Stewardship without walls: taming the unregulated antibiotic economy to contain antimicrobial resistance in Ethiopia Authors: Balew Arega, Asnake Agunie Published: 2026 ABSTRACT Ethiopia’s unregulated private antibiotic economy spans private hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, drug shops and informal vendors. It drives resistance through three forces: intergenerational self-medication (reservoir habit), a satisfaction imperative linking sales to customer retention, and a corner drugstore calculus prioritising immediate access over cheaper but slow public care. Non-prescribed dispensing becomes the norm and selects resistant bacteria. We propose a six-pillar framework: tiered accreditation, point-of-service education, supply chain engagement, mystery client support, technology enabled consultation and operational research. This stewardship without walls is an urgent priority for Ethiopia and similar settings. Introduction This perspective synthesises evidence from peer-reviewed literature, government reports, and international organisation documents published. We searched PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar using combinations of the terms: Ethiopia, antibiotic, AMR, private sector, pharmacy, drug shop, informal vendor, self-medication, and over-the-counter. We prioritised studies from Ethiopia and supplemented with evidence from other low- and middle-income countries where Ethiopian data were sparse. The theoretical framework was developed iteratively based on the synthesis of this evidence. Ethiopia’s private health sector now delivers a substantial share of patient care, with an estimated range of 33% to 48% of health facilities and pharmacies privately owned, and drug stores comprising the majority of medicine retail outlets nationwide1,2. As of 2023, Ethiopia has ~23,000 private pharmacies and drug shops, 5600 private clinics and hospitals, and tens of thousands of informal medicine vendors, together accounting for an estimated 54–67% of all antibiotic transactions nationally3. Ethiopia’s health workforce density remains critically low, with approximately 0.96 physicians and 1.2 nurses per 10,000 population—substantially below the WHO threshold of 4.45 health workers per 1000 population needed for universal health coverage. This scarcity drives patients toward private and informal outlets as default options4. Over the past two decades, this expansion has outpaced regulatory oversight, particularly in urban areas. Meanwhile, public health programmes, including those addressing AMR, remain largely oriented toward public facilities. Regulatory and stewardship frameworks have lagged behind this shift. Consequently, a pluralistic and largely unregulated antibiotic economy has emerged, what we term the “unregulated antibiotic economy” as a conceptual label, recognising that regulations exist but are poorly enforced, spanning private hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, drug shops, general stores, and itinerant vendors—all integrated into a single healthcare-seeking pathway where patients move fluidly between sectors based on convenience, cost, and perceived need5. Ethiopian studies have now quantified this problem across multiple regions. A multicentre simulated client study reported non-prescribed antibiotic dispensing in the vast majority of visits to drug retail outlets6. A systematic review and meta-analysis found that self-medication with antibiotics is the norm, with community pharmacies as the primary source7. Regional studies confirm that over-the-counter sales for childhood illnesses exceed 60% in the capital, and unlicensed providers account for a substantial share of antibiotic access in rural areas8,9. In Ethiopia, as in many low-income countries, care-seeking for common illnesses follows a simple economic logic: the total cost of treatment includes not only the price of medicines but also lost wages, transport, and uncertainty about service availability. When a daily labourer calculates that a day spent in a public facility queue means a day without income, the higher price of an antibiotic from a corner shop can become the rational choice. This calculation—what we term the corner‑drugstore calculus—drives millions of antibiotic transactions outside the public sector each year. In our previous analysis of typhoid-by-default in Ethiopia’s public health system, we showed that empirical diagnosis without confirmatory testing drives inappropriate antibiotic use in public facilities. That work also identified the private sector as a ‘parallel, unregulated antimicrobial economy’ that remained unexplored10. In this perspective, we analyze Ethiopia’s unregulated antibiotic economy across the full spectrum of private actors and propose a six-pillar framework of stewardship without walls to contain antimicrobial resistance. Theoretical framework To systematically understand why Ethiopia’s under-regulated antibiotic economy persists, we draw on three behavioural science constructs. First, cultural schemas explain the reservoir habit, whereby repeated antibiotic use becomes internalised as a routine, intergenerational script for illness management11. Second, principal-agent theory illuminates the satisfaction imperative, describing how providers (agents) prioritise customer satisfaction over professional guidelines to retain business and income12. Third, the behavioural economics of scarcity underpins the corner-drugstore