From out-of-pocket to prepaid financing? projected health expenditure and financing mix in Egypt, 1995–2050 Authors: Moaz Elsayed Abouelmagd, Nereen A. Almosilhy, Asmaa Zakria Alnajjar, Marwa Biltagy Published: 2026 ABSTRACT BackgroundEgypt’s health financing is characterised by persistently high out-of-pocket (OOP) payments exceeding 50% of total health expenditure and a declining government share, threatening financial protection and universal health coverage (UHC). Despite the 2018 Universal Health Insurance Law, whether current trends can achieve Egypt’s OOP reduction targets by 2030 remains unknown. We aim to quantify levels, composition, and temporal dynamics of Egypt’s health spending (1995–2050) and identify historical inflexion points.MethodsCountry-level synthesis of Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Health Financing estimates (1995–2021) and projections (2022–2050). Outcomes: total health expenditure (THE), government health expenditure (GHES), prepaid private (PPP), out-of-pocket (OOP), and development assistance for health (DAH), in constant 2022 USD, per capita terms, and % of GDP. Historical trends (1995–2021) were modelled using segmented log-linear (joinpoint) regression with Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors, reporting segment APCs, 95% CIs, and AAPCs. Long-run change summarised with CAGRs for 1995–2021 and 1995–2050. A pre-COVID Alternative scenario was trained with machine-learning ARIMA models on 1995–2017 to assess robustness.ResultsIn 1995, THE was 7.37 billion USD (GHES 34.2%, PPP 1.7%, OOP 62.1%). By 2021, THE reached USD 20.71 billion (GHES 37.2%, PPP 6.0%, OOP 54.6%). Historically, THE grew 4.06%/yr (1995–2021); full-period CAGR 3.62% (1995–2050). Joinpoint analysis showed accelerations in 1995–2001 and 2010–2017, followed by a flat 2017–2021 segment; PPP was the fastest-growing component (AAPC = 8.8%), with OOP remaining the largest despite a modest share decline. GBD projections indicate USD 52.04 billion by 2050, with GHES 26.6%, PPP 19.1%, OOP 53.8%, DAH 0.6%; per-capita THE rises to USD 319, while THE/GDP = 0.05%. The pre-COVID Alternative scenario (1995–2017) projected PPP rising to 65.9%, GHES declining to 12.7%, and OOP to 21.2%.ConclusionsEgypt’s health spending will more than double by 2050. Both GBD and pre-COVID scenarios project a retreat of public financing and a growing reliance on prepaid private mechanisms. While dependence on PPP may help mitigate the burden of OOP, it may undermine equity and financial protection without a corrective policy. Introduction Achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC), where all individuals receive necessary health services without suffering financial hardship, is a central goal of global and national health policy [1]. The architecture of a country’s health financing system is the primary determinant of its ability to move toward UHC [2]. Egypt was classified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income country, with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 4,137.61 USD in 2024 [3–5]. Its development trajectory is shaped by a complex interplay of demographic changes, shifting disease burdens, macroeconomic pressures, and ongoing health system reforms [2]. Egypt is currently facing significant challenges, including a rapidly growing population exceeding 118 million in 2025, a rising prevalence of non-communicable diseases, and extensive economic restructuring, all of which place immense pressure on its health system and financing mechanisms [2, 3, 6]. A persistent challenge for Egypt’s health system has been its heavy reliance on direct out-of-pocket (OOP) payments by households, which consistently constitute over half of the country’s total health expenditure [2, 7]. High OOP healthcare spending is a key driver of inequity and inefficiency, placing families at risk of catastrophic medical costs and financial hardship and undermining the foundational goals of UHC [8]. Such expenses can disrupt a household’s ability to meet other essential needs and, over time, often drive households to exhaust savings, sell property or livestock, and incur debt [9–11]. Recommendations from the World Health Organization and experts suggest that OOP shares shall be below 15–20% of total health expenditure to avoid its catastrophic effects. However, most countries, especially low-middle-income countries, failed to achieve this target and have OOP sharing 40–70% of their health expenditure, including Egypt [2, 12]. Despite declining public health investments in Egypt, urban areas receive the majority of government health spending, leaving rural regions significantly underfunded, with a roughly 67% disparity in expenditure that translates into marked differences in healthcare infrastructure availability. Additionally, rural populations often experience lower income, education, and economic development levels, all of which may contribute to higher rates of catastrophic health expenditures [13]. Therefore, sustainable healthcare requires governments to efficiently provide essential services to all citizens using adequate resources, ensure private coverage for essential care is affordable relative to citizens’ socioeconomic capacity, and maintain high-quality public services that protect individuals from catastrophic OOP expenses and poverty [14]. In response, Egypt has undertaken major health reform through the Universal Health Insurance Law (UHI Law No. 2 of 2018), providing healthcare access to all citizens regardless of income, establishing a health insurance system aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 3 and Egypt’s Vision 2030 [15–17], a phased initiative designed to transform the health financing landscape by expanding prepaid pooling mechanisms and reducing the direct financial burden on citizenxs [16–18]. Early implementation highlights its potential to increase risk pooling and improve service quality, while also revealing operational and financing challenges likely to influence medium-term expenditure patterns [16–18]. While national reports have periodically documented health spending, such as Egypt’s National Health Accounts, a comprehensive long-term analysis that identifies historical inflexion points and provides robust, forward-looking projections remains a critical gap. Existing studies have characterised expenditure levels and share decompositions at specific time points or across short windows (e.g., Egypt’s National Health Accounts 2001–2002), but none have combined a full 1995–2021 joinpoint trend analysis to characterise spending profiles and their development, scenario-based projections to 2050, and an assessment of whether GBD-baseline or pre-COVID trajectories are less influenced by the COVID-19 effect on health expender. Recent macro-financial events, most notably exchange-rate adjustments and COVID-19, add further uncertainty to the trajectory of real health spending, the affordability of imported inputs, and household budgets. This study aims to provide a comprehensive, long-term quantitative analysis of Egypt’s health expenditure from 1995 to 2050. Using data from the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Health Financing project, we quantify health spending levels, composition, and temporal dynamics over the past quarter-century (1995–2021). We then leverage these historical data and related forecasts to project health expenditure trajectories to 2050. By identifying historical structural breaks and presenting alternative future scenarios, this paper provides evidence for policymakers, stakeholders, and