Ebola Bundibugyo resurgence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Implications for regional surveillance and preparedness Authors: Ayan Abdullahi Mohammed, Salma Zubair Mohamud, Aniso Mohamed Abdi, Abdirahman Mohamed Adan, Yakub Burhan Abdullahi Published: 2026 Dear Editor, On 15 May 2026, the confirmation of a new Ebola Bundibugyo virus outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents a significant regional public health threat requiring urgent cross-border action across the Great Lakes and East African subregion.1 Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is caused by Bundibugyo ebolavirus, one of four ebolaviruses known to infect humans, and has shown lower case-fatality than Zaire ebolavirus but substantial mortality and sustained transmission potential.2,3 In Uganda, a pooled case-fatality ratio (CFR) of 24.8% was estimated for Bundibugyo ebolavirus compared with 44.6% for Sudan and 100% for Zaire ebolavirus outbreaks.3 The 2012 BVD outbreak in Isiro, northeastern DRC, caused 38 confirmed cases and 34% lethality among confirmed cases.2 Retrospective sequencing revealed earlier emergence than previously recognized and challenged the assumption of a single spillover event, underscoring surveillance and detection limitations in eastern DRC.2 Recurrent EVD outbreaks in eastern DRC occur in a context of intense cross-border mobility with Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Sudan and other states, making importation a persistent risk.4,5 Population displacement, informal trade corridors and chronic insecurity weaken health system reach and hamper case finding.4,5 Diagnostic delays have been shown to increase outbreak-level CFR in Uganda; each additional day from first case report to specimen collection was associated with an approximate 3.8 percentage-point increase in CFR, highlighting the consequences of delayed laboratory confirmation.3 Despite prioritization of EVD within DRC's Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system, persistent delays in outbreak detection and weak response capacity in eastern provinces demonstrate gaps in IDSR operationalization and cross-border coordination.4 Countries neighboring DRC have benefited from preparedness investments, yet shortfalls include limited operational cross-border collaboration, vertical surveillance pillars, dependence on external support, and missed opportunities to institutionalize community-based surveillance and interoperable data systems.4 Earlier regional outbreaks in DRC and Uganda were judged a major East African concern due to cross-border activities, with WHO noting structural weaknesses in health management systems and political insecurity.5 In light of the current Bundibugyo resurgence, several measures are urgent. First, cross-border surveillance should be strengthened through fully implemented IDSR with community-based surveillance at porous border points, joint risk assessments, and harmonized case definitions between DRC and neighboring states.4,5 Second, real-time genomic sequencing capacity must be expanded in-country and at regional reference laboratories to support rapid identification of transmission chains and distinguish new spillovers from ongoing transmission, as demonstrated by large-scale genomic surveillance during the Nord Kivu outbreak.6 And by retrospective BDBV sequencing in Isiro.2 Third, community-based surveillance and rapid reporting should be scaled up in conflict-affected and remote areas, building on lessons from neighboring countries where IDSR revitalization improved timeliness and completeness of reporting.4 Fourth, rapid deployment of diagnostics and multidisciplinary response teams, including mobile laboratories and point-of-care platforms, is essential to minimize diagnostic delays known to worsen mortality.3,5 Finally, regional data-sharing mechanisms under WHO AFRO and Africa CDC should be strengthened to ensure near-real-time exchange of epidemiologic, laboratory, and genomic data, and to coordinate cross-border contact tracing and vaccination strategies where applicable.5 In conclusion, the current Bundibugyo outbreak in eastern DRC must be approached as a regional emergency that tests the maturity of IDSR, genomic surveillance, and cross-border coordination architectures. Sustained investment in interoperable surveillance, laboratory networks, and joint preparedness beyond the outbreak cycle is essential to prevent delayed detection, cross-border spread, and avoidable mortality in the Great Lakes and East African region. CRediT authorship contribution statement Ayan Abdullahi Mohammed: Conceptualization, Data curation, Supervision, Validation. Salma Zubair Mohamud: Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Aniso Mohamed Abdi: Conceptualization, Data curation, Software, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Abdirahman Mohamed Adan: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Yakub Burhan Abdullahi: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Supervision, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Ethical approval This study did not involve any human or animal subjects, and thus, did not require review by an Institutional Review Board (IRB). Ethical approval Not applicable. Source of funding The authors have not been recipients of any funding for this specific study. Not applicable. Declaration of competing interest The authors have no conflict of interest to declare. Contributor Information Ayan Abdullahi Mohammed, Email: Ayaancabdullahi@st.snu.edu.so. Salma Zubair Mohamud, Email: Salmaqurux048@gmail.com. Aniso Mohamed Abdi, Email: Anisamaxamed@st.snu.edu.so. Abdirahman Mohamed Adan, Email: abdiradam6@gmail.com. Yakub Burhan Abdullahi, Email: yakub@st.snu.edu.so. Data availability No data was used for the research described in the article. References Associated Data Data Availability Statement No data was used for the research described in the article.