Rwanda’s National Reference Laboratory Operational Capacity during the 2024 Marburg Virus Disease Outbreak Response Authors: Noel Gahamanyi, Naasson Tuyiringire, Jerome Ndayisenga, Emmanuel Kabalisa, Etienne Kayigi, Therese Mukankwiro, Esperance Umumararungu, Raissa Muvunyi, Jean Pierre Musabyimana, Edouard Ntagwabira, Agnes Gasengayire, Sadiki Nkubito, Clarisse Murebwayire, Laetitia Irankunda, Eliane Kamanzi, Odette Sharangabo, Jean Claude Semuto Ngabonziza, Emmanuel E S Francis, Isabelle Mukagatare, Claude Mambo Muvunyi Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractBackgroundRwanda reported its first Marburg virus disease (MVD) outbreak in September 2024. This study presents an assessment of Rwanda’s National Reference Laboratory Operational Capacity during the 2024 Marburg Virus Disease Outbreak Response.MethodsThe assessment was conducted using the World Health Organization laboratory assessment tool for viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) diagnostic capacity. This was complemented by an evaluation of various laboratory quality indicators like the turnaround time (TAT). Data were collected through direct observation, documents’ review, and interviews with laboratory staff. Descriptive analysis of key response activities and observations was conducted using Microsoft Office (Excel). Also, the map of testing sites was drawn using QGIS 3.40.0 software.ResultsThe NRL’s response to the MVD outbreak achieved an overall score of 98%. All components scored 100% except for the quality of the laboratory system, which scored 89% due to the lack of External Quality Assessment (EQA) for MVD. Key achievements during the outbreak response included (i) reduction in the turnaround time (TAT) from sample reception to releasing results from 24 to 7 h, (ii) the recruitment of more laboratory staff supporting sample collection, transportation, testing and results reporting, (ii) creation of five new MVD testing sites, (iii) training of laboratory staff, (iv) digitalization of the laboratory flow, and (v) establishing a 24/7 telephone line for easy communication with laboratories on MVD suspected samples being processed.ConclusionThe strong performance of the NRL highlights its robust laboratory system, which allowed effective testing of MVD suspected cases. We recommend implementing an EQA scheme for VHF diagnostics in Rwanda, including the MVD. Also, improving measures for biosafety, biosecurity, and infection prevention and control in all health facilities would reduce the risk of such infections in the future.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s40794-026-00308-0.Keywords: Marburg virus disease, Outbreak, Response, Quality management system, National Reference Laboratory, Rwanda Background Marburg virus disease (MVD) is a deadly zoonotic viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) that is transmitted from the fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) to humans and can spread between humans through direct contact [1]. The disease is caused by Marburg virus (MARV) and Ravn virus, which belong to the genus of Orthomarburgvirus [2]. The disease is characterized by a high case-fatality rate (CFR) that can reach up to 90% but early diagnosis and patient care increase survival likelihood [3–5]. The first known outbreak of MVD was identified in Germany and Serbia in 1967. Since then, multiple outbreaks have been reported in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These include outbreaks in Angola (2004–2005), Uganda (2017), Ghana (2022), Equatorial Guinea (2023), and recurrent outbreaks in Tanzania (2023 and 2025) [6–9]. The occurrence of MVD outbreaks in SSA has been associated with environmental and occupational exposures that may facilitate human contact with natural reservoir hosts, especially the Egyptian fruit bats. On 27 September 2024, the Government of Rwanda officially declared the country’s first confirmed case of MVD outbreak [2, 10]. The outbreak was later linked to fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) from a mining cave and phylogenetic analysis found that it was closely related to a 2014 Ugandan case [2]. In total, 66 cases were confirmed including 15 deaths with a case-fatality rate (CFR) of 22.7%. This CFR was the lowest among all MVD outbreaks previously reported elsewhere, possibly due to the country’s rapid response and advances in patient care [4, 11]. In total, seven of Rwanda’s 30 districts (Gasabo, Gatsibo, Kamonyi, Kicukiro, Nyagatare, Nyarugenge, and Rubavu) were affected by the Marburg virus outbreak [11]. The outbreak was officially declared over on 20 December 2024 [11]. The high transmissibility and CFR of MVD require a rapid and robust response from health bodies, including early identification of cases; however, African countries face difficulties in the timely diagnosis of VHF outbreaks [12]. MVD typically presents with fever, headache, muscle pain, rash, nausea, vomiting, and in severe and complicated cases, haemorrhagic syndrome [13]. In general, clinicians cannot rely on clinical manifestations for the diagnosis of the patients since MVD symptoms resemble