A blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework for secure communication in VANETs Authors: S. Sajini, V. Jananee, E. A. Mary Anita Published: 2026 ABSTRACT Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are essential for intelligent transportation systems; however, their dynamic topology and open wireless communication environment expose them to impersonation, Sybil, replay, and message modification attacks. Existing authentication schemes mainly rely on centralized authorities and conventional cryptographic mechanisms, which lack dynamic trust evaluation and fail to ensure secure authentication during Roadside Unit (RSU) handover and cluster mobility. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework for secure VANET communication. The framework integrates a Joint Probability and Error Unit-based Deep Learning Neural Network (JPEU-DLNN) for dynamic trust assessment and Log-based Edwards Curve Cryptography (LECC) for lightweight key generation. In addition, Gini Indexed Farthest First Clustering (GIFFC) ensures stable cluster formation, while the Directional Gannet Optimization Algorithm (DGOA) supports optimal routing. Blockchain technology provides decentralized and immutable credential storage, eliminating single-point failure and certificate forgery. Simulation results show that the proposed framework achieves 95.62% authentication accuracy and 96.94% packet delivery ratio, with reduced end-to-end delay and improved network lifetime compared to existing blockchain-based authentication schemes. Security evaluation confirms strong resistance against active and passive attacks. These results demonstrate the practical applicability of the framework for secure and reliable VANET deployments. Introduction In recent years, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) have emerged as a focal point within intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) because of their significant potential to enhance road safety and driving efficiency1. VANET communication typically occurs in three modes: Vehicle‑to‑Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle‑to‑Infrastructure (V2I), and Vehicle‑to‑Roadside Unit (V2R), each enabling the exchange of safety and general information across the network2. Through On‑Board Units (OBUs), vehicles transmit safety messages that help mitigate accidents and congestion by ensuring critical traffic information is shared among participants3. Despite these benefits, VANETs also present notable security and privacy challenges. The exchange of sensitive data exposes users to risks of identity theft and misuse when exploited by malicious actors4. Among the various threats, the Sybil attack is particularly severe, as adversaries generate multiple false identities to disrupt network functionality5. While cryptographic techniques have been widely adopted to secure VANETs, reliance solely on encryption and hashing has proven insufficient, leaving vulnerabilities unresolved6. To address these limitations, blockchain technology has recently been integrated into VANET frameworks, offering decentralized trust, secure data sharing, and robust authentication mechanisms7. By combining blockchain with VANET protocols, researchers aim to strengthen privacy and reliability in vehicular communications8. Blockchain stores information of vehicular nodes as blocks that are chained together and it is not possible to update or delete any information from the blocks. One of the defining characteristics of blockchain technology is its decentralized nature, which eliminates the need for third‑party intermediaries in transaction verification. Every participant maintains a complete copy of the ledger, and once a new block is appended, all nodes update their records accordingly9. Although several blockchain‑based authentication frameworks have been introduced, many still fall short of meeting the stringent security and privacy demands of VANETs, particularly in areas such as entity verification and message authentication. These approaches often suffer from limitations related to computational efficiency and communication overhead10. Consequently, there is a pressing need for a robust trust management system and secure communication framework capable of mitigating insider threats. To address this gap, the present work proposes a blockchain‑enabled authorization scheme that integrates JPEU‑DLNN‑based trust evaluation with LECC‑based security, specifically designed for V2V communication in VANETs. Efficiency problem in VANET Due to high vehicle mobility and dynamic topology in Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANETs), existing authentication mechanisms suffer from increased computational overhead, communication delay, and centralized trust dependence. These issues lead to authentication latency and reduced scalability in real-time vehicular environments. Therefore, designing an efficient lightweight authentication mechanism with reduced computation cost and fast session key agreement is essential for