researchers seeking to strengthen Egypt’s health financing system on its path toward UHC. Literature review Public spending is a crucial source of funding for health systems, generally aiming to: Improve the overall health of the population,Enhance the efficiency and quality of healthcare services,Design health programs tailored to the needs of the population,Provide financial protection against the risks associated with healthcare expenditures, thereby reducing poverty. Improve the overall health of the population, Improve the overall health of the population, Enhance the efficiency and quality of healthcare services, Enhance the efficiency and quality of healthcare services, Design health programs tailored to the needs of the population, Design health programs tailored to the needs of the population, Provide financial protection against the risks associated with healthcare expenditures, thereby reducing poverty. Provide financial protection against the risks associated with healthcare expenditures, thereby reducing poverty. Government spending levels on health reflect the relative importance that the state attaches to the health sector. The higher percentage over time indicates allocating more financial resources to the health sector, thereby increasing the sector’s ability to support groups unable to afford health services [19]. Public health spending is funded through two sources: First, tax revenues: This is the primary source of funding, including income tax, value-added tax, import taxes, and corporate profit taxes. The allocation for public health spending is then determined as a percentage of general tax revenues, or specific tax revenues, such as taxes on luxury or imported goods. The second type is national social health insurance, which relies on mandatory insurance premiums paid jointly by employees and employers in the formal sector to the insurance authority. The insurance premium is determined as a percentage of the employee’s salary, with employers paying the larger share [20]. Public spending in Egypt’s health sector faces numerous challenges, including securing sufficient and sustainable funding, providing trained personnel to deliver healthcare services, and implementing accountability mechanisms to manage spending [20]. The objective of public health spending has evolved to address past problems by improving the supply side of the health sector, such as: expanding the scope of public health insurance to remove financial barriers to healthcare, establishing primary care systems that achieve equity for all, training health personnel especially in rural areas, and conducting health education campaigns to prevent diseases rather than treat them [21]. Evaluating types of health spending in Egypt Consumers bear a significant portion of healthcare costs when the country’s healthcare sector relies more on out-of-pocket spending than on public health expenditure. Consequently, consumers bear a large share of the risks associated with healthcare financing, leading to reduced equity in access to healthcare services. Conversely, if health service financing is more dependent on public health spending, this means that sufficient financial resources are available to make health services available at a cost that suits all income groups, and thus achieve financial protection against any health risks [22]. The impact of public health spending funding sources on equitable access to healthcare also varies. Social health insurance achieves a higher degree of equity than tax revenues because it guarantees subscribers access to healthcare services in exchange for their premium payments, unlike some taxpayer groups who cannot benefit from state-provided healthcare due to its poor quality [23]. The process of increasing the necessary funds for public spending affects the fairness of access to health services and financial protection against the risks of health expenditures. Sometimes, decentralised financing for a province or district within a country is more successful than centralised financing in achieving financial protection because it is easier to identify groups unable to afford health expenses and to quickly support them by redistributing health resources within the province. Brazil provides a successful example of nearly 100% of its population in some provinces being covered by health insurance after the shift to decentralisation in the management of public health spending [24]. The list of public health services in Egypt includes the three types of care: primary, clinical, and secondary, as well as tertiary skills. The Ministry of Health’s coverage of health services varies: it covers 80% of the Egyptian population’s needs for low-cost primary care, while covering only 15% of the population’s needs for secondary care, which is more expensive. Moreover, only 5% of the community’s needs for higher-cost tertiary care are met by specialised hospitals providing advanced care [25]. This list is implicit, as access to healthcare services is regulated through waiting lists, which lead to two consequences: one, restricting the freedom of Egyptian citizens to access services, especially given the high demand for services and the inability of tax revenues to support all individuals, particularly those at low-income levels. Two, the public health sector has the authority to eliminate certain services, such as decreasing country-funded treatment by removing subsidies for some services, or reducing spending on medical supplies in public hospitals. Therefore, university hospitals provide secondary and tertiary care because they have the necessary infrastructure for these services. They allocate a number of beds for free treatment in accordance with pricing systems negotiated with the Ministry of Health [20]. Experiences from around the world Empirical evaluations of health-financing reforms show that moving from direct payment toward pooled or prepaid coverage can reduce OOP spending, but results are highly sensitive to what the scheme actually covers. In Georgia, the Medical Insurance Program for the Poor (MIP) was launched in 2006 as a tax-funded, means-tested scheme targeting roughly the poorest segment. It operated by contracting with private insurance companies as purchasers and risk carriers, effectively functioning as a publicly financed voucher program. The benefit package included urgent outpatient and inpatient care, planned inpatient services with an annual ceiling, selected oncology services, outpatient visits and diagnostics, and limited outpatient drug coverage from an essential medicines list with a low annual limit and cost-sharing. In the evaluation by Bauhoff et al., MIP was associated with improved financial protection outcomes for eligible households, supporting the idea that expanding pooled financing can reduce household exposure to OOP payments [26]. However, later evidence showed that among people with chronic illness, the program did not reduce outpatient drug spending, consistent with medicines coverage being a key bottleneck for protection [27]. In India (Andhra Pradesh), the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme was designed as a cashless, publicly funded insurance program for poor families, purchasing care from a network of hospitals with fixed package payments for covered procedures and an annual family ceiling that has been reported around INR 200,000; coverage also included limited post-hospital medicines for a short period and transport support in some descriptions. Fan et al. reported that the early rollout of the program