those of other infectious diseases common in Africa, such as malaria [14, 15]. Therefore, access to high quality laboratory diagnostics ensures that only confirmed cases are included in case counts, thereby enabling more targeted response efforts [16]. Nonetheless, the need for laboratories with higher biosafety levels to diagnose MVD restricts the ability to decentralize testing services and requires responding laboratories to implement high-level quality management systems [17]. Good laboratory management systems promote diagnostic capacity, which enhances the laboratory response to outbreak control. In 2024, several outbreaks of VHFs occurred in SSA, including Dengue fever, Ebola Virus disease, Yellow fever, and Rift valley fever [18, 19]. Despite the documentation of these multiple VHFs outbreaks in SSA, there is limited evidence regarding the quality of responses of reference laboratories. Indeed, the available evidence has been largely confined to detection methods, particularly the application of real-time PCR (RT-PCR) techniques during the 2022 MVD outbreak in Ghana [20], or response strategies, such as the creation of mobile laboratories during the 2023 MVD outbreak in Tanzania [21]. The NRL, a division of Rwanda Biomedical Centre (RBC) oversees the quality of diagnostic laboratory services country-wide and plays a key role in outbreak response through testing for the efficient disease management and surveillance [22, 23]. In 2024, before the MVD outbreak, NRL was re-accredited to the ISO 15189 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), confirming its competent quality management system [24]. The ISO 15189 requirements are fundamental to effective outbreak response, as they ensure laboratory testing is accurate, reliable, and consistent, enabling timely diagnoses and guiding informed public health interventions. To the best of our knowledge, neither the effectiveness nor the implementation processes of laboratory-based responsive approaches guided by international standards have been reported to inform the public and policy makers on the best laboratory practices. To address this gap, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed a laboratory assessment tool (LAT) for VHFs, designed to evaluate laboratory responses during outbreaks [25, 26]. This tool gathers information across various indicators, including coordination and management, quality of the laboratory system, and human resources. Therefore, this study aimed at conducting an operational assessment of Rwanda’s National Reference Laboratory Operational Capacity During the 2024 Marburg Virus Disease Outbreak Response. Methods Study design and setting This descriptive study was conducted at the NRL in Rwanda and data were collected between September and November 2024 during the MVD outbreak in Rwanda. The NRL confirmed MVD in patients with VHF symptoms using the RealStar® Filovirus Screen RT-PCR Kit 1.0 (Altona Diagnostics, Hamburg, Germany) and sequencing as previously described [2]. During the outbreak, the NRL was responsible for the coordination of laboratory diagnosis of the MVD among suspected cases. It also coordinated the training of laboratory staff on sample collection, biosafety and biosecurity. Data collection Data were collected using a WHO-developed laboratory assessment tool for the diagnostic capacity of VHF, which is freely available at the Institutional Repository for Information Sharing (IRIS) platform of the WHO [26]. This tool collects data on seven sections and a total number of 67 indicators related to the response capacity for VHF testing, including the quality of the laboratory system, coordination, and laboratory information management. However, Serology EQA was not evaluated. Data were collected by two authors, JN and EESF, who were the staff of Africa CDC at the time of data collection; hence, external to the NRL settings. Information was collected mainly through observation within the laboratory and reviewing the laboratory documents, such as quality management records, and supply history. The reviewed documents included protocols at NRL (SOPs and guidelines), office documents (human resources recruitment files and contracts), guidelines, training materials and financial records (donation files and purchasing history). Whenever needed, laboratory staff were interviewed to obtain clarification on the purpose and the way action was taken. However, this was not a structured interview, and it was only used to understand and verify the data quality. Indicators that were fully met were scored as one, those that were partially met were graded as 0.5, and those that were not met in any way were graded as zero. Indicators that were not applicable were not scored. All assessors conducted the evaluation together, and they used peer debriefing to decide score to each indicator. Data analysis and presentation After the data were recorded in the Excel file, the sum of points for each section was calculated and divided by its total number of points to find the percentage. Microsoft Excel was used for data analysis. QGIS 3.40.0 software was used for precise mapping of the MVD