ condition of a ward. This, if it be the o£fence of one who should have been guardian, coincides with wrongftd detrectation of guardianship: if it- be the oSence of a third person, it involves in it non-investment of guardianship^ which^ provided DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^73 the guardianship is^ in the eyes of him who should ^HAr. xL V J* hare been guardian^ a desirable things is wrongful. 2. Wrongful interception of wardship. This^ if it be the oflfence of him who should have been guardian, coincides with wrongful detrectation of guardianship: if it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it mterception of guardian- ship, which, provided the guardianship is, in the eyes of him who should have been guardian, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 3. Wrongfiil divest- ment of wardship. This, if it be the offence of the guardian, but not otherwise, coincides with wrongful abdication of guardianship : if it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it divest- ment of guardianship, which, if the guardianship is, in the eyes of the guardian, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 4. Usurpation of the condition of a ward: an offence not very likely to be com- mitted. This coincides at- any rate with wrongful imposition of guardianship; and if the usurper were already under the guardianship of another guardian, it will involve in it wrongfiil divestment of such guardianship *. 5. Wrongful investment * This effect it may be thought will not necessarily take place: since a ward may have two guardians. One man then is guardian by right : another man comes and makes himself so by usurpation. This may very well be, and yet the former may continue guardfan notwithstanding. How then (it maybe asked) is he divested of his guardianship?— The answer is — Certainly not of the whole of it: but. 174 IMVISION OF OFFEMCES. Chap. perhaps more frequently than in ^: tnbre frequently in opposition to d person of full age^ an adiiU, thaii in /correlation to a parent. For the condition itself we have no other word than Jiliaiwn : an ill-contrived term,^not analogous to, paternity and maternity : the proper term would have been filiality : the word filiation is as fre- quently, perhaps, and more consistently, put for the act of establishing a person in the possession of the condition of Bliality. ISO DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ever, remains so much of the mischirf as depends upon the advantage or disadvantage which might accrue to persons related, or supposed to be re- lated, in the several remoter degrees, to him in question. The catalogue then of these offences stand as follows : 1 . Wrongful non-investment of filiation. This, if it be the offence of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, coincides with wrongful detrectation of parenta- lity : if it be the offence of a third person, it in- volves in it non-investment of parentality, which, provided the parentality is, in the eyes of him or her who should have been recognized as the pa- rent, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 2. Wrongful interception of fihation. This, if it be the offence of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, coincides with wrongful detrectar tion of parentality : if it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it interception of parentality, which, provided the parentality is, in the eyes of him or her who should have been recognized as parent, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 3. Wrong- ful divestment of filiation. This, if it be the offence of him or her who should be recognized as parent, coincides with wrongful abdication of parentality : if it be the offence of a third person^ it involves in it divestment of parentality : to wit, of paternity, or of maternity, or of both : which, if the parentality is, in the eyes of him or her who should be recognised as parent, a desirable things DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^81 are respectively wrongful. 4. Usurpation of ^^^J^- filiation. This coincides with wrongful imposition of parentality ; to wit, either of paternity, or of maternity, or of both : and necessarily involves in it divestment of parentality, which, if the paren- tality thus divested were, in the eyes of him or her who are thus divested of it, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 5. Wrongful investment of filiation : (the filiation being considered as a beneficial thing.) This coincides with imposition of paren- tality, which, if in the eyes of the pretended father or mother the parentality should be an undesirable thing, will be wrongful. 6. Wrongful abdication of filiation. This necessarily coincides with wrong- ful divestment of parentality ; it also is apt to in- volve in it wrongful imposition of parentality ; though not necessarily either to the advantage or to the prejudice of any certain person. For if a man^ supposed at first to be your son, appears afterwards not to be your's, it is certain indeed that he is the son of some other man, but it may not appear who that other man is. 7. Wrongful detrectation of filiation. This coincides with wrongful non-mvestmentor wrongful interception of parentality. 8. Wrongful imposition of filia- tion. This, if it be the offence of the pretended parent, coincides necessarily with usurpation of parentality : if it be the oflPence of" a third person, it necessarily involves imposition of parentality ; as also divestment of parentality : either or both 18^ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, of which, according to the circumstance above- ^ — >^ — ' mentioned, may or may not be wrongful. 9. Mis- management of parental guardianship. 10- De- sertion of parental guardianship. 11. Dissipation in prejudice of filial wardship. 12. Pecul^tioii in prejudice of filial wardship. 1 3. Abuse of paxeiQ- tal power. 14. Disturbance of parental guardi- anship. 15. Breach of duty to parents. 16* Elopement from parents. 17. Child-stealijoig. 18. Bribery in prejudice of parental guardianship. LI. ' Condition of We shall uow bc able to apply ourselves with a liusband. . . —Poweis. some advantage to the examination of the several datiesy and •^ rights, tiiat offences to which the marital condition, or con- nexed to it. ditiou of a husbaud, stands exposed. A husbaml is a man, between wl^om and a certain womm, who in this case is called his wife, th^re subpists a legal obligation for the purpose of theiir tt?ing together, and in psurticular for the pmrpose qf k £(exual intercourse to be carried on between them. Xhi3 obligatiop will naturally be considered in four points of view : 1 • In respect of its gowr mencement. 2. In respect of the pla^g. k. % In respect of the nature of i|;. 4* lo. re^ip^t oi^ its duration. First then, it is evid^, tji^t ia point of possibility> one method of commencement is as conceivable as another: the time of its commencement might have been marked by one. sort of event (by one sort of signal, as it may here be called) as well as by another. But in- ■■\ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 1^ practice the signal has usually been^ as in point of utility it ought constantly to be, a contract entered into by the parties : that is, a set of signs, pitched upon by the law, as expressive of their mutual consent J to take upon them this condition. Second, and third, with regard to the placing of ti« obligations which are the result of the con- txsLCt, it is evident that they must rest solely on ooLe Mide, ox mutually on both. On the first sup- position^ the condition is not to be distinguished from pure slavery. In this case, either the wife must be the slave of the husband, or the husband of the wife. The first of these suppositions has perhaps never been exemplified; the opposmg influence of physical causes being too universal to have ever been surmounted : the latter seems lo kave been exemplified but too often ; perhaps among the first Romans ; at any rate, in many barbarous nations. Thirdly, With regard to the tiature of the obligations. If they are not suf- fered to rest all on one side, certain rights are thereby given to the other. There must, there- fore, be rights on both sides. Now, where there are mutual rights possessed by two persons, as against each other, either there are powers an- nexed to those rights, or not. But the persons in question are, by the supposition, to live together : in which case we have shewn *, that it is not only expedient, but in a manner necessary, that on « Supra. 184 DIVISION OF OFFBNCES. Chap, one sidc there should be powers. Now it is only ' — V — ' on one side that powers can be: for suppose them on both sides^ and they destroy one another. The question is then. In which of the parties these powers shall be lodged ? we have shewn, that on the principle of utility they ought to be lodged in the husband. The powers then which subsist being lodged in the husband, the next question is. Shall the interest of one party only, or of both, be consulted in the exercise of them ? it is evident, that on the principle of utility the inte- rests of both ought alike to be consulted : since in two persons, taken together, more happmess is producible than in one. This being the case, it is manifest, that the legal relation which the husband will bear to the wife will be a complex one : compounded of that of mastef and that of ' guardian. LII. Offences The oflPenccs then to which the condition of a touching the condition of husbaud wiU be exposed, will be the sum of those a husband. , . . « to which the two conditions of master and guar- dian are exposed. Thus far the condition of a husband, with respect to the general outlines of it, stands upon the same footing as that of a parent. But there are certain reciprocal services, which being the main subject of the matrimonial contract, constitute the essence of the two matri- monial relations, and which neither a master nor guardian, as such, nor a parent, at any rate, have DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 185 usually been permitted to receive. These must of course have been distinguished from the indis- criminate train of services at large which the husband in his character of master is impowered to exact, and of those which in his character of guardian he is bound to render. Being thus distinguished, the oflPences relative to the two conditions have, in many instances, in as far as they have reference to these peculiar services, acquired particular denominations. In the first place, with regard to the contract, from the cele- bration of which the legal condition dates its existence. It is obvious that in point of possi- bility, this contract might, on the part of either sex, subsist with respect to several persons of the other sex at the same time : the husband might have any number of wives : the wife might have any number of husbands : the husband might enter into the contract with a number of wives at the same time : or, if with only one at a time, he might reserve to himself a right of engaging in a similar contract with any number, or with only such or such a number of other women after- wards, during the continuance of each former contract. This latter accordingly is the footing upon which, as is well known, marriage is and has been established in many extensive countries : particularly in all those which profess the Maho- metan religion. In point -of possibility, it is evident that the like liberty might be reserved on 186 DIVISION OF OFF£NC£S. c^AP. the part of the wife : though in point of practice no examples of such an arrangement seem ever to have occurred. Which of all these arrange- ments is^ in point of utility, the most expedient, is a question which would require too much dis- cussion to answer in the course of an analytical process like the present, and which belongs indeed to the civil branch of legislation, rather than to the penal*. In Christian countries, the solemni- zation of any such contract is made to exclude the solemnizaticm of any subsequent one during the continuance of a former : and the solemnization of any such subsequent contract is accordingly treated as an offence, under the name of Pdygamjf^ Polygamy then is at any rate, on the part of the vqah, a particular modification of that offence which may be stiled usurpation 'of the condition of a husband. As to its other effects, they will be different, according as it was the man only, or the woman only, or both, that were in a state of matrimony at the time of th^ commission of the <^encQ. If the man only, then his offence uit Yolve? in it pro tanio that of wrongful divestment of the condition of a wife, in prejudice of his prior wifef . If the woman only, then it involves * See ch. xvii. [Limits] § iv. t In this case also, if the woman knew not of the prior marriage, it is besides a species of seducti<^nr; and, in as far as it adepts her, belongs to another division of the oSencen of this class. Vide supra, :iKX2vi. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. .187 in it pro tanto that of wrongfiil divestment of the ^^'^p. condition of a husband^ in prejudice of her prior husband. If both were already married^ it of course involves both the wrongful divestments which have just been mentioned. And on the other hand also^ the converse of all this may be pb^rved with regard to polygamy op the part of the woman. Second, As the engaging not to enter into any subsequent engagement of the Uke kin4 during the continuance of the first, is one of the conditioi^ on which the law lends its sa^tion to the first ; so another is, the inserting as pne pf tbe articles of thiis engagement^ an undertaki^ not to render to, or accept from, any otl^ peiisofii the services wlpich f^^m the characteristic qli^t 0$ it : the rendi^wig pr acceptance of any such ^rvices is accordingly ti^eated as an offence, undei^ thei ni^e of odulti^: under which name is 9,lso comprised the c^nce of ^he stranger, who,, 'm the commission, of the aboVe ofifence, is the necess^^ accomplice. Thirds Ifeturbing either of tb^ parties to this encraj^ement, in the po$sesidon of Lse characteristic services, may, inkTmanner, be distinguished from the offence of disturbing them in the "enjoyment of the miscellaneous ad- vantages derivable from the same condition ; and on whichever side the blame rests, whether that of the party, or that of a third person, may be termed wrongful wiihholding of connubial services. And thus we have one-and-twenty sorts of of- 188 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. fences to which, as the law stands at present in Christian countries, the condition of a husband stands exposed : viz. 1 . Wrongful non-investment of the condition of a husband. 2. Wrongful interception of the condition of a husband. 3. Wrongful divestment of the jcondition of a husband. •4. Usurpation of the condition of a husband. 5. Polygamy. 6. Wrongful invest- ment of the condition of a husband. 7. Wrong- ful abdication of the condition of a husband. 8. Wrongful detrectation of the condition of 'a husband. 9. Wrongful imposition of the condi- tion of a husband. 1 0. Mismanagement of ma- rital guardianship. 1 1 . Desertion of marital guardianship. 12. Dissipation in prejudice of matrimonial wardship. 13. Peculation in preju- dice of matrimonial wardship. 14. Abuse of marital power. 1 5. Disturbance of marital guar- dianship. 16. Wrongful withholding of connu- bial services. 17- Adultery. 18. Breach of duty to husbands. Ij9. Elopement from husbands. 20. Wife-stealing. 21. Bribery in prejudice of marital guardianship*. * I. Semi-public offences. — Falsehoods contesting, or of- fences against justice destroying, the validity of the mar- riages of people of certain descriptions : such as Jews, Quakers, Hugonots, &c. &c. II. Self-regarding offences. — Improvident marriage on the part of minors. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 189 UII. Chap. XVL Next with regard to the oflPences to which the ^^ — ' condition of a wife stands exposed. From the ^^"ching the ^ oonditioa of patterns that have been exhibited already, thea^'ife* coincidences and associations that take place be- tween the offences that concern the existence of this condition and those which concern the exis- tence of the condition of a husband, may easily enough be apprehended without farther repeti- tions. The catalogue of those now under con- sideration will be precisely the same in every article as the catalogue last exhibited. LIV. Thus much for the several sorts of offences relative to the several sorts of domestic conditions : those which are constituted by such natural rela- tions as are contiguous being included. There remain those which are uncontiguous : of which, after so much as has been said of the others, it will naturally be expected that some notice should be taken. Thdse, however, do not afford any of that matter which is necessary to constitute a condition. In point of fact, no power seems ever to be annexed to any of them. A grand- father, perhaps, may be called by the law to take upon him the guardianship of his orphan grand- son: but then the power he has belongs to him not as grandfather, but as guardian. In point of possibility, indeed, power might be annexed to these relations, just as it might to any other. 1» DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap. But Still no ncw sort of domestic condition would XVL result from it: since it has been shewn that there can be no others, that, being constituted by power, shall be distinct from those which have been already mentioned. Such as they are, how- ever, they have this in common with the before- mentioned reflations, that they are capable of importing either benefit or burthen: they there- fore stand exposed to the several offeiices whereby those or any other relations are liable to be afiected in point of existence. It might be expected, therefore, that in virtue of these offences, they should be added to the list of the relations which are liable to be objects of delinquency. Bttt the fact is, that they already stand included in it : and although not expressly named, yet as effectuaiUy as if they were. On the one hand, it is only by affecting such or such a contiguous relation that ahy offeiice, affecting uncontiguous relations can take place. On the other hand, neither can atiy offence, affecting the existence of the contigubtis relatioils, be committed, without affecting thfe existence of an indefinite multitude of such as are uncontiguous. A false witness comes, and causes it to be believed that you are the son of a woman, who, in truth, is not your mother. What follows? An endless tribe of other false persua- sions— that you are the grandson of the father and of the mother of this supposed mother: that you are the son of some husband of her*s, or, at DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^91 least, of some man with whom she has cohabited: Chif. xvt the grandson of his father and his mothet; and so on : the brother of their other children, if they have any : the brother-in-law of the husbands and wives of those children, if married : the uncle of the children of those children: and so on, — On the other hand, that you are not the son of your real mother, nor of your real father : that you are not the grandson of either of your real grand- fathers or grandmothers ; and so on without end : all which persuasions result from, and are included in, the one original false persuasion of your being the son of this your pretended mother. It should seem, therefore, at first sight, that none of the offences against these uncontiguous relations could ever come expressly into question : for by the same rule that one ought, so it might seem ought a thousand others : the offences against the uncontiguous being merged as it were in those which affect the contiguous relations. So far, however, is this from being the case, that in speaking of an offence of this stamp, it is not uncommon to hear a great deal said of this or that uncontiguous relationship which it affects, at the some time that no notice at all i^hall be taken of tiity of those which are contiguous. How happens this ? Because, to the uncontiguous rela- tion are annexed perhaps certain remarkable ad- vantages or disadvantages, while to all the inter- mediate relations none shall be annexed which are IW DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chaf. in comparison worth noticing. Suppose Antony or Lepidus to have contested the relationship of Octavius (afterwards Augustus) to Caius Julius Csesar. How could it have been done? It could only have been by contesting, either Octavius's being the son of Atia, or Atia's being the daughter of Julia, or Julia's being the daughter of Lucius Julius Caesar, or Lucius Julius Caesar's being the father of Caius. But to have been the son of Atia, or the grandson of Julia, or the great grandson of Lucius Julius Caesar, was, in com- parison, of small importance. Those intervening relationships were, comparatively speaking, of no other use to him thati in virtue of their being so many necessary links in the genealogical chain which connected him with the sovereign of the empire. As to the advantages and disadvantages which may happen to be annexed to any of those imcon- tiguous relationships, we have seen already that no powers over the correlative person, npr any corresponding obligations, are of, the number. Of what nature then can they be? They are, in truth, no other than what are the result either of local and accidental institutions, or of some spon* taneous bias that has been taken by the moral sajiction. It would, therefore, be to little purpose to attempt tracing them out a priari by any ex- haustive process : all that can be done is, to pick up and lay together some of the principal articles DIVISION OF OFFENCfiS. }^ in each catalogue by way of specimen* The ad- ^^'- vantages which a given relationship is apt to impart^ seem to be referable chiefly to the follow- ing heads : ] • Chance of succession to the pro- perty, or a part of the property, of the correlative person. 2. Chance of pecuniary support, to be yielded by the correlative person, either by ap- pointment of law, or by spontaneous donation. 3. Accession of legal rank ; including any legal privileges which may happen to be annexed to it: such as capacity of holding such and such bene- ficial offices; exemption from such and such bur- thensome obligations; for instance, paying taxes, serving burthensome offices, &c. &c. 4. Accession of rank by courtesy; including the sort of repu- tation which is customarily and spontaneously annexed to distinguished birth and family alliance : whereon may depend the chance of advancement in the way of marriage, or in a thousand other ways less obvious. The disadvantages which a given relation is liable to impart, seem to be re- ferable chiefly to the following heads: 1. Chance of being obliged, either by law, or by force of the moral sanction, to yield pecuniary support to the correlative party. 2. Loss of legal rank: in- cluding the legal disabilities, as well as the bur- thensome obligations, which the law is apt to annex, sometimes with injustice enough, to the lower stalions. 3. Loss of . rank by courtesy : VOL. ii. o \ 194 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. including the loss of the advantages annexed hy custom to such rank. 4. Incapacity of contract- ing matrimony with the correlative person, where the supposed consanguinity or affinity lies within the prohibited degrees ♦. * In pursuance of the plan adopted with relation to semi- public and self-regarding offences, it may here be proper to exhibit such a catalogue as the nature of the design will admit, of the several genera or inferior divisions of public offences. I. Offences against the external security of the state. 1. Trea9on (in favour of foreign enemies.) It may be positive or negative (negative consisting, for example, in the not opposing the commission of positive.) 2. Espionage (in favour of foreign rivals not yet enemies.) 3. Injuries to foreigners at large (including piracy.) 4. Injuries to privi^ leged foreigners such as ambassadors.) II. Offences against justice, 1. Offences against judi- cial trust : viz. Wrongful non-investment of judicial trust, wrongful interception of judicial trust, wrongful divestment of judicial trust, usurpation of judicial trust, wrongful invest- ment of judicial trust, wrongful abdication of judicial trust, wrongful detrectation of judicial trust, wrongful impositioA of judicial trust, breach of judicial trust, abuse of judicial trust, disturbance of judicial trust, and bribery in prejudice of judicial trust. Breach and abuse of judicial trust may be either inten- tional or unintentional. Intentional is culpable at any rate. Unintentional will proceed either from inadvertence, or ftm mis-supposal : if the inadvertence be coupled with heed^ lessness, or the missupposal with rashness, it is culpable: if not, blameless. For the' particular acts by which the exerdse of judicial trust may be disturbed see B. i. tit. [offences DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 1^ LV. Chap. XVI We come now to civil conditions : these^ it may (^^jp^j well be imagined^ may be infinitely various: as**®™*- against justicfe.] They are too maltifarious, and too ill pro- vided with names, to be examined here. If a man fails in fulfilling the duties of this trust, and thereby comes either to break or to abuse it, it must be through some deficiency' in the three requisite and only re- quisite endowments, of knowledge, inclination, and power. [See supra, xxvii.] A deficiency in any of those points, if any person be in fault, may proceed either from his own &alt, or from the fault of those who should act with or under him. If persons who are in fault are persons invested with judical trust, the offence comes under the head of breach or abuse of trust : if other persons, under that of disturbance of trust. The ill effects of any breach, abuse, or disturbance of judicial trust, will consist in the production of some article or articles in the list of the mischiefs which it ought to be the original purpose of judicial procedure to remedy or avert, and of those which it ought to be the incidental pur- pose of it to avoid producing. These are either primary (that is immediate) or remote : remote ar^ of the 2d, 3d, or 4th order, and so on. The primary are those which import actual pain to persons assignable, and are therefore mis- chievous in themselves: the secondary are mischievous on account of the tendency they have to produce some article or articles in the catalogue of those of the first order; and are therefore mischievous in their effects. Those of the Sd order are mischievous only on account of the connection ibey have in the way of productive tendency, as before, with those of the 2d order: and so on. Primary inconveniences, which it ought to be the object «f procedure to provide against, ^e, 1. The continuance of 196 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Chap, various as the acts which a man may be either com- XVI. manded or allowed^ whether for his own benefit^ or the individual offence itself, and thereby the encrease as well as continuance of the mischief of it. 2. The continuance of the whole mischief of the individual offence. 3. The continuance of a part of the mischief of the individual offence. 4. Total want of amends on the part of persons injured by the offence. 5. Partial want of amends on the part of persons injured by the offence. 6. Superfluous punishment of delinquents. 7. Unjust punishment of per- sons accused. 8. Unnecessary labour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of superior judicial officers. 9. Unnecessary labour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of ministerial or other subordinate judicial officers. 10. Unnecessary labour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of persons whose co-operation is requisite pro re natdy in order to make up the necessary com- plement of knowledge and power on the part of judicial officers, who are such by profession. 11. Unnecessary la- bour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of persons at large, coming under the sphere of the operaticHis of the persons above-mentioned. Secondary inconveniences are, in the counsultative pre- interpretative (or purely civil) branch of procedure. 1. Mis- interpretation or adjudication. In the executive (including tlie' penal) branch. 2. Total impunity of delinquents : (as favouring the production of other offences of the like nature.) 3. Partial impunity of delinquents. 4. Application of pu- ' nishment improper in specie, though perhaps not in degree (this lessening the beneficial efficacy of the quantity em- ployed.) 5. Unoeconomical application of punishment,' though proper, perhaps, as well in specie as in degree. 6. Unnecessary pecuniary expence on the part of the state. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 197 that of others, to abstain from or to perform. As Chap. XVI. many diflFerent denommations as there are of per- Inconveniences of the 3d order axe, 1. Unnecessary delay. 9. Unnecessary intricacy. Inconveniences of the 4th order are, 1. Breach, 9. Abuse, 3. Disturbance, of judicial trust, as above : viz. in as far as these offences are preliminary to and distinct from those of the 2d and 3d orders. Inconveniences of the 5th order are. Breach of the several regulations of procedure, or other regulations, made in the view of obviating the inconveniences above enumerated : viz. if preliminary and distinct as before. III. Offekces against the preventive branch of the POLICE. 1. Offences against phthano'paranomic trust : (4p$aw»j to prevent ; vapayofjua, an offence.) 2. Offences against phihanO'Symphoric trust : well; and noulcvyaytv, to educate. 3. Offences against no$0'Comial trust : vocrof, a disease ; and xo/m^, to take care of. 4. Of- fences against moro-comial trust : Qm^o^, an insane person.) 5. Offences against ptocho-comial trust : (ffT«%o ^"°^ * irtpog ano- tbei's.) 90B DIVISION. OF OTPENCBS. c-«. legal possession, can be made up, we have already ^^ seen : beneficial powers, fiduciary powers, ben^ ficial rights, fiduciary rights, relative duties, ab- solute duties. But as many conditions as import a power or right of the fiduciary kind, as possessed by the person whose condition is in question, belong to the head of trusts. The cata- logue of the offences to'which these conditions are exposed, coincides therefore exactly with the catalogue of offences against trust: under which head they have been considered in a general point of view under the head of offences against trust: and such of them as are of a domestic nature, in a more particular manner in the character of offences against the several domestic conditions. Conditions constituted by such duties of the rela- tive kind, as have for their counterparts trusts constituted by fiduciary powers, as well as rights on the side of the correlative party, and those of a private nature, have also been already discussed under the appellation of domestic conditions. The same observation may be applied to the condi- tions constituted by such powers of the beneficial kind over persons as are of a private nature : as also to the subordinate correlative conditions con- stituted by the duties corresponding to those rights and powers. As to absolute duties, there is no instance of a condition thus created, of which the institution is upon the principle of utility to be justified ; unless the several religious DIVISION OP OFFENCES. *» conditions of the monastic kind should be allowed ^"^^* of as examples. There remain^ as the only ma- terials out of which the conditions which .yet remain to be considered can be composed, condi- tions constituted by beneficial powers over things; conditions constituted by beneficial rights to things (that is, rights to powers over things) or by rights to those rights, and so on; conditions constituted by rights to services; and conditions constituted by the duties corresponding to those respective rights. Out of these are to be taken those of which the materials are the ingredients of the several modifications of property, the several con- ditions of proprietorship. These are the condi- tions, if such for a moment they may be stiled, which having but here and there any specific names, are not commonly considered on the foot- ing of conditions: so that the acts which, if such conditions were recognized, might be considered as offences against those conditions, are not wont to be considered in any other light than that of offences against property. Now the case is, as hath been already inti- mated*, that of these civil conditions, those which are wont to be considered under that name, are not distinguished by any uniform and explicit line from those of which the materials are wont Supra, xvii. S04 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. Cbaf. to be carried to the head of property: a set of rights shall; in one instance^ be considered as constituting an article of property rather than a condition : while^ in another instance^ a set of rights of the same stamp is considered as con- stituting rather a condition than an article of property. This will probably be found to be the case in all languages : and the usage is different again in one language from what it is in another. From these causes it seems to be impracticable to subject the class of 'civil conditions to any exhaus- tive method : so that for making a complete collec- tion of them there seems to be no other expedient than that of searching the language through for them, and taking them as they come. To exemplify this observation, it may be of use to lay open the structure as it were of two or three of the prin- cipal sorts or classes of conditions, comparing them with two or three articles of property which appear to be nearly of the same complexion: by this means the nature