Firearms as a Market‐Driven Epidemic: Potential Pathways to Reduce Preventable Firearm‐Related Harm in the United States Authors: ESZTER RIMÁNYI, JONATHAN D QUICK, STEPHEN W HARGARTEN, CHARLES C BRANAS, SANDRO GALEA, NASON MAANI, JONATHAN LOWY, ZAIN HUSSAIN, NICHOLAS HOFFMANN Published: 2026 ABSTRACT Abstract Policy PointsFor half a century, firearm‐related deaths and injuries have been endemic in the United States, with COVID‐19 contributing to a record high of 48,830 deaths in 2021, an epidemic rate increase. By 2023, national trends masked a significant 10‐fold difference in firearm‐related death rates among states. Over decades, some states have experienced large, sustained reductions in firearm‐related death rates, while others have experienced increases.Firearms are a consumer product that fit the definition of a market‐driven epidemic (MDE), with the firearms industry having successfully marketed gun ownership through strategies that include fear, predatory tactics, and emphasis on lethality; stalling public health research for decades; and employing strategies used in other industries to promote potentially harmful products.Evidence from classic MDEs, such as tobacco and prescription opioids, demonstrates that large‐scale, long‐term reductions in harmful use can be achieved through a combination of focused, effective interventions and engaged governments, nongovernmental organizations, academia, media outlets, and, at times, companies themselves.The United States has developed a robust array of evidence‐based mitigation strategies to reduce firearm‐related harm, including gun safety laws, focused hospital and mental health programs, community and environmental programs, and social and economic policies. Applying insights from classic MDEs, building on what has worked, and increased active engagement among stakeholders are needed to reduce preventable firearm harm. ContextThe United States has among the highest firearm‐related deaths in the world. In 2023, suicides accounted for 58% of firearm‐related deaths and 38% of homicides. Firearms have become the leading cause of death among those under age 19. Nonfatal injuries, outnumbering deaths over two‐to‐one, often lead to lifelong physical and mental health sequelae. The firearms market, valued at around $40 billion per year, is one‐tenth the estimated $500 billion cost of the epidemic due to medical costs, work loss, and quality‐adjusted life years lost.MethodsPeer‐reviewed literature, government documents, and media reports were used to analyze the firearms epidemic according to the market‐driven epidemics (MDE) definition and framework of five often overlapping phases: (1) market development; (2) evidence of harm; (3) corporate resistance; (4) mitigation; and (5) market adaptation. The MDE framework emerged from the analysis of efforts that reduced cigarette, sugar, and prescription opioid use. The central question for mitigating the firearm MDE is: What combination of interventions and actors will achieve large‐scale, long‐term reductions in firearm‐related deaths and other harm?FindingsThe epidemic of firearm harm fits the MDE definition and is progressing through the five stages of an MDE. Phase 1. Firearms marketing accelerated rapidly when the focus shifted from marksmanship, sportsmanship, and hunting to themes of self‐defense, home protection, patriotism, and masculinity. Phase 2. Evidence of harm at the population level has linked firearm ownership or possession to significant increases in suicide deaths, homicide, femicide, and gun‐related injuries. Phase 3. Firearms industry resistance has used “corporate playbook” strategies to downplay the evidence of preventable harm, discredit public health, and influence the passage of favorable legislation. Phase 4. Decades of action by government, academia, and civil society have produced an array of mitigation interventions shown to reduce firearm‐related suicides, homicides, and other harm. Jurisdictions that have implemented these measures have been able to achieve significant, sustained decreases in firearm‐related deaths, while some high‐burden areas that have declined to implement such measures and have enacted permission policies have experienced notable increases in firearm‐related deaths. Phase 5. The firearms market has evolved through consumer demand for “non‐lethal” alternatives (i.e., TASERs, rubber bullets) and through company expansion of overseas sales and pursuit of new technologies (i.e., “smart guns,” magazine safeties).ConclusionsHigh rates of firearm‐related deaths and injuries are not inevitable. By treating the firearm harm epidemic as the market‐driven problem it is, drawing on insights from other MDEs strategies, substantial reductions in violence may be achievable across the United States. States and cities have significantly reduced gun violence without infringing Second Amendment rights. The greatest unmet challenge now is generating increased engagement in gun safety among states and communities still experiencing high levels of preventable firearm deaths and related harms.Keywords: firearms, United States, public health, commercial determinants of health, gunshot wounds, homicide, suicide, mass shooting events Over the last five decades, firearm‐related deaths have been largely endemic in the United States. Since the mid‐2010s, however, there have been epidemic‐level increases that greatly accelerated during the COVID‐19 pandemic, suddenly peaking at a record high of nearly 48,830 deaths in 2021, a 35% increase from 2010. The majority of firearm deaths are self‐inflicted, yet interpersonal violence death rates are also high, with nonfatal interpersonal shootings being an important added consideration, given their very high numbers. 