testing sites in Rwanda. Observations made during the laboratory visits and other recorded information are described below. Results The average indicator score for all criteria was 98%. All sections of the WHO laboratory assessment tool for VHF scored 100%, except for the quality of the laboratory system, which scored 89% as no external quality assessment (EQA) for MVD was performed (Fig. 1). Details of the scoring can be found on the Supplementary File 1. The observations that were recorded during data collection are described below. Assessment results of the sections evaluated for the National Reference Laboratory response to the MVD outbreak. All sections scored 100%, except for the quality of the laboratory system, which scored 89% Coordination and management The coordination scored 100% for the seven indicators. The score was based on the responses including having a dedicated division (NRL) under the Ministry of Health in charge of health laboratory coordination. It has a specific budget for outbreak response in collaboration with various partners for the management of procurement of equipment and supplies. Structure and organization The score for this section was 100% for the assessed indicators. The NRL oversaw the laboratory testing and quality of laboratory network throughout the country as a member of the command post. To reduce the MVD testing TAT, five additional MVD testing sites were activated in all the provinces of Rwanda. These new MVD testing sites included the University Teaching Hospital of Butare (CHUB) in Southern province, Rwanda Military Referral and Teaching Hospital (RMRTH) in Kigali City, Rwamagana Level Two Teaching Hospital (RL2TH) in Eastern Province, Gihundwe District Hospital (GDH) in Western Province, and Ruhengeri Level Two Teaching Hospital (RL2TH) in Northern Province (Fig. 2). These sites are part of the existing laboratory network under the supervision of the NRL. They were selected based on their capacity to accommodate high testing volumes, to host equipment for MVD testing with area for inactivation, and to be strategically located relative to other health facilities. Marburg virus disease testing sites during 2024 Rwanda outbreak. In addition, to NRL, five testing laboratories were activated. CHUB in Southern Province, RMH in Kigali city, RPH in Eastern Province, GDH in Western province, and RL2TH in the Northern Province Both NRL and other testing sites use the same QMS. They were designed to meet biosafety requirements for Biosafety Level 3 where glove boxes were used for inactivating samples before downstream processing. All the five laboratories received at least three additional staff from the NRL, and they operated under the hospital and NRL management. At each site, the NRL deployed its staff to train hospital staff for sample collection and management and then coordinate MVD testing services. A daily report on the number of tests performed, kits, and reagents was provided to the management of NRL. The establishment of new MVD testing sites reduced the workload at the NRL and allowed timely testing of the suspected cases nearer to their residency, reducing challenges and risk associated with sample transportation. The health facilities sent the samples to the nearest or most convenient MVD testing sites. After the MVD outbreak, those new testing sites did not continue to provide routine services, but NRL was committed to revising their structure and responsibilities, so that they could provide advanced testing and support local outbreak surveillance in future. In addition to MVD testing sites, three treatment centers were created, which were Nyamata Level Two Teaching Hospital (NL2TH), Baho International Hospital (BIH), and Gatsata Health Center (GHC). Suspected cases (contacts) were hosted at Kanyinya Health Center. These treatment centers served for regular monitoring of the MVD status on a daily testing by PCR. The NRL has an existing sample referral system used to transport HIV samples requiring viral load (VL) testing from different health facilities to twelve testing hubs distributed throughout the country. The five MVD testing sites are among those HIV VL hubs. Once the five testing sites were activated, the existing sample referral system was revised to refer samples to the nearest testing site (Fig. 3). Overview of the Revised Sample Referral System for Testing Sites. RMH was used as a backup for the NRL. Cross signs in the centres refer to the MVD testing sites while the round points indicate hospitals referring samples to each MVD testing site Although internal quality control (IQC) systems have been established in Rwanda, including the testing of quality control samples every time samples were tested, there was no external quality assessment (EQA) for MVD. While NRL has been participating in various EQA programs, there was no EQA program for MVD by the time the assessment was done. Regulations This section scored 100% and deals with having regulations for handling dangerous pathogens like Ebola. It also assessed the existence of regulations for import or export of such pathogens. Quality of laboratory system The NRL