significantly reduced OOP inpatient expenditures and, to a lesser extent, outpatient expenditures, but did not show clear short-run reductions in catastrophic spending or medical impoverishment [28]. In Thailand, the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS), often referred to as the “30 Baht” policy, expanded coverage to those not already insured under other public schemes, particularly the informal sector, and initially required a small 30 Baht copayment for both outpatient and inpatient services (with exemptions for vulnerable groups), within a largely tax-financed universal coverage architecture [29]. Limwattananon et al. reported substantial gains in financial protection, including a sizeable reduction in average OOP medical payments and a marked reduction in medical expenditure risk, aligning with the view that broad entitlements with limited point-of-care charges can materially lower household exposure [30]. Biltagy and Hamdi (2024) reveal unequal access to Reproductive, Maternal, and Child Health (RMNCH) services across population groups, even as these inequalities have decreased over time [14]. Simultaneously, out-of-pocket healthcare expenses drove around 30% of families in Egypt into poverty throughout the study duration. Together, these cases motivate how we can interpret Egypt’s projected shifts in GHES, PPP, and OOP: increases in prepaid financing can translate into real protection only when pooling is effective and key cost drivers, especially medicines and outpatient chronic care, are covered and regulated. Methods Study design and scope This study is a country-level, retrospective-prospective analysis of Egypt’s health spending from 1995 to 2050. We synthesise retrospective estimates for 1995–2021 with prospective projections for 2022–2050 produced by the GBD Health Financing Collaborator Network [31]. Outcomes include total health expenditure (THE) and its financing components, government health expenditure (GHES), prepaid private (PPP), out-of-pocket (OOP), and development assistance for health (DAH), expressed in constant 2022 US dollars, constant 2022 purchasing-power-parity USD (PPPD), per-capita terms, and as a share of GDP. Data sources and compilation Retrospective health financing estimates were drawn from the GBD Health Financing series for 1995–2021, which integrates WHO’s Global Health Expenditure Database (GHED) for domestic sources and a consolidated DAH series compiled from program reports, budget documents, national estimates, and National Health Accounts. Prospective projections for 2022–2050 are generated within the same GBD framework using macro-demographic covariates: GDP per capita, total government spending, total fertility rate, and the proportion of the population aged ≥ 65 years. To ensure transparency regarding upstream inputs referenced by the GBD process, we note the following data products: World Bank Global Economic Prospects (January 2024), Maddison Project Database 2020, UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, December 2023, Penn World Table v10.1, UN World Population Prospects 2022, WHO GHED indicators in national currency units 2000–2021, World Bank WDI GDP, December 2023, IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2023, and UN World Economic Situation and Prospects 2024. Measures and definitions Government health spending (GHES): Spending for health care that is derived from domestic sources and is mutually exclusive from OOP, PPP, and DAH spending. Government spending includes spending on public health system infrastructure and government-provided social health insurance. Out-of-pocket health spending (OOP): Payments made by individuals for health maintenance, restoration, or enhancement at or after the time of health care delivery, including health insurance copayments or payments devoted to deductibles. Health insurance premiums are not considered OOP. Prepaid private health spending (PPP): Health spending sources from non-public programs that are funded prior to obtaining health care, such as private health insurance and services provided for free by non-governmental agencies. Total health spending (THE): The sum of GHES, PPP spending, OOP spending, and DAH. THE does not include indirect health spending, such as lost wages due to illness or transportation costs; informal care (spending on care provided by a family member or by traditional healers); or illegal transactions. Expenditure levels are measured in constant 2022 USD and 2022 PPPD for THE, GHES, PPP, OOP, and DAH. Per-capita metrics divide levels by mid-year population. Per cent-of-GDP indicators use consistent GDP denominators for each year. Component shares are the percentages of each financing source’s contribution to THE in a given year. We designate 1995–2021 as “actual” and 2022–2050 as “forecast.” We treat these periods distinctly in inferential analyses to avoid attributing structural breaks to model-based projections. Data preparation We harmonised variable names, coerced the year to an integer, sorted observations chronologically, and flagged actual versus forecast periods. For each year, we computed component shares as percentages of THE, year-over-year (YoY) growth rates for all levels, per-capita, PPP, %GDP, and share series, and compound annual growth rates (CAGR) over three windows: 1995–2021 (actual), 2022–2050 (forecast), and 1995–2050 (full). Supplied uncertainty intervals were retained for visualisation (shaded bands) but were not propagated through growth-rate or segmentation estimators using central estimates. Statistical analysis Descriptive analysis comprises full-span (1995–2050) trajectories with a visual demarcation at 2022, uncertainty bands where available, and a focused comparison of 1995, 2021, and 2025 component shares. To characterise historical inflexions, we fit segmented log-linear (“joinpoint”) regressions to the actual period (1995–2021) for total, per capita, %GDP, and component share metrics. The econometric specification is as follows: the natural logarithm of the health spending series is modelled as a piecewise linear function of time with 0–3 candidate joinpoints (changepoints in slope) selected by minimising the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\eqalign{ & \>{\rm{ln}}\left( {{y_t}} \right) = \beta {\>_0} + \beta {\>_1}t + \sum\nolimits_k {{\gamma _k}{\rm{max}}} \cr & \,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,(0,t - {\tau _{\rm{k}}}) + { \in _t} \cr} $$\end{document} yt outcome at time \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:t$$\end{document}, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\beta\:}_{0}$$\end{document}: intercept, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\beta\:}_{1}$$\end{document}: baseline slope (before any joinpoints), \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{t}_{k}$$\end{document}: joinpoints (years where slope changes), \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:{\gamma}_{k}$$\end{document}: change in slope after each joinpoint, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:max(0,t-{t}_{k})$$\end{document}: piecewise linear term (activates only after the joinpoint), \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${ \in _t}$$\end{document}: error term. The slope coefficient in each segment is the log-linear growth rate, exponentiated and expressed as an annual percentage change (APC). The average annual percentage change (AAPC) is the duration-weighted average of segment slopes, likewise transformed to per cent change. Time-series data commonly exhibit serial