1 In 2023, suicides accounted for 58% of firearm‐related deaths, and homicides 38%. 2 Firearm‐related deaths now exceed motor vehicle fatalities for all ages 3 and are the leading cause of death among youth. 4 Mass shootings continue to rise in severity and frequency. 5 Compared to other high‐income nations, the United States has many times the rate of firearm homicide. 2 , 6 , 7 National trends mask significant state‐level variation (Figure 1). In 2021, death rates varied nearly tenfold from Mississippi (29.6 deaths per 100,000) to Rhode Island (3.1 deaths per 100,000). Four states (Rhode Island, New Jersey, Hawaii, and Massachusetts) had rates below 5 per 100,000, while five (Mississippi, Alabama, Missouri, New Mexico, and Louisiana) exceeded 25 per 100,000. 8 The gap in firearm‐related death rates between states with the strongest firearm safety laws and those with the weakest laws almost tripled over the past four decades, increasing from 4.5 deaths per 100,000 in 1990 (13 vs. 17.5, strongest and weakest, respectively) to 12.5 per 100,000 in 2022 (8.5 vs. 21). 9 US Total, Suicide, Homicide, and Other Firearm‐Related Death Rates, 1968‐2021 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] Adapted from National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation 1 and RAND. 10 Firearms also cause nonfatal injuries, which often lead to lifelong physical and mental health sequelae. Although reliable national data are limited, 11 , 12 studies indicate that nonfatal injuries generally outnumber deaths two to one 12 , 13 ; most result from accidents or assaults. 13 Suicides, unintentional shootings, and some interpersonal violence generally involve legally purchased firearms. However, many crimes involve guns sold (often negligently or unlawfully) to straw buyers and gun traffickers who supply the criminal market 14 or guns that have been stolen from legal owners. Firearm harm extends beyond immediate physical injury to broader social harms. Survivors often face disability, substance use, posttraumatic stress disorder, and criminal justice involvement. 15 Communities suffer from eroded safety, while firearm suicides leave families and friends struggling with long‐term mental health challenges. 16 Over half of US adults worry at least “sometimes” about a loved one being a victim of firearm violence. 16 , 17 Despite industry claims that firearms contribute to economic growth, 18 the adverse economic impact of firearms outweighs their purported market value more than tenfold: the firearm harm epidemic costs the United States an estimated $493 billion 19 to $557 billion 1 annually in medical costs, work loss, and quality‐adjusted life‐years. By contrast, in 2023, the US firearms market was valued at $41.7 billion. 20 Firearms are a consumer product that meets the definition and follows the five‐stage phases of the recently defined market‐driven epidemic (MDE) framework: A significant increase in the consumption of a consumer product whose overuse or misuse has been proven to cause death, disability, and other harmful effects; whose consumption has been accelerated by aggressive marketing; whose harmful effects are hidden, denied, or otherwise minimized by producers; and for which effective mitigation is actively resisted by producers. 21 MDEs represent a distinct dynamic within the broader commercial determinants of health landscape, which describes the relationship between the commercial sector and health. 22 , 23 , 24 The MDE methodology was developed using three illustrative MDE products selected to reflect different consumer experiences: cigarettes (nicotine delivery product), sugar (food product), and prescription opioids (medical product). Each met the MDE case definition with proven adverse health impacts, well‐documented histories, longitudinal product consumption and health impact data, and sustained reduction in product consumption. Alcohol, ultra‐processed foods, commercial milk formula, and social media are other examples of products whose overuse or misuse has led to serious adverse effects on health and well‐being and whose producers have resisted public health measures to reduce product harms. 