and the laboratory network fulfilled the requirements for the assessed indicators except for the EQA. Thus, the overall score was 89%. While NRL has been participating in various EQA programs, there was no EQA program for MVD by the time the assessment was done. However, an internal quality control (IQC) has been conducted to increase the reliability of obtained results. The NRL started responding to the MVD outbreak using the available stock of reagents and consumables. Existing preparedness at NRL for VHF outbreaks included keeping stock of kits for testing potential pathogens, such as MVD. This facilitated quick laboratory diagnosis after identification of suspected cases, and allowed continual testing before receiving more resources. After the declaration of the MVD outbreak on 27 September 2024 [27], the Ministry of Health (MoH) established strategies to mobilize more resources, as it was expecting a shortage in the following days. The MoH highlighted the significance of direct response by the government of Rwanda which allocated specific funds for MVD outbreak response. As a result, NRL purchased laboratory supplies and reagents through Rwanda Medical Supplies (RMS) Ltd. The declaration of an MVD outbreak raised the attention of the international organization such as the World Health Organizations, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) and Africa CDC, which collaborated with the MoH to strengthen response through multiple pillars, including the laboratory one for diagnostic capacity. Within one week after the declaration of the outbreak, NRL started to receive personal protective equipment (PPE), reagents, and materials from international organizations and partners. The WHO provided glove boxes, which facilitated the establishment of new testing sites. Moreover, national and internal partners provided more testing kits and offered training sessions to manage the MVD outbreak in the laboratory network. The presence of a stable supply chain management system at NRL, including the availability of a cold chain and transportation system, facilitated the distribution of supplies to the new MVD testing sites. In the first week of the outbreak (27 September to 4 October 2024), the turnaround time (TAT) of MVD testing was 24 h. Since 5 October 2024, the NRL started to use the Health Management Information System (HMIS) in recording all the steps from sample reception to results release. This significantly resulted in the reduction of the TAT from 24 h to seven hours. This reduction in TAT can also be attributed to the recruitment of more laboratory workers, the procurement of more testing kits, and decentralization of testing to five more testing sites. Although the NRL had facilities in place to respond to VHF and had prior readiness to Ebola virus disease (EVD) testing, there was no MVD testing algorithm or teaching aids. Laboratory scientists started to develop testing algorithms and teaching aids, which were distributed to health facilities to guide health professionals with diagnostic information. Laboratory information management This section also scored 100%, with all indicators fully met. Every requirement or criterion used to evaluate it was satisfied. After the declaration of the MVD outbreak, NRL, with the support of the digitalization team at the MoH, customized the health management information system (HMIS) to set up the MVD workflow from sample collection to the release of results. The system was made user-friendly, with similar configurations to the system used in Rwanda during COVID-19 pandemic, so that the laboratory staff and other healthcare providers can use without a special training. The health facilities sending patient samples for MVD testing were required to enrol patient details in the HMIS system by generating a patient code. The HMIS was coordinated at RBC to track sample collection and processing. The NRL staff deployed at all testing sites had access to sample information, and they used the same system to report the results, which were made available to health facilities that sent the MVD suspected samples. This allowed cross-checking and identification of many samples in a short time. This also facilitated tracking of (i) the TAT from the time from sample reception to results release, (ii) the status of the sample after reaching the laboratory, and (iii) data analysis. This inspired the creation of other testing sites and further resource mobilization to reduce the TAT. The NRL, in collaboration with the digitalization team at the MoH, developed the HMIS protocol to maintain high-quality data and to avoid difficulties for laboratory workers in using the system (Fig. 4). This protocol details HMIS-related action to be taken during sample collection, processing, and testing. The digitalization team maintained the system configuration for the future use whenever the similar outbreak could surface. Health Management Information System (HMIS) dashboard. It shows the number of suspected cases vs. age category, total samples vs. status of testing, samples tested at each site NRL provided daily reports showing the status of the outbreak, including