secure vehicle-to-infrastructure communication. Problem statement Despite advancements in authentication mechanisms for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), existing solutions fail to provide a unified framework that ensures decentralized authentication, dynamic trust evaluation, lightweight cryptographic efficiency, and secure mobility support simultaneously. Centralized approaches suffer from single-point failure and scalability limitations, while existing blockchain-based schemes primarily focus on credential storage without addressing real-time trust assessment and authentication continuity during cluster transitions and Roadside Unit (RSU) handovers. Moreover, high vehicle mobility and open wireless communication channels increase vulnerability to Sybil, impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The absence of an integrated mechanism that combines decentralized credential management, intelligent trust evaluation, and mobility-aware authentication leads to reduced reliability and increased security risks in VANET environments. Therefore, the fundamental problem addressed in this study is the lack of a comprehensive, decentralized, and trust-aware authentication framework capable of ensuring secure, lightweight, and mobility-resilient communication in VANET systems. The overall structure of this paper is organized as: Sect. 2 presents the literature survey, Sect. 3 details the proposed techniques, Sect. 4 discusses the experimental results, and Sect. 5 concludes with recommendations for future improvements. Objectives of the study The primary objectives of this study are as follows: To design a decentralized authentication framework for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) that eliminates single-point failure and enhances credential security.To develop a trust-aware mechanism capable of dynamically identifying malicious and legitimate vehicles in highly mobile environments.To reduce computational and communication overhead through the use of lightweight cryptographic techniques suitable for resource-constrained vehicular nodes.To improve authentication continuity during cluster transitions and Roadside Unit (RSU) handover.To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework in terms of authentication accuracy, packet delivery ratio, delay, and resistance to common security attacks. To design a decentralized authentication framework for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) that eliminates single-point failure and enhances credential security. To design a decentralized authentication framework for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) that eliminates single-point failure and enhances credential security. To develop a trust-aware mechanism capable of dynamically identifying malicious and legitimate vehicles in highly mobile environments. To develop a trust-aware mechanism capable of dynamically identifying malicious and legitimate vehicles in highly mobile environments. To reduce computational and communication overhead through the use of lightweight cryptographic techniques suitable for resource-constrained vehicular nodes. To reduce computational and communication overhead through the use of lightweight cryptographic techniques suitable for resource-constrained vehicular nodes. To improve authentication continuity during cluster transitions and Roadside Unit (RSU) handover. To improve authentication continuity during cluster transitions and Roadside Unit (RSU) handover. To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework in terms of authentication accuracy, packet delivery ratio, delay, and resistance to common security attacks. To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework in terms of authentication accuracy, packet delivery ratio, delay, and resistance to common security attacks. Literature survey Maria et al. (2022)11 proposed the Blockchain‑based Anonymous Authentication and Integrity Preservation (BAIV) scheme for VANETs. In this approach, blockchain was integrated into VANET to enable vehicle authentication without relying on a centralized trusted authority. Their performance evaluation demonstrated the effectiveness of BAIV in ensuring secure communication. However, the scheme required each node to authenticate messages individually, which introduced significant delays in message transmission. In another study, Maria et al. (2021)12 introduced the Blockchain‑Based Anonymous Authentication Scheme (BBAAS) to enhance secure communication in VANETs. In this model, Roadside Units (RSUs) were responsible for authenticating vehicles, and subsequent communications were secured using shared session keys. The analysis confirmed that BBAAS was cost‑efficient. Nevertheless, the scheme did not adequately address security concerns when vehicles moved between different coverage regions, leaving a gap in continuous authentication. Alharthi et al. (2021)13 proposed a Biometrics Blockchain (BBC) framework aimed at enhancing privacy in VANETs. In this model, biometric