and generation, if one may so call it, of both these classes of ideal objects may be the more clearly understood. - The several sorts of civil conditions that are not fiduciary may all, or at least the greater part of them, be comprehended under the head of rank, or that of profession ; the latter word being taken in its most extensive sense, so as to include not only what are called the liberal professions, but those also which are exercised by the several DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^5 sorts of traders^ artists^ manufacturers^ and other Cha». persons of whatsoever station^ who are in the way of making a profit by their labour. Among ranks then^ as well as professions^ let us^ for the sake of perspicuity^ take for examples such articles as stand the clearest from any mixture of either fiduciary or beneficial power. The rank of knight- hood is constituted^ how? by prohibiting all other persons from performmg certain acts, the perform- ance of which is the symbol of the order, at the same time that the knight in question, and his companions, are permitted: for instance, to w^ar a ribbon of a certain colour in a certain manner : to call himself by a certsdn title : to use an anno- rial seal with a certain mark on it. By laying all persons but the knight under this prohibition, the law subjects them to a set of duties : and since from the discharge of these duties a benefit results to the person in whose favour they are created, to wit, the benefit of enjoying such a share of extra- ordinary reputation and respect as men are wont to jield to a person thus distinguished, to dis- charge them is to render him a service: and the duty being a duty of the negative class, a duty consisting in the performance of certain acts of the negative kind*, the service is what may be called a service of forbearance. It appears then, that to generate this condition there must be two , ■■ ■ ■ ^ * See ch. [Actions] viii. ^^ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. vVr ^^ ^^ services: that which is the immediate cause of it^ a service of the negative kind^ to be rendered by the community at large : that which is the cause again of this service^ a service of the positive kind^ to be rendered by the law. The condition of a professional man stands upon a narrower footing. To constitute this condition there needs nothing more than a permission given hun on the part of the legislator to perform those acts, in the performance of which consists the exercise of his profession: to give or sell his advice or assisttoce in matters of law or physic : to give or sell his services as employed in the exe- cuting or overseeing of a manufacture or piece of work of such or such a kind : to sell a commodity of such or such a sort. Here then we see there is but one sort of service requisite; a service which may be merely of the negative kind, to be rendered by the law: the service of permitting him to exercise his profession : a service which, if there has been no prohibition laid on before, is rendered by simply forbearing to prohibit him. Now the ideal objects, which in the cases above specified are said to be conferred upon a man by the services that are respectively in question, are in both cases not articles of property but condi- tions. By such a behaviour on the part of the law, as shall be the reverse of that whereby they were respectively produced, a inan may be made to forfeit them : and what he is then said to forfeit DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^ is in neither case his property; but in one case* Chaf. his rank or dignity : in the other case^ his trade or his profession : and in both cases^ his condition. Other cases there are again in which the law^ by a process of the same sort with that by which it constituted the former of the two above-men- tioned conditions^ confers on him an ideal object^ which the laws of language have placed under the head of property. The law permits a man to sell books : that is^ all sorts of books in general. Thus far all that it has done is to invest him with a condition : and this condition he would equally possess^ although every body else in the world were to sell books likewise. Let the law now take an active part in his favour^ and prohibit all other persons from selling books of a certain de- scriptioUj he remaining at liberty to sell them as before. It thereby confers on him a sort of exclusive privilege or monopoly, which is called a copy-right But by investing him with this right, it is not said to invest him with any new sort of condition ; and what it invests him with is spoken of as an article of property ; to wit, of that sort of property which is termed incorporeal * : and so * The reason probably why an object of the sort here in question is referred to the head of property, is, that the chief value of it arises from its being capable of being made a source of property in the more ordinary acceptations of the word; that is, of money, consumable commodities, and so forth. 508 DIVISION OF OFFENCES ^^*' on in the case of an engravings a mechanical en- ^ V * gine, a medicine ; or, in short, of a saleable article of any other sort. Yet when it gave him an exclu- sive right of wearing a particular sort of ribbon, the object which it was then considered as confer- ring on him was not an article of property but a condition. By forbearing to subject you to certain disad- vantages, to which it subjects an alien, the law confers on you the condition of a natural-bom subject : by subjecting him to them, it imposes on him the condition of an alien : by conferring on you certain privileges or rights, which it denies to a roturier, the law confers on you the condition of eL gentilhomme ; by forbearing to confer on him those privileges, it imposes on him the condition ^ of a roturier *. The rights, out of which the two advantageous conditions here exemplified are both of them as it were composed, have for their coun- terpart a sort of services of forbearance, rendered, as we have seen, not by private individuals, but by the law itself. As to the duties which it creates in rendering you these services, they are to be considered as duties imposed by the legislator on the ministers of justice. * The conditions themseWes having nothing that corres- ponds to them in England, it was necessary to make use of foreign terms. DIVISION OP OFFENCES. 209 I It may be observed, with regard to the greater part of the conditions here comprised under the general appellation of civile that the relations cor- responding to those by which they are respectively constituted, are not provided with appellatives. The relation which has a name, is that which is borne by the party favoured to the party bound : that which is borne by the party bound to the party favoured has not any. This is a circum- stance that may help to distinguish them from those conditions which we have termed domestic. In the domestic conditions, if on the one side the party to whom the power is given is called a f master ; on the other side, the party over whom \ that power is given, the party who is the object of that power, is termed a servant, in the civil conditions this is not the case. On the one side, a man, in virtue of certain services of forbearance, . which the rest of the community are bound to render him, is denominated a knight of such or such an order : but on the other side, these ser- vices do not bestow any particular denomination on the persons from whom such services are due. Another man, in virtue of the legislator's rendering that sort of negative service which consists in the not prohibiting him from exercising a trade, in- vests him at his option with the condition of a trader : it accordingly denominates him a farmer, a baker, a weaver, and so on : but the ministers ^ of the law do not, in virtue of their rendering the VOL. II. P « 10 DIVISION OF -OFFENCES. ^"^'- man this sort of negative service, acquire for themselves any particular name. Suppose even that the trade you have the right of exercising happens to be the object of a monopoly, and that the legislator, besides rendering you himself those services which you, derive from the permission he bestows on you, obliges other persons to. render you those farther services which you receive from their forbearing to follow the same trade; yet neither do they, in virtue of their being thus bound, acquire any particular name. After what has been said of the nature of the several sorts of civil conditions that have names, the o£fences to which they are exposed may> withr out much difficulty, be imagined. Takm by itself^ every condition which is thus constituted by a per- mission granted to the possessor, is of course of a beneficial nature : it is, therefore, exposed to all those offences to which the possession of a benefit is exposed. But either on account of a man's being obliged to persevere when once engaged in it, or on account of i^uch other obligations as may stand annexed to the possession of it, or on bo- count of the comparative degree of disrepute which may stand annexed to it by tbe moral sanctioUj^it may by accident be a burthen: it is on this account liable to stand exposed to ^the o£SE^nces to which, as hath been seen, every, thing that partakes of the nature of ^ burthea , stands exposed. As to any offences which may concern DIVISldN OF OFFENCES. 211 M eteii^ of tike ftMicitions belonging to it, if it Cbap. I]JlB{ipen6 to have khy dirties annexed to it^ such as tfaose^ for instance^ which are constituted by regu- lations touching the exercise of a trade, it will stand exposed to so many breaches of duty ; and lastly^ whatsoever are the fiinctions belonging to it^ it will stand exposed at any rate to disturb' dice* In the forming however of th^ catalogue of these oflfences^ exactness is of the less consequence^ inasmuch as an act^ if it should happen not to be comprised in this catalogue^ and yet is in any respect of a pernicious nature^ will be sure to be I found in some other division of the system of [ (^Ssnees : if a baker sells bad bread for the price of good^ it is a kind of fraud upon the buyer ; atid perhaps an injury of the simple corporal kind done to the health of an individual^ or a neigh- bonrhobd : if a clothier sells bad cloth for good at hothe^ it is a fraud ; if to foreigners abroad^ it may; ov^r and above the fraud put upon the fotfSgn purchaser^ have pernicious effects perhaps in the prosperity of the trade at home^ and be- came thereby an offence againi^t the national - weiilth. So again with regard to disturbance : if a inan be disturbed in the exercise of his trade^ tbe ofifence will probably be a wroiigfril inttrcefh tioH €f the profit he might be presumed to have i- beiHi i& a #ay to make by it : and were it even to appear itf iny case that a man > exercised a trade. ^12 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. xvi'* ^^ ^^^t is less unlikely^ a liberal profession^ with- ' — ^^— ' out having profit in his view, the offence will still be reducible to the head of simpk injurious re- strainment, or simple injurious compulsion. § 4. Advantages of the present method. LVI, id^l^^the ^ ^^^ words, for the purpose of giving a general iMth^hCTc yjg^ Qf tj^g method of division here pursued, and of the advantages which it possesses, may have their use. The whole system of offences, we may observe, is branched out into five classes. , In the three first, the subordinate divisions are taken from the same source ; viz. from the consideration of the different points, in respect whereof the in- terest of an individual is exposed to suffer. By this uniformity, a considerable degree of light seems to be thrown upon the whole system ; par- ticularly upon the offences that come under the third class: objects which have never hitherto been brought into any sort of order. With regard to the fourth class, in settling the precedence be- tween its several subordinate divisions, it seemed most natural and satisfactory to place those first, the connection whereof with the welfare of indivi- duals seemed most obvious and immediate. The mischievous effects^ of those offences, which tend in an immediate way to deprive individuals of the ' protection provided for them against the attacks of one another, and of those which tend to bring DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 213 down upon them the attacks of foreign assailants^ Chaf. seem alike obvious and palpable. The mischievous quality of such as tend to weaken the force that is provided to combat thoSe attacks^ but particu- larly the latter^ though evident enough, is one link farther o£Pin the chain of causes and e£Pects. . The ill effects of such offences as are of disservice only by diminishing the particular fund from whence that force is to be extracted, such effects, I say, though indisputable, are still more distant and out of sight. The same thing may be observed with regard to such as are mischievous only by affect- ing the universal fund. Offences against the sovereignty in general would not be mischievous, if offences of the several descriptions preceding were not mischievous. Nor in a temporal view are ofifences against religion mischievous, except in as far as, by removing, or weakening, or misap- plying one of the three great incentives to virtue, and checks to vice, they tend to open the door to the several mischiefs, which it is the nature of all those other offences to produce. As to the fifth class, this, as hath already been observed, exhibits, at first view, an irregularity, which however seems to be unavoidable. But this irregularity is pre- sently corrected, when the analysis returns back, as it does after a step or two, into the path from which the tyranny of language had forced it a wHile to deviate. It was necessary that it should have two pur- ^^* DIVISION OF OFFENCES. poses in view : the one^ to e^hit^ ^pon a ^scf^le more or less minute^ a systematical enumeri^tion of the several possible I^odifications of delinqujen- cy^ denominated or undenominated ; the ptl^er^ tp find places in the list for such names of offences as were in cui;rent use : for the first purpose, nature was to set the law ; for the other, custom. Had the nature of the things themselves been the only guide, every such difference in the mi^imer of perpetration, and such only, should have jserved as a ground for a different denomjxiation, as was at- tended with a difference in point of effect. This however of itself would nevpr have been suffi- cient ; for as on one hand the new language, which i^ would have been necessary to invent, would have been uncouth, and in a manner unintelligible : so on the other hand the names, whidi were before in current use, and which, in spite of all systems, good or bad, must have remained in current use, would have continued unexplained. To have ad- hered exclusively to the current language, would have been as bad on the other side ; for in ihat case the catalogue of offences, when compaJE^ to that of the mischiefs that are capable of iMfing produced, would have been altogether broken and uncomplete. To reconcile these two objects, in as far as they seemed to be reconcileable, the following course has therefore been pursued. The logical whole, constituted by the sum total of possible offences, DIVISION OF OFFENCES. 215 has been bisected in as many different directions Ch^^. as were necessary, and the process in each direc- tion carried down to that stage at which the par- ticidar ideas thus divided found names in current use in readiness to receive them. At that period I have stopped ; leaving any minuter distinctions to be enumerated in the body of the work, as so many sq^ecies of the genus characterized by such or sudh It tiahie. If in the course of any such process I caihe to a mode of conduct which, though it required to be taken notice of, and perhaps had actuaUy been taken notice of, under all laws, in the character of an offence, had hitherto been ex- pressed under different laws, by different circum^ locutions, without ever having received any name oiqpabte of occupjFing the place of a substantive in Sr Sentence. I have frequently ventured so fax as to M>ricate A new name for it, such an one as the idiom c^' the l&nguage, and the acquaintance I haj^pened to haVe with it, would admit of. Thes^ names consisting in most instances, and that un- avoidaUy, of two or three words brought toge- ther, itt a language too which admits not, like the Germad and the Greek, of their being melted into one, can never be upon a par, in point of commo- diousness, with those univocal appellatives which « make part of the established stock. In the choice of names in current use, care has been taken to avoid all such as have been grounded on local distinctions, ill founded, perhaps, in the *il6 DIViajON OF OFFENCES. ^"^j'- nation in which they received their births and at "■^^^ — ' any r&te not applicable to the circumstances of other countries. The analysis^ as far as it goes^ is as applicable to the legal concerns of one country as of another : and where^ if it had descended into further details, it would have ceased to be so, there I have taken care always to stop : and thence it is that it has come to be so much more particular in the clas» of o£Pences against individuals, than in any of the other classes. One use then of this arrangement, if it should be found to have been properly con- ducted, will be its serving to point out in what it is that the legal interests of all countries agree, and in what it is that they are liable to differ : how far a rule that is proper for one, will serve, and how fai* it will not serve, for another. That the legal interests of different ages and countries have nothing in common, and they have every thing, are suppositions equally distant from the truth*. LVII. A natural method, such as it hath been here attempted to exhibit, seems to possess four capital advantages ; not to mention others of inferior Its advan- tages. —1. It is conveiiieDt foi the ap- * The above hints are offered to the consideration of the few who may be disposed to bend their minds to disquisi- tions of this uninviting nature: to sift the matter to the bottom, and engage in the details of illustration^ would re- quire more room than could in this place be consistently allowed. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. «17 note. In the first place^ it affords such assistance ^^' to the apprehension and to the memory, as those "^^^^ faculties would in vain look for in any technical «^ ^« "»«- arrangement ♦. That arrangement of the objects of any science may, it should seem, be tehned a natural one, which takes such properties to charac- terize them by, as men in general are, by the com- mon constitution of man's nature, independently of any accidental impressions they may have re- ceived from the influence of any local or other particular causes, accustomed to attend to : such, in a word, as naturally y that is readily, and at first sight, engage, and firmly fix, the attention of any one to whom they have once been pointed out. Now by what other means should an object eiu gage, or fix a man's attention, unless by interesting him 2 and what circumstance belonging to any action can be more interesting, or rather what other circumstance belonging to it can be at all interest- ing to him, than that of the influence it promises to have on his own happiness, and the happiness of those who are about him ? By what other mark then should he more easily find the place which any offence occupies in the system, or by what other clue should he more readily recall it ? LVIII. In the next place, it not only gives at first glance — s. it giyes a general intimation of the nature of each division nemi pn>. , pOMtioDf. • See Fragment on Government, pref. p. xlv. edit. 1776. — pref. p. xlvii: edit. 1823. V. 218 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^^f' of offences^ in as far as- that nature is determined /— ' by some one characteristic property, but it gives room for a number of general propositions to be formed concerning the particular offences that come under that division, in such manner as to exhibit a variety of other properties that may belong to them in common. It gives room, there- fore, for the framing of a number of propo- sitions concerning them, which^ though very gene- ral, because predicated of a great number of ar- ticles, shall be as generally true *. * Imagine what a condition a science must be in, when as yet there shall be no such thing as forming any extensive proposition relative to it, that shall be at the same time a true one : where, if the proposition shall be true of some of the particulars contained under it, it shall be fake with re- gard to others. Wliat a state would botany, for example, be in, if the classes were so contrived, that no common cha- racters could be found for them? Yet in this state, and no better, seems every system of penal law to be, authoritative or unauthoritative that has ever yet appeared. Try if it be otherwise, for instance, with the delicta privata ei pubUca^ and witl) the pubUca ordinaria, and pubUca extra-ordinaria of the Roman law t* All this for want of method : and hence the necessity of endeavouring to strike out a new one. Nor is this want of method to be wondered at A science so new as that of penal legislation, could hardly have been in any better state. Till objects are distinguished, they cannot be arranged. It is thus that truth and order go on t See Heioecc. Elem. p. vu, § 79, 80. DIVISION OF 0FF£NC£8. 219 LIX. Chap. xvx In the third place^ it is so contrived, that the ' — y- ——3. It very place which any offence is made to occupy, p^*"*' ^^ .1 A . ,' . ,1 the reason s^g^sts the reason of its being put there^ It of the Uw. serves to indicate not only that such and such acts are made o£fences, but why they aught to be« By this means, while it addri^siss itself to the understanding, it recommends itself, in some measure, to the affections. By the intimation it gives of the nature and* tendency of each ob- noxious act, it accounts for, and in some measure vindicates, the treatment which it may be thought prc^r to bestow upon that act in the way of punishment. To the subject then it is a kind of perpetual apology : shewing the necessity of every defalcation, which, for the security and prosperity of each individual, it is requisite to make from the liberty of every other. To the legislator it is a kind of perpetual lesson : serving at once as a corrective to his prejudices, and as.$i dheck upon his passions. Is there a loiscl^ef hi^d in hand. It is only in proportion as the fonner is dis- coyered» that th^ latter can be improved. Before a certain order JiS established, truth can be but imperfectly announced : but until a certain proportion of truth has been developed and brought to light, that order cannot be established. The discovery of truth leads to the establishment of order : and the establishment of order fixes and propagates the dis- covery of truth. I *^ DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^_^»- which has escaped him? in a natural arrange- ^->^ ment, if at the same time an exhaustive one, he cannot fail to find it. Is he tempted ever to force innocence within the pale of guilt? the difficulty of finding a place for it advertises him of his error. Such are the uses of a map of universal delinquency, laid down upon the prin-. ciple of utility : such the advantages, which the legislator as well as the subject may derive from it. Abide by it, and etery thing that is arbitrary / in legislation, vanishes. An evil-intentioned or prejudiced legislator durst not look it in the face. He would proscribe it, and with reason : it would be a satire on his laws. ' ' LX. iiafel*'*ii- ^^ '^^ fourth place, a natural arrangement, ^^'« ^^« governed as it is by a principle which is recog- oatknis. nizcd by all men, will serve alike for the juris- prudence of all nations. In a system' of proposed law, framed in pursuance of such a method, the language will serve as a glossary by which all systems of positive law might be explained, ^while the matter serves as a standard by which they might be tried. Thus illustrated, the practice of every nation might be a lesson to every other: and mankind might carry on a mutual inter- change of experiences and improvements as easily in this as in every other walk of science. If any one of these objects should in any degree be DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^1 attained^ the labour of this analysis^ severe as it ^xvl has been^ will not have been thrown away. § 5. Characters of the Jive classes. LXI. It has been mentioned as an advantage pos- characters sessed by this method^ and not possessed by any ciassw, how other, that the objects comprized under it arcfrom^rtie^ cast into groupes, to which a variety of proposi- ^.® "*" tions may be applied in common. A collection of these propositions, as applied to the several classes, may be considered as exhibiting the dis-^ tinctive characters of each class. So many of these propositions as can be applied to the of- fences belonging to any given class, so many properties are they found to have in common : so many of these common properties as may respec- tively be attributed to them, so many properties may be set down to serve as characters of the class. A collection of these characters it may here be proper to exhibit. The more of them we can bring together, the more clearly and fully will the nature of the several classes, and of the offences they are cotiiposed of, be understood. LXII. Characters of Class 1 ; composed of private of- Characters . ... of Class 1. fences, or offences against assignable individuals. 1 . When arrived at their last stage (the stage «N DIVISION OF OFFENCES. C»AT. of conmmmation*) they produce^ all of theili> a primary mischief as weU as a secondary f. 2. The indivduals whom they affect in the first instance J, are constantly assignable. This extends to all ; to attempts and preparations^ as well as to such as have arrived at the stage of consumma- tion §. 3. Consequently they admit of compensation)\: in which they differ from the offences of all the other classes, as such. 4. They admit ^ also o{ retaliation** ; in which also they differ from the offences of all the other classes. ' 5. There is always some person who has. a natural and peculiar interest to prosecute them. In this they differ from self-regarding offences : also from semi-public and publiq ones ; except in as far as the two latter may chance to involve a private mischief. . * Ch. vii. [Actions] xiv. t See ch* xii. [Consequences] iii. I [First Instance.] That is, by their primary mischief. § See supra, and B. I. tit. [Accessory offences.] II See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet] ii. note. IF [Admit.] I mean, that retaliation is capable of being applied in the cases in question ; not that it ought always to be employed. Nor is it capable of being applied in erery indwidual instance of each offence, but only in some indi- vidual instance of each species of offence. *• See ch. xv. [Properties] viii. mVUIION OF OFFENCESr. 9^ 6* The mischief ibey produce is obvious : ivore Cbap SO thah that of semi-public offences ;. atnd sfill more so than that of self-regarding ones, or even public. 7. lliey are every where, and must ever be, obnoxious to the censure of the world : more so than semi-public offences as such ; and still more so than public ones. 8. They are more constantly obnoxious to the censure of the world than self-regarding offences : and would be so universally, were it not for the influence of the two false principles ; the principle of asceticism, and the principle of antipathy*. 9^ They are less apt than semi-public and public offences to require different descriptions f in different states and countries : in which respect they are much upon a par with self-regarding ones. 10. By certun circumstances of aggravation^ they are liable to be transformed into semi-public offences : and by certain others, into public. 11. There can be no ground for punishing them, until they can be proved to have occa- * Ch. ii. [Principles adverse.] f [Different descriptions.] It seems to be from their pos- sessing these three last properties, that the custom has arisen of speaking of them, or at least of many of them, under the name of offences against the law of nature : a vague expres- sioDy and productive of a multitude of inconveniences. See ch. ii. [Principles advetse.] XVI. 994 DIVISION OF OFFENCES. y"vi'* sioned, or to be about to occasion^ some particular "* — V — ' mischief to some particular individual. In this they differ from semi-public offences, and from public. 1 2. In slight cases, compensation given to the individual affected by them, may be a sufficient ground for remitting punishment : for if the primary mischief has not been sufficient to pro- duce any alarm, the whole of the mischief may be cured by compensation. In this also they differ from semi-public offences, and from public ones. LXIII. Characters Characters of Class 2 ; composed of semi-public of Class 2. ; : , offences, or offences affecting a whole subordi- nate class of persons. 1. As such, they produce no primary mischief. The mischief they produce consists of one or other or both branches of the secondary mischief produced by offences against individuals, without the primary. 2. In as far as they are to be considered as belonging to this class, the persons whom they affect in the first instance are not individually assignable. 3. They are apt, however, to involve or termi- nate in some primary mischief of the first order, which when they do, they advance into the first class, and become private offences. 4. They admit not, as such, of compensation. DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ?^ 5. Nor of retaliation. 6. As such, there is never any one particular individual whose exclusive interest it is to prose- cute them: a circle of persons may, however, always be marked out, within which may be found some who have a greater interest to prose- cute than any who are out of that circle have. 7. The mischief they produce is in general pretty obvious ; not so much so indeed as that of private offences, but more so upon the whole than that of self-regarding and public ones. 8. They are rather less obnoxious to the cen- sure of the world than private offences ; but they are more sq than public ones : they would also be more so than self-regarding ones, were it not for the influence of the two false principles, the principle of sympathy and antipathy, and that of asceticism. 9. They are more apt than private and self-re- garding offences to require different descriptions in different countries : but less so than public ones. 1 0. There may be ground for punishing them before they have been proved to have occasioned, or to be about to occasion, mischief to any parti- cular individual; which is not the case with private offences. 11. In no cases can satisfaction given to any particular individual, affected by them be a suffi- cient ground for remitting punishment : for by VOL. II. Q «W DIVISION OF OFFENC6S. Chap, such Satisfaction it is but a part of the mischief ^-^ of them that is cured. In this they diflPer from private offences ; but agree with public. LXIV. S*ciImT Chft^^^^^'s of Class 3 ; consisting of self-regard- ing offences : offences against om^s self. 1 . In individual instances it will often be ques^ tionable, whether they are productive of any primary* mischief at all: secondary, they produce none. 2. They affect not any other individuals, as- signable or not assignable, except in as far as they affect the offender himself; unless by possi- bility in particular cases ; and in a very slight and distant manner the whole state. 3. They admit not, therefore, of compensation. 4. Nor of reiaUation. 5. No person has naturally any peculiar inte- rest to prosecute them ; except in as far as in virtue of some connection he may have with the offender, either in point of sympathy or of interestf, a mischief of the dervoative kind J may happen to devolve upon him§. * Because the person, who in general is^ mo#t likely to be sensible to the mischief (if there is any) of any ofience. yiz* the person whom it most a£fects, shews by his conduct that he is not sensible of it. t See ch. vi. [Sensibility] xxv. xxvi. X See ch. xii. [Consequences] iv. § Among the offences, however, which belong to tibis DIVISION OF OFPBNCES. *^ 6* The mkchief they produce is apt to be un- ^^'• obvious^ and in general more questionable than that of any of the other elasses*. 7* They are however apt, many of them, to be more obnoxious to the censure of the world than public offences ; owing to the influence of the two &ke {Mrineipks ; the prinoiple of asceticism, and the piincii^ of imtipathy. Some of them more even than seqii-public, or even than private of- fences. 8. They ate lass apt than offences of any other class to require different descriptions in different states and countries f. 9* Among the inducements | to punish them, •Bdpathy agaimt the oifender is apt to have a greater share than sympathy for the public. 10. The best plea for punishing them is founded on a faint probability there may be of their being class, there are some which in certain countries it is not uncommon for persons to be disposed to prosecute without any artificial inducement, and merely on account of an an^ Upaifty, which such acts are apt tb excite. See ch. ji. [Prin-^ dples adverse] zi. * See note* i|i the preceding pagie. t Accordingly, most of them are apt to be ranked among ofiences against the law of nature.^ Vide supra, Characters of the Ist class, Izii. note. I [Inducements.] I mean the considerations, right or wroBg, whiclii induce or dispose the legislator to treat tbeii^ on the footing of offences. *46 DIVISION OP OFFENCES. c*AF. productive of a mischief^ which, if real, will place ' — V — ' them in the class of public ones : chiefly in thos^ divisions of it which are composed of offbnces against population, and offences against the na- tional wealth. LXV. of^cSilT Characters of Class 4 ; consisting of public of- fences, or qffences against the state in general. . 