21 The MDE framing allows for an evidence‐based, action‐oriented method that complements the public health approach to firearms 25 by addressing the core question: what combination of actors and actions is most effective in achieving a sustained, large‐scale reduction in the unhealthy consumption and consequent health, social, and economic harms of certain consumer products? Mitigating MDEs requires a combination of interventions to reduce the unhealthy or unsafe use of a product by changing the structures and behaviors of producers, their supply chains, and individual consumers. In this paper, we analyze the firearm injury epidemic using the five‐phase MDE framework. Also discussed are strategies to reduce firearm‐related harms, injuries, and deaths in the United States and other parts of the world, as the United States plays a significant role as the primary manufacturer and seller of firearms used in crime in many countries. Dynamics of Market‐Driven Epidemics The MDE framework emerged from an analysis of three US “illustrative MDEs” for which product harm was well documented, and mitigation achieved significant, sustained reductions in product consumption: cigarette smoking, sugar, and prescription opioids. These MDEs were found to progress through five, sometimes overlapping, phases: (1) market development; (2) evidence of harm; (3) corporate resistance; (4) mitigation; and (5) market adaptation. Efforts that reduced cigarette, sugar, and prescription opioid use offer potentially applicable lessons for reducing firearm‐related harms. In particular, we can document a catalyst that was associated with a substantial reduction in consumption in each of the three epidemics. 21 For cigarettes, the catalyst was the 1964 Surgeon General's Smoking and Health Report, which reframed cigarette smoking from a harmless pleasure to a serious health risk. 26 The 1999 “America is Drowning in Sugar” initiative, led by the Science in the Public Interest nonprofit, effectively linked sugar to the rising public concern about obesity. 27 Amid rising painkiller‐related deaths in the 2000s, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declared an opioid overprescription epidemic in 2011, 28 decreasing prescription rates of the aggressively marketed OxyContin. From the peak of consumption to the most recent available data, US cigarette sales fell by 82%, sugar consumption by 15%, and opioid prescriptions by 62%. 21 In each case, catalytic events built on years of groundwork by scientists, public health leaders, advocates, and the media were followed by legislative, regulatory, tax, and marketing controls; sustained public awareness and advocacy campaigns; continued media attention; and in some cases, action by concerned industry leaders. These three illustrative MDEs demonstrated that it is possible to change the consumption behavior of millions of Americans through the combined actions of respected public leaders, professional associations, civil society organizations, the media, and others. Firearms as a Market‐Driven Epidemic Preventable firearm‐related injury and death qualify as a market‐driven epidemic, driven by forceful marketing and corporate resistance to mitigation. Despite clear evidence of harm, per capita firearm deaths have increased over the past decade, while industry actors continue to oppose proven mitigation efforts. Producers, sellers, and pro‐gun advocates continue resisting proven harm‐reduction measures to sell their consumer product, consistent with their role as commercial determinants of health. 29 , 30 Below, we map firearm‐related events onto the five‐phase MDE framework. Although a national phase 4 tipping point has not occurred, some states and cities have achieved sustained reductions in firearm deaths through evidence‐based mitigation. Phase 5 market adaptations are already emerging among consumers and private sector actors. Phase 1. Market Development A product is created and aggressively marketed with strategies to make it more appealing, socially desirable, or addictive. Firearm advocacy and marketing accelerated rapidly when the National Rifle Association (NRA) shifted its strategic focus from marksmanship, sportsmanship, and hunting to themes of self‐defense, home protection, patriotism, and masculinity. 31 This trend parallels the decline in hunting in the United States, as reflected in firearm advertising. 32 In the 1960s, over 90% of gun ads emphasized hunting or sports, while fewer than 10% focused on self‐defense or concealed carry themes. 33 By 2019, fewer than 10% of ads featured a hunting or sports theme, while more than 50% emphasized self‐defense or concealed carry. 33 The shift in advertising themes was mirrored in firearms ownership and purchases: In 1990, long guns significantly outnumbered handguns, 34 and by 2015, handguns became the fastest‐growing segment of the market. 34 By 2020, handguns accounted for 58% of new production, compared with 36% in 1970. 35 Additionally, the firearms market is disproportionately driven by repeat buyers, leading businesses to prioritize their interests over broader public safety. 36 Firearm marketing has effectively positioned self‐defense as a primary reason for gun ownership. 37 In 2000, most Americans believed that a gun made a home less safe, and only 35% believed that guns made one safer. 38 By 2014, those numbers had virtually inverted, with 30% believing that a gun in the home makes one less safe, and 63% believing the opposite. 