Communication failure during operating room turnover: a HFACS-informed qualitative case study of system-level coordination Authors: Xin Liao, Yan Zeng, Jun-Ying Zhou, Yu-Qing Song Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractAimTo examine how communication failures develop across multiple system levels during operating room (OR) turnovers and to generate insights for system-level improvement using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification as an interpretive framework.BackgroundOperating room turnovers are high-risk transitional periods requiring rapid multidisciplinary coordination. Communication breakdowns during turnovers are a major contributor to perioperative adverse events. However, existing analyses often focus on individual communication errors, with limited attention to the latent organizational and contextual factors shaping frontline communication and coordination.MethodsA qualitative single-case study was conducted in a tertiary hospital in China focusing on an information-rich OR turnover incident. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with five healthcare professionals involved in OR turnover coordination. Data were analysed using Colaizzi’s seven-step method. HFACS was subsequently employed as a systems-oriented interpretive framework to support understanding of relationships among the identified themes across organizational, supervisory, environmental and frontline levels.ResultsSix interrelated themes were identified: information transmission bias, absence of standardized communication protocols, fragmented interprofessional coordination, inconsistent institutional norms, inadequate alignment between skills and roles and insufficient information technology support. Together, these findings suggested a pattern of communication failure in which organizational constraints, supervisory limitations and operational pressures interacted to influence frontline communication and coordination during OR turnovers.ConclusionThe findings highlight that communication failures during OR turnovers arise from interacting system-level factors rather than isolated individual errors. Understanding these mechanisms may support safer coordination processes, improve service reliability and reduce communication-related patient safety risks in high-intensity surgical settings.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-026-15018-8.Keywords: Operating room turnover, Communication failure, Human factors analysis and classification system, Qualitative case study, Patient safety, Organizational coordination Background Operating room (OR) turnovers represent one of the most vulnerable interfaces in perioperative care, where rapid transitions between teams, patients and operational tasks must occur within tightly constrained timeframes [1]. Despite extensive attention to turnover efficiency and workflow optimization, communication failures during these transitions remain a persistent source of patient safety risk and operational disruption [2–4]. Emerging evidence suggests that such failures cannot be fully understood as individual communication errors but instead reflect complex interactions among organizational structures, supervisory practices and frontline working conditions [5]. OR turnover therefore constitutes not only a local coordination challenge, but also a system-level service delivery issue requiring reliable cross-professional and cross-organizational coordination. OR turnovers require rapid coordination among nurses, anesthesiologists and surgical staff [6]. As workload intensity increases, the risk of information omission, distortion or delay also rises. Previous studies have consistently shown that a substantial proportion of perioperative adverse events are associated with communication failures, particularly during transitional phases of care [2, 7]. Evidence from large tertiary hospitals further suggests that communication-related adverse events remain prevalent in high-volume surgical settings, often resulting in surgical delays, inefficient resource utilization and elevated patient safety risks [8, 9]. In this context, communication during OR turnover is not only a clinical safety concern but also an important issue for service reliability, patient flow and operational coordination. Despite its recognized importance, research on OR turnover communication remains limited in several respects. Most existing studies focus on quantitative indicators of turnover efficiency or provide descriptive accounts of staff perceptions, offering limited insight into how communication failures unfold within complex organizational systems [3, 4]. While communication is frequently identified as a contributing factor, the dynamic pathways through which individual actions interact with environmental conditions, supervisory practices and organizational structures are seldom examined in depth [10]. Consequently, current evidence often explains what went wrong, rather than how and why communication failures emerge and escalate within high-intensity service delivery environments [11, 12]. Traditional adverse event analyses often attribute communication failures to individual performance deficits, inadvertently reinforcing a culture of blame and obscuring latent system vulnerabilities [13]. Such approaches offer limited guidance for sustainable organizational improvement. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), originally developed in aviation safety research, provides a hierarchical framework linking unsafe acts to preconditions, supervisory factors and organizational influences [14]. Within healthcare, HFACS has been increasingly applied to support system-oriented safety analyses [15–17]; however, its categorical structure alone may not fully capture the contextual nuances, perceptions and decision-making processes experienced by frontline staff. Qualitative inquiry offers an important complementary perspective by enabling in-depth exploration of staff experiences and perceptions within real-world clinical contexts. Integrating HFACS with qualitative methods may therefore provide a more comprehensive understanding of communication failures during OR turnovers, particularly in complex, multi-theatre environments [18–20]. Such an approach may help identify not only visible breakdowns in communication, but also the