1 . As such, they produce not any primary mis- chief; and the secondary mischief they produce^ which consists frequently of danger without alarm, though great in value, is in specie very indeterminate. , 2. The individuals whom they affect, in the first instance, are constantly unassignable; except in as far as by accident they happen to involve.or terminate in such or such offences against indi- viduals. S. Consequently they admit not of compensa- tion. 4. Nor of retaliation. 5. Nor is there any person who has naturally any particular interest to prosecute them; except in as far as they appear to affect the power, or in any other manner the private interest, of som6 person in authority. 6. The mischief they produce, as such, is com- paratively unobvious ; much more so than that of private offences, and more so likewise, than that of semi-public ones. DIVISION OF OFFSNGES. 3S9 7. They are^ as such^ much less obnoxious to the censure of the world, than private offences; less even than semi-public, or even than self- regarding offences; unless in particular cases, through sympathy to 'certain persons in au- thority, whose private interests they may appear to affect. 8. Ttey &re more apt than any of the other classes to admit of different descriptions, in dif- ferent states and countries. p. They are constituteid, in mapy cases, by some circumstances of aggravation superadded to a private offence : and therefore, in these cases, involve the mischief, and exhibit the other cha- racters belonging to both classes. 'They are, however, even in such cases, properly enough ranked in the 4th class, inasmuch as the mischief they produce in virtue of the properties which aggregate them to that class, eclipses and swallows up that which they produce in virtue of those properties which aggregate them to the 1 St. 10. There may be sufficient ground for pu- nishing them, without their being proved ^o have occasioned, or to be about to occasion, any par- ticular mischief to any particular individual. In. this they differ from private offences, but agree with semi-public ones. Here, as in semi-public oflfences, the ej^ent of the mischief makes up for the, uncertainty^ of it. , ttO DkVUiON OF OFFENCfSS* 11. In no case can satisfaction, given to any particular individual a£fected by them, be a suffix dent ground for remitting pumshaient. In this they differ from private offences ; but agree witii semi-^ubUc. LXVI. Cbaivcten Characters of Class 5, or appendix : composed of of Class 5. ' rr r MULTIFORM OT ANOMAiiOUs offcuccs ; and con- taining ounces by falsehood, and offenoea concerning trust. 1. Taken collectively, in the purcek marked out by their popular appellations, they are incar pable of being aggregated to any systematical method of distribution, grounded upon the mis- chief of th6 offence. 2. They may, however, be thrown into sub- divisions, which may be aggregated to such a method of distribution. 3. These sub-divisions will naturally and jrea- dily rank under the divisions of the several pro- ceding classes of this system. 4. Each of the two great divisions of ^his class spreads itself in that manner over all the pre- . ceding <;lasses. 5. In some acts of this class, the cUsti&guishing circumstance which constitutes the ^essential dun racter of the offence^ will in some instances enim necessarily, in the character of a criminative circumstance, into the constitution of the oBSsoce ; insomuch that, without the intervention <^ ihk DIVISION OF OFFENCES. ^1 circumstance, no offence at all, of that denomina- ^^^' ^ A, V X* tion, can be committed *. In other instances, the offence may subsist without it; and where it interferes, it comes in as an accidental inde- pendent circumstance, capable of constituting a ground of aggravation f. * Instance, offences by falsehood^ in tbe case of defraud^ tnetit, t Instance, offences by falsebood, in the case of simple coiporal iajuriea, and other offences against person. [ 232 ] CHAP. XVII. § I. LIMITS BKTWKEN PRIVATE ETHICS AND THE ART OF LEGISLATION. I. Use of this So much for the division of offences in ^reneral. chapter. , , , " Now an offence is an act prohibited, or (what comes to the same thing) an act of which the contrary is commanded by the law: and what is it that the law can be employed in doing, besides prohibiting and commandmg? It should seem then, according to this view of the matter, that were we to have settled what may be proper to be done with relation to offences, we should thereby have settled every thing that may be proper to be done in the way of law. Yet that branch which con- cerns the method of dealing with offences, "and which is termed sometimes the criminal, sometimes the penal, branch, is universally understood to be but one out of two branches which compose the whole subject of the art of legislation ; that which is termed the civil being the other*. Between * And the constitutional branch, what is become of it? Such is the question which many a reader will be apt to put. An answer that might be given is — ^that the matter of it might without much violence be distributed under the two other heads. But, as far as recollection serves, that branch. OP THE UMITIS OF TH£^ &c 933 these two branches then, it is evident enough, Chap. XVII. there cannot but be a very intimate connection ; so intimate is it indeed^ that the limits between them are by no means easy to mark out. The case is the same in some degree between the whole business of legislation (civil and penal branches taken together) and that of private ethics. Of these several limits however it will be in a manner necessary to exhibit some idea: lest^ on the one hand^ we should seem to leave any part of the subject that does belong to us untouched^ or^ on the other hand^ to deviate on any side into a track which does not belong to us. In the course of this enquiry^ that part of it I mean which concerns the limits between the civil and the penal branch of law^ it will be necessary to settle a number of points^ of which the con- nection with the main question might not at first sight be suspected. To ascertain what sort of a thing a law is ; what the parts are that are to be found in it ; what it must contain in order to be complete; what the connection is between that part of a body of laws which belongs to the subject of notwithstanding its importance, and its capacity of being jodged separately from the other matter, had at that time scarcely presented itself to my view in the char^ct^r of a distinct one: the thread of my enquiries had not as yet reached it. But in the concluding note of this same chapter, in paragraphs xxii. to the end, the omission may be ^' " » ' ' * seen in some measure supplied. 5iS4 OF THB LUUTS OF TH£ Chap, proceduvc; and the rest of the law at large : — ^AIl ^ V * these, it will be seen, are so many proWems, which must be solved before any satisfactory answer can be given to the main question above mentioned. Nor is this their only use: for it is evident enough, that the notion of a complete law muist first be fixed, before the legislator can in any case know what it is he has to do, or when his work is done. II. Ethics inge. Ethics at larce may be defined, the art of nenl,what. . directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view. III. Private What then are the actions wluph it can be in a man's power to direct? They must be either his own actions, or those of other agents. Ethics, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's own actions, may be stiled the art of self-gcwernment, or private ethics. IV. iTicartof What othcr agents then are there, which, at thaTi^f" the same time that they are under the influence Md ad^^ni-of man's direction, are susceptible of happiness? •tratioiL They are of two sorts; 1. Other human beings who are stiled persons. 2. Other animals, which on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stahH P£NAL BIIANCH OF JURISPRUP£NC£. ^& d^raded into the class of things*. As to other ^f^ human beings, the art of directing their actions * Under the Gentoo and Mahometan religions, the inte- interests of rests of the rest of the animinal creation seem to have met *^? "^[c".** animals im- with some attention. Why have they not, universally, with properly ^ as much as those of human creatures, allowance made for the lej^iiation. difference in point of sensibility? Because the laws that are have been the work of mutual fear; a sentiment which the less rational animals have not had the same means as man has of turning to account. Why aught they not? No reason cao be given. If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to eat such of them as we lake to £at: we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipa* tions of future misery which we have. The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature* If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to kill such as molest us : we should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. But is theYe any res^on why we should be suffered to torment them? Not any that I can see. Are* there any why we should not he suffered to torment them? Yes, several. ^See B. I. tit. [Cruelty to animals.] The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, ,have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day tnatj come, when the rest of the animal crea- tion may acquire those rights which never could have, been wijliolden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned «S6 OF THE LIMITS OP THE " Chap, to the abovc end is what we mean^ or at leaist the XVIL ^ V ' ^ only thing which, upon the principle of utility, we ought to mean, by the art of government: which, in as far as the measures it displays itself in are of a permanent nature, is generally dis- tinguished by the name of legislation: as it is by that of administration y when they are of a temporary nature, determined by the occurrences of the day. V. Art of edu- Now humau creatures, considered with respect to the maturity of their faculties, are either in an aduUy or in a non-aduU state. The art of gover- ment, in as far as it concerns the direction of the actions of persons in a non-adult state, may be termed the art of education. In as far as this business is entrusted with those who, in virtue of some private relationship, are in the main the best without redress to the caprice of a tormentor*. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the ▼illosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum^ are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? ' Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps,, the faculty of discourse ? But a full-grown horse or dog> is. beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more con- versible animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise; what would it avail ? the question is not. Can they reason P nor. Can they talk ? but, Can they suffer ? • See Iiewis XlVth*s Code Noir. PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. ^7 disposed to take upon them^ and the best able^ta ^^^J"* discharge^ this oflSce, it may be termed the art of ' — "^^"^ prvoatt education: in as far as it is exercised by those whose province it is to superintend the con- duct of the whole community^ it may be termed the art of public education. As to ethics in general^ a man's happiness will Ethics exhi- depend^ in the first place, upon such parts of his ot i. Pm- behaviour as none but himself are interested in ; 2. prowty. in the next place, upon such parts of it as may cinc^"* affect the happiness of those about him. In as far as his happiness depends upon the first-mentioned part of his behaviour, it is said to depend upon his duty to himself. Ethics then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's actions in this tespect, may be termed the art of discharging one's duty to one's self : and the quality which a man ma- nifei^ts by the discharge of this branch of duty (if duty it is to be called) is that of prudence. In as far as his happiness, and that of any other person or persons whose interests are it cannot but be admitted, that the only interests which a man at all times and upon all occasions is sure to find adequate motives for consulting, are his own. Ng<>« withstanding this, there are no occasions iik whidb a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness of other men. In the first place, he has, on all occasions, the purely social motive of sympathy or benevolence : in the next place, he has, on most occasions, the semi-social motives of love of amity and love of reputation. The motive t ^ PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. ^9 ei sympathy will act upon him with more or less ^bav. eifect, according to the bias of his sensibility*: ' — v— ^ the two other motives, according to a variety of eircumstances^principally according to the strength of his inteUectual powers, the firmness and steadi- ness of his mind, the quantum of his moral sensi- bility, and the characters of the people he has to deal with. vm. Now private ethics has happiness for its end:^!f7?«* * •'^* 'Which Ma and leirislation can have no other. Private ethics p'?p«' ^ ^ object of concerns every member, that is, the happiness and ethics \b not ^ ^ * -^ of legisla- the actions of every member of any community tton. that can be proposed ; and legislation can concern no more. Thus far, then, private ethics and the art of legislation go hand in hand. The end they have, or ought to have, in view, is of the same nature. The persons whose happiness they ought to have in view, as also the persons whose conduct they ought to be occupied in directing, are pre- cis^ the same. The very acts they ought to be eonversant about, «:e even in a great measure the same^ Where then lies the difference? In that ihe acts which they ought to be conversant about, though in a great measure, are not perfectly and throughout the same. There is no case in which a private man ought not to direct his own conduct to the production of his own happiness, and of * Ch. vi. [Sensibility] iii. S40 OF THE LIMITS OF THE that of his fellow-creatures : but there are cases m which the legislator ought not (in a direct way at leasts and by means of punishment applied im- mediately to particular individual acts) to attempt . to direct the conduct of the several other members of the community. Every act which promises to be beneficial upon the whole to the community (himself included) each individual ought to per- form of himself: but it is not every such act that the legislator ought to compel him to perform. Every act which promises to be pernicious upon the whole to the community (himself included) each individual ought to abstain from of himself: but it is not every such act that the legislator ought to compel him to abstain from. IX. The limite Where then is the line to be drawn? — We shall between the promces of not havc far to seek for it. The business is to ethics and givc an idea of the cases in which ethics ought, ^k^^t and in which legislation ought not (in a direct Smcet^for ' mauucr at least) to interfere. If legislation inter- punishment. £^^^g iu a direct mariner^ it must be by punish- ment*. Now the cases in which punishment, meaning the punishment of the political sanction. * I say nothing in this place of reward : because it is only in a few extraordinary cases that it can be applied, and be- .cause even where it is applied, it may be doubted perhaps whether the application of it can, properly speaking, be termed an act of legislation. See infra, § 3. JPENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUOENCE. ^41 oi^fat not to.be inflicted, have been aheady stated*, ^^^j*- If then there be any of these cases^ in which, al- ^ — v — ' though legislation ought not, private ethics does or ought to interfere, these cases will serve to point out the limits between the two arts or bran- ches of science. These cases, itv may be remem- bered, are of four sorts: 1. Where punishment would be groundless. 2. Where it would be inefficacious. 3. Where it would be unprofit- able. 4. Where it would be needless. Let us look over all these cases, and see whether in any of them there is room for the interference of private ethics, at the same time that there is none for the direct interference of legislation. X. 1 . First then, as to the cases where punishment i. Neither would be groundless. In these cases it is evident, p?^ where^' that the restrictive interference of ethics would be S^uSlaL groundless too. It is because, upon the whole, there is no evil in the act, that legislation ought not to endeavour to prevent it. No more, for the same reason, ought private ethics. XI. S. As to the cases in which punishment would ^-.