38 This shift is echoed in purchase motivations: in 1999, fewer than 30% cited protection as their main reason for buying a gun; by 2017, it was over 65%. 39 Firearm marketing strategies have utilized themes of gender, fear, and panic to drive sales. Advertising portrays guns as symbols of protection and masculinity 40 while simultaneously targeting women with fear‐based messaging framed as empowerment. 41 The industry has leveraged panic over social unrest, natural disasters, and even terrorist attacks to fuel fear, with the aim of boosting sales. 42 During the COVID‐19 pandemic, guns were marketed for personal safety, 43 which may have contributed to the surge in gun sales and associated firearm deaths. Marketing also capitalizes on fears of potential future gun restrictions, as seen in increased sales following the 2008 election and the 2012 reelection of Barack Obama as president 44 and the 2020 election of Joe Biden as president. 44 Like other MDE company strategies, marketing uses predatory tactics to target youth, here extensively through video games. 45 Social media has been a key channel for building public support and expanding market reach, while physical shooting ranges have served as both training sites and community hubs. 46 While firearms share features with other MDE products, they are distinct in that lethality is often a selling point. The appeal of greater force against perceived threats creates incentives to develop more harmful products. As a result, firearms are marketed for traits that increase their danger, such as concealability, speed of reloading, round count, and wounding potential. Companies marketed weapons favored in the criminal market to regular consumers, from cheap “Saturday Night Special” handguns to assault weapons. 36 , 47 Efforts to introduce safer technologies are often actively opposed by the industry. 48 Phase 2. Evidence of Harm Active community members, whistleblowers, and certain researchers raise concerns about the potential harm of the MDE product. Product harm is confirmed over time through rigorous investigations by clinicians, public health experts, and other researchers. The goal of the MDE lens applied to firearms is to minimize the preventable injuries and deaths caused by firearms, while affirming the right to legitimate use of guns for self‐defense, sport shooting, hunting, and other lawful activities. Studying firearms’ self‐defense benefits versus associated harms was greatly hindered by the 1996 Dickey Amendment, which prohibited federal funding “to advocate or promote gun control.” The amendment froze nearly all research on the topic, creating “The Lost Generation of Firearms Research.” 49 Federal support for firearm injury research was only reinstated in 2019. 50 In 2025, however, the administration cut more than 400 gun violence prevention grants totaling at least $815 million. 51 While firearms undoubtedly can be used for legal self‐defense, 52 , 53 the extent to which these benefits outweigh their substantial risks remains contested. In a large 2023 survey of the US population, 4% of respondents indicated that they had “shot a gun in self‐defense” within the last year. 16 In contrast, an landmark 1998 study found that for each legal defensive gun use, there were four unintentional shootings, seven assaults/homicides, and eleven attempted and completed suicides. 54 At the population level, firearm ownership is linked more to suicide, assault, and injury than to safety. 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 Women living with armed abusers face a fivefold increase in femicide risk. 61 Gun possessors are four times more likely to be shot in an assault than victims of assault without guns. 59 Living with a gun owner has been compared to the risks of secondhand smoke. 58 “Stand your ground” laws have not been found to reduce crime and are associated with increased homicides as well as racial disparities in application. 62 , 63 , 64 Access to, and ownership of, firearms has been consistently associated with elevated risks of death by suicide. 57 , 65 Phase 3. Corporate Resistance Companies mount a public relations campaign against the criticism of their product. They deny harm, seek to discredit accusers, commission counter‐science, distract with alternative explanations, and “manufacture doubt.” This leads to legal challenges against mitigation efforts. MDE companies may not intend harm. But when evidence of preventable harm becomes irrefutable, they commonly respond to safety concerns by denying or minimizing risks, rather than directly addressing concerns. Similarly, firearm companies use “corporate playbook” strategies, 66 such as downplaying product harm, discrediting public health, and influencing legislation. 23 , 41 Public health research on firearm violence has faced significant hurdles, ranging from dismissal, restriction of public data critical to its practice, and legal restrictions on the publication of its findings. The gun industry argues that public health should not comment on firearm‐related harm. 42 Public access to crime gun data was suppressed through the Tiahrt Amendment. 