underlying organizational and supervisory conditions that shape them. Accordingly, this study used qualitative interviews to explore an information-rich communication failure event occurring during OR turnovers in a large tertiary hospital, while HFACS was employed as an interpretive framework to facilitate system-level understanding of the findings. By examining interactions among individual actions, work environment factors, supervisory processes and organizational conditions, this study aims to generate evidence to support system-level risk identification and service improvement in high-intensity surgical settings. A qualitative single-case approach is particularly valuable for examining complex safety incidents in which detailed reconstruction of system interactions and decision-making processes is required. Methods Study design This study used a qualitative single-case study design because the research question concerned a complex, context-dependent communication failure embedded within a real-world organizational setting. A single-case approach was considered appropriate for examining how communication breakdowns emerged across interacting system levels during a high-intensity OR turnover, where individual actions, supervisory practices and organizational conditions were closely intertwined. Guided by Yin’s [21], case study methodology, the selected incident was purposively chosen as an information-rich case because it involved multiple professional groups, cross-unit coordination processes, and observable organizational consequences. The case therefore provided a suitable opportunity to explore how communication failures developed within a complex healthcare system and to identify system-level factors contributing to the event. Theoretical and analytical framework This study was informed by the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), a framework originally developed to examine system-level contributors to adverse events. HFACS conceptualizes failures as interactions across four levels: Unsafe Acts, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision and Organizational Influences [14]. Within the context of OR coordination and service delivery, HFACS served as a systems-oriented interpretive framework for understanding how communication failures emerged across multiple levels of the healthcare system. Rather than attributing breakdowns solely to individual performance, the framework provided a conceptual lens through which organizational, supervisory, environmental, and frontline factors could be considered in relation to one another. Themes were generated inductively from interview data using Colaizzi’s seven-step method. HFACS was subsequently used to support interpretation of the findings and to facilitate exploration of relationships among the identified themes within a broader systems perspective. To address the framework’s limited capacity to capture subjective experiences and contextual nuances, qualitative interviews were employed to elicit participants’ perceptions, cognitive processes and decision-making constraints during the event. Study setting and case description The study was conducted in a large tertiary hospital in China with a high-volume surgical service and multiple operating theatres operating concurrently. The selected case involved a communication failure occurring during an OR turnover, resulting in delays in surgical preparation and workflow disruption across several theatres. This case was purposively selected because it exemplified the complexity of clinical coordination, interprofessional interaction and real-time decision-making in a multi-theatre OR environment, thereby providing an information-rich context for system-level analysis. Participants Five healthcare professionals directly involved in the turnover communication failure were recruited using purposive sampling. Eligible participants were identified through the operating department after institutional approval had been obtained and were approached individually by the research team regarding participation. Participants included circulating nurses, scrub nurses, anesthesiologists and OR coordinators, representing all core professional roles involved in OR turnover coordination. Together, these participants reflected the principal roles responsible for patient transfer, operating room preparation, clinical communication and coordination during OR turnover. Professional experience among participants ranged from 27 to 43 years in perioperative practice. Inclusion criteria were: (1) direct involvement in the turnover communication process, (2) firsthand experience of the event, and (3) willingness to participate. This multidisciplinary sampling strategy was intended to capture diverse perspectives relevant to system-level communication and coordination processes. Data collection Semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore participants’ experiences and perceptions of the communication failure. An interview guide was developed based on OR turnover workflows and coordination responsibilities, covering topics such as information transfer, role clarity, coordination processes and supervisory support. Interviews were conducted in a private setting, lasted approximately 30–50 min, and were audio-recorded with participants’ informed consent. Field notes were taken to capture contextual observations and non-verbal cues to support data interpretation. Although the primary data source consisted of semi-structured interviews, the interview guide was developed from the documented sequence of the incident and the operational workflow of OR turnover. During interviews, participants were encouraged to describe their experiences and perceptions of the event in their own words, while chronological prompts were used when necessary to facilitate contextual recall and clarify sequences of communication and coordination. This chronological reconstruction was used to strengthen contextual accuracy and reduce the risk of fragmented retrospective accounts. Given the bounded nature of the case, the sample was considered sufficient when all key stakeholders directly involved in the event had been interviewed and relevant professional perspectives were represented. Data analysis Data analysis followed Colaizzi’s seven-step method. Interview transcripts were read