data was used to record the genuine identity of message senders, thereby ensuring privacy preservation. Their evaluation showed improved performance compared to existing schemes. However, the framework did not address malicious message handling, which could undermine its effectiveness. D. Zhang et al. (2022)14 introduced a Blockchain‑based Multi‑Access Edge Computing for Future VANETs (BMEC‑FV). This approach employed multiple MEC servers to calculate trust among vehicles through computation offloading, while a deep compressed neural network was applied to solve optimization problems. Despite its strengths, the absence of attack analysis raised concerns about its overall security. Sajini & A (2022)15 developed a framework to strengthen secure data communication in VANETs. Their method utilized an ASCII‑ECC (American Standard Code for Information Interchange‑centered Elliptic Curve Cryptography) scheme. Performance results indicated superior efficiency compared to other models. Nonetheless, when a cluster head (CH) migrated between clusters, delays in selecting a new CH increased communication time. Kudva et al. (2021)16 designed a scalable blockchain‑based trust management protocol for VANET routing. The system incorporated a two‑level insider attack detection mechanism, combining individual trust computation with consortium blockchain aggregation. Experiments confirmed scalability and efficiency for large networks. Yet, the lack of V2V communication limited data sharing capabilities. H. Li et al. (2020)17 presented a Fine‑grained Access Control scheme for VANET Data (FADB), integrating blockchain with ciphertext‑based attribute encryption. Simulations demonstrated effective data security with low overhead. However, the scheme remained vulnerable to insider threats due to malicious message injection. Inedjaren et al. (2021)18 implemented a blockchain‑based distributed trust management system using the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol. Results showed reduced detection time and overhead. Still, as the number of nodes increased, control message overhead also grew, affecting scalability. Jenefa & Anita (2021)19 proposed an identity‑based message authentication scheme using proxy vehicles. Their ECC‑based approach (without pairings) allowed proxy vehicles to verify multiple messages, achieving high throughput (e.g., RSUs verifying over 226,000 messages per second). However, the scheme did not address fake message attacks, which could degrade performance. Lin et al. (2021)20 introduced the Blockchain‑based Conditional Privacy‑Preserving Authentication (BCPPA) protocol. By combining blockchain with ECDSA‑based certificate management, the model improved security and utility. Nevertheless, communication costs were higher compared to other schemes. B. Li et al. (2020)21 suggested a blockchain‑based trust management model for location privacy in VANETs. Vehicles used certificates to request location services, while blockchain secured data exchanges. Experiments showed resilience against trust model attacks. Yet, the system faced limitations due to potential location privacy leakage. Al‑shareeda & Anbar (2020)22 examined a privacy‑preserving communication scheme for VANETs that combined ECC with identity‑based encryption. Security analysis revealed vulnerabilities, particularly due to weaknesses in elliptic curve base point selection, leaving the scheme exposed to external attacks. Nandy et al. (2021)23 proposed a lightweight ECC‑based authentication scheme for VANETs. Performance analysis highlighted reduced energy costs and improved efficiency. However, the random generation of authentication keys weakened the model’s security. Alfadhli et al. (2020)24 implemented the Safe Driving and Privacy‑Preserving Authentication (SD2PA) scheme, which relied on hashing and anonymity features to protect vehicle privacy. Communication overhead analysis showed improvements over related schemes. Still, reliance on TA authentication introduced re‑authentication delays, potentially reducing network lifetime. Su et al. (2022)25 developed the Trusted Blockchain‑based SignCryption and Data Management (TB‑SCDM) protocol. The scheme included multiple phases such as initialization, signcryption, authentication, and transaction management. Results indicated reduced storage requirements. However, authentication was not maintained when nodes moved between regions, leaving the system vulnerable to attacks. Recent advancements in blockchain-enabled security frameworks for VANETs have demonstrated significant improvements in authentication, privacy preservation, and trust management. For instance, recent studies have explored lightweight authentication mechanisms integrated with blockchain to ensure secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication while reducing computational overhead. Similarly, trust-aware frameworks leveraging distributed ledger technologies have been proposed to mitigate malicious node behavior and ensure data integrity in highly dynamic