49 The NRA accused the CDC of biased reporting on firearms and successfully lobbied Congress to pass the aforementioned Dickey Amendment. 67 The firearm industry, with the help of the NRA, has successfully lobbied to influence legislation and evade regulation, 68 , 69 including passage of the 1986 Firearm Owners Protection Act, 70 preventing renewal of the expired Federal Assault Weapons Ban, 68 and blocking enforcement by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Firearms were exempted from consumer product safety regulations under the Consumer Product Safety Act, and manufacturers and sellers were shielded from certain civil liabilities through the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. 69 , 71 Although the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act specifies exceptions that allow for some civil liability, it has resulted in a “functional immunization of the gun industry from a suit, unseen in any other areas,” 72 which has reduced incentives for the industry to reform. The gun industry has resisted efforts to prevent firearms from reaching the criminal market. 73 At the state level, the firearm industry has worked to weaken concealed carry laws, shifting from “may‐issue” to “shall‐issue” policies and, in some states, to permit‐less carry. 74 Like other MDE companies, firearm companies frame gun violence regulations as dangerous limitations of freedom and portray regulations as “dystopian” and a “slippery slope” to losing more individual freedoms. It suggests gun harms are due to irresponsible users rather than the product's design or marketing. 41 This “user error” is framed as a necessary cost to maintain the freedom of firearm ownership, echoing the tobacco industry's resistance to cigarette regulation. 75 Finally, through its media campaigns and lobbying, the NRA has fought state and federal firearm laws to portray community violence prevention, public health measures, and other efforts to reduce firearm violence as unjustified intrusions on “freedom‐loving” Americans and “God‐given” Second Amendment rights, 41 , 76 rather than justifiable actions to reduce preventable firearm deaths without infringing rights. Phase 4. Mitigation A consumption tipping point is reached at which legal, regulatory, political, social, and other mitigation measures are implemented at the local, national, and/or global levels. For most MDEs, the goal of mitigation is to reduce current unhealthy product consumption or use to achieve health and wellness benefits that may take years to realize. Hence, the core mitigation question for firearms is the following: what combination of interventions will achieve significant, lasting reductions in firearm deaths and related harm? Interventions The previously cited Dickey Amendment notwithstanding, US state and local governments and nongovernmental organizations have developed a myriad of evidence‐supported interventions, many of which, when deployed, have been shown to reduce firearm deaths significantly. 15 , 77 These include gun safety laws, health care programs, community and environment initiatives, and social and economic policies. 78 Gun Safety Laws A 2024 RAND analysis of several thousand studies on the impact of 18 gun safety laws found significant evidence of reduced harm for ten policies, evidence of increased harm for two policies, and inconclusive or no evidence for six policies (Table 1). Decreases in suicide deaths were associated with minimum age requirements, 79 waiting periods, child‐access prevention laws, and extreme risk protection orders. Decreases in homicides were associated with background checks, waiting periods, prohibitions related to domestic violence, and surrender of firearms by prohibited possessors. Stand your ground and concealed carry were associated with increased homicides. Table 1Evidence on the Impact of 18 Gun Safety Laws on Firearm‐Related Deaths and Other Harm a CategoryModerate to Supportive Evidence Limited Evidence Insufficient EvidenceLaws that may reduce firearm‐related deaths and/or other firearm harms1. Legal ownership, purchase, or possession of firearms Minimum age requirements (S)Prohibitions associated with domestic violence (H)Red flag laws (risk‐based surrender of firearms based on dangerousness of possessor) (H) Prohibitions related to mental illnessExtreme risk protection orders (S) 2. Firearm sales and transfers Waiting periods (S, H)Background checks (H) Licensing and permitting requirementsBans on the sale of assault weapons and high‐capacity magazines Firearm safety training requirements for safe storage, use, and maintenance of weaponsLost or stolen firearm reporting requirementsFirearm sales reporting and registration requirementsBans on low‐quality handguns 3. Legal use, storage, or carrying of firearms Child‐access prevention, safe storage laws (S) Gun‐free zonesLaws allowing armed staff in K‐12 schools Laws that may increase firearm‐related deaths and/or other firearm harms Stand your ground laws—repeal or amend (SYG)Concealed carry laws (right‐to‐carry, shall‐issue, permit‐less carry) Abbreviations: S, associated with decreases in suicide; H, associated with decreases in homicide. a Summarized