repeatedly to achieve immersion, and significant statements related to the communication failure were identified and coded. Formulated meanings were clustered into subthemes and synthesized into overarching themes reflecting shared patterns across participants. Following inductive thematic analysis, HFACS was subsequently used as a systems-oriented interpretive framework to support understanding of relationships among the identified themes across individual, supervisory, environmental and organizational levels. This approach enabled both context-sensitive interpretation and systematic examination of cross-level coordination and organizational influences related to the communication failure. Verbatim quotations used in the findings were linked to anonymized participant identifiers (e.g., P1–P5) to support analytic transparency while protecting confidentiality. Researcher reflexivity Interviews were conducted by a doctoral nursing researcher undertaking clinical rotation in the operating department. The interviewer was not a member of the operating room nursing team and held no managerial, supervisory, or evaluative authority over participants. This independent position helped minimise potential power imbalances and encouraged open discussion of participants’ experiences and minimise response bias. Participants were informed that the study aimed to understand system-level contributors to communication failures rather than evaluate individual performance or assign responsibility for the incident. The interviewer had received formal training in qualitative interviewing and adopted a reflexive approach throughout data collection. During analysis, the research team remained attentive to potential interpretive bias and regularly discussed emerging findings to preserve participants’ intended meanings. Trustworthiness Trustworthiness was enhanced through multiple strategies. Researcher triangulation was employed, with two researchers independently coding the data and resolving discrepancies through discussion. An audit trail documenting analytical decisions was maintained throughout the study, and peer debriefing was conducted to refine theme development and system-level interpretation of the findings. Member checking was undertaken by returning summary findings to participants to verify the credibility and accuracy of interpretations. Ethical considerations Ethical approval was obtained from the hospital’s institutional review board prior to data collection. Participation was entirely voluntary. Eligible participants received written and verbal information regarding the study aims, confidentiality procedures, and their right to decline participation or withdraw at any stage without consequence. Written informed consent was obtained before data collection. Interviews were conducted in a private setting to support confidentiality and encourage open participation. Given the incident-specific nature of the study and the limited number of participants, all interview transcripts were de-identified prior to analysis. Potentially identifying information was removed or generalized in transcripts and reports, and participant quotations were anonymized using non-identifiable codes (e.g., P1–P5) to minimise the risk of identification. Results Analysis of interview data identified six interrelated themes describing how communication failures emerged during operating room (OR) turnovers. Rather than representing isolated breakdowns at the individual level, the findings revealed a cascading chain of system-level influences spanning organizational conditions, supervisory processes, environmental constraints and frontline behaviours. HFACS was used to organize the presentation of findings and support interpretation of cross-level relationships (Table 1). Organizational influences, including insufficient information system support and inconsistent procedural norms, created conditions that limited situational awareness and coordination capacity. These conditions were further amplified by supervisory gaps, such as the absence of structured communication checkpoints and unclear coordination roles. Under these circumstances, frontline staff experienced increased cognitive load and role ambiguity, which manifested as information transmission bias and unauthorized task execution during OR turnovers. The results are presented according to the hierarchical levels of HFACS, beginning with organizational influences and progressing toward frontline unsafe acts to illustrate how higher-level systemic factors shaped observable communication failures. Table 1Qualitative themes interpreted through the HFACS framework in operating room turnover communication failureHFACS levelIdentified themeDescription of findingIllustrative exampleSystem-level relevanceOrganizational InfluencesInsufficient information system supportLack of real-time visibility of OR status and staff availability created coordination blind spots“At present, we mainly rely on phone calls or WeChat. If there were a system showing the progress of each operating room, communication would be much easier” (P1)“The scheduling board is often unclear, and we have to keep walking around to check what is actually happening” “You feel like you’ve entered an information blind spot because you don’t know what is happening in that room” (P2)Need for real-time visual management tools and integrated scheduling systemsInconsistent institutional normsAmbiguity in turnover procedures and reporting expectations across teams“Only laparoscopic procedures have a clear reporting time. For other procedures, everyone relies on their own judgement” (P1)“Different teams seem to have different understandings about when turnover information should be reported” (P3)“Sometimes we know which team we are covering, but nobody tells us exactly which patient we are expected to receive” (P5)Standardization of turnover communication protocolsUnsafe SupervisionAbsence of structured communication checkpointsLack of verification or feedback loops after instructions were given“No one confirmed whether the task had been completed” (P3)“I assumed the responsible staff member had already brought the patient in” “I trusted that they would respond quickly and carry out the arrangement appropriately” (P2)Supervisory mechanisms and closed-loop communicationRole boundary ambiguitySupervisors