vehicular environments. Furthermore, contemporary works have focused on enhancing scalability and latency performance using optimized consensus mechanisms and edge-assisted blockchain architectures. Some approaches also incorporate machine learning techniques to improve anomaly detection and adaptive trust evaluation in VANETs. Despite these advancements, many existing solutions either rely heavily on centralized components, incur high communication overhead, or lack comprehensive trust evaluation mechanisms under real-time vehicular conditions. In contrast, the proposed framework introduces a blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication model that integrates decentralized trust management with efficient authentication protocols, ensuring enhanced security, reduced latency, and improved scalability. The proposed system uniquely combines trust evaluation with blockchain immutability, thereby addressing limitations observed in existing approaches. Table 1Comparative analysis of existing blockchain-based VANET authentication schemes.ReferencesApproachBlockchain usageTrust mechanismSecurity strengthLatencyKey limitation26 Salami et al. (2026)Blockchain-based secure data offloading using Fog-Edge federationYesNoHighHighHigh computational overhead in UAV-assisted environments27 Salami et al. (2024)Secure task offloading in Fog-Cloud-based IoVPartialNoModerate–HighMediumAbsence of integrated trust evaluation28 Zhang et al. (2024)Blockchain-based VANET frameworkYesYesLimitedMediumScalability issues29 Salami et al. (2021)Cost-effective secure key exchange scheme (CE-SKE)NoNoHighLowLack of decentralization due to absence of blockchain30 Sharma et al. (2023)Trust-aware VANET routingYesYesLimitedHighHigh Latency31 Salami et al. (2024, IEEE)Lightweight secure mutual authentication and key agreement (LSMAK-IOV)NoPartialHighLowLimited scalability in highly dynamic VANET environmentsProposed WorkBlockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication with clusteringYesYes (Integrated)HighLow— Table 1Comparative analysis of existing blockchain-based VANET authentication schemes.ReferencesApproachBlockchain usageTrust mechanismSecurity strengthLatencyKey limitation26 Salami et al. (2026)Blockchain-based secure data offloading using Fog-Edge federationYesNoHighHighHigh computational overhead in UAV-assisted environments27 Salami et al. (2024)Secure task offloading in Fog-Cloud-based IoVPartialNoModerate–HighMediumAbsence of integrated trust evaluation28 Zhang et al. (2024)Blockchain-based VANET frameworkYesYesLimitedMediumScalability issues29 Salami et al. (2021)Cost-effective secure key exchange scheme (CE-SKE)NoNoHighLowLack of decentralization due to absence of blockchain30 Sharma et al. (2023)Trust-aware VANET routingYesYesLimitedHighHigh Latency31 Salami et al. (2024, IEEE)Lightweight secure mutual authentication and key agreement (LSMAK-IOV)NoPartialHighLowLimited scalability in highly dynamic VANET environmentsProposed WorkBlockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication with clusteringYesYes (Integrated)HighLow— Comparative analysis of existing blockchain-based VANET authentication schemes. As observed from Tables 1, 2, existing approaches primarily focus on secure data offloading, key exchange, and authentication mechanisms. However, most of these methods lack integrated trust evaluation and decentralized security using blockchain. Additionally, some approaches introduce higher computational overhead or fail to scale efficiently in dynamic vehicular environments. In contrast, the proposed framework combines blockchain technology with trust-aware authentication and efficient clustering, enabling improved security, reduced latency, and enhanced scalability in VANET scenarios32–35. Research gap analysis A comprehensive review of recent authentication schemes in VANET environments reveals several limitations. Traditional cryptographic approaches, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-based schemes, provide secure key exchange mechanisms but rely heavily on centralized authorities, leading to scalability issues and single-point failure risks. Recent blockchain-based authentication frameworks address decentralization; however, most existing solutions focus primarily on credential storage and integrity verification. These approaches often overlook dynamic trust evaluation mechanisms necessary for identifying malicious behavior in highly mobile VANET scenarios. Furthermore, many existing schemes do not adequately address authentication continuity during cluster transitions and Roadside Unit (RSU) handover. High computational overhead and lack of lightweight cryptographic optimization also remain significant concerns for resource-constrained vehicular nodes. Therefore, a clear research gap exists in developing an integrated framework that simultaneously ensures decentralized authentication, dynamic trust assessment, lightweight cryptographic efficiency, and mobility-aware clustering. The proposed blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework is designed to address these unresolved challenges.’ Table 2Research gap identification.Refs.DecentralizedTrust evaluationLightweight cryptoMobility supportGap identified[R1]✔✖✖✖No trust model; centralized dependency[R2]✔✖✔✖No mobility-aware authentication[R3]✔✔✖✖High computational overhead[R4]✔✖✔✖No RSU handover continuityProposed✔✔✔✔Integrated decentralized, trust-aware, lightweight, mobility-resilient framework Table 2Research gap identification.Refs.DecentralizedTrust evaluationLightweight cryptoMobility supportGap identified[R1]✔✖✖✖No trust model; centralized dependency[R2]✔✖✔✖No mobility-aware authentication[R3]✔✔✖✖High computational overhead[R4]✔✖✔✖No RSU handover continuityProposed✔✔✔✔Integrated decentralized, trust-aware, lightweight, mobility-resilient framework Research gap identification. Existing works address decentralization or trust mechanisms individually; however, none provide an integrated framework combining blockchain-based authentication, dynamic trust evaluation, lightweight cryptography, and mobility-aware support. This identified gap motivates the proposed framework. Proposed blockchain authorization-based communication methodologies in vanet The proposed framework consists of four major components: (1) blockchain-based credential storage, (2) JPEU-DLNN-based trust assessment, (3) GIFFC-based cluster formation, and (4) DGOA-based optimal path selection. The overall workflow ensures secure authentication, mobility-aware handover, and resilient communication in VANET environments. In VANETs, security and latency are the major concerns during information sharing. Security of the network can be improved by granting access only to authenticated vehicles and utilizing a secure platform to authorize the vehicles. Hence, a novel blockchain-based authorization framework in VANET using the LECC with a novel GIFFC scheme is proposed. The block representation of the proposed framework is given in Fig. 1, Architecture overview The proposed framework consists of five main components: Vehicles (OBUs), Cluster Heads (CHs), Roadside Units (RSUs), Trust Evaluation Module, and a Permissioned Blockchain Network. Vehicles generate cryptographic credentials using LECC and initiate authentication requests when joining clusters or during RSU handover. The JPEU-DLNN model evaluates vehicle behavior to compute dynamic trust scores and detect malicious nodes. The GIFFC algorithm forms stable clusters, while DGOA optimizes routing paths to reduce delay. Authentication results and trust updates are securely recorded in the blockchain to ensure decentralization and immutability. Fig. 1System architecture of the proposed blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework showing vehicle, cluster head, RSU, trust evaluation, and blockchain interaction. System architecture of the proposed blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework showing vehicle, cluster head, RSU, trust evaluation, and blockchain interaction. Figure 1 illustrates the overall architecture of the proposed blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework. The vehicles equipped with OBUs communicate with cluster heads (CHs), which forward authentication requests to Roadside Units (RSUs). The trust evaluation module analyzes vehicle behavior and generates trust scores. Cryptographic validation using LECC is performed before authentication records are appended to the permissioned blockchain. The arrows in the figure represent the authentication request flow, trust verification process, and blockchain update mechanism. Although Roadside Units (RSUs) are physically static infrastructure components, employing a centralized authentication server introduces single-point failure, scalability limitations, and trust dependency issues in VANET environments. The proposed framework utilizes a distributed permissioned blockchain among RSUs to decentralize authentication control and eliminate reliance on a single trusted authority. In this architecture, multiple RSUs act as blockchain validator nodes that collectively verify and record authentication events. This distributed validation mechanism ensures: Fault tolerance in case of RSU failure.Tamper-resistant storage of authentication records.Load sharing across infrastructure nodes.Resistance to insider manipulation attacks. Fault tolerance in case of RSU failure. Fault tolerance in case of RSU failure. Tamper-resistant storage of authentication records. Tamper-resistant storage of authentication records. Load sharing across infrastructure nodes. Load sharing across infrastructure nodes. Resistance to insider manipulation attacks. Resistance to insider manipulation attacks. Therefore, despite the static deployment of RSUs, the logical authentication process remains decentralized, enhancing system robustness and trust management in dynamic vehicular communication environments. Role of blockchain in DL-VAuth framework In the proposed VANET authentication architecture, blockchain functions as