by the authors from Smart et al., 77 table S.1. Level of evidence defined in Smart et al., 77 p. vii. Evidence on the Impact of 18 Gun Safety Laws on Firearm‐Related Deaths and Other Harm a Limited Evidence Minimum age requirements (S) Minimum age requirements (S) Prohibitions associated with domestic violence (H) Prohibitions associated with domestic violence (H) Red flag laws (risk‐based surrender of firearms based on dangerousness of possessor) (H) Red flag laws (risk‐based surrender of firearms based on dangerousness of possessor) (H) Prohibitions related to mental illness Prohibitions related to mental illness Extreme risk protection orders (S) Extreme risk protection orders (S) Waiting periods (S, H) Waiting periods (S, H) Background checks (H) Background checks (H) Licensing and permitting requirements Licensing and permitting requirements Bans on the sale of assault weapons and high‐capacity magazines Bans on the sale of assault weapons and high‐capacity magazines Firearm safety training requirements for safe storage, use, and maintenance of weapons Firearm safety training requirements for safe storage, use, and maintenance of weapons Lost or stolen firearm reporting requirements Lost or stolen firearm reporting requirements Firearm sales reporting and registration requirements Firearm sales reporting and registration requirements Bans on low‐quality handguns Bans on low‐quality handguns Child‐access prevention, safe storage laws (S) Child‐access prevention, safe storage laws (S) Gun‐free zones Gun‐free zones Laws allowing armed staff in K‐12 schools Laws allowing armed staff in K‐12 schools Stand your ground laws—repeal or amend (SYG) Stand your ground laws—repeal or amend (SYG) Concealed carry laws (right‐to‐carry, shall‐issue, permit‐less carry) Concealed carry laws (right‐to‐carry, shall‐issue, permit‐less carry) Abbreviations: S, associated with decreases in suicide; H, associated with decreases in homicide. Summarized by the authors from Smart et al., 77 table S.1. Level of evidence defined in Smart et al., 77 p. vii. Health Care–Based Programs Suicides account for more than half of firearm deaths. Roughly 90% of firearm suicide attempts result in death, compared to 3% for drug overdoses. Among youths aged 18 and under who died by firearm suicide, the majority did so with a firearm belonging to a family member. 80 In addition to specific gun safety laws noted above, safe storage arrangements and counseling of at‐risk individuals and lethal means counseling (family restricting access to firearms) have been shown to change behaviors and reduce firearm suicides. 81 Hospital‐based violence intervention programs 82 and the Cradle to Grave (C2G) program for patients with violent injuries, 83 which commonly include long‐term psychological follow‐up, have also been reported to reduce violent crime. 84 A meta‐analysis of six clinical safety planning–type interventions (SPTIs) found that suicidal behavior for patients who engaged in SPTIs was 43% less than that of patients who did not participate in SPTIs. 85 Community and Environment Programs Community violence intervention approaches violence as a “learned, transmissible behavior” that can be changed by interrupting violence transmission, focusing on high‐potential violence transmitters, and creating social pressure to stop violence. 86 The approach has been implemented in at least a half‐dozen US cities with reported reductions in gun homicides of 25% to more than 60%. 86 , 87 , 88 Urban remediation programs that rehabilitate dilapidated and abandoned properties have been shown to reduce the number of sites where illegal guns are stored and illegal gun‐related violence occurs, which in turn, has been shown to significantly reduce gun violence up to 39% for years and improve community health. 89 Precision policing strategies and group violence interruption have been associated with significant reductions of up to 36% for shootings and 61% for homicides. 90 Social and Economic Programs Chicago's Rapid Employment and Development Initiative (READI), which offered economic and emotional support programs to those at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of gun violence, has shown declines in arrest/victimization for both shootings (−79%) and homicides (−43%) among participants. 91 Access to the state‐level Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Black households has been associated with a significant reduction in both firearm homicides and firearm suicides among Black youth aged 10‐34. 92 A review of earned income tax credit policies of 46 states and Washington, DC, found a 4.3% reduction in firearm suicides per 100,000 people per year for every 10% increase in the refundable earned income tax credit. 