lacked clear oversight of cross-room coordination responsibilities“All of us were waiting for instructions, but it seemed that there was no one to supervise the coordination between the operating rooms” (P4)Clarification of coordination roles and accountability structuresPreconditions for Unsafe ActsHigh cognitive load and fragmented attentionMultitasking across multiple theatres reduced situational awareness“Too many messages at the same time” “When several things happen at the same time, your original rhythm gets disrupted” (P1)Workload distribution and environmental design to support attention managementInterprofessional communication barriersDifferent expectations and terminology among disciplines“The anaesthesia team and the nursing team seemed to have different understandings of the staffing arrangement” (P1)Interprofessional training and shared communication frameworksUnsafe ActsInformation transmission biasKey details were omitted or assumed rather than explicitly communicated“I thought they already knew” (P2)“We had already admitted the patient, but we did not inform the coordinator afterwards” “I thought telling her that I was going to check the next patient was already enough” (P5)Emphasizing explicit confirmation behavioursUnauthorized task executionTasks initiated without role confirmation or coordination oversight“Someone proceeded without checking” (P2)“I thought they already knew, so I did not repeat the information” “I thought another team was handling it” (P4)“Some doctors think that if the patients belong to the same surgical team, it does not matter which room receives them first. Sometimes they make arrangements first and inform us afterwards” (P5)Reinforcement of protocol adherence and communication accountability Qualitative themes interpreted through the HFACS framework in operating room turnover communication failure “At present, we mainly rely on phone calls or WeChat. If there were a system showing the progress of each operating room, communication would be much easier” (P1) “The scheduling board is often unclear, and we have to keep walking around to check what is actually happening” “You feel like you’ve entered an information blind spot because you don’t know what is happening in that room” (P2) “Only laparoscopic procedures have a clear reporting time. For other procedures, everyone relies on their own judgement” (P1) “Different teams seem to have different understandings about when turnover information should be reported” (P3) “Sometimes we know which team we are covering, but nobody tells us exactly which patient we are expected to receive” (P5) “No one confirmed whether the task had been completed” (P3) “I assumed the responsible staff member had already brought the patient in” “I trusted that they would respond quickly and carry out the arrangement appropriately” (P2) “I thought they already knew” (P2) “We had already admitted the patient, but we did not inform the coordinator afterwards” “I thought telling her that I was going to check the next patient was already enough” (P5) “Someone proceeded without checking” (P2) “I thought they already knew, so I did not repeat the information” “I thought another team was handling it” (P4) “Some doctors think that if the patients belong to the same surgical team, it does not matter which room receives them first. Sometimes they make arrangements first and inform us afterwards” (P5) Overview of the communication failure event The analysed case occurred in a large tertiary hospital operating department and involved multiple healthcare professionals engaged in operating room turnover coordination. During routine turnover activities, a series of communication breakdowns disrupted patient flow and operating room workflow. Although no direct patient harm was identified, the case exposed vulnerabilities in communication reliability, supervisory oversight and real-time coordination. Because it involved multiple professional groups, interdependent coordination processes, and observable organizational consequences, the case was considered information-rich for examining system-level contributors to communication failure. Qualitative analysis identified six interrelated themes, which were subsequently interpreted through the HFACS framework. Organizational influences At the organizational level, participants described structural conditions that constrained effective communication during OR turnovers. Three main organizational themes emerged: inconsistent institutional norms regarding turnover communication, inadequate information technology support and limited alignment between staff capabilities and dynamic scheduling demands. Participants reported ambiguity in institutional expectations regarding communication responsibilities, including who should initiate updates and how task completion should be verified. The absence of standardized turnover communication protocols led to reliance on informal practices and individual assumptions. As one participant noted: “At present, we mainly rely on phone calls or WeChat. If there were a system showing the progress of each operating room, communication would be much easier” (P1). In addition, limited digital support reduced real-time situational awareness across multiple operating theatres. Information regarding staff allocation and room readiness was primarily exchanged through phone calls or informal messaging rather than shared visual dashboards. One participant noted that “The scheduling board is often unclear, and we have to keep walking around to check what is actually happening. You feel like you’ve entered an information blind spot because you don’t know what is happening in that room” (P2). These organizational constraints created latent system weaknesses that shaped supervisory oversight and frontline decision-making. Unsafe supervision Supervisory factors further amplified communication risks during the turnover process. Participants described the absence of structured communication checkpoints and verification mechanisms following task assignment. As one participant explained “All of us were waiting for instructions, but it seemed that there was no one to supervise the coordination between the operating rooms” (P4). The OR coordinator relied on fragmented information without systematic confirmation of staff readiness or task completion. Unclear