a decentralized trust management layer that securely maintains vehicle identity credentials, session token hashes, and authentication records without relying on a centralized Trusted Authority (TA). The Road Side Units (RSUs) act as blockchain nodes that validate and append authentication transactions generated during the vehicle-to-infrastructure communication process. Whenever a vehicle initiates authentication, its identity-bound token is verified through smart-contract-based consensus maintained across RSU nodes. The blockchain ledger stores only hashed authentication parameters and session key validation tags, ensuring immutability, traceability, and resistance against modification and insider attacks. This integration prevents forged identity registration and enables distributed session verification among participating entities. System and security assumptions The proposed blockchain-enabled trust-aware authentication framework is designed under the following assumptions: A trusted authority exists during the initial registration phase to securely register vehicles and RSUs before deployment.The blockchain operates in a permissioned environment where RSUs and selected cluster heads validate and store authentication records immutably.Vehicles are equipped with tamper-resistant Onboard Units (OBUs) that securely store private keys generated using Log-based Edwards Curve Cryptography (LECC).Adversaries can eavesdrop, replay, modify, or inject messages over insecure wireless channels but cannot compromise blockchain consensus or solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).Vehicles are highly mobile, and authentication continuity during cluster transitions and RSU handover is supported through blockchain-based verification.Vehicles and RSUs are loosely time-synchronized to prevent replay attacks. A trusted authority exists during the initial registration phase to securely register vehicles and RSUs before deployment. A trusted authority exists during the initial registration phase to securely register vehicles and RSUs before deployment. The blockchain operates in a permissioned environment where RSUs and selected cluster heads validate and store authentication records immutably. The blockchain operates in a permissioned environment where RSUs and selected cluster heads validate and store authentication records immutably. Vehicles are equipped with tamper-resistant Onboard Units (OBUs) that securely store private keys generated using Log-based Edwards Curve Cryptography (LECC). Vehicles are equipped with tamper-resistant Onboard Units (OBUs) that securely store private keys generated using Log-based Edwards Curve Cryptography (LECC). Adversaries can eavesdrop, replay, modify, or inject messages over insecure wireless channels but cannot compromise blockchain consensus or solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Adversaries can eavesdrop, replay, modify, or inject messages over insecure wireless channels but cannot compromise blockchain consensus or solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Vehicles are highly mobile, and authentication continuity during cluster transitions and RSU handover is supported through blockchain-based verification. Vehicles are highly mobile, and authentication continuity during cluster transitions and RSU handover is supported through blockchain-based verification. Vehicles and RSUs are loosely time-synchronized to prevent replay attacks. Vehicles and RSUs are loosely time-synchronized to prevent replay attacks. The proposed VANET environment consists of heterogeneous nodes with varying computational and communication capabilities. Vehicles equipped with On-Board Units (OBUs) are resource-constrained and perform lightweight cryptographic operations. Cluster Heads (CHs) possess moderate processing capability to manage intra-cluster authentication requests. Roadside Units (RSUs) are infrastructure-supported nodes with higher computational power and storage capacity, enabling blockchain validation and authentication record maintenance. Authentication entities and their roles The proposed framework involves four primary entities participating in the authentication process: Vehicle (OBU): Each vehicle initiates authentication requests when joining a cluster or during RSU handover. Vehicles authenticate themselves to Cluster Heads (CHs) and RSUs before secure communication is established.Cluster Head (CH): The CH verifies vehicle authentication requests within the cluster and forwards validated information to the RSU for blockchain recording. The CH also participates in trust evaluation.Roadside Unit (RSU): The RSU performs final authentication validation and acts as a blockchain validator node. It stores authentication records immutably in the permissioned blockchain.Blockchain Network: The blockchain maintains tamper-resistant authentication logs and ensures decentralized verification without relying on a centralized authority. Vehicle (OBU): Each vehicle initiates authentication requests when