93 Repeal of state Sunday alcohol sales bans has been associated with an increase in firearm homicides (IRR = 1.17; 95% CI 1.03‐1.33), both on Sundays and over the course of several following days. 94 Downward‐Trending and Upward‐Trending US Jurisdictions Despite the preceding array of interventions shown to reduce firearm‐related harm significantly, annual firearm‐related death rates vary tenfold among states, as noted above. National firearm‐related death rates in 2022 were nearly the same as in 1990 (14.9 vs. 14.2 deaths per 100,000 people, respectively; Figure 2). However, during that time frame, the trajectory of firearm‐related deaths varied greatly among the 50 states and Washington, DC. California, New York, and Washington, DC, experienced the greatest decreases in death rates: 47% (from 16.2 to 8.6 deaths per 100,000), 60% (from 13.4 to 5.3 deaths per 100,000), and 61% (from 55.1 to 21.4 deaths per 100,000), respectively. During the same 1990‐2022 period, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Mexico experienced the greatest increases in death rate: 40% (from 21.1 to 29.6 deaths per 100,000), 43% (from 16.9 to 24.2 deaths per 100,000), and 63% (from 16.8 to 27.3 deaths per 100,000), respectively (Figure 2). Percent Change in Firearm‐Related Death Rates Among the Leading Upward‐Trending and Downward‐Trending Jurisdictions, 1990‐2022, Compared to 1990 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] Data adapted from RAND. 10 Each of the three downward‐trending states has enacted a series of gun safety laws that have been shown to reduce firearm death or other harms (Table 2). In contrast, each of the three upward‐trending states has enacted one or more laws associated with increased firearm‐related harm and repealed some previously enacted gun safety laws associated with reduced deaths. Mississippi and Missouri have also enacted stand your ground laws. 77 Understanding the stakeholder dynamics and other factors that have driven these dramatic differences among state firearm death trajectories is a vital step in developing even more effective mitigation strategies. Table 2Enactment and Repeal of Gun Laws for Selected Jurisdictions With Falling or Rising Firearm‐Related Death Rates, 1990‐2022 a Falling Firearm‐Related Death Rates Rising Firearm‐Related Death Rates Year Law Enacted or (Repealed)CaliforniaNew YorkWashington, DCMississippiMissouriNew Mexico Laws that may reduce firearm‐related deaths or other harm Minimum age requirements199020001982 1981 (2008) Prohibitions associated with violent misdemeanors or crimes19902019Prohibitions associated with domestic violence19941996Prohibitions associated with mental health disorders1981Red flag laws (firearm surrender by prohibited possessors)2016201920192020Bans on sale of assault weapons or high‐capacity magazines19911994 1990 (2005) 1994 (2005) 1994 (2005) Background checks19912008(2008)2019Safe storage laws (child‐access prevention)19922019Waiting periods for handguns 1990 (1999) (2008) 1994 (1999) Laws that may increase firearm‐related deaths Stand your ground laws20062016Concealed carry laws2017198620042004Permit‐less concealed carry20162016 a Adapted from RAND.10,77 Enactment and Repeal of Gun Laws for Selected Jurisdictions With Falling or Rising Firearm‐Related Death Rates, 1990‐2022 a 1981 (2008) 1990 (2005) 1994 (2005) 1994 (2005) 1990 (1999) 1994 (1999) Adapted from RAND.10,77 Phase 5. Market Adaptation Companies and consumers respond to mitigation efforts. Companies geographically shift their target demographic and modify products. Consumers seek alternatives providing similar benefits. As states have pursued different approaches to gun violence, consumers and businesses have responded to the evolving firearms market and public responses to gun violence. Some manufacturers have developed “smart guns” with biometric sensors, 95 safety switches, and radio frequency identification locks to reduce accidental shootings and unauthorized use. 96 , 97 Published evidence of the effectiveness of such technologies in reducing firearm harm is lacking at present. Magazine safeties and loaded chamber indicators aim to reduce unintentional injury and alert users to risk, demonstrating potential for harm reduction, particularly among youth. 96 , 97 , 98 Behavior‐focused strategies, such as consumer education on safe use and storage, have also emerged. 99 , 100 Innovations like AI‐assisted emergency calls, gunshot detection systems, and smartphone alerts are being developed to improve response times. 101 While ShotSpotter/gunshot detection has been shown to improve police/EMS response times, 102 a longitudinal analysis found that it did not reduce firearm‐related homicides. 103 Despite indications of acceptance from some consumers and retailers, guns with enhanced safety features have faced intense backlash, including threats of violence to some potential sellers, 104 , 105 and have proven difficult to sell. Currently, “smart gun” technologies still make up only a minor portion of the larger firearms market. 99 , 104 , 106 Consumer demand has spurred the rise of nonlethal weapons and homemade firearms. Demand for safer defense options has driven the development of “nonlethal” alternatives, such as TASERs, rubber bullets, and BolaWraps, 107 , 108 , 109 although questions about their effectiveness and ethics have slowed broader adoption. 