de-identified data on the number of new individuals who tested positive or cleared the infection, which was made available to the public through the website of RBC and the social media channels of the MoH. The leadership of RBC and NRL collaborated closely with stakeholders, including the WHO, the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This allowed the exchange of knowledge on the MVD outbreak response, where the team that had been responding shared the learned lessons, and international organizations supported capacity building and resource mobilization. Infrastructure The section scored 100%. The NRL started a response to the MVD outbreak by leveraging an existing infrastructure established for COVID-19, EVD, Rift Valley fever, and other epidemic-prone diseases [28, 29]. The laboratory testing rooms were renovated and flow set to meet the required standards for MVD testing. High-containment equipment, advanced molecular diagnostics capability, specimen handling and transport were strengthened. Also, High computing servers, uninterrupted power supply (UPSs), super-computers, vehicles were sourced from different partners to supporting the MVD response. Human resources This section scored 100%. After the declaration of an MVD outbreak, the leadership of RBC through the NRL recognized the need to strengthen the surveillance system by testing all suspected MVD cases. This required the rapid recruitment of laboratory workers to reduce working pressure from NRL staff and prepared the testing team to process a high number of samples in a relatively short time, meeting biosafety and biosecurity. The recruitment followed the guidelines for the Ministry of Public Services and Labour. The priority was given to staff who previously contributed to Covid-19 response. Other criteria included being a licensed biomedical laboratory scientist. To avoid systematic shortage of staff from other levels of health systems, the public servants who were employed in other health facilities were not allowed to leave their current employed and join the national MVD response. Recruitment of a multidisciplinary team, including laboratory and data scientists, enabled NRL to exercise good laboratory practices (GLPs) and promote the quality of the data, which are instrumental to preparedness for and response to future outbreaks. To avoid disruption of MVD testing services, laboratory workers were distributed in working shifts. Hence, the high-quality procedures and short TAT were maintained regardless of the sample reception time. The laboratory workers were divided into working teams with specific responsibilities, including teams for sample reception, processing, testing, and results reporting. Since the laboratory staff had no prior experience in responding to the MVD outbreak, the management of NRL organized training sessions, focusing on the biosafety and quality management systems related to MVD testing. All staff participating in the handling of infectious materials were trained on donning, doffing, and waste management. To generate high-quality bioinformatics data, another team was trained on whole-genome sequencing (WGS), which allowed genomic characterization of MVD positive samples. Moreover, the collaboration between NRL and the Uganda Viral Research Institute (UVRI) facilitated the training of NRL staff on the serology of MVD, which provided further evidence on the source of the outbreak. Biorisk management The Biosafety and Biosecurity is overseen by the RBC through the NRL. This section achieved a score of 100%, indicating full compliance with biosafety and biosecurity requirements. NRL and established five sites meeting BSL-3 standards were available for VHF handling, with strict protocols including sample decontamination using bleach, inactivation in a glove box, and RNA extraction under controlled conditions. Wastes were autoclaved before disposal and biosafety cabinets were regularly certified. Only specially trained personnel handled MVD samples, and laboratory waste was autoclaved continuously (24/7) to ensure safe disposal. Also, NRL has an upgraded its biobank to secure long term storage of positive samples. For specimen collection and transport, samples were collected by NRL staff or trained personnel in health facilities as per the specific SOP. Following the outbreak declaration, the NRL conducted nationwide training on safe sample collection to reduce infection risks among healthcare workers. Facilities were equipped with triple packaging systems and dedicated transport vehicles ensured timely and secure delivery of samples. The NRL maintained a strong biobanking and biosecurity system, guided by standard operating procedures and strict access control for authorized personnel only. All processes adhered to infection prevention and biosafety guidelines, demonstrating alignment with national and international standards for laboratory safety, specimen transport, and outbreak response. Discussion The 2024 outbreak of MVD in Rwanda highlights critical aspects of laboratory preparedness and response as observed through this study. The findings of this study demonstrate