^^o^ ^" •■■ ^ pnvate be inefficacious. These, we may observe, may be«^*>»j»f«^ divided into two sets or classes. The first do not cases where punishment depend at all upon the nature of the act : they would be torn jonly upon a defect in the timing of the * Ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet.] VOL. H. R \t 54« OF THE LIMITS OF THE xV\V punishment. The punishment in question is no more than what, for any thing that appears, ought to hbve been applied to the act in question. It ought, however, to have been applied at a diflFerent time ; viz. not till after it had been properly de- nounced. These are the cases of an ex-post-fadto law ; of a judicial sentence beyond the law ; and of a law not suflSciently promulgated. The acts here in question then might, for any thing that appears, come properly under the department even of coercive legislation: of course do they under that of private ethics. As to the other set of cases, in which punishment would be ineffica- cious; neither do these depend upon the nature of the act, that is, of the sort of act: they turn only upon some extraneous cifcumistdhces, with which an act of any sort may chance to be accompanied. These, however, are of such a nature as not only to exclude the amplication of legal punishment, but in general to leave little room for the influence of private ethics. These are the cases where the will could not be deterred from any act, even by the extraordinary force of artificial punishment : as in the cases of extretoe infancy, insanity, and perfect intoxication: of course, therefore, it could not by such slender and precarious force as could be applied by private ethics. The case is in this respect the saine, under the circumstances of unintentionality with respect to the event of the action, unconscious- PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. 245 9 1 I ness with regard to the circumstances^ and mis- Chap supposal with regard to the existence of circum- ' — >^~^ stances which have not existed; as also where the force, even of extraordinary punishment, is rendered inoperative by the superior force of a physical danger or threatened mischief. It is evident, that in these cases, if the thunders of the law prove impotent, the whispers of simple morality can have but little influence. XII. 3. As to the cases where punishment would be How far, ^ ^ ^ where it unprofitable. These are the cases which constitute would be un- the great field for the exclusive interferenc6 of private ethics. When a punishment is unprofita- ble, or in other words too expensive, it is because the evil of the punishment exceeds that of the offence. Now the evil of the punishment, we may remember ♦, is distinguishable into four branches : 1. The evil of coercion, including constraint or restraint, according as the act commanded is of the positive kind or the negative. 2. The evil of apprehension. 3. The evil of sufferance. 4. The derivative evils resulting to persons in connection with those by whom the three above-mentioned original evils are sustained. Now with respect to those original evils, the persons who lie exposed to them may be two very different sets of persons. In the first place, persons who may have actually ft * See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet.] § iv. U4 OF THE LIMITS OF THE ^*?A'j- committed, or been prompted to commit, the acts ' — >^~^ really meant to be prohibited. In the next place, persons who may have performed, or been prompt- ed to perform, such other acts as they fear may be in danger of being involved in the punishment designed only for the former. But of these two sets of acts, it is the former only that are perni- cious : it is, therefore, the former only that it can , be the business of private ethics to endeavour to prevent. The latter being by the supposition not mischievous, to prevent them is what it can no more be the business of ethics to endeavour at, than of legislation. It remains to shew how it may happen, that there should be acts really pernicious, whicli, although they may very pro- perly come under the censure of private ethics, may , yet be no fit objects for the legislator to controul. XIIL m**'*^te 1 Punishment then, as applied to delin« , , tbb respect. disposed to carry their interference full as &r as is expedient. The great difficulty here is, to per- suade them to confine themselves within bounds. A thousand little passions and prejudices have led them to narrow the liberty of the subject in this line, in cases in which the punishment is either attended with no profit at all, or with none that will make up for the expence. XVII. The mischief of this sort of interference is more — Particu- particularly conspicuous in the article of religion, tors of r^ The reasoning, in this case, is of the following"'^"- stamp. There are certain errors, in matters of belief, to which all mankind are prone : and for these errors in judgment, it is the determination of a Being of infinite benevolence, to punish them with an infinity of torments. But from these errors the legislator himself is necessarily free : for the men, who happen to be at hand for him to consult with, being men perfectly enlightened, unfettered, and unbiassed, have such advantages over all the rest of the world, that when they sit down to enquire out the truth relative to points so plain and so familiar as those in question, they cannot faU to find it. This being the case, when the sovereign sees his people ready to plunge headlong into an abyss of fire, shall he not stretch «5« OF THE LIMITS OF THE Chip, out a hand to save them ? Such^ for example^ ^ — w^-^ seems to have been the train of reasonings and such the motives, which led Lewis the XlVth into those coercive measures which he took for the conversion of heretics, and the confirmatioil of true believers. The ground-work, pure sympathy and loving-kindness : the superstructure, all the miseries which the most determined malevolence could have devised*. But of this more fiiUy in another place f . * I do not mean but that other motives of a less social nature might have introduced themselves, and probably, in point of fact, did introduce themselves, in the progress of the enterprise. But in point of possibility, the motive above mentioned, when accompanied with such a thread of -reason- ing, is sufficient, without any other, to account for all the effects above alluded to. If any others interfere, their interference, how natural soever, may be looked upon as an accidental and inessential circumstance, not necessary to the produc- tion of the effect. Sympathy, a concern for the danger they appear to be exposed to, gives birth to the wish of freeing them from it : that wish shews itself in the shape of a com- mand : this command produces disobedience : disobedience on the one part, produces disappointment on the other : the pain of disappointment produces ill-will towards those who are the authors of it. The affections will often make this progress in less time than it would take to describe it. The sentiment of wounded pride, and other modifications of the love of reputation and the love of power, add fewel to the flame. A kind of revenge exasperates the severities of coer- cive policy. t See B. I. tit. [Self-regarding offences.] PENAL BRANCH OP JURISPRUDENCE. 353 XVIII. C,^-; The rules of probity are those, which in point of Jrjg^TJ^ expediency stand most in need of assistance on ^^hTS- jthe part of the legislator, and in which, in point ^?"^"^°fgf^ of fact, his interference has been most extensive. ^— ^ to have been extended hitherto. In particular, in cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done with- out prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him ? ' This accordingly is the idea pursued in the body of the work*. XX. To conclude this section, let us recapitulate Difference and bring to a point the difference between vate ethics • ..T_» 'jj A • aiidiheartof private ethics, considered as an art or science, on legisiationre- the one hand, and that branch of jurisprudence *^p*^**^^^- which contains the art or science of legislation, on the other. Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness, by means of such motives as offer of themselves: the art of legislation (which may be considered as one branch of the science of jurisprudence) teaches * A woman's head-dress catches fire : water is at hand : a mail, instead of assisting ^o quench the fire, looks on, and laughs at it. A drunken man, falling with his face down- wards into a puddle, is in danger of suffocation : lifting his head a little on one side would save him : another man sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of gunpowder lies scattered about a room : a man is going into it with a lighted candle : another knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is there that in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied ? « \ 356 Chap. xvu. , OF THE LIMITS OF TH£ how a multitude of men^ composing a community^ may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by means of motives to be applied by the legislator. We come now to exhibit the limits between penal and civil jurisprudence. For this purpose it may be of use to give a distinct though summary view of the principal branches into which jurispru- dence, considered in its utmost extent, is wont to be divided. § 2. Jurisprudence J its branches. XXI. Jorispro- Jurisprudence is a fictitious entity : nor can pSriS^ any meaning be found for the word, but by censorial, placing it in company with some word that shall be significative of a real entity. To know what is meant by jurisprudence, we must know, for example, what is meant by a book of jurispru- dence. A book of jurisprudence can have but one or the other of, two objects : 1 . To ascertain what the law* is: 2. ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case it may be stiled a book of di- pository jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of * The word law itself which stands so much in need of a definition, must wait for it awhile, (see § 3) : for there is no doing every thing at once. In the mean time every reader will understand it according to the notion he has been ac- customed to annex to it. PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. 257 censorial jurisprudence: or, in other words, a Chap. book on the art cf legislation. ^ — v — ' XXII. A book of expository jurisprudence is either Expository authoritative or unauthoritative* It is stiled au- dence, au- thoritative, when it is composed by him who, by --unautho- representing the state of the law to be so and so, causeth it so to be ; that is, of the legislator him- self: unauthoritative, when it is the work of any other person at large. xxiii. Now law, or the law, taken indefinitely, is an sources of abstract and collective term; which, when ittionsyetre- means any thing, can mean neither more nor less ™**°"^" than the sum total of a number of individual l{i,ws taken together *. It follows, that of whatever other modifications the subject of a book of juris- * In most of the European languages there are two diffe- rent words for distinguishing the abstract and the concrete senses of the word law: which words are so wide asunder as not even to have any etymological affinity. In Latin, for example, there is lex for the concrete sense, jus for the abstract: in Italian, legge and diritto: in French, loi and droit : in Spanish, ley and derecho : in German, gesetz and recht, . The English is at present destitute of this advantage. In the Anglo-Saxon, besides l^e, and several other words, ^or the concrete sense, there was the word ri^ht, answering ^o the German recht ^ for the abstract; as may be seen in the compound folc-right^ and in other instances. But the wocd right having long ago lost this sense, the modern English no longer possesses this advantage. VOL. II. S , S58 OF THE LIMITS OF THE xvn' pr^^®^^^^ is susceptible, they must all of them be ^ — ^''■^ taken from some circumstance or other of which such individual laws, or the assemblages into which they may be sorted, are susceptible. The circumstances that have given rise to the principal branches of- jurisprudence we are wont to hear of, seem to be as follow: 1. The extent of the laws in question in point of dominion. 2. The political quality of the perilous whose conduct they under- take to regu\ate. 3. The time of their being in force. 4'. The manner in which they are eaj)ressed. 5. The concern which they have with the article erf punishment. xxrv. jurispru. In the first place, in point of extent, what is ^amicriai. delivered concerning the laws in question, may have reference either to the laws of such or such a nation or nations in particular, or to the laws of all nations whatsoever: in the first case, the book may be said to relate to locdly in the other, to universal, jurisprudence. Now of the infinite variety of nations there are upon the earth, there are no two which agree exactly in their laws: certainly not in the whole; " perhaps not even in any single article ; and let them agree to-day, they would disagree to-morrow. This i§ evident enough with regard to the substance of the laws : and it would be still more extraor- dinar y if they agreed in point oi form; that is, if they were conceived in precisely the same strings PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. 259 of words. What is more, as the languages of Chap. nations are commonly different^ as well as their laws, it is seldom that, strictly speaking, they hare so much as a single word in common. However, among the words that are appropriated to the subject of law, there are some that in all lan- guages are pretty exactly correspondent to one another : which comes to the same thing nearly as if they were the same. Of this stamp, for ex- ample, are those Which correspond to the words power, right, obligation, liberty, and many others. It follows, that if there are any books which can, properly speaking, be stiled books of universal jurisprudence, they must be looked for within very narrow limits. Among such as are exposi- tory, there can be none that are authoritative: nor even, as far the substance of the laws is con- cerned, any that are unauthoritative. To be sus- ceptible of an universal application, all that a book of the expository kind can have to treat of, is the import of words : to be, strictly speaking, universal, it must confine itself to terminology. Accordingly the definitions which there has been occasion here and there to intersperse in the course of the present work, and particularly the defini- tion hereafter given of the word law, may be considered as matter belonging to the head of universal jurisprudence. Thus far in strictness of speech: though in point of usage, where a man, in laying down what he apprehends to be 2^0 OF THE LIMITS OP THE C".