calculus, demonstrating how poor households rationally prioritise immediate certainty (a guaranteed antibiotic today) over delayed, uncertain savings (a cheaper but time-consuming public sector visit). Together, these constructs inform our intervention logic throughout13. The full spectrum of the unregulated economy Ethiopia’s private health sector is not monolithic. It spans a spectrum of outlets with varying degrees of formality, training, and oversight, each playing a distinct role in the antibiotic economy and each requiring tailored engagement. At the formal end, private hospitals and clinics—ranging from small ambulatory centres to large urban hospitals—are licensed, staffed by trained clinicians, and nominally operate under established rules and regulations. As they operate within a competitive market, clinical decision-making could be influenced by patient satisfaction, which is closely tied to revenue. Evidence from northern Ethiopia indicates that, although overall antibiotic prescribing rates were similar between public and private clinics, patients in private clinics were twice as likely to receive antibiotics that do not follow guidelines and 30 times as likely to receive branded products, reflecting commercial pressures and patient expectations14. Studies from Addis Ababa further show that prescriptions in private facilities often lack diagnostic and prescriber information, preventing effective audit, and that behavioural factors, such as patient demand, profit motives, and weak regulatory enforcement, drive inappropriate dispensing more strongly than provider knowledge alone15,16. Moving down the formality ladder, community pharmacies and drug shops often serve as the first point of contact for illness in local communities, offering convenience, familiar services, and flexible credit arrangements that formal health facilities cannot match. From the perspective of these outlets, self-prescription of antibiotics—highly prevalent in Ethiopia at approximately 46% (35.7%–56.6%)—represents both a demand-driven service and a business opportunity17. At the most informal end of the spectrum are itinerant vendors, operating from roadside tables, bus terminals, and market stalls, who supply antibiotics in single doses or incomplete blister packs. These vendors cater primarily to the most marginalised clients, including daily labourers, recent migrants, and those with limited time and financial resources, reflecting both market demand and structural gaps in formal healthcare access. Perhaps the most overlooked category—and one of the most significant for antibiotic access—is the vast network of general merchandise shops and kiosks that stock medicines alongside household goods. These outlets are unlicensed to sell any medicines, yet they commonly stock a limited range of antibiotics. In eastern Ethiopia, a substantial proportion of antibiotic access occurs through unlicensed providers and informal sellers8. Operating in a regulatory grey zone, they are tolerated because they provide essential access in underserved areas. Three drivers of the unregulated economy To understand why this diverse economy persists, it is necessary to move beyond simple explanations such as a lack of awareness or poor regulation. The under-regulated antibiotic economy is sustained by three deeply embedded forces operating at the levels of culture, social relations, and rational economic choice—forces that transcend the distinctions between formal and informal outlets. Antibiotic self-medication as a cultural script Antibiotic self-medication in Ethiopia is an ever-present reservoir habit, accumulated over decades and transmitted across generations18. For many families, managing common illness follows a familiar script: recognise fever, recall a previously used antibiotic, obtain it from the nearest private outlet, and recover—without consultation, waiting, or explanation. This sequence is efficient, predictable, and validated by repeated experience. Each successful outcome reinforces the script, and the habit is passed down through observation and instruction as practical, inherited wisdom for family survival19. Private pharmacies, drug shops, and informal vendors make this script executable. Unlike public facilities, which introduce queues, documentation, and possible denial, private outlets require no appointment and often no prescription. Each time a private pharmacy dispenses an antibiotic without a prescription and the patient recovers, the script is validated. Over time, families develop loyalty to specific outlets not for formal quality but for reliability and willingness to provide what is asked for. This creates a feedback loop: patient demand reinforces provider dispensing, which reinforces patient expectations. Asking a population to abandon this habit without changing access structures consistently fails, which is why knowledge-based interventions alone have not worked20. Effective stewardship must recognise that private facilities are not a separate problem to be regulated; they are the structural embodiment of the antibiotic habit itself. Changing the habit requires reshaping the incentives and access structures that private facilities provide. The satisfaction imperative Across the entire spectrum of private outlets, every provider depends on customer satisfaction for their livelihood. This creates what we term the satisfaction imperative—the overwhelming pressure to prioritise customer retention