coordination roles contributed to assumptions about responsibility allocation, reducing active monitoring and early error detection. The lack of supervisory feedback loops allowed coordination decisions to proceed without systematic verification, increasing the likelihood of communication-related errors. Preconditions for unsafe acts Under organizational and supervisory constraints, several environmental and cognitive preconditions shaped frontline behaviour. Participants described high workload intensity, fragmented attention and interprofessional collaboration silos during simultaneous OR operations. As one participant noted:“When several things happen at the same time, your original rhythm gets disrupted” (P1). Professional boundaries reduced proactive cross-checking between different professional groups. One participant highlighted role ambiguity and reliance on implicit expectations: “I assumed the responsible staff member had already brought the patient in” (P2). Rapid scheduling adjustments without confirmation of staff readiness increased cognitive load and uncertainty, creating conditions for communication omissions and decision-making shortcuts. Unsafe acts At the frontline level, communication failures manifested as information transmission bias, incomplete reporting and unauthorized task execution. Participants described situations in which key details were omitted or assumed rather than explicitly communicated. One participant stated, “Some doctors think that if the patients belong to the same surgical team, it does not matter which room receives them first. Sometimes they make arrangements first and inform us afterwards” (P5). Another participant reflected: “I thought they already knew, so I did not repeat the information” “I thought another team was handling it” (P4). Such assumptions resulted in incorrect task allocation and delayed corrective actions. Unauthorized patient admission without full coordination further reflected breakdowns in explicit communication and role confirmation. Summary of the HFACS ‘chain of errors’ Interpreting the qualitative findings through HFACS framework suggested a cascading chain of interrelated failures. Organizational constraints limited situational awareness and standardization, supervisory gaps reduced coordination oversight and environmental pressures increased cognitive load, ultimately shaping frontline unsafe acts. Rather than representing isolated individual mistakes, the event reflected systemic vulnerabilities embedded within organizational structures and coordination processes during OR turnover. Synthesizing the cross-level relationships identified through qualitative analysis, a HFACS-informed cascade pathway model was developed to illustrate how organizational and supervisory conditions propagated through operational contexts to shape frontline communication behaviours (Fig. 1). HFACS-informed cascade pathway of communication failure during operating room turnover, showing cross-level contributory factors and system-level intervention targets Discussion Communication breakdowns during operating room (OR) turnovers are commonly interpreted as individual performance failures; however, the present findings reposition these events as manifestations of system-level coordination problems operating across organizational, supervisory and frontline levels. Guided by a systems-oriented perspective informed by HFACS, this study suggests that the analysed incident did not arise from a single communication lapse, but from a cascade of interacting conditions distributed across multiple layers of the service system [22–24]. Organizational ambiguity, incomplete supervisory oversight and operational pressures together created an environment in which frontline communication became vulnerable to omission, misinterpretation and unauthorized task execution. This interpretation shifts attention away from isolated individual error and toward the broader service conditions in which communication occurs. While these findings should be interpreted within the context of a single post-incident case, they provide insight into how communication failures may emerge through interacting system-level conditions. Consistent with previous perioperative research, OR turnover represents a high-risk transitional period characterized by compressed timelines, multidisciplinary interdependence and rapid task switching [25]. While communication has long been recognized as a major contributor to perioperative adverse events [26, 27], the present findings extend this understanding by showing how communication failure is produced within a context of structural ambiguity and coordination fragility rather than through individual skill deficits alone. Participants’ accounts suggested that fragmented information flow, inconsistent procedural expectations and limited real-time oversight reduced shared situational awareness across professional groups. In this sense, the communication failure observed in this case was not merely a breakdown in message exchange, but a symptom of reduced coordination reliability within a complex and time-pressured clinical system [28, 29]. Structural clarity emerged as a central determinant of communication reliability. At the organizational level, the absence of standardized turnover protocols generated variability in practice and ambiguity in responsibility boundaries, consistent with perioperative workflow studies [30–33]. Importantly, the findings also highlight the underexamined role of supervisory architecture. While communication training remains widely emphasized, structured supervisory checkpoints and clearly defined coordination authority appear equally critical in preventing information gaps from cascading across professional silos [34–36]. This is consistent with broader evidence suggesting that unclear authority gradients and limited speaking-up behaviours can constrain corrective dialogue within clinical teams [37, 38]. Environmental pressures further intensified this vulnerability. Participants described high workload, multitasking demands and time pressure as routine features of OR turnover, all of which reduced attentional capacity and increased reliance on assumptions or informal shortcuts. These findings are consistent with human factors research showing that cognitive load and fragmented attention can