a high level of functional laboratory readiness, reflected in the overall score of 98%. The response was facilitated by several key factors, including combined effect of strong and organized laboratory structure, coordination, infrastructure, and Human Resource. All these factors significantly contributed to the faster response of the laboratory system to the MVD outbreak. The swift response to the MVD outbreak can be attributed to the existing organizational structure and a coordinated system. The National Reference Laboratory (NRL), operating under the Rwanda Biomedical Centre, ensured centralized leadership, while its Laboratory Services Coordination and Quality Assurance Unit facilitated efficient linkage between central and peripheral health facilities. Furthermore, the experience from previous outbreaks including the COVID-19 and Mpox set a solid foundation for effective laboratory management of outbreaks. The laboratory system achieved an overall score of 98%. This was mainly due to strong quality management system ensuring adherence to SOPs, staff training, and compliance with ISO 15189 accreditation standards. NRL is accredited for ISO 15189 achieved in 2020, and renewed in 2024 [24, 30]. Preparedness measures, including procurement of reagents and consumables, allowed immediate and uninterrupted testing, while a stable supply chain and strong government and partner support ensured continuous availability of resources. Another key factor contributing to the MVD response, was the reduction testing TAT from 24 to 7 h, achieved through several coordinated changes rather than a single intervention. Testing was decentralized to five regional laboratories, newly recruited and trained staff were deployed to support peripheral sites, improved sample transport and coordination mechanisms, and the implementation of the HMIS digital reporting system. The introduction of the HMIS digital reporting system also helped speed up communication of results. By bringing testing closer to treatment and isolation centers and easing the workload on the NRL. The establishment of testing capacity closer to treatment and isolation sites also contributed to reduced delays in specimen referral, consistent with observations from previous outbreak settings where decentralization improved diagnostic timeliness [31]. These combined efforts significantly reduced delays and improved the overall speed of diagnosis. One important gap identified was the absence of EQA for MVD diagnostics, which resulted in the only non-perfect domain score. Successful performance of EQA support the comparability of results with different testing methods and provide confidence in generating accurate and reproducible results [32, 33]. Moreover, EQA enables the laboratories to improve testing systems because poor performance requires the implementation of corrective actions [34]. Currently, no PT scheme for Marburg EQA has been established, except one study that selected a few laboratories [35]. Although there was absence of EQA provider for MVD during the outbreak, the NRL maintained result accuracy through established internal quality controls (IQCs) and prior participation in other EQA schemes covering Tuberculosis, HIV, and malaria [36]. This finding is important in interpreting the overall high score, as it highlights that strong IQC indicators should be complemented with participation in international EQA programs. The recruitment of additional laboratory staff strengthened the human resource capacity and faster response to the MVD outbreak. The rapid scale-up of laboratory capacity during the MVD outbreak underscores the importance of flexible workforce strategies and targeted training in laboratory response. The strategic recruitment of additional laboratory staff who previously responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, continuous training in biosafety protocols, alongside structured team organization and shift work, ensured safe, efficient processing of a high volume of samples while maintaining short TAT. These findings align with previous studies demonstrating that targeted training and rapid workforce expansion improve biosafety compliance, staff competency, and overall laboratory performance during outbreaks [37, 38]. The customized health management information system (HMIS) played a pivotal role in managing outbreak-specific data in a confidential way. It allowed for efficient tracking of samples and facilitated better communication among healthcare providers, significantly improving patient outcomes. The transparent daily reporting of outbreak status not only kept the public informed but also involved various stakeholders in the ongoing response efforts. A previous study stressed the importance of laboratory information systems in ensuring confidentiality and allowing a quick outbreak response through linking laboratory data with epidemiological, demographic, and clinical data [30]. However, these observations are descriptive and reflect operational functionality rather than measured impacts on clinical outcomes.For the biorisk management, the findings showed that the Rwanda Biomedical