over professional or ethical guidelines. When a patient presents with a pre‑formed expectation, often for a specific antibiotic or an injection, the provider faces a stark choice. Satisfying the expectation completes a transaction and builds a relationship; refusing risks losing that customer permanently to the next provider. In competitive markets, this pressure is intensified at every level, from private hospitals and clinics competing for paying patients to pharmacies competing with unlicensed shops and vendors competing for prime locations. The provider who consistently refuses requests risks losing business, as qualitative studies confirm14. The commercial pressure to satisfy patients is well documented16,21. A 2025 behavioural study in Addis Ababa confirmed that “Emotional and Social Dynamics”—encompassing patient pressure and fear of losing customers—was a powerful predictor of dispensing behaviour, outweighing knowledge alone. One participant captured the logic succinctly: “Some say, ‘If I do not dispense, another pharmacy will,’ so they give in” 22. Providers describe an impossible position: knowing that dispensing without a prescription or prescribing unnecessarily is wrong, yet facing patients who become angry or leave when refused. The immediate, certain cost of refusing outweighs the distant, diffuse cost of contributing to resistance. Notably, providers with longer experience are less likely to dispense appropriately, suggesting that repeated exposure to commercial pressures erodes adherence over time16. Despite the majority of pharmacy professionals knowing that dispensing without a prescription is illegal and contributes to resistance, a large proportion still engage in the practice—a direct manifestation of the satisfaction imperative overriding professional knowledge23. A 2025 behavioural study further found that stronger professional ethics were paradoxically negatively correlated with appropriate dispensing, indicating that individual ethical commitment is systematically overridden by financial and competitive realities22. The corner drugstore calculus Private sector care is substantially more expensive than public sector care, yet patients consistently choose it. Understanding this requires moving beyond the sticker price to the total economic cost of care—a calculation that reveals the rationality of apparently irrational behaviour. The public sector option, while offering cheaper or free services, carries substantial hidden costs. A visit typically consumes a full day or more. Travel may require multiple forms of transport. Queues consume hours. Laboratory investigation, if available, adds further waiting. For a daily wage labourer, this means a day without income—a cost that dwarfs the price of medication. Transport costs add substantially; round‑trip fares can exceed the price of medication. Opportunity costs accumulate as time away from work or childcare24. Uncertainty costs pervade: will the clinician be available? Will the laboratory have reagents? Will the pharmacy have stock? Stockouts and reagent shortages are frequent; a 2022 assessment found that only 30% of primary care facilities had consistent availability of essential antibiotics25,26. When these factors are summed, the apparently cheaper public option often becomes more expensive in real terms. The private transaction—whether at a clinic, pharmacy, shop, or from a vendor—offers predictability and control: the patient knows the cost upfront, the transaction is complete in minutes or hours, and they leave with a tangible product in hand. The price may be higher, but the outcome is guaranteed. We term this the corner-drugstore calculus—the economic logic whereby individuals rationally choose higher prices from whatever private source is most accessible because they minimise total transactional costs. Poor patients are not paying more for the drug or service; they are buying predictability and preserving wages6,24. This calculus is enabled by the ready availability of specific antibiotics in private outlets; studies show that amoxicillin, ciprofloxacin, and cloxacillin are commonly sold without prescription for conditions like upper respiratory tract infections, directly meeting the demand generated by the calculus27. Critically, Ethiopia’s community-based health insurance does not cover private facilities, so nearly all private care is paid out of pocket28. This arrangement pressures providers to satisfy patients and forces patients to weigh immediate costs against hidden costs—reinforcing the calculus that favours private antibiotic use even when not clinically indicated14,29. This phenomenon has been documented across multiple low-income countries, where patients consistently factor time and uncertainty into care-seeking decisions22. Underlying the demand for antibiotics is the reality of preventable infections. Ethiopia’s water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) coverage remains low, with only 9% of the population having access to basic handwashing facilities and 65% practising open defecation in some rural areas30. Similarly, routine vaccination coverage for childhood illnesses—including pneumonia-causing pathogens—stagnates below herd immunity targets in several regions31. These structural deficits generate a continuous stream of febrile illnesses for which antibiotics are sought. Without parallel investment in WASH infrastructure and vaccine coverage, demand for antibiotics—whether