20 , 110 Fear of future restrictions has driven the spread of 3D‐printed, untraceable “ghost guns” or “gun kits,” increasingly recovered by police and used in mass shootings since the 2010s. 111 In addition to product modifications and substitutions, companies have expanded firearms sales overseas. The global firearms market, driven largely by high‐income countries (HICs), expanded significantly in the 1980s and continues to shape global harm. 112 While centered largely on HICs like the United States, 2 research shows that firearms contribute to more than 250,000 deaths annually in lower‐income countries as well as HICs. 113 Small arms from HICs are often exported legally and illegally into lower‐income countries, 114 though data on illicit firearms transactions remains limited. 114 , 115 Discussion The analysis of downward‐trending and upward‐trending US jurisdictions confirms that strategies exist that can significantly reduce firearm‐related harm. Yet some high‐burden areas have declined to implement strategies that reduce harm, while enacting permissive policies has been shown to increase firearm‐related mortality. Government ideology, state per capita income, and shared state borders have been associated with such differences in state‐level action. 116 Understanding the full range of factors that influence state and local action is essential to reducing preventable local and national firearm‐related harm. 117 Organizations such as Global Action on Gun Violence, Everytown for Gun Safety, March for Our Lives, GIFFORDS, and Brady play a critical role in public awareness and political action. In addition, lawsuits against negligent manufacturers and dealers not only seek legal remedies but also spotlight the industry's role in preventable harm, challenge narratives of immunity, and support regulatory reform. Because economic, legal, and cultural incentives shape firearm manufacturing, 118 targeted policy shifts and commercial pressure can ripple through the industry, reshaping production, reducing availability, and lowering firearm‐related deaths. 119 , 120 Guns are culturally iconic in ways that most MDE products are not. Firearms are also durable products whose potential for harm lasts decades, and there are financial advantages to making firearms more deadly and in selling them in negligent or unlawful ways. The political clout of the firearms industry, as well as a recent US Supreme Court decision changing the method of deciding Second Amendment claims, have constrained some marketing and purchase restrictions, as well as liability litigation, product safety regulation, and other consumer‐protection measures that have proven effective in reducing harm from other MDEs. Despite these challenges, the MDE framework introduces a valuable strategy into the field of firearms: applying successful mitigation approaches from one MDE to another. Particularly when targeting similar populations, behavioral interventions effective in one context may influence consumer choices in another. For example, the US Surgeon General's tobacco report effectively reframed smoking as harmful to the user; a parallel message could highlight that firearms are more likely to cause injury to the owner than to provide protection. Similarly, lessons from the sugar‐obesity link could inform messaging around the correlation between firearm availability and violence levels. The 2011 CDC opioid report tailored communication to the decision‐makers on prescription levels; in the firearm context, this could include finding the right vehicle to communicate with purchasers and retailers. Conclusion Firearms are a consumer product that shares dynamics with other MDE products and whose evolution progressed through phases common to other MDEs. Although firearms differ from most other MDEs in ways noted above, the MDE lens offers unique and critical perspectives and strategies for reducing firearm harm by leveraging successful interventions from other MDEs. After decades of federal, state, and local action, the United States has developed an array of intervention measures for which researchers have confirmed effectiveness in reducing firearm‐related harm. States and cities that have implemented such measures have significantly reduced firearm mortality. The greatest unmet challenge now is generating increased engagement in areas with high levels of firearm‐related harm. Insights from other MDEs, building on what has worked, and even more active advocacy are offered to address this challenge. Continued collaboration across potential actors, including governments, nongovernmental organizations, academia, and media outlets, is needed to reshape purchasing behaviors and reduce harm. By treating the firearm harm epidemic as the market‐driven problem it is, focused on both product and producer, substantial reductions in violence remain achievable across the United States. Funding/Support The authors have no funding support to disclose. Conflict of Interest Disclosures After submission of the initial manuscript, Eszter Rimányi began a personal relationship with Kai Kloepfer, the CEO of Biofire, a startup developing biometric smart guns. Ms. Rimányi has not participated in, nor made editorial decisions regarding, any sections that relate to smart guns since. Acknowledgments None References