^'- the law, extends his views to a few of the nations ^ — v'"^ with which his own is most connected, it is com- mon enough to consider what he writes as relating to universal jurisprudence. It is in the censorial line that there is the greatest room for disquisitions that apply to the circumstances of all nations alike: and in this line what regards the substance of the laws in question is as susceptible of an universal application, as what regards the words. That the laws of all nations, or even of any two nations, should coin- cide in all points, would be as ineligible as it is impossible: some leading points, however, there seem to be, in respect of which the laws of all civilized nations might, without inconvenience, be the same. To mark out same of these points will^ as far as it goes, be the business df the body of this work. XXV. —internal ^^ *^^ sccond place, with regard to the political Jkliir^*™' j^Mfl/iVy of the persons whose conduct is the object of the law. These may, on any given occasion^ be considered either as members of the same state^ or as members of different states : in the first case, the law may be referred to the head of internal, in the second case, to that of inter- national* jurisprudence. * The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more s^ignificant ■ I PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. ^61 Now as to any transactions which may take Chaf. place between individuals who are subjects of different states^ these are regulated by the inter- nal laws, and decided upon by the internal tribu- nals, of the one or the other of those states : the case is the same where the sovereign of the one has any immediate transactions with a private member of the other: the sovereign reducing himself, pro re natd, to the condition of a private person, as often as he submits his cause to either tribunal; whether by claiming a benefit, or de- fending himself against a burthen. There remain then the mutual transactions between sovereigns as such, for the subject of that branch of jurispru- dence which may be properly and exclusively termed internatiofial*. way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the law of nations : an appellation so uncharacteris- tic, that, were it not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence. The chancellor D'Auguesseau has already made, I find, a similar remark: he says, that what is commonly called droit de&.gens, ought rather to be termed droit entre les gensf. • In the times of James I. of England, and Philip III. of Spain, certain merchants at London happened to have a claim upon Philip, which his ambassador Gondemar did not think fit to satisfy. They applied for counsel to Selden, who advised them to sue the Spanish monarch in the court of King's Bench, and prosecute him to an outlawry. They did t OeuTfcs, Tom. II, p. 337, Edit. 1773, 1 Jmo. «6« OF THE LIMITIS OF THE Chip. With what degree of propriety rules for the ^ — sr--' conduct of persons of this description can come under the appellation of laws, is a question that must rest till the nature of the thing called a law shall have been more particularly unfolded. It is evident enough^ that international juris- prudence may^ as well as internal^ be censorial as well as expository^ unauthoritative as well as authoritative. XXVI. Internal ju- Internal lurisprudence, ap^ain^ may either con- rispnidence, u j. .... national and ccm all the mcmbcrs of a state indiscriminately^ provincialf local or par- or such of them only as are connected in the way ticular. of residence^ or otherwise, with a particular dis- trict. Jurisprudence is accordingly sometimes I distinguished into national and prtmndal. But as the epithet prtmncial is Hardly applicable to dis- so: and the sheri& of London were accordingly commanded, in the usual form, to take the body of the defendant Philip, wherever it was to be found within their bailywick. As to the sheriffs, Philip, we may believe, was in no great fear of them: but, what answered the s^me purpose, he happened on his part to have demands upon some other merchants, whom, so long as the outlawry remained in force, there was no proceeding against, Gondemar paid the money*. This was internal jurisprudence : if the dispute had been betwixt Philip and James himself, it would have been international. As to the word intematumal, from this work, or the first of ' the works edited in French by Mr. Dumont, it has taken root in the language. Witness Reviews and Newspapers. * Selden'i Table^TaJk, tit. Lew. PENAL BRANCH 01? JURISPRUDENCE. ^3 tricts SO small as many of those which have laws ^hap. of their own are wont to be, such as towns, '—^^ parishes, and manors ; the term /oca/ (where uni- versal jurisprudence is plainly out of the question) or the term particular, though this latter is not very qharacteristic, might either of them be more commodious *. XXVII. Third, with respect to time. In a work of Jurispru- the expository kind, the laws that are in question cieDt—iiv- may either be such as are still in force at the time "*^- when the book is writmg, or such as have ceased to be in force. In the latter case the subject of it might be termed ancient ; in the former, present or living jurisprudence: that is, if the substantive jurisprudence, and no other, must at any rate be eroplpyed, and that with an epithet in both cases. But the truth is, that a book of the former kind is rather a bodk of history than a book of juris- prudence ; and, if the word jurisprudence be ex- * pressive of the subject, it is only with some such word3 as history or antiquities prefixed. And as tiie laws which a^re any where in question are supposed, if nothing appears to the contrary, to . * The term municipal seemed to answer the purpose very well, till it was taken by an English author of the first eminencSe, tp signify internal law in general, in contradistinc- tion to international law» and the imaginary law of nature. It might still be used in this sense, without scruple, in any other language. 964 OF THE LIMITS OF THE Chip, fec thosc which are in force, no such epithet, as xvu. that of present or living commonly appears. Where a book is so circumstanced, that the laws which form the subject of it, though in force at the time of its being written, are in force no longer, that book is neither a book of living jurisprudence, nor a book on the history of juris- prudence : it is no longer the former, and it never was the latter. It is evident that, owing to the changes which from time to time must take place, in a greater or less degree, in every body of laws, every book of jurisprudence, which is of an ex- pository nature, must, in the course of -a few years, come to partake more or less of this condition. / The most common and most useful object of a lustory of jurisprudence, is to exhibit the circum- stances that have attended the establishment of laws actually in force. But the exposition of the dead laws which have been superseded, is inse- parably interwoven with that of the living ones which have superseded them. The great use of both these branches of science, is to furnish ex- amples for the art of legislation*. * Of what stamp are the works of Grotius, Pufiendorf, and Burlamaqui? Are they political or ethical, historical or juri- dical, expository or censorial? — Sometimes one thing, some- times another: they seem hardly to have settled the matter with themselves. A defect this to which all books must almost unavoidably be liable, which take for their subject the PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. 365 XXVIII. ' Chap. XVXI. Fourthly, in point of expression, the laws in ^"7^^ question may subsist either in the form of statute dln^J^tar- or in that of customary law. ccu^limary. As to the difference between these two bran- ches (which respects only the article of form or expression) it cannot properly be made appear till some progress has been made in the definition of a law. XXIX. Last, The most intricate distinction of all, and jorispro- that which comes most frequently on the carpet, — pesmi— is that which is made between the civil branch of"* jurisprudence and the penal, which latter is wont, in certain circumstances, to receive the name of criminal. What is a penal code of laws ? What a civil Qaeation, code ? Of what nature are their contents ? Is it tti distinc- that there are two sorts of laws, the one penal the the dvu other civil, so that the laws in a penal code are all thTpeiX stated. pretended law of nature; an obscure phantom, which, in the imaginations of those who go in chace of it, points some- times to manners, sometimes to laws: sometimes to what law is, sometimes to what it ought to be*. Montesquieu sets out upon the censorial plan : but long before the conclusion, as if he had forgot his first design, he throws off the censor, and , puts on the antiquarian. The Marquis Beccaria's book, the first of any account that is uniformly censorial, concludes as it sets out with penal jurisprudence. * See Chap. U. [Principles advene] iit. ^^ OP THE UMITS OF THE Chap, penal laws, while the laws in a civil code are all JL V XL* ^ — ^^— ' Civil laws ? Or is it, that in every law theire is some matter which is of a penal nature, and which therefore belongs to the penal code and at the same time other matter which is of a dvil nature, and which therefore belongs to the dvil code ? Or is it, that some laws belong ix> one code or the other exclusively, whUe others are divided between the two ? To answer these questions in any man- ner that shall be tolerably satisfactory, it will be necessary to ascertmn what a law is ; meaning one entire but single law : and what are the parts into which a law, as such, is capable of being distin- guished : or, in other words, to ascertain what the properties are that are to be found in every object which can with propriety receive the appel- lation of a law. This then will be the business of the third and fourth sections : what concerns the import of the word criminal, as applied to law, will be discussed separately in the fifth*. Occasion * Here ends the original work, in the state into which it ^^"^J^was brought in November, 1780. What follows is now dadingDot^ added in January, 1789. The third, fourth, and fifth sections intended, as expressed in the text, to have been added to this chapter, will not here, nor now be given ; because to give them in a manner tole- rably complete and satisfactory, might require a considerable volume. This volume will form a work of itself, closing the series of works mentioned in the preface. What follows here may serve to give a slight intimation of PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. «67 the nature of the task, which such a work will have to at- Chip. chieve : it will at the same time furnish, not any thing like a ^^ — ^ '_^ satisfactory answer to the questions mentioned in the text, but a slight and general indication of the course to be taken for giving them such an answer. What is a law? What the parts of a law ? The subject of By a law these questions, it is to be observed^ is the logical^ the ideals meam a tUh the intellectual whole, not the physical one : the law and not *^^' the statute. An inquiry, directed to the latter sort of object, could neither admit of difficulty nor afford instruction. In this sense whatever is given for law by the person or persons recognized as possessing the power of making laws, is law. The Metamorphoses of Ovid, if thus given, would be law. So much as was embraced by .one and the same act of ^ authentication, so much as received the touch of the sceptre at one stroke^ is one law : a whole law, and nothing more. A statute of George II. made to substitute an or instead of an and in a former statute is a complete law; a statute con- taining an entire body of laws, perfect in all its parts, would not be more so. By the word law then, as often as it occurs in the succeeding pages, is meant that ideal object, of which the part, the whole, or the multiple^ or an assemblage of parts, wholes, and multiples mixed together, is exhibited by a statute ; not the statute which exhibits them. Every law, when complete, is either of a coercive or tmcoer^ Every law is . either a at?c nature. command or A coercive law is a Command. a revocatk» An uncoercive, or rather a discoercive, law is the revocation, in whole, or in part, of a coercive law. What has been termed a declaratory law, so far as it stands A declara- distinguished from either a coercive or adiscoercive law, is not ^"^ij^p^. properly speaking a law. It is not the expression of an act ly siMuog, of the will exercised at the time : it is a mere notification of. the existence of a law, either of the coercive or the discoercive kind, as already subsisting : of the existence of some docu- ment expressive of some act of the will, exercised, not at the 26S ON THE LIMITS OF THE Chap, time, but at some former period. If it does any thin^ more XVII , ' . r v..^^^-!^ than give information of this fact, viz. of the prior existence of a law of either the coercive or the discoercive kind, it ceases pro tanto to be what is meant by a declaratory law, and assuming either the coercive or the discoercive quality. V. Every coercive law creates an offence, that is, converts an dTe^w^ act of some sort or other into an offence. It is only by so atea aoof- doing that it can impose oblu;aHon, that it can produce coer^ fSence. cton, VI. A law confining itself to the creation of an offence, and a ting ano^ law commanding a punishment to be administered in case of fence, and the commission of such an offence, are two distinct laws : one appoint ing ponish- i^ot parts (as they seem to have been generally accounted 2^2^" hitherto) of one and the same law. The acts they command laws. are altogether different; the persons they are addressed to are altogether different. Instance, Let no man steal ; and, Let the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing to be hatiged. They might be stiled ; theformer, 9i simple imperative law; the other, a punitory ; but the punitory, if it commands the punishment to be inflicted^ and does not merely permit it, is as truly imperative as the other : only it is punitory besides^ which the other is not. VII. A law of the discoercive kind, considered in itself, can have vclaw ^ no punitory law belonging to it : to receive the assistance and bave no pn- support of a punitory law, it must first receive that of a sim- appStoin- ply imperative or coercive law, and it is to this latter that the "Pg^® h th** punitory law will attach jtself, and not to the discoercive one. intervention Example ; discoercive law. The sheriff has power to Jiang all dveone" *"^^ ^ thejudge^ proceeding in due course of law, shall order f^im to hang. Example of a coercive law, made in support of the above discoercive one. Let no man hinder the sheriff from hanging such as the judge, proceeding in due course of law ^ shall order him to hang. Example of a punitory law, made in support of the above coercive one. Let the judge cause to he imprisoned whosoever attempts to hinder the sherifffrimi hanging PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. ^^ one, whom the judge, proceeding in due course of law, has or^ Chap. XVII. dered him to hang, v..-^^^^^ But though a simply imperative law, and the punitory law VIII. attached to it, are so far distinct laws, that the former con- nitory law tains nothing of the latter, and the latter, in its direct tenor, *?^°\^®! ^® ® ^ ' simply im- contains nothing of the former ; yet by implication, and that perative one a necessary one, the punitory does involve and include the ' ® <* p • import of the simple imperative law to which it is appended. To say to the judge. Cause to be hanged whoever in due form of law is convicted of stealing, is, though not a direct, yet as intelligible a way of intimating to men in general that they must not steal, as to say to them directly. Do not steal: and one sees, how much more likely to be efficacious. It should seem then, that, wherever a simply imperative _ ^^* , . - The simply law is to have a punitory one appended to it, the former imperative might be spared altogether : in which case, saving th. excep- »-„tf be tion, (which naturally should seem not likely to be a frer spared, but - _ 11- . . .1 for its expo- quent one) of a law capable of answering its purpose without gitory mat- such an appendage, there should be no occasion in the *«''• whole body of the law for any other than punitory, or in other ii^ords than penal, laws. And this, perhaps, would be the case, were it not for the necessity of a large quantity of matter of the expository kind of which we come now to speak. It will happen in the instance of many, probably of most, X. possibly of all commands endued with the force of a public ^^^y^ ezposi- law, that, in the expression given to such a command, it shall ^^J matter, be necessary to have recourse to terms too complex in their signification, to exhibit the requisite ideas, without the assist- ance of a greater or less quantity of matter of an expository nature. Such terms, like the symbols used in algebraical notation, are rather substitutes and indexes to the terms capable of themselves of exhibiting the ideas in question, than the real and immediate representatives of those ideas. ' Take for instance the law. Thou shalt not , steal : Such a command, were it to rest there, could never sufficiently answer the purpose of a law. A word of so vague and unex- . ^0 OP THE LIMITS OF THE plicit a meaning can no otherwise perform this office, than hy giving a general intimation of a variety of propositions, each requiring, to convey it to the apprehension, a more particular and ample assemblage of terms. Stealing, for example, (according to a definition not accurate enough for use, but sufficiently so for the present purpose) is the taking of a thing which is another* 8 1 by one who hat no title so to do, and is conscious of his having none. Even after this exposition, supposing it a correct one, can the law be regarded as com- pletely expressed? Certainly not. For what is meant by a fnan'^s hatting a title to take a thing ? To be complete, the law must have exhibited, amongst a multitude of other things, two catalogues ; the one of events to which it has given the quality of conferr^g title in such a case ; the other of the events to which it has given the quality of UMng it ammf. What follows? That for a man to have «to/eii, for a man to have had no title to what he took, either no one of the articles contained in the first of those lists must have happened in his favour, or if there has, some one of the number of those contained in the second, must have happened to his preju- dice» II* Such then is the nature of a general law, that while the of its compa- imperative part of it^ the punctum saliens as it may be termed, ratiTebalkis of this artificial body, shall not take up above two or three not pecnliar j' . .. , . to legpaiative words, its expository appendage, without which that impera- commaiidfl* ^j^^ ^^^ could not rightly perform its office, may occupy a considerable volume. But this may equally be th^ case with a private order given in a family. Take for instance one from a bookseller to his foreman. Remove, fromfthis