appropriate or not—will persist, undermining even the most effective stewardship interventions. These three drivers do not operate uniformly across the private sector. Rather, they manifest differently depending on the outlet type, shaping distinct patterns of inappropriate antibiotic access (Table 1).Table 1How the three drivers manifest across private sector outlets in EthiopiaOutlet typeReservoir habitSatisfaction imperativeCorner-drugstore calculusFormal facilities (private hospitals, clinics)Patients arrive with pre-formed expectations; clinicians reinforce the script by prescribing to maintain satisfaction.Refusal risks losing paying patients to competitors; commercial pressure overrides guidelines.Private care avoids public sector queues, stockouts, and lost wages; predictability justifies a higher cost.Licensed retail (community pharmacies, drug shops)Self-medication script executed directly; providers become script enablers; the first point of contact for most families“If I do not dispense, another will”—fear of losing loyal customers in competitive marketsQuick transaction; no appointment; known upfront cost; flexible credit arrangementsInformal vendors (general merchandise shops, itinerant sellers)Antibiotics purchased alongside household goods; script embedded in daily routine; intergenerational transmissionMinimal interaction; no professional constraints; the customer simply buys what they want without refusalLowest barrier to access; immediate possession; no travel or wage loss; serves the most marginalised Table 1How the three drivers manifest across private sector outlets in EthiopiaOutlet typeReservoir habitSatisfaction imperativeCorner-drugstore calculusFormal facilities (private hospitals, clinics)Patients arrive with pre-formed expectations; clinicians reinforce the script by prescribing to maintain satisfaction.Refusal risks losing paying patients to competitors; commercial pressure overrides guidelines.Private care avoids public sector queues, stockouts, and lost wages; predictability justifies a higher cost.Licensed retail (community pharmacies, drug shops)Self-medication script executed directly; providers become script enablers; the first point of contact for most families“If I do not dispense, another will”—fear of losing loyal customers in competitive marketsQuick transaction; no appointment; known upfront cost; flexible credit arrangementsInformal vendors (general merchandise shops, itinerant sellers)Antibiotics purchased alongside household goods; script embedded in daily routine; intergenerational transmissionMinimal interaction; no professional constraints; the customer simply buys what they want without refusalLowest barrier to access; immediate possession; no travel or wage loss; serves the most marginalised How the three drivers manifest across private sector outlets in Ethiopia The stewardship blind spot Ethiopia has made notable progress in establishing antimicrobial stewardship programmes within its public health facilities. The National Action Plan on AMR, now in its fourth iteration (2025), outlines ambitious goals, sentinel surveillance sites have been established, and training programmes have reached thousands of public sector health workers32. Yet this entire architecture shares a fundamental limitation: it is designed almost exclusively for the formal public sector, leaving the private landscape untouched. Importantly, stewardship for community‑based self‑medication differs fundamentally from hospital‑based provider‑mediated stewardship. In hospitals, interventions target prescribers with audit and feedback, formulary restriction, and pre‑authorisation33. In the community, they must target both dispenser behaviour and patient demand simultaneously, across a fragmented landscape of outlets34. Our framework focuses on the community and retail sectors, where the majority of inappropriate antibiotic access occurs. Facility‑based stewardship remains essential but is insufficient while a parallel community‑based bypass exists. This stewardship blind spot reflects the historical evolution of stewardship programmes in high-income countries, where antibiotic consumption is overwhelmingly provider-mediated and facility-based. The tools developed there—prospective audit and feedback, formulary restriction, pre-authorization—presuppose identifiable prescribers, patient records, and institutional accountability35. None of these conditions obtains across Ethiopia’s private sector. In private hospitals, prescriptions often lack prescriber information, making audit impossible36. In private clinics, the prescriber may be the sole proprietor with no oversight. In pharmacies and shops, there is no prescription at all. For vendors, there is no fixed location. Review of Ethiopia’s AMR policy documents reveals a striking pattern: the words private sector, private hospitals, private clinics, informal vendors, and over-the-counter sales are notable for their absence from stewardship strategies. When the private sector is mentioned, it is typically in the context of enforcement—raids, fines, closures—rather than engagement, support, or capacity building37. This enforcement-only approach has consistently failed; a 2024 assessment in Northwest Ethiopia found that regulatory inspections did not reduce non-prescription antibiotic dispensing, as providers adapted by hiding stock or increasing prices38. Enforcement simply pushes the market further underground, making