weaken communication reliability in high-intensity care environments [39]. Importantly, however, the present study situates these pressures within upstream organizational and service-delivery conditions rather than treating them as background noise [40]. Workload intensity, role ambiguity and reduced shared situational awareness were not incidental features of the environment; they were part of the mechanism through which organizational and supervisory weaknesses propagated into frontline unsafe acts. Taken together, these findings indicate that improving communication during OR turnover requires more than strengthening individual communication skills alone. Because the observed breakdowns were shaped by organizational ambiguity, incomplete supervisory oversight and reduced shared situational awareness, effective improvement should target the system conditions that structure frontline interaction. Drawing on the vulnerabilities identified in this case, several organizational improvement strategies can be considered. Approaches such as standardized turnover protocols with explicit reporting and confirmation requirements [41], real-time visual information support [42, 43] and clearer coordination responsibilities may help reduce ambiguity and strengthen communication reliability during high-intensity transition periods. In addition, shared interprofessional training may support more consistent expectations across professional groups and improve coordination under operational pressure [36, 41]. Together, these strategies point to the need for service redesign that supports more visible, verifiable and coordinated communication during OR turnover. Beyond explaining a single communication failure event, this case has implications for organizational learning in high-intensity surgical settings. The value of the case lies not only in identifying what failed, but also in showing how routine service processes become vulnerable when they depend on informal assumptions rather than shared, visible and auditable coordination mechanisms. The findings suggest that organizations may benefit from strengthening formal coordination processes and verification mechanisms during operating room turnover, particularly in high-demand environments where multiple professional groups must interact under time pressure. From a health services perspective, OR turnover is not merely a local handover task; it is a critical service-delivery process that influences patient flow, theatre utilization and operational reliability. A system-level reading of this incident may therefore help organizations move beyond reactive responses to individual breakdowns and toward proactive learning, redesign and risk reduction in complex surgical environments. This study has several limitations. As a single-case study conducted in one tertiary hospital; the findings should therefore be interpreted as context-specific rather than statistically generalizable, residual risk of deductive identification may remain despite extensive de-identification measures. The study also relied on retrospective interviews with five staff members directly involved in the event, and their accounts may have been influenced by recall bias or post-event rationalization. In addition the analysis was based mainly on interview data and did not include documentary or observational sources that might have strengthened triangulation. Furthermore, although HFACS supported system-level interpretation, its use as a analytical framework may have influenced how some findings were organized and interpreted. Future research could strengthen transferability by examining multiple cases across institutions and by integrating interviews with documentary and observational data. Conclusion This study highlights that communication failures during operating room (OR) turnovers may be influenced by interconnected system-level conditions rather than solely by isolated individual mistakes. Using HFACS as an interpretive framework, the findings highlight how organizational structures, supervisory processes and environmental pressures interacted to influence frontline communication during OR turnover. Improving turnover safety therefore requires a shift from reactive responses to individual errors toward proactive redesign of coordination systems and service processes. By framing OR turnover communication failure as a system-level coordination problem rather than an isolated individual lapse, this study may provide an analytic perspective to inform organizational learning, service redesign and patient safety improvement in complex surgical settings. Supplementary Information Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. Supplementary Material 1 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the healthcare professionals who participated in this study for their time and valuable contributions. Abbreviations Operating room Human Factors Analysis and Classification System Author contributions XL and YZ contributed to study design, data analysis and manuscript drafting. JYZ and YQS supervised the study and critically revised the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Funding Not applicable. Data availability Data are not publicly available due to confidentiality and ethical restrictions. Declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Medical Research Ethics Committee of West China Second University Hospital, Sichuan University, China (Approval No. Medical Research Ethics Approval (076), 2026). All participants were informed about the purpose and procedures of the study before data collection. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the interviews. Participation was entirely voluntary, and participants could withdraw at any time without any consequences. Sufficient measures were implemented to ensure the confidentiality of data throughout the processes of collection, storage, analysis and reporting. All study procedures were conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Xin Liao and Yan Zeng contributed equally to this work. Contributor Information Jun-Ying Zhou, Email: 1762210380@qq.com. Yu-Qing Song, Email: 1547715614@qq.com. References Associated Data Supplementary Materials Supplementary Material 1 Data Availability Statement Data are not publicly available due to confidentiality and ethical restrictions.