shop to my new one, my whole stock, according to this printed catalogue. — Remove, from this shop to my new one, my whole stock, is the imperative matter of this order ; the catalogue referred to contains the expository appendaige. XII. The same mass of expository matter may serve in common mass^oT* for, may appertain in common to, many commands, many PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. ' ^7i masses of imperative matter. Thus, amongst other things the Cbap. catalogue of collative and ablative events, with respect to titles ^ ^ - above spoken of, (see No. IX. of this note) will belong in «*I^*'"'y common to all or most of the laws constitutive of the va- serve in rious offences against property. Thus> in mathematical dia- maDykw^ grams, one and the same base shall serve for ,a whole cluster of triangles. Such expository matter, being of a complexion so different XIH. from the imperative, it would be no wonder if the connec- ti?e c£^^' tion of the former with the latter should escape the obser-*",*^^^ to law, IS apt vation : which, indeed, is perhaps pretty generally the case, to be conceal- And so long as any mass of legislative matter presents itself, ^i>Mitory*'^ which is not itself imperative or the contrary, or of which the nutter, connection with matter of one of those two descriptions is not apprehended, so long and so far the truth of the propo* sition, That every law is a command or its opposite, may remain unsuspected, or appear questionable; so long also may the incompleteness of the greater part of those masses of legis* lative matter, which wear the complexion of complete laws upon the face of them, also the method to be taken for ren- dering them really complete, remain undiscovered. A circumstance, that will naturally contribute to increase ^ XIV. « 1 1. .1 ' t» Theconceal- the difficulty of the discovery, is the great variety of ways m ment is ia^ which the imperation of a law may be conveyed — the great th|^']^^ variety of forms which the imperative part of a law may in- tnde of indi« discriminately assume : some more directly, some less di- which impe- rectly expressive of the imperative quality. Thou shalt not '***y® ™*^" icr IS capi)* steal. Let no man steal. Whoso stealeth shall be punished so ble of being and so, Jf any man steal, he shall be punished so ond so* SteaUng is where a man does so and so ; t?ie punishment for stealing is so and so. To judges, so and so named, and so and^ so constituted, belong the cognixance of such and such offences; viz. stealing — and so on. These are but part of a multitude of forms of words, in any of which the command, by which stealing is prohibited might equally be couched: and it is 87« OP THE LIMITS OF THE Chap, manifest to what a degree, in some of them, the imperative s„,^^^^^^ quality is clouded and concealed from' ordinary appreheo* sion. XV. After this explanation, a general proposition or two, that and nature °^^7 ^ ^^^ down, may help to afford some little insight into of the laws ^^ structure and contents of a complete body of laws. — So in a code, "^ ^ bow de- many different sorts of offences created, so many different laws of the coercive kind : so many exceptions taken out of the descriptions of those offences, so many laws of the dis- coercive kind. To class offences f as hath been attempted to be done in the preceding chapter, is therefore to class laws : to exhibit a complete catalogue of all the offences created by law, includ- ing the whole mass of expository matter necessary for fixing and exhibiting the import of the terms contained in the several laws, by which those offences are respectively created, would be to exhibit a complete collection of the laws in force: in a word, a complete body of law ; a pannomum, if so it might be termed. XVL From the obscurity in which the limits of a law, and the fST Hill t? * L_ kind— in what general way, is it natural to suppose, that the V-^v^— ^ different sorts of matter, as above distinguished, would be distributed between them ? To this question the following answer seems likely to come. k as near as any other to the truth. The dvil code would not consist of a collection. of civil laws, each complete in itself, as well as clear of all penal n ones. Neither would the penal code (since we have seen that it could not) consist of a .collection of punitive laws, each not only complete in itself, but clear of all civil ones. But The civil code would consist chiefly of mere masses of ex- xvn. pository matter. The imperative matter, to which those i^d^^e, masses of expository matter respectively appertained, would be found — ^not in that same code — ^not in the civil code-r-nor in a pure dtate, free from all admixture of punitory laws; but in the penal code — in a state of combination — involved, in manner as above explained, in so many correspondent puni- tory laws. The penal code then would consist principally of punitive XVIH. 1 . 1 • 1 . . ^ , 1 , . n Contents of laws, mvolving the imperative matter of the whole number of a penal civil laws : along with which would probably also be found *°^*' various masses of expository matter, appertaining, not to the civil, but to the punitory laws. The body of penal law, enacted by the Empress-Queen Maria Theresai, agrees pretty well with this account. The mass of legislative matter published ;in French as well XDL as German, under the auspices of Frederic lid. of Prussia, ^-?®.^® by the name of Code Frederic, but never established with iinperati?e force of law*, appears, for example, to be almost ^^o%2mo8tT't* composed of masses of expository matter, the relation of in the ez- which to any imperative matter appears to have been but muterf very imperfectly apprehended. * Mirabeaa but la Monarchie Prassienne, Tom. ▼. IXr, 8. p. 215. VOL. II. T ^^* OP THE LIl^ITS OF THE TVTT* '° ^^^ enormous mass of confusion and inconsistency, ^ V -^ ^ ancient Roman, or, as it is termed by way of eminence, So in tlie ^^ <^^ ^^^» ^^ imperatiye matter, and eren all traces of Bonulaw. the imperative character, seem at last to have been smothered in the expository. Egto had been the language of priniaeval simplicity : esto had been the language of the twelve tables. By the time of Justinian (so thick was the darkness raised by clouds of commentators) the penal law had been crammed into an odd comer of the civil — ^the whole catalogue of offences, and even of crimes, lay buried under a hea]^ of 06- HgatUmS'^wm was hid in optnioii— and the originid esto had transformed itself into tidetuTy in the mouths eye» of the most despotic sovereigns, ^f Among the barbarous nations that grew up out of the ruins burian codes of the Roman Empire, Law, emerging frow under the moun- •plaiousr"^ tain of expository rubbish, reassumed for a while the lan- guage of command : and then she had simj^city at least, if nothing else, to recommend her. Qofu^^ Besides the civil and the penal, every complete body of tkNMl oode, law must contain a third branch, the canstitutionaL with the two 1*^^ constitutional branch is chiefly etnployed in confer- ^^^^^"* ring, on particular classes of persons, powerf , to be exercised for the good of the whole society, or of c(msiderable parts of it, and prescribmg duties to the persons invested widi those powers. The powers are principally constituted, in the BssX in- stance, by discoercive or permissivQ laws, operating as ex- ceptions to certain laws of the coercive or imperative kind. Instance : A tax-gatherer, as stich, may, on such and such an occasion^ take such and such things^ without any other titi.b. The duties are created by imperative laws, addressed to the persons on whom the powers are conferred. Instance: On sitch and such an occasion, such and such a tax-gatherer shall take such and such things. Such and such a Judge shaU, in such and such a case, cause persons so and so offending to be hanged. PENAL BRANCH OP JURISPRUDENCE. *^* The parts which perform the function of indicating who Chap the individuals are, who, in eyery case, shall be considered v— .v^-^ as belonging to those classes, , have neither a permissive complexion, nor an imperative. They are so many masses of expository matter, appertain-* ing in common to all laws, into the texture of which, the names of those classes of persons have occasion to be insert- ed. Instance; imperative matter: — Let the judge cause whoever^ in due course of law, is convicted of stealing, to be hanged. Nature of the expository matter : — ^Who is the persoi:i meant by the word judge 9 He who has been inioested with that office in such a manner : and in respect of whom no event has happened, of the number of those, to which the effect is given, of reducing him 'to the condition of one divested of that office. Thus it is, that one and the same law, one and the same «J^^^' Thos the command, will have its matter divided, not only between two matter of great codes, or main branches of the whole body of the laws, ^y b!Idi- the civil and the penal ; but amongst three such branches, "^^^ •* mong all the civil, the penal, and the constitutional. three codes. In countries, where a great part of the law exists in no XXIV. other shape, than that of what in England is called common nat^ a law but might be more expressively termed judiciary , there g^atquan- must be a great multitude of laws, the import of which can- ists every not be sufficiently made out for practice, without referring ^ other" to this common law, for more or less of the expository matter ^o""™ ^*^ that of , belonging to them. Thus inEngland the exposition of the word common or title, that basis of the whole fabrick of the laws of property, is -j^'*'^ no where else to be found. And, as uncertainty is the very essence of every particle of law so denominated (for the instant it is clothed in a certain authoritative form of words it changes its nature, and passes over to the other denomi- nation) hence it is that a great part of the laws in being in such countries remain uncertain and incomplete. What are those countries ? To this hour, every one on the surface of the globe. W^ OF THE LIMITS OP THE Cbap. Had the science of architecture no fixed nomendatntt «- ' ^ belonging to it — were there no settled names, for distin- Henx Uie ^^^^^''^ ^^^ different sorts of buildings, nor the different depkinbto parts of the same building from each other— <^what would akdrnce of^ it be ? It would be what the science of legislation, considered '^^^^ with respect to its form, remains at present, io respect of Were there no architects who could distinguish a dwelling- ' * house from a bam, or a side-wall from a ceiling, what would architects be ? They would be what all legislators are at present. XXVI. From this very slight and imperfect sketch, may be oollec- a^nliD^Bn ^^ ^^^ ^^ answer to the questions in the text but an midma- exemplifica- tion» and that but an imperfect one, of the course to.be difficulty at taken for giving such an answer ; and* at any rate, some idea .^**^ "f^ of the difficulty, as well as of the necessity, of the task, of this If it were thought necessary to recur to experience for tcitact Proofs of this difficulty, and this necessity, they need not be attempts to long wanting, liwt the ^ i» • powers of Take, for instance, so many well meant endeavours on the . jl^PJ^^ part of popular bodieUt, and so many well meant recommend- tive legis- ations in ingenious books, to restrain supreme representative latiiFes. assemblies, from making laws in such and such cases, or to such and such an effect. Such laws, to answer the intended purpose, require a perfect mastery in the science of law, v considered in respect of its form — in the sort of anatomy spoken of in the preface to this work : but a perfect, or even a moderate insight into that science, would prevent their^.' being couched in those loose and inadequate terms, in which they may be observed so frequently to be conceived ; as a perfect acquaintance with the dictates of utility on that head would, in many, if not in most, of those instances, discounsel the attempt. Keep to the letter, and in attempting to ptevent the making of bad laws, you will find them prohibit- ing the making of the most necessary laws, perhaps even of all laws : quit the letter, and they express no more than if PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. 277 each man were to say, Your laws shall become ipso facto Chap. void, as often as they contain any thing which is not to my ^ ^ '^ mind. Of such unhappy attempts, examples may be met with in the legislation of many nations : but in none more frequently than in that newly-created nation, one of the most enlightened, if not the most enlightened, at this day on the globe. Take for instance, the Declaration of Rights, enacted by XXVIT. the *tate of North-Carolina, in conyention, in or about the Example, month of September, 1788, and said to be copied, with a dedaradoBs small exception, from one in like manner enacted by the state o^"g**^ of Virginia* • The following, to go no farther, is the first and funda- mental article. " That there are certain natural rights, of which men, " when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest *• their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and ** liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and pro- tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. Not to dwell on the oversight of confining to posterity the benefit of the rights thus declared, what follows ? That — as against those whom the protection, thus meant to be afforded, includes — every law, or other order, divesting a man of the enjoyment of life or liberty, is void. Therefore this is the case, amongst others, with every coercive law. Therefore, as against 'the persons thus protected, every order, for example, to pay money on the score of taxation, or of debt from individual to individual, or otherwise, is void ; for the effect of it, if complied with, is ^* to deprive and divest him,** pro tanto, of the enjoyment of liberty, viz. the liberty of paying or not paying as he thinks proper : not to mention . ■ , . iL * Rccherches sur Lea Etats Unis, 8ro. 1788, Vol. I. p. 158, « t78 OF THB LIMITS OF THE the species exposed to imprisonment, in the e? ent of such a mode of coercion's being resorted to : likewisCi of property ^ which is itself, a ** means of acquiring^ possessing, and protec-' ** Hng proper iff f and of pursuing and ohiaimng happuiess and *' •afety. ** Therefore also, as against such persons, every order to attack an armed enemy, in time of war, is also void : for, the necessary effect of such an order is, *^ to deprive some of " them of the enjof/mmt of lifer The above-mentioned consequences may suffice for exam- ples* amongst an endless train of similar ones*. * The VirgiiiiaD Declaration of Rights, said, in the French work abo^e quoted, to have been enacted the Ist of Jooe, 1776, is not inserted in the publication entitled " The OmUxtvium of tha teoenU independent ttates cf America, ^P PukHthed 6y order ef Congreu : Philadelphia printed. Re' printed for Stockdale and Walker, London, 1782 : though that pubtication contains the form of government enacted in the same convention, between the 6th of May and the 5th of July in the same year. ^ But in that same publication is contained a Declaration of Bightt, of the province of Moitachusets, dated in the years 1779 and 1780, which in its first article is a little similar : also one of the province of Penmylvoma, dated between July 15th and September 28th, in which the similarity is rather more considerable. Moreover, the famous Declaration of Independence, published by Congress July 5th, 1776, after a preambniar opening, goes on in these words : " We hold these truths to be self'tvidetU ; that aH men are created equal : that they are endued by the creator with certain unalienabie rights : that amongtt those are ly^e, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Virginian Declaration of Rights is that, it seems, which claims the honour of having served as a model to those of the other Provinces ; and in respect of the above leading article, at least, to the above*mentioned general Declaration of Independency. See Recherches, &c. I. 1 97. Who can help lamenting, that so rational a cause should be rested upon reasons, so much fitter to beget objections, than to remove them? But with men who are unanimous and hearty about measures, nothing so weak but may pass in the character of a reason : nor b this the first instance in the world, where the conclusion has supported the premises, instead of the premises the conclusion. PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE. ^79 Leaning on his elbow, in an attitude of profound and Chap« solemn meditation, ** What a multitude of things there are^* (exclaimed the dancing-master Marcel,) ** in a minuet ? " — May we now add ? — and in a law. TH£ END. £KHATUM. Pages b7 to 73, head line* for ** Ciasies of offences/* r§ad ** DUMoo ofOffencti.'* T. White & Co. Prlnteri, H Bear Alley. 3 ~- 1 t ^