correlation (autocorrelation) and non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity), both of which violate standard OLS assumptions and can produce understated standard errors and misleading inferences about the statistical significance of trend changes. To address these issues, standard errors and confidence intervals for segment APCs and the AAPC were computed using the Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) covariance estimator with a Bartlett kernel and maximum lag of 2. The Durbin-Watson statistic, the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test (2 lags), and the White test were applied to the residuals of each fitted model as post-estimation diagnostics; results are reported in Table 1.These tests indicated evidence of autocorrelation and/or heteroscedasticity in several series (notably THE total, GHES, and per-capita THE), confirming that HAC standard errors were warranted. Joinpoint models are not estimated on forecast years; in full-span figures, fitted segments and break lines are overlaid only across 1995–2021. All analyses were conducted in Python using pandas, numpy, and statsmodels for data management, statistical modelling, and diagnostic testing; matplotlib for visualisation. Confidence intervals derived from the HAC variance-covariance matrix use the delta method for APC transformations.\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\>{\rm{APC}} = \left( {{e^{\beta \>}} - 1} \right) \times \>100$$\end{document}\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\mathrm{AAPC}=\frac{\sum{w}_{i}{\beta\:}_{i}}{\sum{w}_{i}}$$\end{document} Alternative scenario We constructed an alternative forecasting scenario for Egypt’s health spending that trains only on pre-COVID dynamics (1995–2017). The 2017 cutoff was chosen based on a joinpoint inspection of financing shares, which showed a declining segment after 2017 for all shares except GHES (an effect of COVID-19 and the financial crisis in 2018); we therefore excluded 2018–2021 to avoid pandemic distortions and let the model extrapolate from a stable pre-COVID structure. It is important to note that 2018 was also the year the UHI Law was enacted. Consequently, this alternative scenario should be interpreted as a “business as usual without successful UHI implementation” pathway, where pre-existing structural dynamics, particularly PPP expansion, continue uninterrupted. It does not capture potential positive policy shocks from full UHI scale-up. We fitted ARIMA models on log levels for each core spending aggregate-THE, GHES, PPP, DAH-with order selection via rolling-origin 1-step cross-validation across a parsimonious grid. Candidates were ranked by median MAPE, with AICc and RMSE used as tiebreakers. Forecasts were generated for 2017–2050. OOP was derived residually as THE (GHES + PPP+DAH) with a proportional rescale safeguard to prevent negative residuals. To enforce fiscal realism, we applied a ceiling on THE at US$52 billion -derived from GBD predictions-, letting the composition adjust mechanically when the cap binds. We reported annual paths, AAPC from log-linear trends for 2017–2050 and 2022–2050, and average annual changes in financing shares. Diagnostic checks included ADF tests on log levels and first differences, and ACF/PACF visualizations on differenced logs [32–34]. Ethical considerations Only aggregated, publicly available secondary data were used. No individual-level data were analyzed, and institutional review board approval was not required. Results Overview of spending levels and composition at key years In 1995, total health expenditure in Egypt was USD 7.37 billion, composed of GHES USD 2.52 billion (34.16%), PPPD 0.125 billion (1.70%), OOP USD 4.57 billion (62.07%), and DAH USD 0.153 billion (2.08%). By 2021, THE reached USD 20.71 billion, with GHES USD 7.71 billion (37.24%), PPPD 1.24 billion (6.00%), OOP USD 11.32 billion (54.64%), and DAH USD 0.44 billion (2.12%). Under GBD projections, 2050 THE is USD 52.04 billion, with GHES USD 13.82 billion (26.55%), PPPD 9.92 billion (19.06%), OOP USD 27.98 billion (53.76%), and DAH USD 0.33 billion (0.64%) (see Fig. 1). Fig. 1Total and component health spending in Egypt (USD, 1995–2050) based on GDB Total and component health spending in Egypt (USD, 1995–2050) based on GDB Per-capita THE increases from USD 121 (1995) to USD 196 (2021) and USD 319 (2050). Per-capita GHES moves from USD 41 (1995) to USD 73 (2021) and USD 85 (2050); PPP rises from USD 2 to USD 12 and USD 61; OOP from USD 75 to USD 107 and USD 171. The share of GDP is 0.06% (1995), 0.05% (2021), and 0.05% (2050), with similarly low and stable ratios for component shares of GDP (see Figs. 2 and 3). Fig. 2Indexed levels of total and component health spending per capita (USD, 1995–2050) (data on DAH were not suppressed due to very low levels). Actual data is separated from forecast by the dashed line Indexed levels of total and component health spending per capita (USD, 1995–2050) (data on DAH were not suppressed due to very low levels). Actual data is separated from forecast by the dashed line Fig. 3Indexed levels of total and component health spending as % of GDP (1995–2050) Indexed levels of total and component health spending as % of GDP (1995–2050) Composition shifts are pronounced over the long run. From 1995→2050, PPP share rises by + 17.36 pp (1.70%→19.06%), OOP falls by -8.31 pp (62.07%→53.76%), GHES declines by -7.61 pp (34.16%→26.55%), and DAH contracts by -1.44 pp. Relative to 2021, the 2050 mix features lower GHES (-10.69 pp), much higher PPP (+ 13.06 pp), slightly lower OOP (-0.88 pp), and lower DAH (-1.48 pp) (see Fig. 4). Fig. 4Shares of each component of the total health expenditure from 1995 to 2050 according to GDP estimates Shares of each component of the total health expenditure from 1995 to 2050 according to GDP estimates Joinpoint analysis of historical trends (1995–2021) and GDP projections to 2050 Using total USD spending as a measurement index, THE had an AAPC of 3.85%, with accelerations in 1995–2001 (5.68%) and 2010–2017 (6.37%), then a flat 2017–2021 (0.16%) segment. GHES recorded an AAPC of 3.86%, with slower growth in 2001–2012 (2.48%) and renewed expansion in 2012–2021 (4.56%), largely influenced by COVID-19 expenditure. PPP grew fastest (AAPC 8.77%) with a boom in 2007–2014 (30.07%), followed by contraction in 2018–2021 (-16.91%). OOP rose at an AAPC of 3.46%, with faster phases in 1995–2002 (5.69%) and 2010–2018 (5.74%), then a 2018–2021 decline (-2.16%). DAH was volatile (AAPC 3.43%) with alternating declines (1995–2003 − 8.02%, 2006–2013 − 21.03%) and surges (2003–2006 34.31%, 2013–2021 33.55%). Per-capita THE increased modestly (AAPC 1.66%), concentrated in 1995–2001 (3.54%) and 2010–2017 (3.94%), before declining in 2017–2021 (-1.49%). Per-capita GHES grew with an AAPC of 1.67%, featuring slower 2001–2012 (0.09%) and a renewed 2012–2021 (2.43%) rise. Per-capita PPP was the fastest growing (AAPC 6.73%), led by a 2007–2013 surge (29.84%), but contracted after 2017 (-15.42%). Per-capita OOP grew slowly (AAPC 1.28%) with declines in 2002–2010 (-0.80%) and 2018–2021 (-3.68%). THE/GDP declined on average (AAPC − 0.69%), with downswings in 2002–2010 (-3.22%) and 2016–2021 (-3.75%), separated by a recovery in 2010–2016 (3.87%). GHES/GDP was broadly flat to declining (AAPC − 0.71%), with a drop in 2002–2010 (-3.17%). PPP/GDP increased (AAPC 4.15%) with a 2006–2014 surge (25.40%), but sharply contracted in 2017–2021 (-17.07%). OOP/GDP fell (AAPC − 1.20%) with early declines (2003–2009 − 4.72%) and a late contraction (2018–2021 − 7.37%). DAH/GDP remained essentially unchanged (AAPC 0.00% across 1998–2021). GHES’ share was stable overall (AAPC 0.14%), declining in 2007–2018 (-1.85%) before rising in 2018–2021 (7.75%). PPP share rose strongly (AAPC 4.90%) with 2007–2013 expansion (27.37%), then fell in 2018–2021 (-17.97%). OOP share declined modestly (AAPC − 0.37%) with a long-term drop in 2004–2015 (-0.95%) and a final decline in 2018–2021 (-2.54%). DAH share was highly volatile, with large swings (AAPC − 0.61%): early decline (1995–2003 − 12.53%), surge (2003–2006 34.95%), sharp fall (2006–2013 − 24.88%), and strong rebound (2013–2021 28.64%) (see Table 1 for the results of joint point analysis). Full-period CAGRs imply continued real expansion of THE (3.62%/year) to USD 52.04 billion by 2050, with PPP remaining the fastest-growing component (8.28%/year) and outpacing GHES (3.14%/year) and OOP (3.35%/year). The 2050 mix is characterized by a substantially larger PPP role (19.06%), reduced GHES share (26.55%), and still dominant but slightly lower OOP (53.76%). Per-capita spending rises (USD 319), yet THE/GDP remains 0.05%, indicating limited change in macro-fiscal footprint under baseline assumptions (see Fig. 6). Alternative scenario Model selection favored ARIMA(0,2,1) for THE (median MAPE = 1.41%, AICc = -77.65), ARIMA(3,1,0) for GHES (1.95%, -51.29), ARIMA(0,2,2) for PPP (4.83%, -41.34), and a parsimonious ARIMA(0,1,0) for DAH (20.98%, 21.78); all fitted on 1995–2017 with annual frequency. The scenario starts in 2017 at US$20.44 bn THE, with shares GHES 29.0%, PPP 11.4%, OOP 59.2%, DAH 0.5%; THE/GDP is 0.058% and THE per-capita US$207. By 2030, THE reaches US$42.80 bn (GHES 15.4%, PPP 15.7%, OOP 68.7%). The THE cap (US$52.04 bn) binds by 2040 and remains binding in 2050. Under the cap and ARIMA-implied component dynamics, PPP becomes dominant by 2050 (65.9% of THE), OOP declines to 21.2%, and GHES settles near 12.7%; THE/GDP eases to 0.050% and THE per-capita to US$319 (see Fig. 5). Fig. 5Projections of component shares under the alternative scenario Projections of component shares under the alternative scenario AAPC (2017–2050) indicates THE + 2.87%/yr, PPP + 8.50%/yr, modest OOP + 0.74%/yr, near-flat GHES + 0.20%/yr, and negligible DAH; for 2022–2050, AAPC turns negative for OOP (-0.90%/yr) while PPP remains rapid (+ 8.50%/yr). Financing composition trends show PPP share rising by ~ + 1.43 pp/yr (2017–2050) and OOP share falling by ~-0.95 pp/yr (GHES − 0.47 pp/yr, DAH ~ 0). Compared with the broader 1995–2021 joinpoint baseline (THE AAPC ~ 3.85%, PPP ~ 8.77%, OOP ~ 3.46%, GHES ~ 3.86%). See Table 2 for a comparison of our model and the GBD model. See Table 2; Fig. 6 for a comparison of the composition of health expenditure in 2050 of different scenarios. Fig. 6Prediction of total health expenditure in Egypt by 2050 and its composition under the GBD and the alternative scenarios Prediction of total health expenditure in Egypt by 2050 and its composition under the GBD and the alternative scenarios Table 1Joinpoint Analysis of Health Spending in Egypt (1995–2021); standard errors are Newey-West HAC (lag = 2). DW = Durbin-Watson statistic; BG = Breusch-Godfrey LM test p-value (2 lags); White = White test p-valueMeasureJoinpointAAPCSegments (Years)APC (95% CI)THE total (USD)33.85%1995–20015.68% (4.82–6.55)2001–20102.39% (1.92–2.86)2010–20176.37% (5.71–7.04)2017–20210.16% (-1.22 to 1.56)GHES total (USD)23.86%1995–20015.36% (3.75–6.99)2001–20122.48% (1.78–3.17)2012–20214.56% (3.59–5.54)PPP total (USD)38.77%1995–20077.71% (6.80–8.63)2007–201430.07% (28.20-31.97)2014–20180.25% (-2.79 to 3.39)2018–2021-16.91% (-21.02 to -12.59)OOP total (USD)33.46%1995–20025.69% (5.12–6.27)2002–20101.47% (1.07–1.88)2010–20185.74% (5.28–6.20)2018–2021-2.16% (-3.61 to -0.68)DAH total (USD)33.43%1995–2003-8.02% (-12.74 to -3.04)2003–200634.31% (18.67–52.01)2006–2013-21.03% (-25.11 to -16.73)2013–202133.55% (27.24–40.16)THE per-capita (USD)31.66%1995–20013.54% (2.70–4.39)2001–20100.09% (-0.37 to 0.55)2010–20173.94% (3.29–4.59)2017–2021-1.49% (-2.84 to -0.12)GHES per-capita (USD)21.67%1995–20013.46% (1.87–5.08)2001–20120.09% (-0.59 to 0.78)2012–20212.43% (1.47–3.39)PPP per-capita (USD)36.73%1995–20075.02% (3.70–6.36)2007–201329.84% (26.58–33.19)2013–20175.35% (0.74–10.17)2017–2021-15.42% (-19.79 to -10.80)OOP per-capita (USD)31.28%1995–20023.54% (2.95–4.13)2002–2010-0.80% (-1.22 to -0.38)2010–20183.36% (2.89–3.83)2018–2021-3.68% (-5.19 to -2.15)THE (% GDP)3-0.69%1995–20020.65% (-0.02 to 1.33)2002–2010-3.22% (-3.71 to -2.72)2010–20163.87% (3.13–4.62)2016–2021-3.75% (-4.76 to -2.74)GHES (% GDP)2-0.71%1995–20020.42% (-0.91 to 1.77)2002–2010-3.17% (-4.09 to -2.25)2010–20210.40% (-0.35 to 1.16)PPP (% GDP)34.15%1995–2006-0.22% (-1.60 to 1.18)2006–201425.40% (23.04–27.81)2014–20170.65% (-5.19 to 6.85)2017–2021-17.07% (-21.55 to -12.33)OOP (% GDP)3-1.20%1995–20030.49% (-0.03 to 1.01)2003–2009-4.72% (-5.27 to -4.16)2009–20181.88% (1.45–2.31)2018–2021-7.37% (-8.84 to -5.88)DAH (% GDP)10.00%1995–19980.00% (0.00–0.00)1998–20210.00% (0.00–0.00)GHES’ share of THE30.14%1995–2004-0.41% (-0.96 to 0.15)2004–20071.80% (0.39–3.22)2007–2018-1.85% (-2.25 to -1.45)2018–20217.75% (5.78–9.75)PPP share of THE34.90%1995–20073.71% (3.08–4.35)2007–201327.37% (25.85–28.92)2013–2018-1.03% (-2.73 to 0.71)2018–2021-17.97% (-20.80 to -15.04)OOP share of THE3-0.37%1995–20040.26% (-0.04 to 0.56)2004–2015-0.95% (-1.18 to -0.72)2015–20182.08% (1.03–3.15)2018–2021-2.54% (-3.86 to -1.21)DAH’s share of THE3-0.61%1995–2003-12.53% (-16.94 to -7.89)2003–200634.95% (19.50-52.39)2006–2013-24.88% (-28.70 to -20.87)2013–202128.64% (22.68–34.89)THE = Total Health Expenditure; GHES = Government Health Expenditure; PPP = Prepaid Private; OOP = Out-of-Pocket; DAH = Development Assistance for Health; AAPC = Average Annual Percent Change; APC = Annual Percent Change; CI = Confidence Interval Table 1Joinpoint Analysis of Health Spending in Egypt (1995–2021); standard errors are Newey-West HAC (lag = 2). DW = Durbin-Watson statistic; BG = Breusch-Godfrey LM test p-value (2 lags); White = White test p-valueMeasureJoinpointAAPCSegments (Years)APC (95% CI)THE total (USD)33.85%1995–20015.68% (4.82–6.55)2001–20102.39% (1.92–2.86)2010–20176.37% (5.71–7.04)2017–20210.16% (-1.22 to 1.56)GHES total (USD)23.86%1995–20015.36% (3.75–6.99)2001–20122.48% (1.78–3.17)2012–20214.56% (3.59–5.54)PPP total (USD)38.77%1995–20077.71% (6.80–8.63)2007–201430.07% (28.20-31.97)2014–20180.25% (-2.79 to 3.39)2018–2021-16.91% (-21.02 to -12.59)OOP total (USD)33.46%1995–20025.69% (5.12–6.27)2002–20101.47% (1.07–1.88)2010–20185.74% (5.28–6.20)2018–2021-2.16% (-3.61 to -0.68)DAH total (USD)33.43%1995–2003-8.02% (-12.74 to -3.04)2003–200634.31% (18.67–52.01)2006–2013-21.03% (-25.11 to -16.73)2013–202133.55% (27.24–40.16)THE per-capita (USD)31.66%1995–20013.54% (2.70–4.39)2001–20100.09% (-0.37 to 0.55)2010–20173.94% (3.29–4.59)2017–2021-1.49% (-2.84 to -0.12)GHES per-capita (USD)21.67%1995–20013.46% (1.87–5.08)2001–20120.09% (-0.59 to 0.78)2012–20212.43% (1.47–3.39)PPP per-capita (USD)36.73%1995–20075.02% (3.70–6.36)2007–201329.84% (26.58–33.19)2013–20175.35% (0.74–10.17)2017–2021-15.42% (-19.79 to -10.80)OOP per-capita (USD)31.28%1995–20023.54% (2.95–4.13)2002–2010-0.80% (-1.22 to -0.38)2010–20183.36% (2.89–3.83)2018–2021-3.68% (-5.19 to -2.15)THE (% GDP)3-0.69%1995–20020.65% (-0.02 to 1.33)2002–2010-3.22% (-3.71 to -2.72)2010–20163.87% (3.13–4.62)2016–2021-3.75% (-4.76 to -2.74)GHES (% GDP)2-0.71%1995–20020.42% (-0.91 to 1.77)2002–2010-3.17% (-4.09 to -2.25)2010–20210.40% (-0.35 to 1.16)PPP (% GDP)34.15%1995–2006-0.22% (-1.60 