Centre (RBC), through the National Reference Laboratory (NRL), maintained strong biosafety and biosecurity systems, achieving full compliance with required standards. The availability of five BSL-3 laboratories, strict decontamination procedures, continuous autoclaving of waste, certified biosafety cabinets, and handling of MVD samples by specially trained personnel demonstrated high preparedness for VHF management. These findings align with the study by Siddig et al. [38], which reported that the Rwandan NRL successfully handled thousands of Marburg virus samples without any laboratory-acquired infections due to strict biosafety and biosecurity measures. The study further emphasized the importance of continuous training, adherence to safety protocols, and investment in laboratory infrastructure to strengthen outbreak preparedness and prevent transmission. This study faced some limitations worth mentioning. First, the evaluation was conducted during an ongoing MVD outbreak, which may have influenced data completeness and depth of analysis. Data collection relied on direct observation, document review, and brief unstructured staff interviews conducted while laboratory personnel were actively engaged in outbreak response activities. This context may have introduced observer bias, time constraints, and potential social desirability bias in staff responses, and may have limited the full capture of rapidly evolving operational processes. Second, the absence of an established external quality assessment (EQA) provider for Marburg virus disease limited opportunities to independently assess and benchmark laboratory testing performance during the outbreak response. Last, as this was a single-country study conducted in Rwanda, the findings may have limited generalizability to other settings with different laboratory systems and resource contexts. The rarity of MVD and the limited availability of comparable studies also restricted broader contextual comparison. Conclusion The study provides an operational assessment of the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) response to the 2024 Marburg virus disease (MVD) outbreak in Rwanda. The findings demonstrate strong laboratory performance across most assessed indicators, supported by existing quality management systems, rapid operational adjustments, and expanded testing capacity. Key improvements, including reduced turnaround time and decentralized testing, were observed in the context of multiple concurrent interventions. The absence of External Quality Assessment (EQA) for MVD diagnostics represents an important gap and limits interpretation of the high overall performance score. Strengthening EQA systems for viral haemorrhagic fevers, alongside continued investment in laboratory preparedness, coordination, and biosafety practices, remains essential for future outbreak response. We recommend strengthening EQA and proficiency testing for VHF investment in laboratory preparedness and biosafety. Supplementary Information Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. Supplementary Material 1 Supplementary Material 2 Acknowledgements Authors thank the management of the National Reference Laboratory for its cooperation and support during this study. Author contributions NG, TN, JN, and EESF developed the study concept and design. JN and EESF were responsible for data collection, data analysis, and drafting the original manuscript. NG, NT, and CMM critically reviewed and revised the manuscript. NG, NT, JN, EK, EK, TM, EU, RM, JPM, EN, AG, SN, CM, LI, EK, OS, JCSN, EESF, IM, CMM reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript. Funding This study did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Data availability Data generated are included in the manuscript. Further details can be obtained nby contacting the corresponding author. Declarations Ethical approval and consent to participate This study was conducted as part of an operational laboratory assessment initiated by the Rwanda Biomedical Centre (RBC) during the 2024 MVD outbreak. An institutional waiver of ethical approval was granted by RBC, as the activity was classified as a public health service evaluation conducted for outbreak response and laboratory performance improvement. Participation in the assessment was voluntary, and verbal informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to interviews, observations, and document review activities. All data were collected and analyzed in aggregated form, and no personal identifiers were recorded during interviews, observations, or document review. Confidentiality of laboratory staff information and institutional records was strictly maintained throughout the assessment. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Contributor Information Noel Gahamanyi, Email: noel.gahamanyi@rbc.gov.rw. Claude Mambo Muvunyi, Email: claude.muvunyi@rbc.gov.rw. References Associated Data Supplementary Materials Supplementary Material 1 Supplementary Material 2 Data Availability Statement Data generated are included in the manuscript. Further details can be obtained nby contacting the corresponding author.