joining a cluster or during RSU handover. Vehicles authenticate themselves to Cluster Heads (CHs) and RSUs before secure communication is established. Vehicle (OBU): Each vehicle initiates authentication requests when joining a cluster or during RSU handover. Vehicles authenticate themselves to Cluster Heads (CHs) and RSUs before secure communication is established. Cluster Head (CH): The CH verifies vehicle authentication requests within the cluster and forwards validated information to the RSU for blockchain recording. The CH also participates in trust evaluation. Cluster Head (CH): The CH verifies vehicle authentication requests within the cluster and forwards validated information to the RSU for blockchain recording. The CH also participates in trust evaluation. Roadside Unit (RSU): The RSU performs final authentication validation and acts as a blockchain validator node. It stores authentication records immutably in the permissioned blockchain. Roadside Unit (RSU): The RSU performs final authentication validation and acts as a blockchain validator node. It stores authentication records immutably in the permissioned blockchain. Blockchain Network: The blockchain maintains tamper-resistant authentication logs and ensures decentralized verification without relying on a centralized authority. Blockchain Network: The blockchain maintains tamper-resistant authentication logs and ensures decentralized verification without relying on a centralized authority. Initialization At first, the VANET network model is initialized. In VANET, the vehicles (nodes) with OBU are presented in a random manner. The mathematical model of VANET \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left(V\right)$$\end{document}is depicted as,1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:V=\left\{{v}_{1},{v}_{2},....,{v}_{n}\right\}or{v}_{node}$$\end{document} Where, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{v}_{n}$$\end{document}depicts the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{n}^{th}$$\end{document}Vehicle Node (VN) in the VANET. Authentication For authentication, initially, the vehicles and the RSUs are registered with the Trusted Authority (TA).The RSUs perform registration with their factors, such as capacity, signal strength, and so on with the TA. For registration, the Vehicle Users (VUs) register their credential information and OBU details. During registration, the keys and hashcodes are generated for each vehicle node, which was needed for authentication. The authenticated VN’s information is stored in the blockchain. Table 3. Table 3Notation and symbol description.SymbolDescriptionViVehicle iRSUjRoadside Unit jSKSession KeyRIDReal IdentityPIDPseudo Identityr1, r2Random NumbersH(.)Secure Hash FunctionTIDTemporary IdentityTSTimestamp Table 3Notation and symbol description.SymbolDescriptionViVehicle iRSUjRoadside Unit jSKSession KeyRIDReal IdentityPIDPseudo Identityr1, r2Random NumbersH(.)Secure Hash FunctionTIDTemporary IdentityTSTimestamp Notation and symbol description. Key generation Each vehicle generates a lightweight elliptic curve (LECC) public-private key pair during initialization. The public key is registered with the RSU and recorded in the permissioned blockchain. Key update mechanism To ensure forward secrecy and reduce key compromise risk, session keys are dynamically generated for each authentication session using: Vehicle private key.RSU public key.Random nonce and timestamp. Vehicle private key. Vehicle private key. RSU public key. RSU public key. Random nonce and timestamp. Random nonce and timestamp. Session keys are valid only for a limited time interval and are automatically refreshed during: Cluster change.RSU handover.Periodic re-authentication. Cluster change. Cluster change. RSU handover. RSU handover. Periodic re-authentication. Periodic re-authentication. The Edward Curve Cryptography (ECC) is considered as more secure by selecting the base point from the closed formation of the curve with addition and doubling law. Still, the ECC has complexity problems for larger numbers. To solve this problem, the Logarithmic calculation is used to reduce the complexity of ECC. The key generation with LECC is given as, In the LECC algorithm, four points are selected from the Edward curve equation,2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{u}^{2}+{v}^{2}=1+e.{u}^{2}{v}^{2}$$\end{document} Where, u,v depicts uand v axes respectively. A scalar value is given by \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:e\in\:I$$\end{document}, where Idepicts the finite field over the Edward curve. From the curve, two points \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left({i}_{1},{i}_{2}\right)$$\end{document}are considered the private keys. With the private keys, the public keys are generated as,3\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{p}_{1}=loglog\:\left(R\right)\:.{i}_{1}$$\end{document}4\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{p}_{2}=loglog\:\left(R\right)\:.