to 1.18)2006–201425.40% (23.04–27.81)2014–20170.65% (-5.19 to 6.85)2017–2021-17.07% (-21.55 to -12.33)OOP (% GDP)3-1.20%1995–20030.49% (-0.03 to 1.01)2003–2009-4.72% (-5.27 to -4.16)2009–20181.88% (1.45–2.31)2018–2021-7.37% (-8.84 to -5.88)DAH (% GDP)10.00%1995–19980.00% (0.00–0.00)1998–20210.00% (0.00–0.00)GHES’ share of THE30.14%1995–2004-0.41% (-0.96 to 0.15)2004–20071.80% (0.39–3.22)2007–2018-1.85% (-2.25 to -1.45)2018–20217.75% (5.78–9.75)PPP share of THE34.90%1995–20073.71% (3.08–4.35)2007–201327.37% (25.85–28.92)2013–2018-1.03% (-2.73 to 0.71)2018–2021-17.97% (-20.80 to -15.04)OOP share of THE3-0.37%1995–20040.26% (-0.04 to 0.56)2004–2015-0.95% (-1.18 to -0.72)2015–20182.08% (1.03–3.15)2018–2021-2.54% (-3.86 to -1.21)DAH’s share of THE3-0.61%1995–2003-12.53% (-16.94 to -7.89)2003–200634.95% (19.50-52.39)2006–2013-24.88% (-28.70 to -20.87)2013–202128.64% (22.68–34.89)THE = Total Health Expenditure; GHES = Government Health Expenditure; PPP = Prepaid Private; OOP = Out-of-Pocket; DAH = Development Assistance for Health; AAPC = Average Annual Percent Change; APC = Annual Percent Change; CI = Confidence Interval Joinpoint Analysis of Health Spending in Egypt (1995–2021); standard errors are Newey-West HAC (lag = 2). DW = Durbin-Watson statistic; BG = Breusch-Godfrey LM test p-value (2 lags); White = White test p-value THE = Total Health Expenditure; GHES = Government Health Expenditure; PPP = Prepaid Private; OOP = Out-of-Pocket; DAH = Development Assistance for Health; AAPC = Average Annual Percent Change; APC = Annual Percent Change; CI = Confidence Interval Table 2Prediction models GBD vs. machine learning model for 2050Metric (2050)GBD ModelAlternative scenario model (1995–2017)Total Health Expenditure (THE, USD)52,044,87952,044,879 (cap enforced)GHES (USD)13,815,383 (26.6%)6,609,317(12.7%)PPP (USD)9,919,106 (19.1%)34,316,174 (65.9%)OOP (USD)27,977,240 (53.8%)11,020,002 (21.2%)DAH (USD)333,150 (0.6%)99,386 (0.5%)THE per-capita (USD)319319GHES per-capita (USD)8540.51PPP per-capita (USD)61210.34OOP per-capita (USD)17167.55THE = Total Health Expenditure; GHES = Government Health Expenditure; PPP = Prepaid Private; OOP = Out-of-Pocket; DAH = Development Assistance for Health Table 2Prediction models GBD vs. machine learning model for 2050Metric (2050)GBD ModelAlternative scenario model (1995–2017)Total Health Expenditure (THE, USD)52,044,87952,044,879 (cap enforced)GHES (USD)13,815,383 (26.6%)6,609,317(12.7%)PPP (USD)9,919,106 (19.1%)34,316,174 (65.9%)OOP (USD)27,977,240 (53.8%)11,020,002 (21.2%)DAH (USD)333,150 (0.6%)99,386 (0.5%)THE per-capita (USD)319319GHES per-capita (USD)8540.51PPP per-capita (USD)61210.34OOP per-capita (USD)17167.55THE = Total Health Expenditure; GHES = Government Health Expenditure; PPP = Prepaid Private; OOP = Out-of-Pocket; DAH = Development Assistance for Health Prediction models GBD vs. machine learning model for 2050 THE = Total Health Expenditure; GHES = Government Health Expenditure; PPP = Prepaid Private; OOP = Out-of-Pocket; DAH = Development Assistance for Health Discussion According to GBD estimates, Egypt’s THE rose from USD 7.37 billion in 1995 to USD 20.71 billion in 2021 and is projected to reach USD 52.04 billion by 2050, reflecting steady real growth (CAGR = 3.6%, AAPC = 3.85%). Observed growth accelerations in 1995–2001 and 2010–2017 were driven by economic expansion and policy-led increases in health spending [2, 17, 35, 36]. Based on the 2001–2002 National Health Accounts (NHA) report, THE was estimated at 6.1% of GDP, up from 3.7% in 1994–1995, nearly doubling with rising service costs and private-sector demand [2, 35, 36]. Although health spending outpaced GDP growth between 2010 and 2017, its share of GDP has since stagnated due to macroeconomic adjustments, inflationary pressures, transitional policy adjustments (e.g., Egypt’s UHI Law (2018)), and COVID-19 disruptions that affected both service volumes and real prices [15, 17, 35, 37–39]. The most recent “Egypt’s health strategy for 2024–2030” plan aims to achieve an OOP of 28% or less by 2030, which neither the GBD scenario nor our alternative scenario predicts. A marked structural transformation in the composition of Egypt’s health financing sources is observed across scenarios. Historically, PPP grew fastest (AAPC = 8.8%) and is projected to reach 19.1% of THE by 2050 under the GBD baseline, while GHES declines to 26.6% and OOP, though slightly reduced from 1995 levels, remains dominant at about 53–54%. On the other hand, under our alternative pre-COVID ARIMA scenario, PPP is projected to increase to 65.9%, with GHES dropping to 12.7% and OOP to 21.2%, indicating a successful transition toward a predominantly privately prepaid system. Our joinpoint analysis further indicates that PPP activity in Egypt has fluctuated, with sharp expansions between 2007 and 2014 and a relatively small rise later, highlighting its sensitivity to economic and regulatory changes. The expected acceleration of PPP health spending arises from several key drivers. First, Egypt’s 2018 UHI Law, part of Vision 2030, aims to establish a new health insurance system aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 3, achieving nationwide mandatory coverage by 2030 and attracting significant public and private investment [15–17, 39]. Second, the private health insurance (PHI) market has expanded rapidly; premiums rose from EGP 740 billion in 2012 to EGP 5.9 billion in 2022 and are projected to reach about US$491 billion by 2025 [40]. In addition to government initiatives to increase private sector participation, alongside regulatory reforms, are expected to transform the PHI landscape [36]. Abouelmaged et al. reported that PHI coverage is forecast to expand from 5% to 29% of the population within a decade, accompanied by a shift from duplicate to complementary insurance models, and greater regulation replacing open competition [41]. Third, supply-side factors, including rising private investment, which accounted for 42% of total healthcare investment (EGP 9.3 billion in FY2018–2019), have expanded capacity, with further growth expected over the next decade, driven by increased healthcare mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity in 2020 and Q1 2021 [42]. Finally, demand-side dynamics, particularly changes in household purchasing power and preferences, have reinforced this trend, as 65% of the poorest rural Egyptian households seek care from private facilities for better amenities and shorter waiting times, despite higher costs and increased risk of catastrophic expenditure [7]. Similarly, regional evidence from Kampala, Uganda, shows that households are willing to pay premiums for insurance plans that include private providers [43]. A critical dimension not fully captured in USD-denominated projections is Egypt’s exposure to currency devaluation and domestic inflation. Egypt experienced sharp currency depreciations in 2016 and 2022–2023, which, while keeping constant-USD figures stable, substantially reduced the real domestic purchasing power of health budgets and the affordability of imported pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. Households facing both high nominal OOP spending and eroding real incomes may experience worsening financial protection even when aggregate USD-denominated THE appears stable. Policymakers should complement USD tracking with domestic-currency and PPP-adjusted analysis, and ensure that UHI benefit packages and reimbursement rates are indexed to reflect real cost changes rather than nominal USD equivalents.Furthermore, both models