it harder to monitor and more resistant to intervention. The antibiotics moving through this system originate from multiple sources: legitimate wholesalers, leakage from public supply chains, and cross-border trade along Ethiopia’s porous frontiers. The antibiotics moving through this system originate from multiple sources: legitimate wholesalers, leakage from public supply chains, and cross‑border trade along Ethiopia’s porous frontiers. A 2022 assessment of Ethiopia’s public pharmaceutical supply chain found that up to 18% of antibiotics procured for public facilities were unaccounted for at the point of service, suggesting diversion to private channels39. Additionally, informal cross-border trade with Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia—where regulatory oversight varies widely—supplements local supplies with antibiotics from multiple international manufacturers40. Once in the system, antibiotics move through redistribution networks, making them nearly impossible to regulate41. A critical additional blind spot is that national consumption data systematically exclude the private health sector, leading to a substantial downward bias in official estimates of antibiotic use42. The neglect of the private sector is increasingly recognised as a critical gap. In April 2024, a pioneering public-private partnership workshop convened by FAO, WHO, and WOAH brought together Ethiopian stakeholders to address this blind spot, developing concept notes for integrating private providers into AMR containment41. Yet this recognition has yet to translate into operational programmes at scale. Moreover, the neglect of the private sector undermines facility-based stewardship fundamentally. Patients who are denied antibiotics at a public clinic can walk to a private clinic, a corner pharmacy, or a neighbourhood shop and obtain them without restraint. The clinical decision to withhold antibiotics becomes meaningless when the same patient can immediately access them elsewhere. Antimicrobial stewardship cannot succeed at the facility level while the private sector operates as an unregulated bypass around every clinical gatekeeper43. A framework for intervention: stewardship without walls Punitive approaches—raids, fines, closures—have repeatedly failed across decades of experience in Ethiopia and other low-income countries. They drive markets underground and do nothing to address the reservoir habit, the satisfaction imperative, or the corner drugstore calculus. Effective intervention must instead co-opt, engage, and transform the entire private health sector, working with its logic rather than against it44. To address these gaps, we propose a six-pillar framework that operationalises stewardship without walls (Fig. 1). The framework is designed to work synergistically across the full spectrum of private actors, transforming incentives rather than simply enforcing compliance.Fig. 1The unregulated antibiotic economy and the stewardship without walls framework.Three drivers—reservoir habit, satisfaction imperative, and corner-drugstore calculus—fuel a self-perpetuating cycle of inappropriate antibiotic use across Ethiopia’s private sector. The six-pillar framework disrupts this cycle to contain AMR. The unregulated antibiotic economy and the stewardship without walls framework. Three drivers—reservoir habit, satisfaction imperative, and corner-drugstore calculus—fuel a self-perpetuating cycle of inappropriate antibiotic use across Ethiopia’s private sector. The six-pillar framework disrupts this cycle to contain AMR. Pillar 1: tiered accreditation for all private providers A voluntary accreditation programme, administered by regional health bureaus, creates a pathway to accredited status with standards tailored to each outlet type—from formal hospitals to general shops. Benefits include priority access to subsidised medicines, referral directory inclusion, and public recognition. Similar approaches have shown promise elsewhere: Uganda’s Drug Shop Accreditation Programme improved dispensing practices45, and Tanzania’s accredited drug dispensing outlets reduced unnecessary antibiotic sales for malaria-like fevers46. This pattern is not unique to Africa. In Southeast Asia, studies from Indonesia and Vietnam have documented similarly high rates of non-prescription antibiotic dispensing through community pharmacies and drug sellers, with patient demand and commercial pressure identified as dominant drivers47,48. In South America, Brazil’s experience with informal medicine markets reveals that accreditation and supportive supervision—rather than punitive raids—reduced inappropriate antibiotic sales by 34% in pilot municipalities49. Ethiopia can learn from these diverse settings, which share similar health system constraints. Additional non-financial incentives—reduced inspection frequency, free continuing professional development courses on AMR, and Ministry of Health directory listing—further align commercial with public health interests. Pillar 2: point-of-service education for all settings Simple, practical tools at the moment of prescribing and purchase shift behaviour on both sides of the counter. For private hospitals and clinics: clinical algorithms and mandatory diagnosis fields on prescriptions. For pharmacies and drug shops: laminated flowcharts guiding responses to common presentations, providing a professional rationale to refuse inappropriate requests. By shifting the interaction from “the