{i}_{2}$$\end{document} Where, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{p}_{1},{p}_{2}$$\end{document}signifies the generated public keys at the TA and VUs side, and Rdepicts the basepoint obtained from the Edward curve. Hashcode generation Meanwhile, in the proposed model, the hashcode for authentication is also generated by the Split Skein (SS) hashing algorithm and stored in the blockchain. The conventional skein hashing is made by the three-fish cipher approach, which provides secure hashcode. But, the skein provides a very lengthy code for each round; so, it makes more complex code. To overcome this problem, the blocks of a few words are considered as code and a final hash value is the combination of selected code words. The SS hashing is depicted as follows, The input to the SS hashing is the credential information of VU and OBU details of VN. The information detail plain text is denoted as\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left(A\right)$$\end{document}. The basic component of SS hashing is the three-fish block cipher function, which is performed inside each Unique Block Iteration (UBI) chaining mode. Threefish In the threefish technique, a key length of l bytes are used and the block length (plain text) is equal to the l. The tweak value of 128 bits is irrespective of the block length. Depending upon the blocksize, several rounds are performed using arithmetic operators. The threefish can be denoted as \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:tf\left(I,A,\lambda\:\right)$$\end{document}, where I denotes the current tweak value and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\lambda\:$$\end{document} indicates the key value. A single threefish round is a set of l/2 mix operations and a single permute operation. In the proposed model, to reduce the number of rounds, the block is split as,5\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:A=\left\{{R}_{1},{R}_{2},.....,{R}_{be}\right\}or{R}_{sp},sp=\mathrm{1,2},..,be$$\end{document} Where, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{R}_{be}$$\end{document} depicts the end block \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left(be\right)$$\end{document}, sp depicts the split blocks. Then, the split blocks are divided with 64 as three-fish, which operates on a 64-bit word, which can be formulated as,6\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\vartheta\:}_{A}=\frac{{R}_{sp}}{64}$$\end{document} Here, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\vartheta\:}_{A}$$\end{document} denotes the number of 64-bit words in the input message block. Within threefish, three operations take place: mix, permute, and sub-key addition. Threefish subkey generation Threefish generates \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\frac{{\vartheta\:}_{rnd}}{4}+1$$\end{document} subkeys from the cipher key \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left(\lambda\:\right)$$\end{document}, where, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\vartheta\:}_{rnd}$$\end{document} depicts the number of rounds. Along with \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\lambda\:$$\end{document}, a 64-bit constant value \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left(\varsigma\:\right)$$\end{document} and I, the subkeys \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left({\lambda\:}_{0},{\lambda\:}_{1},....,{\lambda\:}_{l-1}\right)$$\end{document} are generated. Prior to sub-key generation, the two 64-bit words of tweak value \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left(t{t}_{0},t{t}_{1}\right)$$\end{document} is extended to a word \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:t{t}_{2}$$\end{document} and a new key \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\left({\lambda\:}_{l}\right)$$\end{document} as,7\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:t{t}_{2}=t{t}_{0}\oplus\:t{t}_{1}$$\end{document}8\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\lambda\:}_{l}=\varsigma\:\oplus\:{\lambda\:}_{0}\oplus\:{\lambda\:}_{1}\oplus\:......\oplus\:{\lambda\:}_{l-1}$$\end{document} In every round, the subkeys are defined as,9 Where, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:0\le\:jj\le\:{\vartheta\:}_{A}-1$$\end{document}and\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:0\le\:sk\le\:\frac{{\vartheta\:}_{rnd}}{4}$$\end{document}, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\oplus\:$$\end{document} represents the bitwise XOR operation, and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\varXi\:$$\end{document} signifies the addition modulo 264. Mix and permutations In threefish, the mix and permutations process is performed in each step of encryption. The encryption is done by adding subkeys to the plain words. The mix operation on 64-bit words is given as,10\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:m{x}_{sk,0}=e{n}_{sk,0}\varXi\:e{n}_{sk,1}$$\end{document}11\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:m{x}_{s,1}=\left(e{n}_{sk,1}<<