project a declining public-financing share, from about one-third in the late 1990s to 26% (GBD) or 13% (ARIMA) by 2050, reflecting Egypt’s limited fiscal space and periodic macroeconomic adjustment policies prioritising deficit control over social-sector expansion [44, 45]. This suggests that the models capture a relative crowding-out of government spending by faster-growing private expenditures, particularly PPP and OOP spending, rather than an absolute reduction in public health budgets, which highlights the potential risks for equity and financial protection [8, 46]. Egyptians have historically faced one of the highest OOP health expenditures in the region, accounting for 60–70% of THE due to limited public financing for health benefit packages, coupled with factors such as growing insurance enrollment outpacing available funds, inadequate service quality, long waiting times, workforce shortages, outdated infrastructure, inadequate sanitation, and the predominance of private spending on pharmaceuticals, resulting in over 20% of households experiencing catastrophic health expenditures, higher than rates in countries like India and Bangladesh [14, 47, 48]. Catastrophic health expenditures (CHE), defined as OOP payments exceeding either 10% of total income or 40% of capacity to pay (non-food expenditure), with severity measured by the share of households surpassing a 20% (OOP-to-THE) threshold. Consistent with a 2015 survey of rural Egyptian households, 7.91% experienced CHE, with the highest incidence among the poorest households (14.59%). Using a heteroskedastic probit model, private hospital use was the strongest predictor of CHE (+ 0.39), and household composition further influenced risk, with larger households and those with higher proportions of females (+ 0.08), elderly (+ 0.03), and sick members (+ 0.06) being more vulnerable, whereas households with more wage earners (-0.27) and educated members (-0.33) were relatively protected. Additionally, the presence of chronic illness and an illiterate household head significantly increased the risk of CHE by 0.10 and 0.04, respectively, whereas employment status reduced it by 0.07 [7]. Furthermore, despite its intended purpose, health insurance provided limited protection, reducing the probability of CHE by only 0.04, while coverage was low (68.25% of household heads uninsured, despite 71.64% having at least one chronic disease) and inequitable, increasing from 15% among the poorest to 52.2% among the richest quintile. Notably, even households using public or insurance-affiliated hospitals faced substantial CHE risk, with OOP spending dominated by pharmaceuticals (54.7%) and followed by outpatient services (38.7%) [7]. CHE is closely tied to the performance of the health system and the effectiveness of its insurance mechanisms. Widespread CHE and the resulting impoverishment are common in countries with weak health systems, insufficient social welfare programs, and poor economic conditions. Features of the health sector, such as services available at high cost and limited coverage, can further exacerbate financial burden [49]. Research shows that the effects of health insurance coverage depend on benefits package design, as plans with limited coverage, high co-payments, and low reimbursement increase the risk of CHE [50, 51]; for instance, in India and Kenya, coverage is restricted, Indian schemes cover only hospital expenses and Kenyan plans only inpatient bed costs, leaving most care to OOP payments and raising CHE, whereas in Argentina, private insurance with broad benefits provides stronger protection against CHE than social schemes [52, 53]. Thus, unplanned inpatient care can be costly and quickly deplete household resources, while over the long term, outpatient services and medication expenses, especially for those with chronic illnesses, account for a large share of health spending. Households that use inpatient services face a higher risk of CHE, particularly when they seek care in private hospitals [54]. Such financial strain can push families into poverty by diverting income from essential needs or discourage them from seeking necessary healthcare until a condition is far advanced, making treatment more complex and costly [53, 55–57]. Besides, the inadequate government spending which forces families to bear the full financial burden of healthcare, hence the interaction of high OOP expenditures with low GHES, further amplifies poverty; for example, a 1% increase in this combined effect is associated with a 0.84% rise in poverty in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2022 [8]. According to Biltagy’s 2005 case study, 0.5% of Egyptians lived in extreme poverty (<$1.90/day) based on total household consumption, but excluding OOP health payments raised this to 0.6%, representing a 20% increase, and over time, extreme poverty estimates have risen by an average of 30% when accounting for such payments [13, 14]. Likewise, health payments have pushed 14% of Philippine households, 20,000 people in Mongolia, 1.3 billion in Nigeria, 1.48 billion in Kenya, 32.5 billion in India (1999–2000), and, between 2007 and 2010, doubled the number of Turks living below the poverty line [58–62]. Projection models suggest only partial improvement, with the GBD scenario keeping OOP payments dominant, indicating limited progress in financial risk pooling and protection, while the ARIMA scenario projects OOP spending falling to around 21%, due to expanded PPP arrangements, but this rapid shift toward privatized prepaid financing, if left unregulated, risks segmentation and adverse selection, and could exacerbate health coverage inequities, benefiting wealthier, urban populations while leaving lower-income groups dependent on underfunded public services with limited access and poorer outcomes [14, 63], Experiences from other middle-income countries suggest that such unregulated privatization may worsen disparities despite apparent improvements in financial protection [63]. Therefore, both projections underscore the need to enhance healthcare financing efficiency by increasing public funding and reducing fragmentation through Egypt’s 2018 UHI Law, which aims to lower high OOP payments and CHE by covering all family members and supporting the poor through the state budget, with full coverage for all Egyptians gradually implemented in six phases, completing by 2032, and once fully implemented, its budget is expected to exceed the current THE, increasing THE as a share of GDP [2, 15–17, 39]. Additionally, Egypt’s UHI separates payers and providers, allowing both public and private providers to participate, a model successfully implemented in countries like Finland to promote cost control, efficiency, responsiveness, and competition [64]. By encouraging competition between providers, the system improves service quality, strengthens patient choice, aligns services with patient needs, and ensures efficient resource allocation, while motivating lower-quality providers to enhance care to attract patients and increase income [2]. While PHI currently covers only a small share of Egypt’s population and healthcare financing, under UHI, it could complement the public scheme by providing complementary (CHI) and supplementary (SHI) health insurance coverage instead of duplicating services [41, 65, 66]. The transition from Egypt’s old health insurance system to the new Comprehensive Health Insurance fundamentally shifts the coverage model from the individual to the entire family, changing the deduction base from a nominal basic wage to the employee’s