pharmacist is denying me” to “the clinical flowchart says no,” these tools reduce the social cost of refusal for the provider, directly countering the satisfaction imperative. For general shops: public recognition through window decals and community boards identifies outlets that have voluntarily ceased antibiotic sales entirely (“antibiotic‑free certified”). This certification—available only to shops that pass three unannounced inspections with no antibiotic stocks found—provides reputational benefit and community trust, creating a market incentive to exit antibiotic sales. A transition pathway of six months allows shops to sell existing stock before certification. In addition to point-of-service tools, accredited short courses (4–6 hours) on AMR and rational dispensing—delivered via mobile platform or at regional health bureaus—should be mandatory for accreditation under Pillar 1. These courses have been shown to improve knowledge and, when paired with supportive supervision, change behaviour44. Informal vendors, who may lack formal pharmacy training, require simplified picture-based modules delivered in local languages—for example, a single A4 sheet showing three common illness scenarios (fever with red flags, wet cough, diarrhoea) with a green “refer” arrow and a red “no antibiotic” symbol, using minimal written text beyond local language labels. Pillar 3: engaging the entire supply chain upstream Interrupting the flow of antibiotics to inappropriate outlets at the source offers significant leverage. Wholesalers and distributors—formal businesses with fixed locations—can be engaged as partners in stewardship. A confidential reporting mechanism allows them to flag suspiciously large orders that suggest diversion to informal markets. Leakage from public supply chains is a recognised pathway, with documented supply chain inefficiencies and diversion contributing to antibiotic availability in unregulated outlets in Ethiopia and similar settings. Participating wholesalers receive preferential treatment in public procurement. Crucially, this pillar must operate in tandem with strengthening public sector supply chain integrity; addressing leakage from public facilities is essential to prevent antibiotics intended for public use from entering the unregulated market. Similar approaches have shown promise in Uganda50. Pillar 4: mystery client and peer support across the spectrum Mystery client visits repurposed for support rather than punishment, provide accurate information about real practice while creating opportunities for constructive engagement. This approach has been successfully used in South Africa using mystery shoppers to determine practices pertaining to antibiotic dispensing without a prescription among community pharmacies50. Trained mystery clients present standardised scenarios to outlets; those responding appropriately receive positive feedback and recognition; those responding inappropriately receive targeted, non-punitive training. Repeated failures trigger escalating support, not punishment, with regulatory consequences only as a last resort. Data from mystery clients feed directly into the accreditation system, creating a continuous quality improvement cycle. Pillar 5: technology-enabled support for all providers Simple mobile technology extends clinical and informational support to providers who currently operate with none. A low-cost, scalable platform—such as a dedicated Telegram bot or an SMS-based service integrated with Ethiopia’s ubiquitous mobile money ecosystem (e.g., Telebirr)—allows providers to describe patient presentations and receive protocol-based guidance within minutes. The service is staffed by trained nurses or pharmacists using standardised protocols, with an option to escalate complex cases to human experts. Accredited providers receive priority access, and the service serves as a harm reduction measure even for informal vendors. Pillar 6: operational research for continuous adaptation This framework must be treated as a hypothesis to be tested. Operational research should accompany every intervention, asking what works, for whom, and under what conditions. Implementation science approaches—such as randomised stepped-wedge trials for rolling out tiered accreditation across regions—would provide robust evidence for scale-up. Rapid cycle evaluation, adaptive trial designs, and qualitative process evaluation can generate evidence for adaptation. Local research capacity built through partnerships will ensure that learning is sustained and applied. Conclusions The six-pillar framework we propose requires urgent operational testing. Future work should prioritise: (1) pilot implementation of tiered accreditation in two diverse Ethiopian regions (e.g., one urban, one rural) with randomised stepped-wedge evaluation; (2) mixed-methods research to understand how the corner-drugstore calculus varies across income strata and geographic settings; (3) development and validation of simple, culturally adapted point-of-service tools for informal vendors using picture-based formats; (4) cost-effectiveness analysis comparing supportive versus enforcement-only approaches; and (5) integration of private-sector antibiotic consumption data into national surveillance systems. Without these investments, the stewardship blind spot will continue to undermine Ethiopia’s AMR containment efforts. The question is not whether to engage the private sector, but how—and how quickly.