total gross income. Under the old system (Law 79 of 1975), an employee paid a negligible 1% of their basic salary solely for their own coverage, leaving dependents without automatic health benefits and forcing families to rely heavily on out-of-pocket expenses. In contrast, the new system significantly increases the monthly financial deduction by mandating contributions based on the breadwinner’s total gross income: 1% for the employee, a substantial 3% for a non-working spouse, and 1% for each child (whereas working spouses independently contribute 1% from their own salaries). Ultimately, while this new structure noticeably reduces the employee’s net take-home pay compared to the past, it trades the previous nominal fees for a robust medical safety net that guarantees comprehensive healthcare for the entire household. Nonetheless, the planned healthcare system reforms will face significant challenges due to the substantial budget required to fully implement UHI for the entire Egyptian population, a challenge also observed in other countries like Tunisia, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, where financing remains a major barrier even in wealthier settings [67–69], and reflected in China’s 2009 reforms toward UHC by 2030, which demonstrate that achieving full implementation is demanding and resource-intensive yet still feasible for large populations [70]. Moreover, higher premiums are likely to raise beneficiary expectations regarding service quality and coverage, and the transition from a unified payer-provider structure introduces administrative complexity, though experiences from countries with similar models may provide useful guidance [2]. For instance, UHI operates effectively, to a certain degree, in well-performing systems such as the UK, Germany, France, and Canada [71], while Iran’s expansion of rural health insurance, currently covering about 90% of its population, shows that increased coverage alone is insufficient, as insured rural households still experience higher rates of CHE than the uninsured, with 49.2% incurring debt, 21.7% selling jewellery, and 15.9% using savings to pay for care [72]. These results highlight that expanding insurance coverage must be accompanied by sufficient financial protection for all necessary health services, as well as accessible, good-quality care that reduces reliance on the private sector. Development assistance for health (DAH) played a minor and highly unstable role throughout the period, marked by sharp drops, intermittent rebounds, and a projected decline to below 1% of THE by 2050, whose volatility reinforces that Egypt cannot rely on it for medium-term financing decisions or UHI sustainability and must strengthen domestic revenue and pooling mechanisms [2, 8, 73]. The decline in DAH is consistent with middle-income transitions and highlights the central role of domestic fiscal capacity and prioritised public spending in achieving equitable UHC [74, 75]. Collectively, our alternative scenario trained on pre-2017 data (excluding pandemic and post-2017 shocks) shows that long-term projections are highly sensitive to the training period and to whether recent shocks are treated as transitory or structural, yielding an outcome in which PPP dominates by 2050 and GHES contracts, thereby highlighting that policy expectations about the future, including UHI’s impact on OOP, are influenced by financing choices and private-sector dynamics, as well as by methodological and sample-selection decisions that significantly determine long-range projections, making scenario exercises tools for contingency planning rather than prediction. This first study spans three decades of retrospective trends and three more of forward-looking projections, harmonising multiple authoritative inputs within the GBD Health Financing framework. Taken together, the findings highlight four key policy priorities for advancing UHI and reducing catastrophic OOP in Egypt: (1) increase and dedicate public financing for core UHI benefits to ensure equitable pooling, particularly for the poor and informal sectors; (2) guide PPP growth through regulation, risk-adjusted pooling, standardized benefits, and limits on user charges to prevent inequitable access; (3) strengthen financial protection monitoring and target OOP reduction, aiming for international targets (15–20% of THE); and (4) plan with fiscal realism and flexibility, aligning ambitious coverage goals with resource constraints, investing in health infrastructure, lowering OOP costs, and implementing income- or employment-based insurance schemes to protect households from OOP-driven poverty. Our interpretation is bounded by the data and modelling choices described in the present study. Key limitations relevant to interpretation include reliance on model-based estimates that may differ from national series; forecasts contingent on macro-demographic assumptions; uncertainty bands not propagated through growth and segmentation estimators (central estimates used); scenario exercises that do not model behavioural responses, policy feedbacks, or endogenous fiscal adjustment. Volatility in DAH and measurement error in source databases may further affect component-level precision, and any future reforms (e.g., UHI implementation details, benefit design, and purchasing) could shift trajectories beyond those captured here. Conclusion This study applied segmented log-linear joinpoint regression with Newey-West HAC standard errors to GBD Health Financing estimates for Egypt (1995–2021), complemented by ARIMA-based projections under a pre-COVID alternative scenario, to characterize historical trend inflections and project health spending composition to 2050. Egypt has experienced real growth in health spending since 1995, but financing composition is shifting toward PPP sources while OOP remains the dominant source of payments. Joinpoint analysis identified three to four distinct growth phases for most components, with PPP showing the fastest long-run expansion (AAPC 8.8%). Projections show that without intentional policy action, the OOP target of 28% by 2030 set by Egypt’s Health Strategy 2024–2030 will not be achieved under either scenario, representing a critical policy gap. The growing reliance on PPP may help mitigate the OOP burden, but combined with the declining GHES share, poses uncertain effects on equity and financial protection. The country’s UHI ambitions will require targeted public funding, regulatory oversight of PPP expansion, and ongoing monitoring of household financial risk. Regarding policy implications: policymakers should (1) commit dedicated public financing to UHI core benefit packages; (2) regulate PPP growth through standardized benefits and limits on user charges; (3) implement OOP monitoring benchmarked against the 15–20% WHO threshold; and (4) adopt income-based premium adjustment to protect poor households from catastrophic expenditure. Regarding study limitations and future research directions: this study relies on GBD model-based estimates that may diverge from national accounts; projections are conditioned on macro-demographic assumptions and do not model behavioral responses or policy feedbacks. Uncertainty intervals were not propagated through segmentation estimators. HAC standard errors mitigate but do not fully resolve inference limitations under structural change. Future research should cross-validate with National Health Accounts data, apply time-varying parameter models to capture post-UHI structural breaks, and evaluate equity implications using household survey data.